ee) ade bas LEVI ee ee Ree a Re)Cee Pee DE aay See eee Coe Birraporetti’s, 500 Louisiana Street, Houston, Texas 77002 ape Free Appetizers/Cash Bar @ 5:00 pm :: CLE starts at 5:30 pm cacy Ce Le Pd Winning Women Seminar Keep an eye on our website for further details! YOU LIKE US? Centr rere VISIT US @ OCU ee FOR THE LATEST NEWS & MORECLE EVENTS | A WORD FROM OUR PRESIDENT 7 ey TweR FLoo0 | HCCLA NEWS ROUND UP | WELCOME NEW MEMBERS / 8 SOCIAL MEDIA SUCCESS / 8 WHAT | WISH PROSECUTORS KNEW ABOUT BRADY V. MARYLAND IN PRACTICE BY PAT MCCANN PRACTICE POINTERS: | ALWAYS TALK TO MAMA BY VILVW WHATS INSIDE FALL 2016 | OFFICERS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS PAST PRESIDENTS [WINNING WARRIORS [ HARRIS COUNTY WE HAVE A PROBLEM 8 JOANNE MUSICK STRATEGY: LITIGATION & NEGOTIATION PEACE AND WAR, BY JOSEPH W. VARELA FORCED CONSENT ‘THE HARRIS COUNTY GAME ROOM REGULATIONS. BY CORDT AKERSTHE DEFENDER Cun tise le aecnes ee OSD ares Crete PSE TCU eerie Peper 2016-2017 PAST PRESIDENTS — 1971-2016 HCCLA OFFICERS & BOARD ———————— PRESIDENT TYLER FLOOD PRESIDENT ELECT TUCKER GRAVES VICE-PRESIDENT USA SHAPIRO STRAUSS ‘SECRETARY DAVID RYAN ‘TREASURER ‘STEVEN H, HALPERT PAST PRESIDENT JOANNE MUSICK © rower EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (CHRISTINA APPELT BOARD OF DIRECTORS DAVID ADLER STACI BIGGAR LORI BOTELLO JLCARPENTER PHILIP GOMMELS CASIE GOTRO JUSTIN C. HARRIS. GEMAYEL HAYNES PAUL KENNEDY THUYLE JASON LUONG DAMON PARRISH I JED SILVERMAN MARK THIESSEN JULIO J VELA (CLYDE WILLIAMS ‘SARAH WOOD C. ANTHONY FRILOUX STUART KINARD GEORGE LUQUETTE MARVIN 0. TEAGUE DICK DEGUERIN WB. HOUSE, JR. DAVID A. BIRES WOODY DENSEN WILL GRAY EDWARD A. MALLETT CAROLYN GARCIA JACK 3, ZIMMERMANN CLYDE WILLIAMS ROBERT PELTON CANDELARIO ELIZONDO ALLEN C, ISBELL DAVID MITCHAM JIM E, LAVINE RICK BRASS MARY E, CONN KENT A, SCHAFFER. DAN COGDELL JIM SKELTON GEORGE J. PARNHAM GARLAND D. MCINNIS ROBERT A, MOEN LLOYD OLIVER, DANNY EASTERLING WAYNE HILL RICHARD FRANKOFF \W. TROY MCKINNEY CYNTHIAHENLEY STANLEY G. SCHNEIDER WENDELL A. ODOM, JA, ROBERT J. FICKMAN PATRICK F. MCCANN MARK BENNETT JOANNE MUSICK NICOLE DEBORDE EARL_D. MUSICK CHRISTOPHER L. TRITICO ‘TB. TODD DUPONT, I (CARMEN M. ROE JOANNE MUSICKyh 7 va WILL YOU PLEASE JUST TELL US THE TRUTH? APLEA FOR ETHICS. ‘These are conceming times in the world of criminal defense in Harris County, Texas. Just recently, we have seen the Precinct 4 Evidence debacle, Harris County Institute of Forensic Science uncovering that their main toxicological expert Tied about her education and was terminated by the lab, and a secret panel of judges decided to give a new Magistrate Judge position to a very controversial prosecutor without any oversight in this decision, 1 teach my sons to be truthful to & fault. Ihave developed an extremely low tolerance for people who have problems with “truth-telling.” After trying over 230 jury trials in my career, I have become somewhat accustomed to law enforcement who have this problem and have learned how to deal with it. However I expect, more from my colleagues. As good defense lawyers, we pride ourselves on our ethics and our integrity, We are constantly being proved to be the “good guys” with regard to our honesty and. character while we are constantly being let down, by the things we see from our counterparts. Ifthe then Harris County DA had knowledge of destroyed evidence from Precinct 4 since January of 2016 (as she admitted in her press conference) why did it take until August 26th to tell any of her prosecutors about it? Where were all the “disclosures” about this destroyed evidence during the 7 months that the DA’s office had knowledge, When was the term Brady deleted from the venacular of prosecutors? ‘When did it become common practice to use go. orders to hide all bad acts of police officers from, the public and defense attorneys. If the Harris County Institute of Forensic Science used Fessesswork Guale’s false education and invalid board certifications in their application for lab accreditation, is the lab’s accreditation ‘even valid? Should they be stripped of their status ‘because of the major role this perjuror had in their laboratory systems? ‘When you have at least three applicants for a new Magistrate position, two of whom have never had their ethics questioned and have solid, trustworthy reputations, how do you maintain confidence in the judiciary when the job is gifted to the least qualified, least trustworthy person? Many presiding judges have reached out to HCCLA in a desperate plea for help ‘over this issue, While Magistrate appointees in the past have all been above board and have been discussed among all presiding judges, this particular appointment was kept secret. Many ‘members of the judiciary have expressed grave concerns over what their colleagues did by appointing a new Magistrate without their input and they are angry at the decision, ‘What can we do? As the country’s largest local criminal defense organization we have a duty 10 adhere to the highest ethical standards possible, ‘The examples we set speak volumes about our dedication to faimess in the judicial system. 1 4m proud of our members and I am proud to be serving a your president, Keep up the good work FATE WHISPERS TO THE WARRIOR. “YOU CANNOT WITHSTAND THE STORN™ /AND THE WARRIOR WHISPERS BACK “1AM THE STORM” worn @CAinning @Aarriors The membership rolled out of the summer and into the fall with more winning ways.. Alex Forrest got the 2 word verdict in CCCL7 on a .12 DWI D asked fora blood test, but the cops de a breath test instead. Vivian King walked D on a $5 million Medicaid Fraud conspiracy count in SDTX, while conceding guilt on 3 lesser counts of improper billing Jose Mata and Brian Burns secured the NG in a Walker ‘County bench trial on Interference with Public Duties. Emily DeToto and Paul Morgan got ASAC dismissed on speedy trial grounds, and hung the jury on BoB in DC177, ided to do Lori Botello heard Not Guilty in CCCLII on Deadly Conduct. Joseph Ruiz got NG on Assault in CCCL7. W finds H with CW, the other woman. CW claimed W struck CW and stabbed I. The jury saw through ital Ryan Mitchell got NG in FBCCL1 in his first trial as a defense attorney In her first trial, Jameka Wester got an in trial dis- missal on Deadly Conduct in CCCL14 for a Vet suffer ing from PTSD. Special thanks to Sean Darvishi for lending a hand. ©) we verewoen © Scott Pawgan got PDR granted by CCA on a separation of powers issue. In a contentious 4 day trial, Jen Gaut walked D on -11 DWI in CCCLA, Tad Nelson and Amber Spurlock got DV on PCS and NG on DWI in GCCL Sam Gardner showed the jury an AFV in CCCL9 was self-defense, in spite of some damning text messages, A.win is not always NG. Amalia Beckner and Randy Martin convinced a jury to give D 2 yeats on BoH and probation on Agg Robbery in DCI84. The best pretrial offer was 15 years TDCI. Phil Gommels and Pat McCann were named to SBOT To Inhis first felony Ist chair, Romy Kaplan got a mistrial in ASAC and