18 Fire Strategy - Fire Engineering

RAM PHASE 1 FIRE STRATEGY
Fire Engineering
01/12/2014
Revised:
22/07/2015
Ram Phase 1 Fire Strategy
Quality Management
Fire Engineering
Issue/revision
Issue 1
Revision 1
Revision 2
Revision 3
Remarks
Draft for comment
Revised following
comments from EPR
Full report
Incorporating
Design Team
Comments
Date
18/07/2014
25/07/2014
27/08/2014
23/10/2014
Prepared by
Callum Dyer
Callum Dyer
Callum Dyer
Callum Dyer
01/12/2014
Client
Signature
Checked by
Chris Barrett
Chris Barrett
Chris Barrett
Chris Barrett
Ryan McCreadie
Ryan McCreadie
Ryan McCreadie
Ryan McCreadie
Greenland Holding Group

16 Upper Woburn Place
London
WC1H 0AF
Signature
Authorised by
Consultant
Signature
Chris Barrett
WSP House, 70 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1AF
Tel: +44 (0)11 3395 6279
Fax: +44 (0)11 3395 6201
Project number
70002677
70002677
70002677
70002677
Issue/revision
Revision 4
Revision 5
Revision 6
Revision 7
www.wspgroup.co.uk
Remarks
Incorporating
Design Team
Comments
Incorporating
Greenland Holding
Group comments.
Sections 3.2 & 3.3.3.2.
Revised to meet
Greenland employers
requirements.
Revised to clarify
Building 10K
common corridor
and sprinklers
inclusion.
Registered Address
Date
23/10/2014
23/02/2015
09/06/2015
22/07/2015
Prepared by
Chris Barrett
Callum Dyer / Alex

Robinson
Callum Dyer
Callum Dyer
Chris Barrett
Callum Dyer
Chris Barratt
Richard Hirst
WSP UK Limited
01383511
Signature
WSP Contacts
Checked by
Callum Dyer
callum.dyer@wspgroup.com
Signature
Authorised by
Ryan McCreadie
Ryan McCreadie
Chris Barratt
Richard Hirst
70002677
70002677
70002677
70002677
Chris Barrett
chris.barrett2@wspgroup.com
Signature
Project number
Project number: 70002677

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
5.2
Fire Mains.............................................................................18
5.2.1 Location of Dry Riser Outlets................................................18
5.2.2 Location of Dry Riser Inlet Connection Points ......................18
5.3
Fire Hydrants ........................................................................18
5.4
Fire Service Vehicle Access .................................................19
5.4.1 Fire Service Access Route ...................................................19
5.5
Access to buildings for fire personnel Fire Fighting Shaft
Requirements ...................................................................................20
5.5.1 Residential Fire Fighting Shaft .............................................20
5.6
Basement .............................................................................21
5.6.1 Basement Level 01...............................................................21
5.6.2 Basement Level 02...............................................................22
5.7
Discharge of Basement Fire Fighting Lobby Smoke Vents ..23
5.8
Secondary Power Supplies ..................................................23
Table of Contents
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Introduction ............................................................................ 4
General .................................................................................. 4
Objectives .............................................................................. 4
Reference Documents ........................................................... 4
Fire Engineering Assessment Process .................................. 4
2
2.1
2.2
Development Description ...................................................... 5

General .................................................................................. 5
Building Heights..................................................................... 5
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.3.5
3.3.6
3.3.7
3.3.8
Means of Warning and Escape.............................................. 6

Evacuation Philosophy .......................................................... 6
Means of Warning ................................................................. 6
Means of Escape ................................................................... 6
Travel Distance...................................................................... 6
Horizontal Means of Escape .................................................. 9
Vertical Means of Escape .................................................... 11
Disabled Egress .................................................................. 12
Automatic Doors .................................................................. 12
Head Room in Escape Routes ............................................ 12
Escape Signage .................................................................. 12
Emergency Lighting ............................................................. 12
Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................26
Appendix B Residential Sprinkler System .....................................29

Guidance Note: Engineering Fire Safety ..........................................29
Introduction ......................................................................................29
Standard Guidance ..........................................................................29
Legislative Requirements .................................................................29
Design Implications ..........................................................................29
Advantages ......................................................................................29
Access and Facilities for Fire Fighting ................................. 18

Introduction .......................................................................... 18

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Report Applicability...............................................................25
General.................................................................................25
Construction Design and Management Regulations ............25
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (RR(FS)O) ..............25
Appendix A Residential Corridor Ventilation..................................28

General ............................................................................................28
4
Internal and External Fire Spread ........................................ 13
4.1
Linings ................................................................................. 13
4.2
Fire Resistance and Compartmentation .............................. 13
4.2.1 Roof Structure ..................................................................... 13
4.3
Sprinklers............................................................................. 13
4.3.1 Building in Excess of 30m.................................................... 13
4.3.2 Open Plan Duplex Apartments ............................................ 13
4.3.3 A3 Retail Units & Service Corridor....................................... 14
4.3.4 Basement (Non Car Park Areas) ......................................... 14
4.4
Smoke Ventilation................................................................ 14
4.4.1 Residential Common Corridor Push / Pull Smoke
Clearance System ........................................................................... 15
4.4.2 Building 10H South Approach.............................................. 15
4.4.3 Basement ............................................................................ 15
4.4.4 Fire Doors ............................................................................ 16
4.5
Fire Stopping ....................................................................... 16
4.5.1 Services in Residential Lobbies ........................................... 16
4.6
Duplex Apartments .............................................................. 16
4.6.1 ADB Compliant Design ........................................................ 16
4.6.2 Open Plan Duplex Apartments ............................................ 17
4.7
External Walls and Roof (External Flame Spread) .............. 17
4.8
External Fire Spread............................................................ 17
4.8.1 Building 3A to Building 3B and ~Vice Versa ........................ 17
5
5.1
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
1.4
Introduction
1
1.1
Where fire engineering analysis has been undertaken within this report the framework set out by the guidance
in BS7974:2001 the application of fire engineering principles to the design of buildings has been followed. A
fire safety engineering approach is formed in 3 main stages (see Figure 1):
General
Qualitative design review (QDR) This stage identifies the scope and objectives of the fire safety design
from identifying the risks. One or more design solutions are proposed and the performance and
acceptance criteria determined. i.e. areas of the proposed design do not meet the recommendations of
the standard guidance, the risks of the proposed design are identified and its performance / acceptance
criteria set. This stage will identify whether a quantified analysis is required.
The fire strategy shall be in accordance with the Building Regulations 2010 and its supporting guidance
Approved Document B (ADB). Where deviations from ADB occur within the building these will be justified
using the guidance presented in BS 7974.
The detailed fire strategy report has been developed based upon the information contained within the drawings
provided by EPR. This report should be read in conjunction with these drawings.
Quantitative analysis Fire engineering analysis is used to evaluate the proposed design solutions. This
stage can involve a range of calculations, for example this may include calculations for smoke spread, fire
growth / spread and evacuation times.
The diagrams in this report are used as an aid to explain the fire strategy; it is likely that they will remain
applicable if changes to the architectural layouts are made. However, any changes to the layouts occurring
after the revisions noted above should reviewed against this strategy to ensure it remains applicable.
1.2
Fire Engineering Assessment Process
Assessment against criteria At this stage the outputs of the quantitative analysis are reviewed against
the acceptance criteria. This stage will determine whether the proposed design solution(s) is suitable,
unsuitable or requires additional fire engineering analysis.
Objectives
The objectives of this report are to:

Provide support to the design team by providing detailed solutions for fire safety issues with appropriate
analyses.
Demonstrate how the detailed fire safety design can meet the requirements of Part B of the Building
Regulations 2010 in terms of life safety.
Enable an opportunity for the Buildings Control Body, Fire and Rescue Service and the design team to
comment on the adopted strategy.
1.3
Reference Documents
The main reference document used in preparing this fire strategy is Approved Document B (ADB). This report
gives the relevant details of how the provisions within ADB are applied to this particular design to achieve an
acceptable level of fire safety.
Other key reference documents referred to in this report are;
BS 5839-1:2013 Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings. Part 1 Code of practice for system
design, installation, commissioning and maintenance.
BS 5839-9:2003 Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings. Part 9 Code of practice for the design,
installation, commissioning and maintenance of emergency voice communications systems.
BS 5499-1:2002 Graphical symbols and signs. Safety signs, including fire safety signs. Part 1 Specification
for geometric shapes, colours and layout.
BS 5499-4:2000 Safety signs, including fire safety signs. Part 4 Code of practice for escape route signing.
BS 5266-1:2011 Emergency lighting. Part 1 Code of practice for the emergency lighting of premises.
BS 5266-7:1999 Lighting applications - Emergency lighting.
BS 5306-8:2012 Fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises. Part 8 Selection and
installation of portable fire extinguishers - code of practice.
BS 7273-4: 2007 Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures. Part 4 Actuation of release
mechanisms for doors.
Figure 1 Basic Fire Safety Engineering Process (Figure 2 of BS7974:2001)
BS 7974:2001 Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings Code of Practice.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
2
2.1
2.2
Development Description
Building Heights
The buildings range in height, each with a single stair core providing means of escape. As the building height
increases, so do the level of fire safety measures required within each building. In determining the fire safety
measures applicable the following building heights, measured from fire service access level to the top most
occupied storey (in accordance with the recommendations of Appendix C of ADB), have been used:
General
The proposed development is split across three separate construction phases. This report outlines the fire
safety recommendations for Phase 1 only at this stage. Form a fire strategy perspective Phase 1 consists of
fourteen (14) single stair residential buildings, with a number of these containing A3 type premises at ground
floor level. The development also includes a two storey basement car park.
In terms of addressing fire and life safety, and the key items for each of the individual buildings within Phase 1,
the scheme is split into the following building references:
Building
Height
Building 1
10.3m
Building 2
18.2m
Building 3a
14.1m
Building 3B North
23.55m
Building 3B South
17.25m
Building 3C North
23.55m
Building 3C South
23.55m
Building 10H North
17.9m
Building 10H South
11.6m
Building 10J
30.5m
Building 10K
27.35m
Building 12
10.3m
Table 1: Phase 1 Building Heights
Figure 2: Building Reference Plan

