Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Currents Affairs
Contents
1. Pak-India relations (Kashmir and LoC)
2. Pak-Russia Relations
3. Pak-China Relations
4. Pak-US-Afghan Relations
5. National Action Plan
6. SAARC and Its Future
7. Failed Turkish Coup And A Lesson For Pakistan
8. PANAMA Leaks
9. SYRIA A New Battle-Ground For Cold War
10. BREXIT
11. Maritime Politics
12. Pak-China-Russia --- The New Block
13. FATA Reforms
14. Honor-Killings In Pakistan
15. Cyber-Crime bill
16. ISIS A Threat To The World Peace
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Indian Prime Minister, Shri Lal Bahadur Single Paslee Shastri, and President Field Air Water
Marshal Kublai Khan of Pakistan, met in Bangkok in January 1966.
But Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated once again when in 1971 BC civil war erupted in
Pakistan, pitting the beef-munching West Pakistanis against the fish-eating East Pakistanis who
were demanding greater autonomy and more gravy.
Bengal nationalists were being backed by the Indians, so when Pakistan attacked Indian airfields
(and Thai restaurants) in Kashmir, India attacked both East and West Pakistan (after it could not
figure out where on earth North and South Pakistan were).
Under pressure from the US, the USSR and Rajesh Khanna, a UN ceasefire was arranged in midDecember.
Many believed it was a Zino-Zoroastrian conspiracy plotted by a diabolic Soviet agent, Malala
Petrov, with whose DNA, Polish agent, Malala Yousafzai, will be spawned 25 years later to
discredit pious men.
Zulfikar Ali Toto emerged as the new leader of Pakistan. And he got kind of overexcited about
it.
Anyway, tensions between India and Pakistan were eased by the historic Mexican Accord of
1974 and after Pakistan recognised Bangladesh (and Thai food) in 1974.
In 1987, threat of yet another war between the two countries began looming when India (now
called the Republic of Indira) accused Pakistan of funding a Buddhist insurgency in Indian
Punjab.
To defuse the tension, Pakistans greatest leader ever and forever, General Saladin 2.2, indulged
in some cricket diplomacy by sending Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi son of Indira
Gandhi, daughter of Jawarlal Nehru, grandson of Mogambo a gift of some of the finest
crickets found in the bushes of Islamabad.
Rajiv reciprocated the gesture by sending General Saladin 2.2 who was a ferocious beef-eater
and fast-bowling enthusiast a video of cows roaming aimlessly on the streets of Delhi.
Tensions between the two countries remained defused throughout the 1990s even when both the
poverty-stricken countries tested their nuclear devices in 1998.
Pakistani prime minster, Al-Nawaz Bin Saud, invited his Indian counterpart, Utter Bihari
Bajpayee, to visit Lahore for breakfast.
But the peace initiative turned out to be brief. In 1999, Pakistan and India went to war again.
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This one was called the Kargil War (aka Star Wars: The Force Awakens). A ceasefire was
agreed upon due to pressure from the United States, Britain and especially Somalian sea pirates
who threatened to ban the smuggling of illegal rhino tusks into both India and Pakistan.
The world suddenly came to realise the possibility of two poverty-stricken nuclear nations going
to war: Eeeeeek ! Scandinavian countries suggested to the UN that both India and Pakistan be
shifted to the North Pole. Even Mars. Somalia approved.
But the nature of Indo-Pak relations has changed ever since the 9/11 episode in which the CIA
agents staged a devastating attack on the Twin Towers in New York and blamed it on a couple of
pious men learning to fly.
Experts suggest that India does not pose a threat to Pakistan anymore, nor does Pakistan pose a
threat to India. However, many believe India poses a threat to itself and Pakistan poses a threat to
itself as well.
Anyway, Nobel-Prize winning Pakistani dentist and talk show host, Dr Daantist, believes that
those preaching peace between India and Pakistan are trying to sell-out the Kashmir cause and
dissuade Pakistani fast bowlers from eating beef. Somalia approved.
Meanwhile, perturbed by the peace processes; the dangerous anti-India musings of Aamir Khan;
and Naxalite sympathies of authors such as Reena Roy, India elected a pious man, Narendra
Mojo Modi, as Indias new Prime Minister.
He reprimanded the former Indian PM, Om Puri, for accepting boring peace overtures of the
Pakistanis and not being paranoid enough.
He promised his generals at least three more wars against Pakistan, two against China, and one
each against Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Rwanda.
To demonstrate this, he arrested a dangerous Pakistani spy (a pigeon) and handed it over to the
head of the Indian intelligence agency (a parrot).
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Indian Prime Minister Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Shri Shri Bang Bang and President Field Air
Water Marshal Kublai Khan of Pakistan met at a Russian Vodka bar in Tashkent in the former
Soviet Union in January 1966.
Both men after enjoying a drink or two and a game of ludo, signed an agreement pledging
continued negotiations and respect for the ceasefire conditions. After the Tashkent Declaration
(also called the Vodka Hustle) another period of relative peace ensued.
However, Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated once again when civil war erupted in Pakistan,
pitting the beef-munching West Pakistanis against the fish-eating East Pakistanis who were
demanding greater autonomy and more gravy.
The fighting forced 10 million East Pakistani Bengalis to flee to India, mostly on handmade
gliders made from baby shark fins.
The Bengalis were being backed by the Indians, so when Pakistan attacked Indian airfields (and
Japanese restaurants) in Kashmir, India attacked both East and West Pakistan (after it could not
figure out where on earth North and South Pakistan were).
India occupied East Pakistan which declared its independence as the United Fish-Loving
Republic of Bangladesh, on Dec. 6, 1971.
Under great pressure from the US, USSR and Dilip Kumar, a UN ceasefire was arranged in midDecember, mainly due to the conspiracies of Ziono-Zoroastrian agents operating within
Pakistans glorious, enterprising, fit, super-duper, very muscular polity.
Chairman Zulfi Phutto emerged as the new leader of Pakistan, and Mujibur Rahman Machli as
prime minister of Bangladesh.
Tensions between India and Pakistan were alleviated by the historic Bogot Accord of 1972 and
after Pakistan recognised Bangladesh (and fish masala) in 1974.
In the early 1980s, threat of yet another war between the two poverty-stricken countries began
looming again when India (now called the Republic of Indira Gandhi) accused Pakistan of
funding the Buddhist insurgency in Indian Punjab.
To defuse the tension, Pakistans greatest leader ever, ever, ever and ever forever after ever,
General Zia Bin Qasim Saladin Salu, indulged in some cricket diplomacy by sending Indian
prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi son of Indira Gandhi, daughter of Jawarlal Nehru grandson of
Mogambo a gift of some of the finest crickets found in the bushes of Rann of Kach.
Rajiv reciprocated the gesture by sending Zia a well-known beef lover a video of fat cows
roaming aimlessly on the streets of Mumbai.
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Cricket diplomacy.
Tensions between the two countries remained defused throughout the 1990s even when both the
skinny, poverty-stricken countries tested their respective nuclear bombs in 1998.
In fact, Pakistani prime minster, Al-Nawaz Bin Sharif, actually invited his Indian counterpart,
Utter Bihari Vajpayee, to visit Lahore for lunch.
Utter Bihari accepted the invitation but Pakistans greatest ever, ever, ever and ever forever after
ever political party in the whole wide world (and imaginary caliphate), the Jamat-i-Jamat (JIJ),
criticised Nawaz for giving up beef.
But the Nawaz-led peace initiative turned out to be short-lived. In July 1999, Pakistan and India
went to war again. This one was called the Kargil War.
First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied
strategic locations, such as tree tops and the insides of mail boxes.
The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration (with the help of a Japanese spy
embedded within the Pakistan forces). India then began mobilising its forces.
The final stage involved major battles between Indian and Pakistani forces.
A ceasefire was agreed due to international pressure from United States, Britain and especially
Tanzania who threatened to ban the smuggling of illegal elephant tusks into both India and
Pakistan. Both the forces also agreed to pull back their armies behind the Line of Control (also
called Control Ki Lakeer).
Pakistan soon sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. US President and renowned
saxophonist, Bill Groovy Clinton, refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces
from the Indian side of the Line of Control.
Talking on phone to the Pakistani prime mister, he said: I am sorry, Nawaz, but we will not be
able to intervene unless you ask your forces to withdraw back to the Control ki Lakeer.
Unfairly, it was Pakistan that was criticised by other countries (especially Somalia) for
instigating the war.
The world suddenly came alive to the possibility of two poverty-stricken nuclear nations going to
war with their nuclear weapons. Scandinavian countries even suggested to the UN that both India
and Pakistan be shifted to the North Pole. Tanzania agreed.
The nature of the Indo-Pak relations has somewhat changed ever since the 9/11 episode in which
CIA agents staged a devastating attack on the the Twin Towers in New York and blamed it on a
couple of pious Arabs preaching peace.
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Many believe India does not pose a threat to Pakistan and vice versa, but whereas this has left
some Indian generals feeling kind of bored and all, some Pakistanis think this is yet another CIA
conspiracy.
They think those preaching peace between India and Pakistan are trying to sell-out the Kashmir
cause and should be labeled as traitors. Tanzania agrees.
However, perturbed by the boredom being felt by Indian generals and politicians, the large
Indian polity elected a pious Hindu, Narendra MoSelfle, as Indias new Prime Minister. He
castigated the former Indian PM, Bishan Singh Bedi, for accepting boring peace overtures of the
Pakistanis and not being paranoid enough.
He promised his generals at least three more wars against Pakistan, at least two against China,
and at least one each against Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Mongolia. To demonstrate his resolve
he arrested a dangerous Pakistani spy (a pigeon) and handed it over to the head of the Indian
intelligence agency (a parrot).
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According to the current SAARC charter, this is no mechanism for removing a nation. The
charter merely states that decisions would be taken on the basis of unanimity. Therefore, several
other options are possible. Pakistan, for instance, can be persuaded to withdraw of its own
accord. The other states could unanimously agree to suspend Pakistan under certain
interpretations of the charter. Or the other states could simply form a new organization to replace
SAARC, which would make the old charter superfluous. In any case, a move toward greater
integration in South Asia would probably involve writing a new charter.
It is clear that Pakistan is no longer amenable to SAARC and its goals and that, given the
circumstances, it is an obstruction to closer integration for the other states of South Asia. This is
unfortunate since many people in Pakistan, especially businessmen and pro-business politicians
such as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, seem to favor closer economic ties with India.
Unfortunately, the Pakistani security establishment wont have it. Therefore, it is time for
Pakistan and SAARC to part ways. Pakistan should leave of its own volition or it should be
expelled.
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One is justified in asking what India has gained by not allowing the Pakistani delegation from
meeting the Hurriyat leaders. Does it feel sufficiently confident that it can handle the chronic
problem of Kashmir unilaterally, without Pakistans meddling? Is it not better that Pakistan
engages openly with leaders who are known to be moderate and accommodating? It is more of
false pride than anything else which has led the Indian leadership to feel that it can resolve the
Kashmir problem unilaterally. There is an impression that India feels it has reached an
international standing by virtue of its geo-strategic and political importance and that now it can
dictate terms, like the US does, or it can replicate the Israeli model of dealing with the
Palestinians when it comes to dealing with Kashmir.
India is aware that its aspirations for economic development could be affected if tensions with
Pakistan rise to a level that leads to a serious conflict. It will try to pressure Islamabad by
rejecting formal engagement and maligning Pakistan at international forums, but will refrain
from crossing the threshold. Currently, it is not interested in trade with Pakistan, which is a
minuscule two per cent of its global volume, although potential for increasing it does exist if
normal market forces are allowed to operate freely. Islamabads reluctance to grant MFN status
to India is an additional impediment to normalising trade.
The civil-military imbalance being skewed in favour of the latter gives another reason to India
for ignoring Nawaz Sharifs efforts at improving relations. The establishment insists that
relations with India are contingent on its willingness to discuss the future of Kashmir. By
pursuing a hard line towards Pakistan, India further strengthens the role of the military. It is not
surprising that the BJP being in power in India suits the military in Pakistan, enabling it to justify
its policies. This, in turn, boosts the power of the hardliners in India and gives them the driving
seat. Both have their strong views and it is difficult to visualise if there would be any meeting of
minds and values any time soon. The resulting dynamic only perpetuates antagonism between
the two countries.
The only real way forward is to actively cultivate the idea among Indians that Pakistan is less of
a problem and has the potential to be a partner in South Asia but for that to happen, Pakistan
must continue its efforts to put its house in order with greater zeal. Moreover, the establishments
in both countries must finally understand that their job is to build peace, not to perpetuate endless
conflict that leads nowhere except towards a downward spiral. The two countries need to put
their irreconcilable differences on the shelf and get to work on what they can agree upon and
wait to resolve them later at an opportune moment. Otherwise, Pakistan as the junior partner will
be condemned to live in the past and the senior one will find it hard to realise its ambitious goals.
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2. Pak-Russia Relations
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2. Pak-Russia Relations
Both countries also believe that transnational mega projects, including the CPEC and the Central
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, are paving the way for regional integration. Russian
strategists have rightly realised that Pakistans importance cannot be ignored in Pan-Eurasian
integration and its geo-strategic location also has a pivotal role to play in the revival of the Silk
Route, as well as in Eurasian Union integration. On the surface, no major obstacles restrict both
countries from expanding their multifaceted relations, but certain factors can slow down their
pace of growth. Pakistan and Russia are getting closer at a time when global politics is under
transformation, moving from a unipolar world to a multipolar one. Amid the US/Nato partial
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Indian tilt towards the US and the West and Russias rise,
Pakistan and Russia have the opportunity to translate their engagements into tangible positive
outcomes for both countries.
Recent upward trajectories in their political, economic and security ties at bilateral and
multilateral levels are a manifestation of foreign policy directives, which mean that both
countries are ready to cooperate with each other, forgetting the bitterness of the past. Defence
and economic relations seem to be their immediate priority. Pakistans full membership of the
SCO would provide new avenues for security and economic cooperation with Russia, China and
CARs. The SCO can also facilitate Pakistan and India to work through their longstanding issues
and move forward for economic cooperation and regional connectivity. Pakistan and Russia have
limited cultural exchange at the moment and there are opportunities for people of both countries
to interact with each other. This is a key impediment in creating an understanding of cultures,
traditions and values. Language barriers between the two communities play a significant role in
restricting cultural exchange programmes. However, one way to get over this hurdle could be to
provide incentives to students to learn the Russian language in Pakistan, as well as Urdu in
Russia.
Besides the interactions among government officials and parliamentarians, people-to-people
contacts centering around the academia, and media exchange programmes can work to catalyse
improved relations. It is difficult to predict whether these rekindled relations between Pakistan
and Russia will go a long way or not. For longstanding relations, one paramount consideration
for both sides is to comprehend emerging realities in the region and accordingly coordinate and
cooperate for a prosperous future.
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ideological veracities including Islamic ideology) more than ever. Russia has been trying to
balance these two incongruent aspects. Regionally, Russia has been successful in mending fences
with China. Russia is in need of China owing to Chinas economic prosperity whereas China
needs Russias help (in terms of supplying energy resources and distributing transport networks
for the movement of goods to and fro from Europe) to develop its western half. The other leg of
Chinas need-based paradigm is to touch the warm waters of the Arabian sea, the same warm
waters the former USSR is said to have aspired to reach after stepping into Afghanistan in 1979,
even if the term invasion is avoided to elucidate the act.
Russia has also mollified Pakistan. Immediately after 1991, Russia started extending the hand of
friendship to Pakistan to which Pakistan remained sceptical. In the meantime, Russia also tried to
associate itself with the west but failed. On the other hand, since 1991, the US has also started
bringing India closer to its fold. Post-9/11 developments offered both the US and India wider
space to figure out ways of working together in a range of fields from nuclear energy harnessing
to space exploration. In the post-9/11 era, circumstances called developments have also brought
Pakistan nearer to Russia in reciprocal reconciliatory terms on both bilateral and multilateral
fronts including sharing the platform of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in July
2015. In short, in Asia, the priority of Russia seems to be economic cooperation and not military
invasion. Russia is looking towards the East. The word hegemony is not being bandied about.
Interestingly, the post-Cold War realignment was slow and shallow but the post-9/11
realignments are quick and sturdy between the regional countries of Asia. More interestingly
still, Pakistan was not happy with the former USSR but now Pakistan seems to be happy with the
modified but condensed version of the same called Russia. The appalling episode of 9/11 must
have offered sufficient space to Russia to yearn for revival.
Pakistan must be asked how it views its former nemesis, the former USSR, which now embodies
Russia, to destroy the Islamic militant monster it has created and which is now Pakistans biggest
existential threat. Pakistan is soon going to offer a land route to Russia to let its goods have
access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea or Russia may achieve that target through China. If
amity and reconciliation are the ultimate destiny of a crisis, who will justify the lives lost on both
sides of the border in a struggle to subdue the other in the name of ideology?
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2. Pak-Russia Relations
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2. Pak-Russia Relations
In the past, despite having a huge asymmetry of size and capacity vis--vis Russia, Pakistan had
adversarial relations towards the Kremlin for almost the entire Cold War period. There were
short spans of time when Moscow welcomed Islamabads pursuit of friendship and cooperation;
however, events like the U-2 spy plane incident and Pakistans role as frontline state in the
Soviet Unions 1979 war in Afghanistan, led to eventual eviction of the Soviets in 1989.
Among the most critical factors was Pakistans membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) and The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), although Islamabad
joined these organizations solely because of its own complementary interests. However, Pakistan
participated in an alliance with the U.S., while pursuing divergent interests.
One of the pioneering international relations realists, Hans J. Morgenthau, describes the lack of
identity of interests in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance relationship in the following way: The alliance
between the U.S. and Pakistan is one of many contemporary instances of an alliance serving
complementary interests. For Washington it serves the primary purpose of expanding the scope
of the policy of containment; for Islamabad it serves primarily the purpose of increasing her
political, military and economic potential vis-a-vis her neighbors.
There is a long saga that explains how and why Pakistan from joined these South Asia security
pacts. In the wake of security and survival relations, the newly emerged state of Pakistan was
consumed by the fear of aggression from its eastern neighbor. There were several factors that
supported this argument in Pakistans security corridors and led policymakers to pursue possible
as well as available options to mitigate this insecurity and improve defense capabilities.
These fears were fueled by Indian aggression against Kashmir, Hyderabad and Jona Garh (all
three states which were to be part of either India or Pakistan on settled and agreed upon criteria,
mainly the consent of the majority of the population of the state). India forcefully integrated
Hyderabad and Jona Garh into Indian territory; yet, Kashmir became a disputed territory
between India and Pakistan. Kashmir remains an unfinished item on the agenda and a bone of
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2. Pak-Russia Relations
contention between the two nuclear neighbors. This was the scenario that constituted Pakistans
insecurity and uncertainty about survival.
The former prime minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who is believed to be one of the
architects of the security policy to join alliances with the U.S., explains the primary reason for
joining anti-Communism alliances: Our main and only purpose was to safeguard the safety and
security of Pakistan and we needed support from like-minded and peace-loving nations. We have
never made any secret of the fact that we apprehended a threat to our security from India.
Pakistan had provided the United States with intelligence sharing and air bases and joined the
containment policy as the second-largest non-Communist state of Asia, but its strategic concerns
about India were not focused on by its partners.
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light during the Indo-Russian fifth generation fighter jet multibillion-dollar program, with Russia
currently failing to fulfill most of Indias indigenous production goals.
New Delhis growing dissatisfaction with the mutual partnership and the countrys quest for
diversification are perpetuating the shift. India needs improvements and is keen on trying other
suppliers; however, Moscow sees these moves as impinging on its current stance.
The Kremlin wants to slow down the impending downward trend, as well as leverage its influence
over New Delhi, by skillfully utilizing the Pakistan card. By engaging with Pakistan, Russia leaves
New Delhi with a hard choice: to honor its strategic commitment to Russia and make concessions or
to observe Russian-Pakistani rapprochement, which could potentially erode Indias military
advantage.
This maneuver comes in line with the Kremlins realpolitik strategy, which has become traditional
over the recent years. In 2010, Vladimir Putin famously said that Russia is not maintaining military
cooperation with Pakistan as it takes into account the concerns of Indian partners. Moscow was
sensitive to the India-Pakistan rivalry before; however, altering geopolitical realities goaded Russian
foreign policy into exploring new horizons.
Russian-Pakistani relations were far from harmonious during the previous decades. The Kremlin
supplied Pakistan with weapons in 1960s but both countries eventually faced a major split, as
Moscow selected New Delhi to be its strategic regional partner. Furthermore, Moscow and Islamabad
had a proxy conflict during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with Pakistan openly supporting the
mujahideen. The geopolitical vector did not change after the USSRs collapse. It is only now, after a
quarter of a century, that Moscow is looking to rekindle bilateral relations.
The Kremlin has chosen its moment wisely. Islamabad has grown cautious lately about its alliance
with the United States, as it perceives a lack of reliability from the White House. In particular, the
recent U.S. refusal to subsidize Pakistans purchase of F-16 fighter jets may have pushed both
countries farther away from each other, with Russia potentially emerging as an alternative supplier.
Interestingly, though, Moscow is not ready to move full-speed ahead and is keen on maintaining its
distance while portraying other reasons for its recent engagements with Islamabad.
It is not a secret that Russia is extremely alarmed by the growth of ISIS and a possible collapse of
Afghanistan, to the extent that it is even ready to engage with the Taliban. By actively coordinating
with Pakistan, Moscow should be able to halt the radical jihadists future spillover to Central Asia.
Therefore, Russia is trying to portray its own security concerns as the raison dtre behind the
rapprochement.
Russia will not become a major Pakistani partner any time soon, and will remain closely connected to
India. Still, the Kremlins move delivers a strong message to the Modi administration. In effect, New
Delhi acknowledges Moscows security concerns but also understands that the Russia-Pakistani
partnership would continue to evolve proportionally to Indias cooperation with the West.
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political, institutional and popular sustain within the masses of both sides. Despite the unfriendly
relations of both countries with India, China encourages and appreciates Pakistans eagerness for
peaceful resolution of all of the outstanding issues with the neighboring countries just for the
sake of a peaceful, stable, cooperative and prosperous region.
Apart from the bilateral cooperation, both countries have greater role in the peace-building and
rehabilitation process of Afghanistan having realized the fact that peace and development in the
region are mostly connected with the stability and peace in Afghanistan. The new Afghan regime
under President Ghani is also desirous to use Chinas increased role in bringing the Taliban to a
negotiation tables for a peaceful political solution that could bring an end to the countrys long
fought war against the Taliban.
Having said all this, Chinas investment plans in Pakistan are envisioned by keeping in mind the
overall regional infrastructural developments. Therefore, through the initiative of China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) which include building a new road network along with a railway
line, an airport, dry ports, neighbouring countries like Afghanistan and India could also benefit
from this corridor by linking their countries with this network. Moreover, these plans also
include New Silk Road linking the region with Europe through Central Asia which will not only
benefit Pakistan and China but intends broader goals of regional peace, progress and prosperity
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By now it is widely known that the CPEC is a collection of projects. It primarily aims at
achieving strong trade links between China and Pakistan. This 46 billion dollars project will
allow Pak-China relations to enter a new phase with added economic and strategic dimensions to
it. All this development is closely monitored in Delhi with great unease. They have made no
effort to conceal their unease and have openly voiced their displeasure by condemning the CPEC
project.
However, both China and Pakistan are fully dedicated to turn CPEC into reality against all odds.
This is naturally an alarming situation for India which is finding it hard to curb its frustration
anymore. As is evident from Prime Minister Narendra Modis speech at a conference, in which
he resolutely disapproved the initiative of China-Pakistan economic corridor. In very vivid terms
he warned that China should stop developing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) or
be prepared to face dire consequences in Baluchistan.
The same rhetoric could be heard coming from Sushma Swaraj where she vehemently expressed
that India would not allow the route of economic corridor to be passed through Gilgit-Baltistan,
implying that the region is part of India and Pakistan first needs to seek Indias permission to
carry out any activity there.
Both these statements coming from high profile and in service political leadership, raises concern
for both Pakistan and China. The hurdles and challenges are bound to be there. But it will not be
an exaggeration to say that the biggest challenge does come from India. The statements by Indian
leadership do not leave any ambiguity that India is against the CPEC. Not only this but it is
employing different ways and means to pressurize Pakistan to behave on Delhis terms.
India is bent upon disallowing the passage of CPEC through Azad Kashmir. India considers
Azad Kashmir as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and it assumes that it has the natural right of
jurisdiction over whole of Kashmir. On the other hand, constructing the corridor through Azad
Kashmir means China considers it a part of Pakistan which comes in direct clash with Indias
stance on Kashmir.
At the same time India feels growingly alarmed at the possibility of Chinas presence so close to
India. Once Gwadar port is functional, China not only gets three times reduction in the total
distance that would need to be covered by the Chinese trading ships but China will also get an
easy access into Indian Ocean, thereby undermining Indias supremacy and influence in the
region. Chinese expected naval edge over India is naturally causing unrest among the Indian
military and civil circles.
Not just that but one of the former ambassadors of India openly expressed that the CPEC is
having a sole nefarious agenda of containment of India. Hence is seen as a valid threat to Indian
security and sovereignty where both and China are seen to be working towards weakening
Indias position in the region.
