Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and
JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision
which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the
petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable
doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally
the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO
GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID
BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA,
ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO
CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias
TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of
GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the

morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David
Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo
Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias
Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by
confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting
without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and
violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their
stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly
opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein
by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the
goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral
damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of
their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent
municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen,
except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with
evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby

imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One
(1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and
severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay
the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David
Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo
Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega,
are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt
for their criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was
not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor
had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal
of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The
petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of
the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner
Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the
market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms
of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law.
They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00
actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages,
P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from
in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of
reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and

severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual

damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the
extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion
holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether
the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no
unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their
hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful,
and, as evidence on record established that complainants
suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is
correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR
OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES
TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF
THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY
AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS
RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE
APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE
DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS
CORRECT.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL
INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN
HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT
PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS
TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic)
'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS
MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS
FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE
GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF
ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE
PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO.
13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent
court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included
in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the
criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil
liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the
criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the
effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received
by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a
separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig,
97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v.
Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil.

623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067;

Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners
were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the
charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the
market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting
away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these
acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some
other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the
violence must be employed against the person, not against
property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an
offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted
either for threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not
allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these
offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these
offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted
does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious
mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by
means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made.
An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of
the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into
trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in
accordance with law.

While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are

liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by
reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of
Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG.
1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might
arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the
properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by
the accused. And since there is no showing that the
complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a
separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed
instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules
of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental
proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case
refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81
SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon
acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge
Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the
same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities
against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is

the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from
the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability
may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot
recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of
criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of
the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases
not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by
law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the
thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v.
Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil

cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558;
People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and
malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only
civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4
SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p.
623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case
the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal
case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on
the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum
for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery
School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the
fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability
arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of
Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed
against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal

case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal

considerations other than the commission of the offense
charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as
in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate
the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered
liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper
accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes
which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not
permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v.
Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to
still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have
already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused
was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in
fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of
innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting
attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the
judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To
require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money
on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones,
complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum
No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had
not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his
policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the
removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same

time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside
in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after
all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the
demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the
trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from
the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not
been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras
had not up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the
co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his
police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and
hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not
present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods
and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the
municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served
upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them
were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall
of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The
defense that they did so in order to abate what they considered
a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and

in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to
the government which allowed them to lease the stall. It is,
therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se
which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the
destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted
away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by
the Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3,
the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief
of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the
Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said store,
and brought these goods to the municipal building under the
custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code,
earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a
separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even
in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic
and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil
action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal
action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An
affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with the
doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win
(a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or

one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and

of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party
unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or
enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal;
and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether
based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil
actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here
suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended
because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action
based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a
separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved
in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon
acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any
other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the
acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and
would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and
separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that
there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that
it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages
against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate
character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on
reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a
reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the
injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured
thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a

court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on
reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a
remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a
criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be
availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed
but there is no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive
permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a
judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same
criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal
operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish
the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil
liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial
requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one
who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act
may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at
the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to
make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation
by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the

criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability

cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from
each other. One affects the social order and the other, private
rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender
while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of
the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case
has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a
separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the
delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a
separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals
did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.

WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of

Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, MelencioHerrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
De Castro, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr. J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 185833

October 12, 2011

ROBERT TAGUINOD, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the petition for review1 dated February 5,
2009 of petitioner Robert Taguinod seeking to reverse the Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 8, 2008 and its Resolution 3 dated
December 19, 2008 affirming the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (RTC)4 and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City
(MeTC)5 dated September 6, 2007 and November 8, 2006, respectively.
The following are the antecedent facts:
This case started with a single incident on May 26, 2002 at the parking
area of the Rockwell Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was
driving his Honda CRV (CRV) from the 3rd basement parking, while Robert
Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd
basement parking. When they were about to queue at the corner to pay the

parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV
was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the
touching of their side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara was
pushed backward and naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was
pushed forward. This prompted the private complainant's wife and
daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the
CRV and confront the petitioner. Petitioner appeared to be hostile, hence,
the private complainant instructed his wife and daughter to go back to the
CRV. While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated the Vitara
and moved backward as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by
the Vitara, took another lane. Private complainant was able to pay the
parking fee at the booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was at the
upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear portion
and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit
portion of the ramp.
As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper
spare tires and the front bumper, the repair of which amounted
to P57,464.66. The insurance company shouldered the said amount, but
the private complainant paid P18,191.66 as his participation. On the other
hand, the Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper.
Thereafter, an Information6 was filed in the MeTC of Makati City against
petitioner for the crime of Malicious Mischief as defined in and penalized
under Article 3277 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information reads
as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of May, 2002, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to cause damage, and
motivated by hate and revenge and other evil motives, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously bump the rear portion of a Honda CRV
car bearing Plate No. APS-222 driven by Pedro N. Ang, thus, causing
damage thereon in the amount of P200.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner pleaded Not Guilty during the arraignment on March 10, 2003.
Consequently, the trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented
the testimony of private complainant. The defense, on the other hand,
presented the testimonies of Mary Susan Lim Taguinod, the wife of
petitioner, Jojet N. San Miguel, Jason H. Lazo and Engr. Jules Ronquillo.
Afterwards, the MeTC, in its Decision dated November 8, 2006, found
petitioner guilty of the crime charged in the Information, the dispositive
portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the accused ROBERT TAGUINOD y AYSON GUILTY of Malicious Mischief
penalized under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing
accused to FOUR (4) MONTHS imprisonment.
Accused Robert Taguinod y Ayson is likewise ordered to pay complainant
Pedro Ang the amount of P18,191.66, representing complainant's
participation in the insurance liability on the Honda CRV, the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the amount of P25,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.8
The case was appealed to the RTC of Makati City, which rendered its
Decision dated September 6, 2007, affirming the decision of the MeTC,
disposing the appealed case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 8 November 2006
is AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.9
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA, praying for the
reversal of the decision of the RTC. The CA partly granted the petition in its
Decision dated September 8, 2008, ruling that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for review