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Means of Warning and Escape
3.1
Evacuation Philosophy
The evacuation strategy to be adopted across Phase 1 will be:
Means of Escape
3.3.1
Travel Distance
The following table provides the travel distances as recommended by ADB, these travel distances are generally
met by the buildings design. Where travel distances are not in accordance with these recommendations
alternative solutions are detailed within this strategy report.
Residential areas Evacuation only of the apartment of fire origin upon activation of the fire alarm. All other
apartments stay in place unless they choose to leave or are directed to evacuate by the Fire Service;
Simultaneous evacuation of occupants will be adopted for all non-residential areas (retail units, basement
car park, loading bay etc.), i.e. one out, all out, should the fire alarm activate.
Activation of an alarm within an individual apartment, or within the A3 premises will not activate the fire alarm to
adjacent areas. Only the area of fire origin will receive an alarm tone instigating evacuation, i.e. alarm activation
within a ground floor A3 unit will not activate the alarm in adjacent A3 units or the apartments on floor above
and vice versa. Activation of an alarm within an apartment will not activate the fire alarm in adjacent
apartments, nor in the retail units below (where applicable).
3.2
3.3
Accommodation
Single direction of travel (m)
More than one

direction of travel (m)
Restaurant / Retail
18
45
Car Park
25
45
Loading Bay Area
25
45
9 (inside the apartment)

7.5 (apartment door to stair
entrance)
N/A
N/A
9
18
35
45
Residential
Means of Warning
The proposed alarm and detection strategy for each area is summarised in Table 2 below.
Use
Automatic Alarm
and Detection
Category
Notes
Single Storey Apartments
LD3
Duplex Apartments
(Protected Entrance Hall
layout)
LD3
Designed in accordance with BS 5839: Part 6[

Detection typically incorporated into circulation spaces
that form escape routes
Designed in accordance with BS 5839: Part 6
Detection typically incorporated into circulation spaces
that form escape routes at both levels.
Open Plan Duplex

Apartments
LD1
Residential Common
Corridors
L5
A3 type retail units
Loading Bay
Building 10
Car Park
Plant
Distance within room
Escape route not in open air
(overall travel distance)
Table 3 Recommended Travel Distance Limits
3.3.1.1
Typically within the scheme the majority of apartments are designed such that all rooms are accessed via a
protected entrance hall. The protected entrance halls (PEH) are designed such that:
Travel distance is typically limited to 9m from a habitable room to the main entrance door;

Detection typically incorporated every room.
The PEH is separated from the habitable areas via 30 minute fire resistant construction;
All rooms opening onto the PEH provided with FD20 fire doors.

Detection typically provided within the common corridor to
activate the common corridor smoke control system
Typically manual call points provided.

Possibly via a combined heat and carbon monoxide
detector.
L3
Possibly via a combined heat and carbon monoxide
detector.
Table 2 Summary of Fire Alarm Requirements
L3
It should be noted that the main fire alarm panel, for all buildings part of Phase 1, will be located in the lobby of
Building 3, where the concierge will be present. Alarm panels in all other buildings shall be repeater panels
only, available for fire service use on their arrival.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Apartment Protected Entrance Hall Layouts Extended Travel Distance
Building
The duplexes are also provided with sprinkler protection. Although the proposed design of the duplex
apartments does not fully comply with any of the four acceptable approaches given within ADB, the design is
considered to be acceptable considering the following:
Worst Case Escape Distance (m) in Protected Entrance Hall

<9
Building 1
The apartments will be provided with a LD1, Grade D detection and alarm system. This requires that the
main living areas and habitable rooms will be fitted with smoke detectors and sounders. Heat detection will
be located in kitchen area. The LD1 system will provide adequate early warning of a fire in the apartment.
<9
Building 2
<9
Building 3a
All sleeping accommodation is located at the lower level and occupants at this level are considered to be in
a relatively safe place. This is due to the fact that the lower level of the apartment is provided with a
protected entrance hall and is remote from the risk area (kitchen). It would take a considerable amount of
time for the smoke layer to build down through the open stair should a fire occur within the
lounge/kitchen/living area, particularly considering that the duplex apartments are provided with sprinkler
protection which will inhibit fire growth and the production of smoke.
<9
Building 3b North
11.7
Building 3b South
<9
Building 3c North
It is our view that the fire safety provisions within the duplex apartments are sufficient to mitigate the risks
presented by the non-provision of separation between the upper level and stair and, as such, the design
complies with the functional requirements of the Building Regulations.
9.5
Building 3c South
10
Building 10H North

Building 10H South
Building 10J
<9
3.3.1.4
<9
There are areas where the ADB recommended travel distance is exceeded (up to 29.5m). These areas are
provided with mechanical ventilation systems to provide a level of safety equal to or greater than that of a code
compliant design. These travel distances and ventilation systems shall be justified using a fire engineering
solution utilising CFD analysis for mechanical ventilation systems at the next design stage (Stage E). Overleaf
indicates the proposed acceptance criteria and design fire that will form the basis of the fire engineering
justification.
<9
Building 10K
<9
Building 12
Residential corridors Extended Travel Distances
Building
Table 4 Protected Entrance Hall Travel Distances
Building 1
3.3.1.2
Duplex Apartments
Building 2
There is a number of duplex style apartments located within building 10J. Duplex style apartment will be
designed in accordance with ADB recommendations, as follows:
Building 3a
Enclose the internal apartment stair within 30 minutes fire resisting construction such that is forms a
protected entrance hall / upper floor landing area;
Building 3b North
All rooms opening onto the PEH provided with FD20 fire doors.
Building 3b South
Automatic detection and alarm as per Table 2.
Building 3c North
3.3.1.3
Open Plan Duplex Apartments
Building 3c South
Within the development there are duplex apartments proposed on the top floors of each of the residential
building 10H South and 10K. The design of multi storey apartments is covered in Section 2.16 of AD-B. This
section sets out four acceptable approaches to designing multi storey apartments that are applicable to duplex
apartments:
Building 10H North

Building 10H South
To provide an alternative exit from each habitable room which is not on the entrance floor of the flat; or
Building 10J
To provide one alterative exit from each floor (other than the entrance floor), with a protected landing
entered directly from all the habitable rooms on that floor; or
Building 10K
Where the vertical distance between the floor of the entrance storey and the floors above and below is less
than 7.5m, to provide a protected stairway plus additional smoke alarms in all habitable rooms and a heat
detector in any kitchen; or
Building 12
Fire Engineering Justification Required?
4.4
No
26
Yes
No
15
Yes
10.5
Yes
20.4
Yes
22.5
Yes
18.2
Yes
5.5
No
29.5
Yes
11
No*
11
Yes
Table 5 Residential Corridors Travel Distances
To provide a protected stairway plus a sprinkler system in accordance with paragraph 0.16 of ADB, with
detection and alarm system fitted in accordance with paragraph 1.9 of ADB.
* BS 9991 allows single direction travel distances up to 15m with a standard ventilation system (code
recommended) if sprinklers are included.
In this situation the duplex apartments are provided with a protected entrance hallway at lower level but the
internal stair is open to the lounge/kitchen/dining area at upper level.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Worst Case Escape Distance (m)
Note: It is recognised by ADB (Diagram 8a) that occupants may escape up to 30m in a space with a single
ventilation system.
3.3.1.4.1 CFD Principles
3.3.1.4.4 Fire Scenario
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) allows a virtual model of a specific design item to be tested with real
world physics. CFD can be used to explore complex scenarios and provide a greater level of detail and
accuracy than is achievable with simple hand calculations. The principle of CFD modelling is to discretise a
physical domain into thousands or millions of individual cells, in which equations for rates of production and
dissipation of physical properties such as temperature, density, pressure, species, mass etc. are
communicated.
The modelling strategy reflects the focus of the AD B, and as such considers both an Escape Phase and a
Fire Service Access phase.
1. Means of Escape Phase

The means of escape phase occurs from the ignition and extends through the period when the
occupants within the apartment of origin are evacuating. It also includes the time after the occupants in
the apartment of fire origin have evacuated in order to assess the ability of the ventilation to clear the
common corridor of smoke in order to allow other occupants to evacuate if they choose to do so.
The FDS software solves numerically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed,
thermally driven flow, with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport, which is appropriate to fire simulations.
The Large Eddy Simulation (LES) model employed in FDS allows transient features of fires to be caught with
great accuracy.
The use of CFD allows a level of accuracy to be produced that can be orders of magnitude greater than
simplified equations. In this study the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS 6.0.1) is used, which is produced by the
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Results are viewed using the visualisation program
Smokeview also produced by NIST.
Residential - Sprinklered
The design fire follows a fast growth t2 fire curve during which ensures a realistic fire size and volume
of smoke upon evacuation from the apartment. The curve and associated door opening times assume
a 1.0 MW - 1.5 MW fire in the apartment. This fire size is considered conservative appropriate as the
maximum expected fire size on the activation of sprinklers is calculated to be c. 420 kW, giving a fire
size for this analysis 3-4 times that which would actually be expected.
3.3.1.4.2 Objectives
This CFD modelling analysis is provided to demonstrate that the proposed solution achieves a level of
performance at least that provided by a design complying with the recommendations of AD-B. This is achieved
by the following:
Residential - Unsprinklered
In this scenario a design fire of 3.5 MW fire is modelled, simulating a fully developed fire within the
apartment. The peak fire size is supported by research carried out by the ATF in the USA as well as
the University of Edinburgh as part of the Dalmarnock tests as well as published BRE data for a living
room fire. The curve and associated door opening times assume a 1.0 MW - 1.5 MW fire in the
apartment. Note: This is considered a conservative fire size at the time of escape and door opening.
Carry out CFD analysis of a design satisfying the recommendations of AD-B.