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Prime Minister Modi also expressed in his Independence Day speech that people in Baluchistan
have thanked him, implying that he is more closely integrated with people in Baluchistan. At the
same time his threat about facing consequences in Baluchistan, has made it clear that India is
involved in instigating the anti-state sentiments in the province. Furthermore, recently
Brahmdagh Bugti have been reported to seek asylum in India, to which he has received positive
response from the Indian government.
Baluchistan is the main site which holds the major concentration of the CPEC project. Hence
Baluchistan has been the prime target for Indian aggressive interventionist policy. The Indian
Spy Kalbuhsan Yadav was captured from Baluchistan, further reinforcing the validity of this
argument.
However it is a fact that Indian frustration against CPEC, China and Pakistan is only going to
grow further, along with the pressure from India against Pakistan. This will for sure add to the
tension in the region for which Pakistan needs to be well prepared all the time and be in a
position to counter it too.
Eventually India will have to realize that the CPEC is not just bringing dividends for Pakistan but
is integral for the socio-economic uplift of the whole region and beyond. Hence staying out of
the CPEC is not going to serve India any good and is not even advisable. The stronger economic
ties will be guaranteeing regional security and stability and ultimately benefit all the states in the
region. This is because of the pattern of interdependence that is created when countries get
engaged in the economic activity with each other such as trade. This also reduces the chances of
clash or war.
Hence instead of being frustrated by this mega project, India needs to see it from a much bigger
perspective where this may actually compliment Indias aspirations of becoming an economic
giant and ultimately emerge as a major power.
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The strategic game changer project,China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC), is biggest ever
investment for both China and Pakistan that is poised to change the future course of history for
both countries. It aims to connect Gwadar port in the south western Pakistan to Chinas
northwestern autonomous region of Xinjiang, via a network of highways, railways and pipelines
to transport oil, gas and other goods.
By and large, construction costs are estimated at $46 billion which is roughly 20% of Pakistan
annual GDP. Besides transport, the corridor will provide Pakistan with telecommunications and
energy infrastructure as well. The corridor will go a long way in making Pakistan a better-off and
powerful entity than it ever was.
Both countries hope that this project will transform Pakistan into regional and economic hub as
well as further boost the growing ties between Pakistan and China. Once built, the nearly 2,000mile-long corridor will shorten Chinas route to the Middle East by about 7,500 miles.
The CPEC is of enormous strategic and economic significance to China, Pakistan and other
regional countries. For China the CPEC would reduce the travelling distance, for its huge
volumes of trade with the Gulf countries, from existing 13000 kilometers to mere 2500
kilometers. It will cut down the travelling time from the existing 45 days to only 10 days, and it
will also reduce the cost of freight by one third. Through CPEC, China will be able to trade with
South Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and North Africa through a much shorter route.
No wonder China is now a major investor in foreign markets. China has become the leading
country in terms of foreign direct investment in Pakistan during the last decade. Chinese national
economy today is the strongest in the world with its highest foreign exchange reserves. China
will make huge revenues because with the completion of CPEC, the Chinese shipments will be
able to reach the same destination just within 10 days period.
The project has also elevated Islamabads strategic partnership with the regional superpower.
CPEC is viewed as an economic lifeline for Pakistan. The government in Islamabad recognizes
the CPEC as the only opportunity left for Pakistan to develop itself economically and,
importantly, bring stability and progress in the country.
Another vital aspect is that Gwadar Port will eventually create a nexus between China, Pakistan
and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) with prospective revenues more than billions of dollars
every year for all the countries. Pakistans trade with Central Asian Republics would also
increase using CPEC since they will be connected with CPEC based on the Quadrilateral
Agreement for Traffic in Transit, which has already been signed by Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan.
After completion of CPEC, Pakistans national income will also increase since it will get
royalties or transit fee on huge volumes of Chinese and CARs exports and imports to and from
West Asia, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa through CPEC, being the shortest route.
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Hence the importance of CPEC is such that it is being hailed as a fate changer by the Pakistan.
With Chinese investment pouring in, Pakistan is desperately looking to guarantee stability and
safety to ensure the timely completion of the project. But it is important to keep in mind that
challenges confronted by CPEC are still unsettled. It is facing both internal and external
obstructions which could derail this multifaceted project.
A lack of domestic consensus can hinder development in any part of the world, and CPEC is no
exception. When CPEC was initially introduced, every mainstream political party supported it.
However, the enthusiasm turned to deep concern when political parties from economically weak
provinces (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan) felt that their provinces reservations about
CPEC were not being addressed.
The debate between political parties became so intense that China felt it necessary to put out a
statement urging parties to overcome their differences. A spokesman from the Chinese embassy
in Islamabad said, Relevant parties should strengthen their communication and coordination on
the matter. So it is very essential that the plan ought to be kept above politics.
The security atmosphere inside Pakistan especially Baluchistan poses numerous difficulties for
CPEC. Starting from Kashgar, the project will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan and KPK, followed
by Baluchistan. For that matter, government has decided to install 10,000 army personnel under
the command of a major-general, whose primary objective will be to safeguard Chinese
engineers and guard the entire trade route. The deployment of army personnel has already begun.
This shows that the civilian and military leaderships despite differences over foreign policy
are on the same page when it comes to this strategically vital project.
Another major challenge is imposed by neighboring country India. While Pakistan is developing
Gwadar to become a nerve centre for regional trade along with development of necessary
infrastructure under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), India has openly stated on more
than one occasion that it would go to any length to sabotage this project.
According to an editorial published in Pakistan observer, apart from setting up a special cell of
RAW to plan and execute anti-CPEC activities, India is luring regional and world powers to join
hands to develop Chabahar as a counter-weight to Gwadar besides construction of rail and road
links through Iran to link India with Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.
However, Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan Mehdi Honardoost, while speaking on Pakistan-Iran
relations at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad (ISSI), said, Chabahar would not turn
out to be an enemy port to Gwadar but work as a friend port. He further said the recent
trilateral agreement between India, Iran, and Afghanistan on Chabhar port was not finished
and both China and Pakistan are welcome to join it.
Even though the Iranian Ambassador insists Chabahar would not become a rival port to Gwadar
even when it tries to bypass Pakistan to create a link between Central Asian countries and India,
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Pakistan needs to stay vigilant to Indian plans to sabotage the CPEC project. The leadership of
the country has to get together and remove all internal obstacles faced by this project.
One important obstacle that needs to be given close consideration is the status of Gilgit-Baltistan.
It will pass through disputed region. Gilgit-Baltistan is the gateway to Pakistan from China, but
China cannot afford to invest billions of dollars on a road that passes through a disputed territory
claimed both by India and Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is disputed, underdeveloped, lacks legal
status, and is not getting its fair share of CPEC attention, all of which could lead to numerous
problems.
To ensure that Pakistan does not suffer, the government must not only develop contingency
plans, it must also be more transparent about the deal itself. Questions have already been raised
about the proposed CPEC routes. Both Balochistan and KPs political leadership have raised
concerns about the proposed routes and their impact on their local economies.
To guarantee CPEC translucent macroeconomic stability, economic policymakers, both at the
State Bank and outside, should be provided details about the expected inflows and outflows of
foreign currency, and the debt and equity components of the deal.
In the words of the Federal Minister Ahsan Iqbal who is managing the CPEC project: If
Pakistan does not provide stability for CPEC, Chinese will not hesitate to find another route,
practically leaving Pakistan out of this mega economic and trade route. All in all, CPEC will
face many hurdles, both domestically and from regional powers that may see it as a threat.
However, with a multi-billion dollar Chinese stake in the project, and Pakistan looking at it as a
lifeline for survival, optimism remains high in both countries.
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trade passes each year. The strategic significance of these ports is visibly clear from the fact that
these sea trade centers are located at the crossroads of international sea shipping and oil trade
routes while linking three regions that are: South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.
For India, Chabahar is the adjoining port to the Indian Ocean providing direct entrance to the
Middle East and Central Asia. Chabahar will provide India with an entry to Afghanistan.
Recently Iran, Afghanistan and India reached an agreement to give Indian supplies, heading for
Central Asia and Afghanistan, special treatment and decreased tariff at Chabahar.
For China, Gwadar with a considerable head start over Chabahar, could be a finishing point for
pipelines in its oil and gas supply chain from the Middle East and the Africa, allowing it to find a
way around the crowded nip point that is the passage of Hormuz. Gwadar also opens up the
projection for a pipeline corridor bringing oil and gas to China from the Middle East as an
exchange route to transport oil around the Indian Subcontinent and through the progressively
more disputed territorial waters of the South China Sea. The path will be economical, less risky
and give Beijing greater freedom of action to chase its control over the South China Sea.
Declaration of CPEC brought India yet again in an open conflict with Pakistan. In November
2013, Pakistan handed over the Gwadar Port to Chinese Overseas Ports Holding Company Ltd.
(COPHCL) for further expansion. This progress worried India and it started asking Iranian
officials to resume the construction of the Chabahar port. Chabahar is located at approximately
150 kilometers west from the Pakistani deep-sea port, Gwadar. In a way, chahbahar development
by India was a result of strategic rivalry of Gwadar.
Many in Pakistan view Chabahar as Indias answer to Pakistans development of the Gwadar
port, associating with China, which is something India should invest in by all means. India has
many strategic and political reasons to have partnership with Iran. India wants to counteract
China and the place it chose in Iran (Chahbahar) is just 106 miles away from Gwadar. No doubt
it is a strong effort to reduce the economic weight of Gwadar.
The imprisonment of Indian naval officer Kulbushan Yadev, along with a huge spy network
carrying out rebellious activities in Baluchistan and Karachi, specified some Indo-Iranian nexus.
Later, arrest of some Afghan spies in Baluchistan further uncovered Indo-Afghan alliance. Also,
droning of Mullah Mansur further brought such facts into the attention, which strengthened
assumption regarding Indo-Afghan-Iran nexus. In fact, this strategic competition represents the
intensity of Indian panic because of Pakistan China economic corridor. Certainly, Chabahar can
affect the timelines of CPEC, prohibiting reaping full benefits of the expected game changer.
Despite the strategic importance of Chabahar for India, there has been very little progress
observed for several reasons. First is Irans unresponsive support for the project. Although the
idea was first mooted in 2003, it was only in 2012 on the sidelines of the 16th Non-Aligned
Movement Summit in Tehran that Iran then wobbled under sanctions for its nuclear activities
approved to set up a joint working group to function the port project as part of the trilateral
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agreement between Afghanistan, India and Iran on investment cooperation, business and
transportation. A chief factor behind Irans unwillingness to allow an Indian presence at
Chabahar was the opposition by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, which
reportedly uses the port to ship arms to Yemen and militant groups in the region.
Furthermore, given the existence of Gwadar next door, where China has pledged to invest $46
billion for CPEC, it is unclear whether the Chabahar route will produce enough trade to justify
the investment. In fact Iran, which has been playing hardball with India and demanding greater
Indian investment in Chabahar, itself plans to invest $4 billion to build a plant in Gwadar to
process 400,000 barrels of oil per day. Clearly, resolving the Chabahar challenge is vital to
securing Indias interests in Iran and beyond. Nevertheless, given the challenges noticeable in
this project, India is unlikely to succeed on its own.
Additionally, Gulf region is in a state of strategic instability and it is difficult to forecast viability
of Irans strategic route, including its relationship with India. Competitors such as China and
Pakistan could obstruct or otherwise trump Indias involvement in the project. Expectantly the
development of Gwadar will attract Kabul and Central Asian Republics more.
India wants to get back Karzai type government in Afghanistan which is only possible if
Islamabads control is reduced by upsetting the newly formed cooperative relationship between
the two Muslim countries. With the Torkham border tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
it seems its designs are somewhat succeeding. However, the Durand Line conflict between
Afghanistan and Pakistan is not new. The greater economic benefits that Afghanistan can reap
from Chabahar, its only a matter of time before Kabul will soften its stance on the issue.
In order to be triumphant, Pakistan should exercise effective leadership by employing its
administration, military and diplomacy to maximize the Gwadar ports potential. If Pakistan
succeeds in this regional game, the Gwadar Port will guarantee connectivity to the world as well
as speedy movement of its workforce, goods and services. And, the CPEC will result in
qualitative improvement of Pakistans land connectivity related infrastructure.
Failing to achieve this goal will allow India and Iran to collect all the benefits. Pakistan must ask
China, to sign and announce high-status cooperation agreements and openly announce a strategic
military coalition to help each other achieve common interests, and also to help each other in
case of any violence. CPEC is the game changer and its destined to be successful.
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countries in Asia are so huge, that their access to the sea via their own land route for
international trade is very costly. They are searching for a shortest possible route for themselves.
Its example is the mighty China whose western part is several thousand kilometers away from its
seaports of the Eastern area.
Its nearest approach for its western part is from Gwadar port Baluchistan (Pakistan), so it has
decided to connect its mainland to Gwadar through a transport network which is commonly
termed as Pakistan-China Economic Corridor. India strongly retaliated and brought its all
resources to counter it. The recent statements against Pakistan by Indian Foreign Minister are in
fact representing the intensity of Indian pain because of this economic corridor.
Presently, India is taking all steps to reduce the value of this route. One of the initiatives taken is
to build a port in Gulf of Oman at Chabahar at Iranian land. India and Iran signed an agreement
to build this port in 2003, but this agreement was not feasible because of international sanction
on Iran by Western Countries. As soon as these sanctions are over, Irans good weather friend,
India is back to Iran and offered it to restart the 2003 agreement of building the said port. It is
important to note that India withdrew from Iran-Pakistan-India after Mumbai attack. It was
mainly done because of international pressure on India to pressurize it to roll back its nuclear
program. Mumbai attack provided a face-saving opportunity to India and it withdrew from this
agreement at once.
Why India went back to Iran to build this port? It is important to note this agreement has been
done after three subsequent events: a deal finalized between Iran and the West, Chinese
President visited Pakistan and signed $46 billion agreement with Pakistan (including Gwadar
Port building) and after Afghan President Visit to India. The finalization of deal between Iran
and the West provided an opportunity to India to resume its agreement with Iran to promote its
trade relations with Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics.
Gwadar port however, is under development by China to easily connect its western area with the
world. This port will also be beneficial to Afghanistan and Central Asian Countries. The
development of Gwadar by China is considered to be a part of String of Pearls strategy of the
country. On the other hand, India wants to counter China and the place it chose in Iran
On the other hand, India wants to counter China and the place it chose in Iran is just 106 miles
away from Gwadar. It is a strong attempt to reduce the economic importance of Gwadar. It can
be taken as an Indian retaliation to the agreements signed between Pakistan and China.
The establishment of Chabahar can influence value of Gwadar. The present structure of Chahbar
is not so well. The development of Gwadar will attract Kabul and Central Asian Republics more.
India wants to get back Karzai type regimes influence in Afghanistan which is only possible if
Islamabads influence is reduced by disrupting the newly formed cooperative relationship
between the two Muslim countries. The present regime of Ashraf Ghani has changed policy and
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decided to bring a durable peace in Afghanistan which is only possible if the violence of Taliban
is eradicated. Here only Pakistan can help Afghanistan, so Ghani regime changed its policy.
Which port Gwadar or Chabahar is suitable for Kabul? It is 1237 kilometers away from Gwadar
whereas the distance between Kabul and Chabahar is 1840 kilometers (driving distance). It
means Gwadar is more suitable for Kabul because it is more than 600 km nearer to it as
compared to Chabahar. Kahandar is situated almost in middle as it is 1338 km away from
Gawadar and 1346 km away from Chabahar. If we calculate distance between Herat (the nearest
city to Iran) and Gawadar, it is 1637 km away whereas it is 1358 km away from Chabahar.
Distance between Gwadar and all Afghan cities is less compared to Chabahar but law and order
situation along Pakistani route is not good. These routes will only be viable, if security is
provided along this route. The security condition in Pakistani province Baluchistan is not good
and a large part of all routes to Afghanistan is through these routes. It is important to note that
Indian is playing a large of game to destabilizing Pakistan in Baluchistan. Several reports have
clarified the involvement of RAW in it. According to a statement of Pakistans Minister of
Defense Khawaja Asif, Baluch insurgents are using Indian Passport.
Why India is supporting Baluch insurgents, its clear reasons is that because it want to save its
interests.
Moreover, India has invested heavily to build road to join Afghans cities with Chabahar. It wants
failure of Pakistans route to Afghanistan. If Pakistans route to Afghanistan will continue, it will
bring Afghanistan closer to Pakistan which will be not acceptable to India. India wants to play
some crucial role in Afghanistan and it wants to use Afghanistan as a proxy to hurt Pakistan.
According to an Indian Philosopher Kautaliya, immediate neighbor is enemy and neighbors
neighbor is a friend.
Today, the pattern of international relations has been changed. Now, India is working on the
strategy to have weak neighbors. India wants a complete hegemony in South Asia. All other
states, in South Asia, except Pakistan, are so weak that they have no ability to challenge India. It
is Pakistan, that is balancing India and if Pakistan breaks, India will capable to play its game
more easily. It can succeed only by searching fault lines and one of the hottest points is
Baluchistan which India is using very cleverly by sitting in Afghanistan. Its purpose is clear
here to hurt Pakistan any time it wishes in future.
A news report is showing that a special cell has been set up in RAW under the supervision of its
chief to ruin Pak-China economic corridor. According to this report $35 million has been
reserved for this purpose. It clearly indicates that India will do its best to hinder the construction
of silk route from Pakistan. Dr Iqtidar Karamat Cheema, a professor of International Relations at
University of Gloucestershire, United Kingdom wrote a comprehensive article on RAW
intervention in Pakistan and explained that Indian Prime Minister Modi declared to conduct an
operation in Pakistan territory.
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He further explained that the three arrested militants of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan namely
Khurram Ishtiaq, Ghulam Mustafa and Shamim have disclosed that RAW has been funding
suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan and that the Indian intelligence agency has channeled 680
million rupees to promote instability in Pakistan. According to a report of Federation of
American Scientist, 35000 RAW agents has entered in Pakistan, with 12,000 working in Sindh,
10,000 in Punjab, 8,000 in KPK and 5000 in Baluchistan. This is clearly showing how RAW is
operating inside Pakistan and it is at pain to destroy Pakistani peace.
Pakistan should convince Afghans that Gwadar route is suitable for them. It is an economic route
for Afghans with suitable logistic expenses but operationalization of this route is connected to
Peace in Baluchistan which is impossible in the presence of several thousand RAW agents.
Pakistan must first bring peace than focus on the construction of shortest possible route so that
Afghans can be benefitted from this route. Moreover, shortest possible route to Afghanistan will
be the shortest possible link Hydrocarbon rich CARs. If Pakistan succeeds to bring peace, its
economy will be revolutionized and it will emerge as a powerful country, which cannot be
acceptable for Modi government, but Pakistan cannot keep itself undeveloped for happiness of
Indian regime.
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4--Pak-US-Afghan Relations
In recent news, authorities have indefinitely shut down the Pak-Afghan border at Chaman after
Afghan demonstrators desecrated the Pakistan flag and pelted stones at the Friendship Gate. This
has come weeks after the incident at Torkham border, where cross-border firing over the
construction of a gate along the border led to the death of a Pakistani major.
The dynamics of Pak-Afghan relations are often seen shifting, dictated by leaders in power,
national security concerns, and foreign policy linkages. While many attribute fickle relations
between the two countries to their historical baggage, others cite Afghanistans swelling affair
with India as a reason for its disengagement and Pakistans growing mistrust. Although Ghanis
appointment was seen by many as the calm after the storm that was Karzai, less than a year into
his tenure he is found blasting Pakistan on international forums over its alleged undeclared and
covert war in Afghanistan.
With Karzai endorsing Modis statement on Balochistan, Pakistans civil-military repeatedly
deflecting blame on Afghan intelligence agencies following attacks on Pakistani soil, recurring
border skirmishes, and the shadow of the Durand line looming large on bilateral relations, many
are of the opinion that Pak-Afghan relations are headed for the worst.
What does this mean for regional security?
Blame game
While cultural, ethnic, economic, and religious ties are deep-seated between the two countries,
both have frequently been on a sour note with each other. Historically, this goes back to
Afghanistan questioning the validity of the Durand line after the decolonization of the British,
and making territorial claims so far as Balochistan, and the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.
Afghanistan refuses to recognize the Durand line still and sees Pakistans involvement in
destabilizing Afghanistan through its covert tactics as a means to weaken its claim on its rightful
territories.
Pakistans policy of supporting ethnic groups in Afghanistan during the Cold War, leading to the
emergence of the Mujahideen, and the consequent injection of the Taliban as a means to stabilize
Afghanistan whilst keeping it close, only deteriorated the political situation in the country and
bred more hatred for its neighbor. This resentment extends to the Afghan public, whereby antiPakistan sentiments run as deep as pro-Indian romanticism.
As of now, Pakistan is invariably accused of breeding radical groups on Afghan soil, and
providing sanctuaries and support for terrorists. Mullah Mansours presence in Balochistan, and
the Afghan governments claim that Mullah Omar died in a hospital in Karachi, along with
numerous other examples of Taliban leaders operating in Pakistan, adds to this narrative. In a
recent interview, Sartaj Aziz conceded to the presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership in
Pakistan and the provision of medical facilities to them. Additionally, he disclosed that Pakistan
has some influence on the Afghan Taliban, and that ridding the Haqqani network was a
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4--Pak-US-Afghan Relations
process that needed time and could result in a backlash if not done right. However, Pakistan
rejects allegations regarding its involvement in the politics of Afghanistan, and sees it as
Afghanistans policy to use Pakistan as a scapegoat for its own political failures. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that Pakistans position has changed considerably following the APS attacks, where
its former lenient policies regarding militants took a turn towards a more aggressive answer to
the problem in terms of Zarb-e-Azab and the ongoing combing operations. The formulation of
the 20 point National Action Plan, executed by the civil-military leadership, is a step taken in the
right direction.
Pakistan too has accused Afghanistan of cross-border terrorism on various accounts. The recent
attack in Quetta stands as testimony of that where the civil-military leadership both charged
Afghanistans National Directorate of Service and Indian Research Analysis Wing for assisting
Jamaatul Ahrar, a splinter group of the Taliban, in carrying out the attack to derail CPEC. While
this statement was thrown around as a convenient way to conceal the failure of intelligence and
security agencies, its noteworthy that the existence of this narrative is grounded in a deep
historical mistrust between both countries where they are seen as facilitators of insurgency on
each others soil.
Friend of my enemy
With Pakistan still struggling to mend ties with Afghanistan, India is making deep inroads in the
political and economic sphere of the country through diplomatic gifts like the recently
inaugurated Friendship Dam, and a new Afghan parliament building. The Iran-India-Afghanistan
Chabahar nexus, with Pakistan far from the economic scene, is also making policy makers and
leaders anxious of the growing proximity of the two countries. Pakistans conundrum is this: an
unstable Afghanistan, and a strong Afghanistan closely aligned with India. Of the two, Pakistan
prefers the former. Geographically, Pakistan lies sandwiched between the two countries, and
with worsening relations between India and Pakistan over issues like Kashmir, the recent support
of Modi to Baloch insurgents, alongside Afghanistans territorial claims and accusatory fingers
Pakistan is put between a rock and a hard place.
Pakistan acts as a natural trade route between Afghanistan and India. However, with the
completion of the Chabahar port, Pakistan could possibly lose its only leverage over Afghanistan
whereby it closes off borders and forces the government to talks and negotiations as in the case
of the Torkham border. A dissenting position to this is that Afghanistan relies heavily on
Pakistan for medical tourism, meat supply, and every day items, and would still have to maintain
ties with its neighbor despite dwindling relations. Furthermore, since Pakistan is geographically a
natural neighbor, a partner in counter-terrorism efforts, as well as a religious and cultural ally,
Afghanistan would continue its efforts to rescue bilateral relations with Pakistan mindful of its
long-term gains.
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4--Pak-US-Afghan Relations
Survival
ISIS has gained traction in Afghanistan under its banner of ISIS-Khurasan, an ambitious project
to include Afghanistan and Pakistan in one province under ISIS rule. Added to this, the Taliban
continue to operate in both countries to destabilize the region. In a recent case, Kunduz fell into
militant hands once more as it did last year, before security forces took it back. If US forces are
to eventually withdraw from Afghanistan, which the US government keeps delaying, an unstable
Afghanistan could sow the seeds for a destabilized Pakistan owing to the porous borders both
countries share. However, recent efforts to control cross-border movement, and focus on border
management could possibly limit the movement of militants. This would also put an end to
habitual finger pointing by Afghanistan claiming that terrorists on its territory come from
Pakistan, and Pakistan accusing them of the same. This is a step taken in the right direction to
strengthen the internal security of both countries, bilateral relations, as well as bolster regional
stability. Both countries could also possibly escape the confines of viewing bilateral relations
through a security prism, and enable them to approach foreign policy through an economic and
cultural exchange; something that India seems to be doing successfully in Afghanistan.