Indecency. Special ish for her help. Brazoria County on CSA, recognition to Priscilla Hired after the plea, Drew Willey convinced DC182 the State's request for 15 years TDCI on SAC was excessive and got itto 3 years NACDL honored Alex Buni Public Service Award, with 2016 Champion of Jordan Lewis heard the sw: est 2 words in the court house on .08 DWI in CCCL4, D was underage, hit a parked car, and took out a mailbox. Jordan followed up with NG on .11 DWI in CCCLI2, where his client was the vietim in an accident.Sa eS eee HAD SOME SUCCESS OR KNOW SOMEONE ELSE WHO HAS Set Ce nT a ates Pere tues Donlee Smith got the NG in CCCL2, Donlee followed up with a win in Chambers County on DWI 2nd, despite the ‘empty beer cans in the car ‘When DC410 signed an order dismissing capital murder charges against his writ client, Brian Wiee was present to see the long legal odyssey come to a just and rightful end, ‘The BP oil spill lead to 66 counts of Fraud by the federal government, Chip Lewis and Alicia O'Neill listened to the jury say Not Guilty on every count! Jed Silverman and Neil Davis got NG on .17 DWI in MCCLS. The blood had been left in the trooper’s trunk for 12 hours. Jed bought a bottle of milk, left it in his car for 12 hours, and asked the analyst if he would drink it. He said no, and there went the State's case. In aheated 2 day trial, Alan Macias and Juan Guerra beat a.19 DWI in CCCLI2, Allison Jackson and Lionel Castro got a NG in FBCCLS on an Assault arising from roommates in a ‘women’s shelter. Kurt Hopke got 4 trial day dismissals on agg robbery. Fox Curl got a trial day dismissal in DC400 on Sexual Assault in a group home. Randy Schaffer got a rare stay of execution in a death capital case, Terri Zimmermann got a dismissal with prejudice under UCMJ in an Air Force court martial on charges of Sexual Assault on speedy trial grounds, The crime allegedly ‘occurred in 1997, but was only charged recently. David Breston got NG on ASAC in DC263, David Ryan is a trial day dismissal machine Prostitu- tion and 2 Massage Violation in CCCL 7; Prostitution and Massage Violation in CCCLI1; AFV in CCCL9: DWI in BCCLI Marcus Adrogué and Alan Perez got NG on DWI in CCCLI James Fletcher won a .10 DWI blood test in CCCL4, and followed the next week with a win in CCC 11 DWI breath test Paul Kendall won an in trial dismissal on AFV in CCCLI3. The State was trying to prove its case with hearsay statements in the medical records. Paul objected, Court sustained, State dismissed. Mark Kelly got the 2 word verdict on Criminally Negli- gent Homicide in DC212. L16, Julio Vela walked his elient on AFV in CCCI It took 40 minutes in DC180 for a jury to agree with Ei Davis and Danny Lacayo that D was not guilty of murder. Danny Easterling hung jury on ASAC in DC185 ‘com 7)NEW MEMBERS PARALEGAL MEMBERS ae Pes aeeeaenl MEMBERS cris County oncology chit resigns JOANNE MUSICK FINDING HE TIME TO BALANCE WORK AND LIFE ol CHRONICLE over DEFENSE LAIWEns To00 FoR omnes Bi AS BAR Today enn fan senior woes a6 . et Ear orcas D Te RTH A wa PAST PRESIDENT JOANNE MUSICK. TAS bar Tonars Topo racocauen, ()BY JOPNNE MUSICKFor years, Texas and particularly Harris County, has struggled with the concept that prosecutors are (0 seck justice, not just convictions, and further they are to disclose favorable evidence, mitigating evidence, and even impeachment evidence. You know, the Brady stuff! ‘Well, Texas loses again and requires the Court of Criminal Appeals to affirm that prosecutors must diselose favorable evidence, regardless of the prosecutor's individual belief in the evidence, and plea deals with witnesses. Brady imposes a duty upon the prosecution to disclose impeaching, mitigating, and exculpatory evidence to the defense, And, the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. In United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court held that the duty announced in Brady required automatic disclosure of evidence that “might have been helpful in conducting the ‘cross-examination” even when the defense did not request the disclosure of that helpful information? Additionally, in Giglio, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution must disclose evidence of offers the prosecution gives to witnesses that may induce witness testimony noting that “evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to {the witness's] credibility ‘and the jury was entitled to know of it."* Despite Brady being the law of the land since 1963, @ number of Harris County prosecutors (and former prosecutors) have come under fire for their tacties in @ series of cases. In particular, courts have criticized their understanding, o lack thereof, as it relates to Brady and their obligation to tum over evidence. While not every Brady violation was the same, the consistent factor is their general misunderstanding as to what Brady actually means or encompasses What's particularly interesting is that each of the prosecutors in question has worked as a Harris County prosecutor, None of the offending prosecutors were young or inexperienced as lawyers. Instead, they were senior prosecutors handling some of the most serious cases. In the series of cases outlined here, prosecutors testified that Brady permits a prosecutor to determine whether favorable evidence is sufficiently worthy of belief or sufficiently certain to warrant disclosure. THE" DIDNT BELIEVE IT. 50 1 DIDNT HAVE TO TURN IT QVER” MISUNDERST ANDING ‘The rule announced in Brady does not create an exception for a prosecutor, even acting in good faith, to fail to disclose ‘evidence the prosecutor deems unworthy of belief. DiSimone © Phillips, a Sevond Circuit appeal, best summarizes why a prosecutor’s personal judgment cannot be factored into the Brady equation: if there [are] questions about the reliability of the exculpatory information, it was the prerogative of the defendant and his counsel ~ and not of the prosecution — to exercise judgment in determining whether the defendant should make use of it, To allow otherwise would be to ‘appoint the fox as henhouse guard.* As the fox cannot guard the henhouse, the general rule must require disclosure and permit the defense team to form its own conclusions regarding the strength of the evidence. In a circumstantial case, Kelly Siegler convicted David Temple of murdering his wife. Plaguing the case was a Brady claim — the prosecution team and law ‘enforcement did not disclose the identity of an alternative suspect until the proverbial 11th hour during tial cose@® CONTINUED NSU TI ae a ae ey on ‘And, even amidst the 11th hour disclosure, the disclosure ‘was wholly inadequate and omitted thousands of pages of police reports and other evidence. In his 19-page findings of fact, Judge Larry Gist noted at least 36 instances of prosecutorial misconduct; he painted a picture of a prosecutor willing to win at any ‘cost and failing to follow her duty to disclose, or timely disclose, evidence favorable to the defense. Judge Gist concluded that Siegler withheld material Brady evidence that suggested an alternative perpetrator ~ and not Temple committed the murder in this case, The trial court's findings emphasized: “[O]f enormous significance was the prosecutor's testimony at the habeas hearing that apparently favorable evidence did not have to be disclosed if the State did not believe it was true.” Prosecutors Connie Spence and Craig Goodhart convicted Linda Carty as a party to capital murder following the kidnapping and murder of her neighbor, While habeas relief ‘was ultimately denied, the trial court still found Brady violations in the prosecutors” flawed understanding of their Brady obligations.’ Again, the Harris County prosecutors determined they did not have to disclose evidence which they deemed untrue or unreliable. In fact, Spence testified during the writ hearing, “That’s kind of why I'm a lawyer, is to make those judgments.” In this case, prosecutors failed to disclosed witness statements that conflicted with or were inconsistent with ‘what they represented to defense. The trial court indicated if these statements had been disclosed, defense counsel ‘would have been able to use them for impeachment of other witnesses. (Can we say favorable impeachment evidence?) Prosecutors also failed to disclose a witness statement slating the witness did not believe Carty to be a danger to we ere society. (Can we say mitigating evidence?) Additionally, prosecutors failed to disclose a deal with another witness the deal being that the witness would not receive prison time if Carty were convicted and received the death penalty. (Ok, let’s just say these prosecutors made the trifecta of Brady violations: failing to disclose exculpatory, mitigating, and impeachment evidence!) ‘The trial court concluded: the State was operating under a misunderstanding of Brady atthe time of the Carty trial; the State's Brady obligation was determined on a ‘case by case” basis and was resolved with a ‘judgment call” based on “gut instinct;’and at the time of the Carty trial, the Harris County District Attomey’s Office did not believe that impeachment ‘or exculpatory evidence needed to be disclosed if the prosecutor did not find the testimony credible.” THE TTS NOT A DEAL THAT HAS TO BE DISCLOSED” MISUNDERSTANDING The prosecution must disclose evidence of offers the prosecution gives to witnesses that may induce witness testimony. This goes to the witness’s credibility and the jury is entitled to know any potential motivating factors in the witness's testimony favoring the state. Rather than split hairs over what constituted an “understanding or an agreement,” in Burkhalter, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “[found] it unrealistic to draw a line between an outright promise not to prosecute and a very real inference not to prosecute."* In Duggan, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Burkhalter: “we decided that it ‘was judicially imprudent to attempt to distinguish express agreements between the State and a testifying accomplice from those agreements which are merely implied, suggested, insinuated or inferred.” With no distinction between implied, suggested, or inferred agreements, the prosecutor is to disclose any and all agreementsEdward McGregor was tried and convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison, McGregor was tried in Fort Bend County, Harris County prosecutor Elizabeth Shipley Exley served as co-counsel for the State in the Fort Bend prosecution as she was simultaneously prosecuting a separate murder case involving MeGregor, but in Harris County. The Fort Bend case was considered the “stronger” case and preceded to tral first, After McGregor received an automatic life sentence in Fort Bend County, Shipley dismissed MeGregor’s Harris County case. In a highly circumstantial case, Shipley relied on three ‘witnesses who each claimed to hear McGregor “confess” to the murder. One of the witnesses was currently serving time and wanted a recommendation for parole in exchange for her testimony, The other two witnesses were jailhouse snitches ‘who served time with McGregor pre-trial and wanted better dcals in their own pending cases. Ultimately all three testified under the direct examination of Shipley, Each was cross-examined and each denied receiving any benefit for their testimony. However, at the habeas hearing, evidence showed that each received a benefit and cach had testified falscly about such benefit. Shipley testified there was no specific promise for 2 dea, ‘only that she “could” rather than “would” notify parole or the pending cour of the witnesses’ cooperation. She believed, so long as there was no specific deal, there was no obligation to disclose it. In this ease, Shipley made good on her promise that she “could” help after each testified; therefore, they ‘wore not testifying under a deal. In fact, she and the State argued that it need not disclose rewards, agreements, oF understandings for consideration unless there has been a firm promise ~ a quid pro quo ~ made before the witness testified. In other words, so long as there is no “binding EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE [MITIGATION J ‘ATION wets 4 contract” in place prior to the testimony, Brady obligations are not triggered. Clearly, her “understanding” was at odds with Giglio and other precedent, Kenneth Headley was convicted of murder based on the testimony of one eyewitness, Rebecca Broussard, Unknown to trial counsel, Broussard had been given quite the deal in ‘exchange for her testimony, She would receive misdemeanor time-served on her two new felony charges in exchange for her testimony at the grand jury and again at trial Rob Freyer, former Harris County prosecutor and current Montgomery County prosecutor, testified first there was no deal; however, ¢ of “the deal” was nonetheless presented and the prosecutor was impeached. ‘The deal had been memorialized in Broussard’s grand jury testimony, At the conclusion of Broussard’s testimony, Rob Freyer stated that “we all know...that you will be given a sentence under 12.44A for two crimes that you have and...you'll get credit for all the time that you get in.” In response (o this, Rebecca Broussard replied that this was indeed her understanding, This deal was never disclosed to the defense, ‘After being impeached with the deal, Freyer changed his position. Instead of contending there was no deal, Freyer testified he would have “brought this out” during the direct examination of Broussard had he tried the case himself, thus thete was no duty to otherwise disclose the deal.