ROMERO VS.

CA
FACTS:
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death, their mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was
appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for her children. [3] Since that
year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the properties. Sometime in 2006, petitioners
Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are
purportedly conjugal properties of their parents. Petitioners further claim that their brother Vittorio through
fraud, misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering such properties in his name through Deeds of
Sale executed by their mother, Aurora.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and
Conveyance of Title (Amended)[6] against private respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the
death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered conjugal.
RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing petitioners complaint stating that the case
remains pending in that no distribution of the assets of the estate of the late Dante Y. Romero,
nor a partition, has been effected among his compulsory heirs. Thus, the contending claims
of plaintiffs and defendants in this case could not be adjudicated nor passed upon by
this Court without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the intestate court as to
the share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate.
Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the properties being
claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same being paraphernal, is an issue which
must be taken up and established in the intestate proceedings.
The court ruled that plaintiffs must first cause the termination of Special Proceedings No. 5185 to its
logical conclusion before this case could be entertained by the Court. , petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule
65 with the CA.
On 14 April 2009, the CA rendered the assailed judgment dismissing the Petition, ruling that the
properties involved in this case are part of the estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition of which is
already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance.
Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons or the appointment of executors,
but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.[10]
They cite Ongsingco v. Tan,[11] Baybayan v. Aquino[12] which states that when questions arise as to
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, he intestate court has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate these questions.
Petitioners conclude that the issue of ownership of the properties must be determined in a separate civil
action to resolve title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue of ownership of the properties must be determined in a separate civil action to
resolve title.

RULING:
NO.
The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present case. The rulings
in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as they both arose out of facts different from those in the
case at bar.
In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass upon
the issue of title, precisely because the only interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject
of the proceeding. SC discussed that As a general rule, the question as to title to property
should not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be
ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by
expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if
the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
Lebin vs Mirasol
FACTS:
In Special Proceedings No. 1307 involving the settlement of the estate of the late L.J. Hodges, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, in Iloilo City, issued an order dated May 3, 1995 (ruling that a property
of the estate sold to the petitioners be divided in two equal portions between the petitioners and the
respondent). The petitioners filed a notice of appeal and, later on, a record on appeal, but the respondents
moved to dismiss their appeal on June 15, 2000 on the ground of tardiness of the record on appeal. The RTC
granted the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002.

Hence, the petitioners appealed via petition for review on certiorari filed on June 23, 2004, to seek the review
and reversal of the orders of the RTC dated February 1, 2002.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in adjudging that Lot 18 be sold to both the
petitioners and Mirasol in equal portions.
RULING:
No.

RTC committed no reversible error in allocating Lot 18 in equal portions to both petitioners and
respondent.
The Court declares that the RTC did not err in allocating the parcel of land equally to the parties if only
to serve and enforce a standing policy in the settlement of the large estate of the late L.J. Hodges to prefer
actual occupants in the disposition of estate assets. The policy was entirely within the power of the RTC to
adopt and enforce as the probate court. Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize the sale,
mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the estate.
RULE 89 Section 4.
When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons; Disposal of proceeds. When it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate will be beneficial to
the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the
executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in the
estate to be sold, authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not
necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of administration; but such authority shall not be granted if
inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons
entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.

Aranas vs. Mercado

FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children and his two children by his first marriage, one of which is
herein petitioner Thelma aranas.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as
the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real
properties but only personal properties"
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory.
The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by
Teresita had excluded properties that should be included.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14,
2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, located in Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir
Realty,
ISSUE: Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties
had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during
his lifetime?
RULING:
No.

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only
be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in
the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court.