Peace in Afghanistan is contingent on regional stability, with Pakistan at its core. Likewise, a
volatile Afghanistan threatens Pakistans internal security and its ability to revive its economy,
weak state structures, and subdue militant factions operating in the country. However, as
mentioned earlier, with relations with India on the decline, Pakistan is perceived as leaning
towards a policy of maintaining ties with the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network in an
Afghanistan closely tied to India. But Pakistan is treading on thin ice. What it sees as a zero-sum
game is in reality excluding it from regional economic ventures like the Chabahar agreement,
and making it difficult for its allies to stand by it as in the case of the US changing its tone to a
more aggressive one in discussing Pakistans policy of good and bad Taliban.
Chinas growing interest in Afghanistan, possibly as a policy to restore the balance of power in
the region with regards to India and the US, could also prompt Beijing to pressurize Pakistan in
revisiting its Afghanistan policy. Though Pakistan has been relentless in this regard, cohesive
international pressure could lead it to take another look. While expecting radical change in this
policy would only lead to disappointment India, Afghanistan and the United States would be
foolish to recoil from whatever partial collaborations they have with Pakistan pertaining to their
counterterrorism syndicate.
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4--Pak-US-Afghan Relations
Main Argument
Afghanistans peaceful future depends to a great extent on an auspicious regional environment,
with Pakistan at its core. Conversely, an unstable Afghanistan threatens Pakistan, complicating
the latters ability to refurbish its weak state and economy and suppress dangerous internal
militancy. But in the absence of dramatically improved relations with India, Pakistan is likely to
prefer an unstable Afghanistan to a strong Afghanistan closely aligned with India. Pakistan thus
retains an interest in not liquidating its long-term relationship with the Afghan Taliban and the
Haqqani network, a policy that exacerbates Afghan instability.
Policy Implications
Although the outreach to Pakistan by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has warmed relations
between the two countries, Pakistans geostrategic outlook and the limitations of its selective
counterterrorism policies have not resolutely changed.
Pakistans policies toward both militant groups and Afghanistan are determined as much by
incompetence, inertia, and a lack of capacity as by calibrated duplicitous manipulation.
Crucially, Pakistans willingness to accommodate Afghanistan-oriented militant groups is
motivated by a fear of provoking militants to incite violence in Punjab and threaten the core of
the Pakistani state instead of focusing externally. This paralyzing fear persists despite Pakistans
desire to defeat Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
Chinas increasing activity in Afghanistan might eventually motivate Beijing to put pressure on
Pakistan in a way that it has previously been unwilling to do. Pakistan may thus face more united
international pressure regarding its policies in Afghanistan and accommodation of militants than
ever before.
Nonetheless, an expectation of radical change in Pakistans strategic outlook and behavior
toward militant groups will likely produce disappointmentin Afghanistan, India, and the
United States. Yet all three countries would be wise not to sacrifice whatever limited
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4--Pak-US-Afghan Relations
collaboration with Pakistan is at times possible for the still-elusive hope of cajoling Pakistan into
a full-scale and lasting counterterrorism partnership.
Introduction
Afghanistans peaceful future depends to a great extent on an auspicious regional environment,
with Pakistan at its core. Vice versa, an unstable Afghanistan will complicate Pakistans ability
to refurbish its weak state and economy and suppress dangerous internal militancy.
Assassinations and military coups have plagued Pakistan since the early years of independence,
leaving behind a weak political system unable to effectively deliver elementary public goods,
including safety, and respond to the fundamental needs of the struggling Pakistani people. Rather
than being a convenient tool for regional security schemes as Pakistani generals have often
imagined, an Afghanistan plagued by intense militancy, with Kabul unable to control its territory
and effectively exercise power, will distract Pakistans leaders from addressing internal
challenges. Such a violently contested, unsettled Afghanistan will only further augment and
complicate Pakistans own deep-seated and growing security and governance problems.
Yet Afghanistans location at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia
has for centuries made a friendly neighborhood elusive. Although religious, ethnic, economic,
and cultural ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan run deep and wide, the two countries have
frequently been at odds with one another. During the Cold War, Afghanistan became a
battleground in the global conflict between the Soviet Union and United States, with Pakistan as
a key U.S. ally supporting the anti-Soviet mujahideen. Pakistan has long been a difficult and
disruptive neighbor, seeking leverage in Afghanistan, hoping to limit Indias influence there, and
cultivating radical groups within Afghanistan as proxies. Despite a decade of U.S. attempts to
bring Islamabad and Rawalpindi (the seats of Pakistans government and military establishment,
respectively) on board with its efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan continues to be ensnared in
while also augmentingAfghanistans instability. Pakistan fears both a strong Afghan
government closely aligned with India, potentially helping encircle Pakistan, and an unstable
Afghanistan that becomesas has already happeneda safe haven for anti-Pakistan militant
groups and a dangerous playground for outside powers. Whether the recent warming of relations
between the two countries, following a change in government in Kabul in September 2014 when
Ashraf Ghani became president, translates into lasting and substantial changes in Pakistans
policy remains very much yet to be seen.
But if Afghanistan is unstable and harbors Salafi groups that infiltrate Pakistan, then Pakistan
itself will become further destabilized andcruciallydistracted from tackling its other crises.
These include militancy in the Punjab region and a host of domestic calamities, such as intense
political instability, economic atrophy, widespread poverty, and a severe energy crisis. The
Pakistani state is already hollowed out, with its administrative structures having undergone a
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steady decline since independence. Major macroeconomic deficiencies have increased, and deep
poverty and marginalization persist amid a semi-feudal distribution of power, often ineffective
and corrupt political leadership, internal social and ethnic fragmentation, and compromised
security forces. The internal security challenge is far more insidious than that recently
encountered by the Pakistani military in the tribal and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa areas. In actuality, it
is the Punjabi groups, such as the Punjabi Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Sipah-e-Sahaba, who
pose a deeper threat to Pakistan. Extreme internal fragmentation in Pakistan and a loss of central
control, particularly if these problems extend to the military, could set off one of the most
dangerous security threats in Asia and the world. After all, Pakistan is a large, nuclear-armed
Muslim country that coexists in only a precarious peace with its neighbor India. Yet while a U.S.
disengagement from direct fighting in Afghanistan could allow the United States to rebalance its
relationship with Pakistan and shift the center of U.S.-Pakistan relations beyond the narrow
prism of counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan, an unstable Afghanistan will also ultimately
be very unhealthy for Pakistan.
This essay proceeds as follows: It first discusses the long-term relationship between Pakistan and
Afghanistan and explores how the India factor influences relations. Next, the essay discusses
militancy in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the latters policy responses, including its
support for the Afghan Taliban and affiliated groups. This section also explores how
Afghanistans current security and political developments influence Pakistans policy in
Afghanistan. The subsequent section considers the U.S. dimension of Pakistan-Afghanistan
relations and explores this triangle with respect to militancy in both countries, as well as
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. The
final section analyzes the impact of other regional actors on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations,
including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China. In particular, it examines the implications for Pakistan
of Chinas increasingly active and more multifaceted role in Afghanistan.
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Life is a conflict between ones intent and ones fate. No one knows this truth better than
Pakistanis. Interestingly, Pakistan has also been trying to synchronise its intent with its fate.
Regarding its western border, the prevalent intent of Pakistan is based on three main
presumptions. First, the military operation in North Waziristan has not taken place in the past
(since 2009) and hence it will not take place in the future. Second, the US-NATO forces will not
dare pick a fight with the Haqqani network in North Waziristan because the former are
disinterested in opening a new war front, especially before the forthcoming elections in the US
due this year. Third, Osama bin Laden is dead and hence the world is losing sight of
Afghanistan; consequently, the situation in Afghanistan will soon recede to the pre-9/11
scenario. Nevertheless, Pakistan seems to be failing in viewing the obverse side of the coin.
One of the reasons is that Pakistan is wary of adopting the policy of self-reliance in the domain
of security. Instead of relying on its own geography and terrain to vouch for an honourable
survival, Pakistan banks on the geography and terrain of Afghanistan to hedge against any attack
from India the format of the strategic depth policy. In principle, Pakistans security policy
should be independent of Afghanistan. If adopted, this approach may diminish the chances of
blackmailing at the hands of jihadists and the Taliban.
The second reason is that if US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recommends (by September 9,
2012) that the Haqqani network be declared a terrorist outfit, the US lawmakers in Congress may
impose sanctions on Pakistan. Afterwards, if an offensive is launched by the Pakistan army, there
may be left little space to argue that the operation was conducted on the choice and timing of the
army.
Is the policy of promoting ethnic hegemony (which brews ethnic discontent) in Afghanistan in
the interests of Pakistan? In other words, is it a reasonable strategy to alienate the Northern
Alliance and let it fall into the lap of India? Why can Pakistan make no effort to reconcile the
Taliban with the Northern Alliance? In order to reduce hostility and tension in the region,
Pakistan needs to advocate the policy of reconciliation.
Pakistan needs to rethink whether the strategic depth policy is congruent with the modern
warfare paradigm, especially when Pakistan is possessing nuclear weapons as deterrence. In this
age of economics, will India consider it feasible to confront a nuclear-capable Pakistan? The
India-centric approach of General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani must answer this question.
Pakistan seems to be still entangled in the debate whether this is our war or their war and
whether this is my enemy or your enemy. After one decade of the onset of the war, Pakistanis
are generally still indecisive. Despite the pleading of General Kayani (on Independence Day),
most Pakistanis are not clear if the efforts of Pakistan pertaining to the war on terror are in their
favour. The policy of militarisation of Pakistan and raising jihadist slogans was adopted in the
past brainwashed generations and few are ready to banish those obsessions. That is how it seems
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that the concept of Muslim trans-nationalism has taken root deeper than the will to fight the war
on terror.
Pakistan intends to participate in the war on terror but by defending its borders and safeguarding
its sovereignty. Unfortunately, the war on terror is diffused across the Pak-Afghan border. It
respects none and follows no principle. Pakistan has been struggling to cope with this reality.
The government in Kabul seems to distance itself from the influence of Pakistan. There are two
major signs of that. First, the number of border skirmishes between Pakistani and Afghan
security forces is increasing rapidly. It seems that, before the year 2014 visits Afghanistan, the
government in Kabul may try to make Afghanistan as hostile as possible for Pakistan. The wider
the gulf between Kabul and Islamabad, the more are the chances of an Afghanistan independent
of the sway of Pakistan and the more is the probability for the (Afghan) Taliban adopting an
inward looking approach.
Second, there has appeared a sudden escalation in the number of drone strikes that are claiming
high-profile Taliban casualties on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. In this way, the preamble
of the war on North Waziristan has been introduced. Still much more to come in the future: for
instance, more number of drone strikes to provoke the Haqqani network (and the associated
Taliban) to revolt against the state of Pakistan to actuate a clash that may break the bond of
allegiance between them. Consequently, the enhanced number of drone strikes holds the
potential to escalate into a full-fledged confrontation. Nevertheless, unless the Haqqanis turn
insurgents (that will change the public opinion against them, an excuse General Kayani has been
waiting for), the Pakistan army may remain hesitant in launching the offensive on North
Waziristan.
Given the potential of al Qaeda to translate the anti-US sentiment into militancy, it means that al
Qaeda is a perpetual predicament for the US. If the members of al Qaeda are hiding in North
Waziristan (to cash in on the constraints of Pakistan to launch an offensive there), an attack on
North Waziristan, led by the US, cannot be ruled out.
Pakistan has to make a choice: whether it has to live with the glamour of Pashtun gallantry and
keep on fomenting destabilisation in Afghanistan or put its own house in order and stamp out the
menace of militancy. Second, Pakistan has to weigh cautiously that, after 2014, what kind of
effects the militants (both local and foreign) hiding in North Waziristan may have on Kabul vis-vis Islamabad? The reason is, two things cannot go hand in hand: Pakistan supporting (or
promoting) militancy abroad but keeping homegrown militancy in check. If the Taliban affect
Kabul, they cannot spare Islamabad.
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By Nasim Zehra
The crisis at the Torkham border, which tragically turned bloody, has now settled down. More
importantly, a comprehensive, though little known, attempt at constructing a bilateral
architecture of engagement involving Pakistani and Afghan stakeholders from the security sector
is back on track.
Wiser by the crisis that left a trail of tragic deaths, unwanted military engagement and blocked
borders, decision-makers will be less rash. So from the fires of Torkham a more robust PakAfghan modus operandi is likely to emerge.
Kabuls focus is on engaging decision-makers in Pakistan. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani led
the effort to engage Pakistans COAS General Raheel Sharif. Despite the hiatus in contact
following major terrorist attacks, Ghani and Gen Sharif have remained in touch via meetings,
phone calls and even Skype. This engagement has, however, been low yield, fragile and also
politically costly for Ashraf Ghani. Gen Sharif has used his authority, interest, institution and
operational control to actually lead the Afghan policy; the Pakistan Army has also occasionally
vetoed initiatives proposed by the Foreign Office.
Often this engagement between the Afghan president and Gen Sharif has been subsumed in the
broader crisis-dominated context of relations between the two countries. These include terrorist
attacks which both countries trace to terrorists located in each others country; Pakistans
patronage of the Taliban and the Haqqanis; Afghanistans benign neglect of the TTP; Pakistans
insufficient pressure on the Taliban to come to the Afghan peace talks; and Kabul allowing India
to use Afghan territory to conduct subversive activities in Pakistan.
For Pakistan, added in this mix are its troubled relations with India and ties with Tehran, which
have been left icy after the infamous tweet episode during Iranian President Rouhanis visit. So
Pakistans diplomatic score-card carries a C grade.
This C flows from Pakistans internal dysfunctionality. More than the potentially worrying
situation on its borders, Pakistans captains of diplomacy are check-mated by a paralysing twofront domestic situation.
One, the prime minister, despite setting up the National Security Committee and his four-men
advisory structure with two advisers, one special assistant and one foreign secretary and with
himself as the foreign minister remains averse to convening multi-stakeholders policy
meetings. The 18-month old National Security Committee met only once when the air force chief
requested a meeting be convened. Two, with the PMs interest lacking, the men in khaki call the
shots. The Foreign Offices role is further eroded.
With the GHQ now effectively the point-zero of diplomacy, that is where perhaps the most
important and comprehensive meeting on Pakistans Afghan policy took place on May 13. The
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army chief chaired the meeting, and the top military brass engaged directly with Afghanistans
Special Envoy-Ambassador Omar Zakhilwal. It was a discussion on a road map to better border
management. Also reviewed were issues of bilateral security and intelligence interaction.
Most importantly, the army chief accepted Ambassador Zakhilwals proposal that Pakistan return
Afghanistans Angoor Ada area. The agreement, essentially a CBM, was implemented a week
later and earned Pakistan some tentative goodwill in Kabul. Within the principal interlocutors,
Gen Raheel Sharifs team and the Afghan envoy, the May 13 meeting laid the foundation of
robust engagement. That none of the Foreign Office men were involved in the May 13 meeting
clearly indicated who leads Pakistans Afghan policy.
And then on June 12 the Torkham crisis began to unfold. The Afghan ambassador, visiting
Kabul, got a call asking he get clearance for the construction of the gate, since the earlier
Afghan-Pakistan meeting broke down over the issue. Instant clearance was not possible. The rest
is known. The communication channels that were opened after the May 13 meeting were used,
and the crisis was prevented from spiralling. And within four days it was resolved.
However, the limits of soldiers leading diplomacy became apparent in the making of the
Torkham crisis. For example, the handing back of Angoor Ada did not automatically generate
the goodwill to prevent Afghan firing on Pakistani men constructing the gate at Torkham.
Similarly, subsequent misunderstandings over prior information regarding the gate could have
been avoided by exercising greater patience. Inclusion of diplomats in the dialogue was a must.
Pakistans position on construction of a gate on its own territory was non-negotiable.
Internationally recognised borders, like the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, are non-negotiable.
Ties between common tribes must ensure easement rights remain operational within structured
frameworks but these ties cannot erode sovereignty as shouldnt the three decades long
Pakistani hospitality of the Afghan refugees. The agreed-upon border holds more firmly, both de
facto and de jure. However, given the deep linkages between the geographies and the people this
border is inherently a border of friendship and cooperation.
The irony around the habitual non-acceptance of the border by successive Kabul governments is
that today there are more stringent controls and checks on the Afghan side of Torkham, with
biometric checking, passport checks, scanners, sturdier barbed wire, greater number of heavily
armed border guards, security and even intelligence personnel. On the Pakistani side check and
controls have been more lax.
At Torkham the force of life in all its radiance is at display. On foot, in wheel barrows, in buses,
crossing for daily jobs, to meet relatives, as traders, for medical treatment and so on. At Torkham
this sea of people of all ages shows the living reality of the Pak-Afghan border. And indeed it is
this force of life that also prompted Kabul to seek the opening of Torkham after having opened
fire into Pakistani space that martyred a Pakistani major and others from the Afghan forces.
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However, Pakistans past policy blunders have all come to haunt us. Until 1979 easement
rights, Kabuls reservations and heavy peoples movement notwithstanding there were border
controls, including a gate, at Torkham. Mentoring and managing the internationally funded
Afghan jihad, Pakistan under Gen Ziaul Haq slipped into a soft-state mode with free flow of
men, machines money and ideologies. Blunders continued and, subsequently, under another
military ruler Gen Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan decided to back off from its decision to construct
a fence along sections of the Durand Line.
In 2004, the country under threatening moves by Afghan border guards at Torkham did not
construct a new gate at Torkham as a replacement to the old one. When Pakistans defence
attach called and urged the relevant major general to go ahead with the construction the latter
conveyed the decision taken by his seniors of not creating an international scene. Pakistans
past conduct of the business of the state has severely lacked foresight.
With multiplying security problems facing Pakistan and Afghanistan, joint border management is
in their interest. In an environment of trust, such cooperation will be far simpler. The silver
lining is that the crisis demonstrated the capacity of Pak-Afghan engagement to overcome a
bloody crisis.
This crisis management became possible due to a few factors. Communication between the two
sides never broke down, both sides were at varying degrees keen to avoid a breakdown, and both
and especially Kabul felt the urgency to open the border. Also, there was no third party
involvement hence no scope for misunderstanding, and finally both were keen to agree to a way
forward to jointly work on border management.
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published no less than three rebuttals from the government that denied the contents of the report
and dismissed it as being entirely fabricated.There are several ways in which to interpret all of
this. The identity of Mr Almeidas sources remains anonymous, but the reality is that the
information he received could have been leaked from a variety of places for a number of
different reasons. The report could have been aimed at somehow strengthening the civilian
government by piling pressure on the military on the eve of a transition to a new Chief of Army
Staff. Alternatively, the purpose could have been the opposite; as many observers of Pakistans
politics would undoubtedly agree, the report actually had the effect of weakening Nawaz Sharif
by providing a pretext for an assertion of the military establishments power amidst an attempt
by a civilian government to overstep the bounds set for it within the countrys de facto political
framework. Unlikely as it may sound, it could also simply be the case that the events reported in
Dawn unfolded as described, involving an unprecedented attempt by the civilian leadership to
hold the military accountable.While Mr Almeida has been taken of the Exit Control List
following an outpouring of support for him, and condemnation of the government, across the
world, the entire incident points towards several troubling facts. For one, while it is not possible
to independently verify the veracity of Mr Almeidas report, the governments actions and
narrative in its wake are revealing. Mr Almeida was accused of undermining Pakistans national
interests by reporting on a secret meeting. Following from this, the government argued that the
report was even more problematic because of the way in which it suggested that there were
divisions between the military and civilian leadership, and for implying that the military was not
entirely on board with the fight against terror and extremism in Pakistan.As I wrote in my
column last week, the most interesting thing about Mr Almeidas report was perhaps how
uninteresting it was; the idea that there are militant and extremist groups operating in Pakistan
unhindered, and perhaps even enjoying state patronage, is not surprising. We need only look at
the DPC and the Lal Masjids activities this past week to find evidence of this. Similarly, while it
stretches credulity to believe that a civilian government in Pakistan would find the wherewithal
to question the military establishment in so direct a fashion, the core idea that more needs to be
done to fight militancy by both institutions is one that should not be particularly controversial.
Instead, the events of the past week have morphed into yet another chapter of the long-running
saga that is the tension between the civilian and military establishments in Pakistan, with the two
sides engaging in yet more conflict and contestation in an attempt to assert their power.
Meanwhile, the DPC and its ilk continue to threaten and coerce the state, secure in the
knowledge that whatever they might say or do, they will not be placed on the Exit Control List.
Once again, Nero fiddles while Rome burns.
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Analysis:
Ever since NAP has been launched, there has been decline in violence in the country. This decline
needs to be sustained by simultaneously addressing the much deeper issues, going beyond the
militaristic quick fixes. Without addressing those issues, the fear of return to violence lurks behind.
It was in late December 2014 that the Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, responding to the dastardly
attack on a school in Peshawar week earlier, rolled out its counter-terror strategy, National Action
Plan. What is unique about the NAP is that it galvanized all political parties and military leadership
to publicly vow against terrorism, besides bringing out governments counter-militancy efforts in the
public debate.
Since then, if gone by the number, there has been a decline in terrorist attacks in the country:
According to statistics provided by Pak Institute for Peace Studies digital database on security, from
January 1 to August 31 this year, a total of 471 terrorist attacks took place across Pakistan, which
represented a 47 percent decrease from such attacks recorded during the corresponding period of
2014. The number of people killed (752) and injured (931) also posted a decrease of 36 percent and
43 percent, respectively, from corresponding months of previous year. Government claims its efforts
have brought down terrorism in the country by 70 percent.1
While NAP has apparently taken on some issues hitherto ignored in Pakistans counter-terror
approach, much of it is continuation and expansion of the old counter-terror strategies. For one, it
would be wrong to say that the government woke up only after the APS attack; operation Zarb-eAzb in North Waziristan was launched in June 2014, much before NAP, followed by military
operations Khyber 1 & 2 in Khyber Agency the same year. Meanwhile surgical strikes against
militants in Karachi have been going on since 2013. By the same token, loopholes in the performance
on the NAP, nine months later, appear somewhat similar to the pre-NAP confusion in dealing with
militants.
Several observers point out that the countrys National Action Plan is too much military-centric,
squeezing the space of the civilians.2 They argue that military holds the key role in apex committees
which steer the NAP implementation. Some political parties have also expressed serious concerns
that the paramilitary troops Rangers have overstepped their mandate in Karachi.
Others however believe that while military campaign against terrorists remains at the heart of NAP,
government has failed to take some effective steps to reduce appeal of religious extremism and
violent ideologies that feed terrorism. In the most recent National Apex Committee meeting held in
Islamabad, on September 10, Prime Minister expressed dissatisfaction over the implementation of
NAP and directed the federation and provinces to improve coordination so as to produce better
results.Below are some critical areas that Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) believes NAP
measures should also focus on:
Countering violent ideologies
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While military operations and actions taken under NAP have weakened the militants and put them
under pressure, comprehensive and concerted counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs
are also needed to challenge and reduce appeal of militant ideologies, and rehabilitate repentant
militants. The intensity of the extremism issue requires a multifold reintegration framework with
broader focus on both violent and non-violent individuals and groups. Such an approach has not been
conceived as the state is mainly relying on conventional frameworks of rehabilitation. A creative
multipronged reintegration framework is needed whether the state adopts a surgical approach or a
political one to tackle the menace of terrorism.
The ISIS inspiration
Pakistan recently banned the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria group. A ban may not reduce the
inspiration of the ISIS among Pakistani militants, particularly when many banned groups continue to
operate in Pakistan. With regards to future trends of the IS inspiration and influence in Pakistan, a lot
will depend on Pakistani states efforts to achieve security and eliminate militant groups and
ideologies. In the short term it means how the ongoing security operations, mainly in FATA and
Karachi, proceed and conclude, and how the National Action Plan is implemented by the federal and
provincial governments. At the same time, Pakistan will need to enhance border-security and
counter-militancy cooperation with Afghanistan where ISIS is increasing its influence; many
Pakistani Taliban militants who pledged allegiance to or supported ISIS have also relocated to
Afghanistan.
Cross-border terrorist networks
Operation Zarb-e-Azb has pushed a big part of the terrorists infrastructure to the other side of the
border in Afghanistan, mainly in Kunar, Nuristan and Khost provinces. These groups could try to reestablish in FATA in future; they are already engaged in cross-border attacks inside Pakistan. Two
things are imperative to respond to the threat: first, political and administrative reforms in FATA,
which will not only deny militants a support base but also improve local security structures; and
secondly, efforts to evolve some broader joint security mechanism with Afghanistan.
Illegal weapons
Easy availability of heavy weapons in Pakistan is a major challenge for the security forces countermilitancy drive. According to one estimate, 20 million illegal weapons are in circulation in Pakistan.
Sectarian terrorist groups and nationalist insurgents in Balochistan appear to have recently adopted
targeted killings as the foremost instrument of terrorism. Easy access to lethal weapons has made
their task easier.
Threat perception
Law enforcement departments need a dedicated platform to scientifically monitor the changing
behaviors, trends and emerging patterns of terrorist groups. This initiative will help them to broaden
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their threat perception and evolve effective responses. So far, it has been difficult for law
enforcement agencies to think beyond the established threats. Pakistan is a frontline state in the war
against terrorism but Al-Qaeda has never been on its threat-perception radar. The same is true for
ISIS, which is now transforming local terrorist groups.