Carry out CFD analysis of each of the proposed ventilation arrangements
3.3.1.4.3 Acceptance Criteria

The ventilation system shall be evaluated with regards to its performance for both the means of escape phase
and fire service operation.
Heat Release Rate (kW)
Means of Escape Phase: demonstrate that the entire corridor does not become smoke logged whilst the
door to the fire affected flat is open and that once the door closes, the building is cleared of smoke in a
short duration. A conservative assumption of the door to the flat being open for 30 seconds after that flat
has filled with smoke has been modelled. This will assess the conditions within the corridor for any
occupants in other apartments if they choose to evacuate.
Fire-fighting Phase: demonstrate that the corridor does not become smoke logged whilst the door to the fire
affected flat is open and that once the door closes, the building is cleared of smoke in a short duration. The
scenario modelled assumes that the door remains open until steady state conditions are reached within the
corridor at which point the door is closed (simulating completion of fire-fighting operations) and the corridor
is cleared of smoke.
Note: It is accepted that tenable conditions are likely to be exceeded during the escape and firefighting phases.
However, in terms of system validation and acceptance the enhanced mechanical ventilation system will be
compared against an idealised corridor vented with a 1.5m 2 natural vent shaft for its time for recovery to
tenable conditions.
For the purpose of the proposed CFD modelling analysis, the following parameters are considered as tenable
conditions:
5m visibility distance at head height (2m above floor level) or below (calculated to a reflective sign);
Temperature at head height (2 m above floor level) does not to exceed 60C.
Time (s)
This is based on the guidance within PD 7974 Part 6 - The application of fire safety engineering principles to
the fire safety design of buildings Human factors: Life safety strategies- Occupancy behaviour, evacuation
and condition (sub-system 6), 2004.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Figure 3 Fire Scenario during Escape Phase
2. Firefighting Phase
The firefighting phase has been modelled as a separate scenario. In this case a steady state 3.5 MW
fire is modelled, simulating a fully developed fire within the apartment. The peak fire size is supported
by research carried out by the ATF in the USA as well as the University of Edinburgh as part of the
Dalmarnock tests as well as published BRE data for a living room fire. The door to the stair is open at
the start of the scenario and the extract fan is operating at full speed.
3.3.2
Horizontal Means of Escape
3.3.2.1
A3 Retail Units
At the base of a number of buildings 3B and 3C, A3 retail units are provided. The units are provided with
multiple egress routes, these being either:
This simulates firefighters having set up prior to attacking the fire. At 100 s the door to the apartment is
opened. This delay allows conditions within both the apartment and the corridor to have stabilised.
via doors to the external faade positioned such that the choice of routes is unlikely to be disabled
simultaneously in the event of a fire, or;
Via the service corridor to the rear of the retail units, with the final exit discharging via the main entrance
lobbies associated with the residential sections of the building. The doors leading into the residential areas
from the retail service corridor shall be readily openable, with any security lock deactivated upon operation
of the fire alarm within the retail units. Where a mag lock type lock is provided, a green break glass button
should be located adjacent to the door separating the retail corridor from the residential lobby area, such
that it can override the security facility if required (i.e. ensure the door lock fail safes open).
Heat Release Rate (kW)
The escape route from the retail service corridor into the residential area shall be approach via a protected
lobby. Both doors separating the retail service corridor from the residential areas of the building shall be an
FD60s fire door with smoke seals and self-closing device.
The door separating the rear of the retail units from the service corridor shall be an FD90s fire door with
smoke seals and self-closing device.
A management strategy is required to ensure the service corridor remains free of stored materials and
goods as this route forms a means of egress for the A3 retail units.
Secondary means of escape is provided from the retail units via the service corridors, these connect a place of
relative safety in the lobby areas of the residential buildings, eventually leading to outside.
The retail units are separated from this escape corridor via 90 minutes fire resistant construction.
As this corridor provides the secondary means of escape from the retail units, a management strategy should
be developed to ensure this corridor remain sterile, and free from stored materials.
The following table highlights the maximum occupancy achievable within the retail units based upon the exit
width afforded.
Time (s)
Building
Retail Unit
Exit width available after

discounting largest
Maximum occupancy
catered for
3B
3B.01
1800mm
360 people
3B.02
1100mm
220 people
3B.03
1100mm
220 people
3B.04
1800mm
360 people
3C.01
1800mm
360 people
All solid boundaries are treated as inert obstacles.
3C.02
1800mm
360 people
No external wind conditions are considered.
3C.03
1100mm
220 people
No leakage is modelled from other doors that are served by the common areas.
3C.04
1100mm
220 people
Glazing is assumed to fail in the flat of fire origin. This assumption is necessary to ensure the peak fire size
can be maintained and the fire does not become ventilation controlled and begin to decay.
3C.05
1100mm
220 people
3C.06
1no x 1800mm
580 people
Figure 4 Fire Scenario during Firefighting Phase
The fire is based on a sofa fire scenario and therefore assumes a polyurethane fuel reaction with a
0.1g/g soot yield.
3.3.1.4.5 Other Assumptions

3C
The following assumptions and conditions will also be considered as part of the modelling setup:
The extract vents are set to turn on gradually over a period of time. This is to take into account the ramp up
times for the fans.
1no x 1100mm
10
The domain has been extended so that any openings are not located on the boundary of a domain.
The effects of wind are not considered in any of the scenarios.
Pressure losses across louvers are not considered. The mechanical extract system needs to be designed
to ensure the required flow rate is achieved on the floor of fire origin.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
10.01
Single exit provided
60 people
10.02
800mm opening inwards
60 people
10.03
800mm
60 people
10.04
800mm
60 people
10.05
800mm
60 people
Table 6 Retail Unit Occupancy limits based upon available egress width
Figure 5 and Figure 6 below highlights the available means of escape from the retail units at the base of
buildings 3 and 10. It also highlights the available escape routes for any occupants within the loading bay.
Figure 6 Loading Bay and Building 10 Retail Means of Escape
3.3.2.2
Block 10 Loading Bay
The loading bay has been designed to meet the recommendations of ADB in that:
Travel distance to an exit is within the 45m limits recommended where two escape routes are available
(one of these exit routes is direct to external, another routed via the residential lobby reception area, which
leads to external) ;
Figure 5 Building 3 Retail Means of Escape
The 850mm wide escape doors provided caters for a maximum occupancy level of 110 people within the
loading bay. It is not expected the occupancy level will at any point exceed this;
An L3 level of automatic detection and fire alarm as detailed within Table 2 will be provided;
The floor separating the basement from the upper floor levels is designed as a compartment floor, rated to
provide 120 minutes fire resistant separation.
Separation via 90 minutes fire resistance is provided between the loading bay and all other adjacent areas.
Should the doors be locked for security purpose to separate the areas, it should be fitted with a lock or
fastening that is readily operated without a key. Similarly, if the door is provided with a swipe or proximity
reader, facilities should be provided to occupants such that the door can be readily opened from the side
where escape is occurring (i.e. from the service corridor into the residential lobby area).
Where, if any, and electrically powered lock is used, the locks should return to the unlocked positon;

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
10
b) A totally inorganic material. Such materials include concrete, fired clay, ceramics, metals, plaster
and masonry containing not more than 1% by weight or volume of organic material.
c) Products classified as non-combustible under BS 476-4:1970.
Security / management procedures should be adopted such that any materials found within the protected
corridor area are removed.
On operation of the fire alarm system