Coca vs. Borromeo

FACTS:
Spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively.
Possessed a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land in Misamis Occidental and is survived by heirs
Prima PangilinanMaria, Eusebio, Apolinar YAMUTA (Children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta) and Francis,
Algerian, Benjamin, Perla and Francisco Jr., Pangilinan (Children of Francisco Pangilinan) and Widow,
Guadalupe. A Special Proceeding before Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was thereafter instituted
where the administrator presented a project of partition. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan opposed such
project of partition.
The CFI nevertheless, ordered partition of the properties:
Giving attys fees to Crispin Borromeo

Without taking into consideration ownership of a 12-hectare land claimed by the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan, of a 6 hectare land claimed by Crispin Borromeo and:
a) Debt to Concepcions estate
b) If Prima sold her share to Francisco
Note: WON Prima was excluded as an heir

CFI ordered that a separate ordinary action is needed to determine ownership of the land in dispute.
Later on, they approved the project of partition. CA sustained CFI.

ISSUES:
WON separate proceedings should be filed to determine ownership?

HELD:
No, the case is an exception.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.

General rule is that a Probate Court may not pass upon ownership
Except: If the interested parties are all heirs, (case at bar)
-

or if the question is one of collation or advancement,

or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court, and the rights of 3 rd parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

The appellees belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur additional
expenses by bringing a separate action to determine ownership of the 12 hectare portion.

Ancheta vs. Guersey-dalaygon

FACTS:
Spouses Audrey ONeil and Richard Guersey were American citizens who lived in the Philippines for
about 30 years. They had an adopted daughter named Kyle.
In 1979, Audrey died, and in a will left her entire estate to Richard. This will was admitted to probate in
USA. The foreign court named Petitioner Atty. Ancheta as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. In 1981,
Richard married Respondent Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon.
The following year, the same will of Audrey was admitted to probate here in the Philippines by the CFI
of Rizal. In 1984, Richard died. In his will, he left likewise his entire estate to Respondent Guersey-Dalaygon.
The will was first admitted to probate by another court USA.
Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in which Richard was to be given a undivided interest in a
Makati property, and the remaining to Kyle, the adopted daughter. This was contrary to Audreys will in which
she bequeathed not only of her estate to Richard, but the whole of it.
It meant that Respondent Guersey-Dalaygon, Richards second wife, was going to receive less, despite
having been given by Richard the whole of his estate in his will.
The trial court still awarded only Richards interest to the Respondent. Respondent GuerseyDalaygon then filed an appeal with the CA, and additionally contended that Petitioner Ancheta breached his
fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator in transgressing the duly-probated will of Audrey. This to her was
tantamount to fraud. The CA took this contention well and nullified the Orders of the trial court giving only to
the respondent.
ISSUES:
1. The Order of the trial court had already been final and executory. Can this till be set aside?
2. Was the distribution of Audreys estate in a - manner (in contradiction of Audreys will) in
accordance with law?

RULING:
1. YES.

Once a decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem. As an exception, such judgment may be set aside on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or fraud. And
his failure to proficiently manage the distribution of the estate according to the terms of the will
amounted to extrinsic fraud.
2. NO.
Rule 77 states that when a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters -testamentary, and such
letters shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of
just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will. Again, Atty
Ancheta failed to manage the distribution of the estate according to the terms of the will.

G.R. No. 209651

November 26, 2014

MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and THE HEIRS OF EDWARD T.

MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, and JOHN
STEVEN J. MARCELO
vs.
JOSE T. MARCELO, JR

Facts:
On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs:
(1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially, petitioner Marcelo Investment and
Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of
Jose, Sr. At first, Helen, along with her brother, Jose, Jr. separately opposed MIMCOs petition; the two prayed
for their respective appointment as administrator. Edward opposed Helens and Jose, Jr.s respective petitions
for issuance of Letters of Administration in their favor and Edward himself prayed for his appointment as
regular administrator. Ultimately, MIMCO, George and Edward banded together: (1) opposed Helens and
Jose, Jr.s petitions, and (2) prayed for Edwards appointment as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate. In
an Order dated 13 December 1991, the RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate.
Jose Jr. filed successive oppugnant motions which were all denied. On 16 February 2001 the RTC approved
the partition after Edward filed a project of partition of the estate after having gained the conformity of all the
compulsory heirs.
On 3 July 2009, Edward died and Jose Jr. immediately moved to revive the intestate proceedings and
for his appointment as administrator. Amidst opposition, the RTC appointed Jose Jr. as regular administrator.
Petitioners then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and moved for the appointment instead of
George as administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate. Upon appeal, the CA held that:
1. The prior Order dated 13 December 1991 of the RTC appointing Edward as regular administrator
instead of Jose, Jr., which appointment was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 123883, did not make a finding
on Jose, Jr.s fitness and suitableness to serve as regular administrator; and
2. On the whole, Jose, Jr. iscompetent and "not wanting in understanding and integrity," to act as
regular administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Jr. was found by a final, immutable, and unalterable judgment, to be unfit to act as
administrator.