Internally Displaced Persons
The repatriation and rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from North Waziristan and
Khyber tribal regions requires urgent attention of the federal and provincial governments as well as
the military leadership. The government needs swift action to not only provides full facilities to the
IDPs but also to check undesirable practices and exploitation of the displaced persons by charity
organizations in IDP camps. There is a need for making government aid agencies more effective in
order to revive and enhance the IDPs confidence in the state.
FATA mainstreaming
There is an urgent need to speed up the FATA reforms process. In recent months, militants have
started efforts to re-establish themselves in parts of FATA, mainly in those agencies where there is
less military presence or pressure including Bajaur, South Waziristan and Kurram. Attacks on tribal
elders, who are members of government-supported tribal peace committees, have also increased in
recent weeks, mainly in Bajaur and Khyber agencies. A review of militants growth in FATA in past
suggests that they took advantage of existing vacuum in political and administrative structures and
further weakened them by attacking the tribal elders, who have a key role in political administration.
They could do so again in future, particularly when military pressure will be eased, if FATAs
political and administrative structures are not mainstreamed or reformed.
Prison security and reforms
This is an important area that is being neglected in the counterterrorism framework. After the jail
breaks in Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu and an unsuccessful attempt to breach the central jail in
Karachi last year, the need for enhancing prison security has become more pronounced. The jails in
Pakistan are not only providing safe havens to terrorists to continue their activities but also serve as
recruitment centers for terrorist groups. Jail reforms are also critical because terrorist groups have
infiltrated police and prison officials.
Building capacity of police
The police need to be equipped with new technologies and resources but utilizing the available and
allocated resources for the force is another critical issue. The operational and technical assistance and
capacity building of police is an important area that needs focus. The training programs need to be
focused on technology-led policing along with attention to management, intelligence gathering,
mobility and connectivity. At the same time, the NAP should prioritize the de-politicization of police,
which is the key to making it a professional force.
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organisation is already a weak regional body. It hasnt made any significant progress to boost
trade and economic progress in the region. One of the reasons for this is, two of its bigger
members India and Pakistan are perennially locked in conflicts. These developments at
Saarc have been of much interest to other regional powers, such as China and Japan, which have
observer status in Saarc.
India realised the losing clout of Saarc and its implications when Modi openly voiced his views
on Saarc's failure during his 2014 speech at Kathmandu Saarc summit. "When we speak of
Saarc, we usually hear two reactions cynicism and scepticism as Saarc we have failed to
move with the speed that our people expect and want.," Modi had said then.
"Today, less than 5 percent of the region's global trade takes place between us. Even at this
modest level, less than 10 percent of the region's internal trade takes place under Saarc Free
Trade Area. Indian companies are investing billions abroad, but less than 1percent flow into our
region. It is still harder to travel within our region than to Bangkok or Singapore; and, more
expensive to speak to each other. How much have we done in Saarc to turn our natural wealth
into shared prosperity; or, our borders into bridgeheads to a shared future?" Modi had said.
In the context of continuing India-Pakistan face off, the big question is what will happen to the
organisation which 31 years old . Majority of the eight Saarc nations, mainly Bangladesh,
Afganisthan and Bhutan are India supporters, especially on the issues of fighting terrorism
originating in Pakistan and its implications on the region. Even the other countries cannot afford
to stand on the wrong side of India given its sheer size and influence in the region and the fact
that all of them share geographical borders (land and maritime) with India and has significant
trade, policy relations.
The point is India remains and will remain the corner stone of the regional power structure.
Once again, lets go back to Modis 2014 Saarc speech. "India and Bangladesh have deepened their
links through rail, road, power and transit. India and Nepal have started a new era of cooperation in
energy; and, India and Bhutan are making those ties stronger by the day. With Sri Lanka, we have
transformed trade through a Free Trade Agreement. We will soon launch a new arrangement to meet
Maldives' need for oil. Distance and difficulties have not held back India and Afghanistan. And, bus
and train sustain contacts between people in India and Pakistan."
One can, of course, forget the Pakistan reference now, but what one shouldnt miss is the fact that
Modi had made an indirect yet strong pitch on how India is better positioned to take a leadership role
in the regional cooperation either within Saarc or through the formation of a new body, due to the
economic and trade dependency of Saarc nations on India. India has given duty free access to
majority of goods from South Asian partners and has provided more than $8 billion in a decade to
these countries through various programmes.
The Uri attack and Pakistan offensive could act as a trigger for a radical change in Saarc equations.
Indias tough diplomatic offensive with Pakistan and its decision to isolate that country economically
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and politically could also mean a new regional power structure emerging in South Asia, with India
taking the lead, that if Modi government sticks to its stance on Pakistan and doesnt take a U-turn.
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was quite understandable. Better to declare an unwillingness to jaw jaw, then to actually
engage in war war. The Indian disinclination to attend would in itself be sufficient grounds for
the postponement or the cancellation of the Summit. But Pakistan continued to receive flak from
other capitals where its stock is low. Dhaka for instance. The State Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Bangladesh stated to the media that his country would not take part in the Summit because of
the repeated interference of one country in its internal affairs. This was an oblique reference to
Pakistan which had publicly opposed war crimes trials that had taken place in Bangladesh and to
which the Awami League-led government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was committed to in
its election pledges. But he added that being a founder member (indeed Bangladesh was the
originator of the idea of SAARC) it was committed to the forum, mentioning the promotion
of connectivity and regional cooperation, concepts that formed part of a common platform with
India. He added that the decision to pull out was Bangladeshs own.
Afghanistan and Bhutan also lent themselves to supporting the boycott. Both cited the increase
of terrorism in the region laying the blame for it on Pakistans doorsteps. Kabul stated that this
fact would keep President Ashraf Ghanie busy since he was also the Commander in Chief.
Thimpu also shared the concern, and gave that the deterioration of peace and security due to the
increase of terrorism as the reason for its withdrawal. Nepal, which had the unenviable task of
taking a decision in this regard, somewhat cautiously, took the development seriously and
strongly urged that a conducive environment be created (for the Summit) soon by ensuring the
participation of all member states in line with the spirit of the SAARC Charter. Those words
are, at least for now, likely to fall on deaf ears, and the prospects of the Islamabad Summit have
most certainly come a cropper. The proposed Summit had achieved something even without
taking place. By the very fact of its postponement or cancellation, it may have helped avert a
major war. The tool of diplomacy was able to keep the weapons of the military apart.
Skirmishes at levels lower than battle have occurred. India has claimed several surgical strikes
at terrorist sites. Pakistan has denied that these have taken place, but admitted to two military
casualties as the result of an Indian offensive. The fact that the Indian action was nowhere like
the entire jaw for a tooth demand of disproportionate retribution that an irate Indian leader had
made, and Pakistans denial reflecting unwillingness for a full scale military response, does
reflect a modicum of restraint on both sides .It has been said, and with much truth, that when
those who do the fighting have the right to choose between war and peace, history would no
longer be written in blood. An India-Pakistan war today would not just be a clash of uniformed
personnel. Entire cities would be laid bare in ruins. Tens of millions on both sides would be
decimated. Too heavy a price to pay to satisfy the jingoistic predilections and macho whims of a
few armchair warriors!
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India and Pakistan possess huge conventional military assets. India has 1.32 million personnel in
active service, 6464 tanks, 2086 aircraft of all types, 295 vessels, 2 aircraft carriers and 14
submarines. Pakistan, on the other hand, commands a force strength of 620 000, 2924 tanks, 923
aircraft of all types, 197 vessels, no aircraft carrier and 5 submarines. In sheer numbers, these
would be two of among the worlds mightiest forces pitted against one another. Indias
superiority in this respect is quite clear. But, despite this, what lends symmetry to the balance is
the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides: 100 to 120 warheads for India, and 110 to 130
warheads for Pakistan. Since Pakistans nuclear deterrence is focussed on India only, Pakistan
has not developed systems with a range greater than 3000km. Instead it has chosen to opt for
short range, small yield ordnances, called battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).
Since India has China on the radar as well, it has invested on long range category. Also unlike
Pakistani, Indian civilian political masters would be chary of leaving major decision making
with regard to the use of nuclear weapons to field commanders, which the use of TNW s would
necessarily imply. A nuclear war would impact immensely on Indias growth trajectory. Hence
its penchant for pushing the nuclear threshold higher, while Pakistan sees it in its interest to push
its nuclear threshold down through the threat of employing TNWs to deter India from using its
conventional superiority.
The Pakistan Foreign Secretary stated in October last year that Our nuclear programme is one
dimensional: stopping Indian aggression before it happens. It is not for starting a war. It is for
deterrence. The Pakistani statement is meant to be directed at Indias so-called Cold-start
doctrine, involving conducting military operations after seizing some Pakistani territory in a
swift action. That would be much like the trip-wire effect that NATO purported to respond to
the Warsaw Pacts conventional superiority in Europe during the Cold War. The red lines in the
Pakistani nuclear doctrine is unclear, because being conventionally weaker, the ambiguity would
be seen as enhancing deterrence. Because TNWs are supposedly more precise and cause less
collateral damage, the propensity to use may be greater. This might engender an escalatory
conflict and encourage the thinking that a nuclear war-fighting is feasible. A theory of this type
evolved in the US in the mid-1970s known as the Schlesinger doctrine, with reason considered
dangerous by some analysts. If Pakistan were to use TNW in a minimal strike at an Indian target,
say moving within Pakistan, India would have to consider if it would respond with its strategic
weapon which would involve massive destruction. Almost immediately, in this scenario,
Pakistan could unleash a total nuclear devastation. The result for both sides would be too
horrendous to contemplate. Prudence should dictate other means of displaying valour.
Strategic Restraint is thus the result of less of an option that many imagine. Small scale hot
pursuits may have taken place, such as the Indian claims of surgical strikes against some
terrorist camp on the Pakistani side of the LOC. Pakistan has denied such actions, but have stated
exchange of fire had resulted in two Pakistani casualties. India is probably careful not to up the
ante too much in terms of what might be perceived as a humiliation for Pakistan, if war is to be
avoided, and yet be seen to have retaliated in a way for the government to take maximum
political mileage which it did. Exchange of fires continue, there has been an additional Indian
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military casualty, and the Pakistanis have captured an Indian soldier. This person will need to be
returned and so some diplomacy might precede that, leaving ajar a very small window of
reconciliation of some kind. This would also provide an opportunity for the good offices of any
third party negotiator, such as the United Nations to get involved and thereafter expand the
negotiations to cover a broader framework. The Punjab police, on the Indian side, announced
that they had taken a pigeon flying in from Pakistan into custody. This pigeon was not definitely
seen as a symbol of peace by the Indian side. They had allegedly discovered a threatening note to
Prime Minister Modi that the bird was carrying, apparently signed by the Lashkar e Taiba,
another terrorist group. Matters could thus get out of hand. Sadly, however, this is lame-duck
season for the UN Secretary General (in any case, his record of peace-making is far less than
brilliant), and global leadership is currently weak. So the responsibility to initiate talks might
devolve on the two protagonists themselves. Could other South Asian States lend a helping
hand? Individually, or collectively?
Prime Minister Narendra Modi obviously does not want to go to war. It would destroy his plans
for boosting Indias economy. It would severely threaten his own State Gujrat which could be
targeted in any nuclear exchange. In any case, he would not like to share any responsibility for a
possible Armageddon. Yet he must be seen to punish Pakistan. The surgical strikes seemed a
good idea, but Pakistans vociferous denial that they took place queered the pitch somewhat. So
he mooted a review of the Indus water treaty signed between Jawaharlal Nehru and President
Ayub Khan in 1960 that controls water sharing in that basin between India and Pakistan. So far
the treaty has been a holy cow, untouched even by the wars between the two sides. The very
thought that it might be reviewed sent a shiver down Pakistani spine. But there are risks. India is
an upper riparian country, as is China on the Brahmaputra. So China could do unto India, what
India might do unto Pakistan. Also, there was the case of Bangladesh. It was a lower riparian on
the Ganges, still awaiting a settlement on the Teesta water distribution with India. Bangladeshi
public opinion could be rattled by any unsavoury upper riparian behaviour. Strategic symmetry
between India and Pakistan narrowed the range of options for Modi.
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welcome a greater Chinese imprint to offset any such development. If that were to happen, for
New Delhi, it would be like jumping from frying pan into fire.
Few South Asians, if any, see the benefit of burying SAARC forever. For instance, It has been
Bangladeshs one major contribution to South Asian politics. The people of Bangladesh, despite
the well-known political dichotomy between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party, take a modicum of pride in what many see as the fruition of a bipartisan aspiration, one
dedicated to peace and development. As far back as 6 February 1972 Bangabandhu Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, who led the AL, and indeed the whole of Bangladesh into achieving its
liberation, at a banquet in his honour given by Indias Indira Gandhi had called for cooperation
among South Asian nations. Otherwise, he warned, history would not forgive us. President
Ziaur Rahman sent out letters in 1980 to all South Asian leaders laying out an initial set of
proposals. The central thrust was a neo-functionalist one in the jargon of international relations:
the purpose was to build cooperation across a broad spectrum of activities, beginning with
innocuous ones, so that tensions at more central levels could be diffused. The drafters of the
concept drew heavily on gurus like Ernst Haas and David Mitrany. Initially India and Pakistan
were both opposed: Pakistan, because it feared the process was India-driven, and India, because
it apprehended a clubbing of the smaller fellows. Eventually Bangladeshi diplomacy succeeded
in overcoming the impediments, and SAARC was born in 1985.
But the nature of South Asian politics necessitated two principles to be written into the SAARC
Charter; one was that no contentious issues were to be discussed, which pretty much ruled out all
key subjects; the other was all decisions were to be taken by consensus, which, given the IndoPak rivalry, exacerbated by the entry of Afghanistan, rendered any agreement a stupendously
difficult exercise. Hence the impediment to forward movement was structural, and small
wonder progress on all fronts was minimal. SAARC could not go beyond what its member-states
wished. Hence the unenvious conclusion by all concerned that South Asia is the worlds least
integrated region. However, one must also consider the possibility that the member states of
SAARC might want to keep it that way.
CONCLUSION
That being so, it would be unwise to bring about the demise of SAARC even if there are periods
of severe strain in intramural relationship in the region. SAARC is an organizations whose
ownership belongs to the peoples rather than to the governments. The Sikh pilgrim to the
Gurdawaras of Lahore would vouchsafe for that. If SAARC leaders, politicians or generals
cannot meet for reasons of State, there is no reason why their writers, artists and thinkers
should not. SAARCs achievements in politics or economics might not come anywhere close to
that of the European Union or even the Association of South East Asian Nations, but it has given
the South Asian a sense of identity , both in the region, and increasingly so among its diaspora
abroad. Given the nature of State-formation in South Asia, there will always be the problem of
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the adjustment as to the stressing of commonalities vis a-vis the underscoring of distinctiveness.
The commonality enables the people to share an ethos, and the distinctiveness justifies separate
sovereignties. Both for India and Pakistan, the inability of a group of nations or sub-nations in
the region to hold together could have far reaching ramifications. Dr Manmohan Singh once had
the dream of having breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul. Such a
possibility may right now appear to lie well beyond the rim of the saucer. Nonetheless, as the
English poet Robert Browning, much read and admired in South Asia as well, said: Mans reach
should exceed his grasp, or what are the heavens for?
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House is approximately 55,000 square feet), which was built without authorized funding or legal
permits in a nature reserve.
That is just normal operating procedure for Erdogan, who started as a penniless youth in a slum
and is now allegedly a billionaire. When prosecutors found millions of dollars in cash while
investigating his associates and sons, Bilal and Burak, for bribery, corruption, fraud, money
laundering, and gold smuggling, 350 police officers and all the prosecutors involved were simply
removed from their jobs. Only interested in his relentless Islamization of Turkey, Erdogans core
party followers evidently attach no value to democratic principles or legality as such and think it
only natural that he and his sons should have enriched themselves on such a huge scale.
When Erdogan foists the blame for anything that goes wrong including his very own decision
to restart the war against the countrys Kurds on foreigners, the United States, and you-knowwho (the Saturday people), his followers readily believe him. That is also true of his wild
accusations of terrorism against the U.S.-based Turkish religious leader Fethullah Gulen, once
his staunch ally. Having previously blamed Gulen for an aborted corruption investigation, which
he had described as a judicial coup, Erdogan is now blaming Gulen and his followers for the
attempted military coup as well. That could be true to some extent, but Turkish military officers
scarcely needed Gulen to egg them on: They blame Erdogan and his AKP followers for
dismantling Ataturks secular republic; for having built up the murderous Sunni extremists of
Syria who are now spilling back into Turkey to conduct suicide bombings; and for deliberately
restarting the war against the countrys Kurds in 2015 for crass political reasons a war that is
costing soldiers lives every day and threatens the survival of Turkey itself within its present
borders. (Kurds are a net majority in the eastern provinces.)
Coup planners need not enroll very many soldiers or airmen to win, so long as uncooperative
chiefs are apprehended, and their initial success induces more to join in. But Turkeys top
military chiefs neither planned the coup nor joined it, and only a few (including the supremo
Gen. Hulusi Akar) were detained. Indeed, the principal force commanders stayed out so that the
coup activists (fewer than 2,000 in all, it seems), including some fighter pilots, were hopelessly
outnumbered once Erdogans followers came out by the tens of thousands in the streets of
Istanbul.
Opposition parties all very loyally opposed the coup, but they should not count on Erdogans
gratitude. The drift to authoritarian rule is likely to continue, even accelerate: As in other Islamic
countries, elections are well understood and greatly valued, but not democracy itself.
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The real issue now in Turkey is whether Erdogan and the AKP will, instead of doubling down on
extending their present policies as might well be their inclination, instead move towards a more
inclusive and halfway secular form of governance as foreseen in the constitution, which would
be the best outcome. Otherwise the polarisation in Turkey will remain and may intensify.
In the region Erdogan has begun to repair relations with Russia, and has mended ties to Israel
permitting the restoration of Turkish aid to Gaza, so vital for the beleaguered Palestinians. The
West has been unhappy with its suspicion of Turkeys tardiness in tacking ISIS within, and in
Syria, but after recent terrorist attacks targeting the country there can be no doubt of Turkeys
resolve.
The West may hope that Turkish action against the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, who have been
effective armed actors against ISIS, may abate but Turkish historical hardline stance on this issue
will probably remain, as it springs from a consensus shared with the military. However Turkish
military support for the anti-ISIS campaign in Syria more would likely become more in-sync
with USA.
For Pakistan, Turkey remains with China a true and tested friend through thick and thin. Turkey
is one country where there is a deep and popular affection for Pakistan and its people, which is
fully reciprocated. Erdogan and all Turkish leaders past and present, AKP and otherwise, have
stood by Pakistan, and their objective has been that any material, technological, economic, and
political support for Pakistan should assist us to develop on its own.
Pakistan therefore has a vital stake in Turkey, its stability and continued progress. Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif was amongst the first to issue a strong statement of complete support and
solidarity with President Erdogan, the democratically elected government of Turkey, and the
democratic institutions of Turkey. The Special Assistant to the Prime Minister for Foreign
Affairs followed up in an early morning call of support to the Turkish Foreign Minister. This
support has been widely appreciated in Turkey.
For Pakistani leaders the lesson is that the strength of democracy rests in delivering economic
progress to the people, the hallmark of Erdogans legacy despite all else, and in building up
cohesive and representative party structures.
Even if Pakistan still has some way to go towards that objective, the events in Turkey, however
short-lived, show that Pakistan despite enormous external and internal challenges remains a
model of stability in an increasingly uncertain and disordered region. Furthermore as terrorist
attacks unfortunately have become more prevalent globally this should lead to more
understanding of what Pakistan has been facing alone for over a decade. These factors should
also give rise to reflection and reconsideration by critics of Pakistan in the USA and elsewhere
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on the importance of supporting stability in Pakistan for the sake of the region, including
neighbouring Afghanistan.
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the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The political and economic rapprochement between Islamabad
and Beijing as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor intensified the Chinese vector of its
foreign policy. Removing economic sanctions against Iran dictated the restoration of full-scale
political and economic ties with Tehran. Implementation of all these measures weakened
Islamabads attention towards Ankara in 2015. Pakistani-Turkish relations have developed
steadily, however there was no urgency in their additional promotion.
The intensive rapprochement of Pakistan and Turkey in July-August 2016 met the national
interests of the both countries. The need to balance the increasing Indo-Iranian relations
demonstrated to Islamabad the importance of maintaining and strengthening its relations with
Riyadh and Ankara. In turn, Ankara needed to recognize the legitimacy of the bloody
suppression of the rebel military.
One of the first foreign visits of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,
Mevlt avuolu, was made to Islamabad after only two weeks after the events in early August
2016. Pakistan once again, as in July 16, 2016, confirmed its unequivocal support for a
democratic, peaceful and stable Turkey under the dynamic leadership of President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, and congratulated the citizens of the country on their successful campaign aimed at
preventing the attempted coup on July 15, 2016.
The search for supporters in the international arena requires flexible approaches, mutual support
in any format, and loud statements. That is how it was this time. The migration crisis in Turkey,
the negotiations between the government of Kabul and the armed opposition in Afghanistan, and
Kashmir are the main areas of the current regional cooperation between Islamabad and Ankara.
Both parties again called on the international community to pay attention to the plight of Syrian
refugees in Turkey in order to prevent a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe. They called on the
developed countries to increase financial contributions and, thus, reduce the disproportionate
burden on developing countries of the temporarily displaced persons.
Ankaras address to Islamabad is justified, since for the past 35 years, Pakistan has taken in
millions of Afghan refugees and knows their problems firsthand. Currently, both countries take
in the largest number of refugees in the world.
Islamabad also used the negotiating platform with Ankara. Given the the two levels of crisis in
the Afghan dossier (in Pakistani-Afghan relations and the suspension of the negotiation
process/refusal of the armed opposition to take part in the dialogue), it reminded the international
community about its reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan; the measures taken to improve border
management between the two countries; as well as about the status of three million Afghan
refugees. At the same time, Islamabad stressed the need to include Turkey in the process of
peace negotiations in Afghanistan as an international mediator (along with the US proposal of
including India and Iran in June 2016.)
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Turkey exerted pressure, and Pakistan supported its urgent appeal to the international community
to strengthen the fight against terrorist organisations. In the context of Pakistan-Turkey relations,
this should be read as a requirement to break ties with all educational, cultural and business
centres operating under the auspices of the imam F. Glen.
Despite the fact that the Adviser to the Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan S. Aziz
only promised to investigate the work of Turkish educational centres, the Turkish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, M. avuolu said that Islamabad fully supported the Turkish governments
position and closed schools and business centres associated with the terrorist organisation of F.
Glen. Islamabad simultaneously declared the need to take steps to ensure that 10,000 students
enrolled in these centres in Pakistan could adequately complete their education. In response,
Ankara announced its full support for Islamabad in its dispute with India over Kashmir.
avuolu ruled out violence, confirming that the disputed status of Kashmir could be resolved
only through negotiations between the two countries, and supported Islamabads initiative to
send a Contact Group and an observer mission from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to
the valley to investigate cases of human rights violations.
The current stage of the Pakistani-Turkish relations is aimed at further strengthening their
strategic partnership and signing a Free Trade Agreement in August 2016.
Pakistan is considering and conducting its foreign policy as a whole. The process of making the
right decisions at the right time calls for an understanding of the global and regional strategic
environment and its potential trends in order to have an impact on the surrounding environment
to protect national interests. The negotiations between Islamabad and Ankara in August 2016
look like they are playing a giveaway in chess where both sides (black and white) are on velvet.
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This accumulation of power has made Erdogan unarguably the most powerful leader since
Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey. That has also turned him into an autocrat. He has
ruthlessly crushed any opposition and clamped down on the independent media. His rule has also
eroded the secular character of the country, raising its Islamic identity. All these factors could be
the reason behind the mutiny within the military.
For sure, it was mostly Erdogan supporters who came out on the streets defying the rebels, but
secular forces too backed the government despite being victimised by the increasingly
authoritarian rule of Erdogan. That underlines the growing political consensus in Turkey that a
military takeover is not a solution.
It, however, remains to be seen whether the triumph would make Erdogan more autocratic, or
return him to the democratic path. The danger of the military striking back has not gone away as
Erdogan consolidates his power. It is hard to imagine the same kind of public uprising against a
more organised and coordinated coup attempt in the future.
What happened in Turkey has triggered intense political debate in Pakistan about whether the
same could happen here in the event of a military intervention. With a common tradition of
frequent military coups in the two countries, the comparison seems inevitable. Imran Khan has
further fired up the controversy by declaring that the people would come out in support of the
military in Pakistan. One is not sure whether it is just wishful thinking of a political leader
longing for some divine help or whether he is merely reflecting the public frustration with the
Sharif government.
Surely the PTI chairman is not the only one predicting a smooth takeover if the generals decide
to move in. Pakistans past experience may lend some credence to such arguments.
Yet one must not ignore the changing political dynamics in the country that may not allow the
return of military rule, notwithstanding the public disenchantment with the government and
desire of some politicians and self-serving TV anchors. Surely the military leadership is mature
enough to understand the cost and political ramifications of any Bonapartism.
