PEREZ

ARTICLE 11

1.

2. SOPLENTE V PEOPLE

3. PEOPLE V NARVAEZ

4. PEOPLE V CABALLERO

5. PEOPLE V CA AND TANGAN

6. PEOPLE V FERNANDEZ

7. PEOPLE V GENOSA

8. PEOPLE V CHUAHIONG

9. PEOPLE V TORING

10. TY V PEOPLE

11. BAXINELA V PEOPLE

12. POMOY V PEOPLE

13. PEOPLE V ANGCACO

14. TABUENA V SANDIGAN BAYAN

15. PEOPLE V BOHOLST CABALLERO

16. PEOPLE V SASMSON

1. SOPELENTE V PEOPLE

FACTS:

The cousins, Rogelio and Nicanor, watched the amateur singing contest being held near the Sta. Cruz Chapel. While engrossed with
the singing contest, they were approached by two persons from the group of Leyson who then tapped Nicanors shoulder. They insisted on
bringing Nicanor along with them so Nicanor called for Rogelios help. The latter immediately intervened to stop the two from harassing

Nicanor.

At about past eleven oclock in the evening (11:00 p.m.), before the conclusion of the amateur singing contest, Rogelio and Nicanor
decided to go home. At past midnight, Bukay (their cousins wife) asked Rogelio and Nicanor to accompany her in looking for her children who
had watched the singing contest.
They obliged but before they had gone about three hundred meters, Nicanor separated from them to buy cigarettes from a nearby
store. Rogelio and Bukay went onwards but at a distance of about fifty meters from the stage, Rogelio stopped and Bukay proceeded alone to

look for her children. A few minutes later, Bukay appeared with the children and they all headed home.
While on the way home, Rogelio suddenly found himself surrounded by around ten persons led by Leyson. He shouted at Nicanor to
run and the latter immediately scampered away. Leyson drew his gun and fired at Rogelio but the latter was able to parry it by tapping the
base of Leysons hand holding the gun. Forthwith, Rogelio stabbed Leyson once.
He was kicked by Notarte immediately after he stabbed Leyson. Rogelio also stabbed Notarte. Rogelio managed to escape after that
and he sought refuge in the house of Susing (their cousin).

Before dawn, a policeman arrived at Susings house and Rogelio voluntarily gave himself up. The knife he used was also turned over
to the police. He was brought to the police substation at Lagao.

ISSUE:

Whether or not our laws on self-defense are suppose to approximate the natural human responses to danger.

Decision:

At the commencement of the attack, Rogelio could not have been obliged to view Notarte, or any other member of the posse for that
matter, as a less menacing threat than Leyson. We have to understand that these events occurred spontaneously in a matter of seconds or
even simultaneously.
Rogelio bore no superhuman power to slow down time or to prevent the events from unfolding at virtual warp speed, to be able to assess with
measured certainty the appropriate commensurate response due to each of his aggressors.
Even those schooled in the legal doctrines of self-defense would, under those dire circumstances, be barely able to discern the legally
defensible response and immediately employ the same. Our laws on self-defense are supposed to approximate the natural human responses
to danger, and not serve as our inconvenient rulebook based on which we should acclimatize our impulses in the face of peril.

It would be wrong to compel Rogelio to have discerned the appropriate calibrated response to Notartes kicking when he himself was
staring at the evil eye of danger. That would be a gargantuan demand even for the coolest under pressure.
2.

2. PEOPLE v. NARVAEZ [121 SCRA 389 (1983)]

Nature: Appeal from decision of the CFI of South Cotabato

FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez
shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice
mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them
to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead. Defendant
lost his equilibrium, and shot Fleisher with his shotgun.
He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceaseds gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the
company of Fleischers family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of
property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to
be annulled).
At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On
June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didnt pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from
the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty.
Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1.

WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part
of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property.
On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil
code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to
the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question.
Its accepted that victim was the original aggressor.
2.

WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC
enumerates these requisites:
?
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellants property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez
6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaezs house and putting up fence. A536 of the CC
also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to
be respected in his possession

Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In case, killing was disproportionate to attack.

Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep

Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC.
These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation)
Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault wasnt
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill.
Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered
3 degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
3.

WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.

No. He isnt liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non-payment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of A39 applicable to fines only
& not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages & costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after
its commission, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect
pursuant to RPC A22.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4
mos. arresto mayor & to indemnify each group of heirs 4K w/o subsidiary imprisonment & w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already
been detained 14 yrs so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at
bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be
released.

3. PEOPLE V. BOHOLST-CABALLERO (1974)

ART. 11 RPC SELF-DEFENSE
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
accused-appellat: Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero (Boholst here, for brevity)
FACTS:
(According to Boholst)
The couple had a rough marriage. Soon after, Caballero left, and Boholst and her daughter was left to the support of her
parents.
One night, after carolling, Boholst met Caballero who upon seeing her, manhandled her. There were an exchange of words and
later on, Caballero was already holding her by the hair and slapping her face until her nose bled.
Caballero pushed her to the grounds, and to stop herself from falling, she held on to his waist. As she did so, she grasped the
knife tucked by the left side of his body.
She fell to the ground then Caballero knelt over her and chocked her saying that he will kill her. Because she had no other
recourse, she pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him, hitting the left side of his body near the belt line.
When she was finally free, she ran home and on the way, she threw the knife.
In the morning, she surrendered to the police and presented the torn and blood-stained dress she wore that night. The police
officer accompanied her to look for the weapon but when it can no longer be found, she was advised to just give any knife
and she did (now marked Exhibit C).
(According to the Prosecutions witness, Caballeros friend)
On the night of the incident, Boholst was already waiting for Caballero, and when he approached her, she suddenly stabbed
Francisco her with the knife marked by the prosecution as Exhibit C.
His friends brought him to the hospital where he was later interviewed by the police officer confirming that his wife stabbed him.
But because he needs blood transfusion, he needs to be transferred to another hospital. He died on the way.
ISSUE: DID BOHOLST ACT IN LEGITIMATE DEFENSE OF HER PERSON?
HELD: YES.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The RTC held that Boholsts evidence was not clear and convincing:
Testimony improbable as brought out by her demonstration during the trial
No wound or injury on her body treated by the physician
That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C is incredible
Contradictory statements
Has motive: husbands abandonment
The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on facts testified by the
witnesses
The trial court judge overlooked an important piece of evidence that could confirm the narration of the appellant: location of the
wound inflicted on the victim.
As she was flat on her back and and her husband choking her, she had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at
the left side of her husbands belt and stabbed him hitting the left back portion just below the waist, as also described by the
attending physician as the left lumbar region.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of her testimony,
for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife

tucked in the left side of the mans belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.

This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the prosecution witness that is if it was true, then the wound
should have been directed towards the front of the body of the victim rather than at his back.

The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-defense.
Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her husband and for several months prior to the incident, she
appeared resigned to her fate.

She also surrendered herself immediately the morning after.

The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches as stated by Boholst for it to penetrate through the left
lumbar region to the victims large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter. >.<

All the elements of self-defense are present:

unlawful aggression as pointed out above
reasonable necessity for means employed: woman strangled and chocked by a furious aggressor, rendered
almost unconcious by the strong pressure on her throat. What is vital is the imminent peril to Boholsts life.
The knife afforded appellant the only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself.
Necessity knows no law.
Lack of sufficient provocation: Boholst did not provoke Caballero. She gave a valid excuse that she went
carolling to earn money for their child.
Boholst acted in the legitimate defense of her person. Judgment of conviction set aside. Acquitted.

4 PEOPLE V. CA AND TANGAN (G.R. NO. 103613)

FACTS:
On December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard heading south and Generoso Miranda
was driving his car in the same direction with his uncle, Manuel Miranda.
Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him to swerve to the right
and cut Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn several times.
Generoso, slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced
speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. When Tangan slowed down to make a
U-turn, Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle.
Tangan also stopped his car and got out. Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Then Tangan went to his car and got his
.38 caliber handgun on the front seat.
According to the prosecution witnesses, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at
Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused
pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter. The shot hit the stomach of
Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall.
Manuel Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun
and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel
Miranda who was able to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.

On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was
taken by the accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun and during the grappling, and while the two
Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused.
The accused lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it
exploded hitting Generoso Miranda.
Tangan ran away while Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. Manuel looked for the gun and ran after Tangan. Tangan found a policeman who
allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew.
Manuel went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a
taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on
the way.
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. However, the information was amended to homicide with
the use of a licensed firearm, and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.
Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on
various grounds. The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On November 5, 1987, said
petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two cases was ordered.
After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party
and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor;
Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail in the homicide case.
Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity to
P50,000.00. His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, naming as
respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment be modified by convicting accusedappellant of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense?
DECISION:
Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the
crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused. In order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a
majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense.
Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the
other two requisites of defense will have no basis.
The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending himself but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. The exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and
Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical
assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.