Ruling:
Yes. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that in all of Jose, Jr.s pleadings opposing Edwards
appointment as regular administrator, he simultaneously prayed for his appointment as regular administrator of
their fathers estate. In short, he proffered his competence and qualification to be appointed as regular
administrator as a legal issue for resolution of the courts. Essentially, Jose, Jr. was weighed and found wanting
by the RTC, the appellate court, and this Court.
This court looks with deep concern the manner by which Jose, Jr. treats the corporate properties of the
Marcelo Group of Companies. Evidence shows that sometime October 21, 1998, Jose, Jr. took evidencing
liabilities of the deceased and other pertinent records and up to the present has not returned them.
Notably, the decision of the trial court appointing Edward as the Administrator of the Estate of Jose, Sr.,
which decision had the imprimatur of a final resolution by this Court, was not merely a comparison of the
qualifications of Edward and Jose, Jr., but a finding of the competence of Edward compared to the unfitness of
Jose, Jr.
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general disqualification of those who wish to
serve as administrator:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is competent to serve
as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence,
or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Plainly, the RTC in its Order dated 13 December 1991, found Edward competent to serve as regular
administrator, more competent than Jose, Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of Preference,
manifesting none of the disqualifications set by law.
Contrary to the recent rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals appointing Jose, Jr. as administrator,
there is a previous and categorical ruling on Jose, Jr.s fitness to serve as such:
It is Jose T. Marcelos position that he is more competent, qualified and suitable for the position of
regular administrator.1wphi1 This, above all else is the main thrust of this second motion for reconsideration.
However, the court in the exercise of its sound discretion after a consideration of the evidence adduced by both
parties, ruled otherwise and instead appointed Edward T. Marcelo as regular administrator.
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855
August 4, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS
Facts:
On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, acting as a probate court, issued an
Order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration6 in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents.
On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.
On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a
bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took his oath as
named executor of the will on January 30, 1996.
On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration to BIR Commissioner Liwayway VinzonsChato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as Special Administratrix
of the Marcos Estate.
On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration
issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.
On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by
petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate court gravely erred in failing to consider that respondents Imelda R.
Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos II should be disqualified to act and serve as executors.
Ruling:
At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether or not respondents are incompetent to
serve as executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos.
Ozeata v. Pecson is instructive:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to
dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to
probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his
application.
In the case of In re Erlangers Estate, this the court said that After the admission of a will to probate,
the courts will not name a better executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow or friend
or other person selected in the will, except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of incompetency.
Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of cases and, hence, should be
characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with questionable integrity. The RTC, however, in its
January 11, 1996 Order, made the following findings:
However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of integrity on the part of Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will and testament, so as
to render them "incompetent" to serve as executors, the Court sees at this time, no evidence on record, oral or
documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation.
Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the
action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error
or gross abuse of discretion is shown. The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty and discretion to
determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor. The sufficiency of any ground for
removal should thus be determined by the said court.
The eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four charges for violation of
Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section 50 (non-payment of
deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC).
It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569, the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos
II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the four charges for
violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a fine
for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner, said decision is still pending
appeal.
The filing of a "fraudulent return with intent to evade tax" is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails
willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same, however, cannot be said for "failure to
file a return" where the mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the
conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral turpitude cannot
serve as a ground for his disqualification.
G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON
Facts:
Eliseo Quiazon died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise
Quiazon, represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
RTC of Las Pias City. She claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. She further impugned the validity of Eliseos
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the
latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached
to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. Claiming