filed in this case is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed decision
dated September 6, 2007 of Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court in
Makati City in Criminal Case No. 07-657 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. The petitioner is penalized to suffer the penalty of 30 days
imprisonment;
2. The award of moral damages is reduced to P20,000.00; and
3. The award of attorney's fee is reduced to P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari dated
February 5, 2009. On March 16, 2009, this Court denied 11 the said petition.
However, after petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 12 dated May 14,
2009, this Court reinstated13 the present petition and required the Office of
the Solicitor General to file its Comment.14
The grounds relied upon are the following:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN UPHOLDING PETITIONER'S
CONVICTION.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.15
This Court finds the petition partly meritorious.
The first argument of the petitioner centers on the issue of credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence presented. Petitioner insists that
between the witness presented by the prosecution and the witnesses
presented by the defense, the latter should have been appreciated,
because the lone testimony of the witness for the prosecution was self-

serving. He also puts into query the admissibility and authenticity of some
of the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution.
Obviously, the first issue raised by petitioner is purely factual in nature. It is
well entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result
of the case.16 This doctrine is premised on the undisputed fact that, since
the trial court had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while on the stand, it was in a position to discern whether or not
they were telling the truth.17 Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be
considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions
thereof or isolated passages therein.18
It is apparent in this present case that both the RTC and the CA accorded
respect to the findings of the MeTC; hence, this Court finds no reason to
oppose the other two courts in the absence of any clear and valid
circumstance that would merit a review of the MeTC's assessment as to the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Petitioner harps on his
contention that the MeTC was wrong in not finding the testimony of his own
witness, Mary Susan Lim Taguinod, to be credible enough. However, this
Court finds the inconsistencies of said petitioner's witness to be more than
minor or trivial; thus, it does not, in any way, cast reasonable doubt. As
correctly pointed out by the MeTC:
Defense witness Mary Susan Lim Taguinod is wanting in credibility. Her
recollection of the past events is hazy as shown by her testimony on crossexamination. While she stated in her affidavit that the Honda CRV's "left
side view mirror hit our right side view mirror, causing our side view mirror
to fold" (par. 4, Exhibit "3"), she testified on cross-examination that the right
side view mirror of the Vitara did not fold and there was only a slight dent or
scratch. She initially testified that she does not recall having submitted her
written version of the incident but ultimately admitted having executed an

affidavit. Also, while the Affidavit stated that Mary Susan Lim Taguinod
personally appeared before the Notary Public, on cross-examination, she
admitted that she did not, and what she only did was to sign the Affidavit in
Quezon City and give it to her husband. Thus, her inaccurate recollection of
the past incident, as shown by her testimony on cross-examination, is in
direct contrast with her Affidavit which appears to be precise in its narration
of the incident and its details. Such Affidavit, therefore, deserves scant
consideration as it was apparently prepared and narrated by another.
Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven its case against the
accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 19
What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the
crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code
are:
(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of
another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving
destruction;
(3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely
for the sake of damaging it.20
In finding that all the above elements are present, the MeTC rightly ruled
that:
The following were not disputed: that there was a collision between the side
view mirrors of the two (2) vehicles; that immediately thereafter, the wife
and the daughter of the complainant alighted from the CRV and confronted
the accused; and, the complainant, in view of the hostile attitude of the
accused, summoned his wife and daughter to enter the CRV and while they
were in the process of doing so, the accused moved and accelerated his
Vitara backward as if to hit them.

The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is
proof enough to establish the existence of the element of "hate,
revenge and other evil motive." Here, the accused entertained hate,
revenge and other evil motive because to his mind, he was wronged
by the complainant when the CRV overtook his Vitara while
proceeding toward the booth to pay their parking fee, as a
consequence of which, their side view mirrors collided. On the same
occasion, the hood of his Vitara was also pounded, and he was
badmouthed by the complainant's wife and daughter when they alighted
from the CRV to confront him for the collision of the side view mirrors.
These circumstances motivated the accused to push upward the ramp
complainant's CRV until it reached the steel railing of the exit ramp. The
pushing of the CRV by the Vitara is corroborated by the Incident Report
dated May 26, 2002 prepared by SO Robert Cambre, Shift-In-Charge of the
Power Plant Mall, as well as the Police Report. x x x 21
The CA also accurately observed that the elements of the crime of
malicious mischief are not wanting in this case, thus:
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution
had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing
elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the
petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on
record. The version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased
him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing
was more believable than the petitioner's version that it was private
complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara
considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It
would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant and his family
to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his
direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational
pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does
not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly,
when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent

to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him

and the private complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the
prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of malicious mischief. This adjudication is but an affirmation of
the finding of guilt of the petitioner by both the lower courts, the MeTC and
the RTC.22
Petitioner likewise raises the issue that the CA was wrong in awarding
moral damages and attorney's fees to the private complainant claiming that
during the trial, the latter's entitlement to the said monetary reliefs was not
substantiated. This Court finds petitioner's claim, with regard to the award
of moral damages, unmeritorious.
1avvphi1