On loss of power or systems error
On activation of a manual door release unit (i.e. green break glass type unit). The manual door release
unit should be positioned adjacent the door approached by people making their escape.
The above strategy for controlling the fire load reduces the risk that the single stair serving the buildings may
be compromised and is therefore considered satisfactory.
3.3.3
Vertical Means of Escape
As all upper levels are primarily residential areas (with associated plant) only occupants of the apartment of fire
origin will be evacuating. Therefore the minimum stair widths recommended by ADB (see below) will provide
ample means of escape for these occupants. Table 7 identifies the stairs providing vertical means of escape
for each of the buildings across the site.
Escape Stairs
- Stairs denoted as escape stairs shall be a minimum of 1000m wide.
Fire Fighting Stairs
- Stairs denoted as fire-fighting stairs shall be a minimum of 1100m wide.
Building
Stair(s)
Building 1
1no Escape Stair
Building 2
1no Escape Stair
Building 3A
1no Escape Stair
Building 3B North
1no Fire Fighting Shaft
Building 3B South
Building 3C North
Building 3C South
Building 10H North
Building 10H South
Building 10J
Building 10K
Building 12
1no Escape Stair
Figure 7 Typical Final Exit Discharge Layout
Table 7 Vertical Means of Escape
3.3.3.1
3.3.3.2
Vertical Means of Escape - Final Exits Discharge from Stairs Building 3
Building 3, with buildings 3B North and South, and 3C North and South, provide a particular challenge in that
multiple stairs discharge into a large combined lobby. This provides a unique challenge in that fire load is likely
to be incorporated into these areas, and therefore should a fire arise in these areas then residential occupants
who want to leave the building may become trapped. Figure 8 below highlights the proposed layout.
Final Exits Discharge from Stairs Typical Building
Escape staircases should exit directly to the outside or exit via an enclosed route (protected exit passageway /
corridor) which is provided with the same degree of protection as the stair itself.
In all instances the stairs serving residential levels within the buildings discharge via protected exit
passageway. The protected passageway should essentially be a sterile area, free of combustible materials.
To minimise the risk posed by introducing a fire load into the sterile stair discharge corridor the following key
fire safety measures are to be provided to reduce the level of risk. This arrangement is therefore considered
satisfactory given the following:
The overall floor area of the exit passageway varies between buildings, with some being larger than
conventional exit passageways. This in turn increases the level of risk that the single stair serving the buildings
may be compromised due to a developing fire situation within this corridor.
Restriction on the type of furniture provided. Non-combustible, fire retardant products to be chosen in
accordance with BS 5852;
Any seating / reception layout to be positioned such that a clear path of discharge from the base of the stair
to the final exit can be maintained, measuring 1100mm wide;
However a strategy for controlling the fire load will be developed for each building based upon the following key
elements:
Where possible no fire load will be introduced within the protected corridor at ground floor discharge level;
Any rooms or ancillary areas such as post rooms opening onto the reception areas should be provided with
lobby protection;
Ensuring any post boxes and any other associated items located within the stair are made of a noncombustible material with lockable individual boxes. A material can be classed as non-combustible under
any one of three following conditions:
a) A material which when tested to BS 476-11:1982 does not flame nor cause any rise in temperature
on either specimen or furnace thermocouples.
It is noted that a 24/7 concierge is to be provided at the reception centrally for the site, located in the lobby
of Building 3. This will ensure any developing situation may be tackled at the earliest opportunity.
Consideration should be given to providing a suitable mounting point for the provision of local extinguishers
to the reception desk;

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
11
design philosophy has been adopted across the development where a stair extends to serve the basement
area.
Provision of a localised sprinkler system to serve only the lobby areas.

At this stage it is proposed to combine the sprinkler system with the domestic cold water system as described
in BS9521. For special and costing purposes it is recommended at this stage that water storage capacity of
approx. 5m3 is allowed for, and can be taken of the potable water storage provided it can always be guaranteed
that there is 5m3 of water available at all times, in the event of sprinkler activation.
3.3.3.4
Basement Car Park Approach to Stairs
Beneath the residential buildings there is a two storey enclosed basement car park, providing ancillary
accommodation to the residential areas situated above. As the stairs at this level serve an enclosed car park,
they should be approached via a protected lobby.
The lobby shall be protected from ingress of smoke via natural or mechanical means. As the basement car
park area is provided with a mechanical smoke extract system, it is proposed to utilise this system to serve the
basement stair lobby areas also. Upon activation of the automatic detection and fire alarm at the basement
level, the mechanical smoke extract system shall activate, ensuring the stairs are protected from smoke
ingress, in the event of a fire at basement level (see Figure 16 for basement lobby details).
3.3.4
Disabled Egress
There is no requirement to provide disabled refuge areas in the residential common areas.
In accordance with ADB, the basement level will be provided with disabled refuge areas within each stair.
These refuge areas will be 900mm x 1400mm and provided with an emergency voice communication (EVC)
unit connecting back to the reception area within the North and South Cores of Building 3, and which complies
with BS 5839-9.
A comprehensive management strategy will be required to ensure an emergency evacuation plan is developed
such that any occupant within the stairs at basement level can be evacuated if required.
3.3.5
Automatic Doors
Any automatic door used for escape shall be designed such that they fail safely to an open position, conforming
to BS 7036.
3.3.6
Head Room in Escape Routes
In accordance with Section 5.26 of AD-B, escape routes (except for door frames) should have a minimum
height of 2m.
3.3.7
Escape Signage
All escape routes are to be distinctively and conspicuously marked by emergency exit signs following the
recommendations of BS 5499 Part 1 and Part 4.
Each disabled refuge area should be clearly marked by appropriate signs.
3.3.8
Emergency Lighting
All escape routes, internal and external, must be adequately illuminated at all material times.
Emergency escape lighting is to be provided in the areas listed below;
Figure 8 Final Exit Discharge from Building 3 North and South Cores
All escape routes (including external).

3.3.3.3
Windowless accommodation (basement areas).
Basement Car Park Means of Escape Continuation of stairs serving basement and upper
levels
Corridors over 30m long.

Open-plan areas more than 60m2.
Because of their location, there is the potential for basement stairs to be compromised by heat and smoke. This
could impact upon the upper floor levels within a building where only a single stair is provided for means of
escape.
Sanitary accommodation with a floor area over 8m2.

Electricity and generator rooms.
To meet ADB recommendations any stair serving the upper levels should not be continued down to serve any
associated basement level, discharging at a level above the basement car park. A separated section of the
stair would then be required to serve the basement level, which in turn would also discharge at ground. This

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Emergency lighting will be installed in accordance with the recommendations of BS 5266 Part 1 and Part 7.
12
Internal and External Fire Spread

4.2.1
4.1
Roof Structure
In accordance with the recommendations of ADB, elements of structure supporting only the roof shall not be
afforded structural fire resistance. However, escape routes from the roof shall be provided with 30 minutes
structural fire resistance.
Linings
Fire spread will be limited by ensuring that internal linings conform to the description in Table 8.
Location
National Class of Lining
European Class of Lining
Within rooms not more than 30m2
D-s3, d2
4.3
Other rooms
C-s3, d2
The following table summarises the arears to be provided with sprinkler protection.
Circulation spaces
B-s3, d2
Sprinklers
Building / Area
Table 8 Internal Linings
Building 10J
Building 10H South
4.2
Fire Resistance and Compartmentation
Building 10K
In accordance with the recommendation of ADB, fire resistance as per Table 9 shall be provided.
Element of Construction
Loadbearing
Elements of
Structure:
Non Car Park Basement Areas
Fire Resistance (minutes)
Buildings 1, 2, 3A, 3B South, 10H, 11

North, 11 South, 11A, and 12
60
Buildings 3B North, 3C North and

South,
90
Buildings 10J & 10K
120
Areas beneath Building 10J (retail

units / loading bay etc)
Reason for Inclusion
Applicable Code
Building height greater than 30m
BS 9251
Inclusion of open plan duplex apartments
BS 9251
Building height greater than 30m
BS 9251
Adopted ventilation solution (mechanical) in lieu

of naturally ventilated car park.
BS 12845
Areas associated with the structure of Building

J which has a height greater than 30m
BS 12845
Table 10 Sprinkler Coverage
Note: Section 20 has been repealed that would have required increased coverage of sprinklers (e.g. the entire
basement car park).
4.3.1
Building in Excess of 30m
Compartment Floors
As per load bearing element rating above.
Compartment floor separating the basement car park / loading bay from upper levels
120
Separating retail areas from residential accommodation

(compartment walls)
As per load bearing element rating above,

dependent on the building in question
Separating retail areas from adjacent retail areas
60
Protected Shafts (Risers, Lift Shafts, Escape Stairs)
Fire-fighting Stairs/Lifts
120
cupboards and pantries with a floor area of less than 2m and where the least dimension does not exceed
1m and the walls and ceilings are covered with non-combustible or limited-combustible materials,
Walls bounding Apartments
60
crawling spaces.
Protected entrance halls within apartments
30
For buildings that exceed 30m in height to the top most occupied floor, a sprinkler system is required for the
buildings. The sprinkler systems covering the apartments shall be designed to meet the guidance within
BS9251:2005. Refer to Appendix B Residential Sprinkler System for further information.
4.3.1.1
Coverage
Sprinkler heads will be provided throughout all residential accommodation (internally within flats) with the
exception of:
2
bathrooms with a floor area of less than 5m ,

2
External Walls which are required to provide Fire Rsistance
4.3.2
For buildings that have open plan duplex apartments a sprinkler system is required for these apartments only.
The sprinkler systems covering the apartments shall be designed to meet the guidance within BS9251:2005.
Refer to Appendix B Residential Sprinkler System for further information.
(see section 4.8)

Bin Stores/High risk plant rooms
30
Table 9 Fire Resistance
4.3.2.1
Coverage
Sprinkler heads will be provided throughout all residential accommodation (internally within flats) with the
exception of:

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
13
bathrooms with a floor area of less than 5m 2,

cupboards and pantries with a floor area of less than 2m 2 and where the least dimension does not exceed
1m and the walls and ceilings are covered with non-combustible or limited-combustible materials,
Building 3B
South
Stair
Natural
Head of stair
AOV 1.0m2 minimum free area
Common Corridor
Mechanical
Smoke Shafts
2no AOV 1.0m 2 to smoke shaft