that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. In a Decision
dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. It held that Elise
was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common
residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseos death in 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not Elise is a party in interest.
Ruling:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court,
or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase
"next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the
estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to
prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It
is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of
the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children,
Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
CRISTINA AGUINALDO- SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY
III,
Petitioner,
- versus ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012
FACTS:

Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her
spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and
Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. After Cristinas death,
respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over Cristinas estate. Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss
Isabels petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the
estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels parents marriage
being declared null and void.
Undaunted by the setback, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on his behalf in
the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed
an Opposition-InIntervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in
his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of
the decedent, Cristina. Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court
rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate. On appeal by
certiorari, the Supreme Court in an earlier case reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The
Court decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas estate, giving weight to his
interest in Federicos estate.
ISSUE:
Whether Emilio III or Isabel is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.
HELD:
Isabel. The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife,
as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply
for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person,
it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve; (c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of
an
administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the
next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is
the prospective administrators interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6,
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator
for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to

administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedents estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an
interest therein greater than any other candidate.
Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be
a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and
the attendant circumstances of the case. Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances
of this case even as we reiterate Isabels and her siblings apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio
III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized
as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the
estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as
co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedents estate, ultimately delaying settlement
thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has not looked after the
estates welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
The evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent
Isabel points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not
looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO- SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M.
SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
V.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

FACTS:
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel CojuangcoSuntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely:
herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to
Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III
and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.

Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine months
old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was annulled. [6] Consequently,
respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City,
separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his
grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
in Quezon City granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to
thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her
sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor.
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his
opposition on December 21, 1995.
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents
estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of
administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in
the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations
in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence on their respective allegations
were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III,
as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of
the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina.
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals by certiorari to this Court.

ISSUE:
1. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF
THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES
2. Whether Emilio III may be appointed administrator of the decedent's estate.

RULING:
1. No.
Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar
between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated
by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents
petition for letters of administration.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e.,
love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate
grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly
pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there
exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

2. Yes.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of
the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much
apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that under
the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled
why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition
and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the
sound discretion of the trial court. [20] In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers,
Cristinas, estate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina AguinaldoSuntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon
payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to
make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual
factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is
further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO JAKE TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS,
Petitioners,
v.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA,
REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.

FACTS:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private
respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to
Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a
special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be resolved by
the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo
D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private
respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the
special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does
not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who
was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.
On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to
Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix.
More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents Urgent Exparte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty.
Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order[4] appointing
Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardos Estate,
Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the
deceased.

On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive
Judge, issued an Order[6] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the 17
July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilmas right to be appointed as special administratix.
On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners Petition. On 6 December
2004, the Court of Appeals similarly denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.
On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was the next of kin of the
deceased.
RULING:
No.
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator.[13] The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter
lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.[14]
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over
administration of Gerardos estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and
put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The appointment of a
special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent
leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at
bar) occasioned by any cause.[18] The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs.[19]

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the
court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed special
administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of the lawful
orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to
comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of Gerardos estate and to provide an
accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardos estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious
and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilmas non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income,
petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the courts
orders.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June
2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the estate of Gerardo Tan,
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133743

EDGAR
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent

SAN

LUIS, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 134029

RODOLFO
SAN
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

LUIS, Petitioner,

FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,

California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving
heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage;
that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that
the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo
claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because
this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse.
2. Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

RULING:
1. Yes
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein
that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
2. Yes.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir,
or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not
merely indirect or contingent. 75
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with
him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated
to marry.
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming
the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.