1 PEOPLE V FERNANDEZ

6 PEOPLE V GENOSA

ART. 11 (1), AND ART 14 (16) OF THE R.P.C

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Genosa
G.R.No. 135981 15January2004

FACTS OF THE CASE:

That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According
to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant
said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant
had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her
and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was
crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating
circumstance of treachery?
No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the
relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression
of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's
bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete
self-defense.
No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which
have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument

or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and
to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking
her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be
resolved in her favor.

HELD:
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
ADDENDUM:
When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not
required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack
before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'
Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be
shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the
existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

7 PEOPLE V CHUAHIONG

Art. 11: Defense of reputation

People vs. Chua Hiong
FACTS:
Cesario Gocheco, nephew of Federico Chua Hiong (accused-appellant), published an article in the Manila Chronicle on February 11, 1952
entitled Doubtful Citizenship questioning the latters citizenship. Aside from that, Gocheco also filed various charges against the appellant
with different government agencies.
To answer this, on February 21, 1952, Chua Hiong published an article in the Manila Chronicle accusing Cesario Gocheco of persecution
mania and sending the appellant a threatening letter under the pseudonym Benito Solipco.
Chua Hiong also alleged that Gocheco was trying to damage his reputation to retaliate. In an earlier case, Gocheco and his family lost 2/3 of
the inheritance left by his father. Chua Hiong was behind the prevailing parties, helping them with the expenses of the case.
Thus, for the article, Chua Hiong was charged with and found guilty of the crime of libel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant was justified by virtue of defense of reputation when he published article in the Manila Chronicle dated the
February 21, 1952 containing libelous material
HELD:
In a physical assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased, because there would be no harm to repel. But that
is not the case when it is aimed at a persons good name. Once the aspersion is cast, its sting clings and the one defamed may avail
himself of all necessary means to shake it off. He may hit back with another libel, which, if adequate, will be justified.
(emphasis supplied)

Note: However, it is justified as self-defense only when it is clearly intended to explain or deny what was previously said of the one making the
libelous statement. (People vs. Pelayo)
Appellant acquitted with costs de-officio.

8 PEOPLE V TORING

FACTS:

A benefit dance was held in one sitio in Lapu lapu City for the last canvassing of votes for the candidates for princesses, attended by the
entire family of one of the candidates. Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, headed by Toring, noted for their bird-like way of
dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble.

Samuel, the father of the declared winner, while answering the call of nature, was approached by Toring and two others and was
stabbed from behind by Toring using a knife handed to him by a companion. Samuel died of stab wound he sustained on the right side of
his abdomen.

An information for MURDER was filed against Toring. The lower court rendered a decision discrediting Toring's claim that the killing of
Samuel was justified because it was done in defense of a stranger. While Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his shotgun at the
chest of Ely Amyon (Amion), prosecution witness Joel Escobia claimed that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's thrusts with the butt
of his shotgun.

To the court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense because in appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, the
court must know "with definiteness the identity of the stranger defended by the accused.

Upon appeal, Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel was justified because he acted in defense of his
first cousin, Joel Escobia is the first cousin of Toring their fathers being brothers, although no explanation appears on record why they
have different surnames. At any rate, this allegation on relationship was not rebutted by the prosecution. Escobia attested that as he was
about to dance with a girl, Samuel stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia.
Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him to eat the bullet.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of Toring in stabbing Samuel was justified for being done in defense of his relative, Joel Escobia.

HELD:
NO. SC ruled that there was no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of Samuel's unlawful aggression and that prosecution failed to
prove that Joel testified to favor Toring. However, the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof
of provocation on the part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a relative.

Toring himself admitted in court that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be
said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the
immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin.

Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring
brothers. Indeed, vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other.