2no shafts 0.75m2 minimum free area
crawling spaces.
4.3.3
Extract 5 m3/s*
A3 Retail Units & Service Corridor
Building 3C
North
In addition to the sprinklers to the residential areas, sprinklers are also required to provide coverage to the retail
and back of house areas that are interlinked with the structure of building 10J. The sprinkler system providing
protection to the retail areas and loading bay area shall be designed to meet the guidance with BS12845. This
system may be provided in conjunction with the basement sprinkler system (i.e. combining tanks and pumps).
Stair
Natural
Head of stair
Common Corridor
Mechanical
Smoke Shafts

Ground 5th Floor
Extract 5 m3/s*
Common Corridor
Mechanical
Smoke Shafts
6th and 7th Floor

4.3.3.1
1no AOV 1.0m2 to smoke shaft
Coverage
Sprinkler heads will be provided throughout the retail areas, including service corridors.
4.3.4
Extract 5 m3/s*
Basement (Non Car Park Areas)
Building 3C
South
In conjunction with the mechanically assisted basement ventilation system, sprinklers shall be provided
throughout the non-car park basement areas in accordance with the recommendations of BS 12845 and
section 18.13 of ADB.
Stair
Natural
Head of stair
Common Corridor
Mechanical
Smoke Shafts
Ground 5th Floor

Extract 5 m3/s*
Common Corridor
4.3.4.1
1no AOV 1.0m to external
Coverage
Mechanical
Smoke Shafts
6th 7th Floor
1no AOV 1.0m 2 to external

1no AOV 1.0m2 to smoke shaft
Sprinkler heads will be provided throughout the non-car park areas of the basement levels.

Extract 5 m3/s*
4.4
Smoke Ventilation
The following table summarises the smoke ventilation systems required for each building across the
development. The basement fire-fighting and stair lobby ventilation requirements are detailed within Section 5
of this report.
Building
Building 1
Ventilation Area
Common Corridor
Stair
Building 2
Common Corridor
Ventilation
Method
Vent Location
Building
10H North
Mechanical
Head of stair
Smoke Shafts
Automatic opening vent (AOV) 1.0m

minimum free area
Building
10H South
Building 3B
North
Building
10J
Mechanical
Smoke Shaft
2no AOV 1.0m to smoke shaft
External wall
at each floor
level
Automatic opening vent (AOV) 1.0m

minimum free area at each level
Common Corridor
Natural
External wall
AOV 1.5m2minimum free area
Stair
Natural
Head of stair
Common Corridor
Mechanical
Smoke Shafts
2
Head of stair
Stair
Natural
Common Corridor
No ventilation provided to common corridor. Alternative Fire Engineered

Solution adopted as building minimally exceeds 11m.
Stair
Natural
External wall
at high level
within the stair
AOV 1.0m minimum free area
Common Corridor
Mechanical
Smoke Shafts
Extract 5 m3/s*
Building
10K
Stair
Natural
Head of stair
Common Corridor
Mechanical
Smoke Shaft
2
AOV 1.0m to smoke shaft
1no shaft 0.75m2 minimum free area

Extract 5 m3/s*

3
Extract 5 m /s*

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Common Corridor
Extract 5 m /s*
Building 3A
AOV 1.0m minimum free area

3
Natural
Head of stair
Extract 5 m3/s*
Stair
Natural
Specification (size or extract rate)
None Required
Natural
Stair
Building 12
14
Stair
Natural
Head of stair
Common Corridor
Mechanical
Smoke Shaft
AOV 1.0m2 to smoke shaft
Rather than providing a 1.5m 2 smoke shaft in the common corridor for the extra 600mm of building height (the
risk hasnt increased because of the height, we still have the same number of floor levels accessing the stair)
the building is to be assessed based upon adopting a similar approach to that of a small single stair building
was proposing the following, based upon a similar solution to the small premises section of ADB. The mitigating
measures for adopting this approach are:
1no shaft 0.75m2 minimum free area

Extract 5 m3/s*
Stair
Natural
Head of stair
* Extract rate of 5m 3/s is indicative only and should be allowed for at this stage.
undertaken at Stage E to determine the actual required rates.
Table 11 Smoke Ventilation
Fire and smoke modelling will be
Instead of and OV we would provide an AOV to the head of the stair, positioned on the faade of the stair,
at high level, linked to the common corridor automatic detection and alarm system. This would ensure
when the fire service arrive any smoke within the stair would have ventilated to external, rather than the fire
service having to control the OV within the base of the stair.
Figures identifying the residential corridor smoke ventilation systems are provided in Appendix A.
4.4.1
We are limited to 2no apartment per floor, with a protected entrance hall provided to each apartment. We
also have a common corridor between the stair and the apartments. In effect a double lobby approach from
the residential areas where fire may originate.
Residential Common Corridor Push / Pull Smoke Clearance System
The general principle of the push pull approach is that there are two ventilation shafts, one used as means of
providing air into the corridor and the second to extract the smoke from the corridor as depicted in Figure 9.
The 3rd / 4th floor apartment is an open plan duplex apartment. Given this layout we are proposing sprinkler
protection as a compensatory measure. Therefore the apartment with the biggest risk in terms of overall
area, smoke development, possible fire size, and impact upon the stair, is well controlled, with any smoke
at a significantly reduced temperature and toxicity/visibility.
We have a maximum of 2 apartments opening onto the common corridor at each level, reducing the
likelihood that smoke will enter this area (in comparison to multiple apartments opening onto the common
corridor).
4.4.3
Basement
4.4.3.1
Car Park Ventilation
All basement areas, including the car park will be ventilated; this shall be afforded using a mechanical
ventilation system as follows:
The system shall be independent of any other ventilation systems provided to the car park.
Figure 9 Mechanical Ventilation in Residential Corridors
Operate at a minimum of 10 air changes per hour for a fire scenario in one area of the car park.
This system will act to draw smoke away from the stair and ultimately clear smoke that has spilled into the
common corridor.
The system shall be designed to operate in 2 parts, each being capable of extracting 50% (5 air changes
per hour).
Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) modelling is to be undertaken to justify the alternative common corridor
smoke clearance system. This will confirm the overall required smoke shaft sizes and mechanical extract rates
adopted. Table 11 details the worst case scenario in terms of smoke shaft size and mechanical extract rate
requirements.
Each of the systems shall be provided with secondary power supplies.

Extract points for the system shall be provided so that 50% are at high level and 50% at low level.
o
Fans shall be capable of operating at 300 C for a minimum of 60 minutes.

o
Ductwork and fixings materials to have a melting point not less than 800 C.
4.4.2
Building 10H South Approach
The above specified smoke ventilation system shall be designed and installed to meet the recommendations of
BS 12101.
Building 10H South is effectively greater than 11m in height from the entrance level to the top occupied floor.
As such it would require a strategy to be developed to remove smoke from the common corridor areas. The
building minimally exceeds the 11 m height by 600mm, i.e. 11.6m. However it is proposed to assess the
building and the common corridor requirements as being a building not exceeding 11m in height based upon
the following mitigating measures and assessment:
4.4.3.2
All non-car park basement areas shall be provided with mechanical ventilation, an extraction point shall be
provided to each compartment. For example, each plant room on basement Level -2 shall be separated to
form individual compartments and provide with an extraction point. This mechanical ventilation system shall be
as follows:
One of the residential buildings is minimally over 11m (measuring in at 11.6m to the entrance door of the
rd
duplex apartment at 3 floor level). In total we have 4 storeys above ground instead of 3 as recommended
by ADB for a building under 11m; one of these being the upper floor of the open plan duplex apartment. In
st
nd
rd
th
effect we only actually have 3 storeys opening into the stair (1 , 2 , and 3 floors with the 4 floor being
the upper floor level of the duplex apartment). If dwellings are also provided with a protected entrance hall,
the apartments in a building under 11m with a single stair escape could open directly into the stair, no
common corridor would be required. The above detail is based upon Diagram 9 of ADB and Section 2.21.
Operate at a minimum of 10 air changes per hour for the largest compartment.
Fans shall be capable of operating at 300oC for a minimum of 60 minutes.
The system shall be provided with secondary power supplies.
For a building not exceeding 11m in height to the top occupied floor, and a maximum of three storeys
above ground level, ADB would only require we limit travel distance to 4.5m and provide an OV in the stair.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Non-Car Park Basement Ventilation
15
4.4.3.3
Basement Lobby approach to Stairs
Where the lift passes through the compartment floor the lift doors shall be provided with 60 minutes integrity
and insulation at all levels and forms a protected shaft.
ADB recommends that if a residential stair serves a (non-open sided) car park the lobby or corridor should
have not less than 0.4m2 (free area) permanent ventilation where no ventilation is already required (e.g. fire
fighting shafts).
4.5
For lobbies located at basement level, where a mechanical extraction system is present, these may be
interlinked to the basement ventilation strategy (via ductwork) and would therefore not require the 0.4m2
permanently open vent.
4.4.3.4
Fire Stopping
Penetrations through a line of compartmentation should be sealed with an appropriate proprietary product to
maintain the fire resistance rating in the compartmentation.
Any such penetration passing through a protected corridor escape route should also be fitted with a smoke
rating as well (i.e. fire and smoke damper).
Refuse Storage
As per ADB recommendations refuse store(s) shall be enclosed in fire resisting construction. A fire rated
shutter shall be provided to ensure the refuse chute remains fully separated from the car park area via 30
minutes fire resistance.
In some cases services are provided to multiple floors and are located within protected shafts. In these cases
the protected shaft is rated to achieve the fire resistance rating equivalent to the highest rated
compartmentation it penetrates.
It is proposed by the mechanical designer to ventilate the bin store via the main car park extract system. A local
dedicated extract will discharge directly into the car park, with final extract linked via the main car park
ventilation system.
4.5.1
Services in Residential Lobbies
Fire Door
Fire Rating
As detailed within Section 8.36 of ADB the use of protected shafts should be limited to specific uses. Within the
residential lobby areas (at ground floor which forms an extension of the protected escape stair) there are
instances where electrical services serving the building are provided. It is not feasible to relocate these services
to any other areas of the building due to the restricted foot print and layout of the building, and the service
strategy for the building. Therefore the services must be located in this position with an alternative fire
engineered solution developed to allow this deviation.
Main entrance doors to apartments
FD30S with self