* Again, the prosecutor was found to have a misunderstanding of actual Brady obligations. ‘Taken together, these four cases illustrate that even senior prosecutors within the Harris County District Attorney's Office fundamentally misunderstood the duty to disclose favorable evidence and demonstrate the need for further cose @)aaa a LE PROBLEM clarification of a prosecutor's duty of disclosure. While these examples represent a small cross section of Harris County prosecutors, it does show a pattern of misunderstandings related to prosecutorial obligations stemming from Brady and its progeny ‘Brady v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) Inted States Bagley, 473 US. 667,678 (1985). Giglio v United Staes, 405 US. 150, 14-155 (1972, DiSimone Philips, 461 F3d 181, 195 (24 Cir. 2006) (citations omit). Trial Cour’s findings and _—_ conclusions: “In considering the ‘Brady violations ‘cumulatively, in consideration of the evidence, in light of the enti body of evidence presented, including. the trial testimony, the Court finds there is no reasonable likelihood it could have affected judgments retuned by the jury and does not meet the Brady materiality standard.” Burkhalter v State, 493 8W24214,219 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), Duggan» Stat, (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), In an interesting twist, a personal relationship was discovered between Freyer and the lead detective in Headley’s case, Based on that relationship, Preyer was removed ffom the case and another rosecor was assigned to handle the tri Bm em a Owned & Operated Dee ee PS ANU Cm LUE eS eee ees » Custom schedule & range settings BNO ie aster ie) BD ea ee) » Color picture verification Presta Recess Od peer i Oa ical Yer »No phone line required Coa TU UMUC) iy i Cae al ee EZMonitoring@yahoo.com eeewhal v wisl... Brady v. Maryland is a simple thing, mostly. It is @ case in which the Supreme Court said that a prosecutor has a duty to turn over exculpatory or mitigating evidence. It specifically said this: “WE NOW HOLD THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO AN ACCUSED UPON REQUEST VIOLATES DUE PROCESS WHERE THE EVIDENCE IS MATERIAL EITHER TO GUILT OR TO PUNISHMENT, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE GOOD FAITH OR BAD FAITH OF THE PROSECUTION.” Brady v. Maryland, at 87. Yet we all continue to have battles about what is, and what is not, covered by this clear statement, So, in an effort to show what 21 years of doing writs has taught me, let me address the reader, whom I hope is a young, often over-worked prosecutor, who may not have had cnough, or correc, training in Brady by his often under-funded office. My job as a writ lawyer, frankly, is to come in after the battle and shoot the wounded. Here are the things that I have leamed will get me hearings, get relief and overturn convictions or sentences, and create less than comfortable moments for my colleagues actoss the aisle. It is a guide to dangers, which, in the heat of an over-crowded docket filled with people who often admittedly deserve to be behind bars, that can lead an ADA to a mistake that costs them a job, a promotion, or puts their license at risk, You may disagree with what I say, but I am telling you this as much to keep you out of trouble as anything clse, so at least think about my points before you dismiss them. You can always find a new place to practice if your boss and you disagree ~ you typically cannot get a new license onee itis taken, (Om Whether you believe an exculpatory witness's statement or mitigating witness is imelevant — if'it is about the event and it could help a defense attomey, it gels turned over. Let the jury decide ‘whom to believe, What you think is mitigating is also irrelevant you are not the jury, nor are you the judge. If it could give someone a reason to go lower on a sentence [whether you would agree to such a plea ‘or not), itis Brady and gets turned over. ANY deal you cut, even on a wink and nod, gets disclosed. [cannot not tell you how unfortunate it looks for any prosecutor who first swears there ‘was no deal, and then a letter from the cooperating, witness or his attomey speaking of their arrange: ment, or some piece of grand jury testimony, surfaces and shows it to be a lie. Or later a parole letter comes up in the jailhouse sniteh’s file, signed by the prosecutor. Do not play the game that you are taught by your well-meaning superi- ors [who will never, ever testify for you in a writ hearing or a Bar proceeding, by the way] that as long as itis not in writing it is not @ deal. Or, that i'you do not explicitly promise them a set term of 's that your signature on a plea for a ridicu- ously short sentence right after their testimony is not a deal. Itis exactly what it looks like, and most. judges on a writ, especially federal ones, do not ‘want their intelligence insulted by your affidavit that it was not a deal One current favorite tactic is to do a plea for a lesser with an open sentencing before the judge. This is simply an audition for a deal, and you are effectively holding their sentence hostage to their testimony. Whether it is out of fear you will say something bad to the sentencing judge, or hope that you will speak favorably for them, itis a deal, an implicit one with their lives in the balance. Saying itis not is simply a denial of realityLike the case above, it is exactly what it looks like, You will not be given credit for cleverness ‘CONTINUED if this situation. Neither, frankly, in these days ‘of misconduct by people such as former elected District Attomeys Ken Anderson, Charles ‘Sebesta, or John Bradley, will you be given quite the same benefit of the doubt you once might have been granted by the State Bar, or the press, Juries understand that your guys (you know, the fone with the deal) are not testifying out of a desire to be good citizens, Acknowledge it Disclose it. Ay anor eta an yor vines ly and then honestly acknowledge it in your ‘opening at trial. Juries are not dumb. They do not expect you to have only nuns who nursed the poor for witnesses. They will ry to sift through the fact that your witness may have been taking anti-psychotic meds. What few will forgive, in the press [and bad conduct by the State always ‘makes the press. Read a paper if you think lam Kidding.], from the bench, or the Bar, is hiding the ball on these screwed up witnesses, Here is the kicker ~ because these flawed witnesses are serewed up, they will ALWAYS serew up again and be like ripe fruit for someone like me, who will get them to give a loving affidavit about how you drove them to CVS to pick up their ‘meds, If you would prefer not to read about your mistakes of judgment in the press or in a pub- lished opinion, then tum it over: By 18. yur fut tpi ide hing, bt is your responsibility. Subpoena your officers and their records BEFORE trial, and go over the stuff they forgot to give you, or kept from you, of lost, or misplaced, or that was inadvertently destroyed, and then tell the defense. [I am aware this is not always feasible given the current caseload, but try for the ones where you can.] By Lam est sxmpathatic to overworked fied cops who misidentify evidence items or covminuen Uploaded a video that then did not save to the serverat theirageney. However, as the represen- {ative ofthe power of the State in court, you are the one on the chopping block. Admit