9 TY V PEOPLE

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty filed the instant Petition for Review, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated 31 July 2001.
The decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Manila, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of
violation of B.P. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465 corresponds to the seven instances for
violation of BP. 22.
(Quoted from Criminal Case No. 93-130465) 30 May 1993, petitioner made, drew and issued to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply to account or
for value to Editha L. Vecino a Metropolitan Bank Check dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30, 000.00,
said accused knowing that at the time of the issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment.
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty. The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys
mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients daughter,
Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.
As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657, 182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua was
also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418, 410.55.
The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1, 075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed
the payment of the obligation in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank
payable to the hospital.
The seven checks, each covering the amount of P30, 000.00 were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the
drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice.
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was
forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless
the hospital bills are paid.
She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to
inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and bed
sheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother.
The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated
suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty
was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers immediate discharge.
21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven counts of violation of BP 22 and sentenced to suffer penalty of
imprisonment of Six Month per count or a total of 42 months. Against this decision Ty reiterated her defense that she issued the checks
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
In its decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of
imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60, 000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in
each case.
The COURT OF APPEALS rejected Tys defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospitals knowledge of her
checking accounts lack of funds. It held that BP. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable, regardless of the purpose
and terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
Petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court alleging the same issues but raising errors ascribed to CA on the following grounds:
1. There is clear and convincing evidence that petitioner was forced to or compelled in the opening of the account and the issuance of the
subject checks.
2. The checks were issued under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
3. The evidence on record patently shows absence of valuable consideration in the issuance of the subject checks.

4. It is an undisputed fact that the payee of the checks was fully aware of the lack of funds in the account.
5. The honorable court of appeals, as well as the honorable trial court, should not have applied criminal law mechanically, without due regard
to principles of justice and equity.
In its memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be
presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check, it falls within the ambit of BP. 22.
What the law punished is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.
The Court finds the arguments a rehash of the arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The Court,
likewise, discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. They
find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction.
Issue: Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant defendant exemption from criminal liability.
Held: No; For this exempting circumstance to be invoked the ff. requisites most concur: 1. existence of an uncontrollable fear, 2. the fear must
be real and imminent, and 3. the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
In this case fear was not uncontrollable or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved
exclusively by the hospitals threats and demands.
The fear evoked on Ty was not real and imminent either but speculative, expected and anticipated; as for fear that her mothers health might
deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital, or worse commit suicide.
Ty also failed to satisfy the last criteria because the Court is not convinced she was left with no choice but to commit the crime. She did not
take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one.
Therefore, the defense of state of necessity is also non-existent. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the
hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.
She even testified her counsel advised her not to open an account nor issue postdated checks. In all these, she failed to give evidence of
coercion and compulsion from the hospital.
Furthermore, a defense of state of necessity requires that the injury expected is not brought about by negligence, imprudence, and the willful
inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of bouncing checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
BP 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely
guarantee an obligation. The Thrust of the law (BP. 22) is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. The law
itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by
BP. 22.

10 BAXINELA V PEOPLE

Baxinela v. People (G.R. No. 149652)

FACTS:
Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo L. Baxinela was in a pub drinking with two other policemen in as early as 11:00 p.m. of October 18, 1996.
At around 12:00 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. there was a minor altercation between the deceased Sgt. Lajo and another customer at the pub but
eventually the two were able to patch things up. While on his way out, Lajo was followed by Braxinela with a gun already drawn out. From
behind, Baxinela held Lajos left arm and asked why he was carrying a gun. Thereafter an explosion coming from Baxinelas gun was heard.
Lajo, still standing, took two steps and then fell down.
ISSUE:

Whether or not fulfilment of duty may validly be invoked by the petitioner?

DECISION:
No. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that:

1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and
2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of
a right or office.
While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinelas duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun
tucked behind his waist in a public place.
This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to
take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting.
The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela
or to the civilians in the pub.
The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, it was held that if the first condition is fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code is applicable so that the penalty lower than one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.

11 POMOY VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Victim: Tomas Balboa, teacher at Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo.
January 4, 1990, 7:30 AM: policemen arrived at Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery. Balboa was
taken to Headquarters and detained in the jail thereat.
Later that day, a little past 2:00 PM: petitioner Pomoy, a police sergeant, directed Balboa to come out of detention for tactical interrogation at
the investigation room.
At that time, petitioner had a gun (.45 caliber pistol) tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt; gun was fully embedded in
its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
As he was holding the doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the victim suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun; he held the
handle of his gun with his left hand, released his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right hand, he held the handle of his gun;
Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the gun because of petitioners efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of
his gun; he used his left hand to parry the move of Balboa;
after he held the handle of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and Balboa
grappled and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the gun; more grappling followed and
five seconds after the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the attempt to grab his gun began
and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling;
His gun was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired; during the grappling he used
his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun fired, they
were separated from each other and Balboa fell and died as a result
ISSUE:
1. Whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident
2. Whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.

RULING: 1. Yes, it was the result of an accident.

2. He was not; however, it was unnecessary for him to do so

RATIO:
1. Presence of All the Elements of Accident
a) accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care
At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member of the PNP
o it was in lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a routine interrogation.

o Also in the lawful performance of his that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it
from his holster
b) resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing
accidental harm to others. He had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within
the premises of his working area
c) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him. Nicostrato
Estepar, guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to
harm the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.
consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.
Petitioner not in control of gun when it fired during the scuffle.

- deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts
- in the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the
weapon, while his left was warding off the victim.
Release of the guns safety lock and firing of the gun both accidental
- though .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless released, would prevent the firing of the gun, a semi-automatic
pistol is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.
- two shots fired: a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns
immediately carrying again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and distance
between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner
2. Self-Defense
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident (no intent to kill)
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner a further discussion of whether the assailed
acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.

12 ANGCACO V. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 146664)

FACTS:
At around 4 o'clock in the morning of September 25, 1980, Noe Bergante and his brother Noel Bergante and his cousin Freddie
Ganancial were awakened by the sound of gunfire while they were asleep in their house.
Petitioner John Angcaco and his co-accused were serving a warrant of arrest issued on Restituto Bergante, who was wanted in
connection with a robbery case. Noel informed the policemen that his father was not in the house, having gone to Puerto Princesa. One of
them ordered the men in the house to come out. Noel accordingly went to the gate and later called Noe to also come out of the house. Noe
and his cousin, Freddie Ganancial, did as bidden.
Once they were outside the house, Noe and Freddie were flanked by petitioner Angcaco on the right side and accused Ramon
Decosto on the left side. Decosto pointed an armalite at the two and warned them not to run.
Noe and Freddie joined Noel Bergante. Protacio Edep approached Freddie saying, "You are tough," and pushed him. Then, shots
rang out from the armalite and short firearm of Decosto and Edep, as a result of which Freddie Ganancial turned around and dropped to the
ground face down.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the justifying circumstance of fulfilment of duty is applicable in this case?

DECISION:

No. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful
exercise of a right or a duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right
or office.
In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. The standard procedure in
making an arrest was, first, to identify themselves as police officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him of the charge
against him, and, second, to take the arrestee under custody. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial was in furtherance of
such duty.
No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from
arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any
attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house.
As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of
the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.

13 TABUENA V SB (1983)
FACTS:

?
In a Presidential Memorandum (the Marcos Memorandum) dated Jan. 6, 1986, President Marcos allegedly commanded petitioner
Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), to pay immediately the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, thru this Office (Office of the President), the sum P55M in cash as partial payment of MIAAs account with said
company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Robert Ongpin to this Office dated Jan. 7,1985
Tabuena withdrew the sum of 55M on three separate occasions (25M, 25M, 5M with Adolfo Peralta) and delivered them to Gimenez,
Marcoss private secretary.
?
It is without dispute that Tabuena did not follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and delivery of the money (no disbursement slips
and paid in cold cash).
?
Tabuena was only issued a receipt after the third delivery and it did not mention anything about the purpose of the receipt or the money
being used to pay PNCC, but merely acknowledged that Gimenez had received the sum of 55M from Tabuena on three occasions.
Furthermore, there was no receipt from the PNCC recognizing payment of debt.
?
Prosecution: there were no standing obligations in favor of the PNCC at the time of disbursement of 55M. PNCC said themselves that
they didnt receive the P55M.
?
Tabuena claimed that he was only complying with the direct order of Marcos (plus the Marcos memorandum which contained same
order) to immediately forward to the office of the President, 55M in cash, as partial payment of MIAAs obligations to PNCC and that he
believed that MIAA indeed had those liabilities to PNCC. In short, that Tabuena acted in good faith.
?

Sandiganbayan rejected Tabuenas claim of good faith and found him guilty of malversation by negligence, hence this case.