closing devices
The following approach has been discussed with Building Control to allow for services to be located within the
protected shaft at ground floor discharge levels:
Rooms within an apartment opening onto the protected entrance hall
FD20
Doors to escape stairs
FD30S with self

closing device
Doors to basement escape stairs
FD60S with self

closing device
Doors to any lobby
FD30S with self

closing device
Doors to places of special fire hazard
FD30 with self closing

devices
4.4.4
Fire Doors
Fire doors shall be provided as per Table 12 below.
Doors sub-dividing corridors
FD20S with self

closing device
Lift doors (where lift penetrates compartment floor)
FD60
Doors in compartment walls (separating buildings or occupancies)
FD 60S with self

closing device
Doors separating retail units from the retail service corridor
FD90S with self

closing device
Doors separating the retail unit service corridor from the residential lobby
area
Where services are incorporated into a riser accessed via the residential lobby, the riser should be
accessed via a removable fire resistant panel rated to the same level of fire resistance as the protected
shaft it serves.
A management strategy should be in place to ensure access to the risers is restricted, such that upon
completion of any works the panel is replaced.
As no doors are provided into the shaft it is unlikely the riser area / cupboard will be used as a temporary
store, increasing the risk of misuse of the area.
As no doors are provided into the shaft it is unlikely the service risers and their contents will be exposed to
the protected shaft, increasing the likelihood that a fire within the area may compromise the escape route.
Any fire within the service riser will not instigate a full building wide evacuation alarm, with the fire
contained to a protected shaft that rises through the building, which is effectively separated from the
adjacent escape route.
Any fire will be in a location that can be controlled by the fire service in terms of its spread throughout the
building as they will control access to the area to fight any fire.
4.6
Duplex Apartments
FD60S with self

closing device
4.6.1
ADB Compliant Design
Doors separating the loading bay area from adjacent residential areas
FD90S with self

closing fire door
There is a number of duplex style apartments located across the development. Duplex style apartment will be
designed as follows:
Fire fighting shaft requirements
As per Figure 14 and

Figure 15
Main apartment door to be an FD30S self-closing fire door.

The internal apartment stair to be enclosed within 30 minutes fire resisting construction such that is forms a
protected entrance hall / upper floor landing area;
Table 12 Fire Door Ratings
All rooms opening onto the protected stair will be provided with FD20 fire doors.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
16
4.6.2
There is a number of open plan duplex style apartments located across the development. Open plan duplex
style apartment will be designed as follows:
South
Boundary
24.75m
3m
10.2m
100%
63%
Yes
Causeway
13.9m
3m
16m
100%
67%
Yes
3BC East
2.9m
3m
6m
45%
36%
Yes
10J
11 North
5.5m
3m
6m
100%
c.75%
Yes
3a
6.5m
3m
6m
85%
50%
Yes
3A
3A
3BC South
Main apartment door to be an FD30S self-closing fire door.

The openings onto the apartment stair at the lower level (where sleeping accommodation is present is to
be within 30 minutes fire resisting construction such that is forms a protected entrance hall.
All rooms opening onto the protected stair at the lower level will be provided with FD20 fire doors.
4.7
External Walls and Roof (External Flame Spread)
Any materials used to construct the external faade of the building shall meet the following classification to
restrict the spread of flame across its surface:
Faade up to 18m high Index (I) not more than 20 (national class) or class C-s3, d2 or better;
External cladding materials (including insulation to rain cladding) shall meet recommendations of ADB with
Class 0 fire rating.
4.8
(sprinkler
protected
unit)
Yes
Yes
2.5m
3m
13.1m
16%
c.50%
No
3m
9m
85% which
may be
doubled as
unit is
sprinkler
protected
73%
Yes
4.7m
3BC
South
Faade over 18m high Class 0 (national class).
As detailed within ADB the south boundary of Building 10J, which is at an angle greater
than 80 (91 angle) to the east faade of building 2, is not considered relevant when
assessing external fire spread.
(taken as
faade of
opposite
protected
stair)
3BC North
& South
External Fire Spread
10J
9.7m
3m
6.9m
100%
c.57.4%
Yes
Retail
area
Each of the buildings is to be designed to restrict the spread of fire from one building to another. This can be
achieved via one of two methods:
Provide adequate separating distance between the buildings
10K
3BC North
6.16m
3m
13m
100%
100%
Yes
Restrict the unprotected areas of the building faade should adequate separation not be possible
10J
3BC North
9.5m
3m
9m
100%
74%
Yes
11 South
4m
3m
5.7m
50%
46.25%
Yes
11 South
South
Boundary
9.3m
3m
13.2m
100%
66%
Yes
12
7.9m
3m
5.8m
100%
72.5%
Yes
12
7.9m
3m
14.2m
75%
c.55.5%
Yes
The following section highlights the maximum level of unprotected faade that can be provided for each of the
buildings, for each of the facades, dependent upon its proximity to adjacent buildings, or the development
boundary.
The BRE report External fire spread: Building separation and boundary distance, BR187, has been adopted
when assessing the required separation distance, or protected faade required.
Where no boundary is identified on the development layouts, a notional boundary, equidistant between
buildings has been assumed for calculations.
Table 13 External Fire Spread
It is assumed at this stage that internal linings to each of the buildings surrounding the glazed openings will be
fire resistant, thereby limiting the amount of unprotected faade. Assessment of external fire spread has been
assessed on this basis.
4.8.1
For calculation purposes it is assumed the only areas deemed to be unprotected (i.e. non-fire resistant) is the
glazed areas.
Based upon the separating distance we have between Buildings 3A and 3B the following level of unprotected
faade (i.e. non fire rated or glazed) is allowable:
From
Building
To Building
11 South

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
Notional
Boundary
Height of
unprotected area
Width of
unprotected
area
Permitted
Unprotected
area
Actual
Unprotected
area
As detailed within ADB the boundary of Building 2, which is at an angle greater than 80
(angle 82 angle) to the east faade of building 1, is not considered relevant when
assessing external fire spread.
4m
3m
4.2m
50%
50%
Building 3A to Building 3B and ~Vice Versa
3A elevation retail to 3B based upon a separation distance of 2.45m (mid-point between 3A and 3B) the
percentage of unprotected faade allowed is 16.3%. This is effectively 11.7m 2. The glazed elements currently
equates to approximately 35.7m 2. An element of the faade is therefore required to be fire resisting.
Alternatively it may be possible to provide a fire rated shutter to the glazed elements which operate upon
activation of the fire alarm within Building 3A, effectively restricting fire spread between the buildings.
Within
Acceptable
Limits
3B elevation retail to 3A based upon separation distance of 2.45m (mid-point again between 3A and 3B) the
percentage of unprotected faade allowed is 49%. The level of unprotected areas we are allowed equates to
26.5m2. The glazed elements on this faade equate to 22.4m 2 so we are within acceptable limits, with no
further requirement to protect the faade.
Yes
Yes, no further
protection
required.
17
Access and Facilities for Fire Fighting
5.1
Introduction
The design of the outlet has been incorporated into the half landing area of the stair cores to provide ease of
access, and to allow a fire fighting hose to be connected and run through the building, taking into consideration
the sweep and arc of a fully charged hose. As the buildings do not exceed 50m in height wet fire mains are not
required.
In some cores the dry risers shall be located on the main landings (rather than half landings) as depicted in
Figure 11.
Part B5 of the building regulations requires reasonable facilities to be provided to assist fire fighters in the
protection of life.
To provide additional coverage within the basement, all basement stairs are provided with a dry riser outlet,
providing flexibility in the approach to firefighting operations within this area, if required. This is in addition to the
dedicated firefighting shafts provided, as identified in Figure 16 and Figure 17.
It also provides details on access requirements required by the fire service to allow fire appliances to gain
access to the building. The following section details those facilities and access recommendations.
5.2
Fire Mains
5.2.1
Location of Dry Riser Outlets
Each building shall include for a dry rising fire main designed to meet the recommendations of BS9990:2006.
The dry rising main shall also be incorporated into each of the stairs serving the basement car park levels. As
highlighted within diagram 52 and Section 15.2 of ADB, for a residential building, the dry rising fire main outlet
may be located within the protected escape or firefighting stair.
Figure 11: Half Landing Location of Outlet within Stair
5.2.2
Location of Dry Riser Inlet Connection Points
Dry riser inlet points are located at the front of each building adjacent to the main entrance. This allows the fire
service to access their facilities at the main point of entry.
As each of the buildings is provided with a dry riser, access within 18m of the inlet point from the fire service
appliance is required. This is provided via the appliance access route designed for the development (see
Figure 13).
5.3
Fire Hydrants
Where a building is being erected that has a compartment of 280m 2 in area of more (basement levels) hydrants
will be provided as follows:
Hydrants should be provided such that all dry rising main inlets are within 90m of a hydrant.
The following sketch provides detail on the current and proposed hydrants for the development to cover any
shortfall.
Figure 10 Diagram 52 Position of dry riser outlet allowable within escape or firefighting stair