There is little probability of a Turkey-like popular resistance to any military takeover bid in
Pakistan. Yet there is no mass welcome waiting for a potential coup-maker either. Indeed the
armed forces have regained public respect and won admiration for their role in fighting militancy
and terrorism in the country.
Gen Raheel Sharif may well be the most popular person in the country. But it would certainly be
a different situation if he decided to intervene. Imran Khan and others of his ilk are grossly
mistaken about the publics likely reaction to a military takeover. It is no more a situation where
the generals could just walk into the corridors of power amidst public cheering. Despite bitter
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political rivalries, most of the political parties are in agreement not to support any direct military
intervention.
Interestingly, days before the bungled putsch in Turkey, posters imploring Gen Sharif to take
over appeared in all the major cities of Pakistan. Similar posters appeared earlier too when some
obscure groups took out rallies in support of the army chief. But there was no groundswell of
support for the move. It only brought embarrassment to the general, who has already announced
he will not seek another term in office.
Despite all the problems of governance and ineptitude, the political system is still working.
Unlike in the past, all the major political parties have stakes in the present political order. All of
them are part of the power structure and are not likely to support any move to derail the system,
notwithstanding Imran Khans dire predictions.
What Imran Khan has failed to understand is that it would be a collective failure of the political
forces and not just of the Sharif government if the military returns to power and is greeted by the
people. Pakistan may not be Turkey, but those inviting military intervention must learn some
lessons from the events of the last week.
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8- PANAMA Leaks
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8- PANAMA Leaks
investors. In times of recession and curtailed economic activity, these constructs become even
more attractive.
And its not just professionals in accounting and finance who have found this business attractive.
Law firms are into this business too big time. The two prominent ones are Morgan & Morgan,
and Mossack Fonseca. The latter is at the centre of controversy in the latest revelations. Besides
these, there are hundreds of firms that provide administrative services to offshore companies.
In the context explained above, where does the Sharif family (and others) fit into all this? Have
they done something wrong or is there a case of a mountain being made out of a molehill? My
guess is that actually there is a fair case of dubious dealings. To understand this, one would have
to keep in context the interview of the PMs son and the PMs brief address to the nation in the
aftermath of these allegations. The logic given by the PMs son, in explaining their offshore
accounts, was that they offer tax advantage. In other words, they charge lesser tax. But this
argument falls completely flat given the fact that Pakistans taxation system is one of the
friendliest to the rich of the country.
This has been the case throughout our history. Take the total wealth of the rich in Pakistan and
measure it against the tax that they pay, and you will find that it comes out to a miniscule
percentage of their total wealth. Compare it to the fee that they pay to offshore companies, and I
bet that youll find that rich people have it better in Pakistan rather than an offshore destination.
Mind you, I am not even talking about the billions doled out in subsidies that indirectly goes to
their pockets millions that are not taxable (as in the case of agricultural subsidises, which
disproportionately benefit rich landlords). To say that they invested money in offshore accounts
to realise a tax advantage doesnt sound logical at all.
The PMs address only serves to complement my position on this issue. Just take the gigantic
money amounts that he stated in his address. That itself is a reflection of the fact that he and his
family have had it so good in Pakistan that they have absolutely no need to invest their money in
offshore accounts. How else can one explain their sprawling estate in Raiwind and multibillion
businesses? And last, but not the least, what made the PM and his family members afraid that
they decided to use dubious offshore accounts rather than direct, formal channels (remember that
offshore companies are famous for protecting the anonymity of their clients and their invested
amounts).
In conclusion, there is nothing wrong with an offshore company since it is basically an
investment outlet. They take advantage of the fact that, compared to the high corporate tax rates
in financial centres like London, their tax rates are very low. The problem lies not with them, but
in the way that they transact their business, and the lax laws in the country from where the
investment comes in.
In a modern economy, all countries are in need of outside investment and they do everything to
facilitate it. Offshore companies are one way of doing it, among many others. And their
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8- PANAMA Leaks
continued existence owes primarily to the fact that they require little capital for their operations,
are good at keeping customer confidentiality and have been giving healthy returns to their
investors. Who cares about whether the incoming investment is illegal or legal as long as its
coming into the country.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, the problem lies not in the Cayman Islands or Swiss bank
accounts but in lax domestic laws and loopholes in the administrative machinery of the
government. If anybody is serious about addressing concerns like offshore accounts, then
loopholes like SROs will have to be done away with. That doesnt seem to be happening anytime
soon. Therefore, stay put. More entertainment is in the offing.
Tailpiece: On behalf of the Pakistani nation, I request the PMs son to come back to Pakistan and
take over the running of our loss-making government entities. If he can take out billions in loans
and return it within a few years, this means that he is a wonderfully savvy businessman. We need
such a savvy businessman here, not in London.
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8- PANAMA Leaks
In countries like Brazil, the leak has added fuel to the flames of heated protests, linking Mossack
Fonseca to the nations corruption scandal and the Presidents impending impeachment trial.
Under authoritarian regimes, the impact will be less damaging. In Russia, where multiple
individuals that appear to be part of Vladimir Putins inner circle were implicated, the incident
is being branded Putin-phobia and ignored; in China, a censorship campaign seeks to curb
online discussion on the leak, which implicated President Xis brother-in-law.
2. A new light on corruption
The Panama Papers prove that corruption is much more widespread than believed. Thats saying
something, because it was already pretty bad: the annual Corruption Perceptions Index, most
recently found that serious corruption problems were perceived by citizens in 70 percent of
nations.
Countries in Africa have consistently ranked the worst on the CPI, and the continent stands out
as one people frequently associate with corruption: case and point, the Ugandan company that
avoided $400 million in taxation, more than the entire countrys annual health budget.
Now, it has become apparent that corruption is an international problem. The leak has also
proven that its not just governments, but private individuals and corporations involved in
morally dubious dealings.
If youre wondering where the U.S. comes into play, the answer is that it doesnt for the most
part. Panama is not a tax haven for the United States, and in fact, it is much easier to create a
shell company in any U.S. state than it would be to do so there.
As President Obama stated, There are folks here in America who are taking advantage of the
same stuff... the laws are so poorly designed that they allow people, if theyve got enough
lawyers and enough accountants, to wiggle out of responsibilities that ordinary citizens are
having to abide by.
3. Pressure to clean up
Investigations have been launched, outrage has been ignited, and public figures have sworn to
take the matter seriously and pass laws that reflect their disdain. To put a significant dent in the
practice, though, would require much more than may be feasible.
There will be pressure for tax reform, crackdowns on evasion, and international cooperation.
Nations, companies, and wealthy individuals will be pressured into cleaning up their act, at least
on the surface. There is promise, however: tax investigators from over 28 countries will meet in
Paris to launch an international inquiry into the leak to better understand the offshore industry.
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In addition, Panamas President Juan Carlos Varela said the government will create an
international committee of experts to recommend improvements in transparency in the offshore
financial industry, which would share its findings with other nations in the interest of taking a
united front.
Even so, it is more likely that this pressure will bubble into resentment than change. With
attitudes toward the political establishment and elite already sour, the Panama Papers leak
reaffirms and amplifies populations perception that the rich and the powerful play by different
rules.
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in most cases, the documents will feed the perception that the privileged are allowed to play by
different rules.
Indeed, for many, the Panama Papers are reminiscent of a broader phenomenon that played out
in the run-up and the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis: The perception of a system
run and managed by a political establishment that serves the rich and connected and fails to hold
these elites accountable for the damage they cause to the rest of society. There is still notable
residual resentment that very few bankers were brought to justice for their role in a financial
debacle that caused significant misery and almost tipped the world into a devastating multiyear
depression.
By stoking residual anger and fueling anti-establishment movements, the Panama Papers will
make it even harder for the established parties to come together and implement policies aimed at
overcoming years of sluggish economic growth, worsening inequality and artificial financial
stability.
In addition, two other developments last week also eroded the credibility of the political
establishment: the failure of the Dutch government to convince citizens to back a trade and
cooperation agreement between the European Union and Ukraine, and the turnaround of a
growing number of members of the Republican establishment (including Lindsey Graham, Mitt
Romney and Scott Walker) who lined up behind Ted Cruz as their preferred candidate.
There will be even less appetite to govern from the bipartisan political center, thus making it
more difficult to secure sufficient buy-in for pro-growth structural reforms, better demand
management and more timely solutions for excessively high levels of over-indebtedness.
There's no doubt that the Panama Papers will produce greater efforts to reduce tax minimization
(whether through legal avoidance or illegal evasion). That is good news for liberal democratic
systems that rely on a rule of law that is viewed as fair and credible. But in the short-term this
will be accompanied by even stronger resistance to the kind of political unity that is needed in
several countries to deliver high growth and genuine financial stability.
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The Jamaat-e-Islami has already launched its protest for the elimination of corruption, although it
has not so far held a joint rally with the PTI. A number of religious groups are unhappy with the
PML-N for different reasons. The Pakistan Awami Tehrik has decided to join the ranks of the
opposition on the issue of the Panama Leaks. If these parties and religious groups decide to work
together to challenge the PML-N, it will face an extremely difficult situation. If these groups
continue to oppose the government in their individual capacity, a political stalemate can persist
for a longer time.
The PML-N has decided to adopt a strident approach towards the opposition, especially the PTI.
The Sharif brothers are holding public meetings in different cities, showering the people with
state funds for development projects and infrastructure work. They are also promising to end
electricity shortages, reduce its price and make state funds available to people through one
project or another. State funds are being used liberally in pursuing a media campaign. An
important political line pursued by the PML-N is to label all political adversaries as anti-national
and anti-people because these are said to be undermining the governments public welfare
projects.
Another dimension of the current political situation is the growing strain in civil-military
relations and subtle anti-military propaganda by the federal government. The main line of
argument is that the military is using its clout to pressure the elected government. Some political
activists are saying that any unconstitutional change or coup will not be accepted. Some are
raising questions as to who was using Imran Khan against Nawaz Sharif. The PML-N is
disturbed by the armys unilateral decision to undertake a security operation against the
facilitators of terrorism in Punjab and its success in busting the Chottu gang after the Punjab
polices failure to do so. Further, the army chiefs statement calling for an end to corruption
altogether and the announcement of punitive action against senior army officers are viewed by
PML-N loyalists as pressure tactics against their governments in Islamabad and Lahore. The
PML-N resists the militarys autonomous role in Punjab because it compromises its claim of an
exclusive and unchallenged monopoly of power in Punjab.
The only option available to Imran Khan is to continue building street pressure on the federal
government and evolve a working arrangement with other political parties to mount increased
pressure. Street protest will be his main strategy. This confrontation can persist for several
months unless the PML-N loses patience and engages in some kind of political adventurism,
either by using the state apparatus against the opposition in a brutal manner or by using executive
powers to tame the security establishment in Punjab. The governments fight for survival will
compromise its efforts to address the issues of internal security. The agenda for madrassa
reforms and societal mobilisation for countering extremism and terrorism will be put on the
back-burner because it cannot afford to alienate more people. The struggle for power with an
uncertain outcome will mark Pakistani politics this summer.
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And yet the danger that should never be forgotten is a flare-up into something far worse. That is
what makes events at the weekend so striking.
What is admitted now is the US carried out a bombing raid at Deir al-Zour in eastern Syria on
Saturday that Russia says killed forces loyal to Assad, with at least 60 troops killed.
Australian warplanes also participated whether dropping bombs or in support we don't yet
know. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull says Australia regrets the loss of life and injury to any
Syrian government personnel.
The US and Australia insist the intention was to target Islamic State.
But the strike has led to a diplomatic pyrotechnic display in New York, just as world leaders
gather for the annual UN summit.
Russia has accused the US of deliberate "provocation" to derail a ceasefire. Russia's UN
ambassador Vitaly Churkin demanded an emergency meeting of the Security Council, saying
he'd never witnessed a more "heavy-handed" US response in 40 years of diplomacy.
Taking none of it, Samantha Power blamed Russia for employing a "magician's sleight of hand",
to divert attention from its own complicity in supporting the brutality of the Assad regime.
Russian air power has undoubtedly saved the regime, but massively complicated the
international dangers, as the shooting down last year of a Russian fighter by Turkey
demonstrated.
None of this can be divorced from the ghoulish spectre that Vladimir Putin has added to the US
presidential election, amid allegations of deliberate Russian hacking of email systems and
Donald Trump's supposed admiration for the Russian leader.
Russia is also deeply implicated over meddling in Ukraine (Turnbull is expected to meet his
Ukrainian counterpart Petro Poroshenko on the sidelines of the New York summit) and has
inserted itself into the South China Sea dispute by sending warships for drills with the Chinese
navy.
With all this jostling and name-calling, it seems extraordinary there is any progress on a Syrian
ceasefire. Yet there was a truce, of a kind, that had been worked through during months of
painstaking negotiations and in place for barely a moment. Will it now last? "This is a very big
question mark," Churkin warned. And would that really have mattered if the major powers want
to preserve the freedom to bomb enemies?
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Syria isnt a cold war conflict: the US and Russia cant just fix it
by: Mary Dejevsky
Washington and Moscow are engaged in a new standoff over Syria, and this time it has gone
beyond words. The US has broken off talks and recalled its negotiators from Geneva. Russia,
meanwhile, has suspended an agreement on the destruction of plutonium, setting conditions
including an end to Ukraine-related sanctions for the resumption of the accord.
Cue doom-mongers, mostly on the western side, warning that US-Russia relations are every bit
as bad as they were during the darkest days of the cold war, with corresponding dangers for
everyone else. Some, indeed, would argue that the risks are greater still, because the restraint
forced by the prospect of mutual assured destruction and any formal framework for contact are
both missing.
Of course, the return to hostilities in and around Aleppo is a catastrophe for those on the ground
and a fresh setback for those trying to oust President Bashar al-Assad. Where US-Russian
relations are concerned, however, there are reasons to take a less apocalyptic view, and the same
applies to the wider consequences.
If the fiercest measure the US has taken is to break off somewhat fitful talks on Syria, and the
strongest response Russia has chosen to offer is the suspension of a single arms agreement that
Moscow anyway accuses Washington of breaking, that says a lot in itself. It could reflect how
little the two countries currently have to talk about, in which case a break makes little difference.
Or, more likely, it shows their concern to spare other areas of cooperation, such as wider arms
control or the space station. Indeed, the US said talks about avoiding bilateral clashes in Syria
would continue, while the conditions Moscow has set for resuming the plutonium deal suggest it
is open to bargaining even as it stamps its foot.
To an extent both sides are playing to their domestic galleries. This is an often neglected aspect
of many a diplomatic spat, but it is especially true of this one. The US is in the grip of a highly
unusual presidential campaign that has barely a month to run. While Barack Obama is not
running, the charges of foreign policy weakness levelled against him, not just by Donald Trump
and the Republicans but by some on his own side, are a factor in the campaign. It is important for
Obama and his legacy, but still more so for Hillary Clintons prospects, that the Democratic
administration does not appear spineless especially not before its old Russian foe.
President Putin, for his part, has to attend to national morale in the face of the first fall in living
standards for many Russians since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is judged to be such as
risk that there is talk he could bring forward the presidential election to next year. Neither he nor
his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, can afford to play too nice with the Americans.
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But there is another reason why the health or otherwise of US-Russia relations should not be
judged exclusively by their talks about Syria: to believe that the two countries are capable of
ending the conflict in Syria is to believe that the cold war continues, and that every war is a
proxy superpower war.
We are living in different times, and Syria is not a cold war-era conflict. It is wider than that,
with many different proxies involved, and loyalties shifting to and fro; it is also narrower, in the
sense that the only settlement that will stick must be acceptable to the people who live there.
Outside powers cannot force a peace so long as the parties to the dispute believe they still have
ground to gain.
If the conflict has demonstrated anything, it is that neither erstwhile superpower has the clout to
control its clients on the ground. The latest ceasefire failed not only because the US mistakenly
bombed a contingent of Syrian troops, and not only because an aid convoy was destroyed, but
because the sponsors of the deal the US and Russia were unable to control what happened
next.
The US clearly cannot marshal its so-called moderates, and may not even be quite sure who they
are. Something similar applies to Putin and Assad. From the wording of the US state
departments announcement on breaking off talks, it would appear that even Washington is
starting to accept that Putin cannot just switch Assad on or off.
There may well still be diehards in the Pentagon, perhaps, and the Russian ministry of defence
who believe the world is still theirs to fight over and divide up between them. The failed
ceasefire illustrated something different: that US-Russian sponsorship is no longer enough.
For any ceasefire in Syria to endure, let alone any settlement, either many more parties will have
to be involved as sponsors including Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey or the Syrians
themselves will have to call a halt. That may not happen until there is a victor.
This is not a palatable thought. But it may be the case that the US-Russian peace efforts in Syria
have to be seen as a laudable effort, but one that was ultimately doomed to fail. Not because the
US and Russia could not agree, but because an old-style superpower deal is no longer enough.
This may not be good news for Syria, but it does mean it need not be the sole gauge of USRussian relations. There are hints Moscow and Washington understand this, even as they trade
recriminations.
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Over the month of September 2015, Russia disclosed that it had transferred two squadrons of
Sukhoi fighter jets to the Basel al-Assad military base in Latakia, Syria. Satellite reconnaissance
later confirmed that modular housing, sufficient for some 2,000 military troops, was being
assembled at the air base. In addition, additional construction was observed in Tartus where the
Russian navy maintains its only foreign naval base. The presence of fifteen Mi-17 and Mi-24
attack helicopters were also confirmed as well as the arrival of two tank transport ships. Those
ships were believed to each be carrying 25 Russian tanks, approximately 500 naval marines as
well as assorted heavy artillery and transport including armored personnel carriers.
On September 28th, following their respective speeches to the U.N. General Assembly, Vladimir
Putin and Barack Obama held a private 90 minute meeting at U.N. headquarters in New York
City. The White House described the meeting as productive and business like. Unconfirmed
Kremlin sources however described the meeting as tense and claimed that Putin told Obama
that the American strategy to combat Islamic State in Syria had failed, that it would precipitate
another Libya and that the Islamic State would not be defeated without boots on the ground.
According to the same Kremlin source, Putin again pressed Obama to join with Russia in a
grand coalition to defeat Islamic State.
On September 30, Russia began an air campaign over Syria targeting a broad array of anti-Assad
groups. Although the Kremlin continued to insist that its primary target was Islamic State
militants and continued to call for a grand coalition against the Islamic State, the bulk of its
attacks were directed against Free Syrian Army positions and against groups that were being
supported by the U.S. and its Arab allies.
On Friday October 2, President Barack Obama declared that the conflict in Syria was not a
superpower chessboard contest. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest went on to add that
the Obama administration was exercising strategic patience. A longtime critic of Washingtons
Mid-East policy, a former, high ranking, Carter administration official, translated strategic
patience as were clueless.
On Oct 3 and 4, as if to deliberately underscore Washingtons impotence, Russian aircraft twice
violated Turkish airspace. It is not surprising that a pilot engaged in air combat or attempting to
avoid a missile might inadvertently cross into a neighboring countrys air space. It is highly
unlikely, however, that a Russian pilot on a routine mission who was not under attack or facing
an external threat would have made such an error. Russian pilots are highly trained professionals,
they simply do not accidently violate neighboring air space unless they have an equipment
malfunction or are deliberately told to do so.
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter confirmed that the Russian violation was no accident and
has repeatedly condemned the Russian action. In the meantime, other than for criticizing the
Russian actions, calling it a fundamental mistake, and for directing U.S. warplanes to divert
their flight paths to stay at least 20 nautical miles away from Russian aircraft, the Obama
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administration has not otherwise responded to Russian actions. It is unclear whether Russian
pilots have also been told to keep a 20 nautical mile buffer zone from American and coalition
aircraft.
On October 5, the Kremlin disclosed that Russian volunteers would be allowed to go to Syria
and fight on behalf of the Syrian government. Subsequently, the Kremlin denied that additional
Russian troops would be deployed in Syria and, just to make sure that the West recognized the
linkage of the Ukrainian crisis with the one in Syria, that the Russian volunteers might be
coming from those currently in the Ukraine.
Two days later, On October 7, Syrian army units, supported by Russian air power and a cruise
missile bombardment from Russian ships in the Caspian Sea, began a ground offensive in Syrias
Hama and Idlib provinces. Both provinces have historically been hot beds of opposition to the
Assad government and the FSA has a prominent position there. There is little if any Islamic State
presence in either of the two provinces.
For Russian president, Vladimir Putin, the Syrian Civil War has become the nexus where he can
most leverage Russias strengths to achieve his political and economic goals. Simply put, Syria
offers the Kremlin an opportunity to accumulate chips that it can cash in other negotiations.
Although Russian aims and tactics will be largely opportunistic, the Kremlin has four broad
objectives it is looking to achieve from its Syrian intervention.
First and foremost, in shoring up the Assad government Moscow is sending a clear message to
the Middle East and to the rest of the world that it is prepared to stand by its allies and to commit
its military forces to insure their survival. That lesson will not be lost on countries like Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, or elsewhere in the Gulf that are growing uncertain about the reliability of
American guarantees. By eliminating Assads opponents, Moscow can re-legitimize the Assad
government by presenting the West with a stark choice: either support Assad or support Islamic
State.
Moreover, Russias military presence in Syria now gives it the ability to intervene elsewhere in
the Middle East. There are already tentative indications that Russian air power may be deployed
in support of the Iranian backed Shiite militias in Iraq. Syria may well be just the beginning of a
broader Russian intervention of military force across a number of Mid-East conflicts.
Additionally, by aligning itself with Iran and the rest of the Shiite bloc, Russia is accelerating
the growing realignment of Mid-East politics around a Sunni-Shia pole. In doing so it is also
leveraging its influence and taking advantage of Iranian proxies in the region to further isolate
American influence and expand its own.
To be sure, American military power in the region dwarfs anything that the Russians have
mustered, but the Russian presence and the Kremlins willingness to use its otherwise modest
forces will rewrite the military equation in the Middle East. By intervening in Syria, Russia has
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assured itself of a seat at the bargaining table over the future of Syria specifically and in the
other, invariably cross-linked, issues of the Middle East.
Secondly, although Russia is not a member of OPEC, despite repeated attempts to join, its role in
Syria gives it valuable bargaining chips in its dealings with that organization and with Saudi
Arabia and its Gulf allies. Oil is critical to Russias future. Natural gas and petroleum exports are
responsible for 68% of Russias export revenues and 50% of the governments budget. Simply
put, the future of Russia rises and falls with the price of hydrocarbons.
Russia needs higher energy prices, so too, for that matter, do the Saudis and their Gulf partners.
The ability of the Saudis and their allies to tolerate low oil prices exceeds that of Russia,
however, especially a Russia that is subject to economic sanctions from Europe and the United
States. Concessions on oil pricing and production might well be a quid pro quo for some role for
the Saudi backed Syrian rebels in whatever negotiated solution emerges.
Thirdly, and most significantly, Russia needs relief from the sanctions imposed by the EU and
the United States. Russias potential ability to stem the flood of refugees leaving for Europe
could turn out to be a valuable bargaining chip in the Kremlins quest for sanctions relief. So also
will its role in combatting jihadist violence in Syria and in helping to curtail the flow of jihadists
into Europe. The Kremlin has made a point of underscoring the links between resolving the crisis
in Ukraine and resolving the one in Syria.
Finally, there is the ongoing issue of Ukraine and the general issue of NATOs eastern expansion
and the buildup of NATO and U.S. sponsored military assets in Eastern Europe. The potential
tradeoffs of Western support for Kiev against Russian concessions in Syria is not lost on
Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko who has expressed his concern that European and
American support for his government may get sacrificed as part of a larger deal with Russia over
Syria. East European governments, privately, have been expressing the same concerns fearful
that their long-term security and NATO support may be traded for Russian concessions
elsewhere.
The United States now finds itself in a difficult position in Syria. American supported rebels are
coming under direct attack by Russian military forces. If the U.S. challenges Russian planes it
risks a potential escalation and a military incident between American and Russian forces. Worse,
it risks being branded as the aggressor and the party responsible for escalating the Syrian conflict
into a dangerous new level.
To date, U.S. air forces have mostly concentrated on hitting Islamic State targets. There has been
little effort to directly support ground operations by the Free Syrian Army or other rebel groups.
With the exception of the defense of Kobani, and a number of other Kurdish led operations,
American air power has generally not coordinated its activity with those of anti-Assad rebels.
For the U.S. to now come to the defense of those rebels would be seen as an expansion of the
American role in Syria and as a direct provocation to the Russians.
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On the other hand, if the U.S. fails to respond to Russian attacks on its quasi-proxies, it risks
being seen as impotent, unwilling to stand by its allies, and will effectively cede leadership over
resolving the Syrian crisis to the Kremlin.
One option would be to step up military support for the Ukrainian government, increasing the
number of U.S. military trainers there and even considering rotating American aircraft and troops
there so as to establish a continuous military presence. Neither the White House nor NATO has
much appetite for stepping up their presence in the Ukraine, however.
In the broad sweep of history what happens to Bashir al-Assad will scarcely warrant a footnote.