the problems and go from there. In these days, there is always a trail for me to follow, and unless you ‘want it discovered that you played chicken as to whether or not there actually was any evidence preserved, then just acknowledge it. Your job is done when the right thing happens. That is not my opinion; it isa direct quote from Footnote 2 in Brady, quoting the famous former Solicitor General Frederick William Lehman. It reads’ Note 2. Judge Simon E. Sobeloff, when Solicitor General, put the idea as follows in an address before the Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit on June 29, 1954: "The Solicitor General is not a neutral; he is an advocate, but an advocate for a client whose business is not merely to prevail in the instant case. My client's chief business is not to achieve victory, but to establish justice. We are constantly reminded of the now classic words penned by one of my illus trious predecessors, Frederick William Lehmann, that the Government wins its point when justice is done in its courts." If you adopt that as your philosophy, even in the face of pressure to succeed and advance, or to win for your boss, then how can you go wrong? Good, luck!Family owned and operated since 1971 Bilingual staff with over 100 years of experience License # 74346 * We advocate a paid in full attorney is a defendant’s best defense * Non-Arrest Bonds - we accompany your client to the jail or from the courtroom 609 Houston Avenue 713.227.3400 Houston, Texas 77007 burnsbailbonds@yahoo.com Interlock An Automobile Ignition Interlock Provider * John Burns David Girard 609 Houston Avenue 713.223.4424 Houston, Texas 77007 ezinterlock@yahoo.comIN THE ORIENT, NEGOTIATION IS NOT THE ANTITHESIS OF BATTLE, IT IS AN EXTENSION. H, JOHN POOLE, LT. COL, USMC? ” STRATEGY: litigation&negotiation PEACE AND WAR caso @stRATEsY:litigation&negotiation PEACEANDWAR Lawyers and laymen frequently observe a distinction between plea-bargain negotiations and trials, Many lawyers see trials as altematives forced upon their clients when negotiations fail. At the other pole, a few disdain negotiation as an expression of weakness or cowardice, something relied upon by those who fear to try a case. Laymen do this as well. They can be heard to claim that “their lawyer doesn’t negotiate and he's never lost a case,” or that their lawyer is “better at plea-bargaining than trials. So there might appear to be a marked difference between negotiation and litigation in the field of criminal defense, such that they are two separate activites. I contend rather that litigation? and negotiation are both ingredients of the same soup called “conflict.” If this is correct, there are implications for the practitioner. Are there two distinguishable conditions of “war” and “peace?” What is “war,” and how does it differ from “peace?” Is there a bright line at which it could be said that war begins or ends? Clansewitz’s On War is widely regarded as the greatest ‘work on military strategy produced by a Wester thinker. At first glance he seems to contrast war and peace in his famous aphorism that “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. Certainly Clausewitz is. not willfully ignorant of the milicu of politics and diplomacy that surrounds war,® but he clearly implies that battlefield conflict is war: 6699: Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war.‘ Om He dismisses alternatives to battle as ineffective: 6699. Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine that this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed... OR OK We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed.* In this conventional and selective reading of Clausewitz, war is fighting, and fighting begins when negotiations have broken down; war is therefore an altemative to negotiation, and the exclusive one at that. To be sure, Clausewitz does subordinate war to policy, but it cannot be denied that having given a nod to policy, he then spends the rest of his bbook discussing the “other means.” 1 believe that this superficial reading of On War is contradicted, or at least moderated, elsewhere in the text. Ina section entitled “War as an Instrument of Policy” we find this: 6699 We also want to make it clear that war itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues irrespective of the means it employs... Do political relations between peoples and governments stop when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged?” So politics and diplomacy are not necessarily superseded by armed conflict.A simple reading of Clausewitz would lead us to believe that armed hostility continues until one side is crushed, whereupon conflict ceases; but he puts this notion aside in his consideration of the termination of war: Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political considerations at some later date.” In contrast to Clausewitz, Sun Tat is patently interested in generals who can win bloodless victories, Indeed, such leaders eam his utmost respect .to achieve a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; to subjugate the enemy's army without doing battle is the highest of excellence." He holds thatthe top level of conflict is not done with arms, bbut with the mind of the leadership: Therefore, the best warfare strategy is to attack the enemy's plans, next is to attack alliances, next is to attack the army, and the worst is to attack a walled city.” Attacking the enemy's plans and alliances is primarily the work of the civilian political leadership and its diplomats and spies. Sun Tzu clearly establishes a hierarchy in which diplomacy and negotiation take precedence over armed conflict. The central implication is that victories can and should be won by these methods before resort to arms, Moreover, nowhere does Sun Tzu imply that they be abandoned at the commencement of fighting; diplomacy can function parallel to and in support of armed conflict. Here Sun Tzu and Clausewitz converge. This was seen in the Vietnam War during the Paris peace talks. Both sides used battle to advance their bargaining positions in Paris. President Nixon could turn the heat up and down by varying the intensity of the bombing, but Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap could do the same by controlling the size of the ground war. Diplomacy was war, and war ‘was diplomacy: The table in the conference room in Paris was an extension of the battlefields of Vietnam, Paris peace talks, While negotiations dragged on, bombing of North Vietsam continued. The great Indian statesman Kautilya finds no essential distinction between peace and war. Conflict is immanent and inexorable. He defines “peace” merely as “agreement with pledges." Kautilya implies that soldiers and diplomats alike are complimentary weapons in an everlasting struggle: Ifa king thinks: “That keeping the agreement of peace, I can undertake productive works of considerable importance and destroy at the same time those of my enemy... or I can destroy the works of my enemy by employing spies and other secret means... | can augment my resources...” ~ Ifa king thinks thus, he may increase his resources by keeping peace.!*conrinueo:: STRATEGY: litigation&negotiation PEACEANDWAR Machiavelli agrees that peace and war are but arbitrary points on a continuum, He has this advice for the leader: 6099 Hence he must never turn his attention away from military exercises. Indeed, he should devote himself to them in time of peace even more than in time of war; and he may do this in two ways: through action and through study." He is more concrete than is Kautilya when he advises the use of diplomats and spies as weapons in time of peace. 6699 In order to penetrate the enemy’s secret designs and to discover the disposition of his army, some have sent ambassadors with skillful and experienced officers in their train dressed like the rest of their attendants; these officers have taken the opportunity of viewing their army and observing their strength and weakness..." So there is general agreement that any bright-ine distinction between war and peace is an artificial and misleading dichotomy"” Om So there is general agreement that any bright-line distinction between war and peace is an artificial and misleading dichotomy"” This rule should apply to any species of conflict. It should be true of criminal litigation, which, after all, is but a specialized form of conflict." If this theory is correct, then trials and plea-bargain negotiations are not mutually exclusive activities, but are merely different aspects of defense of clients. Some implications can be drawn: b> There is no clear “plead” track or “trial” track for any particular ease. Trial preparation begins the day representation commences and continues until the case is disposed of. Only in extraordinary situations, should the possibility of compromise be categorically ruled out. Every time the defense lawyer walks into a courtroom, his client is on trial and each appearance should be so treated. How the lawyer approaches routine matters such as requesting discovery affects, the opponent’s view of him and the case. Each interaction with the prosecutor might teach the lawyer something about the latter’s attitude towards the case. The defense’s notion of whether the case should be pled or tried should not ordinarily be communicated to the prosecutor until itis time to commit All plea offers should be treated as at least potentially negotiable, The State’s “today only” or “no lower” offer should be considered as just another variable of diplomacy. This is not to say that a “no lower” offer will necessarily improve, only that such assertions should not foreclose negotiation,6 ?> ) Negotiation need ot end when the ease st for Dia Rather he tal sein bat one tor which shapes ongeingnepottons Interim bates suchas discovery disputes or pretial rulings on suppression issues should be treated as discrete battles lost ot won in a lxger campaign, ‘The outcomes of these struggles affect the bargaining positions of the parties. Even a lost battle can lay the groundwork for a favorable outcome.” Diplomacy can continue even afer the til stats Al experienced trial lawyers have had trials that ‘were cut short by plea bargains. During a tral, if things appear to be going much better (or worse!) than the defense anticipated, perhaps negotiations can be re-opened tothe client's benefit 2 Militant Tricks: Batefield Ruses ofthe Islamic Insurgent Postrity Press (2005). ‘have heard ll his. In each case Ihave refrained from expressing great dubiety. Here I primarily mean pretrial and tral advocacy in cout, not the word-procesor Firefight that passe for “tigation” inthe civil cout hous, Carl von Clausewitz, On Wir. 1832. Trans, Peter Pare Princeton University Press (1976), Li.24 Other translators use “polities” in place of “pli.” 1d, VILLviB, WL thi Id Li IV, 1, VILL fresh. current. justice WWW.HCCLA.ORG Poser thai Id. Li, One thinks of Marshel Foch of France in 1918, predicting, precisely correctly, that Versailles was not a peace, butonly atwenty years’ amistce 11 Sun Tau, Art of War, C. $00 B.C. Trans. Thomas Huynh, ‘SkyLight Paths (2008), chapter 3 nd 3 Kautlya, Arthashasira, C, 300 B.C. Trans, R. Shamasastry [Mysore Printing and Publishing House (1915), Book VIL id Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. MS_1S13, published 1532. Trans. Daniel Donno, Bantam Dell (1966), Chapter XIV, Machiavelli, The Art of War 1521 Da Capo Press (1965), Book VL Trans, Blis Fameworth [Not forthe first time, I am struck by the similarity of thought among strategic thinkers from vastly different eras end cultures ‘The laws of conflict are universal See Joseph W. Varela, "Theories of Conflict andthe Art of Criminal Defense,” Voice fr the Defense June 2006 ‘See Joseph W. Varela, The Defender Winter 2011, “Losing Battles, Winning Wars,” compromised a tial by sign-language. It was during the judge's voir dite in a burplary wal. The lead prosecutor got ny attention and held up five fingers. I lashed three, ARer some consultation with 2 colleague, she held up four and 1 nodded agreement. Tat was the en ofthat tral. Teannot recommend this asa regular practicealways talk to GIN by Vik Vij Iwas recently appointed to represent a young man we can call Andrew, He was charged with a violent felony offense and has been convicted of several prior violent felony offenses. Andrew has been in prison or in custody for most of the past nine years. When I first met him, Andrew was very angry. He was mad he was in jail, he was ‘mad his family was not able to bond him out, and he was mad at the police for arresting him Andrew was unable or unwilling to offer me ‘much assistance as to what happened the night he was arrested. I was unsure if he was blinded by rage, could not remember because of intoxication that night, of if he just didn’t want to tell me. For several reasons, I had a feeling from the beginning this would be a trial case, There was very little evidence against Andrew and, perhaps only because of his prior criminal history, the State was making a very high offer to him, Andrew told me he was only interested in a plea bargain on a misdemeanor, Both sides were digging in their heels. I asked him towards the end of our first conversation that day in court if he wanted me to talk to anyone in his family about his case or if I could answer any questions for them, Andrew told ‘me that he didn’t know anybody's phone number, but he wanted me to get in touch with his mother Deborah. I filed a motion to get funds for an investigator later that week, both to help secure witnesses and also to help gather mitigation evidence for trial, and, if necessary, punishment, The investigator was able to get in touch with Andrew's mother as well as many other family members quickly. I met with Deborah and was provided with a wealth of information,Despite meeting with Andrew in jail and in court several times during the next few months, he was still unable or unwilling to