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
18
5.4
Fire Service Vehicle Access
As detailed within 5.2.2 fire service access to within 18m of the dry riser inlet points is required. The figure
below highlights the fire service vehicle access route provided across the development. The access road has
been designed to accommodate an appliance with a minimum carrying capacity of 12.5 tonnes for a pumped
appliance.
5.4.1
Fire Service Access Route
The following sketch highlights vehicle access around the development. Three points of access have been
identified as part of the traffic management study, being:
Main access via Wandsworth High Street
Studio access via corner of Wandsworth Plain and Armoury Way
Secondary site access via Ram Street
Figure 12 Hydrant Provisions
Each hydrant should be clearly indicated by a plate, affixed in a highly visible location, in accordance with BS
3251: 1976.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
19
The typical access route specification for a pumped appliance is as follows:

Appliance
Type
Min. width
of road
between
kerbs (m)
Min.
width of
gateways
(m)
Min. turning
circle
between
kerbs (m)
Min. turning
circle
between
walls (m)
Min.
clearance
height (m)
Min.
carrying
capacity
(tonnes)
Pump
3.7
3.1
16.8
19.2
3.7
12.5
Table 14 Fire Appliance Access Requirements
5.5
Access to buildings for fire personnel Fire Fighting Shaft

Requirements
Access to buildings and the facilities provided within for fire service personnel are dependent upon height, area,
and ease of access.
The following apply in relation to the above criteria for this development:
There are buildings which exceed 18m in height to the top most floor that is occupied
The building has a basement which has two floors that each exceed 900m2 floor area.
With regards to the basement areas, the firefighting provisions need not include firefighting lifts, however one
fire-fighting lift has been provided to justify the alternative solution detailed within Section 5.6.2.
The following buildings will be provided with dedicated firefighting facilities:
Building
Height
Area
Building 2
18.2m
N/A
Building 3b North
23.55m
N/A
Building 3c North
23.55m
N/A
Building 3c South
23.55m
N/A
Building 10J
30.5m
N/A
Building 10K
27.35
N/A
Basement Level
<10m deep
Both basement levels exceed

2
900m
Table 15 Buildings requiring firefighting shafts
5.5.1
Residential Fire Fighting Shaft
A typical fire-fighting shaft arrangement is detailed below. The firefighting shaft includes for a firefighting
staircase measuring a minimum of 1100mm wide, firefighting lift, and a dry rising main.
Each firefighting shaft will be provided with a ventilated lobby or corridor. Section 4 of this report identifies the
corridor smoke ventilation solution adopted for each building.
Typically a 1.0m2 free area automatic opening vent at the head of the stair is provided. This shall open upon
activation of the automatic detection system provided within the residential common corridor areas. This allows
make up air to be drawn into the corridor, replacing any air and smoke extracted.
An alternative approach is detailed for Buildings 3B and 3C South in that automatic opening vents will be
provided on the faade of the stair (at high level serving each level) as an alternative design to the vent at the
head of the stair.
Figure 13 Fire Service Access Route

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
20
Additionally smoke ventilation is also provided within the common corridor area. This ensures occupants
escaping, and the fire service arriving to fight a fire, do so in relatively smoke free conditions within the corridor.
Figure 15 Basement Fire Fighting Shaft Configuration
*As the basement level doesn't exceed 10m in depth then the firefighting shafts do not require firefighting lifts
below ground level. However, as the firefighting lifts will be serving the upper levels it may not add to the overall
cost to extend them to basement levels as well since lift services will be required for everyday purposes.
Figure 14 Typical residential firefighting shaft arrangement
5.6.1
For all other residential buildings, as detailed within 5.2, with a top occupied floor not exceeding 18m, a dry
rising main should be provided within the residential stair. This will allow the fire service to access all areas of
the floor plate for firefighting operations.
Basement Level 01
The following strategy for fire service access is adopted at Basement 01 level. Further detail on the full
compartmentation requirements are provided in the fire compartmentation layouts prepared by the architect.
This section will provide detail on firefighting access, location of firefighting shafts at Basement 01 level, with
the location of the fire-fighting shafts determined upon overall fire hose lengths in this area, and being able to
reach all areas within a 60m hose length.
Where a fire fighting lift is provided to serve the upper floor levels due to the buildings height, it need not serve
the basement levels also, as there is no requirement within standard guidance to provide firefighting lifts to
basement areas that are not in excess of 10m deep.
The design of the firefighting shaft shall include:

Fire Fighting Stair(1100mm wide min)
5.6
Basement
Ventilated Lobby (Stair and lift should be accessed via the firefighting lobby) via a 1m 2 natural ventilation
shaft which shall serve the lobby protecting the firefighting stair
As the building has a two or more basements that exceed 900m 2 in area firefighting shafts are required which
need not be provided with firefighting lifts. The basement firefighting shaft will take a different configuration to
the residential design, and will follow a typical BS5588 Part 5 design. It should be noted that the stair should be
separated at ground floor level and discharge to external, prior to continuing to the upper floor levels.
Fire Fighting Lift*

Dry Falling Main
The number of Fire Fighting shafts has been ascertained following a review based on the 60m hose distance
length detailed above. Firefighting stairs with lobby approach are provided to the following locations at Basement Level 01:
The following figure highlights the typical arrangement adopted.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
21
5.6.2
Basement Level 02
At basement level 02 a single firefighting shaft is to be provided. Typically as the area exceeds 900m 2 a second
firefighting shaft would also be required. However a single firefighting shaft is proposed based upon the
following:
Fire Fighting Stair(1100mm wide min)
Ventilated Lobby (Stair and lift should be accessed via the firefighting lobby) via a 1m 2 natural ventilation
shaft which shall serve the lobby protecting the firefighting stair
Fire Fighting Lift*
Dry Falling Main
All areas at basement can be reached within 60m of the dry rising fire main
A firefighting lift for ease of access and movement through the building is to be provided
The basement area is permanently ventilated via a mechanical smoke extract system, limiting the impact of
smoke upon fire service personnel as they enter this area
The basement area is sprinkler protected, which is expected to limit the spread of fire, and contain it to a
single room at this level. This will also limit the temperature of the smoke within this area, and in tandem
with the smoke extract system limit the spread of smoke into the service corridor area.
The two additional protected stairs serving the basement are provided with a dry rising main. Additionally
each stair is provided with a ventilated lobby approach allowing the fire service to fall back into these areas
for egress if required. Whilst not a full firefighting shaft, the stairs provide a means for fire service personnel
to evacuate the building via alternative means if necessary.
The following sketch outlines fire service access and provisions at basement Level 02:
Figure 16 Basement Level 01 Fire Fighting Facilities
Figure 17 Fire Fighting Access Basement Level 02

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
22
5.7
Discharge of Basement Fire Fighting Lobby Smoke Vents
Typically the smoke shafts serving the basement lobby area rise vertically through the building, and discharge
at ground floor level to external air.
The outlet points from the basement smoke shafts are positioned such that:
Any smoke discharging is remote from the building exits located at ground floor level, and;
Access for the fire service will not be affected by smoke discharge
There a limited number of instances where the smoke shaft may incorporate a horizontal section prior to its
discharge to external (this is currently being developed and will be finalised at Stage E should it be determined
that a fully vertical smoke shaft cannot be incorporated into the building fabric). This is proposed for the
following basement firefighting lobbies:
Smoke shaft serving the lobby to the basement stair below Building 3C South
Smoke shaft serving the lobby to the basement stair below Building 3B North
Smoke shaft serving the lobby to the basement stair below Building 10K
The following sketches outline the proposed route of the lobby smoke shafts once they reach ground floor, prior
to discharging to external air. It is proposed at this stage to construct the shaft from fire rated ductwork, with the
ductwork rated to achieve 120 minutes fire resistance.
Figure 19 Smoke shaft discharge route for Fire Fighting stair 10K
It will be determined at Stage E whether any additional computational fluid dynamic (CFD) modelling will be
required to justify a horizontal smoke shaft in lieu of a vertically rising shaft typically adopted.
5.8
Secondary Power Supplies
A secondary power supply is required for essential fire safety measures, i.e:
emergency lighting and signage;
automatic fire detection and alarm system;
firefighting lifts,
basement smoke ventilation system (including basement car park system)
To reduce the risk of loss pf the electrical supply to this essential equipment a secondary power supply is
required. In some instance where the power demand from a system is considered to be low a secondary power
supply can be achieved by the use of back-up batteries.
Where demand is far greater a second independent electrical or similar supply is required. This may be in the
form of a supply from a secondary supply (however it is known that power supply companies have reservations
with offering a secondary supply to provide protection against fault from the high voltage distribution system.
Therefore generators are sometimes provided. Any secondary supply should be capable of providing power to
the above mentioned equipment with 15 seconds of the main supply failing.
Figure 18 Smoke shaft discharge route for Fire Fighting stair 10K
As detailed within BS9999:2005 for the case of residential buildings where regular maintenance of a generator
is unlikely or would not be expected, the power supplies to a fire fighting lift be provided via two separate
intakes into the building from the same external sub-station. Once into the building the cables shall take
separate diverse routes to the firefighting shaft equipment such that a fire in one location of the building does
not impact upon both supplies. Given this is a recognised British Standard solution for adopting alternative,
robust power supplies to life safety and firefighting operational equipment, it is proposed to adopt this approach
to all equipment requiring a secondary or alternative power supply. Therefore a standby generator will not be
provided for secondary power supplies to Phase 1 of the Ram Brewery project. This has been discussed and
agreed both with Building Control (MLM) and the Local Fire Service. One method for ensuring the supplies
remain separate would be to run the electrical cables inside and outside of the firefighting lift shaft, this would