ISSUE:
WON Tabuena, in following the orders of his superior, was guilty of malversation (or if because of the justifying circumstance of following the
orders of his superior, in good faith, he would not be criminally liable, but merely civilly liable)?
HELD:
Tabuena is merely civilly liable. The very fact that he was merely following the orders of his superior is a justifying circumstance.
RATIO:
1.
On the point raised by Tabuena that he cannot be charged with intentional malversation and be convicted by malversation by
negligence, the Court ruled that the dolo and culpa of the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. The same felony is still
there and conviction thereof is proper.
2.
On the defense of good faith: it is a valid defense against malversation because it would negate criminal intent. To constitute a crime,
the act must, except in certain crimesbe accompanied by criminal intent or such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as is
equivalent to criminal intent The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not commited if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of is innocent (malversation cases: US v. Catolico, US v. Elvina).
3.
The Court, based on the evidence presented, found that Tabuena had no other choice but to actually follow the order stated in the
Marcos Memorandum, because, as president of the Philippines, indubitably the head of governmental agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC,
Marcos is undeniably the superior of Tabuena.
4.
Tabuena entitled to the justifying circumstance of any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose because he is only acting in good faith, faithfully and efficiently carrying out orders from the highest official in the land.
Moreover, there was nothing in the Marcos Memorandum that may invite suspicion there was no question about the lawfulness of the order
contained in such a memorandum.
Tabuena had reason to believe that the 55M was indeed part of a due and demandable debt, a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC (existence
of such debts determined from testimonies). So even if the order was illegal and Tabuena was not aware of the illegality, he would not be liable
because there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
5.
Tabuena followed the memorandum to the letter, paying immediately the PNCC, through this office (office of the president) the sum of
55M. Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the money because as Chief Executive, Marcos
exercised supervision and control over governmental agencies (good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the
crime of malversation).
6.
While even Tabuena admitted that procedures were ignored and that the disbursement was unusual, he is found to be excused from
such because the Marcos Memorandum enjoined his IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE. On the other hand, while this allows for the negation of
criminal intent, as Tabuena acted in good faith, he would still be civilly liable (but hes not criminally liable anymore, escaping the harsher
penalties) (see page 362).
7.
There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do with the creation of the Marcos Memorandum that even if the real purpose
behind the memorandum was to get 55M from public funds, it is clear that he did and would not profit from such and that he did not have
anything to do with the creation of the memorandum.
8.
Tabuena case is a case concerning obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. The order/memorandum came from the Office of
the President and bears the signature of the president himself, in effect allowing for the presumption that such order was regularly issued and
patently legal.
Furthermore, the wording of the memorandum expressed a certain urgency to its executionObedienta est legis essential (act swiftly without

Furthermore, the wording of the memorandum expressed a certain urgency to its executionObedienta est legis essential (act swiftly without
question).
9.
Main Ratio: Furthermore, the Court itself raises the contention that the case involves a violation of the accuseds right to due process in
the sense that it was obvious that the Sandiganbayan was overzealous in its attempt to convict parties involved as seen in the volume of
questions asked, and the manner the same were posed (cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation).
To quote Justice Cruz, Respect for the Constitution is more important that securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the
accused. Sandiganbayan was obviously biased, denying Tabuena and parties involves the requirement of the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. As a consequence of such violation of due process, the order of Sandiganbayan was found void. Note that this defense was not raised
by Tabuena.
Voting:
?

Four concurred (Narvasa, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza)

Six dissented (Padilla, Davide, Romero, Puno, Melo, Panganiban)

Justice Hermosisima took no part as he was a signatory to the SB decision

?
Regalaso, Bellosillo and Torres, Jr, Pro hac vice (meaning they join the majority opinion but they reserve their right to change their vote
should a similar case with the same facts arise.)
Implication of pro hac vice: Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan is not precedent for the proposition that any public official who blindly follows orders of
their superior. Thus, this case is not authoritative on Art. 11(6).
DECISION: TABUENA AND PERALTA ACQUITTED.

Davide, dissenting:
Davide disagrees with majority that all the requisites of the sixth justifying circumstance in art 11 of the RPC were present The sixth
circumstance of the said article implies 3 things: a) that the order was issued by a superior; b) such order must be for some lawful purpose
and; c) means used by subordinate to carry out said order must be lawful. According to Davide, facts show that the debt was only 34.5M so
order of Marcos had excess of 20.5M said order then had no factual or legal basis and unlawful.
Romero, dissenting:
He also believes that not all requisites were present to warrant a justifying circumstance as Tabuena, by his own admission, did not follow
standard operating procedures (no vouchers, no approval by Commission on Audit, non-issuance of a receipt in 1st 2 deliveries, non-issuance
of receipt by PNCC, delivery to office of Gimenez [not office in Malacanang], a stranger to contract between PNCC and MIAA). The entire
process, done with haste and with a total disregard of appropriate auditing requirements was not based on normal procedure. Tabuenas rank
does not excuse him from ignoring such.
Puno, dissenting:
He concentrates on the case involving a mistake in fact, citing the Ah CHong case among others, and discussing article 3 in some detail saying that mistake in fact should not excuse the accused from incurring liability. It was also clear from the facts that it took one month for
Tabuena to comply with order (starting from the time Marcos called him up by phone to which the memorandum containing the same orders
followed a week later), which is more than enough time to comply with procedure.
He also adds that if there was not enough time, Tabuena should have asked for more time or at least communicated such problems to the
president. Moreover, to acquit the petitioners imply that people believe that the president is always right, that he or she can do no wrong that
the president is above and beyond the law.
Panganiban, dissenting:
He is of the same view as Romero, Davide and Puno but also raises some points: the defense of obedience to a superiors order is already
obsolete, as determined by the Tribunal in Nuremberg, in its judgment against Nazi war criminals who put up the defense that they were
merely following orders.
The tribunal said that the true test did not lie with the existence of an order but whether a moral choice was in fact, possible. To allow this
defense to hold in the Tabuena case sets a dangerous precedent in the country because it would deprive the Courts the moral authority to
convict any subordinate because he or she was merely following the orders of the his or her superior (allowing the same doctrine to be
invoked in similar criminal cases before the SC and even in the inferior courts who have no choice but to follow the doctrines set by the SC).