help me. Even though the case was set for trial only three months after being filed, Andrew wanted things to move faster and faster but was still unable or unwilling to help His mother, however, was a different story. Not only was she an eloquent and intelligent woman, she had a lot to say. She was able to give me a lot of background information about her son Andrew. She told me he had a college degree and used to have a small business in the Houston area. She told. me that she thought Andrew’s issues were related to the death of his father and his subsequent drug abuse, The timeline certainly made sense. Deborah's husband passed away less than one year before Andrew's first arest in his late 20's. After learning these facts about Andrew, 1 went back to the county jail to meet with him. I was slightly apprehensive as our last meeting a few ‘weeks earlier in court ended with him yelling a string of profanities at me and all those around him. I talked to Andrew about the things his mother told me, I could sense a change in him. He confirmed a lot of the things his mother told me and was able to give me and my investigator more leads to chase down, We had a lot of good information to use to humanize Andrew as well as, defend him in court, Maybe he started to trust me a little bit more, but Andrew was also able to remember much more about what happened the night he was arrested He was able to point to specific details in his relationship with the complaining witness. With the new information, I was able to find several inconsistencies in her statements as well as discover major biases and reasons for her to lic. After pointing these out to the prosecutor, Andrew's case was dismissed on trial day. When I gave him a copy of the Motion to Dismiss, he told me [alright in his book. I told him to thank his mother. Without talking to her, I would have had a much smaller chance of learning anything about Andrew and later enough information to secure his release.rT | TR NUAToN eltN rat BO Siu cmt ira ents what I thought: Hold on a minute, eT omOnt rey yy BURNS INSURANCE SOLUTIONS family owned and operated ORDER TODAY. INSURED TODAY. $R22 CERTIFICATES SENT TO YOU, YOUR ATTORNEY, & THE STATE O} XAS 713 - 224 - SR22 INFO@BURNSSR22.COMROU KUM ry FORCED CONSE Te _ The Harris ame Roo culationsCONTINUED FORCED CONSENT: The Harris County Game Room Regulations “Judge, we'd like to get a trial date.” That is what each and every lawyer in Harris County should be saying whenever a new client enters their office and tells them they've been charged under the Harris County Game Room Regulations.’ Have I been wrong before? Of course. Iwasa persecutor once (00, afterall. But specialty divisions within police departments, specifically the game room task force, are full of creatures of habit, Every one of these cases I've come across, and there have been many, are cookie-cutter investigations. Each and every cone that has darkened our doorstep involves a large group of police officers banging on the door to the game room, demanding entry. As the security guard (usually some poor guy who has been assigned there by his security company) panics and opens the door, the squad of officers moves in and detains him/her. The offense report will read something along the lines of “Mr, Security Guard opened the door and allowed Us entry into the establishment.” As they say, whoever wins the war writes the history books. ‘What's worse, the members ofthese specialty divisions mostly believe that the manner in which they are conducting these investigations is within the bounds of the law, SPOILER ALERT: They're wrong. The application of this law is, in my view, a clear violation of the fourth amendment against and further negates any consent for law enforcement to enter any {game room in Harris County, THE REGULATIONS ‘The most important section in the regulations’, at least in the terms of the argument I'll be discussing, is §3.1, Inspection by Peace Officer. In relevant par, it reads (@) Consent to Entry. A Person who does not allow a Peace Officer, Fire Safety Official, or designated County Employee to inspect a Game Room commits an offense. Ifa Person Operates a Game Room in violation of this ‘Subsection, then they shall be assessed a civil penalty not @ wesc 10 exceed $10,000 per violation. Each Peace Officer, Fire Safety Official, and Designated County Employee denied entry is considered a separate violation. Bach day ‘violation occurs or contiues to occur being considered separate violation. (¢) APerson commits a Class A misdemeanor offense if they intentionally or knowingly Operate a Game Room in violation of this Subsection, If you've read carefully, you should be thinking what 1 thought: Hold on a minute, can they do that? I seem to remember something about this in law school...something that prevented citizens from being subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures. c you a hint. 1¢s an amendment somewhere in-between the third and the fifth, and it’s mirrored in Art. 1 §9 of the Texas Constitution, Now when it comes to making Constitutional challenges, I'll be the first to admit that I'm no Mark Bennett. In order to make facial constitutional challenges to a statute, you need to ‘be much smarter than I am, and that will not be the argument ‘outlined in this article, That said, Texas and other jurisdictions have held similar statutes and ordinances unconstitutional as well What I will focus on is the fact that this ordinance very clearly states that exercising your Fourth Amendment rights will land you with a Class A misdemeanor, Now, there are obviously exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Exigent circumstances won't work, because honestly how are some hourly-paid game room attendants going to destroy the 40-50 slot machines before the police kick the door in? No, the two that police and prosecutors have been relying on are administrative searches and the old favorite, consentNeither of these arguments will save the search, ‘This isn’t 60% of the time, it works every time” argument. If we read by the letter of the law, I believe every lawyer in Houston making this argument will effectively shut down the enforcement of these ridiculous Game Room Regulations.