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
23
effectively separate the supplies by 2 hour fire protection. Further detail on the exact configuration of supplies,
cabling, and routes through the building can be found within the WSP Electrical Services design.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
24
Report Applicability
6.1
General
Measures which fall outside the scope of the Building Regulations 2010, such as those for property protection
and business continuity have not been addressed within this report. Whilst many of the proposed life safety
features will have a property protection benefit, the insurers for the project should be consulted to determine
any additional requirements which they may propose for the project.
The report is intended for the sole use of Greenland Holding Group and the design team for the Phase 1 New
Building of The Ram Quarter development. The information contained herein will not be relied upon by any
third party and WSP UK will not accept any responsibility for matters arising as a result of third part use.Where
specific fire safety details are not discussed within this report, it should be assumed that the recommendations
ADB to the Building Regulations, and relevant British Standards should be followed.
6.2
Construction Design and Management Regulations
Projects undertaken within the UK are subject to the requirements of the Construction, Design and
Management Regulations (CDM), or within the European Union, that particular countries interpretation of the
European Union Directive.
This report defines the strategy for meeting the functional and performance requirements for fire safety in the
finished building. It is intended to form part of the submission for Building Regulations Part B approval. Where
any conclusions or recommendations have been arrived at which specify particular materials, products or forms
of construction these will have been assessed, in accordance with CDM Regulations 13. In the event that these
involve significant residual risks or health and safety critical assumptions, this information will be made
available to the planning supervisor. Where the architect or other consultants use the standard put forward in
this report to specify works, they are understood to be competent in alerting the Client, Planning Supervisor,
Contractors and Building Occupier of CDM issues.
6.3
Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (RR(FS)O)
Due to the introduction of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order (RRO), the onus on the building owner to
provide a safe working environment is paramount. The role of the fire service will be no longer to provide a
certificate confirming the building meets the legislative fire requirements and is deemed to be a safe working
environment.
The development of a detailed management strategy for fire safety issues will be required to show that the
owner of the building has a strategy in place to deal to cover the main areas of risk highlighted during the risk
assessment process. It will be the responsibility of the building owner, not the fire service to ensure the
management strategy is implemented within the building.
Separate to this report an employer is required to carry out a fire safety risk assessment of the occupied
building. The main objective of this assessment is to ensure that an adequate level of safety in respect to fire is
provided, or where it is not, identify the changes required and implement these changes.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
25
Conclusions and Recommendations
It is considered that the content of this report will allow the internal layouts to be fixed for the project. Any future
works to this strategy will be to add further justification to the solutions and strategy proposed for the
development.
The fire resistance requirements issued within the Stage C Concept Report still stand and have not changed
during design development. These layouts will be updated and included within the report once all finalisation
works to the architects layouts are complete, and the frozen final layouts have been issued. It is considered
minor amendments will be made based upon changes to the layouts however any changes will not affect or
change the fixed layouts.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 22/07/2015
26
Appendices

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 2015-06-10T00:00:00
Appendix A Residential Corridor Ventilation

General
Refer to Section 4.4 for further detail on the common corridor smoke ventilation requirements, and also the
latest architectural layouts for the buildings which highlight the location of common corridor smoke shafts, and
the location of any automatic opening vents provided on the external faade of the building or at the head of
the escape stairs.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 2015-06-10T00:00:00
Appendix B Residential Sprinkler System

Guidance Note: Engineering Fire Safety
Introduction
Design Implications
The following informtaiton is to provide an introduction into the standard and design recommendations for
residential sprinklers. This information is purely advisory and relates only to generic applications of residential
sprinklers. Given the number of factors which influence the level of fire safety in residential buildings it would
be unfeasible to establish the best design solution for every instance.
The following architectural and cost implications for residential sprinklers should be considered by the design
team:
Sprinklers provision sprinklers need only be provided within the individual flats; they may not be required
in the common areas such as stairs, corridors or landings or any of the following:
a) Bathrooms with floor area less than 5m 2.
Standard Guidance
The current version of Approved Document B recommends the provision of sprinklers in new residential
buildings over 30m in height. Measurement of the building height (for the purposes of sprinkler requirement) is
outlined below:
b) Common areas such as stairs, corridors or landings.

c) Cupboards with areas less than 2m2.
Floor-floor height this may need to increase with the additional services within the ceiling voids, which
may affect planning approval. Increases in void space may be up to 100 mm per level.
Cost usually averages to approximately 1000-2000 per apartment.
Aesthetics it is possible to conceal the sprinklers using a flat plate.
Alternatively, the sprinkler head can be exposed either with a flush sprinkler pendant, or a dropped sprinkler
pendant.
The building height, excluding any plant room areas, is normally measured from the ground floor on the lowest
side of the building, to the upper floor surface of the highest floor.
Legislative Requirements
Water supply systems should be designed in accordance with BS 9251. The following summarises the key
design recommendations for a residential sprinkler system to BS 9251:
Provide 60 l/min through a single head or 42 l/min for each sprinkler head likely to operate (based on a
maximum of 4 sprinkler heads per room).
Maintain pressure for achieving the above flow rates for a minimum of 30 minutes.
The system should be connected to one of the following:
Mains water supply;
Pressure tank or vessel;
Automatic fire pump drawing from a storage water facility;
Automatic fire pump drawing from a mains water supply or an elevated storage cistern;
Gravity fed stored water system.

Dated: 01/12/2014
Revised: 2015-06-10T00:00:00
Advantages
Some of the main benefits of providing residential sprinklers (combined with enhanced detection) within
buildings include:
Open plan flat layout open plan layouts of the residential units can sometimes be permitted when
sprinklers are used as a trade-off.
Duplex units with a single means of escape and an open stair can sometimes be approved.
Increased travel distances within the common corridors can sometimes be approved. BS 9991 allows this
up to 15m (dead end) but further extensions can sometimes be made, particularly when mechanical some
extract is used.
Improved life safety to the occupants and property protection for the building.
NOTE: only sprinklers within the room of fire origin are likely to operate and property damage from a fire may
be reduced by up to 80% when compared to an apartment without sprinklers.
All of the above advantages are based on experience and would require discussion with the Statutory
Authorities when being applied to a development under design.
WSP UK Limited
Tel: +44 (0)11 3395 6279
Fax: +44 (0)11 3395 6201
www.wspgroup.co.uk

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RAM PHASE 1 FIRE STRATEGY

Ram Phase 1 Fire Strategy

Draft for comment

Greenland Holding Group

Callum Dyer / Alex

Project number: 70002677

Development Description ...................................................... 5

Means of Warning and Escape.............................................. 6

Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................26

Appendix B Residential Sprinkler System .....................................29

Access and Facilities for Fire Fighting ................................. 18

Project number: 70002677

Appendix A Residential Corridor Ventilation..................................28

Fire Engineering Assessment Process

The objectives of this report are to:

Figure 1 Basic Fire Safety Engineering Process (Figure 2 of BS7974:2001)

Project number: 70002677

Building 10H North

Building 10H South

Figure 2: Building Reference Plan

Project number: 70002677

Means of Warning and Escape

The evacuation strategy to be adopted across Phase 1 will be:

Single direction of travel (m)

More than one

Loading Bay Area

9 (inside the apartment)

Single Storey Apartments

Designed in accordance with BS 5839: Part 6[

Open Plan Duplex

A3 type retail units

Table 3 Recommended Travel Distance Limits

Designed in accordance with BS 5839: Part 6

Designed in accordance with BS 5839: Part 1

Designed in accordance with BS 5839: Part 1

Project number: 70002677

Apartment Protected Entrance Hall Layouts Extended Travel Distance

Worst Case Escape Distance (m) in Protected Entrance Hall

Building 10H North

Residential corridors Extended Travel Distances

Table 4 Protected Entrance Hall Travel Distances

Automatic detection and alarm as per Table 2.

Open Plan Duplex Apartments

Building 10H North

Fire Engineering Justification Required?

Table 5 Residential Corridors Travel Distances

Project number: 70002677

Worst Case Escape Distance (m)

3.3.1.4.1 CFD Principles

3.3.1.4.4 Fire Scenario

1. Means of Escape Phase

Carry out CFD analysis of a design satisfying the recommendations of AD-B.

3.3.1.4.3 Acceptance Criteria

Heat Release Rate (kW)

Project number: 70002677

Figure 3 Fire Scenario during Escape Phase

Horizontal Means of Escape

Heat Release Rate (kW)

Exit width available after

All solid boundaries are treated as inert obstacles.

No external wind conditions are considered.

Figure 4 Fire Scenario during Firefighting Phase

3.3.1.4.5 Other Assumptions