17. PEOPLE V CABALLERO

Facts:
(According to Boholst)
The couple had a rough marriage. Soon after, Caballero left, and Boholst and her daughter was left to the support of her
parents.
One night, after carolling, Boholst met Caballero who upon seeing her, manhandled her. There were an exchange of
words and later on, Caballero was already holding her by the hair and slapping her face until her nose bled.
Caballero pushed her to the grounds, and to stop herself from falling, she held on to his waist. As she did so, she grasped
the knife tucked by the left side of his body.
She fell to the ground then Caballero knelt over her and chocked her saying that he will kill her. Because she had no
other recourse, she pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him, hitting the left side of his body near the
belt line.
When she was finally free, she ran home and on the way, she threw the knife.
In the morning, she surrendered to the police and presented the torn and blood-stained dress she wore that night. The
police officer accompanied her to look for the weapon but when it can no longer be found, she was advised to just
give any knife and she did (now marked Exhibit C).
(According to the Prosecutions witness, Caballeros friend)
On the night of the incident, Boholst was already waiting for Caballero, and when he approached her, she suddenly
stabbed Francisco her with the knife marked by the prosecution as Exhibit C.
His friends brought him to the hospital where he was later interviewed by the police officer confirming that his wife
stabbed him. But because he needs blood transfusion, he needs to be transferred to another hospital. He died on the
way.
Issue: Did Boholst act in legitimate defense of her person?
Held: Yes.
Ratio decidendi:
The RTC held that Boholsts evidence was not clear and convincing:
Testimony improbable as brought out by her demonstration during the trial
No wound or injury on her body treated by the physician
That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C is incredible
Contradictory statements
Has motive: husbands abandonment
The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on facts testified
by the witnesses
The trial court judge overlooked an important piece of evidence that could confirm the narration of the appellant:
location of the wound inflicted on the victim.
As she was flat on her back and and her husband choking her, she had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted
at the left side of her husbands belt and stabbed him hitting the left back portion just below the waist, as also
described by the attending physician as the left lumbar region.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of her

testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get
hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the mans belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at
the moment.
This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the prosecution witness that is if it was true, then the
wound should have been directed towards the front of the body of the victim rather than at his back.
The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-defense.
Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her husband and for several months prior to the incident,
she appeared resigned to her fate.
She also surrendered herself immediately the morning after.
The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches as stated by Boholst for it to penetrate through the left
lumbar region to the victims large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter. >.<
All the elements of self-defense are present:
unlawful aggression as pointed out above
reasonable necessity for means employed: woman strangled and chocked by a furious aggressor,
rendered almost unconcious by the strong pressure on her throat. What is vital is the imminent
peril to Boholsts life. The knife afforded appellant the only reasonable means with which she
could free and save herself. Necessity knows no law.
Lack of sufficient provocation: Boholst did not provoke Caballero. She gave a valid excuse that
she went carolling to earn money for their child.

Boholst acted in the legitimate defense of her person. Judgment of conviction set aside. Acquitted.

15. PEOPLE V SAMSON

PARRICIDE
ISSUE: The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not the CA erred in not appreciating the
justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of Cristina.
There appears to be a conflict between the testimony of Cristina and her daughter, Christine Delmar (Christine).
Cristina claimed that she got the knife from her husband who fell down after she pushed him. After taking
possession of the deadly weapon, she told her husband not to come near her. She was holding the knife near
her chest and pointed towards him when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the knife went in
contact with her husband's chest.
Christine, however, perceived it differently. According to her, she witnessed the fight between her parents. She
narrated that as the fight escalated, her mother was able to get hold of a knife, which was inserted in the roof,
and used it in stabbing her father.
Both the RTC and the CA believed the version of Cristina, but both were of the view that before she stabbed her
husband, there was no more imminent danger to her life. For said reason, her fatal stabbing of her husband
was not justified.
Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the accused that he
committed the criminal act. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. When the accused,
however, admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by

however, admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by
13
clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of
14
proof from the prosecution to the defense.
To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of
the RPC, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
15
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
1. Presence of Unlawful Aggression even if Aggressor was Disarmed
Among the requisites of self-defense, the most important that needs to be proved by the accused, for it to
prosper, is the element of unlawful aggression. It must be proven first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
16
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. When the Court speaks of
unlawful aggression, it is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a
person. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts the life, limb, or right of the
person invoking self-defense in actual or imminent danger. There must be actual physical force or actual use of
a weapon. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. It must be
17
continuous, otherwise, it does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.
The question now is: was there unlawful aggression when Cristina killed her husband? YES
Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry's aggression had already ceased when he was disarmed, it is
the Court's view that the aggression still continued. Her perceived peril to her life continued and persisted until
she put an end to it.
It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife from her husband, he did not stand down but,
instead, continued to move towards her despite her plea that he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by the
arm which could have precipitated her well-grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able
to wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that, being stronger, he could have easily
overpowered her and eventually killed her.
In that situation, Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still in danger. It is to be noted that before she
was able to take hold of the weapon, her husband held the same knife and pointed it at her throat. So when he,
who was taller and stronger, approached her and grabbed her by the arm, it was instinctive for her to take the
extreme precautionary measure by stabbing him before he could get back the knife and make good his earlier
threat of putting a hole in her throat.
Contrary to the trial court's assessment, she did not show aggression towards her husband when she pushed
him after he pointed the knife away from her. She was, in fact, manifesting a passive attitude towards him when
20
she just stood her ground, with the knife in hand, asking him not to come near her.
It would have been a different story if Gerry, after dropping the knife, walked away and Cristina still went after
him. If that were the case, she could not assert self-defense. She was no longer acting in self-defense but in
retaliation for the earlier aggression. Retaliation is inconsistent with self-defense and in fact belies it. In
retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him;
21
while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed
The requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed is met if the person invoking self-defense used a
weapon or a manner equivalent to the means of attack used by the aggressor. The reasonable necessity of the
self-defense utilized by an accused is to defend himself "depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the
physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the
22
person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault." Moreover, the nature
23
and location of wounds are considered important indicators whether or not to disprove a plea of self-defense.
In the case at bench, the lone stab wound located on the victim's chest supports the argument that Cristina
feared for her life and this fear impelled her to defend it by stabbing him. It was a reasonable means chosen by
her in view of the attending circumstances, to wit: that her stronger husband, who had earlier pointed the said
knife to her throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea that he refrain from coming near
her; and that she had no other available means or any less deadly weapon to repel the threat other than the
knife in her hand. She did not have the time or sufficient tranquillity of mind to think, calculate and choose the
weapon to be used. In predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon the processes of formal reason
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but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. When it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted
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upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that act or to mitigate his liability. cralawred
Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer armed does not negate the reasonableness of the means employed
by Cristina. Perfect equality between the weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is
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not required. What the law requires is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as
principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the accused is exposed, and the instinct more
than reason, that moves or impels his defense; and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the
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harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury.
Lack of Sufficient Provocation
The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The Court cannot sustain the trial court's observation that it was Cristina who provoked her husband when she

The Court cannot sustain the trial court's observation that it was Cristina who provoked her husband when she
suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him cannot be considered a sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of
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aggression. She merely capitalized on a window of opportunity, when her husband removed the knife away
from her throat, to save herself from what she had perceived to be a danger to her life. Anybody, in her
situation would have acted in the same reasonable way.
Flight as an Indication of Guilt or Non-guilt
Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of
guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to
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defend himself and assert his innocence. It has been held, however, that non-flight may not be construed as
an indication of innocence either. There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence, for
the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to
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flee. In Cristina's case, she explained that she took flight for fear of her safety because of possible retaliation
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from her husband's siblings. The Court finds such reason for her choice to flee acceptable. She did not hide
from the law but from those who would possibly do her harm.
Considering that Cristina was justified in killing her husband under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, she
should be exonerated of the crime charged. For the same reason, the Court finds no act or omission from which
a civil liability may arise.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The May 6, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 05832, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant, Cristina Samson, isACQUITTED of the
crime charged.