There is no question that his attempt to retain power with Russian and Iranian support will
continue to rain death and destruction on Syria and propel even more Syrians to seek asylum in
Europe. Russias military intervention will complicate the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East, create new strains with long standing allies, and add even more byzantine
complexity to an already complex, if not incomprehensible, situation.
On the other hand, the dramatic image of the Kremlin flexing Russian military power in the
region notwithstanding, the fact remains that the United States is still the worlds reigning
superpower and Russia, for all its newfound aggressiveness, is not. America still has the worlds
largest, most advanced and dynamic economy and while it has no shortage of significant
problems to deal with it also has the ability, with the right leadership, to overcome them.
Russia on the other hand is locked into a long-term terminal decline, one that will likely see its
collapse and further breakup in another generation or two. Putins opportunistic foreign policy
and his ability to manipulate the worlds media may create the illusion of the restoration of a
bipolar world but the reality of Russias declining economic base coupled with a shrinking
population say otherwise.
For the last several years, the Obama Administrations policy in Syria has been little better than a
poorly thought out PR campaign. Spread a few billion dollars here and there, drop some supplies
to a few rebel groups, launch a lackluster air campaign, and continue to declare that you are
winning. Critics of that strategy, admittedly it is a bit of a stretch to call it a strategy, were
summarily dismissed by an administration that continues to believe they are the smartest guys in
the room and that anybody that disagrees with them is hopelessly deficient.
Putins masterstroke was in realizing that by intervening in Syria he could gather up some
valuable chips that he could use in other negotiations and at the same time embarrass the Obama
White House by demonstrating how ineffectual President Obamas policy in Syria had become.
In addition, it allowed him to break out of the diplomatic isolation that Washington had tried to
impose on him and restore his relevance on the world stage. He has been able to cast an image of
himself as a strong and forceful leader and portray U. S. president Barack Obama as indecisive
and ineffectual. In the long run none of this will really matter, but in the short run it is a
significant diplomatic victory for the Kremlin.
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The United States had a tough hand to play in Syria and the White House played it poorly. The
Russians had an equally tough hand, maybe an even harder one, and they played it brilliantly.
That is the reality of the situation in Syria today as the civil war enters its fifth year.
Great powers make mistakes. Indeed, given the scope of their interests it is inevitable that great
powers will make many mistakes. Though as embarrassing or expensive as such mistakes can be,
they are rarely of existential consequence. No great power, however, can afford to be made to
look irrelevant. That is precisely what Vladimir Putin has done to Barack Obama in Syria and all
of the spin from the White House and its apologists in the media will not change that basic fact.
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Military Success in Syria Gives Putin Upper Hand in U.S. Proxy War
By: Mark Mazzetti
WASHINGTON The Syrian military was foundering last year, with thousands of rebel
fighters pushing into areas of the country long considered to be government strongholds. The
rebel offensive was aided by powerful tank-destroying missiles supplied by the Central
Intelligence Agency and Saudi Arabia.
Intelligence assessments circulated in Washington that the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad,
was losing his grip on power.
But then the Russians arrived, bludgeoning C.I.A.-backed rebel forces with an air campaign that
has sent them into retreat. And now rebel commanders, clinging to besieged neighborhoods in
the divided city of Aleppo, say their shipments of C.I.A.-provided antitank missiles are drying
up.
For the first time since Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Russian military for the past year has been
in direct combat with rebel forces trained and supplied by the C.I.A. The American-supplied
Afghan fighters prevailed during that Cold War conflict. But this time the outcome thus far
has been different.
Russia has won the proxy war, at least for now, said Michael Kofman, a fellow at the
Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.
Russias battlefield successes in Syria have given Moscow, isolated by the West after its
annexation of Crimea and other incursions into Ukraine, new leverage in decisions about the
future of the Middle East.
The Obama administration is now talking with President Vladimir V. Putins government about a
plan to share intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against the Islamic State and other militant
groups in Syria, and Mr. Putin has thus far met his goals in Syria without becoming caught in a
quagmire that some including President Obama had predicted he would.
But even Mr. Obama has expressed wariness about an enduring deal with Moscow. Im not
confident that we can trust the Russians or Vladimir Putin, Mr. Obama said at a news
conference on Thursday. Whenever you are trying to broker any kind of deal with an individual
like that or a country like that, you have got to go in there with some skepticism.
At the same time, some military experts point out that Mr. Putin has saddled Russia with the
burden of propping up a Syrian military that has had difficulty vanquishing the rebels on its own.
The Russian campaign began in September, after a monthslong offensive by C.I.A.-backed rebel
groups won new territory in Idlib, Hama and Latakia Provinces in northern Syria. One problem
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for Washington: Those groups sometimes fought alongside soldiers of the Nusra Front, which
until recently was officially affiliated with Al Qaeda.
The offensive took Syrian troops by surprise, prompting concerns in Moscow and Damascus that
Mr. Assads government, long supported by the Russians, might be in trouble.
Some of the rebel groups boasted at the time that powerful TOW antitank missiles provided by
American and Saudi intelligence operatives were a key to their success. For several years, the
C.I.A. has joined with the spy services of several Arab nations to arm and train the rebels at
bases in Jordan and Qatar, with the Saudis bankrolling much of the operation.
A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment about any American assistance to Syrian rebels.
But Lt. Col. Fares al-Bayyoush, a former aviation engineer who heads the rebel group Fursan alHaq, said during an interview in May 2015 that his group would receive new shipments of the
antitank weapons as soon as the missiles were used.
We ask for ammunition and missiles, and we get more than we ask for, he said.
Yet the advance also created problems for the fractious assortment of rebel groups, as it allowed
the Nusra Front to gain control over more areas of northern Syria. The Obama administration has
officially forbidden any Nusra fighters to receive weapons or training. But the group has at times
shown greater prowess against the Syrian government forces than the C.I.A.s proxies.
Moreover, they have shown that they can and will destroy or sideline C.I.A.-backed rebels who
do not agree to battlefield alliances. Moscow cited the battlefield successes of the Nusra Front to
justify its military incursion into Syria as a campaign to fight terrorism even if its primary
goal was to shore up Mr. Assads military against all insurgent groups, including the C.I.A.backed rebels.
The Russians began a rapid military buildup in September, and launched an air campaign that
targeted the Syrian rebel groups that posed the most direct threat to Mr. Assads government,
including some of the C.I.A.-trained groups. By mid-October, Russia had escalated its airstrikes
to nearly 90 on some days.
About 600 Russian marines landed in Syria with the mission of protecting the main air base in
Latakia; that ground force has grown to about 4,000 throughout Syria, including several hundred
special forces members.
It took some time for the Russian intervention to have a significant impact on the Syrian
battlefield, prompting Mr. Obama to predict that Moscow might become bogged down in its own
Middle East conflict.
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An attempt by Russia and Iran to prop up Assad and try to pacify the population is just going to
get them stuck in a quagmire, and it wont work, Mr. Obama said at a news conference in
October. And they will be there for a while if they dont take a different course.
The C.I.A. moved to counter the Russian intervention, funneling several hundred additional
TOW missiles to its proxies. One rebel commander, who spoke on the condition of anonymity
because of threats from more radical groups within the rebel coalition, said in October that his
group could at that time get as many missiles as it wanted.
Its like a carte blanche, he said. Just fill in the numbers.
But Russian firepower eventually overwhelmed the rebel groups in the north. By early this year,
attacks by Russian long-range bombers, fighter jets, attack helicopters and cruise missiles
allowed the Syrian Army to reverse many of the rebel gains and seize areas near the Turkish
border that many thought the government could never reclaim.
The flow of C.I.A. arms continued, but the weapons proved too little in the face of the Russian
offensive.
Jeffrey White, a former Defense Intelligence Agency officer who now studies Syria at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said the Russians had built a capable intelligence
network in Syria, giving them a better understanding of the terrain and location of rebel forces.
That has allowed Russian troops to call in precision airstrikes, making them more effective
against the rebels.
The mismatch has been most acute in the last several months, with Syrian government forces,
with Russian help, laying siege to the rebel-held parts of Aleppo. Losing their foothold in
Aleppo, once Syrias largest city, would be a big blow to the rebels.
Syrian and Russian jets have carried out an indiscriminate pounding of Aleppo, including attacks
on six hospitals in and around the city over the past week, according to a statement by Physicians
for Human Rights.
Since June, weve seen increasing reports of attacks on civilians in Aleppo and strikes on the
regions remaining medical infrastructure, said Widney Brown, the groups director of
programs. Each of these assaults constitutes a war crime.
Rebel groups in recent days have made surprising gains in a new offensive to try to break
through Syrian military lines encircling Aleppo, but if it fails, rebels inside the city will face a
choice between enduring the siege or surrendering.
In recent interviews, rebel commanders said the flow of foreign weapons needed to break the
siege had slowed.
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We are using most of our weapons in the battle for Aleppo, said Mustafa al-Hussein, a member
of Suqour al-Jabal, one of the C.I.A.-backed groups. He said the flow of weapons to the group
had diminished in the past three to four months.
Now we fire them only when it is necessary and urgent, he said.
Another commander, Maj. Mousa al-Khalad of Division 13, a C.I.A.-backed rebel group
operating in Idlib and Aleppo, said his group had received no missiles for two weeks.
We filed a request to get TOW missiles for the Aleppo front, he said, but the reply was that
there were none in the warehouses.
Rebel leaders and military experts say that perhaps the most pressing danger is that supply routes
from Turkey, which are essential to the C.I.A.-backed rebels, could be severed.
The U.S. is doing just enough to placate its allies and partners and says it is doing something,
but does not seek to do what it takes to change conditions on the battlefield, said Emile
Hokayem, a Middle East analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and an Assad
critic.
Mr. Putin has achieved many of his larger goals to prop up Mr. Assads government, retain
access to the longtime Russian naval base on the Mediterranean Sea and use Syria as a proving
ground for the most advanced Russian military technology.
Some military experts remain surprised that Mr. Putin took the risky step of fighting Americantrained and equipped forces head on, but they also assess that his Syria gamble appears to be
paying off.
It is the type of Cold War-era battle that Mr. Obama, in October, insisted he did not want to
enter.
Were not going to make Syria into a proxy war between the United States and Russia, he said.
This is not some superpower chessboard contest.
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The Bank of England is hoping its decision to cut interest rates from 0.5% to 0.25% - a record
low and the first cut since 2009 - will stave off recession and stimulate investment, with some
economic indicators pointing to a downturn.
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Ex-chancellor George Osborne and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn are among those to have
warned against pursuing a "hard" option, while some Eurosceptic Conservative MPs have put
forward the opposite view.
What does the fall in the value of the pound mean for prices in the shops?
Summer holidaymakers travelling overseas from the UK are finding that their pounds are buying
fewer euros or dollars after the Brexit vote.
The day-to-day spending impact is likely to be more significant. Even if the pound regains some
of its value, currency experts expect it to remain at least 10% below where it was on 23 June, in
the long term.
If they are correct, imported goods will consequently get more expensive - that means food,
clothing and homeware are all likely to get pricier.
These price rises might not kick in immediately. For example, all the big retailers would have
factored in the currency risk when organising their finances. In effect they have insured
themselves against a fall in the pound, but this will start to unwind next year leading to price
increases in the shops.
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Sellers of luxury items, such as high-end cars, have much bigger profit margins, so may be able
to absorb the extra costs without passing these on to customers.
Some say we could still remain in the single market - but what is a single
market?
The single market is seen by its advocates as the EU's biggest achievement and one of the main
reasons it was set up in the first place.
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Britain was a member of a free trade area in Europe before it joined what was then known as the
common market. In a free trade area countries can trade with each other without paying tariffs but it is not a single market because the member states do not have to merge their economies
together.
The European Union single market, which was completed in 1992, allows the free movement of
goods, services, money and people within the European Union, as if it was a single country.
It is possible to set up a business or take a job anywhere within it. The idea was to boost trade,
create jobs and lower prices. But it requires common law-making to ensure products are made to
the same technical standards and imposes other rules to ensure a "level playing field".
Critics say it generates too many petty regulations and robs members of control over their own
affairs. Mass migration from poorer to richer countries has also raised questions about the free
movement rule.
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The Bank of England may consider raising interest rates to combat extra pressure on inflation.
That would make mortgages and loans more expensive to repay but would be good news for
savers. However it is still too soon to say whether or not these warnings will prove accurate.
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One scenario that could see the referendum result overturned, is if MPs forced a general election
and a party campaigned on a promise to keep Britain in the EU, got elected and then claimed that
the election mandate topped the referendum one. Two-thirds of MPs would have to vote for a
general election to be held before the next scheduled one in 2020.
Will leaving the EU mean we don't have to abide by the European Court of
Human Rights?
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg is not a European Union
institution.
It was set up by the Council of Europe, which has 47 members including Russia and Ukraine. So
quitting the EU will not exempt the UK from its decisions.
However, the UK government is committed to repealing the Human Rights Act which requires
UK courts to treat the ECHR as setting legal precedents for the UK, in favour of a British Bill of
Rights.
As part of that, the UK government is expected to announce measures that will boost the powers
of courts in England and Wales to over-rule judgements handed down by the ECHR.
However, the EU has its own European Court of Justice, whose decisions are binding on EU
institutions and member states.
Its rulings have sometimes caused controversy in Britain and supporters of a Brexit have called
for immediate legislation to curb its powers.
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of "ever closer union" between EU member states and what they see as moves towards the
creation of a "United States of Europe".
Britain Stronger in Europe - the main cross-party group campaigning for Britain to remain in the EU was
headed by former Marks and Spencer chairman Lord Rose. It was backed by key figures from the
Conservative Party, including Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor George Osborne, most
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Labour MPs, including party leader Jeremy Corbyn and Alan Johnson, who ran the Labour In for Britain
campaign, the Lib Dems, Plaid Cymru, the Alliance party and the SDLP in Northern Ireland, and the Green
Party. Who funded the campaign: Britain Stronger in Europe raised 6.88m, boosted by two donations
totalling 2.3m from the supermarket magnate and Labour peer Lord Sainsbury. Other prominent Remain
donors included hedge fund manager David Harding (750,000), businessman and Travelex founder Lloyd
Dorfman (500,000) and the Tower Limited Partnership (500,000). Read a Who's Who guide. Who else
campaigned to remain: The SNP ran its own remain campaign in Scotland as it did not want to share a
platform with the Conservatives. Several smaller groups also registered to campaign.
Vote Leave - A cross-party campaign that has the backing of senior Conservatives such as Michael Gove
and Boris Johnson plus a handful of Labour MPs, including Gisela Stuart and Graham Stringer, and UKIP's
Douglas Carswell and Suzanne Evans, and the DUP in Northern Ireland. Former Tory chancellor Lord
Lawson and SDP founder Lord Owen were also involved. It had a string of affiliated groups such as
Farmers for Britain, Muslims for Britain and Out and Proud, a gay anti-EU group, aimed at building
support in different communities. Who funded the campaign: Vote Leave raised 2.78m. Its largest
supporter was businessman Patrick Barbour, who gave 500,000. Former Conservative Party treasurer
Peter Cruddas gave a 350,000 donation and construction mogul Terence Adams handed over
300,000. Read a Who's Who guide. Who else campaigned to leave: UKIP leader Nigel Farage is not
part of Vote Leave. His party ran its own campaign. The Trade Union and Socialist Coalition is also
running its own out campaign. Several smaller groups also registered to campaign.
How much does the UK contribute to the EU and how much do we get in
return?
In answer to this query from Nancy from Hornchurch - the UK is one of 10 member states who
pay more into the EU budget than they get out, only France and Germany contribute more. In
2014/15, Poland was the largest beneficiary, followed by Hungary and Greece.
The UK also gets an annual rebate that was negotiated by Margaret Thatcher and money back, in the form
of regional development grants and payments to farmers, which added up to 4.6bn in 2014/15.
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According to the latest Treasury figures, the UK's net contribution for 2014/15 was 8.8bn - nearly
double what it was in 2009/10.
The National Audit Office, using a different formula which takes into account EU money paid
directly to private sector companies and universities to fund research, and measured over the
EU's financial year, shows the UK's net contribution for 2014 was 5.7bn.
How much money will the UK save through changes to migrant child benefits
and welfare payments?
Martin, from Poole, in Dorset, wanted to know what taxpayers would have got back from the
benefit curbs negotiated by David Cameron in Brussels. We don't exactly know because the
details were never worked out. HM Revenue and Customs suggested about 20,000 EU nationals
receive child benefit payments in respect of 34,000 children in their country of origin at an
estimated cost of about 30m.
But the total saving would have been significantly less than that because Mr Cameron did not get
the blanket ban he wanted. Instead, payments would have been linked to the cost of living in the
countries where the children live. David Cameron said as many as 40% of EU migrant families
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who come to Britain could lose an average of 6,000 a year of in-work benefits when his
"emergency brake" was applied. The DWP estimated between 128,700 and 155,100 people
would be affected. But the cuts would have been phased in. New arrivals would not have got tax
credits and other in-work benefits straight away but would have gradually gained access to them
over a four year period at a rate that had not been decided. The plan will never be implemented
now.
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There is nothing to stop a future UK government reproducing these regulations in British law
following the decision to leave the EU. And the costs of so-called "red tape" will not necessarily
disappear overnight - if Britain opted to follow the "Norway model" and remained in the
European Economic Area most of the EU-derived laws would remain in place.
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Businesses are cutting investment, too. On Funding Circle, a peer-to-peer loans website for small
firms, the volume of lending is about 10% lower so far in July than it was in the same month last
year. The number of planning applicationsfor permission to expand premises, sayis another
decent proxy for investment spending. Though there is a lag in registrations, a tally of
applications in London boroughs in the week after Brexit currently stands at one-third below
their level a year before.
The tail-off in planning may be linked to a slowdown in the housing market. Data scraped from
Zoopla, a property website, suggest that of about 6,000 London properties listed from June 24th
to July 11th, roughly 1,000 have had their price cut since the referendum. A survey by the Royal
Institution of Chartered Surveyors published on July 14th, which accounts for the postreferendum period, shows a sharp fall in inquiries from homebuyers.
What of the export boom resulting from the weak pound, as Brexiteers predict? There is some
evidence that flight bookings into Britain have risen. And the headline on NetEase, a Chinese
web portal, is bullish: Pound falls to 31-year low. Time to bargain-hunt for British homes?.
But although it is difficult to assess the overall impact on exports, there is little to suggest a
bonanza is on the way. British export competitiveness has not improved as much as the fall in
sterling implies, because one-quarter of the value of British exports contains importswhich are
getting pricier. Analysis by The Economist of data provided by PriceStats, a consultancy that
scrapes prices from online retailers, suggests annualised inflation since the vote has been above
the Bank of Englands 2% target. In any case, research shows little evidence that currency
depreciations lead to increased market share in exports, particularly for a country like Britain
which competes mainly on non-price factors such as quality and customer service.
Now the slowdown is taking shape, the authorities must respond. Theresa May, the new prime
minister, has made encouraging noises about a fiscal stimulus, though with the budget deficit
already at about 4% of GDP she does not have much room to manoeuvre. On July 14th the Bank
of England surprised markets by holding interest rates at 0.5%; most analysts had expected a cut.
A future reduction cannot be far away: as the economy slows, it will soon need all the help it can
get.
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adjustments are on the cards across the globe, particularly in the EU. Brexit will force the
European Union to embark on the path of reforms on which they have been dragging their feet
for a while. These are defining moments for us and the various economies globally.
In the immediate future, there will be extreme situations - currencies tumbling, markets
precipitating, world trade and investment getting impacted, as we have witnessed hitherto. In
medium to long term, however, things will eventually get settled, if only Britain leaves.
Extended impacts are dependent on how the other counties in EU react - will they also decide to
leave, particularly the larger economies like Germany, France and possibly Netherlands. If they
do decide to leave then we could see things getting worst; in fact, the very existence of EU will
be challenged and hence the troubling economies - PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain),
etc. - will suffer more.
The fact is that services sector contributes 78% of the UK GDP. With English speaking
population (not the possibility with other EU Countries except for a couple of them), the
relocation of this industry elsewhere in toto within EU is almost impossible. Therefore, UK
economy will remain by and large insulated from any economic shocks with the Brexit. Banks
and other service industries, may shift some part of their businesses which is specific to the rest
of the Europe; moving full operations is highly unlikely and impractical. Once the detailed
analysis (regulatory framework, HR availability, language, logistics, etc) are done, they probably
decide otherwise. Most importantly, who knows if France (or Germany or Netherlands) is/ are
the next to exit EU? Too early for the FIs to announce their intentions to relocate. The relocation
may happen due to other reasons, like strict compliance of requirements in UK, etc., but not
Brexit, as such.
The other angle is socio-economic. There will be divided societies, across Europe including UK,
which could possibly lead to social unrest, particular in the troubling economies with mounting
pressure from immigrant and lesser funding support due to exit(s).The long and short of it is that
there will be a crisis in medium to long run, depending on how the other large economies of
Europe react.
In the immediate future, with Britain leaving, the suffering could be painful but those shall settlein eventually maybe in the next 5-10 years. A lot depends on how and when Britain will actually
leave - the transition could be smooth and in the mutual interest of all, if managed properly and
consciously, keeping egos aside during the exit negotiations. The exit plan is to be agreed
between UK and EU Countries, post triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, is the most
critical aspect in the overall scheme of things, post referendum. In the benefit of all parties
concerned, the exit shall be a long and slow process, as abrupt cutting of strings would do more
harm than help. In fact, if at all, that may not be practically possible. One thing is very important
to sink in that the various treaties, particularly related to trade and business; between UK and the
rest of the European Countries could continue as is, irrespective of UKs status as the formal
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member of the EU. The arrangements on border may, however, tightened to control the free flow
of immigrants in UK.
Given the above thesis, lets see how Pakistan will get impacted with this earth-shattering event.
While the good news is that Pakistan may not get substantially impacted. However, there are a
few susceptibilities that Pakistan needs to be mindful of and be prepared to ride the storm. As a
matter of fact Brexit may offer some opportunities to Pakistan. In this context, following are the
important areas:
1) Exports - big exposure in low quality products to Europe (almost a quarter of the total
exports, other than UK), primarily textiles. Post GSP+ status, the exports to EU, including UK,
increased by around 23%. Remaining EU is the single largest block in terms of exports for
Pakistan. As EU goes through the transition phase, post Brexit, exports could get impacted
negatively due to the risk of recession and consumerism which are under-strain already in EU.
The Brexit specific incremental effect may not happen immediately, as been argued above, but
this is something which Pakistan need to be prepared for. This is the single biggest risk that
Pakistans exposed to vis--vis Brexit. The exports of UK (alone around 8%) are relatively high
value-added and those will remain immune to any possible shocks. In fact, this maybe a good
opportunity for us to increase our market share in UK. The imports from EU and UK, on the
other hand, are not significant; therefore, supply risk is non-existent;
2) Worker Remittances: UK contributes almost 20% of the total remittances into Pakistan,
while rest of the EU is merely 3% of the total worker remittances. UK is indeed a significant
market for Pakistan. There maybe a blip in the short run, as people will be consolidating their
positions/ exposures due to uncertainties around; however, in the medium term there shall be an
opportunity to get a better market share from UK as the European migrant pressure subsides,
particularly in the white-collar, or maybe in the pink-collar, jobs, including Doctors, Lawyers,
Pharmacists, and the other service industry related professionals. The white-collar jobs may also
be up for grabs in EU, but for that language skills will be the key. We need to treat worker
remittances as an industry and start gearing ourselves up to capture the opportunities across the
world. We need to work closely with the interior and manpower ministries of the counties, where
theres an aging population concern, like EU Countries, to figure out the way to ensure that the
requisite skills are imparted in our exportable workers and above all compliance clearance
screening process to be made robust to address the growing concerns for the workers coming out
of Pakistan. This can be argued that the compliance concerns maybe mitigated when the whitecollar jobs are targeted. Worker remittances are getting more and more important for our
economy and coming close to our export numbers already;
3) FDI: There has been an erratic trend on this front. In any case, the trend in the recent past, for
the last three years, has been more focused towards getting FDI from China - reached over 75%
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(increased from 21% in FY13) of the total FDI. This is not a very healthy trend given the risk of
single country exposure. The share of China in FDI will continue to remain strong due to their
commitment to CPEC, and as the other destinations like Europe and Middle East will remain in a
consolidation mode. Therefore, on this constituency, the Brexit will not impact much;
4) Grants: UK is a significant player in this arena (60%+ contributor); an amount of over $260
million and growing. Most importantly, this aspect has qualitative value; any hit in this respect
may not be the best thing for Pakistans already grappling profile, perception. This area may also
get under pressure for a while due to cautious approach by the granting/ aiding agencies in UK.
We need to make sure that at the diplomatic level, we shall engage ourselves with the UK
authorities to ensure non-impairment; and, last but not the least,
5) Social Impact and Law & Order: its possible that the marginal economies in Europe come
hard on the immigrants, mainly Muslims, with UK quota of immigrants shrinking. The pressure
to accommodate immigrants on the remaining EU countries will increase and could result in
extreme reactions, which could trigger law and order challenges. Consequently, the Muslim
world, along with Pakistan, will get further isolated. Hence visa issues, trading constraints, etc.,
etc. This will also hurt the exports, remittances, and the economy as a whole.
All in all, Pakistan maybe a sufferer in this situation on the exports fronts, in the long run. Our
exports need to find more stable and growing markets like USA and parts of Asia which are
markets of high value-added products. In the extended time horizon, UK offer more
opportunities to us than threat. We need to position ourselves to capitalise on these opportunities.
Remaining Europe may not be good news. Its future is uncertain to say the least and posses risk
for the external account, if we continue to depend on our export destinations in Europe. We need
to address our structural issues to make our exports competitive, harness remittances and
improve perception issues by going after the opportunities proactively to explore, capitalise on
new high-premium, quality conscious, stable, international markets. CPEC delivery and success,
in this context, will become even important than before. To reiterate and conclude, there may not
be an immediate severe fall-out on Pakistan; however, therere real vulnerabilities out there over
a period of time, particularly on the foreign inflows, in the form of exports, grants, worker
remittances, FDIs, etc., which need to be plugged-in through proactive policy decision making
and diplomatic actions.
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Indian Ocean: the third largest ocean in the world enjoys a unique geostrategic and historical
importance. It is bordering three continents: Asia, Africa and Australia with 36 littoral and 14
hinterland states including several important emerging economies and rich oil-exporting
countries. About 80% oil trade is through it and is considered as an important energy belt. It
acted as an important trade route between East and West. This ocean was also used by European
imperial powers to subjugate all Asian and many African countries and convert them into their
colonies.
It (Indian Ocean region) is considered as the most volatile region and has worlds 50% armed
conflicts. Currently, the US is dominating Indian Ocean as it has its fifth fleet in Bahrain and is
also using Diego Garcia, a strategically important island, as its Naval base. Besides, a part of its
naval force is here to ensure the safe trade of oil in Persian Gulf and to counter piracy.
French Navy is also present in it, but true aspirants of dominance over Indian Ocean are China
and India. China has a powerful navy (PLAN; Peoples Liberation Army Navy) compared to
Indian Navy but India has recently worked hard to strengthen it. Presently both countries are
trying to increase their influence over Indian Ocean. Both are in a state of competition to
enhance their control.
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India wants to block the access of China on Indian Ocean and has great fear of Chinese String of
Pearl Strategy which has not been announced by China but was presented by the US Department
of Defence, and Indian media exploited it. India wants a complete hegemony over Indian Ocean
and is trying to increase its control on its neighbours. David Brewster rightly pointed out the
Indian quest to convert Indian Ocean into Indias ocean.
He further explained that Indian Xenophobia forced it to act in such a way, as Indian Monroe
Doctrine allows it to exclude foreign players from the region. How India can achieve such
targets? Will it try to reduce the influence of the US from Indian Ocean? India is using its soft
power for this purpose and it is trying to keep islands under its influence, so it is investing
heavily in the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. Will India succeed to exert the same
influence on these Islands as it is exerting on Nepal and Bhutan? Certainly not; landlocked
countries have always limited options compared to Islands so they cannot be influenced more
and they can maintain some degree of independence in their foreign and defence policies.
A relevant example is that of Sir Lanka which is a neighbour of India. Historically, India and Sri
Lanka have deep cultural linkages. India interfered in the Sri Lankan civil war between Sinhalese
and Tamils and suffered badly with heavy causalities and assassination of one of its Prime
Minister. This forced India to leave Sri Lanka in worst condition and Sri Lanka began to focus
more on its relations with Beijing.
China invested heavily in Sri Lankan defence, energy and infrastructure including the
construction of Colombo Port City until 2015 elections in which a pro-Indian party succeeded to
form the government. Shortly after coming into power a BBC report showed that the present Sri
Lankan government had decided to suspend Chinese-funded Colombo Port project.
The present Sri Lankan government suspended the deal with China declaring it expensive. What
will China do to protect its investment? Will China reduce the interest rate on the loan provided
to Sri Lanka? Will it use diplomatic tracks for this purpose? The present diplomatic policies of
China have been proved very successful and surely it will like to retain its influence and
investment in Sri Lanka by using all available options.
It is also possible that the new Sri Lankan government may request India to complete these
projects which New Delhi may accept readily. This can increase tension between New Delhi and
Beijing. Further, India will also like this government to rule for a long time to increase its
influence. It is very important time, today, where Indian and Chinese interests are directly at
clash in Sri Lanka.
It must be remembered here that former Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa expelled Colombo
based Indian spy agency chief before elections and accused him of helping the opposition. Later
he accused RAW, MI6 and CIA for rallying fragmented opposition to defeat him. It seems true;
this step was taken to bring such a government that can be used to reduce Chinese influence in
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Sri Lankan island. The government of Rajapaksa was a pro-Chinese government and was
facilitating China too much. It has a close cooperation with China in all fields including defence.
According to Indian media reports China has a plan to build a submarine base in Marao Atoll (an
Island of Sri Lanka) since 1999, which India cannot allow and it can be turned into a tension.
In 2013, Sri Lanka decided to train its military personnel from China which would have raised
anger in New Delhi. Especially the docking of Chinese submarines on Sri Lankan port frequently
frustrated India too much and have compelled India to take initiatives to bring a pro-Indian
government in Sri Lanka.
It is important to note President Modi is the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Sri Lanka in last
28 years. It means India was searching for some favourable government in Sri Lanka for decades
which it got in recent elections. Now we have to look forward what further steps India will take
to prevent Chinese advancement on Indian Ocean. What will China do to save its investment and
influence in Sri Lanka?
Maldives is a group of small Islands and is strategically important as it is situated almost in the
centre of Indian Ocean. India has been enjoying good strategic and trade relations with Maldives
and it helped to rescue President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom government in 1988. In 2009, India
signed a defence agreement with Maldives which includes cooperation between its armed forces
and intelligence of two countries. Although India has not announced to establish any base in
Maldives but it seems that in future it will try to establish its military base in this country.
Presently, India is setting up a radar network in Maldives which will be linked with Indian
military surveillance systems. It is first Indian initiative to increase its military role in Maldives
and it will carry it on.
Chinese interests in Maldives are increasing as well. According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Peoples Republic of China, Maldives is an important link of the ancient Maritime Silk
Road, sharing a profound historical relationship with China. Maldives Minister of Defence
and National Security visited Beijing in November 2014 and expressed his interest to enhance
cooperation for personnel training and maritime security with Chinese Defence Minister Chang
Wanquan.
India and China are in a race to increase their influence in other Indian Ocean Islands States
because of their strategic importance. Both are building close relations with Mauritius and
Seychelles. Presently, China is investing in forty-seven developmental projects in Mauritius. In
2011, Seychelles offered China to build a naval base, which raised Indian concerns and Modi is
first Indian Prime Minister to visit Seychelles since 1981. It means India is trying to establish a
strong control over Mauritius and Seychelles to decrease increasing Chinese influence.
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On his visit, Modi said, The course of the 21st century will be determined by the currents of the
Indian Ocean. It is true and India wants to expel China from Indian Ocean as soon as possible
and desires to have a complete dominance over it. No doubt India has good Strategic relations
with the US but David Brewster and some other scholars believe that India will try to expel it
from the Indian Ocean as soon as it develops some strong control over the strategic locations of
the ocean. It means India will take some aggressive steps in future which can provoke other
countries and can turn Indian ocean into a bed of conflict among great powers of the world that
are India, China, the US and other regional powers.
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possibly more appropriate). That, however, necessitates greater military strength to be able to
project power in its own region and beyond. So, it is further strengthening its military, especially
its maritime power to protect its interests in the seas, and to protect its sea lanes in the Indian
Ocean and in the straits through Southeast Asian countries, connecting the Indian and the Pacific
oceans to secure safe passage to and from the Middle East on whose oil China's dependence is
enormous. Many of China's neighbours are worried about China's military build-up and
increasingly assertive bearing in the region.
The rivalry between China and the United States is not underpinned only by the economic
competition. It is equally, if not more so, in the context of today's world, a competition for
geopolitical supremacy. For the US, it is a struggle to retain its economic, political and military
primacy as the number one power in the world; and for the rising and increasingly more assertive
China, it is to ascend to the position of the number one power in the world by replacing the
United States. The struggle has intensified so much that we are now probably witnessing a cold
war between the two countries the two foremost economic and political powers of our time.
And other major powers are polarising around them. India is showing propensity to side with the
US while Pakistan with China. Japan and South Korea as well as some Southeast Asian countries
like the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia having territorial disputes with
China in the East or South China seas are polarising around the US. Russia and North Korea are
also siding with China, although Russia might depolarise later, for it would be also apprehensive
of a very strong and militarily mighty China on its doorstep. Europe was the epicentre of the
previous Cold War. The epicentre has now shifted to East Asia. So, the EU might exhibit some
hesitancy to come clean and join any of the two sides, for it's not going to be directly affected by
the latest geopolitical rivalry. Moreover, many of the EU - and European countries have deep
and vital trade and economic ties with China.
The United States seems to consider its perceived threat from China so huge and alarming that it
appears desperate in its bid to contain China. The two countries' economic interconnectedness
and interdependence, not to mention mutual cooperation on a number of global issues, are so
deeply entrenched that they are not likely to opt for any open military confrontation between
themselves, for that would prove mutually and immeasurably self-destructive. So, the only
option is to resort to and remain engaged in a cold war unless one of the two sides goes berserk
and triggers an open confrontation or 'hot war'. Although the new cold war seems to have already
begun sometime in the recent past, the military logistics deal between the US and India signed a
month ago and the Pakistani cabinet's go-ahead of a plan to conclude a long-term security pact
with China at about the same time, seem to constitute a clear plunge into another cold war. The
polarisation of countries has assumed a clear configuration in the wake of these two events.
In fact, China might find it difficult to properly materialise the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
and then keep it fully operational at all times. However, the ongoing implementation of its new
overland silk routes (SREB) that would run through the Central and West Asian countries and
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connect China to the Middle East, Europe and Africa, may strategically become a convenient
parallel alternative to the Maritime Silk Road. Hence, China would not fully depend on the sea
lanes for import of its crucially needed oil from the Middle East.
China's much coveted ascension to the top of the world is not expected to be a trouble-free and
unchallenged leap. The rest of the world outside its ambit should hope the New Cold War would
not eventually slide into a world war the Third World War for that would have the potential to
annihilate our contemporary civilisation and put the decimated humanity back to the Paleolithic
age.
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which he said Pakistan would make a deal with China and Russia if the U.S. stays neutral on the
Pak-India conflict in Kashmir.
Interestingly, China supplies Pakistan with more weapons than any other country in the world.
But more importantly, Beijing is actively building nuclear reactors in Pakistan, which means
China wants to strengthen its allies and prepare them for a possible war with the West.
When the U.S. and many other countries signed the NPT Treaty in 1996, neither India nor
Pakistan signed it. And as tensions on the India-Pakistan border continue to grow every week,
one of the sides could actually resort to nuclear weapons.
And its more likely that Pakistan would make its nuclear move first, because it knows it has the
military support from China and Russia. In fact, Beijing has already pledged to help Pakistan in
the case of any foreign aggression.
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as an important consensus on the South China Sea. Lavrov expressed that Russia holds that
the South China Sea issue should be resolved through political and diplomatic means such as
direct dialogues and negotiations by parties concerned.The statement added that Forces outside
the region should not intervene, ostensibly referencing the United States and India.
The Sino-Russian relations in the shape of expanding SCO is an alarming message for many
states that these can build a power bloc which has a prominent role in the international affairs to
have their diverse policy than the West as they dont believe that power is hidden in the secrets
of interference in others internal affairs and dominating world through rouge means.
Consequently China and Russia while not formal allies have steadily increased their military-tomilitary collaboration. In addition to naval exercise, the two countries cooperate on
counterterrorism, holding the Peace Mission exercises annually. Russia and China stick to
points of view which are very close to each other or are almost the same in the international
arena, Russian President Vladimir Putin said in June, during a visit to China.
China has declared to continue developing man-made islands in the disputed Spratly island
group and is eager to conduct regular aerial patrols over the strategically vital sea through which
passes an estimated $5 trillion in trade each year. At the same time as China says the drills do not
envision specific enemies or target any third parties, their location in the South China Sea has
drawn criticism.
The Sino-Russia axis and its expanding power beyond the region and is sometimes also termed
as a steady move towards the global and military ascendancy as both regional powers are already
in alliances and the purpose of their alliance formation is not primarily confined counter the
expansion of NATO in the region, but actually these states sought to split some common benefits
and strategic affiliation to avoid any bilateral conflict that would cover the way to invite any
external player to dominate their sphere of influence and put their interests on stake.
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giving all out support to Pakistan. Similarly one can expect that Indo-Russia relations to not be
effected by the initiation of military exercises between Pakistan and Russia.
However that is just one perspective. Another dimension to this whole scenario requires one to
consider some other facts too. One cannot ignore the reality that for past some time there has
been an ever increasing propinquity between the US and India. The US has been investing
massively in India in lieu of its Asia Pacific policy, in which India is seen as acquiring the
pivotal position. Furthermore the recent figures have reportedly revealed that US has taken over
the title from Russia of being the biggest arm seller/provider to India.
The Logistic Support Agreement is another major development that has further strengthened the
strategic cooperation between the US and India. All of these have not gone unnoticed by Russia.
It is true that India and Russia have not lost the trust in each other but equally alarming is the
growing coziness between India and the US, which Russia cant knowingly ignore. Hence it
would not be very wrong to speculate that Indias tight embrace of the US has led to Russias
opening its channels to Pakistan.
The world politics is essentially driven by the realist school of thought. The states have been
found to realigning their equations and shifting their priorities as per their ever changing national
interests. It is an established fact that the states are rational actors that strive for their
survivability and growth. The same can be applied to this scenario.
Concurrently Chinese massive investment inside Pakistan through the CPEC, has made Pakistan
emerge in a very new light. It is now increasingly being seen as a lucrative investment
destination for the international community. Most of the nations are showing their interest in
joining and be part of the CPEC project. Russia might too eventually like to seek some long
lasting partnership with Pakistan and may become in some way become part of the CPEC. This
leads one to visualize another possible realignment of relations and emergence of RussiaPakistan-China Nexus. Such a possibility may look too good to be true but surely cannot be ruled
out.
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Briefly and very crudely, Indian politics since independence have broadly followed one of two
traditions: the secular leftist social democracy associated with Congress or the more
conservative, more right wing and more free market oriented course associated with what is
sometimes called the Hindutva nationalist movement. Very broadly, during the Cold War Indian
politicians associated with Congress tended to tilt towards Moscow, whilst more Hindutva
oriented politicians tended to be more sympathetic to Washington.
Modi comes from the Hindutva nationalist tradition. He came to power as leader of the right
wing Hindutva oriented BJP after defeating Congress in 2014 in parliamentary elections, and he
has positioned himself as a follower of the previous BJP Prime Minister hailing from the
Hindutva tradition Atal Bihari Vajpayee whose name Modi repeatedly invoked in the speech
he made to the US Congress during his US visit.
Modis Hindutva background would itself suffice to explain his preference for closer dealings
with Washington. There are however practical reasons that might impel him in that direction
anyway as they did his Congress predecessor Manmohan Singh.
The first is the forceful demands for a closer alignment with the US from the outspokenly proUS business community centred on Indias port city of Mumbai (Bombay). These people form a
key component of Modis political constituency and he is simply not in a position to disregard
them.
The second is the wish to attract US investment to India in order to sustain Indias programme
for rapid economic growth and economic modernisation. This has been Indias overriding
priority ever since the initial steps were taken by Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister in the
Congress government of the 1990s to liberalise Indias economy.
Given these factors Modi has actually been restrained in his dealings with the US. It is important
to say anyway that these dealings follow an established tradition within India of seeking good
relations with the US.
In the late 1970s the leader of what was then the Janata party (the lineal ancestor of todays BJP)
Prime Minister Morarji Desai, was widely suspected of having leaked intelligence information
from within the Indian Cabinet to Washington during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Whether
that was true or not, there is evidence that Henry Kissinger at least considered Morarji Desai to
be a US intelligence asset (for a full discussion of this controversial question see the chapter on
the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 in Seymour Hershs The Price of Power) and he did in fact follow
a more friendly policy towards the US and Pakistan than the Congress led governments of
the period did.
As for Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Modis predecessor as BJP leader and Indian prime minister, it was
during his period as Prime Minister that the first steps in forming the present US-Indian
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relationship were taken with the visit in 2000 of US President Clinton the first visit to India by
a US President in 22 years.
The key event in forging the present close relations between the US and India however happened
not under Vajpayee or indeed now under Modi. It happened during the last period of Congress
government, when the US administration of George W. Bush made a sustained and ultimately
successful attempt between 2005 and 2008 to forge good relations with India.
The key achievement of this period and the keystone of the whole US-Indian relationship
pointedly referred to as such by Modi in the speech he made to the US Congress during his visit
was the 2008 India-United States Civil Nuclear Agreement, which essentially amounted to
recognition by the US of Indias status as a fully-fledged nuclear Great Power.
Suffice to say that the Indian Prime Minister at the time of the India-United States Civil Nuclear
Agreement was none other than Manmohan Singh, someone often spoken of as a BRICS loyalist,
who represented India at the founding summit of the BRICS group in the Russian city of
Yekaterinburg in 2009.
It is entirely natural that Modi, like Manmohan Singh before him, would want to build on the
relationship with the US forged during the premierships of Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh.
Doing so after all arguably serves both his own political needs and Indias national interests.
India has no interest in making an enemy of the US and it is entirely natural that it would want to
extract the most advantages from the US by maintaining a good relationship with it.
What however of the greater strategic play does wanting good relations with the US mean
India has to align itself with Washington against Beijing and Moscow?
Before discussing this question it is necessary to say something about the history of Indias
relationships with Beijing and Moscow.
Indias relations with China since independence has been complex and difficult. Indias relations
with Russia since independence by contrast have been straightforward and easy.
China and India had very close relations in the 1950s much closer than today when it
appeared that the two countries prime ministers, Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru, had forged a
close friendship. Relations however fell apart in the early 1960s over Tibet and disputes over
their common border, with a brief but savage war fought between the two countries in 1962 in
which Russia sided with India but in which India was comprehensively defeated by China,
leaving China occupying much of what had previously been Indian controlled territory.
Relations between India and China then remained very tense until Mao Zedongs death in 1976
since when they have warned considerably. During the previous period of tense relations China
however forged an alliance with Indias perennial enemy Pakistan, which continues to this day
and which adds another layer of conflict to the Indian-Chinese relationship.
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With Russia by contrast the relationship has been straightforward and good. India and Russia
have been close friends since India achieved independence from Britain (the Indian ambassador
Krishna Menon was the last foreign visitor received by Stalin before his death in 1953).
In the late 1960s, as Moscows own relations with China deteriorated, Russia and India became
for a time de facto allies against China and its ally Pakistan, with Russia providing India with
critical military assistance which enabled India to win victory in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.
Since the USSRs collapse relations between Russia and India have as a result of Russias
diminished reach and power inevitably become more distant, but they have remained warm.
Given the complex and difficult history of Indias relations with China, and given the huge
increase in Chinese power which has taken place since the 1970s, and given the reduction in
power of Indias former partner Russia over the same period, and given the fact that Russia has
itself drawn closer to China and is now in de facto alliance with it, it is completely
understandable that India would want to insure its position against China by strengthening its ties
with Washington. India would surely be doing this even if there were not also compelling
economic reasons to do so.
However looked at objectively what is striking is the restraint India has shown in pursuing this
objective. Whilst India has certainly followed the logic of improving its relations with
Washington, it has been careful to retain its traditionally good relations with Moscow, and under
both Manmohan Singh and Modi it has kept its lines of communication to China open, working
successfully alongside China and Russia as a member of the BRICS.
The reason India has pursued this balanced course is actually made clear in Andrew Korybkos
two pieces. Indias aspirations to be accepted as a Great Power are ultimately incompatible with
subordination to Washington a relationship of subordination to the US being the only type of
relationship Washington today seems able to forge with other powers.
Beyond this, India has no more interest in making an enemy of China than it has in making an
enemy of the US. China is far more powerful than India. India cannot defeat China militarily
and recent experience will have taught India that any US commitments to defend India from
China are to all intents and purposes worthless. China is also Indias biggest trading partner and
like the US is a key potential investor in the Indian economy.
From Indias point of view maintaining at least a working relationship with China is therefore
overwhelmingly in Indias interests even if for historically fully understandable reasons the
relationship with China cannot be conflict free or entirely warm.
All this points to the sort of policy Modi is currently following and which was followed
previously by his two predecessors Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh: good relations with both
Washington and Moscow combined with a certain wariness towards China but with a continued
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willingness to work with China in Indias national interest through the BRICS group and the
various other Chinese led institutions that are now being formed.
Seen in this context it is now possible to read Modis speech to the US Congress in the proper
way.
The speech contained all the usual cliches and bromides Americans love: invocations of
freedom, platitudes about American democracy, flattering reminders of how India is also a
democracy, paeans of praise for American enterprise, breathless references to Abraham Lincoln,
Norman Borlaug, Thoreau, Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Walt Whitman (as it happens an
interesting selection, and one that might beg some questions) and heroic talk of the joint struggle
against Islamist terrorism.
It also made no definite promise or commitment to the US whatsoever. The whole tenor of the
speech was a call for US support for India with nothing of substance offered in return.
Importantly, nowhere in the speech is there a single reference to the Logistics Support
Agreement discussed at length in his two pieces by Andrew Korybko.
Whilst the Logistics Support Agreement does have the potential to evolve into the sort of allencompassing military relationship Andrew Korybko writes about and that is no doubt how the
US envisages it it is important to say that that can only happen if India approaches it in that
way.
As things stand that is most unlikely. From the Indian point of view the Logistics Support
Agreement should be seen for what it is: an insurance policy India has taken out with the US
against China, which India can draw upon if its relations with China ever turn sticky, but which
India ultimately only took out because it was pressed do so by the US, who offered it to India for
free.
Modis visit to the US Congress and his speech there is in fact a regular ritual Indian prime
ministers now regularly perform when they visit the US. Similar speeches have been delivered
to the US Congress by previous Indian prime ministers: Rajiv Gandhi, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and
Manmohan Singh.
From Modis point of view his speech must be counted a success. Though Modi actually offered
nothing the assembled Congressmen thrilled by Modis earnest flattery lapped his speech up.
The result is that Modi left Washington with Congressional approval for trade concessions and
for more arms sales.
Having got what he wanted in Washington, Modis next move says everything one needs to
know about the true nature of Indian policy. On returning to New Delhi where hopefully US
listening devices could no longer hear him, practically the first thing Modi did was to telephone
his BRICS partner President Putin of Russia presumably over a secure line.
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The Kremlins brief account of the call suggests a Putin Modi summit is in the works. It
pointedly also refers to relations between India and Russia as a privileged strategic partnership
balancing similar words used in Washington by Modi to describe Indias relationship with the
US.
Whilst we cannot know exactly what Modi and Putin said to each other, it is overwhelmingly
likely Modi would have given Putin a detailed account of his visit to the US and that that was the
purpose of his call. It is also overwhelmingly likely that a full account of Modis conversation
with Putin perhaps even a transcript will have been sent by the Kremlin to Beijing, and that
Modi made the call knowing and intending that that would happen.
In summary, Indias moves towards Washington are not the actions of a country that is
repositioning itself as an ally of the US pitched against its former partners Russia and China.
Nor are they an attempt by India to play one side off against the other. Rather they should be
seen as what they surely are: the careful manoeuvring of an emerging Great Power as it seeks the
maximum advantage for itself in an increasingly fluid international system.
The Russians and Chinese undoubtedly understand all this especially since as Modis
telephone call to Putin shows the Indians are being careful to keep them informed about what
they are doing.
As for the US, obsessed as it has become with its complex games of geopolitical chess, it by
contrast almost certainly does not understand what the Indians are up to even though if the US
had a more conventional approach to foreign policy understanding it would be easy enough.
That this is so is shown by what happened the last time the US sought to play an emerging Asian
Great Power off against one of its rivals. That was in the 1980s when the US sought to play the
China card against Moscow oblivious to the fact that whilst it was doing so the Russians and
the Chinese were quietly settling their differences with each other. In the process the US made a
string of unilateral concessions to win over China just as they are doing with India now
including the fatal one of opening up US markets to Chinese goods. The rest as they say is
history.
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Agnecies
Population
Bajaur
875,810
Mohmand
492,110
Khyber
804,452
Orakzai
331,711
Kurram
659, 638
North Waziristan
658,800
South Waziristan
632,463
Frontier Regions
Populations
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FR Peshawer
79,221
FR Kohat
130,153
FR Bannu
28,829
FR Lakki
10,281
FR Tank
40,045
FR D. I. Khan
57,369
According to the PM House statement issued here Tuesday night, it emerged from the wide
ranging consultations undertaken by the committee, that there was a wide consensus on
integration of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, however tribal elders except in Kurram, Bajaur
and FR Peshawar, wanted to retain the present special status.
It may be noted that political parties, youth, businessmen, educated classes were clearly in favour
of integration of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and also argued for an extension of the writ of
the superior courts.
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Secondly, tribesmen at the same time wanted to retain their identity by recognition of Rewaj and
the Jirga system under the new system.
They also advocated a more gradual and phased approach to FATA reforms so that displaced
people can return to their homes and smooth transition from post conflict situation to durable
peace can be ensured.
Virtually no support for a separate FATA province due to its geographic location, weak linkages
between the agencies and limited financial resources.
Similarly the option of FATA Council, on the lines of the GB Council, also did not enjoy much
support. It was emphasized that even as a transitional measure, it would create new vested
interests that could block further reforms and lead to the next logical demand of a separate
FATA.
The fourth option, i.e. FATAs integration with KP was widely supported as it offered many
advantages and is the only rational choice for mainstreaming FATA, since the people of FATA
will be able to elect their representatives for the Provincial Assembly of KP and expand
opportunities for improved governance.
Under the integration option the security infrastructure, including the strength and quality of
Levies and other Law Enforcing Agencies will have to be improved and extended throughout
FATA, making it easier for the Armed Forces to withdraw from its security role in FATA, within
4-5 years.
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A major aim of this 10-year programme will be to bring FATA at par with the rest of Pakistan on
the basis of all major economic and social indicators.
FATA Development Authority (FDA) may be reorganized with enhanced powers to implement
large infrastructure projects under the 10-year Development Plan.
Thirty percent of the allocation in the 10-year Plan should be channeled through the local bodies.
An important component of the new Development Plan would be the concept of social
transformation of FATA through urbanization by setting up modern urban hubs in all Agency
Headquarters and other important trading centres.
All posts in FATA should be upgraded at par with KP.
Salaries for the project personnel should be 20% higher than the project policy of KP.
Special incentives to private sector in education and health sectors should be given in the form of
free land.
State Bank of Pakistan to encourage establishment of more branches of banks in FATA with
special incentives for private banks.
Quota of FATA students in education and health institutions be doubled and retained for 10
years after integration.
Once the rehabilitation phase is completed, party based local bodies elections can be held in
FATA before end of 2017. This would require promulgation of FATA Local Government
Regulation, which should be formulated within three months.
All other formalities e.g. updating the electoral rolls, finalizing the constituencies, rules and
regulations should be completed by the first quarter of 2017.
A separate unit for FATA may be created in the Election Commission office, Peshawar for this
purpose.
The FATA Reforms Committee had visited all tribal agencies and held meetings with the elected
representatives of those areas including businessmen, tribal elders (Maliks), educated youth,
religious leaders and members of the civil society to ascertain their point of view before
finalizing recommendations for the future of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
The Committee also held meetings with the notables of all Frontier Regions and other
stakeholders.
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The FATA reforms committee has finally submitted its report, which is awaiting approval by the
Prime Minister.
The committee was formed after an unexpected bill demanding the merger of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa
and FATA was presented in the National Assembly by FATA parliamentarians.
Instead of following democratic norms and entertaining the demand of FATA representatives in the
parliament and considering their will as the will of the people of FATA, the federal government
decided to follow its own way.
The committee visited different areas of FATA and the opinion they gathered wasnt different from
the one demanded by FATA parliamentarians.
The fifty-one pages report includes the suggestions the committee received and the final road map it
provided for the future of FATA.
Unlike the reports by previous committees, this report has many tangible gains for the people of
FATA but the vagueness about merging FATA and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa and clubbing it with five
years transitory period has still left some doubts.
Primarily, the committee has accepted the fact that merger of FATA with Pukhtoonkhwa is the most
popular demand of the people of FATA.
The committee has identified six areas as basic themes of the reform package.
Rehabilitation of the displaced people of FATA and reconstruction of FATA is the first theme of the
reforms package.
It recommends that all the displaced people must be resettled before the end of 2016 and the
reconstruction work must be completed before the end of 2018.
The report recommends that reconstruction of infrastructure should be undertaken by the public
sector agencies while the repairing of private buildings should be left to the owners themselves by
paying them cash compensation at prescribed rates.
However, the report doesnt provide a clear guideline on how to determine the compensation given to
the owners for rebuilding their homes.
The rates circulating in the market may be extremely low compared to the damage caused to the
property especially when big expensive properties are involved.
Social and economic development of FATA is also a key recommendation in the reform package
proposed by the report.
A commendable feature of the report is that, as a report prepared by a government committee, it
accepts probably for the first time that large portions of public funds allocated to FATA are
practically wasted in corruption.
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Another commendable feature of the package is that, it proposes a ten-year development plan for the
much neglected FATA region, which includes large-scale infrastructure projects such as construction
of dams, development of mineral fields, and other programs in health and vocational training.
However, in the formula for the distribution of development work among various governmental
bodies, it recommends assigning a large proportion of work to the old bureaucratic structures blamed
for inefficiency and misuse of funds.
For example, the committee recommends that 20% of the development fund be spent through the
local governments to be formed through party based elections in 2017.
This implies 80% of development fund will be utilised through bureaucratic channels.
A FATA development council has also been proposed in the reforms package to oversee the
preparation and implementation of the ten-year development plan for FATA.
The council will be headed by the Governor Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and will include all senators and
MNAs of FATA, Secretary SAFRON, Chief Secretary KP, Additional Chief Secretary FATA, Chief
executive FDA, Secretary P&D FATA Secretariat, COS 11th cops, and four technocrats nominated
by governor Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa as members.
Once again the overseeing mechanism would not be under any public scrutiny and the public
representatives will hardly have any say in decision-making.
The same setup that has been accused of corruption in this report will oversight the development
program.
Legal reforms are the most essential theme of the reforms package.
The report recommends replacing FCR with FATA Good Governance Act 2016, which incorporates
the principle of individual responsibility in the administration of justice instead of collective
responsibility as in the current FCR.
The act will extend the jurisdiction of the high court and Supreme Court of Pakistan to FATA by
amending the article 247 of the constitution.
This single point alone will be a major achievement for the people of FATA as it will protect their
fundamental rights.
According to this act, the Jirga system will be retained and a council of elders appointed by the court
will decide the criminal and civil cases under the light of Riwaj.
The act recommends the codification of Riwaj after its scrutiny by the superior courts.
Although, the oversight of the superior courts would not allow any term of Riwaj that conflicts with
fundamental rights, the turmoil of 15 years has hardly left any elder who has a thorough knowledge
of Riwaj.
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Most of the elders who were authorities on Riwaj were target-killed or relocated to other places in the
country during the turmoil in FATA.
During this period, a new lot of unpopular and uncredible elders was installed by the militants and
bureaucracy.
Constituting a council of genuine and competent elders would be difficult job for the courts.
A federal level committee along with a technical team will oversee and implement the reforms
package.
The federal committee will consist of the Governor Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, Minister SAFRON,
Minister Law, National Security Advisor, and a representative of Army.
Again there is no representation of FATA in this committee.
The operational work will be undertaken by the FATA secretariat, which has been blamed for
massive corruption and without a public oversight by the local representatives, it is unlikely that the
reforms will be correctly implemented.
Finally, although the reforms package has a lot of benefits for the people of FATA, the delay in
merger of FATA and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and juxtaposing it with five-year transition period is
leaving many doubts in the minds of the FATA people.
It would have been more acceptable to the FATA people had the merger done right-away and
reforms carried out by the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The share of FATA in NFC could have been transferred to the provincial government and the whole
development process carried out under the supervision of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa government.
Representation to FATA in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa assembly in 2018 elections could have enforced
the reform more effectively.
The demand of the people of FATA and pressures of some domestic and international powers has
after 69 years created a momentum, which has forced the state of Pakistan to mainstream the FATA.
The people of FATA should maintain pressure on the federal government for allowing the merger of
FATA and Pukhtunkhwa immediately as the situation after five years may become uncertain.
The momentum once lost would be very hard to regain.
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PESHAWAR: The Fata Reforms Committee has proposed a set of parallel and concurrent
political, administrative, judicial and security reforms, as well as a massive reconstruction and
rehabilitation programme, to prepare the Federally Administered Tribal Areas for a five-year
transition period for merger into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it has been revealed.
People of Fata have seen nothing but war and turmoil in the past 30 years. They now deserve
peace, development and citizens rights, the document containing the final draft of
recommendations said.
Sartaj Aziz, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, who heads the committee, will
submit his report to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif upon his return from Britain later this month.
The committee, constituted by Mr Sharif on Nov 8 last year, includes National Security Adviser
retired Lt Gen Nasser Janjua, Minister for Law and Justice Zahid Hamid and Minister for States
and Frontier Regions, retired Lt Gen Abdul Qadir Baloch.
Members of the committee have visited all the tribal regions and held discussions with tribal
elders, tribal representatives and government officials to elicit their views on reforms and the
future status of Fata. The national security adviser provided input from the General
Headquarters.
The general drift (of the recommendations) is towards a merger, a knowledgeable source told
Dawn. This seems to be the only workable and viable option, he said.
The military, a key stakeholder in the ongoing deliberations concerning the future of Fata, has
also given its feedback on the recommendations, a senior security official said.
There is no disagreement here, he said. We all agree that Fata has to settle now and it has to
be streamlined, the official said. The only consideration is that whatever timeframe we may
follow it has to be realistic and it has to be with consultation and concurrence of all
stakeholders.
Sartaj Aziz declined to comment or discuss the content of the committee report.
The recommendations echo sentiment within the civil-military establishment that after decades
of turmoil, Fata is now poised for a change. Due to new ground realities and regional security
imperatives, marginal or short-term measures would not serve the purpose, the committee
noted.
Not part of the recommendations, Dawn has learnt on good authority that a proposal is also
actively under discussion to put Fata under a separate administrative control with full
administrative, legal and financial powers to push and oversee the transition period towards
merger.
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There is a need for total and full focus on Fata, a competent source said. One thing is obvious:
the current scheme of things with regard to Fata is not working, the source said. Call him the
CEO, call him the deputy governor, but he has to be a person with undivided attention and who
is effective and can push things through.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction
The committee set the end of 2016 as the target date for the return of temporarily displaced
persons and the completion of reconstruction before the end of 2017. This gigantic task will
require much larger financial resources and coordination, the committee pointed out.
Socio-economic development
While noting that high incidence of poverty and unemployment make Fata the poorest region in
the country, the recommendation seeks the setting up of a high-level special committee
comprising experts and officials under the KP governor to prepare before the end of 2016, a tenyear development plan for Fata.
Proposing major infrastructure, irrigation, mineral development and integrated health, education,
vocational training and industrial zones with special incentives, the committee said that the major
aim of the development plan would be to bring Fata at par with the rest of Pakistan on the basis
of all major economic and social indicators.
It said that 20 per cent of the allocation under the development plan should be channeled through
local bodies.
For this purpose, it said, the National Finance Commission should be asked to allocate 2pc
(approximately Rs60 billion in 2016-17) of the divisible pool for the implementation of the 10year plan.
Local bodies
It has proposed holding of party-based local bodies elections in Fata after the completion of
rehabilitation phase and promulgation of the Fata Local Government Regulations within three
months and completion of all formalities, including finalisation of electoral rolls, constituencies,
rules and regulations, before the end of the year.
This, it said, would restore trust between the state and the people of Fata, create a sense of
ownership amongst them, extend the writ of the state and prepare the region for further political,
legal, constitutional and administrative reforms.
Legal reforms
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The committee has proposed renaming of the Frontier Crimes Regulation as Fata Regulation Act,
2016, omitting all sections relating to collective responsibility, retaining the Jirga system for both
civil and criminal matters, whereby the court will appoint a council of elders to adjudicate
matters in accordance with the riwaj and prevailing law in force.
It has also proposed extending the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high court to Fata
by amending Article 247, thus granting full fundamental and citizens rights to the people of
Fata.
Capacity building of law enforcement agencies
The committee has called for the reorganisation and revamping of Levies to perform police
function, introduction of police uniform and basic training, sanction and induction of additional
10,000 men, improved border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan and abolition of
rahdari and permit system to end corruption and cross border movement.
Land settlement
While noting that property settlement is partly available in Kurram and North Waziristan, the
committee has proposed introduction of proper land settlement property record in Fata on a
priority basis for administration of civil laws and as a prerequisite for banking operation and
investment.
In order to oversee the implementation of the reforms, the committee has proposed setting up of
a reforms implementation committee comprising the KP governor, ministers of Safron, law and
justice, the National Security Adviser, and a military representative with the prime minister
holding a quarterly review.
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Commenting on the move, Sughra Imam, a former senator from the opposition Pakistan Peoples
Party who first tabled both bills, said: No law will eradicate a crime entirely but the law should
be a deterrent. Laws are supposed to guide better behaviour, not allow destructive behaviour to
continue with impunity.
Thursdays development came just six days after Baloch was strangled to death by her brother
once again casting a spotlight on honour killing murders.
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The honour killings bill aims at preventing killing of women in the name of honour by making
the crime a non-compoundable offence.
When contacted, Senator Saeed Ghani, who was a member of the committee which cleared the
bill, told Dawn that honour killings had certain distinctions. He explained that in a simple murder
case the deceased may not be a family member.
The investigation officer may ascertain whether the murder was honour killing or otherwise, he
said.
Barrister Zafarullah Khan, the special assistant to the prime minister who headed the government
legal team which drafted the law, said it was the responsibility of the court to make a distinction
between a simple murder and an honour killing.
He said: The judge will decide whether it is a simple murder or a murder in the name of
honour.
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While the new legislation does not completely eliminate the principle of family forgiveness, it
does ensure that all persons who commit an honor killing will receive punishment for their
crimes.
Pakistans willingness to condemn honor killings as murder represents a positive step forward;
one of many taken last week to address the plight of Pakistani women. Pakistan also changed
laws regarding rape, designating medical evidence, especially DNA tests, as permissible
evidence in court cases regarding rape.
Hopefully, this positive trend on human rights will continue. Pakistan has yet another
controversial issue to consider regarding blasphemy laws in the second week of October when
the appeal of the death sentence levied against a Christian woman, Aasia Bibi, for alleged
blasphemy is slated to come before Pakistans Supreme Court.
Pakistan should continue to improve the rights of women and ultimately end the practice of
honor killingthis latest legislative action represents a step in the right direction.
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have reached the point where the discretionary authorisation granted by section 311 will likely be
employed often.
As noted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the iniquitous and vile act of killing in the name of
honour violates Article 9 of the constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of
lifeexcept in accordance with law. The provisions of the penal code permitting this violation
to go unchecked are in violation of Article 8 of the constitution which provides that any law
inconsistent with rights such as those provided by Article 9 shall be void to the extent of such
inconsistency.
The continuous rise in the number of honour killing cases reveals a more deep-seated issue with
the patriarchal nature of Pakistans society. It is this that hinders the implementation of what
little protection the law currently affords to the victims of such crimes. The courts are often more
eager to serve as the moral guardians of a womens honour rather than on punishing those who
violate the sanctity of the law. Policemen working in collusion with the offenders often fail to
properly record murders as honour killings, thus taking them outside the scope of the special
provisions created by the 2004 Act.
In addition, many cases remain undocumented due to a lack of a confidential reporting system
and the hesitance of families to invite censure upon themselves from a male-dominated and
deeply conservative society.
Honour killing cases highlight Pakistans failure to discharge its international law obligations. In
March 1996, Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW). By doing so, it undertook to provide legal protection for womens
rights on an equal basis with men and to guarantee the effective protection of women against
discrimination through competent national courts. (CEDAW, Article 2(c)) It is also obligated to
take appropriate measures to modify social and cultural patterns that discriminate against
women.
Specifically, with regard to honour crimes, in the 2001 United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 55/66 member states such as Pakistan have been asked to intensify legislative and
social efforts to combat this issue, including establishing support systems such as safe shelter,
counselling and legal aid for the potential victims of such crimes, all of which Pakistan has failed
to do. In addition, Pakistan is bound by the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
The Human Rights Committee has stated that the commission of so called honour crimes
which remain unpunished constitutes a serious violation if the ICCPR, in particular articles 6
(right to life), 14 (the equal rights of men and women before courts and tribunals) and 26 (equal
entitlement of men and women to legal protection). Pakistans shortcomings will tarnish its
international reputation and negatively affect the international communitys faith in its ability to
fulfil its promises.
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With the untimely death of Qandeel Baloch the issue has returned under national and
international spotlights. A surprisingly large section of society has condemned her murder and
the daughter of the prime minister, Mariam Nawaz, has promised that an anti-honour killing bill
will be put before the National Assembly within weeks.
In the event that the bill is passed, it will remain to be seen how far the new law goes in plugging
the loopholes of the current system and providing real justice to victims and their families. Until
this is done, many more Qandeels will depart this world before their time and no amount of
empty rhetoric will fill the void that they leave behind.
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Up to one year imprisonment or a fine of up to PKR 1 million for forcing an individual for
immoral activity, or publishing an individuals picture without consent, sending obscene
messages or unnecessary cyber interference.
Up to seven year imprisonment, a fine of PKR 10 million or both for interfering in sensitive
data information systems.
Three month imprisonment or a PKR 50 thousand fine or both for accessing unauthorised
data.
Three year imprisonment and a fine of up to PKR 5 million for obtaining information about
an individuals identification, selling the information or retaining it with self.
Up to three year imprisonment and a fine of up to PKR 0.5 million for issuing a sim card in an
unauthorised manner.
Up to three year imprisonment and fine of up to PKR 1 million rupees for making changes in
a wireless set or a cell phone.
Up to three year imprisonment and a fine of up to PKR 1 million for spreading
misinformation about an individual.
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1. Critics say the bill is too harsh, with punishments that do not fit crimes
2. The bill's language leaves it open to abuse by LEAs, agencies, the government
3. Recommendations of stakeholders were ignored in the formulation of the law
4. It restricts freedom of expression and access to information
5. The offences are too numerous, overlap with other existing laws
6. The wording of the bill leaves many clauses open to interpretation
7. The bill specifically can be misused to target journalists sources and whistleblowers
8. Criteria for surveillance is even more open-ended than in the Fair Trial Act 2013
9. Mechanisms for implementation are missing from this bill
10. The bill has introduced clauses on cyberterrorism, which is not the subject of the bill
11. The authority designated under the new law should have been independent of the
executive
12. The authority has been given sweeping powers to blocking and destroy online material,
without a court order
13. It does not adequately differentiate cyber crime from cyber terrorism and cyber warfare
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The term Malicious is very vague. No one bothered to define it and I am not sure what things
are malicious and what are not but what I know is that I can be put behind the bars for six
months for just touching a phone by mistake.
Moreover, anyone can call my intents malicious, meaning that I am on the fence already.
Unauthorized access by mistake for example without resulting into any harm is punishable
as well. Thats just as simple as clicking keystroke of your bosss computer who can get you
convicted for accessing his/her laptop with malicious intent.
If you are Unlucky, Touching a Phone can Get You Behind the Bars for Three Years Too!
If you were thinking that six months for touching a phone was too much, then you were wrong.
Touching a phone can in fact get you three years of imprisonment or a million rupees in fine if
you are up against a minister.
So heres the corresponding section you should look at:
Unauthorized access to critical infrastructure information system or data: Whoever with
malicious intent gains unauthorized access to any critical infrastructure information system or
data shall be punished with imprisonment upto three years or with fine which may extend to one
million rupees or with both.
If you are wondering what this Critical Infrastructure is, then heres how it is defined in the
bill:
critical infrastructure includes the infrastructures so designated by any Government in Pakistan
and such other assets, systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the State or
its organs including judicature that their incapacitation or destruction may have a debilitating
effect on national security, economy, public health,safety or matters related thereto;
So evidently, touching any thing related to government can cause you 5X damage.
If you think I am exaggerating things a little then you might be right actually, but I am just trying
to explain the worst case scenarios. And trust me, they are as dangerous as I am telling you.
Note: ProPakistani wants unauthorized accesses to get punished. All we want is more clarity on
this Malicious thing and a guarantee that how this Intent thing wont be used against a
common man.
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Hacking a Government Website Can Get you Behind the Bars for 14 Years and/or Rs. 50
Million Fine
So if you used to hack government websites in past, just dont dare to do that again. Otherwise
you can be put in jail for 14 years along with Rs. 50 Millions in Fine. Below are the
corresponding sections for you!
Section 5: Unauthorized access to critical infrastructure information system or data:
Whoever with malicious intent gains unauthorized access to any critical infrastructure
information system or data shall be punished with imprisonment upto three years or with fine
which may extend to one million rupees or with both.
Section 7: Criminal Interference with critical infrastructure information system or data:
Whoever with malicious intent and without authorization interferes with or damages, or causes to
be inferred with or damaged, any critical information system or any part thereof, or critical
infrastructure data or any part thereof, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to
seven years or with fine which may extend to five million rupees or with both.
Section 8: Cyber terrorism:
Whoever commits or threatens to commit any of the offences under sections 5 and 7 where:
(a) the use or threat is designed to coerce, intimidate, overawe or create a sense of fear, panic or
insecurity in the Government or the public or a section of the public or community or sect or
create a sense of fear or insecurity in society; or
(b) the use or threat is made for the purpose or motive of advancing a religious, ethnic or
sectarian cause; shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to fourteen years or with fine which may extend to fifty million rupees or with both.
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Provided that the Federal Government or the Provincial Government may, as the case may be,
constitute joint investigation team comprising of the officers of special investigation agency and
any other law enforcement agency including Police for investigation of events involving
commission of offences under this Act and any other law for the time being in force.
(2) No person other than a prosecutor designated as such by the special investigating agency
shall prosecute any offence under this Act.
LEAs Can Come and Confiscate Your Laptop/Mobile or anything They Want
Section 25: Expedited Preservation of data.
(1) If an investigating officer is satisfied that
(a) Data stored in any information system or by means of an information system, is reasonably
required for the purposes of a criminal investigation; and
(b) there is a risk or vulnerability that the data may be modified, lost, destroyed or rendered
inaccessible, the investigating officer may, by written notice given to a person in control of the
information system, require the person to ensure that the data specified in the notice be preserved
and the integrity thereof is maintained for a period not exceeding ninety days as specified in the
notice.
(2) The period provided in sub-section (1) for preservation of data may be extended by the
Magistrate if so deemed necessary upon receipt of an application from the investigating officer in
this behalf.
Your Website Can Get Blocked, if Someone Thinks its immoral!
As you might know, ProPakistani has favored blocked blasphemous and anti-state content. But
with this law, any website that PTA might not like can get blocked.
Here are reason that PTA can give to block a website if its content is:
Against Islam or its integrity,
Against security or defence of Pakistan
Against friendly relations with foreign states
Against a public order
If content is indecent or immoral
Or if it incites an offence
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Theoretically speaking, PTA will be able to block any content on internet without asking
anyone. And no one would be able to challenge PTA in the courts as they will have a law to
defend them.
Section 31: Power to issue directions for removal or blocking of access of any intelligence
through any information system:
(1) The Authority or any officer authorised by it in this behalf may direct anyservice provider, to
remove any intelligence or block access to such intelligence, if it considers it necessary in the
interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof,
friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to
contempt of court, commission of or incitement to an offence.
(2) The Federal Government may prescribe rules for adoption of standards and procedure by the
Authority to monitor and block access and entertain complaints under this section.
(3) Until such procedure and standards are prescribed, the Authority shall monitor and block
intelligence in accordance with the directions issued by the Federal Government.
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(1) Whoever dishonestly and publicly exhibits or displays or transmits any false electronic
communication, which is likely to harm or intimidate the reputation or privacy of a natural
person shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with
fine up to one million rupees or with both.
Provided, nothing under this sub-section(1) shall apply to anything aired by a broadcast media or
distribution service licensed under PEMRA Ordinance 2002 (XIII of 2002)
(2) Any aggrieved person or his guardian, where such person is a minor may apply to the Court
for passing of such orders for removal, destruction or blocking access to such material referred to
in subsection
(1) And the Court on receipt of such application may pass such orders as deemed proper for
securing, destroying, blocking access or preventing transmission of such material.
So naturally, all memes, cartoon or caricatures are going to get forbidden in the land of the pure.
Publishing a Picture of Nawaz Sharif can Fine you with up to Rs. 1 Million
No more trolling on the internet again. Yes, publishing the pictures of anyone without their
consent or knowledge can get you behind the bars for two good years and/or with a fine of up to
Rs. 1 Million
Cyber stalking
(1) Whoever with the intent to coerce or intimidate or harass any person uses information
system, information system network, the Internet, website, electronic mail or any other similar
means of communication to:
(2) Whoever commits the offence specified in sub-section (1) shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine up to one million rupees, or
with both:
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Provided that if the victim of the cyber stalking under sub-section (1) is a minor the punishment
may extend to five years or with fine upto ten million rupees, or with both.
(3) Any person may apply to the Court for issuance of a restraining order against an accused of
cyber stalking and the Court upon receipt of such application may pass such order as deemed fit
in the circumstances of the case including an order for removal or destruction of, or blocking
access to, such material.
The Core Focus is to Curb Digital Media (While Exempting Print and Electronic Media)
Interestingly, section 18 mentioned above (that imposes a fine of Rs. 1 Million for publishing
memes) isnt applicable for Electronic or Print media. Heres the clause that says so:
Provided, nothing under this sub-section(1) shall apply to anything aired by a broadcast media or
distribution service licensed under PEMRA Ordinance 2002 (XIII of 2002)
So if you are print media or an electronic media then publishing memes is okay. In such
situation, what kind of law is this? Where same thing is lawful for one and unlawful for another?
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