‘ The reason is plain and simple: with this ordinance in place, free and voluntary consent is impossible. When the voluntariness of consent is contested by the defense, the state has the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence. Reasor »: State, 12 $.W.3d 813 (Tex. Crim, App. 2002). That consent must be freely and voluntarily given, ‘and not given in submission to a claim of lawful authority Bumper v: North Carolina, 391 US. $43 (1968), Let’s assume that the game room task force actually makes entry into an alleged game room in the actual way we're accustomed to them testifying to: they politely knocked on the door in full uniform, announced their presence, and were allowed inside by the security guard. Sccms pretty straight forward, right? We've all had the same discussion with clients a thousand times. “Never consent to searches.” This case is no different, except with the game room ordinance, the client cannot possibly give valid, legal consent. Whether they are subjectively aware of this is irrelevant Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Hubert v, State, 312 S,.W.3d $54, 560 (Tex.Crim.App.2010), These are all familiar phrases, but here’s the kicker that helps us out: in Texas, the acts of every person must be reviewed from the standpoint that he or she knew the law. Wilsom v State, 823 S.W.2d 155 (Ct. App— Dallas 1992), Taff. State 155 S.W. 214 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913). No one ean come in, from Colorado with a bag full of marijuana and claim, “Sorry, officer, I didn’t know my plants were illegal in Texas.” By the same token, someone who brings a gun toa fistfight can't say “But thought it was legal to defend yourself?” Ignorance of the law cannot be a defense in these cases. The State uses this against us in hundreds of cases, and there’s nothing we can do, But in this situation, it cuts both ways, and we can turn it around and use it to benefit our clients, In this ease, our client's imputed knowledge of the regulations is the weapon, and the law does not distinguish if their knowledge is actual or constructive. cose @)CONTINUED : FORCED CONSENT: The Harris County Game Room Regulations, ‘Assuming that everyone who breathes Texas air has full knowledge of every law, this means that every time a game room ‘operator, change maker, or security guard who allows a police officer into the business, they do so with the legally imputed knowledge that they will be arrested if they don. Does that sound like free and voluntary consent? In my view, the ordinance issue is analogous to the ruling in Bumper x. North Carolina, aS. Supreme Coust case from 1968. In Bumper, law enforcement approached the defendant's house to ask for consent to search it, and Bumper's mother answered the door, Officers told her they had a search warrant and asked for her consent, which she gave, Tums out they had no warrant atall, but used that ploy to gain her consent to search the house. ‘The Supreme Court held the consent she gave was neither free nor ‘voluntary because she only gave it because she believed the police hhad a warrant, and could search the house anyway. Bumper, 391 Us543 ‘This law puts us in a situation where any occupant of a game 100m is left with the dilemma of (I) being arrested for operating ‘@ game room, or (2) being arrested for not allowing an officer to investigate an alleged game room, Both ofthese options are class ‘A misdemeanors. The regulations, like the warrant in Bumper, are ‘purported lawful authority” that our game room clients must ssubmitto, Tat leaves the burden on the state to prove that given 4 choice between two arrests, our clients made the “free and voluntary’ choice to be searched, Translated into Texan, “That ddog don’t hunt.” COUNTERING THE STATE ‘ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH’ ARGUEMENT ‘The favorite counter to this argument has been the administrative search, which is another exception to the warrant requirement. New York w: Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987). The game room task force will even go so far as to bring fire marshals with them to attempt to legitimize their illegal search. In the regulations, these are called “compliance inspections: §3.1(0). Compliance Inspection. Any Peace Officer, Fire Safety Official and designated County Employee may inspect @ permitted Game Room located within their jurisdiction to determine whether the Game Room isin ‘compliance with these Regulations ‘The key word here is permiited, [have seen few, iFany, cases come through our door where the owners have applied for and received a ‘game room permit to operate @ wesc ‘And without a permit to operate, the search should be subject to ‘anormal Fourth Amendment review, Clarified, the business and its employees ean certainly get into trouble for operating without 4 license, but they are not subject to warrantless administrative searches, “[Aln individual who has not sought the protection of a license to conduct a regulated activity is vulnerable to prosecution in the ‘event itis illegal to conduet the activity without a license, bu he has ‘not invoked the protection ofthe regulatory hod so as to abandon the expectation of privacy.” State v. Clouse, 839 S.W24 459, 562 (CtApp.—Beaumont 1992). Further, “itis the act of applying for 4 license...which authorizes administrative searches without the ‘benefit ofa warrant.” 1d, at 462. These businesses need to be looked at just as if they were engaging in any other unregulated illegal activity. That said, the ‘administrative search’ counterargument should fail ‘Consent won't work. Administrative searches won't work, Warrants ‘will work, but they're few and far beween and will require playing by the rules with an actual investigation. These regulations are, in my view, an attempt to increase county revenue. I bope that these ideas serve you and your clients well in your gambling cases. Ifyou have any questions, you can find me atthe blackjack table 1 On. ifyou prefer. a prea ering. these ease ae sil being mvs ‘he same manne, soul be aking tis argument in every case 2 The filet ofthe most recent revision of th game room regulitions| (ere ave bee seven led atemps} can be Found at ip:viwmw.harriscountyso.org/docoments/Permits/Game_Room_ Replatonspa _foundhtp: we harisounyse og ocumentsPemits ‘Game Room Regulations pif 3 Neslony Sate 711 SW/24 636 (Tex. Cro, App, 1986 (Court suck down "afte that foes clas A misdemeuortorefse tallow Tena Pars and ‘iit o inspect your prope for aqua produc). US. v Prescot, 38) 24 1388, 1380 (18 Ck. 1978) ("The [Four] Amendment gives bi a cnstttona ght o reise consent to cay and seach. His asserng ica, bea crime. Nor ean it be evidence ofa erie." Sate w Hee, 428 NJ. Soper 8 (Sup, CLNJ, 2012) (Staite crimialiring efsng consent o allow ‘iy consrcton aii nspect dings ie uncontitsonal nd les ‘thAmendme) 4 eshould be noe sat he cases arising ou ofthe eval Code $4.06, "Pos tesson of s Gambling Devi” soul be ttt dete. Argument coud be made as othe difference between “gambling device” and "amuseren rolerpion machine” ang whether ort he ordnance wl apy a won bedhevased inthe aie 5) Dow’ yeu just love hw they capitalize their own es?Dy co! ET ae WWW.HCCLATV.COM AULTHINGS REASONABLE DOUBT | ALL.THINGS JUSTICE LIVE EVERY THURSDAY @ 8PM STREAMING LIVE AT HOUSTON MEDIASOURGE - WWW.HMSTY.ORG/HSLIVE.ASPx Bas CT Ne Cea saa eT _ WANTTOPLACEANAD? =FALL 2016 THE DEFENDER PO Box 92: Houston 1h 7292 4523 BLACKWOOD =e ESS : BAIL BONDING COMPANY EDD BLACKWOOD / LICENSE 77432 Houston’s Oldest Bail Bonding Company | Serving Houston, Harris County, All Texas Counties, fe & Nationwide Bail Bonds _ WE ALSO PROVIDE COURTROOM ASSISTANCE | 1002 N. 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