In Manuel v. People,23 this Court tackled in substance the concept of the

award of moral damages, thus:
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission. An award for moral damages
requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained
by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of
the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.24
It is true that the private complainant is entitled to the award of moral
damages under Article 222025 of the New Civil Code because the injury
contemplated by the law which merits the said award was clearly
established. Private complainant testified that he felt bad 26 and lost
sleep.27 The said testimony is substantial to prove the moral injury suffered

by the private complainant for it is only him who can personally

approximate the emotional suffering he experienced. For the court to arrive
upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent and
substantial proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it. 28 The
same also applies with private complainant's claim that his wife felt dizzy
after the incident and had to be taken to the hospital. 29
However, anent the award of attorney's fees, the same was not
established. In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,30 this Court held
that there must always be a factual basis for the award of attorneys fees.
This present case does not contain any valid and factual reason for such
award.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review dated February 5, 2009 of petitioner
Robert Taguinod is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 8, 2008 and its Resolution dated December 19, 2008 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the attorneys fees
are OMITTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz
(petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated March 22,
2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
1

petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under

Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral
Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant
was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and,
upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed,
and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an
18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall
remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items,
within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting
the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that
he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa,
which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1)
men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's
bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k,
worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part
of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to
return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said
items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and

convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the
accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount
of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the
damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered
a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone
testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the
lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio
Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to
Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission.
Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for
which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same
receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for
the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did
not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one
(1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of

deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the
amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of
petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment
dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term,
such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or
a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this
Court the present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING
THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE
MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR
ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID

NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH
THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED,
IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF
SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2)
VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH
HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND
APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE
STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object

to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established
the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime
charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and
carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial
court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in
the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in
affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court
raising both procedural and substantive issues.
4

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A"
and its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus,
violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner
never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The
CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection
in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even
admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that
when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time
they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived.
5

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally

defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information
does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to
be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from

the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The

CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and
in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the
Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money
or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of
the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected
in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
6

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the

statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the
subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time
of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th)
day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money
or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the
fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of
the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact
date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the
said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should
have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the

rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he

was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.
7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa

under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there
be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the offender.
8

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by
the offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees.
In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate
petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of
jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising
to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction
could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens
(sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him
where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him
partially or full?
a No, sir.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was

demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific
word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to
a demand. As expounded in Asejo v. People:
10

11

12

13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand
under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court
observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa
under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word
"demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both
written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a
written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about
the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was
tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the
existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to
account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by
other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.
14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was
able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private
complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission
basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell
or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those
pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same
pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the
private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned
by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing
the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation
of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity
denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the
case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the
CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality
of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence,
the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
15

16

17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on
this case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons
convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently
pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930
when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the
division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of
first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for
consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the
behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among
those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later

heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L.
Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter,
this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value
of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the
said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided
for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as
that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without
any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article
5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed
but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should
be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense.
18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts
bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it

proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and

thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation.
The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of
any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive
of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The
second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the
act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed
by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph
is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief
Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be noncommensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform
the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the
proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, Guillermo B.
Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to
the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
19

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena
sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those
previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not
deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court
of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution
of a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of
this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could
do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions
which it believes to be harsh.
20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief

Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. GrioAquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code, echoed the above-cited
commentary, thus:
21

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian

principle that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts
have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by
law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough,
are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it
is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases
unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited
class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for
clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.
22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against

property be based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is
equal to P100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must
be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition
of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not
cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the
same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also
improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves
to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times.
For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order
to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have
increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who
violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum
amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it
to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold

amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply,

from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present
penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed
imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state
that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos
but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but
does not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value

does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of
the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of
any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50
pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the
offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the
difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the aboveprovision states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying
the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is
imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional
minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would
seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same
as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered
by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium
period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the
offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum
period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal,
the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum
period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period under
the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed
under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of
Estafa.
23

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the

thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of

Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is
the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too
wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the
act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be
modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00
to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor minimum to prision
mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00
to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium and to
prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).
24

3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00,

punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional
medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum
(2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum
to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also
be modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:

1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00

to P2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).

25

2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00

to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to
prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).
26

3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00,

punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional
minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed
amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of
the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four
requisites:
27

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not
rest on substantial distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in
the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was
devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would

receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a

person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as
someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second
requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is
limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and
declares the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied
in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions
than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their
inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA: