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Aristotle, The Politics vol. 1 [320 BC]

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Online Library of Liberty: The Politics vol. 1

Edition Used:
The Politics of Aristotle, trans. into English with introduction, marginal analysis,
essays, notes and indices by B. Jowett. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1885. 2 vols. Vol. 1.

Author: Aristotle
Translator: Benjamin Jowett

About This Title:


Volume 1 of Benjamin Jowett’s translation of one of Aristotle’s most influential
writings. The editor provides detailed marginal annotations and lengthy introductions
to each book.

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About Liberty Fund:


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Copyright Information:
The text is in the public domain.

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Table Of Contents
Preface.
Note.
Introduction.
The Politics.
Book I.
Book II.
Book III.
Book IV.
Book V.
Book VI.
Book VII.
Book VIII.

to the REV. WILLIAM ROGERS, RECTOR OF BISHOPSGATE, who by the


kindness of his heart, and the force of his character, has given a new life to education
in the city of london, this work is affectionately inscribed.

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PREFACE.
The translation of the Politics which is now given to the public was commenced about
fifteen years since, with the intention of illustrating the Laws of Plato. A rough draft
was made by the translator, which he had the advantage of reading over with Mr.
Alfred Robinson, of New College. But finding the work more difficult than he had
anticipated, he determined to begin again and rewrite the whole. He was insensibly
led on to the preparation of a commentary and an analysis. Other subjects of a more
general character, which arose out of the study of Aristotle’s Politics, naturally took
the form of essays1 . These will be published shortly and will complete Vol. II. The
translation was printed more than two years ago, and before the appearance of Mr.
Welldon’s excellent book. The editor has availed himself of the opportunity which the
delay afforded to add in the Notes his second thoughts on some doubtful passages.

He has to acknowledge the great assistance which he has received from several
friends, especially from Mr. David Ritchie in the composition of the Notes, and from
Mr. Evelyn Abbott in the criticism of them. He has also to express his gratitude to his
friend and secretary, Mr. Matthew Knight, for the excellent Indices he has prepared
both of the Text and Notes, and for many valuable suggestions which occur in
different parts of the book. He wishes that Mr. Knight could be induced to bestow on
some work of his own the knowledge and thought which he devotes to the writings of
another.

The Editor has to apologize for a delay in the fulfilment of his task, which has arisen
necessarily out of the pressure of other avocations. He had hoped that his work would
have been completed some years ago. An author generally finds that his literary
undertakings exceed the measure of time which he has assigned to them; they grow
under his hand; the years which he has spent upon them quickly pass, and at last he
too often fails of satisfying either himself or the public. When he has nearly finished,
if ever, he feels that he is beginning to have a greater command of his subject; but he
is obliged to make an end. He may perhaps claim to know better than any one else the
deficiencies of his own performance; but he knows also that he cannot expect to be
heard if he attempts to excuse them.

It is a ‘regrettable accident’ that this book will probably appear about the same time
with another edition of the Politics of Aristotle, also to be published at the Clarendon
Press, the long expected work of an old friend and pupil, Mr. Newman, Fellow and
formerly Tutor of Balliol College, which would not have been delayed until now, if
the ‘bridle of Theages’ (Plato, Rep. vi. 496 b) had not retarded the progress of the
author. Those who remember the enthusiasm which was aroused by his brilliant
lectures on this and other subjects a quarter of a century ago will take a great interest
in the result of his labours. I gladly welcome the ?ψίγονον τέκος and offer hearty
wishes for the success of the work.

The editor of a Greek or Latin classic generally owes a large debt to his predecessors.
In some one of them he will probably find the collation of the text ready to his hand,

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or at least carried to such an extent that to pursue the enquiry further would lead to no
adequate result. The difficult passages have already been translated by them many
times over, and the use of words and idioms has been minutely analyzed by them.
There are innumerable parallels and illustrations, relevant and also irrelevant, which
have been collected by their industry. The new Editor freely appropriates the
materials which they have accumulated; nor can he greatly add to them. He is no
longer the pioneer; he enters into the labours of others, and is responsible for the use
which he makes of them. The field in which he has to work is limited; the least of the
kingdoms into which physical science is subdivided is greater and more extended. It is
an ancient branch of knowledge on which he is employed; a mine out of which, with
care, some good pieces of ore may still be extracted, but which does not yield the
same rich profits as formerly. And he is in danger of finding that ‘what is new is not
true, and that what is true is not new.’ He knows how often conjectures which cannot
be disproved have taken the place of real knowledge. He can only hope that the
constant study of his author, the interpretation of him from his own writings, the
dismissal of all prejudices and preconceptions may throw some fresh light upon the
page. It will not always be easy for him to determine what he has thought out for
himself and what he has derived from others, and still less to distinguish what in
former editors is their own and what they in turn have derived from their
predecessors. No one who has spent many years in the study of an author can
remember whether a thought occurred to him spontaneously or was suggested by the
remark of another. There is therefore the more reason that he should make his
acknowledgments to those who have preceded him.

The writer of these volumes is under great obligations to Schlosser, whose good sense
and manly criticism are of great value in the interpretation of the Politics; he is also
much indebted to Schneider, who is a sound scholar and a distinguished critic both of
Aristotle and Plato; as well as to A. Stahr and Bernays who have made accurate and
finished translations, Stahr of the whole work, Bernays of the three first books; above
all to the learning of Susemihl, who is not only the author of a new translation, but has
also made a fuller collection of all the materials necessary either for the study of the
text or the illustration of the subject than any previous editor; lastly to Immanuel
Bekker, the father of modern textual criticism, who has not left much to be improved
in the text of Aristotle. The commentary of Goettling has likewise a good deal of
merit. I am indebted for a few references to Mr. Eaton’s edition of the Politics, and to
Mr. Congreve for several excellent English expressions, and still more for his full and
valuable indices.

The editor, like many of his predecessors, has been led to the conclusion that the
Politics of Aristotle exist only in a questionable and imperfect shape. He cannot say
that the work is well arranged or free from confusion of thought or irregularities of
style and language. To assume a perfection or completeness which does not exist
would contradict facts which are obvious on the surface. The worst kind of inaccuracy
is pretended accuracy. No progress can be made in the study of Aristotle by an art of
interpretation which aims only at reconciling an author with himself. Neither is there
any use in seeking to reconstruct the Politics in another form; no analysis of them will
enable us to arrive at the secret of their composition. We cannot rehabilitate them by a
transposition of sentences, or by a change in the order of the books; we must take

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them as they are. Real uncertainties are better than imaginary certainties. Yet the
uncertainty in this instance is one of which the human mind is peculiarly impatient.
For amid so much repetition and confusion great truths are constantly appearing
which reflect the mind of the master. But to separate these by any precise line, to say
‘here are the genuine words of Aristotle,’ ‘this the later addition,’ is beyond the art of
the critic. The student of Aristotle will do better to fix his mind on the thoughts which
have had so vast an influence, and have so greatly contributed to the progress of
mankind, and not to enquire too curiously into the form of the writing which contains
them.

Balliol College, Oxford:

Sept. 8, 1885.

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NOTE.
The text of the Politics from which the Translation has been made, and to which the
Notes refer, is that of Bekker’s First Edition. The variations from this Text are
indicated at the foot of the page in the Translation.

An Essay on the Text will be found in the Second Part of the Second Volume
hereafter to be published.

ERRATA IN TRANSLATION
Mentioned In The Notes.
Page 77 (iii. 5, § 9), for ‘to deceive the inhabitants’ read ‘that the privileged
class may deceive their fellow citizens’
Page 141 (iii. 15, § 6), for ‘A king must legislate’ read ‘There must be a
legislator, whether you call him king or not’
Page 149 (v. 3, § 7) for ‘having been cut to pieces’ read ‘after their army had
been cut to pieces’
Ib. (ib. § 9) for ‘Oreum’ read ‘Oreus’

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INTRODUCTION.
The writings of Aristotle are almost entirely wanting in the charm of style, and several
of them cannot even be said to have the merit of clearness. In the Politics we are often
unable to follow the drift of the argument; the frequent digressions and conflicting
points of view which arise are troublesome and perplexing to us. We do not
understand why the writer should again and again have repeated himself; why he
should have made promises which he never fulfills; why he should be always
referring to what has preceded, or to what follows. He sometimes crosses over from
his own line of argument to that of his opponent; and then returns again without
indicating that he has made a change of front. There are words and clauses which
seem to be out of place; or at any rate not to be duly subordinated to the rest of the
passage. No other work of genius is so irregular in structure as some of the
Aristotelian writings. And yet this defect of form has not prevented their exercising
the greatest influence on philosophy and literature; the half-understood words of
Aristotle have become laws of thought to other ages.

With the causes of these peculiarities we are not at present concerned. The style of
Aristotle runs up into the more general question of the manner in which his writings
were compiled or have been transmitted to us. Are they the work of one or of many?
Do they proceed from the hand or mind of a single writer, or are they the
accumulations of the Peripatetic school? This is a question, like the controversy about
the Homeric poems, which cannot be precisely answered. The original form of some
of the Aristotelian writings will never be restored. We can hardly tell how or where
they came into existence: how much is to be attributed to Aristotle, how much to his
editors or followers,—whether his first followers, such as Eudemus, or later editors,
such as the Alexandrians, or Andronicus of Rhodes, or Tyrannion, the friend of
Cicero. We cannot by the transposition of sentences make them clearer, nor by verbal
conjecture remove small flaws in the reasoning, or inconsistencies in the use of
words. The best manuscripts of the Ethics and Politics, though not of first-rate
authority, are not much worse than the primary manuscripts of other Greek authors.
The disease, if it is to be so regarded, lies deeper, and enters into the constitution of
the work. The existing form of the Aristotelian writings is at least as old as the first or
second century b. c.; it is in the main the Aristotle of Cicero, though he was also
acquainted with other works passing under the name of Aristotle, such as the
Dialogues, which are preserved to us only in fragments. If we go back in thought from
that date to the time when they were first written down by the hand of Aristotle, or at
which they passed from being a tradition of the school into a roll or book, we are
unable to say in what manner or out of what elements, written or oral, they grew up or
were compiled. We only know that several of them are unlike any other Greek book
which has come down to us from antiquity. The long list of works attributed to
Aristotle in the Catalogues also shows that the Aristotelian literature in the
Alexandrian age was of an indefinite character, and admitted of being added to and
altered.

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But although we cannot rehabilitate or restore to their original state the Politics or the
Nicomachean Ethics or the Metaphysics, we may throw them into a form which will
make them easier and more intelligible to the modern reader. We may 1) present the
argument stripped of digressions and additions; 2) we may bring out the important
and throw into the background the unimportant points; 3) we may distinguish the two
sides of the discussion, where they are not distinguished by the author; 4) we may
supply missing links, and omit clumsy insertions; 5) we may take the general meaning
without insisting too minutely on the connection. We cannot presume to say how
Aristotle should or might have written; nor can we dream of reconstructing an original
text which probably had no existence. But we may leave out the interlineations; we
may make a difficult book easier; we may give the impression of the whole in a
smaller compass. We may be allowed, without violating any principle of criticism, to
imagine how Aristotle would have rewritten or rearranged his subject, had our
modern copies of the Politics fallen into his hands.

Many things become clearer to us when we are familiar with them. A sense of unity
and power will often arise in the mind after long study of a writing which at first
seemed poor and disappointing. Through the distinctions and other mannerisms of his
school, the original thinker shines forth to any one who is capable of recognising him.
Great ideas or forms of thought indicate a mind superior in power to the average
understanding of the commentator or interpreter. We cannot be sure that any single
sentence of the Politics proceeded from the pen of Aristotle, but this is no reason for
doubting the genuineness of his works, if we take the term in a somewhat wider sense;
for they all bear the impress of his personality. That which distinguishes him from
Plato and the Neo-Platonists, from Isocrates and the rhetoricians, from the Stoics and
Epicureans, from all Scholiasts and Commentators, is not the less certain because his
writings have come down to us in a somewhat questionable shape. Even if they are
the traditions of a school, the mind of the founder is reflected in them. The aim of the
interpreter should be to simplify, to disentangle, to find the thought in the imperfect
expression of it; as far as possible, to separate the earlier from the later elements, the
true from the false Aristotle. The last, however, is a work of great nicety, in which we
can only proceed on grounds of internal evidence and therefore cannot hope to attain
any precise result. There may be said to be a petitio principii even in making the
attempt, for we can only judge of the genuine Aristotle from writings of which the
genuineness is assumed.

Any mere translation of Aristotle’s Politics will be, in many passages, necessarily
obscure, because the connexion of ideas is not adequately represented by the sequence
of words. If it were possible to present the course of thought in a perfectly smooth and
continuous form, such an attempt would be too great a departure from the Greek. It is
hoped that the Analysis or short paraphrase which follows may assist the student in
grasping the general meaning before he enters on a minute study of the text; and that
the reflections which are interspersed may enable him to read Aristotle in the light of
recent criticism and history, and to take a modern interest in it, without confusing the
ancient and modern worlds of thought. (Compare, in vol. ii, Essays on the Style of
Aristotle, and on the Structure of certain of the Aristotelian writings.)

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BOOK I.
A criticism on Plato,—the origin of the household, village, state,—the nature of
property and more especially of property in slaves,—the art of household
management, and its relation to the art of money-making,—literature of the
subject,—some further questions concerning the relations of master and slave,
husband and wife, parent and child.

The great charm of the writings of Plato and Aristotle is that they are original. They
contain the first thoughts of men respecting problems which will always continue to
interest them. Their thoughts have become a part of our thoughts, and enter
imperceptibly into the speculations of modern writers on the same subjects, but with a
difference. The Ionian and Eleatic philosophers who preceded them were eclipsed in
the brightness of their successors; they had not yet reached the stage of ethics or
politics, and were little known to the ancients themselves. The ethical teaching of
Socrates has been preserved and not been preserved; that is to say, it does not exist in
any definite form or system. To us, therefore, Plato and Aristotle are the beginnings of
philosophy. In reading them the reflection is often forced upon us: ‘How little have
we added except what has been gained by a greater experience of history!’ Some
things have come down to us with

‘Better opinion, better confirmation:’

they have acquired authority from age and use. But there are other truths of ancient
political philosophy which we have forgotten, or which have degenerated into
truisms. Like the memories of childhood they are easily revived, and there is no form
in which they so naturally come back to us as that in which they were first presented
to mankind.

For example, during the last century enlightened philosophers have been fond of
repeating that the state is only a machine for the protection of life and property. But
the ancients taught a nobler lesson, that ethics and politics are inseparable; that we
must not do evil in order to gain power; and that the justice of the state and the justice
of the individual are the same. The older lesson has survived; the newer is seen to
have only a partial and relative truth. So for the liberty, equality, and fraternity of the
French revolution we are beginning to substitute the idea of law and order; we
acknowledge that the best form of government is that which is most permanent, and
that the freedom of the individual when carried to an extreme is suicidal. But these are
truths which may be found in Aristotle’s Politics. Thus to the old we revert for some
of our latest political lessons. The idealism of Plato is always returning upon us, as a
dream of the future; the Politics of Aristotle continue to have a practical relation to
our own times.

But while we are struck with the general similarity, we are almost equally struck by
the different mode in which the thoughts of ancient and modern times are expressed.
To go no further than the first book of the Politics, the method of Aristotle in his
enquiry into the origin of the state is analytical rather than historical; that is to say, he
builds up the state out of its elements, but does not enquire what history or pre-

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historic monuments tell about primitive man. He is very much under the influence of
logical forms, such as means and ends, final causes, categories of quantity and
quality, the antithesis of custom and nature, and other verbal oppositions, which not
only express, but also dominate his meaning. The antagonism to Plato is constantly
reappearing, and may be traced where the name of Plato is not mentioned; the rivalry
of the two schools never dies out. The sciences are not yet accurately divided; and
hence some questions, which present no difficulty to us, such as the relation of the art
of household management to the art of money-making, are discussed at great length,
and after all not clearly explained. Some good guesses are made about the nature of
money, and some obvious fallacies remain undetected. The lending of money at a fair
rate of interest is not distinguished from the usury which is so severely condemned.
The universal custom of slavery presents a difficulty which Aristotle is unable to
resolve on any clear or consistent principle. The tendency to pass from the absolute to
the relative, or from a wider to a narrower point of view, as in the discussion
respecting the slave and the artizan, the good citizen and the good man, the art of
money-making, the perfect state,—is another element of confusion. The connection is
often tortuous and unnatural. It would seem as if notes had been parenthetically
inserted in the rough draft of the argument; and here and there considerable
dislocations of the text may be suspected. There are favourite topics to which
Aristotle is always returning; such, for example, as the Lacedaemonian constitution,
which, like the constitution of Great Britain or of the United States, was a powerful
idea, and exercised a great influence on the speculations of philosophers, as well as on
the laws and customs of cities and peoples.

In the Politics as well as in Aristotle’s other works, there are many indications that he
was writing in an age of controversy, and surrounded by a voluminous literature. Had
all the books which were written come down to us they would not have been scanned
with the same minuteness, and they might perhaps have been studied in a larger and
more liberal spirit. The excessive value set upon a small portion of them, and the
fragmentary form in which they have been preserved, has given an extraordinary
stimulus to the art of interpretation and criticism. Had there been more of them we
should have seen them in truer proportions. We should not have spent so much time in
deciphering them, and possibly they might not have exerted an equal influence over
us. For the study of the classics has become inseparable from the critical method,
which enters so largely into the mind of the nineteenth century. But this is a part of a
great subject, which it would be out of place here to discuss further.

Every community aims at some good, and the state, which is the highest community,
at the highest good. But of communities there are many kinds. And they who [like
Plato and Xenophon] suppose that the king and householder differ only in the number
of their subjects, or that a statesman is only a king taking his turn of rule, are
mistaken. The difference is one of kind and not of degree, as we shall more clearly
see, if, following our accustomed method, we resolve the whole into its parts or
elements. For in order to understand the nature of things, we must inquire into their
origin.

Now the state is founded upon two relations; 1) that of male and female; 2) that of
master and servant; the first necessary for the continuance of the race; the second for

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the preservation of the inferior class or of both classes. From these two relations there
arises, in the first place, the household, intended by nature for the supply of men’s
daily wants; secondly, the village, which is an aggregate of households; and finally,
the state. The parent or elder was the king of the family, and so when families were
combined in the village, the patriarchal or kingly form of government continued. The
village was a larger family. When several villages were united, the state came into
existence. Like the family or household, it originated in necessity, but went beyond
them and was the end and fulfilment of them. For nature makes nothing in vain; and
to man alone among the animals she has given the faculty of speech, that he may
discourse with his fellows of the expedient and the just; and these are the ideas which
lie at the basis of the state. In the order of time, the state is later than the family or the
individual, but in the order of nature, prior to them; for the whole is prior to the part.
As there could be no foot or hand without the body, so there could be no family or
man, in the proper sense of the words, without the state. For when separated from his
fellows, man is no longer man; he is either a god or a beast. There is a social instinct
in all of us, but it requires to be developed; and he who by the help of this instinct
organized the state, was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected by law
and justice, is the best,—when estranged from them, the worst of animals.

But before we enquire into the state, we must enquire into the household. In a
complete household there are three relations:— 1) that of the master to the slave; 2) of
the husband to the wife; 3) of the parent to the child:—What is and ought to be the
character of each of these? There is also another element which we shall have to
consider, the art of money-making, which is sometimes identified with household
management. [But this is an error.]

Concerning the relation of master and slave, two views are entertained: 1) there is the
doctrine [of Plato] that the rule of a master is a science [and therefore natural]; and
that all kinds of rule are essentially the same: and there is the other doctrine, 2) that
slavery is contrary to nature; and that the distinction between freemen and slaves is
made by law only and not by nature, and is therefore unjust. [Before determining the
questions which thus arise we must enquire into the nature of the slave.]

The art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing a household, and like
other arts requires instruments; property is a collection of such instruments, living or
lifeless. The slave is a living instrument, and the lifeless instruments are used by him;
he is the first of a series. He is an instrument of action, not of production, for he does
not produce; he only lives and serves his master, and life is action. But he is also a
possession [and therefore the agent of another]; for he is intended by nature to belong
to his master, though separable from him. He may be defined, ‘a human being who is
a possession and likewise an instrument of action.’

But is there a slave by nature? There is: from the hour of their birth some are intended
to command, others to obey; they work together, and the better the workman, the
better the work. A ruling principle runs through the whole of nature and is discernible
even in things without life, for example, in musical harmony. And in man there is a
despotic rule which the soul exercises over the body, and a constitutional rule which
the intellect exercises over the appetites. The higher principle has dominion whenever

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the soul and body are in their best state; the intention of nature is then fulfilled. The
male rules and the female is ruled, for the good of both; and animals subjugated by
man are better and better off than wild ones. For this rule of the superior by nature is
the preservation of the subject or inferior. And the same principle applies to slaves,
but there is a difference: for the animal is only guided by instinct, whereas the slave,
though he does not partake of reason, can apprehend reason. Where, then, one class of
men presents a marked inferiority to another, there slavery is justified. And nature
probably intended to make a visible distinction between freeman and slave, but she
has not always succeeded, for some slaves have the souls or bodies of freemen, and
some freemen the souls or bodies of slaves.

On the other hand it has been argued that there is a slave by law as well as by nature.
But this doctrine is indignantly denied by many jurists, who contend that to make the
captive taken in war the slave of the victor is an act of great injustice. The question
runs up into the wider question: ‘What is justice?’ Some say that virtue when
furnished with external goods is power, and that justice is only the rule of a superior;
while others distinguish between justice and virtue, and assert justice to be
benevolence. If these two propositions are simply opposed, the result is an absurdity.
For the truth of a third proposition [which combines them], viz. that the benevolent
rule of a superior in virtue is just, can hardly be contested. Others again appeal to
custom, which they identify with justice; but this is a view which cannot be
consistently maintained. For a war which is justified by custom may nevertheless be
an unjust war, or the person enslaved may be unworthy to be made a slave. ‘Hellenes
never can be slaves;’ they are noble everywhere, even when taken in war; but the
barbarians are noble only in their own country. Does not this use of language clearly
imply that there are two classes of men, the slave by nature, and the freeman by
nature? And where there is a marked superiority in one class and a marked inferiority
in another, there the relation of master and slave springs up; and this relation, when
arising naturally and not resting merely on law and force, is a kindly and beneficent
one. [In slavery then the rule of the superior is combined with benevolence; and
therefore on both grounds it is justice.]

The question respecting the different kinds of rule on which we touched before is now
set at rest. The master has been shown to exercise an absolute rule over his slaves,
unlike the constitutional rule which the statesman exercises over his fellow-citizens.
And master and slave receive their name, not from any science or art which is
possessed by either of them [as Plato imagined], but because they are of a certain
character. (There might indeed be a science of another sort, which would teach the
master how to give his orders and the slave how to execute them; this science would
include cookery and other menial arts. And there might also be a science or art of
slave-hunting, which would be a kind of war.—But enough of this subject.)

In the opening of the Politics there are many indications of the strife of opinion and
uncertainty of language which prevailed in the time of Aristotle. In the first page the
writer strikes a note of hostility against Plato, which is repeated at intervals
throughout the treatise. Yet the views of Aristotle and Plato respecting the kinds or
degrees of governments are not essentially different; the opposition between them was
exaggerated, if not invented, by their respective followers. From this almost verbal

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controversy, he passes on to consider the intentions of nature in the creation of


society. But the word nature was ambiguous in ancient no less than in modern times,
and was variously used to signify 1) the undeveloped or inchoate, 2) the final or
perfect nature. The state and the family are both said to exist by nature; but the state in
a higher sense than the family. . . . The distinction between men and animals is seen to
be the gift of language by which the sphere of human nature is enlarged and rendered
capable of good and evil. This distinction is here limited by Aristotle to that part of
language which is concerned with our moral ideas. We should rather say that through
language man attains to the expression of general and universal conceptions not only
in morals, but in all things (cp. Met. 1. 6. § 2). The true method of enquiry, according
to Aristotle, is the analysis of the whole into its parts; but he does not see that the
whole is more than the sum of the parts, and that the parts are changed by their
relation to one another. As well might we suppose that we could analyse life into the
chemical elements which are the conditions of life, or detect the mind in the nerves
which are its instruments, as imagine that the state was only a compound of families
and villages.

Yet there is likewise in Aristotle’s Politics a consciousness that the whole is prior to
the parts, and that the synthetical method must be combined with the analytical.
Though imperfectly expressed, the perfect image of the state in which ‘every means is
an end, and the end the sum of the means,’ is already present to his mind. The two
aspects of the truth are placed side by side, but they are not yet harmonised or brought
into relation with one another. Aristotle is thought to have been the first who based
knowledge on experience, but ever and anon the ideal or poetical image which was
always latent in Greek philosophy, though clothed in an unpoetical dress, and reduced
to a skeleton, returns upon him. It would have been a surprise to himself, and still
more to his school, if he could have recognised how nearly he approached in reality to
some of those conceptions on which he was making war. For example, when he
speaks of a whole prior to the parts, what does this mean but the idea of the state prior
to the existence of it in fact? The conception of the perfect man whose single virtue
exceeds that of all other men put together, and who therefore has a natural right to
rule, is even more extravagant than the rule of philosophers in the Republic of Plato.

The ‘accustomed’ method of dividing the whole into its parts is logical rather than
historical: that is to say, they are the parts into which it can be dissected, not the
elements out of which it has grown. ‘It is like the carving of some noble victim,
according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part, as a bad
carver might.’ (Phaedrus, 265 E.) But it is not the historical method which resolves
institutions and facts into their antecedent elements. Aristotle does not investigate the
origins of states, but only divides a genus into species or a larger whole or form into
the lesser parts or unities of which it is made up, or shows how an existing state may
be preserved or destroyed. We must not expect him to give an analysis of primitive
society, such as would be found in a modern writer on anthropology. His observation
and experience were almost confined to Hellas. The earliest forms of property and
society were unknown to him. He does not appear to have heard of ‘marriage by
capture,’ and does not distinguish ‘endogamy’ and ‘exogamy.’ The horror naturalis,
which forbids marriage within near degrees of relationship, was to him an established
fact. He seems to have supposed that there existed from the first some rude form of

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the family, like that of the Homeric Cyclops, in which the individual savage gave the
law to his own household. But he does not examine how this lowest form of human
society passed into the village and the village into the state. Nor does he seriously
attempt to gather the ancient customs of Hellas from the usages of the contemporary
barbarians, although he occasionally lights upon this path of enquiry, which had been
already indicated both by Thucydides and Plato. Nor does it occur to him that the ties
of family or caste may be so strong, that the growth of the state is stunted by them;
nor, on the other hand, that the life of cities may be so intense as to make any larger
political unity impossible.

He tries to distinguish between instruments of production and action, and almost in


successive sentences he implies that the slave is and is not both. There is a similar
confusion in the opposition which he attempts to make between the artisan and the
slave. Nor is the distinction between the slave who can only apprehend reason and the
freeman who partakes of reason anything more than a verbal quibble. Both partake of
reason in different degrees. He argues, again, that the slave being a possession and
belonging to another is necessarily the minister of action. But the notion that a
possession is a minister of action rather than of production is a fancy of his own; and
he appears to forget at the moment that the artisan, who, if any one, may be termed a
minister of production, was often a slave. Here, as in c. 13, he is contrasting the slave
and the artisan on the ground that the true slave, not the artisan, derives an inspiration
from his master. Such confusions we must admit to have existed in the mind of
Aristotle, if we would attain any degree of clearness in the interpretation of his
writings.

Respecting slavery, Aristotle arrives at a definite conclusion which, though


unsatisfactory to us, satisfies himself. But he has not clearly separated his own view
from that of his opponents. His conclusion is that slavery is right when intended by
nature; and the manifest inferiority of certain races is regarded by him as the proof
that nature intended them to be slaves. But the captive taken in war, unless he were of
inferior race, was only accidentally a slave. The slavery of Barbarian to Greek was
natural; the slavery of Greek to Greek was arbitrary and cruel. He implies, though his
meaning is obscurely expressed, that the two opposite views, ‘justice is benevolence,’
‘justice is the rule of a superior,’ must be combined.

We are interested to remark that in the age of Aristotle there were some Greeks who
would have maintained that slave-hunting was a lawful employment, and that there
were also anti-slavery philosophers or sophists in the days before the Stoics, who
asserted freedom to be the birthright of all mankind. Either of these extreme views
was repudiated by him; his sense of justice revolted from the former, and he probably
regarded the latter as too much at variance with the actual condition of the world.
How could the 400,000 Athenian slaves ever be emancipated? How could the Greek
enjoy cultivated leisure, which was a necessity to him, when deprived of them? How
could the barbarians of Illyria and Scythia be transformed into civilized beings? (‘If at
all,’ he would perhaps have replied, ‘by subjection to the superior reason of an
Hellenic master.’) The question which has been asked in modern times, whether
society could exist without domestic service?—may illustrate the manner in which a
moderate thinker of the school of Aristotle would have regarded the existence of

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slavery in ancient Hellas. The difficulties which existed in the management of slaves
at Lacedaemon were sufficient to show that they were a dangerous element in the
state, a ‘troublesome sort of cattle,’ as Plato calls them. It is however remarkable that
neither at Athens nor at Corinth, notwithstanding their enormous numbers and their
constant employment in naval and other warfare, do we find any attempt at organised
revolt among them, nor does any mention occur of their ill-treatment by the state. It
may be further noted that Aristotle, in the Seventh Book, proposes the emancipation
of individual slaves as the reward of good conduct—the door of hope was never to be
closed—this is a first principle to be always observed in the management of them.
The attempt to open a career to slaves, whether practicable or not, is in advance of
most modern countries in which slavery is or has been maintained, and may be
compared with the principle upheld, not by the primitive, but by the mediaeval
church, which led to the emancipation of the serfs. [See note in loco and Essay on
Aristotle as a Political Philosopher.]

Having discussed the relation of master and slave, we will now proceed to the other
question: How is the art of money-making related to household management? Is it the
same with it, or a part of it, or subordinate to it? Clearly subordinate, because
instrumental; and not the same; for household management uses the material which
the art of money-making provides. How then are they to be distinguished? We reply
that the acquisition of food is natural to man, and that when limited to natural needs
this art of acquisition is a part of household management, which takes many forms;
for nature has given many sorts of plants and animals for the use of man; and the
differences, both in men and animals, are dependent on their food. Hence arise many
employments which may be pursued either to a limited or to an unlimited extent.
There are shepherds, husbandmen, fishermen, hunters, and the like. When limited
these employments are natural and necessary; for the master of the household must
store up the means of life, if they do not exist already. But when unlimited they are
bad, and should not be included in household management, which, like the arts, has a
natural limit.

The other sort of acquisition is the art of making money, or retail trade, which does
not exist in the household but grows up with the increase of the community. Now all
things have two uses, the one proper, the other improper; in other words, they may be
either used or exchanged. Retail trade is the improper use of them for the sake of
exchange only, and is not natural because it goes beyond the wants of nature and
therefore has no place in the household. It grew out of simple barter, and was innocent
enough until coin was invented. After the invention of coin it developed into money-
making, and riches have been identified with a hoard of coin, a notion against which
mankind rightly rebel. For money is a conventional thing and may often be useless. A
man might be able to turn the dishes which were set before him into gold, like Midas
in the fable, and yet perish with hunger.

True wealth is a means and not an end, and is limited by the wants of the household;
but the spurious wealth has no limit and is pursued for its own sake. The legitimate art
of money-making, which corresponds to the first of these, is a part of household
management; the art which creates wealth by exchange is illegitimate. The two have
been often confused, because the same instrument, wealth, is common to both; and the

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desires of men being without limit, they are apt to think that the means to gratify them
should also be unlimited.

The whole question may be summed up as follows:—There is an art of money-


making which uses the means provided by nature for the supply of the household;
there is another art which exchanges and trades. The first is honourable and natural;
the second is dishonourable and unnatural. The worst form of the latter sort is usury,
or the breeding of money from money, which makes a gain not only out of other men,
but out of the ‘barren metal.’

The last of the difficulties which are discussed by Aristotle in the First Book is the
relation of money-making to household management. The sciences or subjects of
knowledge which are concerned with man run into one another; and in the age of
Aristotle were not easily distinguished. As we say that Political Economy is not the
whole of Politics, so Aristotle says that money-making [χρηματιστική] is not the
whole of household management [ο?κονομική] or of family life. But in either case
there is a difficulty in separating them. Aristotle perceives that the art of money-
making is both narrower and wider than household management; he would like to
establish its purely subordinate relation. He does not consider that the property of
individuals becomes in time of need the wealth of the state; or that one of his
favourite virtues, magnificence, depends on the accumulation of wealth; or that
Athens could not have been the home of the arts ‘unless the fruits of the whole earth
had flowed in upon her,’ and unless gold and silver treasure had been stored up in the
Parthenon. And although he constantly insists that leisure is necessary to a cultivated
class, he does not observe that a certain amount of accumulated wealth is a condition
of leisure.

The art of household management has to decide what is enough for the wants of a
family. Happiness is not boundless accumulation, but the life of virtue having a
sufficiency of external goods. The art of money-making goes further; for it seeks to
make money without limit. According to Aristotle the excess begins at the point
where coined money is introduced: with the barter of uncivilised races, with the wild
life of the hunter, with the lazy existence of the shepherd, or the state of mankind
generally before cities came into existence, he has no fault to find. He does not
perceive that money is only a convenient means of exchange which may be used in
small quantities, or in large; which may be employed in trade, or put out at interest;
and that the greater the saving of time in production, the greater will also be the
opportunities of leisure and cultivation. The real difference between the true and the
false art of money-making is one of degree; and the evil is not the thing itself, but the
manner of obtaining it,—when men heap up money at the cost of every other
good;—and also the use of it,—when it is wasted in luxury and ostentation, and adds
nothing to the higher purposes of life. Something of the prejudice against retail trade
seems to enter into the whole discussion. Another prejudice is observable in the
fanciful argument against usury, to which Aristotle objects, not on the ground that the
usurer may become a tyrant, but because the money which is produced out of usury is
a sort of unnatural birth. . . . Once more, he falls unconsciously into the error of
preferring an uncivilised to a civilised state of society. The beauty of primitive
life—that fair abstraction of religion and philosophy—was beginning to exercise a

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fascination over the Greeks in the days of Aristotle and Plato, as it afterwards did over
the mind of modern Europe when it was again made attractive by the genius of Sir
Thomas More and of Rousseau.

But now leaving the theory, let us consider the practice of money-making, which has
many branches; the knowledge of live-stock, tillage, planting, the keeping of bees,
fish, poultry—all these are legitimate. The illegitimate are 1) commerce, of which
there are three subdivisions, commerce by land, commerce by sea, and selling in
shops; 2) usury; 3) service for hire, skilled and unskilled. There are also arts in which
products of the earth, such as wood and minerals, are exchanged for money; these are
an intermediate kind. The lowest are the arts in which there is least precision, the
greatest use of the body, and the least need of excellence.

But not to go further into details, he who is interested in such subjects may consult
economical writers, or collect the stories about the ways in which Thales and others
made fortunes. He will find that these stories usually turn upon the same point, the
creation of a monopoly; which is also a favourite device of statesmen when they want
to increase the revenue.

Enough has been said of master and slave. There remain the two other relations which
exist in a family, that of husband and wife, and of parent and child. The master rules
over the slave despotically, the husband over the wife constitutionally, but in neither
case do they take turns of ruling and being ruled after the manner of constitutional
states, because the difference between them is permanent. On the other hand, the rule
of the father or elder over the child is like that of the king over his subjects.

The master of a house has to do with persons rather than with things, with human
excellence and not with wealth, and with the virtue of freemen rather than with the
virtue of slaves. For in the slave as well as in the freeman there resides a virtue which
enables him to perform his duty. Whether he has any higher excellence is
doubtful:—If he has, in what will he differ from a freeman? Yet he is a man and
therefore a rational being. And a noble disposition is required in the natural subject as
well as in the natural ruler. But, on the other hand, we say that the difference between
them is one of kind and not of degree. What is the conclusion? That the virtue of the
slave is the same with that of his master, or different? Not the same, nor yet altogether
different, but relative to the nature of each, like the virtues of the soul and of the body,
like the rule of the male over the female, who both partake of the same virtues but in
different degrees. [Plato] was wrong in trying to comprehend all the virtues under a
single definition; [Gorgias] was right in distinguishing them.

The artisan should not be confounded with the slave. He does not exist by nature, and
is not linked to a master; whereas the slave is a part of his master, and receives from
him the impress of his character.

The relations of husband and wife, of parent and child, will be more fully considered
when we speak of the constitutions of states. For the family is a part of the state, and
the virtue of the part must be relative to the virtue of the whole.

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The two last chapters of the First Book seem to be a summary of the subjects which
have preceded. Yet the writer, as if not wholly satisfied with his previous analysis of
the relations of slave and master, and desirous of having one more ‘fling’ at Plato,
returns to the discussion, which he illustrates by a new and not very accurate
distinction between the slave and the artisan. The artisan is inferior to the slave,
because he is not subjected to the civilising or inspiring influence of a master, nor
does he stand in any natural relation to the person from whom he learns his art. The
distinction, which is untenable (for many artisans were slaves), seems to be an
afterthought and comes in out of place. Aristotle has already in view the education of
the citizens, and he intends that it shall be relative to the state of which they are
members. He concludes with an unfulfilled promise, one of the many which occur in
the course of the work. The promise is, that he will discuss the virtues of husband and
wife, parent and child, when he treats of the different forms of government. Whether
he meant to compare particular relations of family life with particular forms of
government, e. g. the relation of husband and wife to a constitutional government, and
that of father and son to a monarchy; or only to say generally that the organisation of
the family must correspond to that of the state, is left unexplained. His views of the
state and the family are mutually influenced by each other; and he sees fanciful as
well as real analogies subsisting between them. Yet at the beginning of his work he
has expressly distinguished between them, and it is hard to say how a particular form
of government can be supposed to depend upon the family.

There are many glimpses of higher truths presented to us in the First Book of the
Politics: such, for example, as the remarks 1) that the state is prior to the individual; 2)
that the lower is intended by nature to lead up to the higher, i. e. that the state is
implicitly contained in the family and the village; 3) that in all men there is a social
instinct which is matured by the wisdom of legislators, who are the great benefactors
of mankind; 4) that there is a principle of government or law even in inanimate things;
5) that wealth is not the true end of human life; 6) that the virtue of the individual
must exist in the state. These are noble thoughts, which, though entangled in some
paradoxes and errors incidental to the age of Aristotle, may be regarded as the true
lights of political philosophy in all ages. The individual, the family, the state, are all
parts of a larger whole on which is impressed a final cause, dimly seen to be the
harmony of the world.

The first half of the second book of the Politics is devoted to the controversy with
Plato, who is criticised by Aristotle from an adverse point of view. His criticisms are
not those of an admiring pupil who seeks to enter into the spirit of his master, but of a
teacher who has revolted against his authority. The clouds and dreams of the Republic
have many heavy blows dealt against them by the weapons of common sense, but like
‘the air invulnerable’ they come together again and are unharmed by the spear of
criticism. For they can never be brought down to earth, and while remaining in their
own element they are beyond the reach of attack.

In the criticisms of Aristotle on the Republic there is one leading thought:—the state,
like the human frame, has many parts or members, but Plato reduces it to an
unmeaning and colourless unity. He makes it into a large family in which there are
unreal relationships and no bond, either political or social, holding them together. The

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unmeaningness of the conception becomes evident as soon as we attempt to realise it.


If the ideal state were divided into tribes and phratries, hardly anything would remain
of it. In Plato the correlation of the parts and the whole is lost sight of; and society,
instead of being held together by a multitude of ‘little invisible pegs’ or threads,
becomes thin and transparent.

The argument of chap. 4 is difficult to follow, because Aristotle, without making any
regular transition, attacks Plato from different points of view in successive sentences.
First of all he complains that the unity of the Platonic state is too great, and even
suicidal. Then, again, he urges that this unity or friendship is really imaginary. For it
has no organisation, and, like a drop of honey in water, is dissipated or lost in the
mass through which it is diffused.

The arguments which Aristotle employs against communism are for the most part the
same which may be found in modern writers. Though not a communist, he is of
opinion that existing laws or usages are capable of improvement. Men cannot have all
things in common, but they may have many more than at present. The instinct of
ownership is a kind of self-love implanted by nature, not blameable, but it should be
tempered by liberality and benevolence. The Spartan freedom of taking and using a
neighbour’s goods is commended by Aristotle, and he thinks that such a custom might
be carried further. The legislator should seek to inspire the ‘love which is the fulfilling
of the law’; he should not by enactments take away the grace and freedom of virtuous
actions. The sentiment might be thrown into a modern form:—More good will be
done by awakening in rich men a sense of the duties of property, than by the violation
of its rights.

Aristotle is dissatisfied with the vagueness of Plato. He wants to know more about the
inferior classes: what is to be their education, and in what relation do they stand to the
guardians? Are they to have wives and children in common? As if in a work of
imagination which was intended to shadow forth great principles every particular
must be consistent, or every detail filled up. Neither has Aristotle himself given any
sufficient answer to the question, ‘What should be the position of the subject-class in
a Greek state?’ Nor is it strictly accurate to say that the rulers in the Republic are
always the same. For the ‘high-spirited warriors’ when they are qualified by age all
take their turn of ruling: see Essay on Aristotle as a Critic of Plato in vol. ii.

BOOK II.
A criticism on the Republic and on the Laws of Plato; the constitutions of Phaleas and
Hippodamus; the states of Lacedaemon, Crete, and Carthage,—their similarities and
differences; scattered remarks on Solon and other legislators.

Before entering on the search after a perfect state, we must pass in review those
constitutions, whether ideal or actual, which are the most in repute. In seeking for
something beyond them, we are animated by the love of truth, not by the desire of
display.

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Let us examine the nature of the social union. The members of a state must either
have all things in common or nothing in common, or some things in common and
some not. They must have some things in common, for they live in the same place.
But should they have all things in common, as in the Republic of Plato, or some
things only and others not? Which is better—the communism of the Republic, or the
prevailing custom?

Plato believed that the community of women would promote the unity of the state.
But 1) unity may be carried to such an extent that the state is no longer a state, and, in
tending to greater unity, becomes first a family, and then an individual; such an unity
as this would be the ruin of the state, and therefore the reverse of beneficial to it. 2)
Moreover, a state must be large enough to be self-sufficing, and a family is more self-
sufficing than an individual, and a state than a family. 3) A state is not a mere
aggregate of individuals, like a military alliance of which the usefulness may depend
on quantity only; nor yet a nation, which is a host of men ‘numero tantum
differentes,’ like the Arcadians; the elements of a state differ in kind. Where the
citizens are all free and equal, they rule and are ruled in turns; and this principle of
compensation is the salvation of states. It might be better from one point of view that
there should be a permanent division of labour and that the same persons should
always rule. But where there is a natural equality and not enough offices for all the
citizens, the continuance of one set of persons in office is found to be impossible; and
so they hold office by turns, and upon the same principle pass from one office to
another. 4) Even assuming the greatest unity to be desirable, it would not be attained,
as Plato supposes, when all men say ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ of the same thing or
person at the same moment. For the word ‘all’ has two senses, a collective and a
distributive; taken collectively it is unmeaning—all the world cannot have one wife or
house; taken distributively it implies that every man’s wife or house will be the wife
or house of every other man; but this arrangement will not conduce to the harmony of
a family. The state is an unity in plurality; and the unity without the plurality, or the
plurality without the unity, is absurd. Again, 5) that which is common to many is apt
to be neglected. The children will belong to everybody and to nobody. They will have
an infinitesimal share of parental affection:—moreover, when they were born many of
their supposed fathers may have had no sons or daughters, or they may not have lived
to grow up. Better to have a cousin in the ordinary sense of the word than a thousand
sons in the Republic of Plato. 6) The children will often resemble their fathers or
mothers, and inferences will be drawn about their parentage.

There will be other evils:—7) Unholy acts done against fathers and mothers are more
likely to be committed if the relationship is unknown. And who will make atonement
for them? 8) It was inconsistent of Plato to forbid intercourse between lovers because
of the intensity of the pleasure, and yet allow familiarities between relations which are
far more discreditable; for all the citizens will be relations. 9) The true effect of
communism is disorganisation. It might therefore be allowed among the subject-class
whom the legislator wants to keep down, but not among the rulers. 10) Such
legislation is suicidal; while pretending to make men friends all round and to preserve
them from revolutions, it really weakens the ties which bind them to one another;
instead of unity so complete as to be self-destroying, there will be a watery friendship
among them. 11) The transference from one class to another will be impossible; for

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how can secrecy be maintained? 12) And the citizens who are transferred will be
restrained by no ties of relationship from committing crimes against their nearest
relations.

Whether the citizens of the perfect state should have their property in common or not
is another question. Three modes of tenure are possible:—1) private ownership of the
soil and common use; 2) common ownership and private use; 3) ownership and use
alike common. If the cultivators are the owners, they will quarrel about the division of
the produce [‘chacun produit selon sa capacité’ et consomme selon ses besoins’], but
if they are not their own masters the difficulty will be diminished. There is always an
awkwardness in persons living together and having things in common. Fellow-
travellers are often said to fall out by the way, and we are apt to take offence at our
servants because they are always with us. The present system, if humanised and
liberalised, would be far better. There might be private possession and common use
among friends, such as exists already to a certain extent among the Lacedaemonians,
who borrow one another’s slaves and horses and dogs, and take in the fields the
provisions which they want. To Plato we reply:—1) When men have distinct interests,
they will not be so likely to quarrel; and 2) they will make more progress, because
every one will be attending to his own business. 3) There is a natural pride of
ownership; and also 4) a pleasure in doing a kindness to others;—these will be
destroyed by communism. 5) The virtues of continence and liberality will no longer
exist. 6) When Plato attributes all the ills which states endure to private property, he
overlooks the real cause of them, which is the wickedness of human nature. 7) He has
a false conception of unity. The state should be united by philosophy, by a common
education and common meals, not by community of property. 8) The experience of
ages is against him: his theory, if true, would have been discovered long ago. 9) If his
scheme were ever realised, he would be compelled to break up the state into tribes and
phratries and other associations. And then, what would be left of the original idea?
Nothing but the prohibition of agriculture to the guardians. 10) The plan is not worked
out—even the general form of the community is indistinct. He says nothing about the
lower classes who are the majority of the citizens. The husbandmen, if they have all
things in common, do not differ from the guardians; but if they have wives and
property of their own, they will form a state within a state, and the old evils arising
out of property will reappear. Education is his panacea which is to take the place of
law; but he has confined education to the guardians. 11) Or if the husbandmen own
the land on payment of a tribute, is this desirable? will they not be even more
unmanageable than the Helots? 12) If the wives of the citizens are common and the
land private, who will see to the house? 13) And what will happen if the husbandmen
have both lands and wives in common? 14) Once more, it is absurd to argue for the
community of women from the analogy of the animals; for animals have not to
manage a household. 15) There is a danger in the fixedness of the rulers, who are said
to be made of the same gold always. For high-spirited warriors will want to have a
turn of ruling as well as of being ruled. 16) The guardians are deprived of happiness,
and yet the whole state is supposed to be happy: but how can the whole be happy
unless the parts are happy?

Many of these objections apply to Plato’s later work, the ‘Laws,’ in which he intended
to delineate a constitution more of the ordinary type; but he gradually reverts to his

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ideal state. The only differences are, that the women share in the common meals, that
the number of the warriors is increased from 1000 to 5000; and that the community of
women and property is abandoned. But 1) he has exceeded the bounds of possibility
in making so large a state. 2) He has neglected foreign relations; yet a city must be
provided against her enemies. 3) He has not defined the amount of property which his
citizens may possess. He says a man should have ‘enough to live
temperately’—meaning ‘to live well.’ Yet a man may live temperately but miserably.
He should have said ‘enough to live temperately and liberally.’ 4) If he equalises
property, he should limit population; he fancies that the fruitfulness of some
marriages would be balanced by the barrenness of others, and so the number of
citizens would remain about the same as in existing states. But if the lots are
absolutely divided they could not be redistributed. There would then be
supernumeraries, who would stir up revolution. 5) He does not say how the rulers are
distinguished from the subjects. 6) If other property may be increased five-fold, why
not land? 7) His two homesteads, one in the city and one on the border, will be very
inconvenient. 8) The citizens are to be heavy-armed soldiers who will form a polity.
This constitution, though it may be suited to the greatest number of states, is not the
nearest to his ideal. There are persons who think that all the elements of the state
ought to share in the government, and these would prefer the more complex
constitution of Sparta, which is made up of king, elders, and ephors. According to
Plato the best state is a combination of democracy and tyranny; but both of these are
bad and can hardly be called constitutions at all; and the constitution which is actually
proposed is nothing but an union of democracy and oligarchy, inclining rather to the
latter, as may be seen from the mode of choosing the magistrates and the council, and
the enforcement on the rich of attendance at the assembly. 9) He contrives the council
in such a manner as always to give the predominance to the higher or richer classes.
10) The double election will tend to throw the power of choosing into the hands of a
clique or cabal.

Most of the arguments which Aristotle employs against communism are the same
which are employed among ourselves: he expresses in them the common sense of
mankind. But some are peculiar to him, or characteristic of his age and country. For
example, 1) the notion that the lower classes will be more easily retained in subjection
if they have wives and children in common; which may be compared with the desire
to suppress education and family life among slaves in some slaveholding countries of
modern times; 2) the impossibility of expiating crimes committed against relations
when relationships are unknown; 3) the supposed necessity of breaking up the state
into tribes and phratries, which is maintained from the point of view, not of Plato, but
of an Athenian citizen; 4) the remark that there is much more quarrelling among those
who have all things in common than among the owners of private property; which
probably refers to partnerships in business. Several of Aristotle’s arguments are
unsatisfactory to us. First the attempt to show that the population in ordinary states is
kept equal by the compensation of sterile and fertile unions, but that this
compensation will not occur under the constitution of the Laws; whereas enactments
are expressly made to preserve the equality of families; secondly, the assertion that,
according to Plato, the best state is composed of democracy and tyranny: a statement
which is nowhere to be found either in the Republic or Laws, though something like it
occurs in Laws, vi. 756 E. Again, it is not true to say that Plato has not considered the

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question of population; for he has treated of it in Laws, v. 740, and provides against
the difficulty by ‘preventive checks,’ by laws of marriage and adoption, and by
colonisation.

The relation of the ‘Laws’ to the Republic is not such as it is represented by Aristotle.
The words, that ‘Plato, having intended to adapt the “Laws” to an ordinary state,
gradually returns to the ideal form,’ are not justified by anything found in the book of
the Laws which has come down to us, and there is no trace of any other form of the
work. He always intended that the constitution of the Laws should be that of a second-
rate state, and the distinction, though only once explicitly noted (Laws, v. 739, 740),
is present to his mind throughout. The point of which Aristotle makes light, when he
says that the only difference between the Republic and the Laws is the community of
wives and property, is really essential. He has omitted to mention the other difference,
which, in Plato’s estimation, was even greater, the government of philosophers. There
is little or nothing ideal or peculiar in what remains; for nearly all the other
institutions contained in the Laws have their parallel in Sparta or some other Greek
state. It can hardly be said that the Lacedaemonian constitution comes nearer than that
of the Laws to the ideal state; nor is this remark of Aristotle consistent with his
previous remark that the constitution of the Laws gradually reverts to the ideal state.

For this whole subject see the Essay in vol. ii. on the Criticisms of Aristotle upon
Plato. Oncken (Staatslehre des Aristoteles, vol. i. p. 194 foll.) is of opinion that the
Laws of Plato which were known to Aristotle were not the same with the extant work.
He argues from the silence of Aristotle on many points, and from his
misrepresentation of others. But Aristotle’s treatment of Plato in the Laws is not
different from his treatment of him in the Ethics and Metaphysics. The hypothesis of
Oncken is highly improbable. There is no example of corruption or interpolation on
such a scale in a work of such excellence anywhere in the compass of ancient
literature. An hypothesis against which so fatal an objection may be urged, would
have to be supported by the strongest proofs, and not merely by a weak inference
from the statement that Philippus of Opus copied the Laws from the original tablets.
(See Introduction to the Laws; Translation of the Dialogues of Plato, vol. v.)

Yet the Plato or the theses of Plato which Aristotle or the diorthotes of the Politics had
in his mind in an age when manuscripts were scarce and were not yet divided into
books and chapters, may have been very different from the Plato which is known to
us. Such a view is confirmed by an examination of Aristotle’s references not only to
the Laws, but to Plato’s other writings, and by the general character of the citations in
early Greek literature. The anti-Platonic theses of the Peripatetic school may often
have had little foundation in the actual writings of Plato. The arts of interpretation and
controversy were in their infancy. This is a more reasonable explanation of the want
of correspondence between Plato and Aristotle than to suppose the wholesale
corruption or interpolation of an ancient writer.

No constitution is so novel and singular as that of Plato; no one else has introduced
the community of women and children, or the public tables for women. Other
legislators have made the regulation of property their chief aim, deeming that to be
the point on which all revolutions turn. Phaleas of Chalcedon saw this danger and was

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the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions. In a new
colony he would have started with an equal distribution of property; in an old-
established one he would gradually have attained the same end by an arrangement of
marriage portions:—the rich were to give and not receive them, and the poor to
receive and not to give them. 1) But if a limit of property is to be fixed, there should
also be a limit of population; otherwise the law will be broken, and those who have
nothing will stir up revolution. 2) And even where a limit of property is fixed, the
amount should not be so great as to encourage luxury, or so small as to allow of
poverty. 3) The desires of mankind must be limited as well as their possessions. 4)
The equality of honour among unequals and the inequality of honour among equals
are as dangerous as the equality or inequality of property. There are three motives to
crime, a) want, b) ambition, c) the love of pleasure without pain. But want is far from
being the strongest of these incentives, and therefore equalisation of property would
only banish the lesser sort of crimes. The true remedy for want is to have a
competency and something to do; for ambition, self-control; for the love of pleasure,
philosophy. Phaleas probably intended to give equal education as well as property to
all his citizens, and thereby to equalise their desires; but he has not told us what will
be the character of his education. 5) He has regarded only domestic, and not foreign
relations, into which the consideration of property likewise enters; for a state should
have enough wealth to resist, but not enough to attract invaders [§§ 18-21 are partly a
repetition of what has preceded, § 9 foll.]. 6) The greater evils which flow from
ambition are not diminished by an equalisation of property, but by training the nobler
dispositions of men to contentment, and by putting down discontent among the lower
sort. 7) Phaleas should have equalised, not merely land, but moveables. 8) He wants
to make all the artisans slaves, which would only be possible in a small city.

This and the following chapters show us how fertile was the genius of Hellas in
devising forms of government. Already there were many treatises in existence,
probably a large literature, relating to the subject of Politics. Yet we are also struck
with the meagreness of Aristotle’s information and the feebleness of some of his
judgments. Of Sparta he knows very little, of Crete even less, and his ideas respecting
Carthage are fragmentary and also contradictory. Not having before us the writings of
Phaleas or Hippodamus, we cannot say how far he misunderstood or misrepresented
them: he may not have done them greater justice than he appears to have done to
Plato. The reflections of Aristotle on Phaleas and Hippodamus, like so many of his
criticisms, are made in the dialectical manner of the age; but we have reached a
further point of view, and can judge in a more comprehensive spirit. It was impossible
for him to do justice to his predecessors; he can only try them by formulas of his own
and by the more advanced standard of his own time. But we know that the first steps
in political philosophy, feeble and inconsistent as they may have been, are really the
greatest; and the highest achievement of modern criticism is the power of appreciating
such new and original thoughts in all their greatness.

It is no real objection to Phaleas that in treating of the equalisation of property he has


said nothing of equality of population; he might have replied that the support of
surplus numbers is not more difficult where there is equality than where there is
inequality of property. Nor can he be blamed for neglecting to speak of foreign
relations, except on the ground which is hardly tenable that every political treatise

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should be complete in every part. The subject was impressed on the mind of Aristotle
by the history of Hellas; but it might not equally have occurred to an earlier writer on
politics.

In ancient times men did not easily analyse the forms of government under which they
lived. In reflections of this kind Polybius, who lived a century and a half later, though
not a genius of the highest order, has made an advance upon Aristotle. His sketch of
the Roman Republic is fuller and clearer than any of the constitutions described in the
Politics. Yet even he, truthful as he was in the main, cannot be acquitted of partiality.
His predecessor Timaeus is a bête noire to him, whom he is always attacking, but, as
we should be inclined to infer from his virulence, not always with justice.

The first person, not a statesman, who framed a constitution was Hippodamus, the
architect of the Peiraeus, a man affected in his dress and eccentric in his way of life,
who was a political philosopher as well as an enquirer into nature. 1) His state
consisted of 10,000 citizens who were distributed in three classes, husbandmen,
artisans, warriors. 2) He divided the land into three parts, a sacred, a public, and a
private part, the first for the maintenance of religion, the second for the support of the
warriors, the third to be owned by the husbandmen. 3) He classified laws under three
heads, insult, injury, homicide. 4) He instituted a court of appeal formed of elders
chosen for the purpose. 5) He was of opinion that in the courts of justice the judges
should use, not a pebble but a tablet, and in doubtful cases, instead of a simple
acquittal or condemnation, they should write down on the tablet the degree of guilt
which they attributed to the defendant. Unless they were allowed to draw distinctions,
they must often commit perjury. 6) He enacted that rewards should be conferred on
public benefactors. 7) He provided that the children of citizens slain in battle should
be maintained by the state, as is customary at Athens; and 8) he had all the
magistrates chosen by the people.

These proposals are open to many objections. 1) The artisans, the husbandmen, and
the warriors are supposed to have an equal share in the government. But the first two
will be the slaves of the last, for they have no arms; and for the same reason they are
not fit to be magistrates: on the other hand, if excluded from the government, how can
they be loyal citizens? And if the warriors are the stronger, why should the two other
classes have any share in the government at all? The artisans have a natural place in
the state, and the husbandmen, if they provided the warriors with food, might have a
claim. The anomaly is that they have land of their own. Now if they cultivate the land
of the warriors as well as their own, they will have too much to do: and the warriors,
if they are engaged in cultivating their own lands, will become husbandmen; or if
there are yet other cultivators, these will be a fourth class in the state for which no
place is allowed. 2) The qualified verdict would turn the judges into arbitrators; it
would cause confusion, and is unnecessary. If the charge is properly drawn, the dicast
can always say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ without committing perjury. 3) The proposal to reward
discoveries or improvements in the laws would encourage informers. But should laws
be improved?—that is a controverted question. The example of the arts and the
general experience of mankind is in favour of improvement. Men in general desire
good and not merely what their fathers had. On the other hand, the authority of laws is
derived from custom, and the habit of lightly altering them impairs their force. There

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must sometimes be changes, but great caution should be observed; else the evil of
change may outweigh the gain of reform. The analogy of the arts is misleading.

Aristotle regards Phaleas and Hippodamus as he regards Plato, from the point of view
of an adversary: he is their critic, after the manner of his age, and tells us, not what he
approves, but what he disapproves in their writings. Yet it is evident that some of their
political ideas had great merit. Phaleas attempted to deal with the evils of property,
which he thought could most easily be remedied in an old country by a clever
arrangement of dowries: we should say, probably, by restricting the power of
settlement or bequest. A difficulty which pressed upon ancient legislators more than
ourselves owing to the stationary character of the arts of production was the increase
of population; of this difficulty Aristotle is very sensible. When men begin to feel the
struggle for existence they are apt to be discontented with the government under
which they live. Yet mere equality of property, even if it could be maintained, would
not always content them. For all men cannot be reduced to the same dead level, even
if there were enough for all. The ambitious will still commit crimes on a great scale;
the possession of a competence takes away only the temptation to petty larceny. Nor
can it be denied that great inequalities of property by giving a stimulus to increased
production may give a larger share of the goods of life to the poor than could be
obtained by any system of distribution however just.

It is an interesting question which Aristotle raises in his criticism of Phaleas. What


amount of wealth may with advantage be possessed by a state? To which we may
reply, That the value of wealth in a state depends not on the amount, but on the use
and distribution of it. Men may talk about the meannesses and miseries which are
caused by a highly artificial state of society. They may seek to throw off the restraints
of law. But

‘How small of all that human hearts endure,


That part which laws or kings can cause or cure.’

This is the spirit which Aristotle here expresses, though an opposite thesis might be
maintained with equal truth. For the miseries which arise from bad, and the blessings
of good government, in which the blessings of peace are generally included, can
hardly be exaggerated. He also expresses the feeling which is familiar to us in modern
times, that want of morality, which is in fact weakness, lies at the root of the
corruption in a state. Men are always crying out, Give, give, and are for dividing and
subdividing the property of the rich. But while Aristotle acknowledges the inequalities
of society to be natural and necessary, he insists on justice being done to the lower
classes. Foreign relations are ever present to his mind. They could hardly be
otherwise, since in the fourth and fifth centuries before Christ nearly every state in
Hellas had become the friend and enemy of every other several times over.

The number 3 exercises a great influence on the constitution of Hippodamus. He built


the streets of cities at right angles, and also gave an arithmetical or mathematical form
to the fabric of his ideal state. Number and figure naturally became in his age guiding
principles of the human mind. Yet he was also an original thinker, and already before
the time of Plato had treated of a best or perfect state. His classification of offences,

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his institution of a court of appeal and a qualified verdict (for he was apparently the
first author of them), are great legal inventions. The court of appeal was probably
intended to amend the decisions of the popular assembly or of the ordinary law courts
by the judgment of a court of elders. Whether Aristotle approved of the proposal or
not, he does not say. The argument of Hippodamus against the unqualified verdict is
really untenable. The difficulty is inherent in the nature of the case, and cannot be
removed by the several jurors or judges giving their verdicts in different forms. Other
objections of Aristotle’s appear to us rather trivial; for example, the argument that the
husbandmen cannot be a fourth class, seemingly because a fourth class is contrary to
the genius of the state, or, his notion that the artisans have a place in the state, but not
the husbandmen unless they are entirely devoted to the service of the military class.
We are also surprised at his digressing from the Laws of Hippodamus to the general
question whether laws should or should not be changed.

The commonplaces of conservative and reformer are arrayed against one another for
the first time in the Politics. Aristotle anticipates by his great power of reflection the
lessons which the experience of ages has taught the modern world.

All governments may be criticised from two points of view: their relation 1) to the
perfect state, 2) to the intention of the lawgiver. Under these two aspects we will now
examine, first the Lacedaemonian, secondly the Cretan state. [N. B. This symmetrical
plan is immediately forgotten.]

1) In a well-ordered state the citizens must have leisure, and therefore others must
provide for their daily wants. But slaves are apt to rebel: the Spartan Helots and the
Thessalian Penestae have constantly risen against their masters, though the Cretans
have succeeded better in the management of their slaves, because they are islanders,
and because when at war with one another, all having slaves, they do not encourage
them to revolt.

2) The influence of the Spartan women is fatal to good order. They are half the city,
and the other half has fallen under their dominion; in the language of mythology, Ares
has been overcome by Aphrodite. They are disorderly and cowardly; in the Theban
invasion they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy. Their
way of life tends also to foster avarice in their husbands. The evil is of old standing.
Lycurgus long ago wanted to control them, but they were too much for him. He found
them more impracticable than the men, who had been schooled into obedience by
their long wars against their neighbours, and he gave up the attempt. To their
resistance this defect in the constitution is to be attributed.

3) Another evil is the inequality of property. This inequality is caused by the


unlimited right of bequest, and is aggravated by the practice of giving large dowries;
two-fifths of the land has passed into the hands of women. And so the population has
diminished. The country was once capable of maintaining 1500 knights and 30,000
heavy-armed troops, and although at one time the Spartans themselves were as many
as 10,000, the total number has now fallen below 1000.

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4) The legislator ought to have kept the number of lots equal to the number of the
people; but instead of equalising them, he encouraged large families, so that they have
become more unequal and disproportionate. [Yet he did not succeed in increasing the
number of his citizens.]

5) The high office of the Ephoralty has many defects. a) The Ephors are chosen out of
all, and the office is often held by very poor men, who, being ill off, are open to
bribes; b) their powers are so extravagant that the balance of the constitution has been
disturbed by them; c) they are elected in a manner which is perfectly ridiculous; d)
they are quite ordinary men, and are therefore unfit to decide great causes on their
own judgment; they should be controlled by written laws; e) the laxity of their life
contrasts with the severity of the ordinary Spartan régime. On the other hand, the
office is popular; the common people are pleased because they share in it.

6) The Council of Elders, again, is ill-constituted:—a) they are judges for life and
irresponsible; or at least only controlled by the Ephors, who are not fit for their high
office: b) they are very corrupt; the legislator himself shows that he cannot trust them,
for he places them under the control of the Ephoralty: c) the manner of their election
is as ridiculous as that of the Ephors: d) the practice of canvassing, which the law
encourages, should be forbidden.

7) The Kings should not be hereditary, but should be elected for merit.

8) The common meals, which are intended to be a popular institution, should be


provided at the public cost, as in Crete; but they are not, and consequently the poor
are excluded from them, and lose the rights of citizenship.

9) The office of Admiral sets up a rival to the Kings.

10) The state, as Plato truly says, is framed with a view to a part of virtue only, the
virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war, but in time of peace is useless or
injurious.

11) The Spartans conceive than the goods of life are to be obtained by virtue, but are
mistaken in preferring them to virtue. They have a right idea of the means, but a
wrong idea of the end.

12) Lastly, their revenues are ill-managed. The citizens are impatient of taxation, and
the greater part of the land being in their own hands, they allow one another to cheat.
Instead of the citizens being poor and the state rich, the citizens are too fond of
money, and the state is impoverished.

The constitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage are said by Aristotle to be excellent,
but against each of the three he brings rather a heavy indictment. Of all three the
accounts are warped by the desire to compare them, and are not always consistent
with themselves. The Lacedaemonian government did not aim at the best end, and did
not succeed in attaining the end at which it aimed. The Spartans had not found out the
secret of managing their slaves; the men were hardy and temperate; but they fell under
the influence of their women, who were licentious and disorderly. Equality had been

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the aim of the legislator, but inequality had been the result. Their administration of
justice, their common meals, their finances were ill-managed. Their great magistrates
received bribes from foreign states; the Ephors were very ordinary men invested with
tyrannical powers; the elders were corrupt and often superannuated. The spirit of
suspicion and distrust reigned in their government; they regarded virtue as a means
only and not as the great end of life. The inefficiency of the Spartan government, in
almost every particular, is severely commented upon by Aristotle.

To what form of government the Spartan constitution is to be referred is a question


which greatly exercises ancient writers; Aristotle inclines to think that it is three in
one, a combination of royalty, aristocracy, and democracy.

(For a fuller consideration of the criticism of Sparta in the Politics, see vol. ii, Essay
on the Spartans and their Institutions.)

The Cretan constitution resembles the Spartan, and in some respects is quite as good,
but being older, it is less perfect in form. Lycurgus is said to have taken it as his
model. The Cretan town of Lyctus is a Lacedaemonian colony, and he appears to have
been attracted to Crete by the connection between the two countries. The situation of
the island between Asia Minor and Hellas was favourable to the growth of a maritime
power; and hence Minos acquired the dominion of the sea.

There are many similarities in the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions. The
Cretan Perioeci correspond to the Helots, and like the Spartans, the Cretans have
common meals; the ten Cosmi answer to the five Ephors. There is a council of Elders
which corresponds to the Lacedaemonian; and the Cretans formerly had kings. There
is also an assembly, but it can only ratify the decrees of the Cosmi and of the Elders
[as at Lacedaemon].

1) The Cretan common meals are supported out of the public revenues, so that no
citizen is excluded from them; in this respect they are an improvement upon the
Lacedaemonian. There is a common stock, in which the women and children share.
The legislator has many ingenious ways of preventing his citizens from eating and
drinking too much; and in order to check the increase of population, he separates men
from women, lest there should be too many mouths to feed. 2) The Cosmi are like the
Ephors, but they are even a worse form of magistracy; for they are elected out of
certain families and not out of the whole people. The institution is not unpopular: but
it has great evils, and the remedy for them is as bad. For the mischief can only be
cured by a revolution among the nobles, or the violent expulsion of the Cosmi from
office. And so the Cretan government, while possessing some constitutional elements,
really becomes a close oligarchy. 3) The Council is formed of ex-Cosmi. The
members of it, like the Spartan Council of Elders, are appointed for life, and judge by
unwritten laws.

Crete has the good fortune to be an island, or the incessant factions would long ago
have destroyed the state.

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Aristotle compares the Cretan to the Spartan constitution—in some respects to the
advantage of the former. Among the desirable aims which the Cretan legislator
proposed to himself, he notices moderation in eating, the good arrangement of the
Syssitia, the suppression of population. But the whole machinery of government was
very rude and imperfect; although their insular situation preserved the Cretans from
servile wars, they could correct political evils only by a periodical revolution. This
anarchy of Crete contrasted with the stability of Lacedaemon.

The Syssitia, called Andria by the Cretans, were provided out of a public fund. They
were not therefore exclusive, like the common meals of the Spartans. They would
rather help to relieve the poverty of some of the citizens. The good principle which
Aristotle praises among the Spartans of having some things in common was carried
further by the Cretans. They all had a dinner at the expense of the state. Women and
children also shared in the public stock, although it is not said by Aristotle that they
partook of the common meals. And Aristotle himself observes that the presence of
women at the common meals was a novelty first proposed by Plato. He also intimates
that the intention of the legislator was to separate the sexes and not to bring them
together. The similarity which Aristotle supposes to exist in the three states, Sparta,
Crete, Carthage, is slenderly, if at all, confirmed by facts. It is an old remark that
mankind observe similarities sooner than differences, and some general similarities
may be expected to be found in all governments which are similarly circumstanced.
The ancients, having a very limited knowledge of the world, were apt to regard these
general similarities as proofs of a common origin. (Thus Herodotus, wherever he goes
among his friends the priests, is apt to discover resemblances between the Greek and
Egyptian religions.) In his criticism on the institutions of Crete Aristotle is expecting
to find a similarity with Lacedaemon, derived from a common origin; but in the
course of his enquiry he discovers more differences than points of resemblance. The
one real similarity is the Syssitia, which may naturally have arisen out of the military
necessities of a conquering race, and would easily lead to the invention of the various
legends by which Crete is connected with Lacedaemon. The Cretan institutions had
no revival, and the tradition of them had not the same hold on the mind of Hellas as
the tradition of Lycurgus. The Cretans never attained to the power and importance in
Hellas for which the situation of the great island seemed to intend them. There was
not in their nature the capacity of adapting themselves to the changing circumstances
of the Greek world. They did not exclude foreigners, but they were seldom visited by
them. They remained in the background of the history of Hellas, and did not ever
become a considerable maritime power. They were renowned as archers, but not as
heavy-armed troops. Their naval fame was legendary, going back to the times of
Minos, the sea king, who put down the pirates. In later legend he is also called the
lawgiver, who received laws from Zeus as Lycurgus did from Apollo. No historical
king of Crete is mentioned in antiquity: the office was not retained as at Sparta, but
shared the downfall of the other kingships of Hellas in the age when the oligarchies
grew powerful.

The Carthaginian constitution resembles the Spartan and Cretan: all three are like one
another, but unlike any others. The Carthaginian, though containing an element of
democracy, has lasted well, and has never degenerated into a tyranny. At Carthage
there are clubs which have common tables: these answer to the Spartan pheiditia.

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There is also a magistracy of 104, which answers to the Ephoralty, but unlike the
Ephors, the Carthaginian magistrates are elected for merit. Like the Spartans they
have Kings and a Council of Elders, but, unlike the Spartan, their Kings are elected
for merit, and are not always of the same family.

The deviations of Carthage from the perfect state are the same as in most other states.
The deviations from aristocracy and polity incline both to democracy and to
oligarchy. For instance, the people discuss and determine any matter which has been
brought before them by the Kings and Elders (this is not the case at Sparta and Crete);
and when the Kings and Elders are not unanimous, the people may decide whether the
matter shall be brought forward or not. These are democratical features. But the
election of the magistrates by co-optation and their great power after they have ceased
to hold office are oligarchical features. The inclination to oligarchy is further shown
in the regard which is paid in all elections, to wealth. (On this point however the
majority of mankind would agree with the Carthaginians.) Once more, the
appointment to offices without salary, the election by vote and not by lot, and the
practice of having all suits tried by certain magistrates, and not some by one and some
by another, are characteristic of aristocracy. The constitution of Carthage therefore is
neither a pure aristocracy nor an oligarchy, but a third form which includes both, and
has regard both to merit and wealth. 1) The over-estimation of wealth leads to the sale
of offices, which is a great evil. True, the rulers must have the leisure which wealth
alone can supply, but office should be the reward of merit, and therefore the legislator
should find some other way of making a provision for the ruling class. The sale of
offices is a gross abuse, and is a bad example to the people, who always imitate their
rulers. 2) It is not a good principle that one man should hold several offices. In a large
state they should be distributed as much as possible. 3) The Carthaginians remedy the
evils of their government by sending out colonies. The accident of their wealth and
position enables them to avail themselves of this outlet; but the safety of the state
should not depend upon accidents.

Of the Carthaginian constitution Aristotle knows less than of Crete or Sparta. Though
he is inclined to praise, his statements hardly justify his panegyric; nor does he make
good the resemblance which he assumes to exist between the Spartan and
Carthaginian constitutions. The purchase of the highest offices which prevailed
among the Carthaginians, and their pluralism, are corruptions, which, as far as we
know, existed nowhere in Hellas. These offices were without salary, and therefore
those who bought them must have repaid themselves in other ways (§ 12).

The permanence of the Carthaginian government is to Aristotle the most striking


feature of it. To Carthage, as to England, emigration was the great safeguard against
political dangers. Aristotle seems to think that such a remedy is an evasion of the
duties of the legislator. He strongly insists that there should be a constitutional or
legal method of reforming abuses; this did not exist either in Crete or Carthage. As in
some modern European states, revolution or assassination was the only remedy for
them.

The defect of knowledge derived from other sources renders it difficult to form a
judgement upon Aristotle’s account of Carthage or even to reconcile him with

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himself. We cannot venture to connect his statements with the later but still scanty
accounts of Carthage which have been preserved by the Romans. Nor can we correct
the inaccurate statements of later writers by comparing them with one another. We do
not know of whom the assembly was composed at Carthage, nor whether the council
of 100 is or is not the same as the council of 104, or in what sense Carthage had or
had not an exemption from revolution, or how far the club dinners may have
corresponded to the Syssitia of Sparta, or whether offices were put up for sale to the
highest bidder absolutely without regard to his fitness for office. To raise conjectures
about these and similar uncertainties, to say what may have been or might have been,
in an unknown age or country, to find reasons ‘plentiful as blackberries’ for one
hypothesis or another, is not to make a contribution to history, and tends rather to
impair the clearness of the critical vision.

Political writers have been either private individuals or lawgivers. Of lawgivers some
have framed constitutions, others have only made laws. Lycurgus and Solon did both.
Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have already spoken. There have been various
opinions concerning the legislation of Solon. 1) He is thought to have produced a
mixed constitution, but he did not—the addition of dicasteries appointed out of the
whole people does not make the constitution mixed, and this was the only element
due to Solon, for the Areopagus and the elected magistracies existed before his time.
2) He is thought to have created the democracy; but he did nothing of the kind. The
power of the people began to increase after the Persian war, and was extended by
Ephialtes and Pericles, who paid the jurors and curtailed the power of the Areopagus,
as well as by other demagogues who succeeded them. Incidentally the institution of
the law-courts led to the creation of the democracy. But Solon neither intended nor
foresaw this result. He only gave the people a voice in the election and control of the
magistrates, who continued to be taken from the three higher classes of citizens.

Zaleucus and Charondas were only legislators. Zaleucus legislated for the Italian
Locrians, Charondas for the Chalcidian cities of Italy and Sicily. The latter was the
first who instituted actions for perjury; he is very precise in the form of his laws.
Onomacritus is thought to have been even older than these; and to have been
contemporary with Thales, of whom Lycurgus and Zaleucus are supposed to have
been disciples; but all this is an anachronism. Philolaus, a Corinthian, who settled at
Thebes, enacted ‘Laws of Adoption;’ Phaleas would have equalised property. Some
peculiarities of Plato’s legislation are the community of women and property, the
common meals of women, the law that the sober should be rulers of the feast, and the
training of soldiers to acquire equal skill with both hands. Draco’s laws are proverbial
for severity. Pittacus was merciless to drunkards. Androdamas of Rhegium legislated
for the Thracian Chalcidians.

The fragmentary chapter which concludes the Book and which is in part a repetition
of what has preceded, contains an interesting criticism on Solon and Pericles.
Aristotle (?) defends Solon against the charge of having introduced democracy.
Although he admits that there was a seed of democracy in some of the institutions of
Solon, he attributes the real growth of it to the course of events, especially to the
increased power deservedly gained by the people after the great sacrifices which they
made in the Persian War. Ephialtes, Pericles, and other demagogues, for in this class

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by implication he places them, gave too much encouragement to the democratic spirit,
until Athens became what it was in later Greek history. (See also note on Text, p.
100.)

It may be observed that the writer is not quite consistent in his account of Solon; for
he says, first of all, that he only introduced the dicasteries, and in a subsequent
sentence that ‘he only gave the people power to elect and control their magistrates.’
How are these two statements to be reconciled with one another? He denies that
Pericles [directly] created the democracy, but he admits that he did so indirectly by
appointing the courts of law from all the citizens. It may be remarked also that he
recapitulates what he had said about Phaleas without alluding to the previous
discussion of him.

There is little or nothing in this chapter which need make us doubt its genuineness,
that is to say, the degree of genuineness which we attribute to the rest of the Politics.

The writer seems rather strangely to suppose that in these few chapters he has told all
that was worth telling either about the theories of philosophers or about ancient
legislators. There are many matters of interest concerning which he is silent. But the
beginnings of ancient criticism are fragmentary and always fall short of our wishes
and expectations.

The question ‘whether the virtue of the good citizen is the same as that of the good
man’ with which the third Book opens, is Aristotle’s way of discussing what is the
relation of Ethics to Politics. The modern aspect of the question will be further
considered in an Essay (Vol. II) on Aristotle as a Political Philosopher. (See also Note
at end of Book III.)

A science which is not yet fully established must proceed tentatively in the use of
words. It has to take them from poetry or common life and to set a new stamp upon
them. A special meaning has to be elicited from a generic word or a new idea to be
expressed through the medium of an outward object. Figures of speech are brought
into use which gradually cease to be figurative. Abstract ideas have often to be
explained by the concrete terms which correspond to them. It is easier to answer the
question ‘Who is a man?’ than ‘What is the true idea of human nature?’ But these
again, however familiar they may be, are perplexing when we attempt to define them.
The specific use of words easily returns into the generic; the good sense passes into
the neutral, or even into the bad; and what ought to be is confounded with what is.
Many meanings grow out of the one (e.g. πολιτεία). Even the material substance and
the idea associated with it are not always distinguished. Such variations in the use of
words often occur in the same page. Hence we are not surprised that Aristotle, before
enquiring into the nature of the state, should begin by asking, ‘Who is a citizen?’ or
that the first and popular use of the words ‘citizen’ or ‘office’ should require to be
modified under different forms of government: or that the term ‘polity’ should in the
same paragraph or sentence be used to signify ‘a constitution’ both in the more
general and the more precise sense, or that the word ‘city’ should mean a ‘town’ and
also a ‘state.’

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In ancient philosophy as well as in modern, and in the beginning quite as much as in


the decline of either, there arose casuistical questions which often did not admit of a
precise answer, although the attempt to solve them may have contributed to the
growth of ethical and political science. ‘Is a citizen de facto also a citizen de jure?’
‘What constitutes a state?’ ‘Should obligations incurred by one government be
discharged by another?’ ‘Is the one best man to be a king or an exile?’ Aristotle is
fond of raising such questions, which he sometimes cuts short by common sense and
sometimes leaves without an answer. He exaggerates conflicting points of view, and
also reconciles them. The art of dialectic had not yet attained to a system, but moved
forward with irregular steps. Yet by the raising of objections and the contrast of
opposites a real progress was made, and a higher stage of truth attained.

BOOK III.
The definition of a citizen and of a state: several casuistical questions, of which the
most important is, Whether the virtue of the good citizen is the same as that of the
good man: the definition of a polity: true forms of polity and their perversions: should
the few or the many or the virtuous be supreme? recapitulation: the five species of
kingship.

‘What is a state?’ is the first question which the political philosopher has to
determine. But a state is composed of citizens, and therefore we must further ask,
‘Who is a citizen?’—Not he who lives in a particular spot, or who has the privilege of
suing and being sued (for these rights are not confined to citizens); nor yet one who is
either too young or too old for office, or who is disfranchised, or an exile, or a metic;
but he who actually shares in the administration of justice and in offices of state. And
whereas offices are either limited by time, like special magistracies, or unlimited, like
the office of dicast and ecclesiast, we are here speaking of the latter only, and we want
to find some common term under which both dicast and ecclesiast are included. Such
a term is a holder of ‘indefinite or unlimited office:’—those who share in office
unlimited by time are citizens.

But since governments differ in kind and have a different place in the order of thought
(for true forms are prior to perversions), the definition of the citizen will likewise
differ in different states; and the definition which we have just given, strictly
speaking, is suited only to a democracy. In aristocratic states like Lacedaemon and
Carthage, which have no regular meetings of the ecclesia, the chief power is in the
hands of the magistrates who decide all causes; and they are holders not of indefinite,
but of definite offices. The words of our definition therefore, if they are to include
aristocracies as well as democracies, will have to be amended: and we must say, That
he is a citizen who shares in the judicial or deliberative administration of a state.

In practice, a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents, or, as others say,
the grandparents or great grandparents were citizens. But here the difficulty is only
carried a step or two further back. For who were the first citizens? As Gorgias said of
the Larissaeans, They were an article manufactured by the magistrates. And what are
we to think of those who hold office unjustly or after a revolution? The point is, not
whether they are, but whether they ought to be citizens. We answer that they are

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included in our definition: the defect of right does not alter the fact. They hold office;
and this is our criterion of citizenship.

The question suggests another question: when is an act the act of the state? In times of
revolution persons refuse to fulfil their obligations: they say that they were contracted,
not to the state, but to the governing body which has been deposed, and that the acts
of the previous government, not having been established for the common good, were
unlawful. But they should remember that their argument applies to all forms of
government alike:—to a democracy which is founded on violence, quite as much as to
an oligarchy or tyranny.

We are therefore driven to consider the question in a more general form: When is a
state the same, and when different? It is not enough that the place and the inhabitants
continue, or that a particular spot is surrounded by a wall. Nor does the city alter
because successive generations of men come and go. The real identity is the identity
of the constitution; not of the place, nor of the inhabitants. (This is true; but we must
not go on to infer, that a state need not fulfil her engagements when the form of
government changes.)

Connected with the question ‘Who is a citizen?’ there is a further question, ‘Whether
the virtue of the good citizen is also the virtue of the good man?’ Before entering on
this question, we must first ascertain what is the virtue of the citizen. Now different
citizens have different functions, like sailors on board ship; but they have a common
end, which, in the case of the sailors, is the safety of the ship, in the case of the
citizens, the salvation of the state. And since forms of government differ, and the
virtues of the citizens are relative to them, they cannot all have the perfect and
absolute virtue of the good man. Even in the perfect state, though the members of it
must all be good citizens, we cannot suppose them to be all good men unless we
suppose them to be all alike. Again, the state, like the living being, has higher and
lower elements, and the virtue of all of them cannot be the same.

But is there no case in which the virtue of the good man and of the good citizen
coincide? There is; for the good and wise ruler is a good and wise man. (The rule of
which I am speaking, is not the rule of the master over the slave, but the constitutional
rule of freemen and equals.) Therefore, in some cases, though not in all, the good
citizen coincides with the good man. And if the virtue of the good man is that which
rules, and the virtue of the citizen includes both ruling and obeying, from one point of
view the good citizen is not only the equal, but the superior of the good man. For
every citizen in a free state should learn how to become a statesman by being first a
simple citizen, just as he would learn the duties of a general by being under the orders
of a general. Yet the two are not the same; the justice of the ruler differs in kind, or at
any rate in degree from that of the subject. And there is another difference—the ruler
has knowledge, but the subject true opinion only.

One more question:—Is the mechanic to be included among the citizens? No; for he
holds no office and therefore cannot have the double virtue of ruling and obeying
which makes the citizen. He can only obey and do his work: that is all. Therefore, he
cannot be a citizen. But if not, what place has he in the state? The answer is, that like

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a slave or a freedman, he may live in the state and he may be necessary to the
existence of the state, and yet not form part of it. In ancient times, the artisan class
were not admitted to citizenship, and in well-ordered states they are still excluded. If
they are admitted, our definition of the virtue of a citizen must be restricted to those
who do not work with their hands. [For if they do, they cannot have leisure for the
performance of their duties as citizens.]

The manner of treating the artisan and labouring class differs in different states. In an
aristocracy, or government of the best, if such there be, they are excluded, for they are
too busy to practise virtue: into an oligarchy, where only a money-qualification is
required, the mechanic may often find his way, for many of them become rich; but not
the labourer, who remains poor. In democracies, not only mechanics and labourers,
but, when there is a dearth of population, even aliens and persons of illegitimate birth
attain the rights of citizens.

Thus we see that there are different kinds of citizens, and that the virtue of the good
citizen is not always the same with that of the good man, but only the virtue of the
statesman [and this only in the perfect state].

[Having defined and discussed the citizen], we will proceed to consider constitutions
or forms of government. The constitution is in fact the government; and governments
vary as the governors are one, the few, or the many, and have ends higher or lower.
Men are political animals, and they meet together in cities, not only because they need
one another’s help, but with a view to mutual improvement and well-being. And even
for the sake of mere life, in which there is an element of nobility and sweetness, they
still continue to maintain the political bond until the evil is too much for the good.

There are many kinds of authority:—first, that which a master exercises over his
slaves. He has in view primarily his own interests, among which is accidentally
included an interest in the life and health of his slave. In household management the
common good of the family is primarily considered, and only secondarily the good of
the ruler or head. The case is like that of the pilot or trainer, who while he takes care
of those entrusted to him also incidentally takes care of himself. And so in politics;
[there is a common as well as a private interest], and in all forms of government when
they are false the animating principle is the interest of the individual, when they are
true, the public good. [In a constitutional government] the citizens rule and are ruled
in turn; they come into office and see to the affairs of others for a time, and when they
go out the others come in and see to theirs. This was the original intention. But now-a-
days all men are seeking for wealth to which they make office a stepping-stone. They
go hunting after places as if their lives depended upon them. . . . . . .

Some of the perplexities of language which beset the infancy of philosophy are the
use of a generic term in its specific sense, or of a neutral term in a good sense and
conversely, or the necessity of attributing to the same word a passive, active, and
neuter sense. In the discussion which follows, the term πολιτεία is used of states in
general and also of the state par excellence which, according to Aristotle, is the true
form of a constitution. So in English the terms ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutional’ are
used without a qualifying epithet to signify a moderate form of constitution. And in

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the Nicomachean Ethics, the want of a more copious vocabulary compels Aristotle in
like manner to employ the word δικαιοσύνη in two or perhaps three senses for justice,
honesty, and also for righteousness. The use of the term ‘justice’ applied to the
performance of a right or to the punishment of a wrong action affords an instance of
the perverse influence which cognate or paronymous words are liable to exercise upon
thought. (Cp. N. E. v. 9. § 2.) The various meanings of words are generally settled by
custom, and their use in each particular case determined by the context. But to the
contemporaries of Aristotle the multiplicity in the meaning of words was often a
source of fallacy and confusion which required to be cleared up.

The imperfection of logic in the time of Aristotle is likewise illustrated by the


discussion of the question, What constitutes a state? To which the political
philosopher, after rejecting the explanation of sameness of place or race, replies
‘sameness of government.’ But surely the sameness of a state consists in many things,
and is consistent with many changes of government as well as of race or place. No
one would deny that England and Sweden are the same nations or countries which
existed 800 years ago; about France, Italy, Germany, or Poland, the answer would be
more doubtful. The elements which constitute national identity may perhaps be
reckoned in the following order, sameness of race, sameness of language, sameness of
place, sameness of religion, sameness of government, sameness of character. But we
must remember that the idea of sameness is relative, and in reality can never be
equally applicable to the state and to the individual.

An analogous question not unconsidered by Aristotle has often been raised in modern
times, Where in case of a revolution does lawful authority reside? To which we may
reply that what is ordinarily a difference in kind has become a difference of degree,
and that in a state of change we must not expect either to have an unchanging
authority, or to pass by a jump from one government to another. Or we may say that
society is being resolved into its elements, and that for a short time the sacredness of
authority is overpowered by force. Or, that to whichever side in the conflict power
distinctly inclines, there authority begins to exist. Such difficulties were answered in
English writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by asserting a divine and
unchangeable right of kings or of government and a corresponding duty of passive
obedience; or on the other hand by an imaginary compact which, according to
Hobbes, was made once for all in the beginning of society and was therefore
unchangeable,—but according to Locke and others, might at any time be altered or
reversed. Such a compact was a convenient figure of speech adapted to the
understanding and wants of the age, just as the divine right of kings was once a
convenient symbol of the sacredness of authority.

In the writings of Aristotle incongruous notions are often brought together by the
accident of a common word. The rule of a king or statesman has to be distinguished
from the rule of a master over his slaves. The position of the artisan, who has already
caused us a good deal of trouble, is generally assumed to be outside the pale of
political society. Yet we are surprised to find that there are some oligarchies, in which
even the artisan, if he acquires property, may become a member of the state. And we
end where we might have begun, with what to us appears to be rather a commonplace

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conclusion, that under different forms of government there are various kinds of
citizens.

The question whether democracy and oligarchy derive their character respectively
from wealth and poverty or from the fewness and multitude of the citizens, would
hardly have occurred to a modern political writer. The majority, as at Colophon, or to
take modern instances, in Australia or America, may be well-to-do, the poor may be a
minority. Yet such a state will be a democracy, for every citizen equally shares in the
government. But it might be argued that even in a Greek Republic, as in the United
States, the real character of democracy would be greatly modified by the prosperity of
the people. Aristotle has stated the possible combinations of the different elements;
but in this passage he has not fairly balanced them with one another. It might with
equal truth be affirmed that democracy was the government of the many or of the
poor, oligarchy of the few or of the rich. But it would be truer still to say that in a
democracy are commonly included the many and the poor, in an oligarchy the few
and the wealthy; and this is in fact Aristotle’s own conclusion in the Fourth Book (c.
4. § 4), where he returns to the subject. Oligarchy and democracy may also be
regarded as relative terms; and there is always a residuum of either in the other; for
democracy is led by a few, and all the members of an oligarchy claim to be equal with
one another. Nor can we say how strong may be the elements of conservatism which
are latent in the mass of the people who are averse to many kinds of change, or how
much of the revolutionary temper may lurk in ambitious members of an oligarchy
who are attracted by contrast, or stimulated by private hatred or interest.

Another question is a source of still more serious perplexity to Aristotle,—it had been
already discussed by Plato: Should men be governed by a law or by a person? By the
law which cannot take cognizance of particular cases, or by the person who can? The
practice of the Athenians, whose laws were written down on square or triangular
lecterns (κύρβεις) placed in the agora, and of the Lacedaemonians, who for the most
part decided causes without written law by judgments of the Gerousia and the Ephors,
afforded conspicuous examples of the two opposite principles. All law must have
been originally unwritten, though it is probable also that in primitive times cases may
have been decided by precedent. The claims both of the law and of the individual
judge are asserted by Aristotle. What law can have a right to limit the actions of the
perfectly just man who is a law to himself, and yet, if there is to be equality among
equals, how can all the other citizens be excluded from power? To which the answer
is made that he is not an equal any more than Zeus among the gods. Aristotle wavers
between these two points of view which he almost brings to an agreement; for the law
must be executed by judges; and the one wise ruler will have other wise men to assist
him in his judicial labours.

Throughout the Politics he is distracted between an ideal perfection and the actual
conditions of human life, and often passes unconsciously from one to the other. The
best state in the Seventh Book comes round to be little more than an ordinary Greek
state which is placed under favourable circumstances. The aim of the state should be
the highest virtue, yet virtue is also relative to the form of government; the virtue of a
democracy is not the same with that of an oligarchy. Even the political virtues are not
all equally required of all magistrates. In idea the one best man is to be lord and

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master of all; in fact he is to be ostracised. And it is intimated that there is a good deal
to be said in favour of this latter mode of procedure. According to Plato in the
Republic the true ruler was entrusted with power, not for his own good, but for the
good of his subjects, and he distinguishes governments into true and false as they aim
at the good of the governed or of the governors themselves. Aristotle in like manner
lays down the principle that all true forms of government exist only for the good of
the governed; all false ones for the good of the rulers. That he should have passed
from the ideal to the actual, or that he should have clothed the ideal in fanciful forms,
is not surprising.

We have next to consider how many and what forms of government there are and how
they differ from each other. The supreme power must always be exercised either by
one, or by a few, or by many. The true forms are those which regard the common
interest: the perverted forms have in view only the private interests of the rulers. The
rule of one is called royalty, the rule of a few, aristocracy, the rule of many, polity or
constitutional government, when these forms severally aim at the good of the
governed. They are called tyranny, oligarchy, democracy, when they have regard to
the good of a single person or class only, of the king, of the wealthy or of the needy.
The general term ‘polity’ is naturally applied in a specific sense, because the form of
government designated by it is the most popular and comprehensive. For few are
capable of every kind of virtue, and therefore there are few royalties or aristocracies;
but military virtue is found in all classes, and is shared by the many. And thus arises
polity or constitutional government, in which the heavy-armed soldiers have the
supreme power.

But the differences in forms of government do not depend solely on number and
quantity; the element of quality must also be included. Democracy, for example, is
said to be the government of the many and of the poor. But what if the many are rich?
does the form of government continue to be a democracy? Oligarchy again is defined
to be the government of the few and of the rich, but if the few are poor, what becomes
of the definition? In any case, how shall we describe those states in which a rich
majority or in which a poor minority are rulers?

We answer that the number of the governing class in oligarchy and democracy is
unessential. The true characteristic of oligarchy is wealth, of democracy, poverty. But
in fact the two definitions generally coincide; for the wealthy are almost always the
few and the many are the poor.

Yet neither the claim of freedom nor the claim of wealth is really just: for justice is
the distribution of the right thing to the right person. The self-love of the oligarch or
of the democrat puts relative in the place of absolute justice:—the one thinks that
inequality in wealth involves inequality in everything: the other that equality in
freedom involves equality in everything. They both forget that the true end of the state
is not wealth or freedom, but a good life. Mere life is not enough; if it were, slaves
and brute animals would be citizens. Neither do community of place nor rights of
intermarriage and trade constitute a state. Nor can commercial treaties or defensive
alliances give a true political life; for there is no superior power which can enforce
them, and the inhabitants of one state do not care about the virtues or vices of other

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states if only they keep faith with them. Even within the limits of a single state the
prevention of crime and the promotion of trade are secondary objects. The life of
virtue is the only true and sufficient end of the state. Men may live in the
neighbourhood of one another, or even in the same place, and intermarry and trade
and meet at festivals and form alliances. But these are means and conditions only;
virtue is the end. Political society exists for the sake of virtue, and they who
contribute most to this end have a greater right to power in the state than the rich or
noble. But if so, those who make justice relative to a particular form of government
speak of a part of justice only.

Yet another question: Who ought to have the supreme authority in the state? The
many,—the wealthy,—the tyrant,—the good,—the one best man? Any of these
alternatives may lead to bad results. If the poor rule, they may divide the property of
the rich. Is not this unjust? ‘Nay,’ will be the reply, ‘the people did it.’ But if they go
on and on, the poor majority dividing by force the wealth of the rich minority, the
state will be ruined. And on the same principle the rich or the tyrant may rob the poor.
Yet surely justice is the preservation and not the destruction of states. The people, if
they plunder the rich, are no better than the tyrant; both make might prevail over right.
‘But ought not the good to rule?’ Then a slight will be put upon everybody else. ‘Or
the one best man?’—that will make the number excluded still larger. Or, shall the law,
and not the will of man, have the supreme power? And what if the law be defective?

The rule of many is upon the whole the best solution of these difficulties. The people,
taken collectively, though composed of ordinary individuals, have more virtue and
wisdom than any single man among them. As the feast to which many contribute is
better than the feast given by one, as the judgment of the many at the theatre is truer
than the judgment of one, as a good man and a fair work of art have many elements of
beauty or goodness combined in them;—so the assembly of the people has more good
sense and wisdom than any individual member of it. The good qualities which are
scattered about in individuals are combined in it. But is this principle really applicable
to bodies of men? To some, not to all; for there are assemblies of men who are no
better than brutes. But there are men of another sort, whom union makes wise. And if
so, our difficulties are at an end; this is our answer to the question, Who are to be the
rulers of states?

But a new dilemma arises. The many are not fit to hold great offices of state, and yet
if they are excluded, they will be dangerous. They had better therefore have some
judicial and deliberative functions,—such a power as Solon gave them of electing the
magistrates and calling them to account. Although they are not fit to form a judgment
individually, they have sense enough when they meet. But some one will still argue
that the magistrates should be elected and called to account by their peers, just as in
the arts the expert must be judged by the expert, the physician by some one who
understands medicine, whether he be a professional physician or not. Once more we
reply that the people collectively have more wisdom than any individual among them.
Besides, in many of the arts the user is a better judge than the artist.

Yet one more difficulty remains:—The election and calling to account of the
magistrates is the highest of political functions; should such a power be entrusted to

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the people rather than to men of position and fortune? The old answer must be
repeated. The power resides, not in the individual, but in the assembly or lawcourt;
and collectively the wealth and the wisdom of the people are greater than that of any
one or a few individuals.

The previous enquiry shows plainly that the people must govern, but they must
govern according to law. The laws therefore, when good, should be supreme, and the
magistrates should only speak when the laws are unable to speak.—But what are good
laws? We reply generally that the goodness of the laws is relative to the goodness of
the constitution: true forms of government have just laws, perverted forms have unjust
laws.

[In the next chapter, after having disposed of the difficulty which he had suggested,
Aristotle returns to the subject of Chap. ix.]

All arts and sciences aim at some good, and the good or end of the highest of all, the
political, is justice, which is another name for the common interest. And justice is
defined to be equality in relation to persons. But there arises the question: In what
does this equality consist? Some will say that equality or superiority in any single
respect gives a claim in all other respects. But this is absurd; no man can claim
political rights on the ground that he is tall or good-looking. The skill of a flute-player
is not more highly esteemed because he is richer or better born, but because he is the
superior performer. How can there be any comparison of things so dissimilar as
wealth and flute-playing or stature and freedom? Not every kind of superiority, then,
gives a claim to office, but only wealth and rank and freedom; for these are necessary
elements of a state. And we must add justice and courage; for courage is essential to
the well-being, justice to the very existence, of a state.

First, and above all, if we take into account a good life, education and virtue have
superior claims. These are the true bases of government; but the assertion of absolute
equality among equals or of absolute inequality among unequals is mischievous and
false. The relative claim does not give an absolute claim. The rich have a greater stake
in the country; the free and the noble have inherited good qualities from their
ancestors, and their claim is always recognised in their own country; the virtuous have
a claim because justice is the virtue which unites men in states, and all the others are
implied in it; the many, taken collectively, are stronger, richer, and better than the
few. But let us suppose the rich, the free, the virtuous, to be living together in the
same city, which of them ought to govern? (There is no difficulty at all in determining
who should rule in a democracy or in an oligarchy.) But suppose all the elements to
co-exist in the same state, how are we to decide between them? The virtuous will
probably be too few to administer the state. And if men are to govern because they are
more virtuous or richer or higher in rank, on the same principle the most virtuous, or
the richest or the highest in rank, ought to rule over them all. If, again, the many claim
to rule because they are the stronger, with equal justice the strongest of all will claim
to rule over the others. Hence we infer that none of them have any claim to the
exclusion of the rest.

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A similar question:—Should the laws be made for the higher classes, or for all? We
answer that the laws should be just, and that the just is the equal, and has regard to the
common good of the citizens. The laws therefore cannot regard the good of one class
only, but of all the citizens. The good citizen is both ruler and subject, not a member
of one class only. [And he would be excluded from the operation of a law which
related to a class only.] Once more [this is the old question repeated]: What if the
virtue of any one citizen very far exceed the virtues of the rest,—is it not unjust that
he should be only the equal of the others? for he is a God among men. Laws apply
only to equals; and he is himself a law. Democracies feel the inconvenience which
arises out of the presence of men who are pre-eminent by their wealth or influence,
and they have recourse to ostracism. Oligarchs and tyrants are in the same difficulty.
Nor can any form of government allow the existence of a person superior to itself.
The argument in favour of ostracism is based on a political necessity. The painter
does not allow any feature in the face, nor the shipbuilder any part of the ship, to be
out of proportion to the rest; and the citizen must not be out of proportion to the state.
But the legislator should, if possible, so order his state that the evil will not arise; that
would be far better. Ostracism is liable to abuse and is essentially unjust; it has been
employed for purposes of faction, and not for the good of the state. In perverted forms
of government such a practice may be expedient; in the ideal state, who would think
of expelling the one best man? But what is the alternative? If he cannot be a subject,
he must be a king.

Thus from the consideration of the question,—Who is the true ruler in states? we are
led to speak of royalty and to examine the kinds of it. They are five: 1. The
Lacedaemonian, which is a perpetual generalship, either hereditary or elective, having
the power of life and death, but, like the Homeric chiefs, only in the field. To the king
matters of religion are also committed. 2. The despotic form of monarchy which
prevails among barbarians and is exercised over voluntary subjects; for the people are
willing to obey, because they are by nature slaves, and therefore such governments
are hereditary and legal. In one sense they are tyrannies, because their subjects are
slaves: but there is no danger of their being overthrown; for they are guarded not by
mercenaries but by their own people. 3. The dictatorship or elective tyranny, which,
under the name Aesymnetia, existed in ancient Hellas, and was legal but not
hereditary; it lasted either for life or for a term of years, or until certain duties had
been performed. Such an office was held by Pittacus at Mitylene, whom Alcaeus, the
leader of the exiles, denounces in his poems. 4. A fourth kind of monarchy, that of the
Heroic times, was hereditary and legal, and was exercised over willing subjects. The
first monarchs were benefactors of the people in arts or arms; they procured lands or
built cities for them, and the prerogatives which they acquired descended to their
children. They were priests and judges and warriors, and had a supreme authority over
all things. Afterwards their power declined; and at length the office of priest or
general alone remained to them. 5. There is a fifth form of absolute kingship which
exercises an universal power, like that of the state over the public property, or that of
a master over a household.

Of these five forms the first and fifth alone need consideration; the rest differ from
them not in kind but in degree. Thus two questions remain: 1. Is a perpetual
generalship advantageous to the state? This question likewise may be dismissed; for a

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perpetual generalship is not a constitution, but an office established by law which may
exist equally under any form of government. 2. Should one man have absolute power?
Such a royalty is certainly a form of government; but many difficulties are involved in
it.

Already we are engaged in the old controversy,—whether the best laws or the best
man should rule. Both views are tenable. The advocate of royalty says that the law
cannot provide for particular cases. To whom we may fairly reply: Neither can the
ruler dispense with a general principle which is law; and the law which is passionless
is to be preferred to the caprice of the individual. Says the advocate of royalty, An
individual must advise in individual cases. [To whom we in turn reply that] There
must be a legislator, whether he be called a king or not, who will make laws, and
these laws will have validity as far as they are adapted to their ends. But there is still a
question: When there is a defect in the law, who shall decide, the expert or the
multitude? Our conclusion is that the collective wisdom of the many is to be preferred
to the one wise man. They will not all go wrong together, and by reason of their
numbers they are less corruptible, less liable to passion, and not more subject to
faction than the individual. You will say: That they may be divided among
themselves, but that he cannot be divided. Answer, They are quite as good as he. And
are not many good men better than one? But if so aristocracy is to be preferred to
royalty. The reason why ancient governments were monarchies is that in early times
there were only a few good men who could confer benefits, and these benefactors
were made kings. The reason why democracies are a necessity in our own day is that
all men are pretty much on an equality, and no one is pre-eminent among his fellows.
When good men increased in number, royalties passed into aristocracies; these
degenerated into oligarchies. Oligarchies passed into tyrannies, and tyrannies became
democracies, for the rich became fewer and fewer, and the poor more and more
numerous. And democracy seems to be the only form of government any longer
possible, now that cities are increased in size.

Two more questions: 1. Should monarchy be hereditary? No, for the next generation
may be quite ordinary persons, and yet the king will be constrained by natural
affection to bequeath his power to his sons, however ill-fitted they may be to succeed
him. 2. Should he have a military force? Yes, but only such a force as will be
sufficient to control individuals, not to overawe the mass of the citizens.

Absolute monarchy is held to be contrary to nature. Equals are deemed to have an


equal right and worth; and therefore they must all have their turn of ruling and being
ruled in an order of succession fixed by law. (For law is already implied, if there is an
order of succession.) The law is preferable to the rule of individuals; wherefore judges
should be only the ministers of the law, and when they take office they must judge
according to law. But if the law cannot decide, what then? Then we must have
recourse to skilled persons, who are expressly trained to decide causes which are
omitted by the law; they may even go further and amend the law. But still they are its
servants. The rule of the law is the rule of God and reason: in the rule of man there is
an element of the beast. It is argued on the other hand that the physician does not cure
his patients according to fixed rules which are found in a book, but then he is not
liable to be affected by motives of party or interest. Men desire impartiality; the law is

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impartial. And even if there are cases in which the opinion of the one man is better
than law, custom may be better still.

There is another point of view from which the subject may be approached. Every
magistrate must have subordinates; ‘two going together’ and ‘ten such counsellors’ as
Homer says; and it is desirable that they should be regularly appointed. Matters of
detail cannot always be comprehended under laws; and therefore they are referred to
the decision of individuals. But many are better than one, just as many eyes or hands
or feet are better than a single pair. The eyes of kings are the friends who are their
second-selves, and are therefore appointed to rule by them. Thus the two points of
view tend to approximate, and royalty in seeking for instruments of government is
converted into an aristocracy.

But is the doctrine that the law is better than the individual applicable to all forms of
government? No, not to all, but only to those which are legitimate, such as that which
a master exercises over his household, or a king over his subjects, or a free people
over itself. For no man should be lord over his equals, whether there are laws or
whether there are no laws, always excepting the case of the one best man.

A people capable of producing a superior race are fitted for monarchy, and a people
who willingly submit to their superiors in virtue are adapted for aristocracy. To a
warlike multitude of freemen who rule and are ruled in turn, and who select their
officers according to merit, a constitutional government is best suited. When a family
or a single person is pre-eminent in virtue, they are the natural kings and lords of the
state. And the one best man or born superior in virtue cannot be ostracized or killed.
Neither can he be a subject. He is the superior person; the ideal or whole of which the
state is only a part. What is the inference? He must be the ruler of the state for life.

We see then that the true forms of government are three: 1) in which there is one man,
or 2) a family, or 3) many men, of pre-eminent virtue, and both rulers and subjects
rule and obey with a view to the best life. We have already explained that the virtue of
the good man is the same with that of the citizen of the perfect state; and that the term
good has the same meaning whether applied to states or individuals. The education
therefore of the good man and of the good statesman or king will be the same.

The criticisms of royalty in the latter part of the Third Book are many of them
unsatisfactory. It is not true that the kingship of Sparta was merely a generalship for
life, and when Aristotle says that of such monarchies some are hereditary and some
elective, he appears to be making a logical division not to be found in history,—at any
rate we cannot tell to what or to whom he is referring. Neither is it true that of the five
kinds of monarchy two only differ in kind; for there are essential differences between
all the five. Still more unreasonable is the dismissal of the first kind on the ground
that it is only a generalship for life, when we consider that the Spartan monarchy was
the single monarchical institution in Hellas. The five kinds are thus reduced to one.
Neither is the account of the origin of kingship given in this place really based upon
the experience of history. In a few instances it is true that benefits conferred on a city
or nation have raised men to power; but more often the power of a chief or king has

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originated in superior bodily strength or superior intelligence directed to a private end.


Barbarous cunning has often founded kingdoms.

The favourite speculation which Aristotle has inherited from Plato, whether the law or
the wise man is to be supreme, is represented by analogous questions in modern
times: How much is to be common or statute law? what is the place of custom and
precedent? how much is to be left to the direction of the judge? These are inquiries
which are not without interest to the modern jurist. The problem is, What elements of
law should be fixed and permanent, and what proportion should they bear to the
floating and transient? Laws must be known beforehand, or the offender cannot justly
be subjected to them. At first they are simple and general; then as society becomes
more complex, the interstices of these general principles require to be filled up with
details which are demanded by new occasions. But the new occasions are infinite; and
hence at some point the individual must decide. How far he is to bring the question at
issue under some existing law or analogy of law; how far in the absence of law he
may freely use common sense, are points which will be determined differently by
different minds and different schools of jurisprudence. Do what he will he cannot get
rid of the past, nor can he always find there a solution for the present. Like Aristotle,
he will be disposed to regard custom as a mediator between the two contending
principles. And in modern times, where there are representative institutions, the power
of determining causes, which the ancients gave either to the magistrates as in an
oligarchy, or to a popular assembly as in a democracy, acting separately, will be
transferred to the one and many acting together as judge and jury.

This book is characterized by great want of arrangement and frequent repetition. The
paradox that the many are wiser than the few is affirmed again and again. The
paradox of the one best man also occurs twice over. Such an ideal was evidently a
notion common in the age of Aristotle; it culminated in the Stoical wise man. Several
controversies seem to be protracted long after we ought to have finished with them.

But notwithstanding paradoxes and want of arrangement, this book contains many
noble passages, such for example as the two declarations that the rule of law is the
rule of God and of reason; and that the state exists for the sake of a good life, and
without virtue has no true existence; or the favourite thesis that all true forms of
government have regard to the good of the governed; or the final conclusion, arrived
at after many tossings of the argument to and fro, that from the higher point of view
and in the perfect state the good citizen, or at any rate the good ruler, is identical with
the good man.

The Fourth Book of Aristotle’s Politics does not furnish many new ideas. The most
original of them is the middle state, which will be discussed more at length in a
separate Essay (vol. ii). The book contains some excellent remarks, and some things
hard to be understood. Among noble and liberal sentiments may be reckoned the
requirement that all should take part in the government; the reflections that political
tricks and devices are foolish and useless; that the poor should receive gentle
treatment; that there must not only be good laws in the state, but the spirit of
obedience; and the fine observation (taken from Plato) that, even in states which do
not make virtue the aim of the community, men of a noble nature may be found.

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Among difficulties may be mentioned the distinctions without a difference in the


subdivisions of oligarchies and democracies; the distinction between the laws and the
constitution, which elsewhere is forgotten (cp. iii. 15, § 2); the two combinations in
the twelve forms of appointment to offices; the sudden transition in the enumeration
of the different kinds of law courts to political cases, which are no sooner spoken of
than the consideration of them is dropped; or the mention in c. 7. § 2 of ‘the form of
government to which the term aristocracy is rightly applied in the first part of our
treatise,’ a reference to which there is no antecedent, either in the previous Books, or,
if the order is transposed, in the Seventh Book.

BOOK IV.
The absolutely, relatively, conditionally, and on the average best forms of
government: why forms of government differ, and what are their component elements:
the varieties of oligarchy and democracy: of aristocracy and policy: of tyranny: the
forms taken by the deliberative and executive power under different constitutions.

Every art which embraces an entire subject must take in all the branches of that
subject. Gymnastic, for example, includes 1) the training which is best absolutely; 2)
which is best suited to different individuals; 3) which is not the best, either relatively
or absolutely, though sometimes wanted, and must therefore be understood and taught
by the training master; 4) which is best for the majority. So too the art of politics
comprehends several forms of government,—1) the ideal state, 2) the state which is
best relatively to circumstances, 3) the inferior state placed under inferior conditions
and not making the best use of them, 4) the best average state.

We must aim at what is practicable; and not, like [Plato and other] political writers
who have excellent but impossible ideas, seek after an unattainable perfection. Any
change which we desire to introduce should be congenial as well as possible; for to
reform is as difficult as to create, to unlearn as to learn. The statesman should not be a
mere theorist; but he should have a true political insight into the evils of states and
their remedies. And he should not fall into the error of supposing that there is only
one kind of democracy and one kind of oligarchy; for there are many. He should
know, not only which government is the best, but which is the best under the
circumstances, and not only which laws are the best, but which are adapted to one
form of constitution rather than to another. The laws are the rules according to which
magistrates administer the state; but they vary under different governments, and are
not to be confounded with the principles of the constitution.

We have said that there are three true forms of government—royalty, aristocracy,
polity; and three perversions—tyranny, oligarchy, democracy. Royalty and
aristocracy have been already (?) discussed, for they are included in the perfect state;
both imply a principle of virtue provided with external goods.—Of perversions,
tyranny, which is the perversion of the best and most divine, is necessarily the worst.
Not so bad is oligarchy; and last and least bad is democracy. A certain writer [Plato]
is wrong in saying that democracy, although the worst of good constitutions, is the
best of bad ones; for there is no best; all perversions are bad.

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Leaving this question we will proceed to describe, 1) the different forms of oligarchy
and of democracy; 2) the constitution which is next best after the perfect, and best
suited to states in general; 3) the people to whom each of the other constitutions is
suited; 4) the manner in which these inferior forms of government are severally to be
established; 5) the causes of the preservation or ruin of states.

There are many kinds of states, because every state contains many elements, [which
are combined in many ways]. Differences of rank, wealth, merit, are found in them
all. Some of the citizens are armed and some unarmed. The common people have their
various employments. Even among the notables there are gradations of wealth,
shown, for example, by the number of horses which they keep. And as the poor, or the
middle class, or the notables predominate, they divide the government among
themselves.

Hence arise various forms of constitutions. There are generally thought to be two
principal ones, democracy, the rule of the many, oligarchy, the rule of the few; the
rest are included under them, aristocracy being a kind of oligarchy, and polity a kind
of democracy, as men say of the winds that there are two only, North and South, the
West being a variation of the North, and the East of the South; and of the harmonies
that there are two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian, other adaptations of the scale
being comprehended under these. But it is better to distinguish one or two true forms,
i.e. royalty or aristocracy, and to regard all the others, however many there may be, as
perversions of these. And, adopting the language of music, we may compare
oligarchy to the severer, democracy to the more relaxed harmonies.

Figures of speech in modern writers are only illustrations by which we seek to convey
abstract ideas in a lively form. They provide a rest or refreshment in an argument, like
the pictures in a book, and when we lay them aside, they leave the mind free from the
associations of sense. We do not argue from them or allow them to influence our
judgment. But among ancient philosophers, figures of speech and other picturesque
forms of expression generally affect the ideas which are conveyed through them. The
liveliness of the image is purchased at the cost of a certain amount of error. Although
Aristotle contemptuously says of Plato, τον?το δ’ ?στ? λέγειν μετα?ορ?ς ποιητικάς
(Met. i. 991. 22 a), he is himself often under the influence of language borrowed from
sense.

The comparison of the state to the human body or to the living animal is one of the
most fruitful of the images used by ancient philosophy. It represents to the mind the
unity in plurality of the state, the complexity and interdependence of the parts, and the
common life which animates them: ‘as there are many members in one body, and all
members have not the same office, so we being many are one body.’ Many political
as well as theological ideas have been suggested by this image. It is better than ‘a
machine,’ to which the state is often compared in modern times. But it is far from
‘going on all fours,’ or furnishing an exact or scientific analogy. The unity and
continuity of the state are different from the unity and continuity of the individual; the
state has a longer life than the individual, but is less united; it has no consciousness or
conscience, but only public opinion; and its freedom of action is more limited.

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The variety in the organs of animals to which Aristotle refers below, is a laboured and
imperfect image of the differences in forms of government. For neither do the
differences in the forms of the organs constitute the differences of animals, nor the
differences in the classes of citizens the varieties of states. It would be a truer
supposition that both states and animals are made after different types or patterns,
though there are some points in which they all resemble each other. We may say of
nature what Aristotle says of the political society, that the whole is prior to the part.
The comparison of the higher classes of the state to the soul and the lower classes to
the body, though in one point of view elevating, is also degrading; for the lower
classes have minds equally with the higher; nor is the relation between the two
analogous to that of the soul and the body.

Democracy is not simply the rule of the majority, nor oligarchy of the minority; for in
every form of government the majority rules. Neither is a rich majority a democracy,
nor a poor minority an oligarchy. The prime and characteristic quality of democracy is
freedom, of oligarchy, wealth. But the freemen must be poor and a majority; the
oligarchs must be a wealthy and noble minority.

Besides the constitutions already mentioned, I have alluded to other forms of


government, which vary with the variations of their component parts. Their
differences may be illustrated by the varieties among animals, which likewise
originate in differences of the essential organs, such as the stomach, mouth, eyes,
organs of locomotion, and the like; for there are as many animals as there are possible
changes and combinations of these organs. In like manner the state has various
elements, husbandmen, artisans, traders, serfs, and the differences of states are caused
by different combinations of these elements. A warrior class must be added; for they
are as necessary to the state as any other. Plato was mistaken in saying that a state
consisted of four persons only, 1) a weaver, 2) a husbandman, 3) a shoemaker, 4) a
builder,—these are his four original citizens, to whom he afterwards adds, a smith, a
herdsman, a merchant, and retailer. But there are other elements no less essential. The
higher classes, such as 5) the warriors, or 6) the deliberative and judicial class, are
more truly parts of the state than any other. 7) There are the wealthy, and 8) the
magistrates. Some of these classes overlap, and the same persons fall under more than
one of them. But two of them, the rich and the poor, exclude one another, and
therefore furnish a basis for the classification of states. Hence there are supposed to be
two kinds of government, democracy and oligarchy. These are the greater divisions of
states, and there are subdivisions, varying as the classes vary out of which
democracies or oligarchies are composed. The common people differ in their
occupations and modes of life, and the notables differ according to their wealth, birth,
virtue, education.

Of democracies there are five kinds: 1) the democracy in which nobody is poor, and
nobody is rich or superior, but all are equal and equally share in the government; 2) in
which a low property qualification is required for citizenship; 3) in which all who are
not disqualified [by birth] share in the government; but in this, as in the preceding
forms, the law is supreme; 4) in which everybody, without any scrutiny of his rights,
has a share in the government; but the law is supreme as before; 5) the democracy in
which there is no law, but the tyrant people, flattered by their leaders, set aside the

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law and the government is carried on by decrees. For in democracies, as in tyrannies,


there are flatterers, and the extreme democracy is to other democracies what tyranny
is to legitimate forms of monarchy. [N.B. It is difficult to distinguish 1), which seems
to be a general description of democracy, from some of the other forms, or 3) from
4).]

The stages of democracy may be traced as follows: The government is administered


according to law, 1) when the people are husbandmen moderately well off and are
compelled to live by the labour of their hands but are not paid for the performance of
political duties; for then nobody is excluded who has the required qualification; but
they do not come to the assembly, because they cannot spare time, and so the law
rules and not the multitude: 2) when every one whose parents are citizens has a share
of power, and still, because there is no way of providing pay, the law rules: 3) when
all freemen have a share, and still no pay: 4) but when, as in our modern overgrown
cities, pay is given, the state is governed by the multitude who have nothing else to
do, and not by the laws.

Of oligarchies there are four kinds: 1) in which there is a qualification high enough to
exclude the masses: 2) in which there is a high qualification, and the vacancies in the
governing body are filled up by co-optation: 3) in which the son succeeds the father:
4) in which there is an arbitrary rule of powerful families called a dynastia; this is
among oligarchies what tyranny is among monarchies and the worst form of
democracy among democracies.

The stages of oligarchy may be traced as follows: 1) The first form of oligarchy is
based upon the possession of moderate property; and the owners of property being
numerous and having to attend to their property admit the rule of law: in a second
form 2) the properties are larger, and the owners fewer. In a third 3) the government is
hereditary and passes into the hands of a small number of families. In all these three
forms, as in the three corresponding forms of democracy, the law is observed, and is
the instrument by which the rulers carry out their wishes. But there is a fourth form, 4)
in which the law is set aside, and a few leading families take possession of the
government, which thus approximates to a monarchy.

But in distinguishing different kinds of government, it must also be remembered that a


constitution framed in one spirit may be administered in another, e. g. an oligarchy
may be administered in a popular, a democracy in an exclusive spirit. This frequently
happens after a revolution; old habits linger although the government is changed. The
laws remain, but the victorious party keep the power in their own hands.

There are yet two other forms of government, 1) aristocracy and 2) polity; the first has
been generally recognized, but the latter is often overlooked by writers on these
subjects. Aristocracy or the government of the best, taken in the highest and first
sense of the word, is the ideal state, or the state in which the good man is absolutely
the same as the good citizen. But in a secondary sense it is applied to another kind of
state, which is neither oligarchy, nor polity, but a mixed government taking three
forms; 1) as at Carthage where regard is had to wealth, numbers, and merit; 2) or to

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merit and numbers as at Lacedaemon; and there is 3) that form of polity which
inclines to oligarchy.

And now I have to speak of polity, which, like the above-mentioned aristocracies, is
not a perversion, but only a falling short from the perfect state. This form of
government is a fusion of democracy and oligarchy; it is usually called polity when
inclining towards democracy, and aristocracy when approaching more nearly to
oligarchy, the latter because birth and education are commonly accompanied by
wealth, and the rich by their external advantages are placed above crime. Whence
oligarchy and aristocracy are often confused; for they are both supposed to be a
government of the best, and it is thought that the government of the best can never be
bad. Now there are two things to be considered: the goodness of the laws, and the
willingness of the citizens to obey them; for in an oligarchy there may be good laws
which are never observed. And the citizen of a state may obey not the best laws, but
the best which are attainable by them.

Polity or constitutional government is not like aristocracy based on merit; it only


seeks to unite the freedom of the poor majority with the wealth of the rich minority.
When it includes virtue, it is fairly entitled to be called aristocracy, not in the highest,
but in the secondary sense of the term. It combines the characteristics of oligarchy and
democracy. There are three ways in which the two latter may be united so as to form a
polity: either 1) elements may be taken from both, e. g. the government may give pay
to the poor as in a democracy for coming to the courts of law, and fine the rich as in
an oligarchy for abstaining: or 2) there may be a mean between the two: instead of a
high property qualification, or none at all, a moderate one may be imposed: or 3) [in
the same public act] something may be borrowed by the government from both; e. g.
the magistrates may be elected by vote as in an oligarchy, and without a property
qualification as in a democracy. The fusion is most complete when the mixed state
may be termed indifferently democracy or oligarchy, like the Lacedaemonian, which
in the election of the Ephors by all out of all, and of the Elders by all, and in the
common education of all the citizens and common meals and dress, has the character
of a democracy; in the power entrusted to a few magistrates of inflicting death or
banishment and in the election of them by vote, resembles an oligarchy. In a polity
both should be present, and neither seen; and the government should depend for
support not on foreign aid, but on the good-will of the citizens.

Tyranny must also be accounted a form of government. Two kinds of it have been
already discussed, 1) the barbarian monarchy, 2) the Aesymnetia or dictatorship
which existed in ancient Hellas. Both these, although they possess absolute power,
may be said to be royal in so far as the monarch rules according to law and over
willing subjects. But the true or typical form of tyranny is the arbitrary power of an
individual crushing everybody alike, and governing only for his own advantage and
against the will of his subjects,—a government which is detestable to freemen.

The want of arrangement in the Politics is nowhere greater than in the Fourth Book.
There is a pretence of order which increases the confusion. The elaborate preface has
hardly any relation to what follows. After dividing governments into 1) the best
absolutely, 2) the best relatively, 3) the best on the average, 4) the inferior sort, the

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writer sets aside the first ‘because it has been already (?) discussed under the subject
of monarchy,’ and silently drops the fourth. The two which remain are formally
distinguished, but are not really very different from each other. But he partly
identifies them with the actual forms of government, which are discussed at
disproportionate length. Such is the confusion of style, that while in the Fourth Book
he seems to consider this middle or average form of government to be the only
preservative of states, in the Fifth Book, where the subject is treated of more at length,
many instructions are given by which all varieties of government may be preserved.

In the enumeration of the states which are best relatively to circumstances, that is to
say, the ordinary Greek states, he passes in Chap. 6 from oligarchy to democracy, and
from democracy back again to oligarchy. He then proceeds to speak of polity, which
he describes as a fusion of the two. The best state for the average of mankind seems to
be the same or nearly the same with what he has already called polity, and what he
afterwards calls the ‘middle constitution,’—i.e. not the best actual state, but the best
practicable under ordinary conditions. Then returning to oligarchy and democracy, he
reckons up the devices by which they respectively seek to get the better of one
another; and having gained what he calls an appropriate basis of discussion, which is
only a recital of the different forms of oligarchy and democracy, he proceeds to
enumerate the parts of states. But in this enumeration he is far from showing that
different forms of government are made up of the same component elements
differently modified, which seems to be implied when he says that the kinds of states
as of animals are formed by variations of the same organs. It is not clear whether here,
as in Book III, he would include in his definition of offices dicasts and ecclesiasts; nor
does he distinguish satisfactorily between deliberative and judicial offices. The term
‘office’ he is here disposed to confine to magistrates. The above-mentioned
transitions, the incomplete treatment of subjects which have been introduced with a
sort of flourish and are quickly dropped, the tendency to let the meaning of words
slide, such as aristocracy, office, polity, give rise to further difficulties in this part of
the work. The twelve modes and the two combinations according to which officers or
magistrates are to be appointed, and the parallel list of the law-courts, though standing
in some relation to actual facts, are for the most part a logical fiction.

The idea of the middle constitution, that form of government which one legislator
alone, and he unknown to us, sought to establish in Hellas, is also indistinct. Aristotle
describes it as a combination of democracy and oligrachy; for his tendency is to
regard forms of government as running into one another. To us it rather appears to be
intermediate between them. It is allied both to aristocracy and to democracy; but is
not a fusion of them. The conception of aristocracy is hazy to us. It is said to be a
government of the best men or of virtue; but we know of no Hellenic state in which
such a government existed; nor is a hint given of any method by which the
government of the virtuous only could be secured. Strictly speaking, it only applies to
the ideal state. Oligarchy, democracy, tyranny, had a real life, and were at different
periods of Greek history in conflict with one another. They were more or less
moderate or just in the administration of the state; but the other governments, polity
and aristocracy, were a shadow only, in which the ideal of philosophy mingled with a
tradition of an earlier time, when the government of one or a few had been more
natural and just than in the later ages of Hellas. Aristotle never distinguishes these two

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elements; nor does he apply the term aristocracy, except in the sense of an aristocracy
of birth, to any Hellenic state. In the traditional meaning of the word, Sparta is called
an aristocracy, but at the same time a democracy. His aristocracy, when not used in
the ideal sense, really comes back to the ‘bad’ and ‘good’ of Theognis and Alcaeus.

There is a similar verbal difficulty about oligarchy: was it really a government of the
few rich or of the few noble? Many prejudices would have to be got over in a state
before the nouveaux riches would be admitted into the ranks of the nobility; nor,
except at Athens, under the Solonian constitution, do we certainly know of any
Hellenic state in which rights of citizenship depended upon wealth, although this
arrangement is frequently alluded to by Aristotle; v. c. 3, §§ 8, 10; vi. c. 6, §§ 16-18;
c. 7, § 9, etc. Both by Aristotle and Plato oligarchy is described as the government of
the wealthy, in Plato rather of those who have remained wealthy, when the rest of the
governing class have become impoverished; but in Aristotle clearly those who have
made, as well as those who have inherited their wealth, even the artisans, are admitted
to the government. The truth seems to be that oligarchies were originally founded
upon birth; the oligarchs were the ancient houses of the city, or the leaders of the new
settlement, in whom wealth and birth generally coincided. The colony, like our own
colonies, was of necessity less exclusive than the mother state. In later times the
oligarchs were regarded as the wealthy rather than as ‘the good;’ and in some
instances, probably when their own numbers were failing, they admitted to their ranks
other wealthy persons, who became united to them in the brotherhood of arms. But it
is not likely that a property qualification was originally the basis of an ancient state.

The idea which more than any other is present to the mind of Aristotle in this part of
the Politics is the relativeness of government. We do not seek always for the best, or
even for the best under the circumstances. We must think of the average man and the
average conditions, and sometimes acquiesce in a very bad form, because no other
can be carried out in practice. Therefore the statesman must know not only what are
the leading kinds, but also the subdivisions of them, and how they are created. They
are apt to run into one another. And many states may be administered in a spirit
opposed to their constitution. They may be nominally oligarchies or democracies; but
the democracies may be governed oligarchically, or the oligarchies democratically.

Underlying all this part of the treatise, there is a latent antagonism to Plato. For Plato
has four forms of government only; he has omitted the single true one. Aristotle
maintains that there are different sorts of oligarchies and democracies; by Plato one
form of each is recognized and no other.

[Enough of forms of government.] We have now arrived at the question, What is the
best state and the best life for men in general? Most of the so-called aristocracies
assume a standard of virtue which is too high; others hardly differ from the
constitutional government, and therefore need no separate discussion. [In all these
forms we are seeking for the mean.] Virtue was said in the Ethics to be a mean, and
the same principles apply both to states and to individuals. Happy is the state which is
ruled neither by the very rich who are reared in luxury, nor by the very poor who are
too degraded, but by the middle class who are equal and similar. The rich know not
how to obey, nor the poor how to rule; and thus arises a city of masters and slaves; the

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slave envying his master and the master despising his slave. But the middle class are
to be trusted. They do not covet other men’s goods and nobody covets theirs; they
neither plot nor are plotted against; and therefore they are the very best material of the
state. And where they outnumber one or both the other classes, the state will be safe
from extremes, and will be free from faction. Large cities are more populous than
small ones, and are therefore safer, because they rest upon the basis of a large middle
class; and for the same reason democracies are safer than oligarchies. But in
democracies and oligarchies the middle class is often small, and where rich and poor
are in naked antagonism the balance is destroyed. [This appears to be in partial
contradiction with what has preceded, or at least to be ill expressed.] Whichever wins,
sets up an oligarchy or democracy, as the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians did in
the days of old, regarding only their own advantage and not that of Hellas. The middle
state is the best, and of other states that is the best which is nearest to the middle state.
Yet one man only of all who ever ruled in Hellas thought of establishing this middle
constitution.

There arises another question: to what peoples are different forms of government
suited? We may begin by assuming as a general principle common to all governments
that the desire of permanence should be stronger than the love of change. Now in
every state there is a qualitative and a quantitative element. Under quality is to be
included freedom, wealth, education, birth; under quantity superiority of numbers.
And there must be a comparison or balance of the two. Where the poor exceed in
numbers more than the rich in quality, there will naturally be a democracy; where the
rich exceed in quality more than they fall short in quantity, there will naturally be an
oligarchy. And therefore in every state the middle class should be included by the
legislator if he desires to avoid extremes and to have a stable government. The rich
and the poor cannot trust one another, but the middle class is the arbiter between them
whom both parties are willing to trust. The more perfect the fusion of elements, the
more lasting will be the state. Yet even in the better forms of aristocracy [which are
akin to polity] the single element of wealth is often allowed to predominate; and a
foolish attempt is made to overreach the people by various devices. Out of the false
good there arises a true evil; for the rich encroach, and their encroachments are ever
more fatal than the excesses of the people.

Oligarchies and democracies have their devices and counter-devices: the devices of
oligarchies apply 1) to the assembly; 2) to the magistracies; 3) to the law-courts; 4) to
the possession of arms; 5) to gymnastic exercises. 1) The assembly is open both to
rich and poor but the rich only are fined for non-attendance, the poor may do as they
like. 2) The rich cannot refuse office, but the poor may. 3) They both serve in the law-
courts, but the poor are let off easily, or the fine inflicted upon them is smaller; and in
some states the poor do not register themselves that they may be exempt from public
duties and not incur a fine. 4, 5) The rich are obliged to have arms and to attend the
gymnasium, but the poor are not obliged. In democracies there are counter-devices:
The poor are paid for attending the law-courts and the assembly, and the rich incur no
penalty if they are absent. He who would duly mix the two principles should both pay
the poor for attendance and fine the rich for non-attendance. In a well-balanced state
the government should be confined to the heavy-armed soldiers, and the qualification
imposed should be such that the number of the citizens may just exceed the number of

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those who are excluded. (‘But where are the poor to find a place?’ They will not
complain if they are kindly treated. Nor are they unwilling to fight when they are well
fed. But how to secure gentle treatment for them is a problem; for the rich are not
always humane.) [And so this government of the middle class naturally took the place
of the oligarchy.] After the overthrow of the kings, the warriors became the ruling
class, and their arm of war was cavalry; for without discipline infantry are useless,
and there was no art of war in ancient times. But afterwards, when the art of war had
been invented and the heavy-armed increased in strength, the middle-class had a
larger share in the government.

Once more let us renew the whole discussion in due order, now that we have gained a
sound basis. In all states there are three elements: 1) the deliberative, 2) the executive,
3) the judicial; these three take different forms in different constitutions. In
democracies all things are decided by all, but there are various ways in which the
democratic principle may be carried out. a) The citizens may deliberate in the
assembly, but by turns; and the boards of magistrates may come into office by turns
until every citizen has held office, while the body of the people meet only to hear
edicts and to pass laws. b, c) In another form of democracy the citizens all meet, but
only to elect magistrates, to pass laws, to decide about peace and war, and to make
scrutinies. The ordinary administration is entrusted to the magistrates, who are elected
either by vote or by lot. [This form of democracy is given under two heads, but the
second appears only to be a repetition of the first.] Or again, d) the whole power of
the executive is in the hands of the assembly, and the magistrates only prepare the
business for them: — this is the last and worst form of democracy. In oligarchies
some deliberate about all things. If a) the ruling class are a numerous body, having a
moderate qualification attainable by any one, and they observe law, there arises a
form of oligarchy which inclines to a polity. But b) when only selected persons have
the power of deliberation, although they still observe the law, the state is a pure
oligarchy; and is of necessity oligarchical when c) the government is hereditary or co-
optative. On the other hand, d) when the whole people decide the most important
questions, but the executive is in the hands of the magistrates who are elected by lot
or by vote, there the constitution is an aristocracy or polity. And e) when the
magistrates are partly elected by vote and partly by lot, [the whole people having still
to decide about peace and war and retaining the power of scrutiny,] then the
government is partly aristocratical and partly constitutional.

As an oligarchy should have some democratical, so a democracy should have some


oligarchical elements; the rich should be compelled to attend the courts of law. The
deliberative body should be chosen by vote or by lot in equal numbers out of different
classes; and pay should be given only to so many of the people as will balance the
notables. In oligarchies, on the other hand, the people should share to a certain extent,
but only vote after a previous deliberation of select persons, who should also retain in
their hands the final decision.

About the executive many questions arise. 1) What is an office? 2) How many shall
there be? 3) How long shall they last? 4) How shall the holders of them be appointed?
The question 1) What is an office?—is partly verbal; those offices have the best right
to the name which are concerned with deliberating, superintending, judging,

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commanding, especially the last. Much more important is the second question, 2) how
many shall there be? To which we reply that in larger states they should be numerous
and special,—that in small states there are not many persons qualified to take them,
and therefore one man may hold several, for they will not interfere with one another.
We must ascertain what offices are necessary or useful, and then see which of them
can be combined. Some other points have to be determined: When should authority be
localized and when centralized? Should offices be arranged according to subjects or
according to the persons with whom they deal? Should they be the same under
different constitutions? Some offices, like that of counsellor, are clearly democratic;
others, like that of censor of boys or women, aristocratical; others, like that of probuli,
oligarchical. [Question 3), relating to the term of office, appears to be forgotten.] As
to question 4) How shall officers of state be appointed? three cases arise. a) Who shall
elect the magistrates? b) Out of whom shall they be elected? and c) In what manner?
The answer to any of these three questions may take three forms, and each of these
three forms admits of four variations, twelve in all, besides two further combinations.
The result may be summed up as follows: All or some, or all and some, elect out of all
or some, or out of all and some, by vote or by lot; or partly out of some and partly out
of all, and partly by vote and partly by lot. In extreme democracies the choice is made
by all out of all; in extreme oligarchies by some out of some, both admitting of certain
imitations or extensions which bring them nearer respectively to aristocracy or
constitutional government.

Three similar questions arise about courts of law. 1) How many are the kinds of law-
courts? 2) Out of whom are the judges to be appointed? And 3) in what manner? 1)
There are eight law-courts: a) a court of audits; b) a court for the trial of [ordinary]
offences against the state; c) for the trial of treason; d) of disputes respecting
penalties; e) of important civil suits; f) of murder and homicide; g) of disputes with
and among strangers; h) of minor suits. Of these courts the most important is that
which tries political cases. [Of political cases he proposes to speak, but at once drops
them and returns to his former subject.] 2) Judges may be appointed either wholly or
partly out of all or out of some. 3) They may be appointed by vote or by lot, or by a
combination of the two. When the judges are chosen from all and deal with all cases,
the court is democratical; when from a few only, oligarchical; when mixed,
aristocratical and constitutional.

Two or three more remarks are suggested by the study of this book. We may note 1)
the real enthusiasm with which Aristotle speaks of the middle class, and of the
constitution which is based upon it: no other government is equally praised by him. It
seemed to him, not like the Republic of Plato to be out of the reach of human nature,
but well adapted to a Greek state which was unwilling to be at the mercy of every
invader and to be the true remedy for the evils of Hellas. Of the invidious connotation
attaching in modern times to the term ‘middle class,’ which has been equally
obnoxious to those above and those below them, there is no trace in Aristotle. 2)
When he speaks of the middle class as in a mean between the rich and the poor, he
hardly seems to recognize that the rich are included in the middle class: he probably
intended to say that the power of the oligarchy would be merged or lost in the larger
body to whom the government was entrusted: but it might also be argued that the rich
and the middle class together would be too much for the poor, and would unite in

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oppressing them. The spirit of Aristotle’s ‘polity’ is more truly expressed in the
statement that the heavy-armed citizens should at least exceed in number the rest of
the city. But the idea is not worked out; it is impossible to conceive a state in which
the very poor and the very rich are alike excluded. Some other characteristics of polity
are introduced in c. 14. § 10, for the first time. But there is nowhere any clear
statement of the relation in which the πολιτεία and the μέση πολιτεία stand to one
another. The middle class and constitutional government are elsewhere spoken of
separately; in this passage only they are combined. The different ways in which
Aristocracy and Polity are explained in different passages, the obscurity in which they
are involved, and the manner in which they slide into one another, are worthy of
remark.

3) The absence of illustrations from Greek history in this part of the work is striking,
nor are we able to supply them for ourselves. The reason is that the different forms of
government described by Aristotle, with the exception of tyranny and extreme
democracy, do not correspond with known facts; and though implying a general
notion of Greek history, there is no sufficient evidence to show whether they are or
are not the result of historical research. The numerous divisions and subdivisions of
the modes of appointment to offices are enough to prove that many of the distinctions
of Aristotle are purely logical, and are not drawn from the history of Hellas.

4) Thus far there is no reference to contemporary history, nor any distinct allusion to
the great historians of Hellas, any more than there is a trace of their phraseology.
Neither is there reason to think that the revolution effected by Philip and Alexander
had any influence upon the speculations of Aristotle. He lives in the world of political
philosophy, which in his view, however surprising the fact may be to us, hardly
appears to stand in any relation to the facts which were passing before his eyes.

The fifth is the most valuable and interesting of all the books of the Politics. It
embraces a wide field. It contains a picture of Greek political life; it is a ‘bazaar’ of
states and governments. But it is defective in order and arrangement. It draws
illustrations indiscriminately from all parts of Hellas, and from all times of Greek
history. The period before the Persian War, and the age of Epaminondas and of Philip,
alike furnish examples of political philosophy, which are placed side by side in
successive sentences. To us these examples stand in no relation to the course of
history, and therefore we are unable to make use of them. Still they have an interest,
not only as a picture of Hellenic life, but as showing that the political philosophy of
Aristotle, if partly resting on divisions of logic (see above), was also based on
historical facts.

We shall hereafter discuss in an Essay which will be found in the second volume the
value of Aristotle as an historian, and shall endeavour to show that his greatness was
not less, but of a different kind from that which has generally been attributed to him.
He saw far and wide; he had cast his eyes over Hellas from Cyrene to Miletus and
Rhodes; from Massalia to Chios; from Sybaris and Syracuse to Apollonia and
Heraclea on the Pontus; from Crete to Amphipolis. Over the whole Hellenic world
and to some extent into the barbarous regions beyond his inquisitive spirit had
penetrated. We know not whence his information was obtained; whether from Peripli

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or other geographical works of writers such as Scylax and Hecataeus; or whether an


oral tradition of Greek history was collected and taught in the Peripatetic School. He
lived in a hearing and not in a reading age, and therefore much of his information
must have come from merchants and travellers, or may have been collected in places
to which he himself had travelled. But he hardly anywhere indicates his sources, and
it would be vain for us to try and discover them.

BOOK V.
The motives, objects, and occasions of revolutions: they begin in small matters, but
are concerned with great: they are accomplished by force or fraud: revolutions in
democracies: in oligarchies: in aristocracies and mixed governments: how to avoid
them: how tyrannies and monarchies may be preserved: the beneficent despot: short
duration of tyrannies: a word about Plato’s cycle.

Our design is now nearly completed. We have only to speak of the causes of
revolution in states,—out of what and into what they mostly change,—what are the
conservative, what are the destructive elements.

In all governments there is a recognition of justice and equality; but they often fail in
the attainment of them. Democracy is based on the equality of equals, oligarchy upon
the inequality of unequals. The democrat argues that those who are equal in one
respect (freedom) should be equal in all; the oligarch that those who are unequal in
one respect (wealth) should be unequal in all. Both these forms of government have a
kind of justice, but it is a relative and imperfect one; and therefore either of the two
parties in the state, when dissatisfied, stirs up revolution. (The virtuous, from whom
the nobility claim descent, have the best right to rebel—for they are in a position of
far greater inequality; but they are not inclined.) And thus revolution arises, taking
two forms, 1) changes in the government, and 2) changes in the persons who
administer the government. The change in either case may be one of degree, or of a
part only, and the revolution may be only directed against some office or institution;
as at Sparta, when Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and at Epidamnus,
where a council was appointed to supersede the heads of tribes.

I should explain that equality is of two kinds, 1) numerical, and 2)


proportionate,—sameness of number and size, and sameness of ratios. Democracy
answers to the first, oligarchy to the second. Although there may be other differences,
these are the principal; for virtue and good birth are comparatively rare, but the
opposition of wealth and numbers exists everywhere. Both kinds of equality are bad
and come to a bad end if taken alone; they should therefore be combined; and the
equality should be partly numerical, and partly proportionate.

Still the less dangerous form of government is democracy: oligarchy is threatened


both from within and from without; democracy only from without, for the people
rarely, if ever, quarrel among themselves. Also democracy is akin to a government of
the middle class, which is the safest of all the imperfect forms of government.

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The equality of mankind is an idea of the greatest power and efficacy. It begins with
the beginnings of abstract thought; it is the expression of a natural sentiment: it has
long been made in all civilized countries the foundation of ethics and of civil
rights:—Men, as we say, are equal in the sight of God and in the eye of the law. To
this also the world seems to be tending in politics: it is the ideal of the future that all
men may be equal in political powers and privileges, and equally fitted to exercise
them. Nor would Aristotle have dissented from this latter view if the saving clause
were added, and equality in political power were accompanied by equality of personal
fitness. And several times in the history of the world, in the Middle Ages as well as at
the Reformation and the French Revolution, premature attempts have been made to
grasp at this equality and to anticipate what in future ages may prove to be the course
of history. The philosopher advises caution: he tells us that mankind never ‘are,’ or
have been, but always ‘are to be,’ upon an equality; and that equal rights and
privileges imply equal education and equal capacities. He warns us against the
confusion and perhaps destruction which an idea at present so impracticable and so
incapable of being confined by law as equality among unequals may bring upon the
world. He tells us that equality if for a moment attained will speedily be lost, or rather
is always in a process of being demanded and being refused.

To the Greek mind the idea of equality had a sort of arithmetical necessity derived
from the Pythagorean philosophy. Not that the Greek thought of applying the
argument from numbers (‘every man to count for one and no man for more than one’)
to slaves or barbarians. It was the equality of peers, ?σοι κα? ?μοιοι, which he pre-
supposed whether they included the people or a select class only. Yet no doubt the
Pythagorean idea of equality, though derived from an aristocratical society or school,
gave a great impulse to the conception of democracy in Hellas. Aristotle, like the
modern philosopher, is aware of the dangerous character of this formula when applied
indiscriminately to all stages of society and to all sorts of men. He is aware too that
democracy can no longer be resisted, and that equality among unequals had become
the prevailing principle of Greek politics. But he would add, as far as he can, checks
and limitations. The arithmetical symbol which he opposes to equality is proportion;
the citizen is to have power or to have the franchise in proportion to his wealth,
education, and capacity. The distinction between mere numerical and proportionate
equality is analogous to the geometrical and arithmetical ratios upon which justice is
based in the Nicomachean Ethics. Such arithmetical or geometrical expression gave
men a formula for aristocracy as well as democracy, which was a ‘most gracious aid’
to their conception of a higher notion of the state. Ideas must be given through
something, and if we may parody Aristotle’s own language there are two things which
mankind require, true thoughts, and true expressions; and the one cannot exist without
the other.

In order to ascertain, Whence revolutions arise?—we must consider 1) the tempers of


those who make them; 2) the motives from which they are made; 3) the causes and
occasions of them. [It is difficult to distinguish the first from the second, or the second
from the third of these general causes or kinds of causes. They do not exactly
correspond to internal and external, which would have been an intelligible division.
Indeed Aristotle himself implies, infra § 5, that the second is not distinguishable from
the third.] 1) They are made by equals who desire, or by unequals who disdain

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equality. 2) The motives from which they are made are gain and honour, or the
avoidance of loss and dishonour. 3) The causes of them are altogether eleven in
number: a) love of gain; b) love of honour—both have been already noted; they are
here explained to mean indignation at the undeserved gain and honour of other men;
c) insolence; d) fear; e) the love of superiority; f) contempt; g) unequal increase of a
part; also h) election intrigues; i) carelessness; k) neglect of trifles; l) disparity of
elements. [The order is not exactly preserved in the description which follows.]

a) Insolence and b) avarice induce the magistrates to conspire against one another and
the state; c) disregard of merit in the distribution of honours is another cause of
revolution; d) the consciousness of superiority in some person or persons leads to an
outbreak which ends in the triumph of an individual or of a family; e) fear of wrong or
punishment is another cause; f) contempt is a cause; g) revolutions also arise out of
disproportion in any part of a state, e. g. in an oligarchy when the rich are reduced in
numbers by a great defeat, as at Argos after the battle of Hebdome, or in a democracy
when their wealth and numbers become excessive; or h) they are due to election
intrigues; or i) to carelessness which has allowed traitors to find their way into the
highest offices; or k) they may be caused by the neglect of an apparently small matter
such as the qualification for office; or l) may arise out of disparity of elements, as aa)
when different races meet in new colonies, like the Achaeans and Troezenians at
Sybaris, or the Sybarites and their fellow colonists at Thurii; or again bb) disunion is
produced by separation of place, as at Colophon and Notium, or as at Athens and the
Peiraeus. There are also cc) oppositions of virtue and vice, which are the greatest of
all, and next to them in importance is the antagonism of poverty and wealth; and there
are others, e. g. the difference of place.

Trifles may be the occasions of revolutions, but they are not the true causes of them.
Trifles are most important when they concern the rulers; we should be especially on
our guard against the beginnings of strife among great men, for they quickly involve
the whole state. ‘Well begun is half done,’ says the proverb; and to an error at the
beginning may be attributed half of all the evils which follow. A quarrel about a love
affair at Syracuse, about an inheritance at Hestiaea, about marriages at Delphi and
Epidamnus, about heiresses at Mitylene, about an heiress in Phocis, were the causes
of revolution and ruin in those states.

Sometimes the magistrates or some part of the state increase in power by the credit
which they gain for their services. The noble conduct of the Areopagus in the Persian
War strengthened the oligarchy, the victory of Salamis which was gained by the
common people, the democracy. At Argos the notables, having distinguished
themselves at the battle of Mantinea, tried to overthrow the democracy; at Syracuse
the people, after the defeat of the Athenians, overturned the constitutional
government. From similar causes revolutions occurred at Chalcis and Ambracia. And
generally any one who has done great service to the state is very likely to cause
revolution; for either he is ambitious himself, or others are drawn into rebellion by
envy of his greatness. When one of two parties is a minority like the good (who are
always a minority), there is a disposition to submit; but when the two are nearly
balanced, then revolutions break out. They are accomplished either by force or by
fraud—force practised either at the time or afterwards—fraud which is often

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succeeded by force (as in the case of the Four Hundred at Athens), or continued and
repeated.

‘Behold how great a matter a little fire kindleth!’ And so we sometimes speak
metaphorically of a match applied to a powder magazine, or we are inclined to think
that there was a sleeping volcano which would have awakened and come to the
surface at some other time, if not when it burst forth through an accident. These are
figures of speech which from time to time we apply to the states of Europe. The
history of nations is supposed to have a majestic onward march whether favoured by
accident or not. For example, in the French Revolution democracy is believed to have
gathered irresistible force from the corruption of the court, from the oppression of the
grands seigneurs, from the omnipresent tyranny of the bureaucracy, and at last to
have broken its bonds and to have swept over the continent of Europe. Philosophy
was in the air and seemed for the moment to inspire the poor creatures who were
crawling upon the earth. But the genius of a great soldier and statesman turned back
the flood which looked so giant-like and made it return to its underground channels.

It is a curious enquiry, how far small occasions have contributed to great events.
When we analyze them, it is difficult to distinguish the small from the great. The birth
or death of a royal infant, the unskilfulness of a physician, the fancy of a king’s
mistress, the arrow shot at a venture in the wars of the Jews, the chance ball striking
down a great commander, the mole-hill which caused a king’s horse to stumble (‘the
little gentleman in velvet’), the spilling of a drop or two of water on Mrs. Masham’s
gown, the dishonesty of a maker of arms, a runaway carriage, a minute too late on the
field of battle,—these and similar accidents have overthrown dynasties and changed
the governments of countries. Aristotle seems to be thinking of the inadvertencies or
carelessnesses of politics or of war, such as the slight matter of the qualification at
Ambracia or the impediment of a ditch however small in a battle, but more especially
of private occasions which have public or national consequences. Insults to the
honour or to the person of individuals, quarrels about marriages and betrothals, a
dispute about an heiress, or a mistress,—causes such as these have often whetted the
dagger of the conspirator, or have stirred up a party in the state.

The trifles will be generally such as affect distinguished persons. But it is impossible
to draw a line between the trifling occasions of great events and the real causes of
them. Was the hurling of the stool by Jeannie Geddes at the head of the clergyman
when reading the liturgy in St. Giles’, Edinburgh, a real cause of the overthrow of
Episcopalianism in Scotland, or only the trifle which was the occasion of it? Must it
not rather be regarded as a symptom of the temper which pervaded the whole
country? There is doubtless an element of accident in human affairs; that is to say,
there are small events of which the causes are absolutely unknown to us. And these
small events, affecting as they may do the lives of persons on whom the world seems
to depend, or occurring in a great conflict or at some other critical moment of history,
may have an effect, going far to upset what we are pleased to term the philosophy of
history.

Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the arts of wicked demagogues


who wrong the notables in various ways; either they inform against them that they

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may confiscate their wealth, or they diminish their income by the services which they
impose upon them, or they drive them into exile; but, after a while, the notables in
self-defence combine and conspire; or the exiles come back in a body and overthrow
the democracy, as at Cos, Rhodes, Heraclea, Megara, Cyme, and other places.
Anciently democracies changed into tyrannies; either the tyrant had been a great
magistrate, or he was a demagogue; but, unlike our present demagogues, he was a
general, not an orator; and if he had any military talent and could persuade the
multitude that he sincerely hated the rich, he easily gained over the scattered rustic
population and usurped the government. Our modern democrats do not attempt coups
d’état, because they are not soldiers. Democracies also change from a more moderate
to an extreme form. For the representatives of the multitude when they have been
elected, in return set the people above the laws.

Revolutions in oligarchies arise 1) outside the governing class: either a) the oligarchs
are oppressive, and then the people take anybody for a leader, especially if he be a
member of the oligarchy, as at Naxos; or b) they are exclusive; and then i) the
notables who are excluded make a rebellion and force their way into the government,
as at Massalia and elsewhere; or ii) at a time when the ruling class is attacked by the
rest of the notables the people strike in and establish a democracy, as at Cnidos; or iii)
although the state is well managed, the people take offence at the narrowness of the
government and bring about a revolution, as at Erythrae. Or 2) within the governing
body; from the personal rivalry of the oligarchical leaders who either a) intrigue
against the other oligarchs, like Charicles in the Thirty and Phrynichus in the Four
Hundred at Athens, or b) some of their members turn demagogues and appeal to the
people. This is a result which commonly occurs either i) when the oligarchical leaders
are magistrates elected by the people and are therefore under their control, no matter
what be the qualification for office, and even though they are supported by a political
club; or ii) when the law-courts are independent of the government; or iii) when an
attempt is made to narrow the oligarchy; or iv) when the oligarchs are extravagant in
their way of living, for then they want to innovate, and sometimes they rob the
treasury and afterwards fall out either among themselves or with the rest of their
party. But an oligarchy is seldom overthrown when it is at unity with itself. But when
there is a state within a state it is otherwise; in time of war, because the government is
obliged to call in mercenaries, and the general who is in command of them often ends
in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at Corinth; and in time of peace, the two
parties, from their mutual distrust, are likely enough to hand over the defence of the
state to the general of an army, who in the end becomes the master of both, as at
Larissa and Abydos. Love-quarrels and law-suits also lead to revolutions in states.
Many oligarchies have been destroyed because they have become intolerable to some
members of the ruling class, as at Cnidos and Chios. Both constitutional governments
and oligarchies may be changed by an accidental lowering of the qualification.

We may remark generally, both of democracies and oligarchies, that they do not
always change into their opposites, but sometimes only into another variety of the
same class.

Aristocracies are a kind of oligarchies, and are often confounded with them. They are
both the government of a few; but the few in an oligarchy are the wealthy, in an

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aristocracy the virtuous. The revolutions which arise in aristocracies, as in oligarchies,


are caused by their exclusiveness, and by the diminution of their numbers. When a
section of the people, like the Partheniae at Sparta, or when individuals, like
Lysander, fancy themselves dishonoured; or, like Cinadon, are excluded from the
government; when a great man, like Pausanias, wants to be greater; or when there is
an extreme inequality of classes,—a state of society generally created by war,—then
revolutions are likely to arise.

Both constitutional government and aristocracies are overthrown when the two
elements of democracy and oligarchy, or the three elements, democracy, oligarchy,
and virtue, are ill-combined. Constitutional governments are safer than aristocracies
because they rest upon a broader basis. The rich in an aristocracy are often insolent
and greedy, and the government has a natural tendency to oligarchy. But it may also
pass into a democracy or into a constitutional government, or a constitutional
government may change into an oligarchy. Thus at Thurii, where the qualification for
office was at one time high, the notables acquired the whole of the land. But a
reaction speedily set in; the qualification was lowered, and the people who carried
arms quickly resumed possession of the land which had been taken. In Lacedaemon,
too, the land has passed into the hands of a few rich men, and they are able to do
much what they like.

Trifles, as I have already remarked, often lead to great changes. Thus the government
at Thurii became a family oligarchy after the repeal of the law which forbad their
generals to hold perpetual commands. The magistrates yielded to the youth of the city,
thinking that no further change would ensue: but a revolution followed and the state
passed into the hands of a dynastic oligarchy. And besides these changes from within,
there may be compulsion from without, such as the Athenians of old exercised
towards the oligarchies and the Lacedaemonians towards the democracies.

The balance of classes or of parties has been hitherto deemed to be the best or only
mode of regulating the internal affairs of a state. Yet a government constructed on
such a principle is attended by many drawbacks; there is a waste of the governing
power. The principle of ‘a balance,’ which in our own age is beginning to be
discredited both in home and foreign politics, was a favourite doctrine of ancient
philosophers. To Aristotle it was a leading idea that one political party or institution
must be checked by another. He does not remark that whatever makeweight is thrown
into the scale against either party is so much deducted from the whole power of the
state. If we suppose the two parties to be in diametrical opposition, then it is only the
surplus of them, possibly a small fraction, which represents the national will. These
checks or balances directly affect the strength and consistency of the state. In the
Spartan and Roman constitutions they were carried to the greatest extent. The Ephors
are regarded by Aristotle as providing a security against the encroachments of the
Spartan kings, and therefore as rendering the power of the king himself more
permanent. The double kingship is supposed by him to have a similar effect. But we
remember how in the Peloponnesian War the policy of Sparta alternates from year to
year as the Ephors change, or the king or the Ephor is in the ascendant; and how
weakening to the state were the quarrels of the two kings with one another. In modern
times we perceive such oppositions of party or of powers in a state to be due not to the

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wisdom of our legislators, but to the natural growth of institutions. We try, seemingly
in vain, to bring them to an understanding with each other, ne quid detrimenti
respublica capiat; and at any rate to preserve the unity of the Executive. They may be
necessary, but whether necessary or not, we find that they tend to diminish our
national vigour, and to impair our reputation in dealing with foreign countries. There
are some who would argue on the other side that the antagonism of parties is not so
absolute as has been supposed; that they often act as a stimulus to one another, and
therefore, instead of impeding, quicken progress; that they are a necessary
consequence of political activity; and that as there are differences of character, there
must also be differences of opinion among men. They certainly give a distinct form to
opposing forces, instead of dissipating them in personality; and in critical times there
may arise mediators or benefactors among them, and, like the Greeks in the Persian
War, they may forget their quarrels and vie with one another in the service of their
country. Aristotle notices a phenomenon which may be observed in modern as well as
in ancient politics: the representation of one class by another. He thinks that an
oligarchy is doomed to fall when the members of a governing body are elected by the
whole people, for they will always be at the mercy of those who elect them. So in
some of the countries of modern Europe a great change is being silently wrought, not
by the physical force of the people, but by the wealthy who are their representatives
and do their bidding. ‘The poor have not the leisure to go to the Assembly;’ and
therefore they elect some member of the higher or richer classes to assert their rights,
who expresses partly his own opinions and partly theirs; or his own opinions in
private and theirs in public.

Having now explained the chief causes of revolutions in states, we have next to
consider the means of preserving them.

The knowledge of opposites is one and the same; if we know the causes which
destroy states, we shall also know the causes which preserve them. We must in the
first place maintain the authority of the law and not be careless about little things, for
the whole is made up of them (as the saying is, ‘Many a mickle makes a muckle’);
neither must we rely upon arts and devices. Evils creep in unperceived, and we must
watch the beginnings of them; or they will increase and overwhelm the state. Even an
oligarchy, though inherently weak, may be long preserved if the ruling class are just
and considerate to one another and to their fellow citizens, and are willing to receive
into their own body any who are deserving of honour. As in a democracy, so in an
oligarchy there must be equality; for equals in rank where they are numerous are a
kind of democracy, and demagogues are very likely to arise in both. And many of the
safeguards of democracy are equally useful in an oligarchy. One of these safeguards is
the short tenure of office; the magistrate whose term lasts only for six months will not
be able to usurp.

Another cause of the preservation of states is the fear of an enemy near at hand, which
may often unite and waken up the citizens. The cautious ruler will seek to create
salutary terrors in the minds of the people: he will also endeavour to restrain the
quarrels of the notables. He will need the gift of foresight if he aspires to the character
of a statesman.

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The census should be periodically revised and the qualification raised or lowered as
the value of property increases or diminishes. It is better to give moderate honour to a
citizen for a long time than great honour for a short time. But when once given it
should not be suddenly withdrawn. The magistrates should have an eye to the lives of
the citizens, and should bring them into harmony with the constitution of the state.
The growth of prosperity and power in any one person or part of the state should be
carefully watched. Rich and poor should be combined in one body, and the middle
class increased. Above all, the magistrates should not be allowed to make money from
their offices; nothing is so provoking to the common people as corruption of this kind.

Democracy and aristocracy might come to an understanding if offices brought no


profit; for then the rich and the poor would both obtain their desires; the poor would
not wish to hold them; —they would rather attend to their own business;—and the
rich, who do not want money, would take them. The public accounts should be
regularly audited at a general assembly of the citizens, and duplicates of them put up
in the tribes and demes. Honest magistrates should be rewarded. In an oligarchy the
poor should be well treated, and in a democracy the rich should not be required or
allowed to waste their money upon useless liturgies; their income should be protected
as well as their property. Estates should pass by inheritance, and no person should
have more than one. The poor should be allowed to share in all the lesser offices of
state, and a member of the aristocracy should be more severely punished for insulting
them than for insulting one of his own class.

[If we proceed to ask, How far the character of chief magistrates is preservative of a
constitution, it may be answered that], Three qualifications are required in them: 1)
loyalty, 2) administrative capacity, 3) virtue of a kind suited to the constitution. But
when all these qualities do not meet in the same person, which is better,—a virtuous
and dull man, or a vicious and clever one? We reply,—different qualities are required
in different offices; honesty is the first qualification of a steward, military skill of a
general; and we must consider what qualities are rare and what are common; military
skill, for example, is less common than honesty. But will a statesman who is loyal and
patriotic have any need of virtue? Yes, surely; for without self-control he will be
incapable of managing either his own affairs or the affairs of the public.

Among the preservatives of states may be mentioned laws which are for the interest of
the state; and the great preserving principle of all is that the loyal citizens should
outnumber the disloyal. The mean which is often lost sight of in the extremes of party
violence, should also be regarded. Some disproportion, as in the human body, may be
pardonable; but great excess in limb or feature is the caricature and destruction of
either. He who pushes the principle either of democracy or of oligarchy to an extreme,
will begin by spoiling the government, and will end by having none at all. Neither
oligarchy nor democracy can exist unless a place is found in them for both rich and
poor. They are equally in fault, and their feelings towards one another are the reverse
of what they should be; for the oligarchs should maintain the cause of the poor, the
democrats of the rich; whereas the demagogues are always cutting the city in two by
their quarrels with the rich, and the oligarchs even take an oath that they will do the
people all the harm which they can.

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The great preservative of all is education; but it must be adapted to the constitution:
when properly educated the people will become neither violent oligarchs nor
democrats, but good citizens under either form of government. For the true oligarch or
democrat is not he who does the most oligarchical or democratic actions, but he who
provides best for the continuance of oligarchy or democracy. Among ourselves the
ruling class are reared in luxury, while the children of the poor are hardened by
labour, and therefore more than a match for the rich in time of revolution. On the
other hand, in extreme democracies there is a false idea of freedom: men think only of
the supremacy of the people, which means that they may do as they like; this is
contradictory to the true interests of the state. They do not understand that obedience
to law is the salvation of states.

The two leading forms of government, democracy and oligarchy—for, in Hellenic


politics, monarchy, aristocracy, timocracy, need hardly be considered—are both
regarded by Aristotle as good enough when well administered. But they must live and
let live: the oligarch must find a place for the poor; the democrat must leave room for
the rich. The sense of patriotism should prevent them from disorganizing the state by
their quarrels; the sense of justice should leave them in the possession of their
respective properties. They should both avoid extremes; for he is not the best
democrat who is most of a democrat, or the best oligarch who is most of an oligarch.
But that is the best form, whether of democracy or oligarchy, which is the most
lasting. The true test of governments is their permanence. Although the tendency of
Greek history was setting in towards democracy, yet oligarchies were still existing,
and Aristotle seems to have thought that, if there were humanity, public spirit, and
consideration towards the lower classes, they might continue to exist. The people
should spare the rich, and not impose unequal taxes or burdensome duties upon them:
the poor should be treated kindly, and the wrong done to them by a person of breeding
or education should be regarded as more discreditable than a similar offence against
one of his own class. There is a fine spirit of courtesy in this last regulation. Measures
should be taken to prevent the accumulation of inheritances, lest the poor should
always be growing poorer, and the rich richer; and the poor should receive a
preference in the lesser offices of state.

Next come the two forms of monarchy,—royalty and tyranny; the first, like
aristocracy, based upon merit, the second a compound of democracy and oligarchy in
their worst form. The two differ in their very origin; for kings were the benefactors of
their people, but tyrants were usually demagogues who gained the favour of the
demos by their accusations of the notables; or they were the presidents of oligarchies;
or, in the old times, kings or great magistrates who usurped despotic power. A king is
appointed by the better class to protect them against the people; the tyrant is the
favourite of the people who takes their part against the notables. The king benefits all
classes; the tyrant no one but himself; the one desires honour, the other pleasure and
gain; the one is guarded by the citizens, the other by mercenaries. The tyrant
combines all the vices of democracy and oligarchy; he robs and suspects the people,
he oppresses and exiles the notables, ‘he cuts off the tallest ears of corn.’

The motives of revolutions in royalties and tyrannies are similar to the motives of
revolutions in other states. The rest of mankind desire the wealth or rank of the king

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or tyrant; or some one is stirred up to avenge an insult. Sometimes the office of the
monarch is attacked, sometimes his life. Insults to the person have been frequently
fatal to the sovereign who offered them. Fear and contempt have also been the
motives of conspiracies. The probability of success is another motive. Tyrants have
been attacked by their familiars who know their weakness; or by generals whom they
have trusted with power. The desire of gain is yet another motive; love of glory
another. There are a few who, regardless of their own lives, have sought to
immortalize themselves by the assassination of a tyrant; they wish to acquire not a
kingdom, but a name. Few, however, are willing to set their life upon such a cast.

Tyrannies are also destroyed, from without, by the hostility of opposite forms of
government; from within, by dissension in a ruling family. There are two chief
motives which induce men to attack them, hatred and contempt; to these must be
added anger, which is all the more ready to strike because it is painful. In a word, all
the causes by which the worse forms of oligarchy or democracy are affected, also
affect tyranny. Royalty is less liable than tyranny to be overthrown by a revolution; it
is generally destroyed from within—either members of the royal family quarrel with
one another, or the king himself grows tyrannical. But there are no kings in our own
days; no one has a natural superiority, and therefore he who aspires to rule over his
fellows becomes a tyrant. Hereditary monarchies run the greatest risk of all, for the
king is apt to play the part of a tyrant, forgetting that he has not the power. When the
king is not wanted, he is dethroned, but the tyrant maintains himself whether men like
him or not.

These are the causes destructive of monarchy; and the preservatives are the opposites
to these. Royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers, as at Lacedaemon by the
double kingship and the institution of the Ephoralty; tyranny by the traditional policy
of lopping off the tallest shoots, by the prohibition of education, common meals,
clubs, meetings for discussion, in short by a policy of suspicion and repression. The
tyrant must take every means of keeping the people under; he must know what they
are doing; he must employ spies and eaves-droppers; he must sow quarrels and
dissensions among them. He should engage them in great public works, like the
Pyramids of Egypt or the temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens, and should multiply
taxes after the manner of Dionysius of Syracuse; he should keep his subjects busy and
poor, and make them pay for his guards; he should stir up war that they may need his
services as a general. He cannot, like a king, trust his friends; for he knows that the
hand of every man is against him, and they have him in their power. Tyranny, like the
extreme form of democracy, gives influence to women and licence to slaves, in the
hope that they may inform against their husbands and masters; hence both women and
slaves are partial to tyrannies and democracies because they have a good time under
them. Like the people, the tyrant loves flatterers, who are bad themselves and are used
for bad purposes. Independent spirits are distasteful to him; and he prefers foreigners
to citizens. There is nothing too bad for him. In short, he has three principal aims:—1)
to sow distrust among his subjects, 2) to deprive them of power, 3) to humble them.
Good men cannot be made his tools; and therefore he is their enemy.

But tyranny may also be preserved by an entirely opposite method. Although the
tyrant must in self-defence keep his power, yet he may use it like a constitutional

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monarch. He ought to be a model of virtue and economy, not squandering on


courtesans and artists the public revenues, but using them in the service of the state, as
if he were the trustee and not the owner of them. This will be far wiser than to keep a
hoard which there will be no one to guard when he is away from home. He should
inspire reverence rather than fear; whatever vices he may privately practise, he should
be dignified in public, and maintain the character of a ruler. He should avoid
immodesty or sensuality, or at any rate he should not parade them in the face of the
world. He should adorn and improve the city; he should be religious, that he may be
thought a good man and a friend of the gods—men will then be less afraid of
suffering injustice at his hands, and they will be less likely to conspire against him,
for they will think that he has the gods fighting on his side; but he should not make
himself ridiculous by superstition. He should honour men of merit. Yet neither should
he make any one person great, but if one, then more than one; and if he has to take
away honour, he should proceed gradually. He should be tender of other men’s
reputation, kind to the young; his attachments should seem to be inspired by affection,
and not by the insolence of power. Assassination is his greatest danger, and he should
therefore be careful of insulting or seeming to insult others. ‘For,’ as Heracleitus says,
‘a man will buy revenge with life.’

He will keep the peace between the rich and poor, and will conciliate to himself the
stronger of the two, whichever that may be. He will not then need to emancipate the
slaves or to disarm the citizens. He will be moderate and gentle, the friend of the
upper classes and the hero of the multitude. His rule will thus be nobler and better,
because he will rule over nobler and better men, whom he does not fear, and to whom
he is not himself an object of hatred. His power, too, will be more lasting. Let him be
virtuous, or at least half-virtuous; and if he be wicked, let him be half-wicked.

Aristotle, proceeding by the method of opposites, contrasts the king and the tyrant,
and the modes in which royalty and tyranny are destroyed and preserved. To the
Greek the king could hardly appear a reality: of the semi-barbarous Macedonian and
Thracian monarchs he had heard at a distance only. But in Hellas properly so called
all other kings except the kings of Sparta had disappeared. The tyrant, although he
hardly existed except in Sicily between the days of Themistocles and Alexander, was
deeply impressed on the mind of Hellas. The traditional portrait of him, exaggerated
by the genius of Plato, is preserved in Aristotle; it had come down like the story of the
Trojan War, from an unknown antiquity, and had been recently revived by the
oppressions of Dionysius and his son.

From the ordinary Greek conception of the tyrant we pass to a better sort of despot,
who seems to have not much more reality than the one best man of Book III. We may
fancy that Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus, suggested the thought to Aristotle’s mind;
but he has scarcely found his way into Greek history, except by his connection with
Aristotle.

It is said that there have been two perfect princes only among all who have held sway
over the civilized world, the Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, the French King who
is also a Catholic Saint, Louis IX;—perhaps together with these two our own Alfred
might be ranked. Their lives, though not spent in vain, supply an historical proof that

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the beneficent ruler is by no means absolute in his power of doing good. It is an


observation of Buckle’s that the high character and intelligence of several of the
Spanish monarchs in the last century, altogether failed to arrest the degeneracy of the
people. The truth is, that although the spirit of a king may sometimes animate his
people, a nation is too heavy a load for any man to carry on his shoulders or elevate
by the force of his own will.

The other sort of tyrant described by Aristotle is a good way removed from the ideal;
like Peisistratus in Thucydides, he professes virtue, but at the same time keeps a firm
hand on power. He has learnt the lesson of Machiavelli, that ‘there are many virtues
which would certainly prove ruinous to kings if they practised them.’ He maintains
arbitrary power that he may make a good use of it; he sets up authority against the
rights of men. He is perhaps the only solution of a great political difficulty. Many
questions are stirred about him. They run up into the wider question, What are the
moral conditions of political action? And they would probably have received from
Aristotle his favourite solution, namely that politics are relative to persons and
circumstances.

Plato and Aristotle alike indulge in the fancy of a virtuous tyrant: ‘there is no shorter
way,’ says Plato, ‘in which men can be made virtuous than by obedience to a wise and
virtuous tyrant.’ (Laws, iv. 709.) And Aristotle himself is characteristically willing to
believe that like all other forms of government, even a tyranny, if well administered,
may be for the advantage of the subjects of it. But the tyrant is to be prudent rather
than virtuous. He must keep up appearances and give mankind the good government
which they so much want. Such governments may be the only ones possible in certain
stages of society; and certainly men would not be justified in overthrowing them,
unless they could set up a better in their place. Aristotle would have acknowledged
that they depend upon accidents, for, as in the case of the Roman Emperors, many a
good father may have a bad son; and modern writers would make the further
reflection, that by giving people good government, we take from them the power of
governing themselves.

Tyrannies and oligarchies are short-lived. The tyrannies which have lasted longest are
those of Orthagoras and his sons at Sicyon, which continued for a hundred years, of
the Cypselidae at Corinth, who reigned seventy-three years and six months, and of
Peisistratus at Athens, which lasted, not including sixteen years of exile, seventeen
years, or adding in the eighteen years which his son reigned, thirty-five years. Their
greater duration may be attributed to the personal character of the tyrants. Cypselus
was a popular man; his son and successor, Periander, a great soldier: Orthagoras and
his family were gentle and careful of their people; his descendant, Cleisthenes, was
also a great soldier; the latter is said to have crowned the judge who decided against
him at the games, as Peisistratus is recorded to have submitted to the court of the
Areopagus. Of other tyrannies, that of Hiero and Gelo has been the most enduring, but
their combined reigns only lasted eighteen years.

In the Republic, Socrates gives a fanciful account of the first step in the decline of
states. He says that they change according to a certain cycle which depends upon a
base of number. When this cycle comes to an end, bad men will be born and

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education will be neglected. Very likely; but why in the perfect state more than in any
other? And why should the perfect state change into the Spartan, or the Spartan into
an oligarchy, or an oligarchy into a democracy, or a democracy into a tyranny? Had
the cycle been completed, tyranny should have reverted to the perfect state. But the
truth is that there is no regular order in the changes of states; both tyrannies and
oligarchies may pass into any other form of government, as is proved by numberless
facts. And when he says that the decline of the Spartan government is due to
covetousness, he should rather have said that it is due to the jealousy which the rich
entertain towards the poor. Nor is the tale of two cities in one, peculiar to oligarchy: it
might describe any state in which there is great social inequality. The indebtedness of
the poor is not the only cause of revolution in oligarchies, but far more the
impoverishment of great men. Finally, Plato fails to discriminate the various kinds of
revolution which arise out of the various forms of democracies and oligarchies.

Aristotle has a fling at the Platonic number of the state. We may observe that he does
not regard this curious symbol as a mere arithmetical or geometrical puzzle. He only
says that such a cause of change would apply equally to all states; and while he treats
the number seriously he does not remark that he has omitted two or three steps in the
calculation. He makes an assumption in saying that the perfect state degenerates into
the Spartan; of this no mention is made by Plato, though some of the characteristics of
the timocratic man recall to us the Spartan. His common sense told him that there was
no law or order in the succession of states. It could hardly be supposed that tyranny
returned to the perfect state. Yet this was the conclusion which logically followed if
the cycle was to begin again.

There are numerous repetitions in the Sixth Book of the Politics, but there are also a
few subjects which are more fully worked out and appear in a clearer light than
elsewhere. To these we will confine ourselves in the remarks which follow.

Aristotle’s views about Democracy are set forth more in the concrete and less in the
abstract. Leaving the general idea, he proceeds to consider the various forms of
Democracy which arise out of the complication of the different elements which are
combined in them. Democracy is a necessity rather than a good, and therefore the
form which is least of a democracy is the least of an evil. The people are nominally to
have their rights, but, if possible, they are to be deprived of them; that is to say, they
are to be placed under circumstances in which only a few can ever exercise them:
what he gives with one hand he takes away with the other. He is far from having any
confidence in the people; he devises many expedients in order to minimize their
power. They are generally paid, but it would be better if they were not paid, because
then they would not have leisure to take part in the government. In the interests of the
upper classes, who have to conduct the government, the meetings of the Assembly
and of the Law Courts should be few and short. The reflection naturally occurs to the
mind, How is all this reconcileable with another dictum of Aristotle’s that ‘political
devices are useless’? Neither is he consistent with himself; at any rate traces of
different views appear in successive chapters.

Two confusions often arise about democracy. First, it is supposed that the form of a
democracy which is the most extreme, is the most truly democratic; but this is an

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error; permanence is the true test whether of democracy or of any other form of
government. Secondly, we should observe that in all forms of government there is an
element of democracy within the governing body, for the will of the majority must
prevail, and there may be persons who play the demagogue in it, or who use the
demos in furtherance of some oligarchical design.

Aristotle’s favourite notion that the greater offices should be confined to the rich,
while admission to the assembly and to the lesser offices is granted to the poor, will
be found to be an impossible combination. At least the only way in which we can
suppose such an arrangement to be carried out, would be by the great magistrates
retaining independent command of the army. But then why should they allow the
power of the people to exist at all? They can rarely be brought to think that they and
the people have a common interest. In several modern European countries, such as
Germany, Russia, or France in the time of the emperors Napoleon I and III, this near
connection, or perhaps natural affinity, between the army and the throne has alone
rendered the Imperial form of government possible.

To us in England who are always considering the question of parliamentary


representation, the doctrine of Aristotle that the right of voting should be extended
only so far as will provide a bulwark against democracy, is curious and suggestive.
The greater number, though only a little greater, if including the upper and heavy-
armed classes, would evidently be many times as strong as the rest of the citizens.
Had a form of constitution, like that called by the Greeks timocracy, in which all men
voted, but the numbers of the poor were compensated by the wealth of the rich, been
adopted by the authors of the American constitution or of the first English Reform
Bill, it is possible that such a settlement of the representative question might have
driven back the tide of democracy for many generations.

BOOK VI.
The nature and characteristics of democracy; the better and worse kinds: how
democracies may be created and preserved: the various kinds of oligarchies: the
organization of offices under different forms of government.

We have discussed the various elements of states in their various forms, the supreme
or deliberative power, the law-courts, the offices; we have also spoken of the
destruction and preservation of states. And now we have to consider in what manner
different forms of government are organized, and what various combinations of their
parts or elements are possible. [The latter is an unfulfilled promise; cp. iv. 7-9.] I
mean, for example, how an oligarchical council may be combined with aristocratical
law-courts, and any similar disharmony in the composition of the state. We have also
to enquire how the forms of government which are adapted to different states may be
established.

First let us describe democracy, of which there are several varieties. These varieties
depend upon two causes, 1) differences in the character of the population, which may
consist of husbandmen, or of mechanics and labourers, either singly or mingled in
various proportions; 2) differences in the combinations of the characteristic features

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of democracy. All the elements should be studied, but it would be a mistake to


suppose that every democratic element should exist in every democracy; there should
be an admixture of different elements, and they should be balanced against one
another; proportion should be observed.

The basis of democracy is liberty, and one principle of liberty is that all should rule
and be ruled in turn. Democratic equality is not proportionate, but numerical: every
man counts for one, and therefore the will of the majority is supreme. Another
principle of liberty is non-interference—every man should live as he likes, if this is
possible; or, if not, then he should rule and be ruled in turn—this also is a kind of
equality.

Such is the nature of democracy; its characteristics are as follows:—all officers are
elected by all out of all; all to rule over each, and each in his turn over all; by lot,
unless the office be one for which special knowledge is required; with little or no
qualification; for a short period only; rarely if ever twice to the same office, except in
the case of military offices. All men or judges selected out of all sit in judgment on all
matters, or on the most important; the assembly, and not the magistrates, is supreme.
Even the council, which is generally the most popular of institutions, falls into the
background and loses power when the citizens are paid; for then they draw all
business to themselves. And in a democracy everybody is paid when there is money
enough, but when there is not, then at any rate the principal officers, such as the
judges, ecclesiasts, councillors, are paid. No magistracy is perpetual; any such which
have survived from ancient times are stripped of their power, and, instead of being
specially elected by vote, the holders of them are appointed by lot. Poverty and
vulgarity are the notes of democracy; wealth, education, and good birth of oligarchy.
The most extreme form of democracy is based upon the principle of numerical
equality. And in this way men believe that true freedom will be attained.

But in what manner is this equality to be secured? Besides simple equality there is an
equality of proportion, which may be obtained in two ways. 1) Five hundred rich may
be reckoned equal to a thousand poor, [in other words, the rich man will have two
votes where the poor has only one]; or 2) preserving the same ratio of rich and poor
[i.e. 10:5], both may choose an equal number of representatives. Now which,
according to the true idea of democracy, is the better?—some form of proportionate
equality such as either of these, or the bare equality of numbers? The former, say the
oligarchs; the latter, say the democrats. Yet upon the oligarchical principle, if one man
were richer than all the rest, he would be a lawful tyrant; or if the democratic principle
prevail, it is probable that the majority will confiscate the wealth of the minority.

All agree in saying that the rule of the majority is law. But numbers and wealth should
both be included; and whichever side, when the qualifications are added up, has the
greater amount, should prevail. The real difficulty is not in finding a principle of
justice, but in making the strong respect the rights of the weak.

Of the four kinds of democracy the first and oldest is also the best; I mean, that of
which the material is a rural population who are always at work, and therefore do not
attend the assembly. They are too busy to care about office, unless money can be

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made out of it. They are well enough off, and their ambition is satisfied if they may
deliberate, and elect, either by themselves or their representatives, and can also call to
account, the principal magistrates. In such a democracy a high qualification is
commonly required from the holders of the greater magistracies; or, if there is no
qualification, special ability. Such a form of government is excellent. The notables are
satisfied because they are not governed by their inferiors; and the persons elected rule
justly, because they are liable to be called to account. The superiority of this form of
democracy is due to the fact that the people are owners of land. The ancient legislators
were sensible of the gain, and endeavoured in every way to encourage an agricultural
life. Either they limited the quantity of land which might be held by individuals, or
forbade the original allotment to be sold, or required some part of it to be preserved
free from mortgage, or they granted political rights to the owners of very small
portions of land.

The next best material 2) out of which a democracy can be formed, and even better
for the making of soldiers, is a pastoral people. The trading classes 3) who live in
towns are far inferior in moral qualities; and being always on the spot they are always
attending the assembly and interfering with the government. The last and worst form
of democracy 4) is that in which all share alike,—legitimate, illegitimate, citizens by
one parent or by both; nothing comes amiss. To increase their own power the
demagogues include as many as they can. Whereas they should stop when the number
of the commonalty exceeds that of the middle class or of the notables. Another
practice of demagogues is to break up old associations and to form the citizens into
fresh wards and tribes, as Cleisthenes did at Athens. Under democracies as under
tyrannies great licence is allowed to slaves and women; and generally there is more
liberty. Such governments are popular, for most persons prefer disorder to order.

The creation of a democracy is not so great a difficulty as the preservation of it. Any
government may last a few days, but not longer, unless well regulated by laws and
customs. The legislator must employ all known preservatives; against all known
dangers he must guard. He should remember that the truly democratic policy is not
the most extreme, but that which makes democracy last longest. He must not allow
the demagogues to attack the wealthy that they may confiscate their property;
confiscated property should go, not to the people, but to the state. Heavy penalties
should also be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations.

Where there are no revenues and the people can only be paid by a tax upon the
notables, the sittings of the law-courts and of the assemblies should be few and brief.
The rich will then be able to attend; they will not mind the expense, and causes will be
better tried. The revenues, where there are any, should not be wasted in largesses to
the poor, who are always wanting more and more; they should be economized, and
the money distributed among the people in such quantities as may enable them to
purchase a small farm, or to make a beginning in trade. It is the interest of all classes
to promote their prosperity. The rich should pay the fee for the poor who attend the
assemblies, and should themselves be excused from useless services. In their
treatment of the poor the Carthaginians and Tarentines furnish an excellent example.
The former send them to their colonies, the latter share the use of their property with
them. It is worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor among them

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and give them the means of going to work. The Tarentines further elect to offices by
lot as well as by vote; by lot, that the poor may not be excluded; by vote, that the state
may be well governed.

The language of Aristotle about the poor expresses a truly modern sentiment. He has a
human feeling for them, such as is hardly to be found elsewhere in ancient
philosophy. Cp. Plato, Laws, 761 C. As in Book V (c. 2. § 19), the philosopher deigns
to think about the miserable earnings of the poor; he sympathizes with their
indignation at the extortions which are practised upon them; he is aware how much
harm may be done to them by indiscriminate charity, which is like water running
through a sieve; he would help them to help themselves; he would give them, not
doles, but the means of stocking a shop or of purchasing a small farm. He thinks that
the public revenues may with advantage be used for such an object; because the
contentment of the poor is the common good of the state. In forming an estimate of
such proposals, we must remember that the number of citizens in the ancient Greek
states was far more manageable than in any modern European country. Aristotle
would wish this comparatively small number to be divided among the rich, so that
every poor man might look to some one among the notables for his maintenance. We
too know the importance of dividing large districts into parishes and townships, in
which the clergy and gentry or leading inhabitants may be expected to attend to the
wants and interests of their poorer brethren. He is sensible that the poor require the
help of the rich, and on the other hand that no class can be entirely trusted to protect
the rights and interests of any other. It has been sometimes thought that an
enlightened sense of their own advantage would lead the rich to provide for the poor;
but, according to Aristotle, whose words cannot be said to be wholly inapplicable to
our own age and country, the relations between the rich and the poor are too often of
another kind. The nobles are indifferent to the sufferings of the poor, and are often
oppressive. Instead of making a princely use of their money, and erecting public
works which would redound to their honour, they accumulate only that they may
spend upon themselves.

In Book II Aristotle is disposed to think that a liberal and common use of property
would be better than communism. In a similar strain we might ask two or three
questions respecting the use of property. Has not property duties as well as rights, and
is it not a trust to be used for others rather than for ourselves? Or if such a standard of
conduct is too exalted, may we not ask whether the greatest gainer by such liberality
would not be the giver, and whether the discovery of the way to do good without
doing harm is not one of the noblest exercises both of the head and heart? Whether,
lastly, property can ever be so well administered as by private persons possessing a
measure of public spirit?

Oligarchy is the opposite of democracy, and we may argue from one to the other. The
best form of oligarchy has two qualifications, a higher for the important, a lower for
the unimportant offices. In this form of oligarchy, which is the first and best and is
akin to polity, care should be taken that the entire governing body is stronger than
those who are excluded. A second form is similar but narrower. The worst and last is
the family clique, which is the most tyrannical and also the weakest, and therefore

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liable to be ruined by the very smallest mistake. The salvation of an oligarchy


depends chiefly on good order; of a democracy on numbers.

[The preservation of oligarchies is closely connected with their military


arrangements.] Now there are four kinds of military forces, cavalry, heavy infantry,
light-armed troops, sailors; of these the first two are adapted to oligarchies, the last
two to democracies. But often the light-armed are too much for the heavy infantry;
and to provide against this danger, in every army there should be a contingent of light-
armed troops. In an oligarchy, instead of raising such a force out of the lower classes
who will some day rise against the government, fathers should train their own sons,
while young, to the service. Another mode of preserving oligarchies is that deserving
persons or those who have a property qualification or have given up mean
employments should be adopted into the ruling class. The highest offices should be
expensive, and then the people will not desire them; and the magistrates should
signalize their accession to office by some public work. But how unlike is all this to
the practice of our modern oligarchs!

The next point which we have to consider is the right arrangement of offices in a
state. Some will be necessary under all forms of government. First among these there
will be 1) a warden of the market, who will inspect contracts and regulate the relations
of buyers and sellers; 2) a warden of the city, who will superintend buildings,
harbours, roads, houses, and the like; where the city is large, this office should be
shared by several persons; 3) a warden of the country, having a similar jurisdiction
outside the walls; 4) there will be the office of treasurer, who will take charge of the
revenue; 5) the recorders, who will register all contracts and legal decisions; 6) an
executioner, who has duties very important, yet so invidious that one man can hardly
sustain the odium of them, and they should therefore be distributed among many. The
custody of prisoners is often, as at Athens, separated from the execution of sentences,
and it is well to divide them, and so to diminish the unpopularity of the jailor. In
general such duties should be assigned to the youth organized in bands, and the
magistrates acting in turns should preside over them. Higher offices 7) are those of
generals and admirals, who have their subordinates. Again, there are officers 8) who
audit the public accounts. Besides these, 9) there are the officers called ‘councillors,’
or ‘a council,’ who summon the assembly and introduce all measures, and also ratify
them. Once more, there are 10) priests and other officers attached to the temples; 11)
offerers of sacrifice—the latter called archons, kings, or prytanes. Specially
characteristic of aristocratic states are guardians of the law, of women, of children;
and also directors of gymnastic and Dionysiac contests.

There are three forms of the highest elective offices of the state; these are guardians of
the law, probuli, councillors; the first aristocratical, the second oligarchical, the third
democratical.

The analysis of governments into their parts or offices, like the analysis of the human
mind into the intellectual and the moral, and the subdivision of these into their
respective faculties, was first made in ancient Greek philosophy. The idea of
organization is not found in a primitive society, ‘for among barbarians all men are
slaves alike;’ nor in the despotisms of the age which succeeded. In the Homeric

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poems there are hereditary chiefs in peace and war, sons or descendants of the Gods;
and there is a faint indication of the assembly of the people. There are also priests and
heralds and different classes of warriors, soldiers and captives of the spear; but further
than this, organization did not reach. There is no distinction between kings and
nobles, between generals and judges, or between a ruling and a subject class. Such
was the poetical idea which the Greeks conceived of their own past history. It was a
long time before the need of offices was recognized or there began to be a division
into classes, and still longer before the opposition between them arose, and a method
of reconciling them had to be devised. The earliest distinction is that made between
the general and the legislator or judge. Later the ecclesia is separated from the
dicastery. Yet according to our notions there is no real difference between them; for
they are both popular assemblies: they both decide causes, and the same kind of
rhetorical arguments, taking sometimes an ethical form, are addressed to both of
them. A further distinction is made in Aristotle between the deliberative and
executive, but their relation to one another is not clearly defined. One of the most
peculiar and characteristic features of an Hellenic state was the calling of magistrates
to account after their term of office had expired.

The division of governments into their political and judicial elements, and into their
legislative and political functions, must necessarily exist in all civilized countries.
Aristotle insists strongly upon the necessity of adapting offices to the constitution. But
he can hardly be said to view the question in a comprehensive manner, and the
examples which he gives of such adaptations are feeble and trifling. First among them
is the adaptation of judicial to political institutions. If the government is exclusive,
then the law-courts should be exclusive: if all are represented in one, then all should
be represented in both. The power of the one should not be capable of checkmating or
overthrowing the other. Though there is some recognition of offices which require
special skill, the idea of a single skilled person, the great jurist of the Romans, who
has made the laws of his country the study of a life, is not to be found in Aristotle.
The deeper study of law did not exist among the Greeks of his time. In the judicial, as
Aristotle would say, the voice of God and reason should prevail; in the political there
is a mixture of the beast. How are these two to be adjusted? It is not by accident but
by a natural connection that in the government of the United States an elective
judiciary is combined with the extreme form of democracy; yet it seems hardly
possible that judges who are ill-paid and have a precarious tenure of office should
resist considerations of party and interest (cp. ii. 9. § 19). So much independence as is
not absolutely inconsistent with democracy should therefore be granted to them.
There is a natural sense of justice in mankind which makes this possible, if the people
are educated to see that moral principles are the basis of any true form of politics. The
sphere of law is more limited than that of politics, but also higher, for it is concerned
only with truth, which is the foundation of all justice; and the legal element of society
is or ought to be conservative, not only because it appeals to precedent and authority,
but because it maintains right which is the surest basis of a government or state.

Aristotle places in a long series all the officers of state from the king or general down
to the executioner, but he does not treat of the relation of the rulers or ruling class to
the popular assembly. In modern states the power of the nobles has been always
tending to encroach upon that of the monarch, and the power of the people upon both.

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Sometimes reactions have occurred and reactionary forms of government have been
restored when democracies have become imbecile or shown themselves incapable of
governing. The distinctions of ancient times have been more clearly defined, and
some new ones have been added. Individual judges dividing their power with juries
have for the most part taken the place of judicial assemblies. Civil and military
functions have been more separated; by the side of the army the Civil Service has
grown up to an almost equal power, the one cutting through with the sword the knots
of the world, the other throwing a network, from which there is no escape, over a
whole country. Both have a certain independence, and yet are responsible to the great
Assembly or Parliament of the Realm. If the ministers of state or the generals of an
army unduly seek to extend their powers and duties or Parliament to absorb them, the
administration of the state will become weakened or disordered.

Great offices of state should have each their own sphere divided according to the
subjects with which government is concerned. Those who hold them should be
capable of acting together, and yet not liable to interfere with one another. We should
not have the Minister of War asking for money; the Minister of Finance refusing it.
Both should be subject to a higher power which would generally leave them to
perform their duties independently, but would at times arbitrate between them. The
great secret of administration is to combine what is local and individual with the
uniformity of a system, to leave every man to himself, and yet to prevent his getting
into the way of others. The higher power in a free state should represent the will of the
nation. There should be a main-spring, and larger and smaller wheels by which the
required force is regulated and diffused. Among the Romans when special danger was
apprehended, or when there was a conflict of parties or offices in the state, a Dictator
was appointed. All the powers of the state were thus brought under the direction of a
single mind; they were suddenly stopped, and at the same moment a new life was
communicated from the centre to the extremities of the state. In some modern
countries there have been times when the nation seemed to be equally divided into
irreconcileable factions, and then the only way of saving society has been
Imperialism.

In modern, as well as in ancient times, the relations of great officers, or, as we should
say, of the Ministry, to the Parliament or public Assembly have been peculiar. The
greater part of the business to be submitted to the Parliament or representative
Assembly has been prepared by them; and all their public acts have been subject to
enquiries or resolutions of the House. Where should this control stop, and what liberty
should be allowed to them? No precise answer can be given to this question. But it is
clear that a minister should seek to guide the members of the Assembly in matters of
which he is better informed than they are, and that he should resist unnecessary
interference with the executive. His influence over them depends upon his power of
evoking in them that nobler principle in men which is the better self of the political
society.

The Seventh Book is not more regular in structure than those which have preceded it.
The thread is tolerably evident, but is often dropped and taken up again after a
digression. This irregularity may be in a great measure due to the form in which the
Aristotelian writings have been transmitted to us. But we must not complain of some

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disorder in ancient authors; the habit of arrangement was not easily acquired by them;
even the greatest among them have not moulded their works into an artistic whole.
Such an overruling unity of idea is not always found in Plato himself: they follow
‘whither the argument leads:’ they pass from one subject to another, and do not
impose upon themselves that rule of symmetry or consistency which is demanded of a
good modern writer. (See Essay on Structure of Aristotelian Writings, vol. ii.)

The book opens with an eloquent panegyric upon the life of virtue, which is the same
both for individuals and states, and which is not confined in either to outward actions.
But this life of virtue requires material conditions, a given number of citizens, a
situation near but not too near the sea, a territory not too large, suitable walls and
buildings, a national character in which spirit and intelligence are combined. It is also
made up of parts, and the principal parts are the two governing classes, warriors and
counsellors. Throughout the book we trace the connection with difficulty, and some
favourite speculations, such as the question whether the life of the freeman is better
than that of the ruler, the right of the one best man, the opposition of the practical and
speculative reason and the classes of actions corresponding to them, are introduced by
the way. The greater part of the discussion has no more reference to the perfect state
than to any other. The character of the state, though essentially aristocratic (for the
husbandmen are excluded from it), is nowhere precisely defined, and nothing is said
about its relation to any other form of government. There are several incorrectnesses
of style and expression, for example, the mention of the freeman who is substituted in
c. 2 for the contemplative philosopher; or in c. 6 the words ‘all the citizens are
virtuous,’ meaning not all, but only the higher classes; or the use of the term ‘ruling in
turn’ (c. 14) in a new sense, for the succession of the young to the old, not for the
alternation of one section of the citizens with another; or the seeming confusion of
contemplation with leisure (c. 14). Nor can the writer resist the temptation to discuss
the antiquities and geography of Greece and Italy. After describing in detail the
buildings of the city, he returns to the nature of virtue, its absolute and relative
character, the means toward it, the elements which constitute it, the priority of the
mind to the body. He is thus led on to speak of education, first, before birth, and
secondly, after birth. With this great subject, which is very imperfectly handled, the
treatise comes rather abruptly to an end. Nowhere else in his writings has Aristotle
borrowed so freely from Plato, yet he, or the writer of this part of the treatise, has only
alluded to him where he disagrees from him: cp. vii. c. 7, § 5-8; c. 11, § 8; c. 17, § 6;
viii. c. 7, § 9. For some of the similarities, cp. vii. c. 7, § 23, and Rep. iv. 35 E: vii. c.
9, § 3; Laws, xi. 919: vii. c. 10, § 7; Laws, iii. 676: vii. c. 10, § 11; Laws, v. 745, &c.

BOOK VII.
The best life both for individuals and states is a life of virtue, not of war or conquest:
the conditions of the perfect state: national character: distinction between the
conditions and the parts of a state: caste: syssitia: cultivation of the land: walls and
buildings: happiness is the realization of virtue: marriage: education.

In enquiring into the best form of a state we have first to determine which is the most
eligible life, and, secondly, whether the same life is or is not best for the individual
and for the state.

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The division of goods into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, is
generally accepted; and no one will deny that the happy man must have all three. But
there is a difference of opinion about the relative superiority of different classes of
goods. Some think that a little virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desire of
power, wealth or reputation. To whom we reply that virtue is not acquired or
preserved by external goods, but external goods by virtue. Where they are in excess
they are harmful or useless, but the goods of the soul are never in excess. And as the
soul is higher and nobler than the body, so the goods of the soul are higher than the
goods of the body; and the goods of the body and external goods are to be chosen for
the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of them. The happiness of a man is
proportional to his wisdom and virtue. Of this truth God is a witness to us, for he is
happy in his own nature. Whereas external goods are gifts of fortune—they are due to
chance, but no one was ever just or temperate by chance. In like manner the state
which is happiest is morally best and wisest; and the courage, justice, and wisdom of
a state are the same qualities which make a brave, just, and wise man.

The true relation of the individual to the state was not clearly understood by Plato and
Aristotle, because the limitations which are imposed upon common or collective
action were not perceived by them. Hence they appear to us, more frequently than
modern political writers, to fall into the error of confounding Ethics with Politics. A
good simple man is apt to believe that a state can be as easily reformed as an
individual: he will often repeat the aphorism that ‘what is morally wrong cannot be
politically right.’ He does not see that the changes which he deems so easy are limited
by the condition of what is possible. There are many opposing winds and conflicting
currents which interfere with the good intentions of statesmen and the progress of
politics. The wills of men counteract one another: and the minority must be deducted
from the majority before the force of any given movement can be ascertained. The
will of a state is the balance or surplus of will; the conscience of a state is that higher
opinion or judgment of men acting collectively which can make itself felt in the
world.

But if the analogy of the state and the individual has been a cause of error, it has also
had an elevating influence on the science of Politics. In the pursuit of material interest
men are always losing sight of the true and the good. The infusion of Ethics into
Politics tends to restore them, and this ethical element is derived chiefly from ancient
philosophy. In modern as in ancient times there are some statesmen who think that
Politics are entirely concerned with finance (i. 2. § 13). The formula that the state is
only ‘a machine for the protection of life and property,’ though rather worn out and
discredited in our own day, had a great hold on the last generation of statesmen. When
the pendulum has swayed long enough in the other direction the world may return to
the saws of political economy, for the recovery of some truths as well as errors which
are contained in them. At present we are living in an age which is averse to such
formulas; which feels that more is needed; and the study of ancient political
philosophy has helped to restore a more elevated conception of society. In Aristotle
and Plato we have different types of ideal states,—a perfect state on the ground, and a
perfect state in the air to which we may look as the form or example of a higher
political life. Such ideas are apt to become unreal, and may even be injurious when
they supersede the natural machinery of government, but when rightly infused into the

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mass of human motives, they seem to be worth all the rest. They must be clothed in
circumstances, and then they become to the state what the mind is to the body, what
the higher thoughts of men are to mere habits and fashions.

We may assume, then, that the happiness of the state and of the individual are the
same. But two questions remain to be determined: 1) Is a political or a contemplative
life to be preferred? 2) What is the best form or condition of the state? As we are
engaged, not in an ethical, but in a political enquiry, the latter is to us the main
question. But the former is also not without interest. Is the life of the philosopher or of
the statesman the more eligible? For the wise man, like the wise state, will seek to
regulate his life according to the best end. Some say that the exercise of any rule over
others, even of a just rule, is a great impediment to virtue; while others maintain that
the political is the only true life, and that virtue may be practised quite as well by
statesmen as by private persons; others will even affirm that despotic power is the
only true happiness. And the laws of many nations make power and conquest their
aim. Yet to the reflecting mind, it must appear strange that the statesman should be
always considering how he can tyrannize over others. A physician does not deceive or
coerce his patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Nevertheless, despotism is
thought by some to be a true form of government: and men are not ashamed of
practising towards their neighbours what in their own case they would declare to be
neither expedient nor right. Yet they cannot suppose that they have a right to rule over
their equals; but only over those who are by nature intended to serve. Other men are
not wild animals whom they may hunt and eat. And so far from war being the true
object of a state, there may be states which, having no neighbours, have no enemies,
and are nevertheless happy in isolation. Hence we see that warlike pursuits are means,
not ends; for they are not essential to the happiness of a state. The good law-giver will
enquire how men and cities can attain happiness, and how they can do their duty
toward their neighbours if they have any, and he will vary his enactments accordingly.

And now let us address those who agree that the life of virtue is the most eligible, but
differ about the manner of practising it. Some renounce political power; they think
that the life of the free citizen is better than the life of the statesman. Others think the
life of the statesman the best on the ground that virtuous activity is happiness. Both
are partly right and partly wrong. The first are right in saying that the life of the
freeman is better than that of the despot, but wrong in supposing 1) that all rule is
despotic, for there is a rule over freemen as well as over slaves; 2) wrong again in
thinking that the life of the freeman is necessarily inactive. The upholders of the
statesman’s claim see clearly enough that activity is preferable to inactivity, but they
think that virtue is power, because the greater the power of a man the more noble
actions he will be able to perform, and that he should therefore regard neither family
nor any other obligations, but the acquisition of wealth and power only. Not so; for if
this were true, the life of a thief or a highwayman would be the best of all. Rule is
only honourable where the ruler is manifestly superior to his subjects. No success,
however great, can justify a violation of principle. Evil is not to be done that good
may come. He only has a right to rule who is superior in virtue, and this superiority in
virtue must be accompanied by the capacity for action. Nor is the life of action
necessarily relative to others or confined to external acts; there are thoughts and
contemplations perfect in themselves, as well as actions which have practical results;

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and there may be an inward energy, like the divine, both in states and individuals, and
in the world at large.

Thus much by way of preface; from the abstract we may now pass to the concrete,
and having reviewed other states, may proceed to enquire into the conditions of the
ideal or perfect state.

The legislator, like any other artist, must have materials upon which to work. We may
presuppose for him imaginary conditions, but nothing impossible. First he will have
to consider 1) the numbers, but far more 2) the character of the people, and then 3) the
size and character of the country. The greatness of a state is to be estimated, not by
the numbers, but by the quality of the citizens. It has a work to do; and that is the
greatest city which accomplishes the greatest work. Great is a relative term, and is
here used in the sense in which we speak of a great man. A city in which there are
many artisans and few soldiers is not really great. We know from experience that a
very populous city can seldom be well governed; and we may reasonably assume that
a great multitude cannot be orderly; nothing short of Divine Power can impart law to
infinity. The beauty of a state, as of a ship or of anything else, depends upon
proportion: magnitude must be combined with good order.

A state begins to exist when the population is self-sufficing, and it must not be
increased to such an extent that the administration breaks down because the citizens
cease to know one another, or that foreigners and metics can creep undiscovered into
the rights of citizens. The entire multitude should be taken in at a single view.

The Greeks were averse to any considerable extension of the size or population of a
state. The citizens were to know one another, they were to be accustomed to act
together, they were to live within the same walls. When the city began to increase in
population, the Greeks instead of allowing it to grow indefinitely sent out a colony to
some other place. There seem to have been many causes of this limitation. First, 1)
there was the fact; the early Greek populations were not large, and the ruling class
were not upon the average more than a third or fourth of the whole; the valleys in
which they were located were not capable of sustaining great numbers, any more than
the valleys of Cumberland or Switzerland in England and in Europe. 2) There were
the necessities of self-defence; when war was almost the constant state of man, and
nations were not yet organized, the country population could not extend very far from
the city which protected them. What had been the fact thus became the principle. To
the Greek the cities of Assyria or of Egypt, built in vast plains, seemed to have a
monstrous and unmeaning greatness. The Greek races had quickly become diversified
by circumstances into lesser tribes, and the configuration of the country tended to
maintain and strengthen the subdivisions. A distinct and peculiar life was stamped
upon each of them. The city soon became all in all; the country nothing. The fewness
of the aristocracy and their constant struggles with the rising democracy also tended
to prevent their free expansion. The intensity of their inner life rendered it impossible
for them to amalgamate great masses of men. Besides, the idea itself was repugnant to
the Greek mind. ‘The good was of the nature of the finite,’ in politics as in other
departments of knowledge. Hence the saying of Aristotle that ‘the state which consists
of 100,000 men is no longer a state.’

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The territory of the state should likewise be moderate in size, but large and fertile
enough to enable the citizens to live temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of
leisure. It should be difficult for an enemy to get into it, and easy for the citizens to
get out of it. The country and the inhabitants should be taken in at a glance. The city
should be well situated for the protection of the country both by sea and land, and
should be a centre of inland as well as of maritime commerce.

Whether a communication with the sea is beneficial or not is a disputed question;


much may be said on both sides. The influx of strangers and the increase of
population are adverse to good order. But on the other hand, the citizens should be
able to act at sea as well as by land against an enemy; and they will require imports
and exports. It may not be well that they should seek to be a market for the world, but
still they will find the advantage of having a port near the town and dependent on it.
The possession of a moderate naval force is therefore advantageous. The citizens
require such a force for their own needs; they should also be formidable to their
neighbours, and on the other hand they should be able to assist them, if necessary, by
sea as well as by land. The number of this naval force should be relative to the size
and character of the state. No increase of population is required to maintain it. The
marines who will be the officers must be citizens taken from the infantry, and the
large populations of perioeci and husbandmen will supply abundance of common
sailors.

We have next to speak of the character of the citizens, a subject which leads us to
consider national character in general. The gifts of nature are variously distributed
among different races. The northern nations are courageous but stupid; capable of
preserving their freedom, but not capable of political life or of command. The
Orientals are intelligent but spiritless, and always in a state of subjection. The
Hellenes, who dwell in an intermediate region, are high-spirited and also intelligent;
they are well governed, and might, if united, rule the world. But this combination of
qualities does not exist equally in all of them, and both intelligence and courage are
required in those whom the legislator is training to virtue. We do not agree [with Plato
when he says] ‘that the guardians of a state should be gentle to those whom they know
and fierce to those whom they do not know.’ For passion is the quality of the soul
which begets friendship, and our anger is stirred more by the contempt or ingratitude
of friends than by the injuries of enemies. Both the power of command and the love of
freedom are based upon this quality.

The middle position which the Greek occupies between the over-civilized Asiatic and
the under-civilized Gaul and Thracian is a central fact in the philosophy of History;
for from the Greek the political life of the modern world and the very form of the
human mind may be said to be inherited. In the Asiatic a feeble and fanciful
intelligence has become separated from character, in the barbarian, character from
intelligence. In the Greek at his best they are assimilated or harmonized, and such a
balance or harmony never existed in any other ancient nation. The great empires of
the East were slowly decaying or had already crumbled beneath the sand which buried
their cities. The Egyptians, except from the impact of Greeks, during two thousand
years and more, had ‘learnt nothing,’ and they ‘had forgotten nothing.’ They were
‘hoary with time,’ and the old age of the world was no match for the youth Alexander.

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Far in the North and the South, but reaching to the fair shores of the Mediterranean,
there were barbarous tribes, creatures of impulse and of violence, who gathered
something from the civilization which they touched. In the centre of them all dwelt
the Greek, seeming to differ from them in beauty of form and enlightenment of mind
almost as much as gods from men. But this greatest and least among the nations only
for a short time, scarcely more than the length of two human lives, retained this happy
mixture of earth’s best elements. Aristotle hardly recognizes that he saw the Greek
world already in decay. But the life which had departed was after a time to rise again
in a new form. ‘That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die.’ The real
greatness of Hellas is the influence which she has exercised on humanity. New forms
of government, new admixtures of race were to arise after many ages, in which a
small seed of Greek literature, not a hundredth or thousandth part of the whole, was to
flourish and abound under the altered circumstances of modern Europe.

There are conditions as well as parts of a state; [means as well as ends]. And two
things of which the one is an end, the other the means, have nothing in common
except the relation. The conditions of a state must not be confused with the organic
parts of it. The builder requires tools and materials; they are the conditions of the
house, and the art of the builder is for the sake of the house, but the house and the
builder have nothing in common. And so states require property, but property is no
part of a state, which aims at the best life possible, and is not merely a community of
living beings. [The end is the highest good, and] men seek after this best life or
highest good in various modes, out of which arise the various forms of government.
We are seeking for the parts of a state, and these are to be found somewhere among
the conditions of it.

First there must be food; secondly, arts; thirdly, arms; fourthly, money; fifthly, or
rather first, a care of religion; sixthly, political and judicial administration. Without
these the community will not be self-sufficing; and therefore the state must contain
husbandmen, artisans, soldiers, capitalists, priests, and judges.

But should these pursuits be common to all? or divided among different classes? or
some common to all and others not? In democracies all share in all: in oligarchies the
opposite principle prevails. In the best state, which is also the happiest, the citizens
are virtuous, not relatively but absolutely; and they ought not to lead the ignoble life
of mechanics or tradesmen. Neither should they be husbandmen who have no leisure,
and therefore cannot practise virtue or fulfil political duties. But when mechanics and
husbandmen are excluded, there remain only the two classes of warriors and
councillors, and our enquiry is therefore limited to the question whether the functions
of these two shall be discharged by the same or by different persons. It is a provision
of Nature that the young shall be warriors, the old councillors; and the young will be
willing enough to wait for their turn of office. Such a distribution will be both
expedient and just, and will contain an element of proportion, for the duties of the two
will be relative to their respective ages. Besides, the rulers should be in easy
circumstances, and should have leisure to be virtuous; for without virtue, happiness
cannot exist; and the city is happy when the citizens are happy. The meaner sort will
be mechanics, the slaves and perioeci husbandmen. As to the priests, they too must be
citizens; for only by citizens can the Gods be duly honoured. They should be men

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who have grown old in the service of the state as warriors and councillors, the eldest
of the elders. To sum up: there must be husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers of all
kinds—these are necessary to the existence of a state; but the parts of the state are
councillors and warriors.

The division of the population into warriors and husbandmen is not an invention of
political philosophers, but a very ancient institution still existing in Egypt, which is
the oldest of all countries, and in Crete, established, as we learn from tradition, by a
law of Sesostris in Egypt and of Minos in Crete. Common meals are also of great
antiquity; according to the learned among the Italians they were first introduced into
Hellas from Italy. But these and many other things have been invented several times
over in the course of ages.

There is a general agreement in favour of common meals. But they should be


furnished at the public cost, so that even the poorest may not be excluded from them.
To this extent I agree with those who maintain that property should be common. The
expense of religious worship should also be defrayed by the state. To meet such
charges the land should be divided into two parts, the one public, and the other
private. Of the public land half should be appropriated to the service of the Gods, half
to defray the common meals. Of the private land, half should be near the border and
half near the city. Where there is not this arrangement, those at a distance who are not
immediately affected will be too eager to strike, while those who are on the border
will be ready to purchase peace at any price. The cultivators should be slaves of an
inferior sort, and not all of the same race; or they should be perioeci of foreign race
and of a like inferior nature. Some of them should be employed on private lands, the
remainder on the property of the state. Slaves should be well treated, and should be
encouraged by the hope of freedom. But I shall return to this subject [a promise
unfulfilled] at some other time.

Nothing is less like Aristotle’s political ideal than a state in which all men are free and
equal. On the contrary, he is quite satisfied that the land should belong to a ruling and
be tilled by a subject class. He would keep the rulers thoroughly united among
themselves, and weaken the subjects by dispersing them. So far is he from approving
entirely of the pure democracy which he elsewhere describes. He accuses Plato of
indistinctness in his account of the lower classes; but is he much clearer himself?
What he says hardly amounts to more than this, that the poorer classes should be
treated humanely by the rich, and that whatever political privileges they may possess,
they should be deprived as far as possible of the opportunity of exercising them. The
ancient institution of caste is regarded by him as the natural beginning of society.
Syssitia should always exist in a well-ordered state. He is going to explain his reasons
for taking this view, but, as in many other passages, the intention is no sooner formed
than it seems to be forgotten.

In what follows we are interested to observe the external conditions which he requires
in the state. First, good air and good water; for these are the elements which we use
oftenest, and on which our health is most dependent. The principles of sanitation have
never been stated more clearly or concisely. The separation of drinking water from
water used for other purposes is an ingenious idea which has been adopted in some

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modern cities. The walls and buildings of the state illustrate the military character of
Greek society. The priests have a feeble place among the other classes. As in Plato
(Laws, vi. 760), they are to be aged citizens who are no longer useful in war or
politics. Man when he has done his duty and is passing out of life is transferred to the
service of the Gods.

The city should be open to the sea and to the country. With a view to health, 1) it
should be exposed to the east and sheltered from the north: 2) there should be a good
natural supply of water: 3) the situation should be convenient for political, and 4) for
military purposes. The supply of water and air is most important, for these are the
elements which we use most. In wise states, if the supply is insufficient, a distinction
is made between drinking water and water used for other purposes; and in addition to
the natural springs and fountains, reservoirs are established to collect the rain.

Different positions are suited to different forms of government,—an acropolis to a


king or oligarchy, a plain to a democracy, many strongholds to an aristocracy. The
houses should be built upon a regular plan; but a part also in the old irregular fashion,
that beauty and safety may be combined. The city should be fortified; the notion [of
Plato] that walls had better be left to slumber in the ground is an antiquated fancy;
they should be made as strong as possible, especially now that siege engines have
been brought to such perfection. To have no fortifications would be as foolish as to
level the heights of a country, or to leave a house unwalled lest the inmates should
become cowards. The walls of a city should be ornamental as well as useful, and they
should be adapted to resist the latest improvements in war. ‘Si vis pacem, para
bellum.’

There should be guard-houses in the walls, and as the citizens are to be distributed at
common meals, common tables for the guards should be set up in them. The temples
and government buildings should occupy a site towering over the city, as becomes the
abode of virtue. Near this spot let there be an agora for freemen, from which all trade
should be scrupulously excluded. There the gymnastic exercises of the elder men may
be performed in the presence of some of the magistrates, while others superintend the
exercises of the youth in another place. There must also be a traders’ agora in some
other spot—this should be easily accessible both by land and sea. The magistrates
who deal with contracts and have the care of the city and the agora should be
established near the agora. Nor must the priests be forgotten; public tables will be
provided for them in their proper place near the temples.

A similar order should prevail in the country. There too the magistrates must have
guard - houses and common tables; and temples dedicated to gods and heroes will be
scattered throughout the land.

Enough of details. The well-being of the state, like all other well-being, consists first
in the choice of a right end and aim of action; secondly, of the right means. In life, as
in the arts, a man may mistake or fail to attain either or both. The physician may not
always understand the nature of health, or he may use the wrong means for the
restoration of it. All men desire happiness, but many, through some accident or defect
of nature or of circumstances, fail to attain it; for even the highest virtue has need of

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some portion, however small, of external goods. And as we are enquiring into the best
government of a state, and since the happiest state is that which is best governed, we
must enquire into the nature of happiness. As we ventured to say in the Ethics,
happiness is the perfect exercise of virtue; and this not conditional but absolute. I use
the term ‘conditional’ to express that which is necessary, like punishments and
chastisements, which are lesser evils and therefore relative goods. But actions which
aim at honour and advantage are the foundation and creation of good. A good man
will make the best use of poverty and disease, but he can only be happy when he has
health and wealth. [In like manner the good state will be patient of adversity, but can
only attain happiness when blessed with favourable conditions.] The absolute good is
the true good, but by a confusion of ideas we are apt to argue that the external
conditions are the end, which is just as if we were to say that a musical performance is
due to the instrument and not to the skill of the performer. The goods of fortune are
often matters of chance,—we can only pray for them; but the virtue and goodness of a
state are the result of knowledge and purpose. A city is virtuous when all the citizens
are virtuous; and therefore we must enquire how they may become such.

There are three elements of virtue—nature, habit, reason. Every one must be born a
man, and he must have a certain character or habit. The animals lead a life of nature,
and they are also influenced by habit. But man, and man only, has reason in addition
to nature. And these three, nature, habit, reason, must be in accord; and reason should
control both nature and habit.

But there still remains a question which has not been fully answered: Should rulers
and ruled be always the same, or are they to interchange? And upon the answer to this
question the education of the citizens will depend. If there were men as clearly
superior to their fellows in body and mind as the Gods are to men, there could be no
doubt; the one class would always rule and the other obey. But since there is no such
marked superiority, it is just that the citizens should rule and be ruled in turn. [We
note that the words ‘ruling and being ruled in turns’ are here used to describe not, as
elsewhere, a constitutional but an aristocratical government, like the Republic of
Plato.] In regard to education, Nature herself has made a difference, for she
distinguishes between old and young, and has appointed the one to rule, the other to
be ruled. The rulers and the ruled are the same, yet also different; and therefore their
education, although the same, will differ in some respects. Those who are ruled, by
obeying learn to rule; [how or what the rulers learn is not said, unless the meaning is,
that they learn by experience]. There is a just and an unjust rule; the former for the
sake of the ruled, to which the citizen may honourably submit; the latter tyrannical,
existing for the good of the rulers only. Under a rule which is just and gentle many
apparently menial duties may be honourably performed by the younger citizens.

The virtue of the citizen and of the ruler is the same with that of the good man, and
the legislator has to consider how his citizens may become good. Now the soul of man
has two parts, one, the rational, having reason in itself, the other, not having, but
obeying reason. And he is good who has the virtues of both; yet clearly the virtues of
the part which has reason are the superior, and the end is more likely to be found in
them, the higher in the higher. The reason too is subdivided into the practical and the
speculative; and the actions of the speculative, which is the superior part, are higher

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and better than those of the inferior. And the whole of life is divided into two parts,
business and leisure, war and peace, and actions are divided into those which are
useful and necessary, and those which are honourable. And in all, the useful is for the
sake of the honourable, the lower of the higher. These are the principles in which the
statesman should train his citizens. Yet even the best law-givers have framed their
laws only with a view to what is gainful and profitable. The Lacedaemonian
constitution, although greatly eulogized, aims at nothing higher than war and
conquest, which is deemed happiness. But surely the Lacedaemonians are not a happy
people now that their empire has passed away; they continue in the observance of the
old laws, but the better part of life has departed from them. And the desire of
dominion in nations is really a crime of the same sort as the usurpation of power in
individuals. The law-giver should implant in his citizens the love of the best; for the
same things are best both for individuals and states. Men should not study war for the
sake of enslaving others, but they should provide against their own enslavement; they
should rule for the good of the governed, and they should rule over none but those
who are by nature slaves. Military states are safe only in time of war; they fall asunder
in peace.

Leaving the external conditions of the state, Aristotle now proceeds to consider the
higher aspects of it. The same moderate principle which he had already enunciated in
the Nicomachean Ethics, namely that happiness is not altogether separable from
external goods, is here repeated, though less clearly and with a certain degree of
confusion. The state must have a fair share of material prosperity, and there may be
conditions under which the life of a society, like that of an individual, becomes no
longer endurable. But although the state is not absolutely independent of external
circumstances, the higher principle of politics is virtue, which is given by reason
working through education.

After what has been told us in Chap. x., that there is a distinction between the owners
and cultivators of land, we are surprised to find that all, whether rulers or subjects, are
to have their share of governing. The cultivators, then, would seem to be a class
inferior to the subjects. The censure passed on Hippodamus may be retorted,—Surely
there is a great deal of confusion in all this.

Aristotle and Plato were well aware that the Spartans and the Hellenic world generally
had exalted too much the military ideal. They saw that the virtues of war could not be
separated from the virtues of peace. But they were equally strenuous in maintaining
that an individual or a state must be able to defend themselves. Courage founded upon
animal spirit was held by them to be the safeguard of every virtue. But they had not
attained to the distinction of physical and moral courage; nor had they determined the
relation of the reason to the desires. They had not yet made a study of the virtues, but
had only taken them in the rough, without clearly distinguishing them. Their analysis
was imperfect and often accidental, derived as much from the associations of a word
as from the observation of facts. Nor are we ourselves aware how much in all mental
investigations we are under the influence of language and of crude ideas inherited
from the ancients.

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It may be observed that Aristotle in the latter part of this Book is describing, not a
democracy or a timocracy, but an aristocracy in which the relation of classes is the
same, or nearly the same, as in the Republic of Plato. He has told us that democracy is
‘a necessity, not a good;’ he is here speaking of the good, not of the necessity;—of the
state which is based, not on numbers, but on virtue, ‘and provided with a fair share of
external goods.’ His old formula of ‘ruling and being ruled in turn’ he still retains, but
in a different sense; the alternation is not the artificial interchange of citizens of the
same age, but the natural division of them into old and young. The injustice of one
class ruling and the other being ruled is supposed to be remedied by the class which is
governed looking forward to being governors; they are willing to wait until their turn
comes. This is called ‘justice according to proportion;’ all the old are to rule, all the
young are to obey. How such an arrangement is possible in a great city or how the
education of the old and young differs is not explained.

The city should possess the virtues of peace as well as of war, of leisure as well as of
business. Her citizens should be temperate, brave, just,—qualities which are
especially needed by the rich and well-to-do. The dwellers in the Islands of the Blest,
if such there be, will above all men need philosophy and temperance and justice. War
is compulsory, but in peace a man is his own master. It is therefore peculiarly
disgraceful to him not to be able to use aright the goods of life in time of peace.

We have already determined that nature and habit and reason are required in man; but
we have not said whether early training should be that of reason or of habit. The
training must not be of one only, but of both; for the two must accord; and will then
form the best of harmonies. Either reason or habit may be mistaken, and fail to attain
the ideal of life. Now every end has a beginning in some former end. But reason and
mind are the final end towards which human nature strives [they have their beginning
in habit and nature], and to this education should be directed. The care of the body
should precede that of the soul; and the training of the appetitive part should follow,
but always the body for the sake of the soul; the appetites, of the reason; the lower, for
the sake of the higher.

It will be the first care of the legislator that the population are strong and healthy; and
therefore he will begin by regulating the marriages of his citizens. He must provide 1)
that the time of reproduction in men and women should correspond; 2) that the
parents should be of suitable ages relatively to the children when they grow up; 3) that
the frames of the children should from their birth be moulded to his will. The parents
should marry at the right time, that is to say, the men at 37, and the women at 18. For
since the limit of generation in men is 70 and in women 50, they will then marry in
their prime; and the children will succeed them at a suitable age. When persons are
married too young, their children are apt to be small or ill-developed; in childbirth the
younger women suffer more, and more of them die; such early unions are apt to make
them wanton, and in men the bodily frame is stunted. Marriages should take place in
winter, and, if the natural philosophers are right, during the prevalence of a north
rather than of a south wind. The constitution of both parents should be strong and
inured to labour, not the temperament of an athlete any more than of a valetudinarian,
but in a mean between them. Women who are pregnant should take exercise and have
a nourishing diet; their minds should be at ease, for children derive their nature from

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their parents. Deformed offspring should not be reared; and if there are too many
children, abortion must be procured,—a practice which is not criminal if life has not
yet begun in the embryo. The parents should not continue procreation too long: it
should cease when the fathers have reached the age of 50 or 55. For the children of
the very old, like the children of the very young, are weakly both in body and mind.

Adultery should be deemed disgraceful, and if it occur during the time of


cohabitation, should be punished with loss of privileges.

Young children should be fed on milk,—the less wine the better. Motion of every
kind is good for them; in some countries mechanical appliances are used to straighten
their limbs. They should be accustomed to bear cold from the first. The cries of a
child should not be restrained, for they have an excellent physical effect. Up to five
years the children must learn nothing, but only play; and their games should be
miniature representations of after-life. They should not be left too much with slaves,
and should not be allowed to hear improper stories. Indeed, all indecency of speech
must be banished from the city; for shameful words are the parents of shameful
actions. A freeman who says or does anything unseemly shall be beaten if he is
young; or if he be an older person, he shall lose the privileges of a citizen.

All indecent statues and pictures must be prohibited, except in the temples of certain
Gods; and the young must not go to the theatre until they are old enough to take their
place at the common meals. Children while they are growing up should only see what
is good; for their first impressions colour their whole life. What men hear first at the
theatre, or anywhere else, has the greatest effect upon them. And therefore youth
should be strangers to vice in every form.

The poets who divide the ages of men by sevens are not always right; we had better
adhere to the distinctions which nature makes, and divide education into two periods
of equal or unequal length, from seven to the age of puberty, and onwards to the age
of 21.

The precepts about early education are chiefly taken from Plato. Yet we observe that
there is no acknowledgment of the source from which they come. Plato is only
mentioned to be censured, when he has first been misinterpreted. We are surprised to
find how high a place in the state is assigned to education both by Plato and Aristotle;
whereas in modern treatises on politics it is generally banished as being part of
another subject, or a subject in itself. At their birth, and even before their birth, the
children of the state are to be the special care of the legislator, and their whole life is
to be regulated by him. This idea is deeply impressed upon ancient political
philosophy. And though, as Aristotle truly says, he has treated this subject in a very
cursory manner, and never fulfills the promise that he will elsewhere return to it, yet,
following closely in the footsteps of Plato, he has discussed it with a breadth of view
scarcely to be found in modern writers. He sees that the body must come before the
soul, because in the first years of life the child is the creature of bodily impressions;
yet all for the sake of the soul, which gradually takes possession of the bodily frame.
There is a mystic tie by which they are linked together, and by which the human
reason is connected with the divine.

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Very little in this short tractate upon education can be deemed original. The greater
part is to be found in the Laws and the Republic. And the claim to originality might be
further diminished if we had more of the contemporary literature.

There is no break or division between the Seventh and Eighth Books. A very
imperfect notion of the subject which they profess to treat is given in them. The
education of after-life, whether political or speculative, seems never to have been
seriously considered by Aristotle. Of mathematics and of literature he says little or
nothing. His main ideas about education are that it should be public or national, and
adapted to the constitution of the state,—an education which, as far as we know,
existed nowhere in Hellas except at Sparta, and there only in an imperfect form. In
other respects he does not depart from the ordinary type of Greek education.

The Eighth Book contains a very imperfect sketch of education, in which a few
fragmentary though sagacious remarks on training and gymnastics, and a more
elaborate discussion of the place of music in the studies of youth, are introduced. It
has been sometimes said that Aristotle could never have intended these few remarks
to be his whole account of education which had already been treated of by Plato in a
fuller and more perfect form, and therefore that he must be supposed to have left that
part of the treatise unfinished. The same remark applies to other writings of Aristotle,
notably to the Poetics. Has Aristotle no more than this to tell us about poetry?—is the
reflection which naturally arises in the mind of the modern reader. But the comparison
of these two examples, to which many others might be added, makes us hesitate in
applying this favourite commonplace of an ‘unfinished work,’ and we are led to think
that what appears to us a meagre and imperfect treatment of a subject may have worn
a different appearance in the age of Aristotle. To plan out a treatise so that every part
should throw a light upon every other part was a rare achievement in ancient Greek
literature. At any rate we may remark that the Poetics of Aristotle and the last book of
the Politics, whether finished or unfinished, perfect or imperfect, have exercised a
vast influence on all succeeding writers. The truth is that unity or completeness was
the last quality which an ancient writer attained, partly from the dearth of materials,
and also from the meagreness of thought in the beginnings of philosophy. His
conceptions were rough-hewn. The original force of them was not yet completely
subdued by the art of rhetoric; and when rhetoric became the form of Greek literature,
the originality disappeared.

BOOK VIII.
Education should be national and should be liberal: two chief branches of it, music
and gymnastic: how leisure should be employed: the effects of music and the mode of
studying it: the lower and the higher kinds.

Every one will admit that education is the chief business of the legislator; and that he
has to adapt his citizens to the form of government under which they live. They must
be all trained in virtue; and the training should not be individual or private, but public
and the same for all. No one of the citizens belongs to himself; each of them is a part
of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole.

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That education should be an affair of state is denied by no one; but mankind are not
equally agreed about the things to be taught:—should education be intellectual or
moral? should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should knowledge of the higher
sort be our aim? Neither are they any more agreed about the means [as indeed might
be expected when they differ so widely about the ends]. Some useful things should be
taught, but not those vulgar arts which deform the body, nor yet those paid
occupations which absorb and degrade the mind. Even the liberal arts should only be
carried to a certain extent. The object too makes a difference; a man will perform a
menial office for himself or his friends which he would not do for other people (cp.
vii. 14, § 7).

Education is commonly divided into four branches, 1) reading and writing, 2)


gymnastic exercises, 3) music, to which some add a fourth, 4) drawing. Reading,
writing, drawing, all have some practical purpose, and gymnastics are said to impart
courage. Music is cultivated in our own day chiefly for the sake of pleasure, but was
formerly included in education, and rightly. Nature demands that we should both
work well and use leisure well, and leisure is better than work. But we ought not to be
idle; and the question arises—‘How shall we employ our leisure?’ Not in mere
amusement, clearly. Yet he who works hard must have relaxation. Therefore we
should at suitable times introduce amusements, and they should be the medicines of
the soul by which we obtain rest. This kind of relaxation varies according to the habits
of individuals; the pleasure of the best man is the best and springs from the best. It is
clear, then, that there are branches of study which add to the enjoyment of leisure, and
these are to be valued for their own sake. And music was admitted by our fathers into
education, not, like reading and writing, on the ground either of necessity or utility,
but with a view to intellectual enjoyment in leisure. The practical branches of
education, such as drawing, reading, and writing, ought not to be neglected, but they
should be studied with a higher purpose; for example, drawing may give the learners a
sense of beauty. To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and
exalted minds.

The atmosphere of perplexity and controversy which envelopes Aristotle’s other


writings upon Ethics and Politics and is characteristic of his age and school, also
surrounds his discussion of education. He cannot advance a step without stumbling
upon a dispute. Is education to be moral or intellectual, useful or noble? Is the
received education the best, or are we to seek for a more excellent way? How are
leisure and work related to each other? No distinct answer is given to these questions,
which are almost immediately superseded by other questions. We are still in the stage
of enquiry, and have not attained to order and light. We gather as the final result that
education must be noble as well as useful, and that these two are not absolutely
divided; for things which are useful may be taught in a spirit which ennobles them.

The education of the body should precede that of the mind, and therefore young boys
must begin with the trainer and wrestling-master. [Here Aristotle diverges from Plato,
who thinks that the mind must be trained before the body.] But we should avoid the
error of the Lacedaemonians, who brutalize their children by laborious exercises,
thinking to make them courageous. They forget that education is not directed to any
single end, and that true courage is always associated with a gentle and noble

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character. Their system has been a complete failure. There was a time when the
Lacedaemonians were the first people in Hellas; and this pre-eminence they won by
their superior training, but now that others train, they are beaten both in war and in
gymnastics. They must be judged from what they are, not from what they have been.
That the young should be trained in light exercises is a principle generally admitted,
but they should not be overtasked. The evil of too much early training is proved by
the example of the Olympic victors, who have rarely gained the prize both as men and
boys. When boyhood is over, three years should be spent in other studies; the period
of life which follows may then be devoted to hard exercises and strict regimen. Care
should be taken not to work mind and body at the same time.

There are many striking observations scattered up and down in the Eighth Book. What
can be better than the remark that to be always seeking after the useful does not
become free and exalted souls? Or that in education habit must go before reason and
the body before the mind? Or the idea of noble dangers, and a courage to be
associated with a gentle and lion-like temper? Or the acute remark that the evil of
excessive training in early life is proved by the example of the Olympic victors, for
not more than two or three of them have gained a prize both as boys and men? Or the
common-sense rule that men ought not to labour at the same time with their minds
and with their bodies?

Music is commonly supposed to be learnt either for amusement, or for the training of
the mind and character, or for intellectual enjoyment in leisure. But learning is a
serious business, and therefore music cannot be taught to youth simply as an
amusement, and the intellectual employment of leisure is only suitable to full-grown
men. It may be asked why in any case should we learn to play and sing ourselves
when we can hear professional musicians who sing and play far better? Like the
Lacedaemonians, we may be good judges of music and yet not performers. Zeus does
not play or sing to the Gods; and no gentleman would play or sing [in public] unless
he were intoxicated.

Not to enlarge further on this controversy, we will consider the other question: Is
music an amusement, or an instrument of training, or an intellectual enjoyment? All
men agree that music is a solace and refreshment; a noble pleasure which they may
enjoy when, engaged in some high pursuit, they would rest by the way. And with a
view to relaxation, as well as to some further good, the young should be trained in it.
Yet it may also happen that the means may be converted into an end, because the end
contains an element of pleasure, and so the lower takes the place of the higher. Now
music is both a solace and a recreation. And who can say that, having this use, it may
not also have a higher one? For it enters into and forms the soul; virtue and vice are
represented by melody and rhythm, and the feeling aroused by the imitation is not far
removed from the same feeling about realities. No other sensations are expressive of
character equally with those of hearing, although objects of sight, such as paintings
and statues, exercise in a lesser degree the same power. Each of the modes affects the
soul in a peculiar way; the Mixolydian makes men sad and grave,—the relaxed
harmonies slacken and weaken, the Dorian compose and strengthen, the mind; the
Phrygian mode inspires passion. Rhythms, too, have a character, some of rest, others
of motion; and of the latter some have a more vulgar, others a nobler, movement.

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Seeing the great power of music, we cannot afford to neglect the use of it in
education. It is suited to the time of youth; we have in us an affinity to harmonies and
rhythms which makes some philosophers say that the soul is, or contains, harmony.

But the question has not yet been determined 1) whether youth should be taught to
sing and play themselves or not? Clearly their characters will be more influenced if
they can play themselves; they will be better judges of music, and while they are
growing up, music will be to them what the rattle is to very young children, and will
keep them out of mischief. But they must not continue the study too far into life. A
gentleman should not aim at acquiring the marvellous execution of the professor of
music. But he should know enough to feel delight in simple and noble rhythms.

Musical instruments should be simple and adapted to a simple style of music. The
flute and the harp must be rejected. The flute requires too much skill, and has not a
good moral effect; it is too exciting; it also prevents the use of the voice, and is
therefore an impediment to education. The ancients were right in forbidding it,
although about the time of the Persian War, when a great educational movement arose
in Hellas, the flute came into fashion. But soon a reaction took place, and the flute,
together with various oddly-shaped, old-fashioned instruments, was again banished.
There is truth in the old myth which tells how Athene, after inventing the flute, threw
it away, not approving of an instrument which distorted the features. That was a
pleasing fancy of ancient mythology. But with still more reason may the wise goddess
be supposed to have rejected it because it contributed nothing to the mind.

Professional music, then,—that is to say, the music which is performed in contests


and is adapted to the taste of the audience, who are vulgar themselves and vulgarize
the performers,—is unsuited to education, and should therefore be prohibited by us.

Lastly, we have to consider what melodies and rhythms shall be employed in


education. Melodies have been divided into ethical melodies, melodies of action, and
inspiring melodies. Accepting these divisions, we further maintain that music should
be studied with three objects,—1) education, 2) purification (of which we will explain
the meaning when we treat of poetry), 3) intellectual enjoyment. And in education
ethical melodies are to be preferred, but we may listen to the others. For men are
variously affected by pity, fear, enthusiasm, and the various melodies corresponding
to these feelings lighten and deliver the soul. The freeman will desire to hear the
nobler sort of melodies at the theatre, but for the amusement of artisans and slaves the
lower kinds may be also admitted. Plato in the Republic wishes to retain only the
Dorian and Phrygian modes, although he rejects the flute, which is to other musical
instruments what the Phrygian is to other modes. He is wrong in retaining the
Phrygian, which is exciting and emotional; he is equally wrong in excluding the
Lydian, which is better adapted to old men and to children of tender years than the
severer melodies; and he is inconsistent with himself in keeping the Phrygian mode
when he rejects the flute. The Dorian is grave and manly, and therefore especially
suited to education. Two principles should be always kept in view, What is possible
and What is becoming; yet even these are relative to age, the relaxed song of the old
will naturally differ from the severer strain of youth. These two principles, to which
may be added a third, viz. the mean, lie at the foundation of education.

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One of the Aristotelian ideas which we have a difficulty in translating into English
words and modes of thought is σχολ? or ? ?ν σχολη?? διαγωγή. To us leisure means
hardly more than the absence of occupation, the necessary alternation of play with
work. By the Greek, σχολ? was regarded as the condition of a gentleman. In Aristotle
the notion is still further idealized, for he seems to regard it as an internal state in
which the intellect, free from the cares of practical life, energizes or reposes in the
consciousness of truth. To such an elevation of the soul, music, in which the mind
through the ear receives the mathematical proportions of harmony and rhythm, lends
the greatest aid. Some old Pythagorean feeling, exaggerated by fancy and tradition,
enters into all this; but we also know by experience how, when listening to the tones
of the organ, strange but undefined thoughts arise in our minds,—we feel better than
ourselves, and are caught up into a sort of heaven,—and we know also that those who
have learnt in their youth to play on an instrument are much better able to realize the
power of music than the uninstructed listener, who nevertheless, like the
Lacedaemonians, may not be a bad judge of the style of music. We agree with
Aristotle that marvels of execution may very well be dispensed with, if simple and
noble rhythms are retained. The ancient Greek music was devoid of harmony in the
modern sense, but the beauty of music, as of poetry, lies not only in subtle
adjustments of notes or words, but much more in simplicity, in purity, in sweetness.
There was a nearer connexion between poetry and music than among ourselves; for
the metre of the words coincided with the time of the music. The instrument was
secondary, not primary; the human voice was the dominant or prevailing tone in the
performance. The choric lays of Æschylus or Sophocles were heard above the Dorian
and Phrygian modes which kept measure with them. There was some combination of
mind and sense, some sweet influence falling melodiously on the ear, and ‘finding a
way to the inner place of the soul’ (Plato), which we fail to conceive. And since Greek
music can no longer be performed, ‘married to immortal verse,’ with its
accompaniments of dance and song, and the modes of it are unfamiliar to us and not
ennobled by national and religious associations, we shall always continue to think that
the language of the Greeks about music is exaggerated and unreal.

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[Back to Table of Contents]

THE POLITICS.

BOOK I.
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community Ed. Bekker, 1252 a.
is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act
in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all The state being the
communities aim at some good, the state or political community, highest community
aims at the highest
which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims,
good.
and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good.

Now there is an erroneous opiniona that a statesman, king, Plato treated the
householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in difference between
kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the household, royal, and
ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a political rule as a
difference only of
household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if degree.
there were no difference between a great household and a small
state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows:
When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the
principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is
called a statesman.

But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will But it is really a
be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the difference in kind, as
methodb which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments will be clear if we
of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolve the state into
its elements.
resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We
must therefore look at the elements of which the state is
composed, in order that we may see ain what they differ from one another, and
whether any scientific distinction can be drawn between the different kinds of rulea .

He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, (1) Union of male and
whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of female.
them. In the first place (1) there must be a union of those who
cannot exist without each other; for example, of male and (2) Of ruler and
subject.
female, that the race may continue; and this is a union which is
formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with 1252 b.
other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to
leave behind them an image of themselves. And (2) there must be a union of natural
ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is
by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a
subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Nature,
however, has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly,
like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing
for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for
many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves,

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because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male
and female. Wherefore the poets say,—

‘It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbariansb ;’

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master The family the first
and slave, the family first arises, and Hesiod is right when he stage of society.
says,—

‘First house and wife and an ox for the ploughc ,’

for the ox is the poor man’s slave. The family is the association The village the next.
established by nature for the supply of men’s every day wants,
and the members of it are called by Charondas ‘companions of the cupboard’
[?μοσιπύους], and by Epimenides the Cretan, ‘acompanions of the mangera ’
[?μοκάπους]. But when several families are united, and the association aims at
something more than the supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the village.
And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the
family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be ‘suckled with
the same milk.’ And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed
by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as
the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the
colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of
the same blood. As Homer says [of the Cyclopes]:—

‘Each one gives law to his children and to his wivesb .’

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say
that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times
under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their
ways of life to be like their own.

When several villages are united in a single community, perfect The city or state the
and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state third and highest.
comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and
continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, 1253 a.
if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is
the end of them, and the [completed] nature is the end. For what each thing is when
fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a
family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing
is the end and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that The state exists by
man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and nature.
not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity,
or below it; he is the

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‘Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,’

whom Homera denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to


a bird which flies alone.

Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees Man, having the gift
or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often of speech and the
say, makes nothing in vainb , and man is the only animal whom sense of right and
she has endowed with the gift of speechc . And whereas mere wrong, is by nature a
political animal.
sound is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore
found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception
of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the
power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise
the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of
good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this
sense makes a family and a state.

Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the The whole is prior to
individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for the part, the state to
example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or the family and
hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone individual.
hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better. But things
are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the
same when they are no longer the same, but only that they have the same name. The
proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the
individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in
relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a
state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded
the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of
animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed
injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of
intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore,
if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the
most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, and the
administration of justice, which is the determination of what is justa , is the principle
of order in political society.

Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before 1253 b.


speaking of the state, we must speak of the bmanagement of the
householdb . The parts of the household are the persons who The family or
compose it, and a complete household consists of slaves and household. Its parts.
freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its
least elements; and the first and least parts of a family are master and slave, husband
and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each of these three
relations is and ought to be:—I mean the relation of master and servant, of husband
and wife, and thirdly of parent and child. [I say γαμική and τεκνοποιητική, there being
no words for the two latter notions which adequately represent them.] And there is

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another element of a household, the so-called art of money-making, which, according


to some, is identical with household management, according to others, a principal part
of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of Master and slave.
practical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of
their relation than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is
a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and
the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outseta , are all the same. Others
affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the
distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and
being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.

Property is a part of the household, and therefore the art of Property includes
acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; instruments lifeless
for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be and living.
provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a
The slave is a living
definite sphere the workers must have their own proper
instrument.
instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the
management of a household. Now, instruments are of various sorts; some are living,
others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a
living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a
possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the
family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and
the servant is himself an instrument, which takes precedence of all other instruments.
For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the
will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says
the poetb ,

‘of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;’

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum 1254 a.
touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen
would not want servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, His master’s life is a
another distinction must be drawn: the instruments commonly so life of action, to
which he ministers.
called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an
instrument of action. The shuttle, for example, is not only of use; Who is the slave by
but something else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a nature?
bed there is only the use. Further, as production and action are
different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which they employ
must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the
slave is the minister of action [for he ministers to his master’s life]. Again, a
possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of
something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The
master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is
not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the
nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another’s and yet a
man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to belong to another who, being a

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human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument


of action, separable from the possessor.

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for Is there a slave by
whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all nature?
slavery a violation of nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of


fact. For that some should rule, and others be ruled is a thing, not only necessary, but
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for
rule.

And whereas there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects, Everywhere in nature
that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects—for there is the distinction
example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts. of higher and lower,
The work is better which is executed by better workmen; and of ruler and ruled.
where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to
1254 b.
have a work. In all things which form a composite whole and
which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a 1255 a.
distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to
light. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them There are slaves by
only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in nature and freemen by
a nature, but the
things which have no life, there is a ruling principle, as in difference is not
musical harmonya . But we are wandering from the subject. We always marked.
will, therefore, restrict ourselves to the living creature which, in
the first place, consists of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the
ruler, and the other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in
things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore
we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in
him we shall see the true relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the
body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural
condition. First then we may observe in living creatures both a despotical and a
constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the
intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the
rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the
passionate is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the
inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals as well as of men; for tame
animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they
are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior,
and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of
necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a difference as that
between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose
business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by
nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the
rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is another’s, and he who
participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, reason, is a slave by
nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend reason; they obey their
instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different;

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for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to
distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for
servile labour, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for
political life in the arts both of war and peace. But this does not hold universally: for
some slaves have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if
men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the
statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should
be slaves of the superior. And if there is a difference in the body, how much more in
the soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen.
It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these
latter slavery is both expedient and right.

But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way The view that slavery
right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and is contrary to nature
slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as examined.
well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of
Might and right, how
convention, according to which whatever is taken in war is
related.
supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists
impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an Slavery of captives
unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because taken in war.
one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute
strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among Greek and barbarian.
philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the
dispute, and the reason why the arguments cross, is as follows: Virtue, when furnished
with means, may be deemed to have the greatest power of doing violence: and as
superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power
is thought to imply virtue. But does it likewise imply justice? — that is the question.
And, in order to make a distinction between them, some assert that justice is
benevolence: to which others reply that justice is nothing more than the rule of a
superior. If the two views are regarded as antagonistic and exclusive [i. e. if the notion
that justice is benevolence excludes the idea of a just rule of a superior], the
alternative [viz. that no one should rule over othersa ] has no force or plausibility,
because it implies that not even the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master.
Some, clinging, as they think, to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort
of justice), assume that slavery in war is justified by law, but they are not consistent.
For what if the cause of the war be unjust? No one would ever say that he is a slave
who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be
slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken
captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call themselves slaves, but
confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the
natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves
everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard
themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem the
barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of
nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes
says:—

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‘Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem
of the Gods?’

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and 1255 b.
slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good
and evil? They think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good
men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot
always accomplish.

We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and that all
are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some
cases a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right
for the one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practising obedience, the
others exercising the authority which nature intended them to have. The abuse of this
authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and wholea , of body and soul,
are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his
bodily frame. Where the relation between them is natural they are friends and have a
common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true.

The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a The rule of the
master is not a constitutional rule, and therefore that all the household is not a
different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm, the same with science, though two
b rather inferior
each other . For there is one rule exercised over subjects who
sciences enter into it.
are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature
slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is (1) The science of the
under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government of slave.
freemen and equals. The master is not called a master because he
has science, but because he is of a certain character, and the same (2) The science of the
remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be a master.
science for the master and a science for the slave. The science of
the slave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made money by
instructing slaves in their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge may be carried
further, so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some duties are of the
more necessary, others of the more honourable sort; as the proverb says, ‘slave before
slave, master before master.’ But all such branches of knowledge are servile. There is
likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as
such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this so-
called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need only know how
to order that which the slave must know how to execute. Hence those who are in a
position which places them above toil, have stewards who attend to their households
while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of
acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the
master and the art of the slave, being a species of hunting or wara . Enough of the
distinction between master and slave.

Chrematistic, or the
art of money-making.
How related to the art

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Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of of managing a
money-making, in accordance with our usual method [of household?
b
resolving a whole into its parts ], for a slave has been shown to
be a part of property. The first question is whether the art of 1256 a.
money-making is the same with the art of managing a household
1256 b.
or a part of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in the
way that the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art of Why men lead
weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental different kinds of
to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same lives.
way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by
material I mean the substratum out of which any work is made; Nomadic life.
thus wool is the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Hunting.
Now it is easy to see that the art of household management is not
identical with the art of money-making, for the one uses the Agriculture.
material which the other provides. And the art which uses
household stores can be no other than the art of household Nature’s provision for
the maintenance of
management. There is, however, a doubt whether the art of
life.
money-making is a part of household management or a distinct
art. [They appear to be connected]; for the money-maker has to consider whence
money and property can be procured; but there are many sorts of property and
wealth:—there is husbandry and the care and provision of food in general; are these
parts of the money-making art or distinct arts? Again, there are many sorts of food,
and therefore there are many kinds of lives both of animals and men; they must all
have food, and the differences in their food have made differences in their ways of
life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the way which
is best adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or herbivorous or
omnivorous: and their habits are determined for them by nature in such a manner that
they may obtain with greater facility the food of their choice. But, as different
individuals have different tastes, the same things are not naturally pleasant to all of
them; and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ
among themselves. In the lives of men too there is a great difference. The laziest are
shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their subsistence without trouble from tame
animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pasture, they
are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of living farm. Others support
themselves by hunting, which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are pirates,
others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are
fishermen, and others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number
obtain a living from the fruits of the soil. Such are the modes of subsistence which
prevail among those awhose industry is employed immediately upon the products of
naturea , and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail trade—there is the
shepherd, the husbandman, the pirate, the fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a
comfortable maintenance out of two employments, eking out the deficiencies of one
of them by another: thus the life of a shephered may be combined with that of a
brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly
combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a
bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they are first
born, and when they are grown up. For some animals bring forth, together with their
offspring, so much food as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this

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the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals
have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves, which is
called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist
for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use
and food, the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the
provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing
incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals
and plants for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural
art of acquisition, for it includes hunting, an art which we ought to practise against
wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not
submit; for war of such a kind is naturally justa .

Of the art of acquisition then there is one kindb which is natural The natural mode of
and is a part of the management of a householdb . Either we must acquiring property.
suppose the necessaries of life to exist previously, or the art of
household management must provide a store of them for the common use of the
family or state. They are the elements of true wealth; for the amount of property
which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems
says that

‘No bound to riches has been fixed for manc .’

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the arts; for the instruments of any art
are never unlimited, either in number or size, and wealth may be defined as a number
of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a
natural art of acquisition which is practised by managers of households and by
statesmen, and what is the reason of this.

There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is 1257 a.


commonly and rightly called the art of making money, and has in
fact suggested the notion that wealth and property have no limit. The non-natural
Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often identified mode, or money-
making.
with it. But though they are not very different, neither are they
the same. The kind already described is given by nature, the
other is gained by experience and art.

Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations:—

Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong Value in use and
to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the value in exchange.
proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For
example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both Invention of money
are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money
and of coin.
or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a
shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an
object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of exchange
extends to all of them, and it arises at first in a natural manner from the circumstance
that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a

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natural part of the art of money-making; had it been so, men would have ceased to
exchange when they had enough. And in the first community, which is the family, this
art is obviously of no use, but only begins to be useful when the society increases. For
the members of the family originally had all things in common; in a more divided
state of society theya still shared in many things, but they were different thingsa which
they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still
practised among barbarous nations who exchange with one another the necessaries of
life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange for corn
and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the money-making art and is not contrary
to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of men’s natural wants. The other or more
complex form of exchange grew out of the simpler. When the inhabitants of one
country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they
needed, and exported the surplus, money necessarily came into use. For the various
necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in
their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily
applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the
value was at first measured by size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp
upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.

When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter Retail trade.
of necessary articles arose the other art of money-making,
namely, retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, Two views about
but became more complicated as soon as men learned by money.
experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit
1257 b.
might be made. Originating in the use of coin, the art of money-
making is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which
produces wealth and money; having to consider how they may be accumulated.
Indeed, wealth is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the art of
money-making and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined
money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, which would have
no value or use for any of the purposes of daily life if another commodity were
substituted by the users. And, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of
necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great
abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable
prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold?

Distinction between
natural wealth and the
mere acquisition of
coin.

In the arts the means


are limited by the end,
the end is unlimited:
so in money-making,
but not in household
management.

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Men seek after a better notion of wealth and of the art of making Error of those who
money than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For make wealth an end.
natural wealth and the natural art of money-making are a
different thing; in their true form they are part of the 1258 a.
management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of
producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it seems to be concerned
with coin; for coin is the beginning of exchange and the measure or limit of it. And
there is no bound to the wealth which springs from this art of money-makinga . As in
the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts
there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing
their ends to the uttermost; (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always the
limit), so, too, in this art of money-making there is no limit of the end, which is
wealth of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of money. But the art of household
management has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of money is not its business. And,
therefore, in one point of view, all wealth must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter
of fact, we find the opposite to be the case; for all money-makers increase their hoard
of coin without limit. The source of the confusion is the near connexion between the
two kinds of money-making; in either, the instrument [i.e. wealth] is the same,
although the use is different, and so they pass into one another; for each is a use of the
same propertyb , but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but
there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to believe that making
money is the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that
they ought either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it.
The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not
upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited, they also desire that the means of
gratifying them should be without limit. Even those who aim at a good life seek the
means of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to
depend on property, they are absorbed in making money: and so there arises the
second species of money-making. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek an
art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not able to supply their
pleasures by the art of money-making, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty
in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to
make money, but to inspire confidence; neither is this the aim of the general’s or of
the physician’s art; but the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless,
some men turn every quality or art into a means of making money; this they conceive
to be the end, and to the promotion of the end all things must contribute.

Thus, then, we have considered the art of money-making, which is unnecessary, and
why men want it; and also the necessary art of money-making, which we have seen to
be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a
household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind,
unlimited, but having a limit.

And we have found the answer to our original questiona , Relation of money-
Whether the art of money-making is the business of the manager making to the art of
of a household and of the statesman or not their business?—viz. household
that it is an art which is presupposed by them. For political management.
science does not make men, but takes them from nature and uses

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them; and nature provides them with food from the element of earth, air, or sea. At
this stage begins the duty of the manager of a household, who has to order the things
which nature supplies;—he may be compared to the weaver who has not to make but
to use wool, and to know what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and
unserviceable. Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the art of money-
making is a part of the management of a household and the art of medicine not; for
surely the members of a household must have health just as they must have life or any
other necessary. And as from one point of view the master of the house and the ruler
of the state have to consider about health, from another point of view not they but the
physician; so in one way the art of household management, in another way the
subordinate art, has to consider about money. But, strictly speaking, as I have already
said, the means of life must be provided beforehand by nature; for the business of
nature is to furnish food to that which is born, and the food of the offspring always
remains over in the parenta . Wherefore the art of making money out of fruits and
animals is always natural.

Of the two sorts of money-making one, as I have just said, is a 1258 b.


part of household management, the other is retail trade: the
former necessary and honourable, the latter a kind of exchange Retail trade.
which is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which
men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the Usury the breeding of
money from money.
greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself,
and not from the natural use of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange,
but not to increase at interest. And this term usury [τόκος], which means the birth of
money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring
resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of making money this is the most
unnatural.

Enough has been said about the theory of money-making; we Practical


will now proceed to the practical part. aThe discussion of such classification of
matters is not unworthy of philosophy, but to be engaged in them money-making.
practically is illiberal and irksomea . The useful parts of money-
making are, first, the knowledge of live-stock,—which are most (1) The natural kind.
profitable, and where, and how,—as, for example, what sort of (2) Exchange.
horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals are most likely to
give a return. A man ought to know which of these pay better (3) The intermediate
than others, and which pay best in particular places, for some do kind.
better in one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry,
which may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and of fish, or fowl,
or of any animals which may be useful to man. These are the divisions of the true or
proper art of money-making and come first. Of the other, which consists in exchange,
the first and most important division is commerce (of which there are three kinds —
commerce by sea, commerce by land, selling in shops—these again differing as they
are safer or more profitable), the second is usury, the third, service for hire—of this,
one kind is employed in the mechanical arts, the other in unskilled and bodily labour.
There is still a third sort of money-making intermediate between this and the first or
natural mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned with exchange of the fruits
and other products of the earth. Some of these latter, although they bear no fruit, are

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nevertheless profitable; for example, wood and minerals. The art of mining, by which
minerals are obtained, has many branches, for there are various kinds of things dug
out of the earth. Of the several divisions of money-making I now speak generally; a
minute consideration of them might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to
dwell upon them at greater length now.

Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least element of chance;
they are the meanest in which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile in which
there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least
need of excellence.

Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons; 1259 a.
for example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the
Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting, while others Works on economic
have treated of other branches; any one who cares for such subjects.
matters may refer to their writings. It would be well also to
Story about Thales.
collect the scattered stories of the ways in which individuals have How a philosopher
succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is useful to persons once made a fortune.
who value the art of making money. There is the anecdote of
Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which involves a Monopoly.
principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on
account of his reputation for wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty, which was
supposed to show that philosophy was of no use. According to the story, he knew by
his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a great harvest of
olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits for the use of all
the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one
bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many wanted them all at once and
of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of
money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if they like, but
that their ambition is of another sort. He is supposed to have given a striking proof of
his wisdom, but, as I was saying, his device for getting money is of universal
application, and is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often practised
by cities when they are in want of money; they make a monopoly of provisions.

There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with Story about a man of
him, bought up all the iron from the iron mines; afterwards, Sicily.
when the merchants from their various markets came to buy, he
was the only seller, and without much increasing the price he Monopoly applied to
gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him finance.
that he might take away his money, but that he must not remain
at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered a way of making money
which was injurious to his own interests. He had the same ideaa as Thales; they both
contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen ought to know these
things; for a state is often as much in want of money and of such devices for obtaining
it as a household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely
to finance.

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Of household management we have seenb that there are three Different kinds of rule
parts—one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been within the household:
c
discussed already , another of a father, and the third of a (1) rule of master over
husband. A husband and father rules over wife and children, both slaves; (2) of father
over children; (3) of
free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, husband over wife.
over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be
exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for 1259 b.
command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is
superior to the younger and more immature. But in most constitutional states the
citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that
the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at alld . Nevertheless, when one
rules and the other is ruled we endeavour to create a difference of outward forms and
names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about
his foot-pane . The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the
inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he receives
both love and the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore
Homer has appropriately called Zeus ‘father of Gods and men,’ because he is the king
of them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the
same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father
and son.

Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men 1260 a.


than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human
excellence more than to the excellence of property which we call Has a slave virtue?
wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of
slaves. A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any How far have women
and children virtues?
excellence at all in a slave beyond merely instrumental and
ministerial qualities — whether he can have the virtues of The virtues of ruler
temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves and subject different.
possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever
way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have Psychological
virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, parallel.
since they are men and share in reason, it seems absurd to say Different degrees of
that they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about virtue.
women and children, whether they too have virtues: ought a
woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to be Plato criticised.
called temperate, and intemperate, or not? So in general we may
ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or
different virtues. For a noble nature is equally required in both, but if so, why should
one of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a
question of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind,
and therefore not of degree; yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and
that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how
can he rule well? if the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and
cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of them
must have a share of virtue, but varying according to their various natures. And this is
at once indicated by the soul, in which one part naturally rules, and the other is
subject, and the virtue of the ruler we maintain to be different from that of the subject;

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— the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it
is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things
rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; — the freeman
rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the
female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in all of
them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at
all; the woman has, but it is awithout authoritya , and the child has, but it is immature.
So it must necessarily be with the moral virtues also; all may be supposed to partake
of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfilment
of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his duty is
entirely that of a master artificer, and the master artificer is reason; the subjects, on
the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them.
Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of
a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates
maintainedb, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in
obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we look at
them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of
the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such
definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgiasb , enumerate the virtues. All
classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women,

‘Silence is a woman’s gloryc ,’

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, 1260 b.
and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone,
but to the perfect man and to his teachera , and in like manner the Has the artisan virtue?
virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined
that a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will Mechanic and slave.
obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from Plato criticised.
failing in his duty through cowardice and intemperance. Some
one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in
the artisans, for they often fail in their work through misconduct? But is there not a
great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master’s life; the artisan
is less closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in proportion as he
becomes a slave, [i. e. is under the direction of a master]. The meaner sort of
mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature,
not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be
the source of excellence in the slave; but not merely because he possesses the art
which trains him in his dutiesb . Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to
converse with slaves and say that we should employ command onlyc , for slaves stand
even more in need of admonition than children.

The relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their several Virtues in the family
virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and relations.
what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and escape the
evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government.
For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts
of a family, the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole. And

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therefore women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the state d ,
if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of
the state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens,
and half the free persons in a state are womena .

Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time.
Regarding, then, our present enquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning.
And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.

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[Back to Table of Contents]

BOOK II.
Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is Reasons for
best of all for those who are most able to realise their ideal of examining model
life. We must therefore examine not only this but other forms of government
constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, actual or ideal.
and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is
good and useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for
something beyond them awe at all want to philosophise at the expense of trutha ; we
only undertake this enquiry because all the constitutions with which we are
acquainted are faulty.

We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three 1261 a.
alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either
have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things What should be
in common and some not. That they should have nothing in common in a state?
common is clearly impossible, for the state is a community, and The logical
alternatives.
must at any rate have a common place—one city will be in one
place, and the citizens are those who share in that one city. But The communism of
should a well-ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in Plato.
common, or some only and not others? For the citizens might
conceivably have wives and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes
in the Republic of Platob . Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new
order of society?

There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the The community of
principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an women.
institution does not appear to be established by his arguments.
The end which he ascribes to the state, taken literally, is (1) Plato is wrong in
making the greatest
impossible, and how weare to interpret it is nowhere precisely
unity the end of the
stated. I am speaking of the premiss from which the argument of state.
Socrates proceeds, ‘that the greater the unity of the state the
better.’ Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a The state is a unity in
degree of unity as to be no longer a state?—since the nature of a difference.
state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from
being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the
family may be said to be more one than the state, and the individual than the family.
So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the
destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of
different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like a military
alliance, of which the usefulness depends upon its quantity even where there is no
difference in quality. For in that mutual protection is the end aimed at; and the
question is the same as about the scales of a balance: which is the heavier?

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In like manner, a state differs from a nation; for in a nation the A state, unlike a
people are not adistributed into villages, but live scattered about, nation, is composed
like the Arcadiansa ; whereas in a state the elements out of which of different elements;
the unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle
of compensationb , as I have already remarked in the Ethicsc , is and freedom is
preserved by the
the salvation of states. And among freemen and equals this is a interchange of them.
principle which must be maintained, for they cannot all rule
together, but must change at the end of a year or some other 1261 b.
period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that
upon this plan they all govern; [but the manner of government is] Excessive unity
would ruin the state.
just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their
occupations, and the same persons did not always continue
shoemakers and carpenters. And it is clearly better that, as in business, so also in
politics there should be continuance of the same persons where this is possible. But
where this is not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and it
would be unjust that any one should be excluded from the government (whether to
govern be a good thing or a bada ), then it is better, instead of all holding power, to
adopt a principle of rotation, equals giving place to equals, as the original rulers gave
place to themb . Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they
were no longer the same persons. In like manner there is a variety in the offices held
by them. Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some
persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their
destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves themc . Again,
in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a
family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city
only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If
then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than
the greater.

But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have (2) Communism will
the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to not be the means by
follow from the fact ‘of all men saying “mine” and “not mine” at which unity is to be
the same instant of time,’ which, according to Socratesd , is the attained.
sign of perfect unity in a state. For the word ‘all’ is ambiguous. If
Fallacy in the word
the meaning be that every individual says ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ ‘all.’
at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims
may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the What is common least
same person his own son and his own wife, and so of his cared for.
property and of all that belongs to him. This, however, is not the
Present arrangements
way in which people would speak who had their wives and better.
children in common; they would say ‘all’ but not ‘each.’ In like
manner their property would be described as belonging to them, 1262 a.
not severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in the
term ‘all’: like some other words, ‘both,’ ‘odd,’ ‘even,’ it is The real relationship
ambiguous, and in argument becomes a source of logical will often be
discovered.
puzzles. That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in
which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is impracticable; or if the words are
taken in the other sense [i.e. the sense which distinguishes ‘all’ from ‘each’], such an

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unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another objection to the proposal.
For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.
Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only
when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations,
everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfil; as
in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a
thousand sons who will not be his sons individually, but anybody will be equally the
son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike. Further, upon this
principle, every one will call another ‘mine’ or ‘not mine’ according as he is
prosperous or the reverse;—however small a fraction he may be of the whole number,
he will say of every individual of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the city,
‘such an one is mine,’ ‘such an one his’; and even about this he will not be positive;
for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or whether, if one came into
existence, it has survived. But which is better—to be able to say ‘mine’ about every
one of the two thousand or the ten thousand citizens, or to use the word ‘mine’ in the
ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the same person is called by one man
his son whom another calls his brother or cousin or kinsman or blood-relation or
connexion by marriage either of himself or of some relation of his, and these
relationships he distinguishes from the tie which binds him to his tribe or ward; and
how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato’s
fashion! Nor is there any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and
mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are born like their
parents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one
another. Geographers declare such to be the fact; they say that in Upper Libya, where
the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born are assigned to their
respective fathers on the ground of their likenessa . And some women, like the
females of other animals — for example mares and cows — have a strong tendency to
produce offspring resembling their parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare
called Dicaea (the Just)b .

Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a Evils of concealment.
community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as
well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when
committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy
when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the
relationship is unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary expiations of
them cannot be made. Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after having made the
children common, should hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only, but should
permit familiarities between father and son or between brother and brother, than
which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them, love of this sort is
improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence
of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one
another made no difference.

1262 b.

Communism a source
of weakness.

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This community of wives and children seems better suited to the Instead of self-
husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and destroying unity
children in common, they will be bound to one another by
weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain there will be watery
a friendship.
obedient and not rebel . In a word, the result of such a law
would be just the opposite of that which good laws ought to
have, and the intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and
children would defeat itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of
statesb and the preservative of them against revolutions; neither is there anything
which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the state which he and all the world
declare to be created by friendship. But the unity which he commendsc would be like
that of the lovers in the Symposiumd , who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow
together in the excess of their affection, and from being two to become one, in which
case one or both would certainly perish. Whereas [the very opposite will really
happen;] in a state having women and children common, love will be watery; and the
father will certainly not say ‘my son,’ or the son ‘my fathere .’ As a little sweet wine
mingled with a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of
community, the idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost;
there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or the son about
the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire
regard and affection—that a thing is your own and that you love it—neither can exist
in such a state as this.

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the Difficulties in the
rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from transfer of children
the rank of guardians into a lower rankf , will be very difficult to from one rank to
arrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they another.
are giving and transferring, and to whom. And the previously
mentioned evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often
amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned
to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call the members of any other
class brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be
afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the community
of wives and children, let this be our conclusion.

Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about 1263 a.


property: should the citizens of the perfect state have their
possessions in common or not? This question may be discussed Should property be
separately from the enactments about women and children. Even common?
supposing that the women and children belong to individuals,
Possible modes of
according to the custom which is at present universal, may there common property.
not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common?
Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be
thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is the practice of some
nations. Or (2), the soil may be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the
produce divided among individuals for their private use; this is a form of common
property which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or (3), the soil and the
produce may be alike common.

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When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be Difficulties.
different and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground
themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share
equally in enjoyments and toils, those who labour much and get little will necessarily
complain of those who labour little and receive or consume much. There is always a
difficulty in men living together and having things in common, but especially in their
having common property. The partnerships of fellow-travellers are an example to the
point; for they generally fall out by the way and quarrel about any trifle which turns
up. So with servants: we are most liable to take offence at those with whom we most
frequently come into contact in daily life.

These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the Better private
community of property; the present arrangement, if improved as possession and
it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and friendly use.
would have the advantages of both systems. Property should be
Illustration from
in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for,
a Sparta.
when every one has a distinct interest , men will not complain of
one another, and they will make more progress, because every The magic of
one will be attending to his own business. And yet among the property.
good, and in respect of use, ‘Friends,’ as the proverb says, ‘will
have all things commonb .’ Even now there are traces of such a Communism destroys
the two virtues of
principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well- liberality and of
ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be temperance.
carried further. For, although every man has his own property,
some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of 1263 b.
others he shares the use with them. The Lacedaemonians, for
example, use one another’s slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were their own;
and when they happen to be in the country, they appropriate in the fields whatever
provisions they want. It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of
it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this
benevolent disposition. Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man
feels a thing to be his own; for the love of selfc is a feeling implanted by nature and
not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is not the
mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the miser’s love of money; for all,
or almost all, men love money, and other such objects in a measure. And further, there
is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or
companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property. The
advantage is lost by the excessive unification of the state. Two virtues are annihilated
in such a state: first, temperance towards women (for it is an honourable action to
abstain from another’s wife for temperance sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of
property. No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an
example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is
made of propertya .

The speciousness of
universal friendship.

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Such legislation may have a specious appearance of The real cause of


benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to existing evils, not
believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become private property, but
everybody’s friend, especially when some oneb is heard the wickedness of
men.
denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts,
convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which
are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are
due to a very different cause—the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that
there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, though
there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private
property.

Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the 1264 a.
citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will
lose. The life which they are to lead appears to be quite Plato’s false ideal of
impracticable. The error of Socrates must be attributed to the unity.
false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be,
The true unity can
both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For only be given by
there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity education.
as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to
exist, it will become an inferior state, like harmony passing into All experience against
unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The men.
state, as I was saying, is a pluralityc , which should be united and
made into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a system of
education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his
citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like
those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the
legislator has [to a certain degree] made property common. Let us remember that we
should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if
they were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost everything has
been found out, although sometimes they are not put together; in other cases men do
not use the knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on this subject if
we could see such a form of government in the actual process of construction; for the
legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and dividing the citizens
into associations for common meals, and into phratries and tribes. But all this
legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which
the Lacedaemonians try to enforce already.

Difficulties.

How about the


dependent classes?
are they to be
educated and to have
wives in common?

If not, there will be


two states in one.

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Again, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in Omissions.
such a community will be the general form of the state. The
citizens who are not guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been
determined: are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in common? Or, besides
the common land which he tills, is each individual to have his own? and are their
wives and children to be individual or common? If, like the guardians, they are to
have all things in common, in what do they differ from them, or what will they gain
by submitting to their government? Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless
indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their
slaves the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the
possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities
in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community? Must it
not contain two states in onea , each hostile to the other? b One class will consist of
the guardians, who are a sort of watchmen; another, of the husbandmen, and there will
be the artisans and the other citizensb . But [if so] the suits and quarrels, and all the
evils which Socrates affirmsa to exist in other states, will exist equally among them.
He says indeed that, having so good an education, the citizens will not need many
laws, for example laws about the city or about the marketsb ; but then he confines his
education to the guardians. Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the land upon
condition of their paying a tributec . But in that case they are likely to be much more
unmanageable and conceited than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in generald . And
whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the
higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of
government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither is it
easy, though very important, to discover what should be the character of the inferior
classes, if the common life of the guardians is to be maintained.

Again, if Socrates makes the women common, aand retains 1264 b.


private property, the men will see to the fields, but who will see
to the house?e And what will happen if the agricultural class More difficulties.
e
have both their property and their wives in common ? Once
more; it is absurd to argue, from the analogy of the animals, that Who will look after
the house?
men and women should follow the same pursuitsf ; for animals
have not to manage a household. The government, too, as Danger from the
constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for he rulers being always
makes the same persons always rule. And if this is often a cause the same.
of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much more among
How can the whole
high-spirited warriors? But that the persons whom he makes
state be happy if
rulers must be the same is evident; for the gold which the God happiness is denied to
mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at the guardians?
another time to another, but always to the same: as he says, ‘God
mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; but brass and iron in
those who are meant to be artisans and husbandmena .’ Again, he deprives the
guardians of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state
happyb . But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy
happinessc . In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which
may exist only in the whole, but in none of the parts; not so happiness. And if the
guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The

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Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these difficulties, and others quite as
great.

The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato’s later The Laws a later
work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the work.
constitution which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates
has definitely settled in all a few questions only; such as the Brief summary of
community of women and children, the community of property, questions not settled
in the Republic,
and the constitution of the state. The population is divided into
two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; from and they are not
this latter is taken a third class of counsellors and rulers of the settled in the Laws,
state. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen which
and artisans are to have a share in the government, and whether
1265 a.
they, too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or not.
He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the begins with a more
education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The ordinary type of
remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the constitution, but soon
main subject, and with discussions about the education of the reverts to the ideal.
guardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not
much is said about the constitution. This, which he had intended to make more of the
ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the
exception of the community of women and property, he supposes everything to be the
same in both states; there is to be the same education; the citizens of both are to live
free from servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only
difference is that in the Laws, the common meals are extended to womena , and the
warriors number about 5000b , but in the Republic only 1000c .

The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always Plato, with all his
exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in genius, has sinned
everything can hardly be expected. We must not overlook the against probability in
fact that the number of 5000 citizens, just now mentioned, will creating so large a
state.
require a territory as large as Babylonia, or some other huge
country, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness,
together with their women and attendants, who will be a multitude many times as
great. [In framing an ideal] we may assume what we wish, but should avoid
impossibilitiesd .

It is said [in the Laws] that the legislator ought to have his eye Foreign relations
directed to two points,—the people and the countrye . But neglected.
neighbouring countries also must not be forgotten by himf , if the
state for which he legislates is to have a true political lifeg . For a state must have such
a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbours, and not merely useful at
home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or
statesh , still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating.

How much property


should a citizen hold?

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There is another point: Should not the amount of property be So much as will
defined in some clearer way? For Socrates says that a man enable a man to live
should have so much property as will enable him to live temperately and
i
temperately , which is only a way of saying ‘to live well;’ this
would be the higher or more general conception. But a man may also liberally.
live temperately and yet miserably. A better definition would be Necessity of a limit to
that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live population.
not only temperately but liberallyj ; if the two are parted,
liberality will combine with luxury; toil will be associated with 1265 b.
temperance. For liberality and temperance are the only virtuesa
which have to do with the use of property. A man cannot use property with mildness
or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of these
virtues is inseparable from property. There is an inconsistency, too, in equalizing the
property and not regulating the number of the citizensb ; the population is to remain
unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of
marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to
be the case in existing states. But [in Plato’s imaginary state] greater care will be
required than now; for among ourselves, whatever may be the number of citizens, the
property is always distributed among them, and therefore no one is in want; but, if the
property were incapable of division [as in the Laws], the supernumeraries, whether
few or many, would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even more
necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit should be fixed by
calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of sterility in married persons.
The neglect of this subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing
cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and
crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the most ancient legislators, thought
that the families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, although
originally all the lots may have been of different sizes; but in the Laws, the opposite
principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right arrangement will have to be
explained hereafterc .

There is another omission in the Laws; Socrates does not tell us How do the rulers
how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they differ from their
should be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out subjects?
of different woolsa . He allows that a man’s whole property may
The two households.
be increased five-foldb , but why should not his land also
increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of
a household be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? for he assigns to each
individual two homesteads in separate placesc , and it is difficult to live in two houses.

1266 a.

The constitution a
mixture of democracy
and oilgarchy.

Sparta, also a mixture,


is praised and blamed.

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The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy The best constitution
nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is is said to be that
usually called a polity, and is composed of the heavy armed which includes most
soldiers. Now, if he intended to frame a constitution which elements.
would suit the greatest number of states, he was very likely right,
Election of
but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came magistrates.
nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the
Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic Election to the
government. Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a Council.
combination of all existing forms, and they praise the
Danger in double
Lacedaemoniand because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, election.
and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council
of elders the oligarchy, while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for
the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be
a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits
of daily life. In the Lawse , it is maintained that the best state is made up of
democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of
all. But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the state is better
which is made up of more numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the Laws
has no element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning
rather to oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of appointing magistratesa ; for although
the appointment of them by lot from among those who have been already selected
combines both elements, the way in which the rich are compelled by law to attend the
assemblyb and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest
may do as they like, and the endeavour to have the greater number of the magistrates
appointed out of the richest classes and the highest officers selected from those who
have the greatest incomes, both these are oligarchical features. The oligarchical
principle prevails also in the choice of the councilc ; for all are compelled to choose,
but the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, and of an equal
number out of the second class and out of the third class, but not in this latter case to
all the voters of the third and fourth class; and the selection of candidates out of the
fourth classd is only compulsory on the first and second. Then, he says that there
ought to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be
given to the better sort of people, who have the larger incomes, because many of the
lower classes, not being compelled, will not vote. These considerations, and others
which will be adduced when the time comes for examining similar polities, tend to
show that states like Plato’s should not be composed of democracy and monarchy.
There is also a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are themselves
elected; for, if but a small number choose to combine, the elections will always go as
they desire. Such is the constitution which is described in the Laws.

Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private 1266 b.


persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, which all come
nearer to established or existing ones than either of Plato’s. No Phaleas first proposed
one else has introduced such novelties as the community of the equalization of
property.
women and children, or public tables for women: other
legislators begin with what is necessary. In the opinion of some,
the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which

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all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was
the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions. He
thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without
difficulty, not so easily when a state was already established; and that then the
shortest way of compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to
receive marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them.

Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, But population must
accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already be equalized as well
observeda , any citizen to possess more than five times the as property.
minimum qualification. But those who make such laws should
The acquisition or
remember what they are apt to forget,—that the legislator who
sale of land should be
fixes the amount of property should also fix the number of limited.
children; for, if the children are too many for the property, the
law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a Evils arise not merely
bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for from inequality of
men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions. That the property but from
inequality of honour
equalization of property exercises an influence on political
society was clearly understood even by some of the old 1267 a.
legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting an
individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there are other laws in
states which forbid the sale of property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a
law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some
misfortune has befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the
preservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas, and the
abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the
prescribed qualification. Again, where there is equality of property, the amount may
be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be living either in luxury or
penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of
properties, but at moderation in their amount. And yet, if he prescribe this moderate
amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but
the desires of mankind which require to be equalizeda , and this is impossible, unless
a sufficient education is provided by the state. But Phaleas will probably reply that
this is precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states,
not only equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell us what will be the
character of his education; there is no use in having one and the same for all, if it is of
a sort that predisposes men to avarice, or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles
arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honour,
though in opposite ways. For the common people quarrel about the inequality of
property, the higher class about the equality of honour; as the poet says,—

‘The bad and good alike in honour shareb .’

There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these and from the desires
Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, of men.
which will take away from a man the temptation to be a
highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to
crime; men desire to gratify some passion which preys upon them, or they are eager to

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enjoy the pleasures which are unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit
crimes.

Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, The real cure moral.
moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of
temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they
will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other
pleasures we are dependent on others. The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused
by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not
suffer cold; and hence great is the honour bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but
on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only
against petty crimes.

There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to Foreign relations not
promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator considered.
should consider also its relation to neighbouring nations, and to
all who are outside of ita . The government must be organized with a view to military
strength; and of this he has said not a word. And so with respect to property: there
should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet
dangers coming from without. The property of the state should not be so large that
more powerful neighbours may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel
the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against
states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule;
and we should bear in mindb that a certain amount of wealthb is an advantage. The
best limit will probably be, not so much as will tempt a more powerful neighbour, or
make it his interest to go to war with you. There is a story that Eubulus, when
Autophradates was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the
operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the
time. ‘For,’ said he, ‘I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus at
once.’ These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and he desisted
from the siege.

One advantage gained by the equalization of property is that it Equal property has
prevents the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the gain in this some advantages, but
direction is very great. For the nobles will be dissatisfied because they are not great.
they do not receive the honours which they think their due; and
this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolutiona . And 1267 b.
the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was
pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more
and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most
men live only for the gratification of it. bbThe beginning of reformb is not so much to
equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to
prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not
ill-treated. Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas is imperfect; for he only
equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and
in the abundance of what are called his moveables. Now either all these things must
be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must all be let alone. It
would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city only, if, as he supposes, all the

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artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a part of the population of the city. But
if there is a law that artisans are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those
engaged on public worksc , as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which
Diophantus once introduced.

From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his
ideas.

Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same Hippodamus the first
who invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the political philosopher.
Piraeus,—a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him
into a general eccentricity of life, which made some think him affected (for he would
wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; and yet he dressed himself in the same
cheap warm garment both in winter and summer); he, besides aspiring to be an adept
in the knowledge of nature, was the first person not a statesman who made enquiries
about the best form of government.

The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens 1268 a.


divided into three parts,—one of artisans, one of husbandmen,
and a third of armed defenders of the state. He also divided the His three-fold
land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third division of the
citizens, of the land,
private:—the first was set apart to maintain the customary
worship of the gods, the second was to support the warriors, the and of the laws.
third was the property of the husbandmen. He also divided his
laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that there Court of appeal.
are three subjects of lawsuits,—insult, injury, and homicide. He
likewise instituted a single final court of appeal, to which all Verdicts not to be
limited to a simple
causes seeming to have been improperly decided might be
‘guilty’ or ‘not
referred; this court he formed of elders chosen for the purpose. guilty.’
He was further of opinion that the decisions of the courts ought
not to be given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one Rewards for
should have a tablet on which he might not only write a simple inventions.
condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal;
Maintenance of
but, if he partly acquitted and partly condemned, he was to children of citizens
distinguish accordingly. To the existing law he objected that it slain in battle.
obliged the judges to be guilty of perjury, whichever way they
voted. He also enacted that those who discovered anything for Magistrates, how to
the good of the state should be rewarded; and he provided that be elected:
the children of citizens who died in battle should be maintained
at the public expense, as if such an enactment had never been heard of before, yet it
actually exists at Athensa and in other places. As to the magistrates, he would have
them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes already mentioned, and
those who were elected were to watch over the interests of the public, of strangers,
and of orphans. These are the most striking points in the constitution of Hippodamus.
There is not much else.

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The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken, is (1) Threefold division
the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, and the of the citizens
husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the criticised.
government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans
neither arms nor land, and therefore they become all but slaves of 1268 b.
the warrior class. That they should share in all the offices is an
impossibility; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal
magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two
other classes have no share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens? It may
be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other
classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they
are, why should the other classes share in the government at all, or have power to
appoint magistrates? Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and
they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen, too, if they really
provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government. But in
the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own, which they
cultivate for their private benefit. Again, as to this common land out of which the
soldiers are maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior
class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make
a distinction between them. If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both
from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will
make a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if
the same persons are to cultivate their own lands and those of the public as well, they
will have a difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce which will maintain two
households: and why, in this case, should there be any division, for they might find
food themselves and give to the warriors from the same lots? There is surely a great
confusion in all this.

Neither is the law to be commended which says that the judges, (2) Proposed verdict
when a simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in in detail condemned.
their judgment; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator.
Now, in an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another
about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this is
impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains to prevent the judges from
holding any communication with one another. Again, will there not be confusion if
the judge thinks that damages should be given, but not so much as the suitor
demands? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten minae, or one
judge more and another less; one five, another four minae. In this way they will go on
apportioning the damages, and some will grant the whole and others nothing: how is
the final reckoning to be taken? Again, no one who votes for a simple acquittal or
condemnation is compelled to perjure himself, if the indictment is quite simple and in
right form; for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing,
but that he does not owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks
that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him.

(3) To reward
political information
dangerous.

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To reward those who discover anything which is useful to the Should laws be
state is a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot safely changed at all?
be enacted by law, for it may encourage informers, and perhaps
even lead to political commotions. This question involves Changes in the arts
beneficial,
another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to
make any changes in the laws of a country, even if another law but the case of laws is
be better. Now, if all changes are inexpedient, we can hardly not quite analogous to
assent to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretence of that of the arts.
doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are
really destructive to the laws or to the constitution. But, since we 1269
have touched upon this subject, perhaps we had better go a little
into detail, for, as I was saying, there is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes
seem desirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences have
certainly been beneficial; medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art
and science have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be an art, change
must be necessary in this as in any other art. The need of improvement is shown by
the fact that old customs are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the ancient
Hellenes went about armeda and bought their wives of each other. The remains of
ancient laws which have come down to us are quite absurd; for example, at Cumae
there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produce a certain number
of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty. Again,
men in general desire the good, and not merely what their fathers had. But the
primeval inhabitantsb, whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of
some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary foolish
people among ourselvesb (such is certainly the traditionc concerning the earth-born
men); and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions. Even when laws
have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. As in other
sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in
writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars d
. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed; but when
we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be
required. For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage
is small, some errors both of law-givers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will
not gain so much by the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience. The
analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in
an art. For the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which
can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws
enfeebles the power of the law. Even if we admit that the laws are to be changed, are
they all to be changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody
who likes, or only by certain persons? These are very important questions; and
therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion.

1269 b.

Two questions to be
asked about
governments: (1) Is
the end which they

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In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in all propose good? and (2)
governments, two points have to be considered; first, whether do they fulfil it?
any particular law is good or bad, when compared with the
perfect state; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the Defects of
idea and character which the lawgiver has set before his citizensa Lacedaemonian state.
(1) The Helots a
. That in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and constant trouble.
not have to provide for their daily wants is generally
acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained.
[For, if you employ slaves, they are liable to rebel.] The Thessalian Penestae have
often risen against their masters, and the Helots in like manner against the
Lacedaemonians, for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing,
however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; the reason probably is that
the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, never form an alliance
with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their interest, since they themselves have
a dependent populationb . Whereas all the neighbours of the Lacedaemonians,
whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, are their enemies [and the Helots are
always revolting to them]. In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the slaves
occurred at a time when the Thessalians were still at war with the neighbouring
Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Besides, if there were no other difficulty,
the treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome affair; for, if not kept in hand,
they are insolent, and think that they are as good as their masters, and, if harshly
treated, they hate and conspire against them. Now it is clear that when these are the
results the citizens of a state have not found out the secret of managing their subject
population.

Again, the licence of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the (2) The women: their
intention of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the good disorder and
order of the state. For a husband and a wife, being each a part of pernicious influence.
every family, the state may be considered as about equally
1270 a.
divided into men and women; and, therefore, in those states in
which the condition of the women is bad, half the citya may be The licence allowed
regarded as having no laws. And this is what has actually to them fosters
happened at Sparta; the legislator wanted to make the whole state avarice.
hardy and temperate, and he has carried out his intention in the
case of the men, but he has neglected the women, who live in every sort of
intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly
valued, especially if the citizens fall under the dominion of their wives, after the
manner of all warlike races, except the Celts and a few others who openly approve of
male loves. The old mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and
Aphrodite, for all warlike races are prone to the love either of men or of women. This
was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness; many things were
managed by their women. But what difference does it make whether women rule, or
the rulers are ruled by women? The result is the same. Even in regard to courage,
which is of no use in daily life, and is needed only in war, the influence of the
Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous. The evil showed itself in the
Theban invasion, when, unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless
and caused more confusion than the enemy. This licence of the Lacedaemonian
women existed from the earliest times, and was only what might be expected. For,

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during the wars of the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards
against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from home, and, on
the return of peace, they gave themselves into the legislator’s hand, already prepared
by the discipline of a soldier’s life (in which there are many elements of virtue), to
receive his enactments. But, when Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to bring the
women under his laws, they resisted, and he gave up the attempt. They, and not he,
are to blame for what then happened, and this defect in the constitution is clearly to be
attributed to them. We are not, however, considering what is or is not to be excused,
but what is right or wrong, and the disorder of the women, as I have already said, not
only of itself gives an air of indecorum to the state, but tends in a measure to foster
avarice.

The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the (3) Accumulation of


inequality of property. While some of the Spartan citizens have property in a few
quite small properties, others have very large ones; hence the hands; an evil
land has passed into the hands of a few. And here is another fault aggravated by the
number of heiresses.
in their laws; for, although the legislator rightly holds up to
shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he allows any body ‘Thus wealth
who likes to give and bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the accumulates and men
same result. And nearly two-fifths of the whole country are held decay.’
by women; this is owing to the number of heiresses and to the
large dowries which are customary. It would surely have been 1270 b.
better to have given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or
moderate ones. As the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one
whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to
his heir. Hence, although the country is able to maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000
hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens [at the time of the Theban invasion]
fell below 1000. The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property;
for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their ruin. There is a
tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings, they were in the habit of giving the
rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of
population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time Sparta is said to have
numbered not less than 10,000 citizens. Whether this statement is true or not, it would
certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of
property. Again, the law which relates to the procreation of children is adverse to the
correction of this inequality. For the legislator, wanting to have as many Spartans as
he could, encouraged the citizens to have large families; and there is a law at Sparta
that the father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has
four from all the burdens of the state. Yet it is obvious that, if there were many
children, the land being distributed as it is, many of them must necessarily fall into
poverty.

(4) The Ephors


chosen from the
people and often
corrupt; they have too
much power. Yet the

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The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I office keeps the state
mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest together.
matters, but the Ephors are all chosen from the people, and so the
office is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men, who, being Childish mode of
badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at electing them.
Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the They are above the
matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed laws.
did their best to ruin the state. And so great and tyrannical is their
power, that even the kings have been compelled to court them; through their influence
the constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has turned into a
democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are
contented when they have a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to
the legislator or to chance, has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be
permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and be maintained a .
This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire permanence because they have due
honour in their own persons; the nobles are represented in the council of elders (for
the office of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people in the Ephoralty, for all are
eligible to it. The election of Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, but
ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is too childish. Again, they
have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore
they should not determine them merely on their own judgment, but according to
written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the
spirit of the constitution—they have a deal too much licence; whereas, in the case of
the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they run away from the
law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures.

Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be 1271 a.
said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly
virtue; and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in (5) Council of elders.
having them. But that judges of important causes should hold
office for life is not a good thing, for the mind grows old as well Life tenure of judges
bad.
as the body. And when men have been educated in such a
manner that even the legislator himself cannot trust them, there is The elders corrupt
real danger. Many of the elders are well known to have taken and imperfectly
bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs. And controlled.
therefore they ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta they
are so. But (it may be replied), ‘All magistracies are accountable Childish mode of
electing them.
to the Ephors.’ Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them,
and we maintain that the control should be exercised in some other manner. Further,
the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is childish; and it is improper that b
the person to be elected should canvass for the office; the worthiest should be
appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly indicates the
same intention which appears in other parts of his constitution; he would have his
citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders;
for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice, almost
more than any other passions, are the motives of crime.

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Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will (6) Mistrust of the
consider at another timea ; they should at any rate be chosen, not kings.
as they are now, but with regard to their personal life and
conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he They should be
appointed by merit.
could make them really good men; at least he shows a great
distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join
enemies in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be
conservative of the state.

Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called (7) The common
‘phiditia,’ regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have meals ill arranged.
b
been provided at the public cost, as in Crete ; but among the
Lacedaemonians every one is expected to contribute, and some of them are too poor
to afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common
meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating
them is the reverse of popular. For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and,
according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain
their rights of citizenship.

The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and (8) The admiral
with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are another king.
perpetual generalsc , and this office of admiral is but the setting
up of another king.

The charge which Plato brings, in the Lawsd , against the (9) The end of
intention of the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole Spartan legislation a
constitution has regard to one part of virtue only,—the virtue of part of virtue only.
the soldier, which gives victory in war. And so long as they were
1271 b.
at war, their power was preserved, but when they had attained
empire they fella , for of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and
had never engaged in any employment higher than war. There is another error,
equally great, into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods for
which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in
supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.

Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no (10)Finance.
money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great Impatience of taxes
wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the and laxity in
land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely collecting them.
into one another’s contributions. The result which the legislator
has produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city poor, and his
citizens greedy.

Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the principal defects.

The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, and in Cretan institutions
some few points is quite as good; but for the most part less older than Spartan.
perfect in form. The older constitutions are generally less

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elaborate than the later, and the Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a
very great measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition, Lycurgus, when he
ceased to be the guardian of King Charilaus, went abroad and spent a long time in
Crete. For the two countries are nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the
Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution
which they found existing among the inhabitants. Even to this day the Perioeci, or
subject population of Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos enacted.
The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well
situated; it extends right across the sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are
settled; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to
the region of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of
the sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others; at last he invaded Sicily,
where he died near Camicus.

The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots Cretan and Spartan
are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and institutions compared.
both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which
were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not ‘phiditia’ but 1272 a.
‘andria;’ and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which
proves that the common meals [or syssitia] originally came from Crete. Further, the
two constitutions are similar [in many particulars]; for the office of the Ephors is the
same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors
are five, the Cosmi are ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete,
who are termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in
Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war.
All classes share in the ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders and the
Cosmi.

The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than The Cretan common
the Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much meals better managed
per head, or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, than the Spartan.
forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they
are of a more popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth, of cattle, of the
public revenues, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is
assigned to the gods and to the service of the state, and another to the common meals,
so that men, women, and children are all supported out of a common stocka . The
legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating which he
conceives to be a gain; he likewise encourages the separation of men from women,
lest they should have too many children, and the companionship of men with one
another—whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of
considering at another timea . But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered
than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt.

On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than But the Cosmi a
the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. worse institution than
Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is the Ephors.
not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At
Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest

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office, want the state to be permanentb . But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of
certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of those who have
been Cosmi.

The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has 1272 b.
been already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their
irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their The elders.
arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment, and
dispensing with written law, is dangerous. It is no proof of the goodness of the
institution that the people are not discontented at being excluded from it. For there is
no profit to be made out of the office; and, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an
island, are removed from temptation.

The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an Injudicious remedies
extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a of political evils.
constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a
conspiracy of their own colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are allowed
also to resign before their term of office has expired. Surely all matters of this kind
are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very unsafe rule. Worst
of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have
recourse when they will not submit to justice. This shows that the Cretan government,
although possessing some of the characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a
close oligarchy.

The Cretans have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get Crete saved from
together a party among the common people and gather their revolution by her
friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this insular position.
but the temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of
society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to
attack her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation;
distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of strangers; and the
Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented
in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But when lately foreign
invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was
revealed. Enough of the government of Crete.

The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form Merits of


of government, which differs from that of any other state in Carthaginian
several respects, though it is in some very like the institutions:
Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states—the Lacedaemonian,
the Cretan, and the Carthaginian—nearly resemble one another, and are very different
from any others. Many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent. The superiority
of their constitution is proved by the fact that, although containing an element of
democracy, it has been lasting; the Carthaginians have never had any rebellion worth
speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant.

wherein they
resemble the Spartan.

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Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution 1273 a.


resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following:— The common
tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of the 104 to
the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the
Carthaginians are elected according to merit — this is an improvement. They have
also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings
and elders of Sparta. Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same
family, whatever that may happen to be, but if there is some distinguished family they
are selected out of it and not appointed by seniority — this is far better. Such officers
have great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of
harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon.

Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for The constitution has
which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply (1) some
equally to all the forms of government which we have democratical,
mentioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy and
constitutional government, some incline more to democracy and (2) some oligarchical
features.
some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may
determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when
they are not unanimous, the people may decide whether or not the matter shall be
brought forward. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not
only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now
this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistracies of five who have under
them many important matters should be coopted, that they should choose the supreme
council of 100, and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are
virtually rulers both before and after they hold office)—these are oligarchical
features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such
as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistratesa , and not some by one class
of judges or jurors and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of
aristocracy. The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to
oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in
general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their
wealth: a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well,—he has not the leisure. If,
then, election of magistrates for their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and
election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the
constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose their
magistrates, and particularly the highest of them — their kings and generals — with
an eye both to merit and to wealth.

But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from Need of leisure and
aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is therefore of wealth in
more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, the official class;
not only when in office, but when out of office, should have
but the sale of offices
leisure and not demean themselves in any way; and to this his
a gross abuse and a
attention should be first directed. Even if you must have regard bad example.
to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing
that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, 1273 b.
should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth

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of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever
the chiefs of the state deem anything honourable, the other citizens are sure to follow
their example; and, where virtue has not the first place, there aristocracy cannot be
firmly established. Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places
will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and
honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has
incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best
[?ρισταρχε??ν]. And even if the legislator does not care to protect the good from
poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for those in officea .

It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person Pluralism among the
should hold many offices, which is a favourite practice among Carthaginians.
the Carthaginians, for one business is better done by one manb .
The legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-
player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance both
with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be
distributed among many persons. For, as I was saying, this arrangement is more
popular, and any action familiarised by repetition is better and sooner performed. We
have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command and of obedience in
both these services extend to all.

The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they Emigration a panacea


successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by their wealth, which against revolution.
enables them from time to time to send out some portion of the
peoplea to their colonies. This is their panacea and the means by which they give
stability to the state. Accident favours them, but the legislator should be able to
provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any
misfortune occurred, and the people revolted from their rulers, there would be no way
of restoring peace by legal methods.

Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions,


which are justly celebrated.

Political writers and


law-givers.

Solon praised by
some because he
broke up the
oligarchy,

blamed by others
because he founded
the democracy. In
reality he only
established the law
courts.

Things afterwards
grew worse and

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Of those who have treated of governments, some have never worse, but this was
taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives not his fault.
in a private station; about most of them, what was worth telling
has been already told. Others have been lawgivers, either in their 1274 a.
own or in foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered;
and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions; for
example, Lycurgus and Solon did both. Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have
already spoken. As to Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator,
who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people,
established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of
the state. According to their view, the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical
element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical.
The truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy existed before the
time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of
all the citizens, thus creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he is
sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the law courts, which are
elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-democratic element. When the
law courts grew powerful, to please the people, who were now playing the tyrant, the
old constitution was changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles
curtailed the power of the Areopagus; they also instituted the payment of the juries,
and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it
became what we now see. All this is true; it seems however to be the result of
circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people having been
instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian Wara , began to get a
notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues, whom the better class opposed.
Solon, himself, appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to
offices and calling to account the magistrates, which was absolutely necessary b ; for
without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to the government.
All the magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of wealth, that is to
say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the class called zeugitae (because they
kept a yoke of oxen), or from a third class of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth
class were labourers who had no share in any magistracy.

Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Charondas.


Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his
own city of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in Italy Onomacritus.
a
and Sicily. Some persons attempt to make out that Onomacritus
was the first person who had any special skill in legislationa , and that he, although a
Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic
art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of
Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is quite inconsistent with
chronology.

1274 b.

Philolaus, a
Corinthian who
settled at Thebes,

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There was also a Theban legislator, whose name was Philolaus, gave laws to the
the Corinthian. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Thebans.
Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left
Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had conceived
for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. The
inhabitants still point out their tombs, which are in full view of one another, but one
looks towards Corinth, the other not. Tradition says that the two friends arranged
them in this way, Diocles out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the land of Corinth
might not be visible from his tomb; Philolaus that it might. This is the reason why
they settled at Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some
other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of children, which they call
the ‘Laws of Adoption.’ These laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to
preserve the number of the lots.

In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing remarkable, Charondas.


except the laws about false witnesses. He is the first who
instituted actions for perjury. His laws are more exact and more precisely expressed
than even those of our modern legislators.

Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of property; of Plato, Stray reremarks about


the community of women, children, and property, the common Phaleas and Plato.
meals of women, and the law about drinking, that the sober shall
be masters of the feasta ; also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill
with both hands, so that one should be as useful as the otherb .

Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution which Draco.
already existed, and there is no peculiarity in them which is
worth mentioning, except the greatness and severity of the punishments.

Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author of a Pittacus.
constitution; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that, if a
drunken man strike another, he shall be more heavily punished than if he were soberc
; he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to
expediency, for drunken more often than sober people commit acts of violence.

Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians of Thrace. Androdamas.


Some of them relate to homicide, and to heiresses; but there is
nothing remarkable in them.

And here let us conclude our enquiry into the various constitutions which either
actually exist, or have been devised by theorists.

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[Back to Table of Contents]

BOOK III.
He who would enquire into the nature and various kinds of 1275 a.
government must first of all determine ‘What is a state?’ At
present this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has What is a state?
a
done a certain act; others, no, not the state , but the oligarchy or
the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely A question which
leads to another, who
with the state; a constitution or government being an is a citizen?
arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is
composite, and, like any other whole, made up of many Neither residence nor
parts;—these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, merely legal rights are
therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and sufficient to constitute
perfect citizenship.
what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a
difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a democracy will The citizen is he who
often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. Leaving out of shares in ‘indefinite
consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have office.’
obtained the name of citizen in any other accidental manner, we
may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for
resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has no legal right
except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the
provisions of a treaty. Even resident aliens in many places possess such rights,
although in an imperfect form; for they are obliged to have a patron. Hence they do
but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified
sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register,
or to old men who have been relieved from state duties. Of these we do not say simply
that they are citizens, but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the other,
that they are past the age, or something of that sort; the precise expression is
immaterial, for our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have
mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles. But
the citizen, whom we are seeking to define, is a citizen in the strictest sense, against
whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares
in the administration of justice, and in offices. Now of offices some have a limit of
time, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them
after a fixed interval; others have no limit of time,—for example, the office of dicast
or ecclesiasta . It may, indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, and that
their functions give them no share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say
that those who have the supreme power do not govern. Not to dwell further upon this,
which is a purely verbal question, what we want is a common term including both
dicast and ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it ‘indefinite office,’ and
we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most
comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are generally so
called.

This definition,
strictly taken, suits

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But we must not forget that things of which the underlying only democratic
notions differ in kind, one of them being first, another second, states,
another third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, or
hardly anything, worth mentioning in common. Now we see that 1275 b.
governments differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and
and must be modified
that others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted are when extended to
necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. (What we mean others.
by perversion will be hereafter explainedb .) The citizen then of
necessity differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to
the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states. For in some states the
people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only
extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates. At
Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they
distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, and other
causes are decided by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at Carthage a ;
there certain magistrates decide all causes. We may, indeed, modify our definition of
the citizen so as to include these states. [But strictly taken it only applies in
democracies.] In other states it is the holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office,
who legislates and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite offices is
reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things. The
conception of the citizen now begins to clear up.

He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any
state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and speaking generally, a state is a body
of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the Practically the citizen
parents are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to is the son of a citizen.
two or three or more grandparents. This is a short and practical
definition; but there are some who raise the further question: But how about the
first citizen?
How this third or fourth ancestor came to be a citizen? Gorgias
of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony,
said — ‘Mortars are made by the mortar-makers, and the citizens of Larissa are also a
manufactured article, made, like the kettles which bear their name [λαρισα??οι], by
the magistratesb .’ Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the definition
just given they shared in the governmentc , they were citizens. [This is a better
definition than the other.] For the words, ‘born of a father or mother, who is a citizen,’
cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

There is a greater difficulty in the case of those who have been Is the citizen de facto
made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after also citizen de jure?
the expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in tribes a number of
strangers and slaves anda resident aliens. The doubt in these 1276 a.
cases is, not who is, but whether he, who is, ought to be a citizen;
and there will still be a further doubt, whether he who ought not to be a citizen, is one
in fact, for what ought not to be is what is false and is not. Now, there are some who
hold office, and yet ought not to hold office, whom we call rulers, although they rule
unjustly. And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or

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office,—he who holds a judicial or legislative office fulfils our definition of a citizen.
It is evident, therefore, that the citizens about whom the doubt has arisen must be
called citizens; whether they ought to be so or not is a question which is bound up
with the previous enquiryb .

A parallel question is raised respecting the state whether a certain When is an act the act
act is or is not an act of the state; for example, in the transition of the state?
from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. In such cases
persons refuse to fulfil their contracts or any other obligations, The identity
on the ground that the tyrant, and not the state, contracted them;
they argue that some constitutions are established by force, and not for the sake of the
common good. But this would apply equally to democracies, for they too may be
founded on violence, and then the acts of the democracy will be neither more nor less
legitimate than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This question runs up into
another:—when shall we say that the state is the same, and when different? It would
be a very superficial view which considered only the place and the inhabitants; for the
soil and the population may be separated, and some of the inhabitants may live in one
place and some in another. This, however, is not a very serious difficulty; we need
only remark that the word ‘state’ is ambiguous, meaning both state and city.

It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be and the unity of a
regarded as a single city—what is the limit? Certainly not the state depend not so
wall of the city, for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a much on place,
wall. But a city, having such vast circuit, would contain a nation
rather than a state, like Babylona , which, as they say, had been taken for three days
before some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. This difficulty may,
however, with advantage be deferredb to another occasion; the statesman has to
consider the size of the state, and whether it should consist of more than one nation or
not.

Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as well as 1276 b.
their place of abode, remain the same, the city is also the same,
although the citizens are always dying and being born, as we call nor yet on race,
rivers and fountains the same, although the water is always
flowing away and coming again? Or shall we say that the but mainly on the
sameness of the
generations of men, like the rivers, are the same, but that the constitution.
state changes? For, since the state is a community and a
community is made up of citizens, when the form of the government changes and
becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as
a tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical.
And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements, when the
form of their composition alters; for example, harmony of the same sounds is said to
be different, accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this
is true it is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of
the constitution, and may be called or not called by the same name, whether the
inhabitants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another question, whether a
state ought or ought not to fulfil engagements when the form of government changes.

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There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the virtue Is the virtue of the
of a good man and a good citizen is the same or nota . But, before good man the same as
entering on this discussion, we must first obtain some general that of the good
notion of the virtue of the citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen is a citizen?
member of a community. Now, sailors have different functions,
The virtue of the
for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out- citizen differs in
man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and while the different states, and
precise definition of each individual’s virtue applies exclusively therefore cannot
to him, there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable always be the same as
to them all. For they have all of them a common object, which is that of the good man.
safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from another,
but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This
community is the state; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the
constitution of which he is a member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it
is evident that the virtue of the good citizen cannot be the one perfect virtue. But we
say that the good man is he who has perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that the good
citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man.

The same question may also be approached by another road, Even in the perfect
from a consideration of the perfect state. If the state cannot be state, though all are
entirely composed of good men, and each citizen is expected to good citizens, they are
do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, not necessarily good
men.
inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the
citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the 1277 a.
virtue of the good citizen—thus, and thus only, can the state be
perfect; but they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the
good state all the citizens must be good.

Again, the state may be compared to the living being: as the first The citizens differ
elements into which the living being is resolved are soul and among themselves,
body, as the soul is made up of reason and appetite, the family of and therefore cannot
husband and wife, property of master and slave, so out of all all have the same
virtue.
these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is composed;
and, therefore, the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be the
same, any more than the excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the
performer who stands by his side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds of
virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same.

But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good The good ruler is the
citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we good man.
answer [not that the good citizen, but] that the good ruler is a
good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man. And
some persons say that even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind; for
are not the children of kings instructed in riding and military exercises? As Euripides
says:

‘No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires.’a

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As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. If But are not all the
then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, citizens rulers in turn?
and we assume further that the subject is a citizen as well as the
ruler, the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good Yes; by obedience
man cannot be always the same, although in some cases [i.e. in they learn to rule.
the perfect state] they may; for the virtue of a ruler differs from The obedience is not
that of a citizen. It was the sense of this difference which made such as that of slaves
Jason say that ‘he felt hungry when he was not a tyrant,’ or mechanics,
meaning that he could not endure to live in a private station. But,
on the other hand, it may be argued that men are praised for 1277 b.
knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a
citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a
good man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and
obeying, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of praise. Seeing, then, that
according to common opinion the ruler and the ruled must at some time or other learn
the duties of both, but that what they learn is different, and that the citizen must know
and share in them both; the inference is obviousa . There is, indeed, the rule of a
master which is concerned with menial officesb ,—the master need not know how to
perform these, but may employ others in the execution of them: anything else would
be degrading; and by anything else I mean the menial duties which vary much in
character and are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as
handicraftsmen, who, as their name signifies, live by the labour of their
hands:—under these the mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among
some nations, the working classes had no share in the government—a privilege which
they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and the
statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except for
their own occasional usec ; if they habitually practise them, there will cease to be a
distinction between master and slave.

This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but there is a rule but the obedience of
of another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by freemen in a
birth — a constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by constitutional state.
obeying, as he would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by
being under the orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a Practical wisdom is
the virtue of the ruler.
general of infantry by being under the orders of a general of
infantry, or by having had the command of a company or brigade. It has been well
said that ‘he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.’ The two
are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know
how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues
of a citizen. And, although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from
those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will include both; for the good man, who
is free and also a subject, will not have one virtue only, say justice,—but he will have
distinct kinds of virtue, the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing
as the temperance and courage of men and women differa . For a man would be
thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman
would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation
than the good man; and indeed their part in the management of the household is
different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve. Practical

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wisdom only is characteristic of the rulerb : it would seem that all other virtues must
equally belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly not wisdom,
but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his master
is like the flute-player or user of the flutec .

From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question, whether the
virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, or different, and how
far the same, and how far differentd .

There still remains one more question about the citizen: Is he Is the mechanic a
only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic citizen?
to be included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed
citizens, not every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and He is necessary to the
obeying which makes a citizen . And if none of the lower class existence of a state,
e e
but not a part of it,
are citizens, in which part of the state are they to be placed? For and
they are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners. To this
objection may we not reply, that there is no more absurdity in therefore in the best
excluding them than in excluding slaves and freedmen from any state not a citizen at
of the above-mentioned classes? It must be admitted that we all.
cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the 1278 a.
existence of the state; for example, children are not citizens
equally with grown up men, who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being
grown up, are only citizens in a qualified sense. Doubtless in ancient times, and
among some nations, the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the
majority of them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship;
but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of a citizen will apply to
some citizens and freemen only, and not to those who work for their living. The latter
class, to whom toil is a necessity, are either slaves who minister to the wants of
individuals, or mechanics and labourers who are the servants of the community. These
reflections carried a little further will explain their position; and indeed what has been
said already is of itself explanation enough.

Since there are many forms of government there must be many Citizenship relative to
varieties of citizens, and especially of citizens who are subjects; the constitution.
so that under some governments the mechanic and the labourer
will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called
government of the best (if there be such an one), in which honours are given
according to virtue and merit; for no man can practise virtue who is living the life of a
mechanic or labourer. In oligarchies the qualification for office is high, and therefore
no labourer can ever be a citizen; but a mechanic may, for many of them are rich. At
Thebesa there was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from
business for ten years. In many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens;
for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his mother only be a citizen [and
his father an alien]; and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate children; the law
is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But when the number of citizens
increases, first the children of a male or a female slave are excluded; then those whose
mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those
whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.a

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Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens; and he The true citizen
is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honours of the shares in the honours
state. In the poems of Homer [Achilles complains of of state.
b
Agamemnon treating him] ‘like some dishonoured stranger ;’
for he who is excluded from the honours of the state is no better than an alien. But
when this exclusion is concealed, then the object is to deceive the inhabitants.

As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the 1278 b.
same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already
adduced prove that in some states the two are the same, and in Final answer to the
others different. When they are the same it is not the virtue of question ‘whether the
good citizen is the
every citizen which is the same as that of the good man, but only
good man.’
the virtue of the statesman and of those who have or may have,
alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs.

Having determined these questions, we have next to consider whether there is only
one form of government or many, and if many, what they are, and how many, and
what are the differences between them.

A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a statec , Constitutions vary


especially of the highest of all. The government is everywhere with the governing
sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the power and in relation
government. For example, in democracies the people are to the end.
supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that
these two forms of government are different: and so in other cases.

First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how What is the end of the
many forms of government there are by which human society is state?
regulated. We have already said, in the former part of this
treatisea , when drawing a distinction between household-management and the rule of
a master, that man is by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even when they
do not require one another’s help, desire to live together all the same, and are in fact
brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to
any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of
states. And also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly some noble
element) mankind meet together and maintain the political community, so long as the
evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the goodb . And we all see that men cling
to life even in the midst of misfortune, seeming to find in it a natural sweetness and
happiness.

The various kinds of


rule.

Rule is primarily
intended for the good
of the governed,

1279 a.

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There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of and is perverted when


authority; they have been often defined already in popular exercised in the
c
works . The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and interests of the ruler.
the master by nature have in reality the same interests, is
nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but
accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master
perishes with him. On the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of a
household, which we have called household-management, is exercised in the first
instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties, but
essentially for the good of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine,
gymnastic, and the arts in general, which are only accidentally concerned with the
good of the artists themselvesd . (For there is no reason why the trainer may not
sometimes practise gymnastics, and the pilot is always one of the crew.) The trainer or
the pilot considers the good of those committed to his care. But, when he is one of the
persons taken care of, he accidentally participates in the advantage, for the pilot is
also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of those in training. And so in politics: when
the state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citizens think that
they ought to hold office by turns. In the order of nature every one would take his turn
of service; and then again, somebody else would look after his interest, just as he,
while in office, had looked after theirsa . [That was originally the way.] But now-a-
days, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from the public revenues and
from office, men want to be always in office. One might imagine that the rulers, being
sickly, were only kept in health while they continued in office; in that case we may be
sure that they would be hunting after places. The conclusion is evident: that
governments, which have a regard to the common interest, are constituted in
accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those
which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for
they are despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen.

Having determined these points, we have next to consider how Forms of government,
many forms of government there are, and what they are; and in true and perverted.
the first place what are the true forms, for when they are
determined the perversions of them will at once be apparent. The (a) The true forms.
words constitution and government have the same meaning, and
(1) Royalty, or the
the government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be rule of one.
in the hands of one, or of a few, or of many. The true forms of
government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or (2) Aristocracy of a
the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but few.
governments which rule with a view to the private interest,
(3) ‘Polity’ of the
whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are
citizens at large.
perversionsb . For citizens, if they are truly citizens, ought to
participate in the advantages of a state. Of forms of government (But all for the sake
in which one rules, we call that which regards the common of the governed.)
interests, kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, but
not many, rule, aristocracy [the rule of the best]; and it is so 1279 b.
called, either because the rulers are the best men, or because they
have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the citizens at
large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the

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generic name,—a constitution [πολιτεία]. And there is a reason for this use of
language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but of virtue there are many kinds:
and as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in
every kind, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the masses. Hence,
in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those
who possess arms are the citizens.

Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as (b) The perversions.


follows:—of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of (1) tyranny, (2)
constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of oligarchy, (3)
monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; democracy.
oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of
the needy: none of them the common good of all.

But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it The division however
will therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the must not be made to
nature of each of them. For he who would make a philosophical depend merely on a
study of the various sciences, and does not regard practice only, principle of number
(quantity).
ought not to overlook or omit anything, but to set forth the truth
in every particular. Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy
exercising the rule of a master over political society; oligarchy is when men of
property have the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite, when the
indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers. And here arises the first of our
difficulties, and it relates to the definition just given. For democracy is said to be the
government of the many. But what if the many are men of property and have the
power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said to be the government of the
few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power in their hands
because they are stronger? In these cases the distinction which we have drawn
between these different forms of government would no longer hold good.

Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty Wealth and poverty
to the many, and name the governments accordingly—an (quantity) must also
oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the wealthy, and be considered.
a democracy that in which the many and the poor are the
rulers—there will still be a difficulty. For, if the only forms of government are the
ones already mentioned, how shall we describe those other governments also just
mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer,
and both govern in their respective states?

The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in 1280 a.


democracies, the number of the governing body, whether the
greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in The qualitative is the
an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich essential and the
everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, there is a quantitative the
accidental difference,
misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them. though in fact they
For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is generally coincide.
poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their
wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule,

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that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many: for few are
well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and freedom are the
grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power
in the state.

Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy Justice is equality to


and democracy, and what is justice oligarchical and equals,
democratical. For all men cling to justice of some kind, but their
conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the whole inequality to
unequals, but people
idea. For example, justice is thought by them to be, and is,
in general leave out of
equality, not, however, for all, but only for equals. And sight the persons, and
inequality is thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, put relative in the
but only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men place of absolute
judge erroneously. The reason is that they are passing judgment justice.
on themselves, and most people are bad judges in their own case.
The state exists not
And whereas justice implies a relation to persons as well as to for the sake of wealth
things, and a just distribution, as I have already said in the or security or society,
Ethicsa , embraces alike persons and things, they acknowledge but for the sake of a
the equality of the things, but dispute about the merit of the good life.
persons, chiefly for the reason which I have just given,—because
1280 b.
they are bad judges in their own affairs; and secondly, because
both the parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and It is more than a mere
partial justice, but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute alliance designed for
justice. For those who are unequal in one respect, for example the protection of life
wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all; and any who and property.
are equal in one respect, for example freedom, consider
themselves to be equal in all. But they leave out the capital point. For if men met and
associated out of regard to wealth only, their share in the state would be proportioned
to their property, and the oligarchical doctrine would then seem to carry the day. It
would not be just that he who paid one mina should have the same share of a hundred
minae, bwhether of the principal or of the profitsb , as he who paid the remaining
ninety-nine. But a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life
only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they
cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice. Nor does a state
exist for the sake of alliance and security from injusticec , nor yet for the sake of
exchange and mutual intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and
all who have commercial treaties with one another, would be the citizens of one state.
True, they have agreements about imports, and engagements that they will do no
wrong to one another, and written articles of alliance. But there are no magistracies
common to the contracting parties who will enforce their engagements; different
states have each their own magistracies. Nor does one state take care that the citizens
of the other are such as they ought to be, nor see that those who come under the terms
of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness at all, but only that they do no injustice to
one another. Whereas, those who care for good government take into consideration
[the larger question of] virtue and vice in states. Whence it may be further inferred
that avirtue must be the serious care of a state which truly deserves the namea : for
[without this ethical end] the community becomes a mere alliance which differs only
in place from alliances of which the members live apart; and law is only a convention,

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‘a surety to one another of justice,’ as the sophist Lycophron says, and has no real
power to make the citizens good and just.

This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as Corinth and It implies not only
Megara, to be united by a wall, still they would not be one city, intermarriage,
not even if the citizens had the right to intermarry, which is one intercourse, exchange,
of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, if men
dwelt at a distance from one another, but not so far off as to have a common locality,
no intercourse, and there were laws among them that they should but much more than
not wrong each other in their exchanges, neither would this be a these, viz. a
state. Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a community of well-
husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their being.
number is ten thousand: nevertheless, if they have nothing in
1281 a.
common but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not
constitute a state. Why is this? Surely not because they are at a
distance from one another: for even supposing that such a community were to meet in
one place, and that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his state,
and that they made alliance with one another, but only against evil-doers; still an
accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse with one
another was of the same character after as before their union. It is clear then that a
state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of
crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot
exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of well-
being in families and aggregations of families, for the sake of a perfect and self-
sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the
same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods,
common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. They are created by
friendship, for friendship is the motive of society. The end is the good life, and these
are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages having for
an end a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable
lifea .

Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake Those who contribute
of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. And they who most to such a society
contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it than have the greatest
those who have the same or a greater freedom or nobility of birth claim to power.
but are inferior to them in political virtue; or than those who
exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.

From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the partisans of different forms
of government speak of a part of justice only.

Who are to have


supreme power?

Difficulties: any class


having the power may
act unjustly, is its

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There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the authority to be


state:—Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the deemed just?
one best man? Or a tyrant? Any of these alternatives seems to
involve disagreeable consequences. If the poor, for example, because they are more in
number, divide among themselves the property of the rich,—is not this unjust? No, by
heaven (will be the reply), for the lawful authority [i. e. the people] willed it. But if
this is not injustice, pray what is? Again, when [in the first division] all has been
taken, and the majority divide anew the property of the minority, is it not evident, if
this goes on, that they will ruin the state? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those
who possess her, nor is justice destructive of a statea ; and therefore this law of
confiscation clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity
be just; for he only coerces other men by superior power, just as the multitude coerce
the rich. But is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? And
what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people,—is this just? If so, the other
case [i. e. the case of the majority plundering the minority] will likewise be just. But
there can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.

Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in The rule of the good
that case everybody else, being excluded from power, will be men will exclude the
dishonoured. For the offices of a state are posts of honour; and if other citizens.
one set of men always hold them, the rest must be deprived of
Even the rule of the
them. Then will it be well that the one best man should rule?
law may only
Nay, that is still more oligarchical, for the number of those who represent a party.
are dishonoured is thereby increased. Some one may say that it is
bad for a man, subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion, to have the
supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the law itself be democratical or
oligarchical, how will that help us out of our difficultiesb ? Not at all; the same
consequences will follow.

Why the many should


have power. They are
wiser than any one
man,

in many cases, though


not always.

1281 b.

1282 a.

Their wisdom
collective.

But should not the


expert be chosen by
the expert?

Answer: the people


may be able to judge

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Most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion. though they have no
The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than special knowledge.
the few best is capable of a satisfactory explanation, and, though
not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many, of
whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very
likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as
a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse.
For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when
they meet together they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands,
and senses; that is a figure of their mind and disposition. Hence the many are better
judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some
another, and among them, they understand the whole. There is a similar combination
of qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful
are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities,
because in them the scattered elements are combined, although, if taken separately,
the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would be fairer than in
the picture. Whether this principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of
men, is not clear. Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of application;
for the argument would equally hold about brutes; and wherein, it will be asked, do
some men differ from brutes? But there may be bodies of men about whom our
statement is nevertheless true. And if so, the difficulty which has been already raised,
and also another which is akin to it—viz. what power should be assigned to the mass
of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and have no personal merit—are both
solved. There is still a danger in allowing them to share the great offices of state, for
their folly will lead them into error, and their dishonesty into crime. But there is a
danger also in not letting them share, for a state in which many poor men are excluded
from office will necessarily be full of enemies. The only way of escape is to assign to
them some deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason Solona and certain
other legislators give them the power of electing to offices, and of calling the
magistrates to account, but they do not allow them to hold office singly. When they
meet together their perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the better
class they are useful to the state (just as impure food when mixed with what is pure
sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the pure
would be), but each individual, left to himself, forms an imperfect judgment. On the
other hand, the popular form of government involves certain difficulties. In the first
place, it might be objected that he who can judge of the healing of a sick man would
be one who could himself heal his disease, and make him whole—that is, in other
words, the physician; and so in all professions and arts. As, then, the physician ought
to be called to account by physicians, so ought men in general to be called to account
by their peers. But physicians are of three kinds:—there is the apothecary, and there is
the physician of the higher class, and thirdly the intelligent man who has studied the
art: in all arts there is such a class; and we attribute the power of judging to them quite
as much as to professors of the art. Now, does not the same principle apply to
elections? For a right election can only be made by those who have knowledge; a
geometrician, for example, will choose rightly in matters of geometry, or a pilot in
matters of steering; and, even if there be some occupations and arts with which
private persons are familiar, they certainly cannot judge better than those who know.
So that, according to this argument, neither the election of magistrates, nor the calling

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of them to account, should be intrusted to the many. Yet possibly these objections are
to a great extent met by our old answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded,
although individually they may be worse judges than those who have special
knowledge—as a body they are as good or better. Moreover, there are some artists
whose works are judged of solely, or in the best manner, not by themselves, but by
those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge of the house is not
limited to the builder only; the user, or, in other words, the master, of the house will
even be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder
than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook.

This difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered, but there Sovereignty of the
is another akin to it. That inferior persons should have authority people means not
in greater matters than the good would appear to be a strange volonté de tous but
thing, yet the election and calling to account of the magistrates is volonté générale.
the greatest of all. And these, as I was saying, are functions
which in some states are assigned to the people, for the assembly is supreme in all
such matters. Yet persons of any age, and having but a small property qualification,
sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge, although for the great officers of state,
such as controllers and generals, a high qualification is required. This difficulty may
be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the present practice of
democracies may be really defensible. For the power does not reside in the dicast, or
senator, or ecclesiast, but in the court and the senate, and the assembly, of which
individual senators, or ecclesiasts, or dicasts, are only parts or members. And for this
reason the many may claim to have a higher authority than the few; for the people,
and the senate, and the courts consist of many persons, and their property collectively
is greater than the property of one or of a few individuals holding great offices. But
enough of this.

The discussion of the first questiona shows nothing so clearly as The laws when good
that laws, when good, should be supreme; and that the magistrate supreme. But what are
or magistrates should regulate those matters only on which the good laws?
laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of
1282 b.
any general principle embracing all particularsa . But what are
good laws has not yet been clearly explained; the old difficulty
remainsb . The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws is of necessity
relative to the constitutions of states. But if so, true forms of government will of
necessity have just laws, and perverted forms of government will have unjust laws.

Justice is equality.

But equality in what?

Not in anything and


everything.

Differences of quality
have no common
measure.

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In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and especially and What kinds of
above all in the highest of allc — this is the political science of superiority give a
which the good is justice, in other words, the common interest. claim to political
All men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a certain power?
d
extent they agree in the philosophical distinctions which have
1283 a.
been laid down by us about Ethicse . For they admit that justice
is a thing having relation to persons, and that equals ought to have equality. But there
still remains a question; equality or inequality of what? here is a difficulty which the
political philosopher has to resolve. For very likely some persons will say that offices
of state ought to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence, in
whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other difference between him and
the rest of the community; for that those who differ in any one respect have different
rights and claims. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of a man, or any
other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a greater share of political rights.
The error here lies upon the surface, and may be illustrated from the other arts and
sciences. When a number of flute-players are equal in their art, there is no reason why
those of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them; for they
will not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved
for him who is the superior artist. If what I am saying is still obscure, it will be made
clearer as we proceed. For if there were a superior flute-player who was far inferior in
birth and beauty, although either of these may be a greater good than the art of flute-
playing, and persons gifted with these qualities may excel the flute-player in a greater
ratio than he excels them in his art, still he ought to have the best flutes given to him,
unless the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence in flute-playing,
which they do not. Moreover upon this principle any good may be compared with any
other. For if a given height, then height in general may be measured either against
height or against freedom. Thus if A excels in height more than B in virtue, and height
in general is more excellent than virtue, all things will be commensurable [which is
absurd]; for if a certain magnitude is greater than some other, it is clear that some
other will be equal. But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that there
is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of
inequality any more than in the arts. For if some be slow, and others swift, that is no
reason why the one should have little and the others much; it is in gymnastic contests
that such excellence is rewarded. Whereas the rival claims of candidates for office can
only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a
state, [such as wealth, virtue, etc.] And therefore the noble, or free-born, or rich, may
with good reason claim office; for holders of offices must be freemen and tax-payers:
a state can be no more composed entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if
wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valour are equally soa ; for
without the former a state cannot exist at all, without the latter not well.

1283 b.

The claims of wealth,

of birth,

of virtue,

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If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it of numbers.


would seem that all, or some at least, of these claims are just;
but, if we take into account a good life, as I have already saidb , Concurrent claims.
education and virtue have superior claims. As, however, those
who are equal in one thing ought not to be equal in all, nor those who are unequal in
one thing to be unequal in all, it is certain that all forms of government which rest on
either of these principles are perversions. All men have a claim in a certain sense, as I
have already admitted, but they have not an absolute claim. The rich claim because
they have a greater share in the land, and land is the common element of the state;
also they are generally more trustworthy in contracts. The free claim under the same
title as the noble; for they are nearly akin. And the noble are citizens in a truer sense
than the ignoble, since good birth is always valued in a man’s own home and countrya
. Another reason is, that those who are sprung from better ancestors are likely to be
better men, for nobility is excellence of race. Virtue, too, may be truly said to have a
claim, for justice has been acknowledged by us to be a socialb virtue, and it implies all
othersc . Again, the many may urge their claim against the few; for, when taken
collectively, and compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and better. But,
what if the good, the rich, the noble, and the other classes who make up a state, are all
living together in the same city, will there, or will there not, be any doubt who shall
rule?—No doubt at all in determining who ought to rule in each of the above-
mentioned forms of government. For states are characterized by differences in their
governing bodies—one of them has a government of the rich, another of the virtuous,
and so on. But a difficulty arises when all these elements coexist. How are we to
decide? Suppose the virtuous to be very few in number: may we consider their
numbers in relation to their duties, and ask whether they are enough to administer the
state, or must they be so many as will make up a state? Objections may be urged
against all the aspirants to political power. For those who found their claims on wealth
or family have no basis of justice; on this principle, if any one person were richer than
all the rest, it is clear that he ought to be the ruler of them. In like manner he who is
very distinguished by his birth ought to have the superiority over all those who claim
on the ground that they are freeborn. In an aristocracy, or government of the best, a
like difficulty occurs about virtue; for if one citizen be better than the other members
of the government, however good they may be, he too, upon the same principle of
justice, should rule over them. And if the people are to be supreme because they are
stronger than the few, then if one man, or more than one, but not a majority, is
stronger than the many, they ought to rule, and not the many.

All these considerations appear to show that none of the None of these claims
principles on which men claim to rule, and hold all other men in to power strictly just.
subjection to them, are strictly right. To those who claim to be
masters of the state on the ground of their virtue or their wealth, The many may be
better or richer than
the many might fairly answer that they themselves are often
the few.
better and richer than the few—I do not say individually, but
collectively. And another ingenious objection which is The equal is limited
sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner. Some by the common good.
persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the
justest laws ought to legislate with a view to the good of the 1284 a.
higher classes or of the many, when the case which we have

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mentioned occurs [i. e. when all the elements coexista ]. Now what is just or right is to
be interpreted in the sense of ‘what is equal;’ and that which is right in the sense of
being equal is to be considered with reference to the advantage of the state, and the
common good of the citizens. And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being
governed. He differs under different forms of government, but in the best state he is
one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of
virtue.

If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, The true king or hero
although not enough to make up the full complement of a state, an anomalous person
whose virtue is so preeminent that the virtues or the political who is not part of a
power of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs, he state:
or they can be no longer regarded as part of a state; for justice
such persons are
will not be done to the superior, if he is reckoned only as the ostracised in
equal of those who are so far inferior to him in virtue and in democracies which,
political power. Such an one may truly be deemed a God among like tyrannies, act on
men. Hence we see that legislation is necessarily concerned only the advice of
with those who are equal in birth and in power; and that for men Periander to
Thrasybulus.
of preeminent virtue there is no law — they are themselves a
law. Any one would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws Imperial states
for them: they would probably retort what, in the fable of ostracise dependent
Antisthenes, the lions said to the hares [‘where are your claws?’], states.
when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and
1284 b.
claiming equality for all. And for this reason democratic states
have instituted ostracism; equality is above all things their aim,
and therefore they ostracise and banish from the city for a time those who seem to
predominate too much through their wealth, or the number of their friends, or through
any other political influence. Mythology tells us that the Argonauts left Heracles
behind for a similar reason; the ship Argo would not take him because she feared that
he would have been too much for the rest of the crew. Wherefore those who denounce
tyranny and blame the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus cannot be held
altogether just in their censure. The story is that Periander, when the herald was sent
to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off the tallest ears of corn till he had
brought the field to a level. The herald did not know the meaning of the action, but
came and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who understood that he was to
cut off the principal men in the statea ; and this is a policy not only expedient for
tyrants or in practice confined to them, but equally necessary in oligarchies and
democracies. Ostracisma is a measure of the same kind, which acts by disabling and
banishing the most prominent citizens. Great powers do the same to whole cities and
nations, as the Athenians did to the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians; no sooner had
they obtained a firm grasp of the empire, than they humbled their allies contrary to
treaty; and the Persian king has repeatedly crushed the Medes, Babylonians, and other
nations, when their spirit has been stirred by the recollection of their former greatness.

Illustration taken from


the arts.

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The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns all forms of Ostracism when
government, true as well as false; for, although perverted forms applied a sad
with a view to their own interests may adopt this policy, those necessity, but it
which seek the common interest do so likewise. The same thing should not be
necessary.
may be observed in the arts and sciencesb ; for the painter will
not allow the figure to have a foot which, however beautiful, is Can we ostracise the
not in proportion, nor will the ship-builder allow the stern or any one best man?
other part of the vessel to be unduly large, any more than who
sings louder or better than all the rest to sing in the choir. No: Then he must be
c king.
Monarchs, too, may practise compulsion and still live in
harmony with their cities, if their government is for the interest
of the statec . Hence where there is an acknowledged superiority the argument in
favour of ostracism is based upon a kind of political justice. It would certainly be
better that the legislator should from the first so order his state as to have no need of
such a remedy. But if the need arises, the next best thing is that he should endeavour
to correct the evil by this or some similar measure. The principle, however, has not
been fairly applied in states; for, instead of looking to the public good, they have used
ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that under perverted forms of government,
and from their special point of view, such a measure is just and expedient, but it is
also clear that it is not absolutely just. In the perfect state there would be great doubts
about the use of it, not when applied to excess in strength, wealth, popularity, or the
like, but when used against some one who is preeminent in virtue, — what is to be
done with him? Mankind will not say that such an one is to be expelled and exiled; on
the other hand, he ought not to be a subject—that would be aas if in the division of the
empire of the Gods the other Godsa should claim to rule over Zeus. The only
alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to be
the order of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state for life.

The preceding discussion, by a natural transition, leads to the 1285 a.


consideration of royalty, which we admit to be one of the true
forms of governmentb . Let us see whether in order to be well Royalty,
governed a state or country should be under the rule of a king or
under some other form of government; and whether monarchy, kinds of.
although good for some, may not be bad for others. But first we
must determine whether there is one species of royalty or many. It is easy to see that
there are many, and that the manner of government is not the same in all of them.

Of royalties according to law, the Lacedaemonian is thought to (1) The


answer best to the true pattern; but there the royal power is not Lacedaemonian kings
absolute, except when the kings go on an expedition, and then not sovereigns, but
they take the command. Matters of religion are likewise generals for life.
committed to them. The kingly office is in truth a kind of
generalship, irresponsible and perpetual. The king has not the power of life and death,
exceptc when upon a campaign and in the field; after the manner of the ancients which
is described in Homer. For Agamemnon is patient when he is attacked in the
assembly, but when the army goes out to battle he has the power even of life and
death. Does he not say?—

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‘When I find a man skulking apart from the battle, nothing shall save him from the
dogs and vultures, for in my hands is deatha .’

This, then, is one form of royalty — a generalship for life: and of such royalties some
are hereditary and others elective.

(2) There is another sort of monarchy not uncommon among the (2) Barbarian kings
barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny. But even this is have despotic power,
legal and hereditary. For barbarians, being more servile in but are legal and
character than Hellenes, and Asiatics than Europeans, do not hereditary.
rebel against a despotic government. Such royalties have the
nature of tyrannies because the people are by nature slavesb ; but there is no danger of
their being overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal. Wherefore also their guards
are such as a king and not such as a tyrant would employ, that is to say, they are
composed of citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenariesc . For kings rule
according to law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants over involuntary; and the one are
guarded by their fellow-citizens, the others are guarded against them.

These are two forms of monarchy, and there was a third (3) (3) Aesymnetes or
which existed in ancient Hellas, called an Aesymnetia or dictators.
dictatorship. This may be defined generally as an elective
tyranny, which, like the barbarian monarchy, is legal, but differs from it in not being
hereditary. Sometimes the office is held for life, sometimes for a term of years, or
until certain duties have been performed. For example, the Mitylenaeans elected
Pittacus leader against the exiles, who were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the
poet. And Alcaeus himself says in one of his airregular songsa , ‘They chose Pittacus
tyrant,’ and he reproaches his fellow-citizens for

‘having made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless and 1285 b.
ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises.’

These forms of government have always had the character of despotism, because they
possess tyrannical power; but inasmuch as they are elective and acquiesced in by their
subjects, they are kingly.

(4) There is a fourth species of kingly rule—that of the heroic (4) The hereditary
times—which was hereditary and legal, and was exercised over ruler over willing
willing subjects. For the first chiefs were benefactors of the subjects.
b
people in arts or arms; they either gathered them into a
The king’s power
community, or procured land for them; and thus they became
gradually declined,
kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was inherited by the office of priest or
their descendants. They took the command in war and presided general alone
over the sacrifices, except those which required a priest. They remaining to him.
also decided causes either with or without an oath; and when
they swore, the form of the oath was the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient
times their power extended to all things whatsoever, in city and country, as well as in
foreign parts; but at a later date they relinquished several of these privileges, and
others the people took from them, until in some states nothing was left to them but the

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sacrifices; and where they retained more of the reality they had only the right of
leadership in war beyond the border.

These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the monarchy of Re-enumeration of the
the heroic ages; this was exercised over voluntary subjects, but kinds of royalty. To
limited to certain functions; the king was a general and a judge, the four above-
and had the control of religion. The second is that of the mentioned
barbarians, which is an hereditary despotic government in
accordance with law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator; this
is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which is in fact a
generalship, hereditary and perpetual. These four forms differ from one another in the
manner which I have described.

There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the disposal is added (5) absolute
of all, just as each tribe or each state has the disposal of the royalty.
public property; this form corresponds to the control of a
household. For as household management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule
is the household management of a city, or of a nation, or of many nations.

Of these forms we need only consider two, the Lacedaemonian Only the two extreme
and the absolute royalty; for most of the others lie in a region forms need be
between them, having less power than the last, and more than the considered.
first. Thus the enquiry is reduced to two points: first, is it
The Lacedaemonian
advantageous to the state that there should be a perpetual
royalty is an office,
general, and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or not a constitution; the
open to the citizens in turn? Secondly, is it well that a single man absolute royalty raises
should have the supreme power in all things? The first question many questions.
falls under the head of laws rather than of constitutions; for
perpetual generalship might equally exist under any form of Should the best laws
or the best man rule?
government, so that this matter may be dismissed for the present.
The other kind of royalty is a sort of constitution; this we have 1286 a.
now to consider, and briefly to run over the difficulties involved
in it. We will begin by enquiring whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the
best man or by the best lawsa .

The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in Laws are general,
general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for
any science to abide by written rules is absurd. Even in Egypt the but they are
physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day, passionless, and the
rules too must have
but if sooner, he takes the risk. Hence it is argued that a
general principles.
government acting according to written laws is plainly not the
best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general principle which exists in
law; and he is a better ruler who is free from passion than he who is passionate.
Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man.

But how about


particular cases which

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Yes, some one will answer, but then on the other hand an cannot be determined
individual will be better able to advise in particular cases. [To by law?
whom we in turn make reply:] A king must legislate, and laws
must be passed, but these laws will have no authority when they Should the one best
miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their authority. man or the many
decide them?
[Yet a further question remains behind:] When the law cannot
determine a point at all, or not well, should the one best man or The many are
should all decide? According to our present practice assemblies collectively wiser,
meet, sit in judgment, deliberate and decide, and their judgments
all relate to individual cases. Now any member of the assembly, taken separately, is
certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of many individuals. And
as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a
single mana , so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual.

Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are 1286 b.
like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted
than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or less corruptible,
by some other passion, and then his judgment is necessarily
perverted; but it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of freer from passion,
persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same and not more subject
moment. Let us assume that they are freemen, never acting in to faction.
violation of the law, but filling up the gaps which the law is
obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need
only suppose that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask which will be
the more incorruptible, the one good ruler, or the many who are all good? Will not the
many? But, you will say, there may be parties among them, whereas the one man is
not divided against himself. To which we may answer that their character is as good
as his. If we call the rule of many men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and the
rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for states than royalty, whether
the government is supported by force or nota , provided only that a number of men
equal in virtue can be found.

The first governments were kingships, probably for this reason, Ancient monarchies
because of old, when cities were small, men of eminent virtue
were few. They were made kings because they were benefactorsb passed into
, and benefits can only be bestowed by good men. But when aristocracies, these
into oligarchies;
many persons equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-
eminence of one, they desired to have a commonwealth, and set then came tyrannies,
up a constitution. The ruling class soon deteriorated and enriched
themselves out of the public treasury; riches became the path to lastly, democracies.
honour, and so oligarchies naturally grew up. These passed into
tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies; for love of gain in the ruling classes was
always tending to diminish their number, and so to strengthen the masses, who in the
end set upon their masters and established democracies. Since cities have increased in
size, no other form of government appears to be any longer possiblec .

Should monarchy be
hereditary?

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Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power Should the monarch
is the best thing for states, how about the family of the king? Are have a military force?
his children to succeed him? If they are no better than anybody
else, that will be mischievous. But [says the lover of royalty] the Yes; but he must not
be too powerful.
king, though he might, will not hand on his power to his
children. That, however, is hardly to be expected, and is too
much to ask of human nature. There is also a difficulty about the force which he is to
employ; should a king have guards about him by whose aid he may be able to coerce
the refractory? but if not, how will he administer his kingdom? Even if he be the
lawful sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, still he must have
some force wherewith to maintain the law. In the case of a limited monarchy there is
not much difficulty in answering this question; the king must have such force as will
be more than a match for one or more individuals, but not so great as that of the
people. The ancients observed this principle when they gave the guards to any one
whom they appointed dictator or tyrant. Thus, when Dionysius asked the Syracusans
to allow him guards, somebody advised that they should give him only a certain
number.

At this place in the discussion naturally follows the enquiry 1287 a.


respecting the king who acts solely according to his own will; he
has now to be considered. The so-called limited monarchy, or The royalty of Sparta
a
kingship according to law, as I have already remarked , is not a is only a life
generalship, which
distinct form of government, for under all governments, as, for
may be found in any
example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there may be a general kind of state.
holding office for life, and one person is often made supreme
over the administration of a state. A magistracy of this kind But absolute
b
exists at Epidamnus , and also at Opus, but in the latter city has monarchy is often
a more limited power. Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary thought to be contrary
to nature.
rule of a sovereign over all the citizens, in a city which consists
of equals, is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature; it is Equals should be
argued that those who are by nature equals must have the same under the impersonal
natural right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal rule of law.
share, or for equals to have an unequal share, in the offices of
Law is passionless
state, is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to have the
Reason.
same food and clothing or the same different. Wherefore it is
thought to be just that among equals every one be ruled as well The analogy of
as rule, and that all should have their turn. We thus arrive at law; medicine is adduced
for an order of succession implies law. And the rule of the law is in support of personal
preferable to that of any individual. On the same principle, even government, but the
cases are not parallel.
if it be better for certain individuals to govern, they should be
made only guardians and ministers of the law. For magistrates 1287 b.
there must be, — this is admitted; but then men say that to give
authority to any one man when all are equal is unjust. There may indeed be cases
which the law seems unable to determine, but in such cases can a man? Nay, it will be
replied, the law trains officers for this express purpose, and appoints them to
determine matters which are left undecided by it to the best of their judgment. Further
it permits them to make any amendment of the existing laws which experience
suggests. [But still they are only the ministers of the law.] He who bids the law rule,

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may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an
element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of
rulers, even when they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire.
We are told that a patient should call in a physician; he will not get better if he is
doctored out of a book. But the parallel of the arts is clearly not in point; for the
physician does nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship; he only cures a
patient and takes a fee; whereas magistrates do many things from spite and partiality.
And, indeed, if a man suspected the physician of being in league with his enemies to
destroy him for a bribe, he would rather have recourse to the book. Even physicians
when they are sick, call in other physicians, and training-masters when they are in
training, other training-masters, as if they could not judge truly about their own case
and might be influenced by their feelings. Hence it is evident that in seeking for
justice men seek for the mean or neutrala , and the law is the mean. Again, customary
laws have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than written laws, and a
man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer than the customary law.

Again, it is by no means easy for one man to superintend many The one must always
things; he will have to appoint a number of subordinates, and have the assistance of
what difference does it make whether these subordinates always many: then is it not
existed or were appointed by him because he needed them? If, as better that the many
should rule from the
I said beforea , the good man has a right to rule because he is first?
better, then two good men are better than one: this is the old
saying,—

‘two going togetherb ;’

and the prayer of Agamemnon,—

‘would that I had ten such counsellorsc !’

And at this day there are some magistrates, for example judgesd , who have authority
to decide matters which the law is unable to determine, since no one doubts that the
law would command and decide in the best manner whatever it could. But some
things can, and other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the
origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule. For
matters of detail about which men deliberate cannot be included in legislation. Nor
does any one deny that the decision of such matters must be left to man, but it is
argued that there should be many judges, and not one only. For every rulere who has
been trained by the law judges well; and it would surely seem strange that a person
should see better with two eyes, or hear better with two ears, or act better with two
hands or feet, than many with many; indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make
to themselves many eyes and ears and hands and feet. For they make colleagues of
those who are the friends of themselves and their governments. They must be friends
of the monarch and of his government; if not his friends, they will not do what he
wants; but friendship implies likeness and equality; and, therefore, if he thinks that
friends ought to rule, he must think that those who are equal to himself and like
himself ought to rule. These are the principal controversies relating to monarchy.

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But may not all this be true in some cases and not in others? afor But monarchy may be
there is a natural justice and expediency in the relation of a preferable, when in
master to his servants, or, again, of a king to his subjects, as also accordance with the
in the relation of free citizens to one another; whereas there is no character of a people.
such justice or expediency in a tyrannya , or in any other
Natural fitness of
perverted form of government, which comes into being contrary constitutions.
to nature. Now, from what has been said, it is manifest that,
where men are alike and equal, it is neither expedient nor just 1288 a.
that one man should be lord of all, whether there are laws, or
whether there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law. Neither should a good
man be lord over good men, or a bad man over bad; nor, even if he excels in virtue,
should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular case, which I have already
mentioned, and to which I will once more recurb . But first of all, I must determine
what natures are suited for royalties, and what for an aristocracy, and what for a
constitutional government.

A people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior When one man is pre-
in virtue and political talent are fitted for kingly government; and eminent in virtue he
a peoplec submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtue ought to rule.
renders them capable of political command are adapted for an
aristocracy: while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom, are those
among whom there naturally existsd a warlike multitudee able to rule and to obey in
turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their desert. But when
a whole family, or some individual, happens to be so pre-eminent in virtue as to
surpass all others, then it is just that they should be the royal family and supreme over
all, or that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation. For, as I said beforea ,
to give them authority is not only agreeable to that ground of right which the founders
of all states, whether aristocratical, or oligarchical, or again democratical, are
accustomed to put forward; (for these all recognize the claim of excellence, although
not the same excellence), bbut accords with the principle already laid downb . For it
would not be right to kill, or ostracise, or exile such a person, or require that he should
take his turn in being governed. The whole is naturally superior to the part, and he
who has this pre-eminence is in the relation of a whole to a part. But if so, the only
alternative is that he should have the supreme power, and that mankind should obey
him, not in turn, but always. These are the conclusions at which we arrive respecting
royalty and its various forms, and this is the answer to the question, whether it is or is
not advantageous to states, and to whom, and how.

We maintain that the true forms of government are three, and The best government
that the best must be that which is administered by the best, and may be either the rule
in which there is one man, or a whole family, or many persons, of the one, or of the
excelling in virtue, and both rulers and subjects are fitted, the one many virtuous.
to rule, the others to be ruledc , in such a manner as to attain the
State and individual
most eligible life. We showed at the commencement of our both become virtuous
enquiryd that the virtue of the good man is necessarily the same in the same manner.
as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state. Clearly then in the
same manner, and by the same means through which a man 1288 b.
becomes truly good, he will frame a state [which will be truly

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good] whether aristocratical, or under kingly rule, and the same education and the
same habits will be found to make a good man and a good statesman and king.

Having arrived at these conclusions, we must proceed to speak of the perfect state,
and describe how it comes into being and is established. He who would proceed with
the enquiry in due manner. . . . .a

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[Back to Table of Contents]

BOOK IV.
In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of any subject, The problems of the
and are not restricted to a part only, it is the province of a single gymnastic art
art or science to consider all that appertains to a single subject.
For example, the art of gymnastic considers not only the suitableness of different
modes of training to different bodies (2), but what sort is absolutely the best (1); (for
the absolutely best must suit that which is by nature best and best furnished with the
means of life), and also what common form of training is adapted to the great majority
of men (4). And if a man does not desire the best habit of body or the greatest skill in
gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer or the teacher of
gymnastic should be able to impart any lower degree of either (3). The same principle
equally holds in medicine and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and in the arts
generallya .

Hence it is obvious that government too is the subject of a single illustrate the problems
science, which has to consider what kind of government would of politics for the
be best and most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were statesman.
no external impediment, and also what kind of government is
adapted to particular states. For the best is often unattainable, and therefore the true
legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only with (1) that which is best in
the abstract, but also with (2) that which is best relatively to circumstances. We
should be able further to say how a state may be constituted under any given
conditions (3); both how it is originally formed and, when formed, how it may be
longest preserved; the supposed state being so far from the very best that it is
unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the very best; neither is it the best
under the circumstances, but of an inferior type.

He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of government which The best state for the
is best suited to states in general; for political writers, although majority.
they have excellent ideas, are often unpractical. We should
consider, not only what form of government is best, but also The reformation of
the old as hard as the
what is possible and what is easily attainable by all. There are
creation of the new.
some who would have none but the most perfect; for this many
natural advantages are required. Others, again, speak of a more The ‘pathology’ of
attainable form, and, although they reject the constitution under states.
which they are living, they extol some one in particular, for
example the Lacedaemoniana . Any change of government which 1289 a.
has to be introduced should be one which men will be both
willing and able to adopt, since there is quite as much trouble in the reformation of an
old constitution as in the establishment of a new one, just as to unlearn is as hard as to
learn. And therefore, in addition to the qualifications of the statesman already
mentioned, he should be able to find remedies for the defects of existing
constitutionsb . This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of a government
there are. It is often supposed that there is only one kind of democracy and one of
oligarchy. But this is a mistake; and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must

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ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many
ways they are combined. The same political insight will enable a man to know which
laws are the best, and which are suited to different constitutions; for the laws are, and
ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the constitution to the laws. A
constitution is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the
governing body, and what is the end of each community. But claws are not to be
confounded with the principles of the constitutionc : they are the rules according to
which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders. So
that we must know the number and varieties of the several forms of government, if
only with a view to making laws. For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all
oligarchies and to all democracies, and there is certainly more than one form both of
democracy and of oligarchy.

In our original discussiona about governments we divided them Royalty and


into three true forms: kingly rule, aristocracy, and constitutional aristocracy have been
government, and three corresponding perversions—tyranny, already discussed.
oligarchy, and democracy. Of kingly rule and of aristocracy we Polity, democracy,
oligarchy, tyranny,
have already spoken, for the enquiry into the perfect state is the remain.
same thing with the discussion of the two forms thus named,
since both imply a principle of virtue provided with external means. We have already
determined in what aristocracy and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the
latter should be establishedb . In what follows we have to describe the so-called
constitutional government, which bears the common name of all constitutions, and the
other forms, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy.

It is obvious which of the three perversions is the worst, and 1289 b.


which is the next in badness. That which is the perversion of the
first and most divine is necessarily the worst. And just as a royal ‘Corruptio optimi
rule, if not a mere name, must exist by virtue of some great pessima.’
personal superiority in the king, so tyranny, which is the worst of
governments, is necessarily the farthest removed from a well-constituted form;
oligarchy is a little better, but a long way from aristocracy, and democracy is the most
tolerable of the three.

A writerc who preceded me has already made these distinctions, A criticism on Plato.
but his point of view is not the same as mine. For he lays down
the principle that of all good constitutions (under which he would include a virtuous
oligarchy and the like) democracy is the worst, but the best of bad ones. Whereas we
maintain that they are all defective, and that one oligarchy is not to be accounted
better than another, but only less bad.

Not to pursue this question further at present, let us begin by A new beginning:
determining (1)a how many varieties of states there are (since of Questions to be
democracy and oligarchy there are several); (2)b what discussed.
constitution is the most generally acceptable, and what is eligible
in the next degree cafter the perfect or any other aristocratical and well-constituted
form of government—if any other there be—which is at the same time adapted to
states in generalc ; (3)d of the other forms of government to whom is each suited. For

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democracy may meet the needs of some better than oligarchy, and conversely. In the
next place (4)e we have to consider in what manner a man ought to proceed who
desires to establish some one among these various forms, whether of democracy or of
oligarchy; and lastly, (5)f having briefly discussed these subjects to the best of our
power, we will endeavour to ascertain whence arise the ruin and preservation of
states, both generally and in individual cases, and to what causes they are to be
attributed.

The reason why there are many forms of government is that Forms of government
every state contains many elements. In the first place we see that differ because states
all states are made up of families, and in the multitude of citizens are made up of
there must be some rich and some poor, and some in a middle various elements.
g g
condition; the rich are heavy-armed, and the poor not . Of the
There are differences
common people, some are husbandmen, and some traders, and of occupation,
some artisans. There are also among the notables differences of
wealth and property—for example, in the number of horses wealth,
which they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they
are rich. And therefore in old times the cities whose strength lay 1290 a.
in their cavalry were oligarchies, and they used cavalry in warsa
rank,
against their neighbours; as was the practice of the Eretrians and
Chalcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the river Mæander, merit.
and of other peoples in Asia. Besides differences of wealth there
are differences of rank and merit, and there are some other elements which were
mentioned by us when in treating of aristocracy we enumerated the essentials of a
stateb . Of these elements, sometimes all, sometimes the lesser and sometimes the
greater number, have a share in the government. It is evident then that there must be
many forms of government, differing in kind, since the parts of which they are
composed differ from each other in kind. For a constitution is an organization of
offices which all the citizens distribute among themselves, according to the power
which different classes possess, for example the rich or the poor, or according to some
principle of compensation which includes both. There must therefore be as many
forms of government as there are modes of arranging the offices, according to the
superiorities and other inequalities of the different parts of the state.

There are generally thought to be two principal forms: as men Two generally
say of the winds that there are but two—north and south, and that reputed types,
the rest of them are only variations of these, so of governments oligarchy and
there are said to be only two forms—democracy and oligarchy. democracy.
For aristocracy is considered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being
But our classification
the rule of a few, and the so-called constitutional government to is more precise.
be really a democracy, just as among the winds we make the
west a variation of the north, and the east of the south wind. Similarly of harmonies
there are said to be two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian; the other arrangements of
the scale are comprehended under one of these two. About forms of government this
is a very favourite notion. But in either case the better and more exact way is to
distinguish, as I have done, the one or two which are true forms, and to regard the
others as perversions, whether of the most perfectly attempered harmony or of the

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best form of government: we may compare the oligarchical forms to the severer and
more overpowering modes, and the democratic to the more relaxed and gentler ones.

It must not be assumed, as some are fond of saying, that A democracy not
democracy is simply that form of government in which the simply the rule of the
greater number are sovereigna , for in oligarchies, and indeed in many but of the free;
every government, the majority rules; nor again is oligarchy that oligarchy not merely
of the few but of the
form of government in which a few are sovereign. Suppose the rich.
whole population of a city to be 1300, and that of these 1000 are
rich, and do not allow the remaining 300 who are poor, but free, 1290 b.
and in all other respects their equals, a share of the
government—no one will say that this is a democracy. In like The qualitative and
manner, if the poor were few and the masters of the rich who quantitative elements
must both be present.
outnumber them, no one would ever call such a government, in
which the rich majority have no share of office, an oligarchy. Therefore we should
rather say that democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers, and
oligarchy in which the rich; it is only an accident that the free are the many and the
rich are the few. Otherwise a government in which the offices were given according
to stature, as is said to be the case in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, would be an
oligarchy; for the number of tall or good-looking men is small. And yet oligarchy and
democracy are not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of
wealth and freedom. Both of them contain many other elements, and therefore we
must carry our analysis further, and say that the government is not a democracy in
which the freemen, being few in number, rule over the many who are not free, as at
Apollonia, on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera; (for in each of these states the nobles,
who were also the earliest settlers, were held in chief honour, although they were but
a few out of many). Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government,
because they exceed in number; as was the case formerly at Colophon, where the bulk
of the inhabitants were possessed of large property before the Lydian War. But the
form of government is a democracy when the free, who are also poor and the
majority, govern, and oligarchy when the rich and the noble govern, they being at the
same time few in number.

1291 a.

Every animal has


certain organs which
take different forms.
The various
combinations of these
differing forms make
different species.

So the kinds of states


depend on the various
combinations of the
elements of a state,
such as (1)
husbandmen, (2)

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I have said that there are many forms of government, and have mechanics, (3)
explained to what causes the variety is due. Why there are more traders,
than those already mentioned, and what they are, and whence
they arise, I will now proceed to consider, starting from the (4) labourers, (5)
a soldiers.
principle already admitted , which is that every state consists,
not of one, but of many parts. If we were going to speak of the A criticism on Plato.
different species of animals, we should first of all determine the
organs which are indispensable to every animal, as for example The higher classes
some organs of sense and instruments of receiving and digesting more truly parts than
food, such as the mouth and the stomach, besides organs of the lower.
locomotion. Assuming now that there are only so many kinds of
(6) The class which
organs, but that there may be differences in them—I mean exercises judicial and
different kinds of mouths, and stomachs, and perceptive and deliberative functions.
locomotive organs—the possible combinations of these
differences will necessarily furnish many varieties of animals. 1291 b.
(For animals cannot be the same which have different kinds of
(7) The wealthy. (8)
mouths or of ears.) And when all the combinations are Magistrates.
exhausted, there will be as many sorts of animals as there are
combinations of the necessary organs. In like manner the forms Different functions
of government which have been described, as I have repeatedly may sometimes be
said, are composed, not of one, but of many elements. One united in the same
element is the food-producing class, who are called husbandmen; person,
a second, the class of mechanics, who practise the arts without but poverty and riches
which a city cannot exist;—of these arts some are absolutely are always
necessary, others contribute to luxury or to the grace of life. The antagonistic.
third class is that of traders, and by traders I mean those who are
engaged in buying and selling, whether in commerce or in retail trade. A fourth class
is that of the serfs or labourers. The warriors make up the fifth class, and they are as
necessary as any of the others, if the country is not to be the slave of every invader.
For how can a state which has any title to the name be of a slavish nature? The state is
independent and self-sufficing, but a slave is the reverse of independent. Hence we
see that this subject, though ingeniously, has not been satisfactorily treated in the
Republica . Socrates says that a state is made up of four sorts of people who are
absolutely necessary; these are a weaver, a husbandman, a shoemaker, and a builder;
afterwards, finding that they are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman,
to look after the necessary animals; then a merchant, and then a retail trader. All these
together form the complement of the first state, as if a state were established merely to
supply the necessaries of life, rather than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in
need of shoemakers and of husbandmen. But he does not admit into the state a
military class until the country has increased in size, and is beginning to encroach on
its neighbour’s land, whereupon they go to war. Yet even amongst his four original
citizens, or whatever be the number of those whom he associates in the state, there
must be some one who will dispense justice and determine what is just. And as the
soul may be said to be more truly part of an animal than the body, so the higher parts
of states, that is to say, the warrior class, the class engaged in the administration of
justice, and in deliberation, which is the special business of political common
sense,—these are more essential to the state than the parts which minister to the
necessaries of life. Whether their several functions are the functions of different

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citizens, or of the same,—for it may often happen that the same persons are both
warriors and husbandmen,—is immaterial to the argument. The higher as well as the
lower elements are to be equally considered parts of the state, and if so, the military
element must be included. There are also the wealthy who minister to the state with
their property; these form the seventh class. The eighth class is that of magistrates and
of officers; for the state cannot exist without rulers. And therefore some must be able
to take office and to serve the state, either always or in turn. There only remains the
class of those who deliberate and who judge between disputants; we were just now
distinguishing them. If the fair and equitable organization of all these elements is
necessary to states, then there must also be persons who have the ability of statesmen.
a
Many are of opinion that different functions can be combined in the same individuala
; for example, the warrior may also be a husbandman, or an artisan; or, again, the
counsellor a judge. And all claim to possess political ability, and think that they are
quite competent to fill most offices. But the same persons cannot be rich and poor at
the same time. For this reason the rich and the poor are regarded in an especial sense
as parts of a state. Again, because the rich are generally few in number, while the poor
are many, they appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails they
form the government. Hence arises the common opinion that there are two kinds of
government—democracy and oligarchy.

I have already explainedb that there are many differences of Democracy and
constitutions, and to what causes the variety is due. Let me now oligarchy subdivided
show that there are different forms both of democracy and according to the
oligarchy, as will indeed be evident from what has preceded. For differences among the
common people,
both in the common people and in the notables various classes
are included; of the common people, one class are husbandmen, and among the
another artisans; another traders, who are employed in buying notables respectively.
and selling; another are the seafaring class, whether engaged in
war or in trade, as ferrymen or as fishermen. (In many places any one of these classes
forms quite a large population; for example, fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium,
crews of triremes at Athens, merchant seamen at Aegina and Chios, ferrymen at
Tenedos.) To the classes already mentioned may be added day-labourers, and those
who, owing to their needy circumstances, have no leisure, or those who are not of free
birth on both sides; and there may be other classes as well. The notables again may be
divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue, education, and similar differences.

(1) First form of


democracy.

(2) Second.

(3) Third.

(4) Fourth.

(5) Fifth, or extreme


democracy,

1292 a.

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Of forms of democracy first comes that which is said to be based in which the tyrant
strictly on equality. In such a democracy the law says that it is people,
a
just for nobody to be poor, and for nobody to be rich ; and that
neither should be masters, but both equal. For if liberty and flattered by their
leaders,
equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in
democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike set aside the law,
share in the government to the utmost. And since the people are
the majority, and the opinion of the majority is decisive, such a until the government
government must necessarily be a democracy. Here then is one ceases to be a
sort of democracy. There is another, in which the magistrates are constitution.
elected according to a certain property qualification, but a low
one; he who has the required amount of property has a share in the government, but
he who loses his property loses his rights. Another kind is that in which all the
citizens who are under no disqualification share in the government, but still the law is
supreme. In another, everybody, if he be only a citizen, is admitted to the government,
but the law is supreme as before. A fifth form of democracy, in other respects the
same, is that in which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power, and
supersede the law by their decrees. This is a state of affairs brought about by the
demagogues. For in democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens hold
the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme,
there demagogues spring up. For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one;
and the many have the power in their hands, not as individuals, but collectively.
Homer says that ‘it is not good to have a rule of manya ,’ but whether he means this
corporate rule, or the rule of many individuals, is uncertain. And the people, who is
now a monarch, and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical
sway, and grows into a despot; the flatterer is held in honour; this sort of democracy
being relatively to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The
spirit of both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better
citizens. The decrees of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant; and the
demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. Both have great power;—the
flatterer with the tyrant, the demagogue with democracies of the kind which we are
describing. The demagogues make the decrees of the people override the laws, and
refer all things to the popular assembly. And therefore they grow great, because the
people have all things in their hands, and they hold in their hands the votes of the
people, who are too ready to listen to them. Further, those who have any complaint to
bring against the magistrates say, ‘let the people be judges;’ the people are too happy
to accept the invitation; and so the authority of every office is undermined. Such a
democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all; for where
the laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme over
all, and the magistracies and the government should judge of particulars. So that if
democracy be a real form of government, the sort of constitution in which all things
are regulated by decrees is clearly not a democracy in the true sense of the word, for
decrees relate only to particularsa .

(1) First form of


oligarchy.

(2)

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These then are the different kinds of democracy. Of oligarchies, (3)


too, there are different kinds:—one where the property
qualification for office is so high that the poor, although they (4)
form the majority, have no share in the government, yet he who
acquires a qualification may obtain a share. Another sort is when Dynastia.
there is a qualification for office, but a high one, and the 1292 b.
vacancies in the governing body are filled by co-optation. If the
election is made out of all the qualified persons, a constitution of this kind inclines to
an aristocracy, if out of a privileged class, to an oligarchy. Another sort of oligarchy is
when the son succeeds the father. There is a fourth form, likewise hereditary, in which
the magistrates are supreme and not the law. Among oligarchies this is what tyranny
is among monarchies, and the last-mentioned form of democracy among democracies;
and in fact this sort of oligarchy receives the name of a dynasty (or rule of powerful
families).

These are the different sorts of oligarchies and democracies. It Governments which
should however be remembered that in many statesb the are not democracies
constitution which is established by law, although not or oligarchies may be
democratic, owing to the character and habits of the people, may administered in a
democratical or
be administered democratically, and conversely in other states oligarchical spirit.
the established constitution may incline to democracy, but may
be administered in an oligarchical spirit. This most often happens after a revolution:
for governments do not change at once; at first the dominant party are content with
encroaching a little upon their opponents. The laws which existed previously continue
in force, but the authors of the revolution have the power in their hands.

From what has been already said we may safely infer that there 1293 a.
are so many different kinds of democracies and of oligarchies.
For it is evident that either all the classes whom we mentioned (1) The first
must share in the government, or some only and not others. form—rural
democracy.
When the class of husbandmen and of those who possess
moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the government is (2) Second form, in
administered according to law. For the citizens being compelled which every one
to live by their labour have no leisure; and so they set up the whose parents are
authority of the law, and attend assemblies only when necessary. citizens shares, but
Since they all obtain a share in the government when they have there is no pay given;
acquired the qualification which is fixed by the law, nobody is (3) in which all free
excluded—the absolute exclusion of any class would be a step men share, and still
towards oligarchy. But leisure cannot be provided for them no pay;
unless there are revenues to support them. This is one sort of
democracy, and these are the causes which give birth to it. (4) in which pay is
Another kind is based on the mode of election, which naturally given. The democracy
a
of large cities.
comes next in ordera ; in this, every one to whose birth there is
no objection is eligible, and may share in the government if he can find leisure. And
in such a democracy the supreme power is vested in the laws, because the state has no
means of paying the citizens. A third kind is when all freemen have a right to share in
the government, but do not actually share, for the reason which has been already
given; so that in this form again the law must rule. A fourth kind of democracy is that

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which comes latest in the history of states. In our own day, when cities have far
outgrown their original size, and their revenues have increased, all the citizens have a
place in the government, through the great preponderance of their numbers; and they
all, including the poor who receive pay, and therefore have leisure to exercise their
rights, share in the administration. Indeed, when they are paid, the common people
have the most leisure, for they are not hindered by the care of their property, which
often fetters the rich, who are thereby prevented from taking part in the assembly or in
the courts, and so the state is governed by the poor, who are a majority, and not by the
laws. So many kinds of democracies there are, and they grow out of these necessary
causes.

Of oligarchies, one form is that in which the majority of the Oligarchies, (1) first
citizens have some property, but not very much; and this is the form based upon
first form, which allows to any one who obtains the required moderate property;
amount the right of sharing in the government. The sharers in the
government being a numerous body, it follows that the law must (2) in which
properties are larger
govern, and not individuals. For in proportion as they are further and the owners fewer;
removed from a monarchical form of government, and in respect
of property have neither so much as to be able to live without (3) narrowed to
attending to business, nor so little as to need state support, they families,
must admit the rule of law and not claim to rule themselves. But
(4) who set aside the
if the men of property in the state are fewer than in the former law.
case, and own more property, there arises a second form of
oligarchy. For the stronger they are, the more power they claim, and having this
object in view, they themselves select those of the other classes who are to be
admitted to the government; but, not being as yet strong enough to rule without the
law, they make the law represent their wishes. When this power is intensified by a
further diminution of their numbers and increase of their property, there arises a third
and further stage of oligarchy, in which the governing class keep the offices in their
own hands, and the law ordains that the son shall succeed the father. When, again, the
rulers have great wealth and numerous friends, this sort of dynastia or family
despotism approaches a monarchy; individuals rule and not the law. This is the fourth
sort of oligarchy, and is analogous to the last sort of democracy.

There are still two forms besides democracy and oligarchy; one Two other forms, (1)
of them is universally recognized and included among the four aristocracy, and (2)
principal forms of government which are said to be (1) polity.
monarchy, (2) oligarchy, (3) democracy, and (4) the so-called
1293 b.
aristocracy or government of the best. But there is also a fifth,
which retains the generic name of polity or constitutional (1) Aristocracy not
government; this is not common, and therefore has not been the perfect state,
noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the different kinds
of government; like Plato in his books about the state, they but a mixed
recognize four only. The term ‘aristocracy’ is rightly applied to government taking
three forms.
the form of government which is described in the first part of our
treatise; for that only can be rightly called aristocracy [the
government of the best] which is a government formed of the best men absolutely,
and not merely of men who are good when tried by any given standard. In the perfect

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state the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen; whereas in other states
the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government. But there are
some states differing from oligarchies and also differing from the so-called polity or
constitutional government; these are termed aristocracies, and in them magistrates are
certainly chosen, both according to their wealth and according to their merit. Such a
form of government is not the same with the two just now mentioned, and is termed
an aristocracy. For indeed in states which do not make virtue the aim of the
community, men of merit and reputation for virtue may be found. And so where a
government has regard to wealth, virtue, and numbers, as at Carthagea , that is
aristocracy; and also where it has regard only to two out of the three, as at
Lacedaemon, to virtue and numbers, and the two principles of democracy and virtue
temper each other. There are these two forms of aristocracy in addition to the first and
perfect state, and there is a third form, viz. the polities which incline towards
oligarchy.

I have yet to speak of the so-called polity and of tyranny. I put Polity and tyranny
them in this order, not because a polity or constitutional remain.
government is to be regarded as a perversion any more than the
above-mentioned aristocracies. The truth is, that they all fall short of the most perfect
form of government, and so they are reckoned among perversions, and other forms
(sc. the really perverted forms) are perversions of these, as I said beforea . Last of all I
will speak of tyranny, which I place last in the series because I am enquiring into the
constitutions of states, and this is the very reverse of a constitution.

Having explained why I have adopted this order, I will proceed Polity or
to consider constitutional government; of which the nature will constitutional
be clearer now that oligarchy and democracy have been defined. government is a
For polity or constitutional government may be described fusion of democracy
and oligarchy, but
generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy; but the term is inclining to
usually applied to those forms of government which incline democracy,
towards democracy, and the term aristocracy to those which
incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are as aristocracy to
commonly the accompaniments of wealth. Moreover, the rich oligarchy.
already possess the external advantages the want of which is a
1294 a.
temptation to crime, and hence they are called noblemen and
gentlemen. And inasmuch as aristocracy seeks to give predominance to the best of the
citizens, people say also of oligarchies that they are composed of noblemen and
gentlemen. Now it appears to be an impossible thing that the state which is governed
by the best citizens should be ill-governedb , and equally impossible that the state
which is ill-governed should be governed by the best. But we must remember that
good laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good government. For there are
two parts of good government; one is the actual obedience of citizens to the laws, the
other part is the goodness of the laws which they obey; they may obey bad laws as
well as good. And there may be a further subdivision; they may obey either the best
laws which are attainable to them, or the best absolutely.

Polity a union of
freedom and wealth.

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The distribution of offices according to merit is a special Aristocracy adds to


characteristic of aristocracy, for the principle of an aristocracy is these virtue.
virtue, as wealth is of an oligarchy, and freedom of a democracy.
In all of them there of course exists the right of the majority, and whatever seems
good to the majority of those who share in the government has authority. Generally,
however, a state of this kind is called a constitutional government [not an aristocracy],
for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the
wealth of the rich, who commonly take the place of the noble. And as there are three
grounds on which men claim an equal share in the government, freedom, wealth, and
virtue (for the fourth or good birth is the result of the two last, being only ancient
wealth and virtue), it is clear that the admixture of the two elements, that is to say, of
the rich and poor, is to be called a polity or constitutional government; and the union
of the three is to be called aristocracy or the government of the best, and more than
any other form of government, except the true and ideal, has a right to this name.

Thus far I have described the different forms of states which exist besides monarchy,
democracy, and oligarchy, and what they are, and in what aristocracies differ from
one another, and polities from aristocracies—that the two latter are not very unlike is
obvious.

Next we have to consider how by the side of oligarchy and Polity, how formed
democracy the so-called polity or constitutional government out of democracy and
springs up, and how it should be organized. The nature of it will oligarchy.
be at once understood from a comparison of oligarchy and
democracy; we must ascertain their different characteristics, and Three modes of
combination.
taking a portion from each, put the two together, like the parts of
an indenture. Now there are three modes in which fusions of First mode:
government may be effected. The nature of the fusion will be Syncretism of
made intelligible by an example of the manner in which different oligarchy and
governments legislate, say concerning the administration of democracy (?).
justice. In oligarchies they impose a fine on the rich if they do Second mode: a mean
not serve as judges, and to the poor they give no pay; but in between the
democracies they give pay to the poor and do not fine the rich. enactments of the
a
Now (1) the union of these two modes is a common or middle two.
term between them, and is therefore characteristic of a
constitutional government, for it is a combination of both. This is Third mode:
something borrowed
one mode of uniting the two elements. Or (2) a mean may be from each.
taken between the enactments of the two: thus democracies
require no property qualification, or only a small one, from 1294 b.
members of the assembly, oligarchies a high one; here neither of
these is the common term, but a mean between them. (3) There is a third mode, in
which something is borrowed from the oligarchical and something from the
democratical principle. For example, the appointment of magistrates by lot is
democratical, and the election of them oligarchical; democratical again when there is
no property qualification, oligarchical when there is. In the aristocratical or
constitutional state, one element will be taken from each—from oligarchy the mode of
electing to offices, from democracy the disregard of qualification. Such are the
various modes of combination.

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There is a true union of oligarchy and democracy when the same The fusion is most
state may be termed either a democracy or an oligarchy; those complete when the
who use both names evidently feel that the fusion is complete. mixed government
Such a fusion there is also in the mean; for both extremes appear may be called either
democracy or
in it. The Lacedaemonian constitution, for example, is often oligarchy.
described as a democracy, because it has many democratical
features. In the first place the youth receive a democratical Sparta such a mixed
education. For the sons of the poor are brought up with the sons government because it
of the rich, who are educated in such a manner as to make it has both democratical
possible for the sons of the poor to be educated like them. A
and oligarchical
similar equality prevails in the following period of life, and when elements.
the citizens are grown up to manhood the same rule is observed;
there is no distinction between the rich and poor. In like manner they all have the
same food at their public tables, and the rich wear only such clothing as any poor man
can afford. Again, the people elect to one of the two greatest offices of state, and in
the other they sharea ; for they elect the Senators and share in the Ephoralty. By others
the Spartan constitution is said to be an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical
elements. That all offices are filled by election and none by lot, is one of these
oligarchical characteristics; that the power of inflicting death of banishment rests with
a few persons is another; and there are others. In a well attempered polity there should
appear to be both elements and yet neither; also the government should rely on itself,
and not on foreign aid, nor on the good will of a majority of foreign states—they
might be equally well-disposed when there is a vicious form of government—but on
the general willingness of all classes in the state to maintain the constitution.

Enough of the manner in which a constitutional government, and in which the so-
called aristocracies ought to be framed.

Of the nature of tyranny I have still to speak, in order that it may 1295 a.
have its place in our enquiry, since even tyranny is reckoned by
us to be a form of government, although there is not much to be Tyranny.
said about it. I have already in the former part of this treatiseb
discussed royalty or kingship according to the most usual meaning of the term, and
considered whether it is or is not advantageous to states, and what kind of royalty
should be established, and whence, and how it arises.

When speaking of royalty we also spoke of two forms of The two legal forms
tyranny, which are both according to law, and therefore easily of tyranny already
pass into royalty. Among Barbarians there are elected monarchs discussed under
who exercise a despotic power; despotic rulers were also elected royalty, viz. (1)
Barbarian
in ancient Hellas, called Aesymnetes or dictators. These monarchies, (2)
monarchies, when compared with one another, exhibit certain Dictatorships.
differences. And they are, as I said before, royal, in so far as the
monarch rules according to law and over willing subjects; but (3) Tyranny proper.
they are tyrannical in so far as he is despotic and rules according
to his own fancy. There is also a third kind of tyranny, which is the most typical form,
and is the counterpart of the perfect monarchy. This tyranny is just that arbitrary
power of an individual which is responsible to no one, and governs all alike, whether

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equals or betters, with a view to its own advantage, not to that of its subjects, and
therefore against their will. No freeman, if he can escape from it, will endure such a
government.

The kinds of tyranny are such and so many, and for the reasons which I have given.

We have now to enquire what is the best constitution for most What is the best state
states, and the best life for most men, neither assuming a for men in general?
standard of virtue which is above ordinary persons, nor an
education which is exceptionally favoured by nature and Virtue is a mean.
circumstances, nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration only,
1295 b.
but having regard to the life in which the majority are able to
share, and to the form of government which states in general can attain. As to those
aristocracies, as they are called, of which we were just now speaking, they either lie
beyond the possibilities of the greater number of states, or they approximate to the so-
called constitutional government, and therefore need no separate discussion. And in
fact the conclusion at which we arrive respecting all these forms rests upon the same
grounds. For if it has been truly said in the Ethicsa that the happy life is the life
according to unimpeded virtue, and that virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a
mean, and in a mean attainable by every one, must be the best. And the same
principles of virtue and vice are characteristic of cities and of constitutions; for the
constitution is in a figure the life of the cityb .

Now in all states there are three elements; one class is very rich, The state should be in
another very poor, and a third in a mean. It is admitted that a mean,
moderation and the mean are best, and therefore it will clearly be
best to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation; for in that and should therefore
be ruled neither by the
condition of life men are most ready to listen to reason. But he
very rich
who greatly excels in beauty, strength, birth or wealth, or on the
other hand who is very poor, or very weak, or very much nor by the very poor,
disgraced, finds it difficult to follow reasona . Of these two the
one sort grow into violent and great criminals, the others into but by the middle
rogues and petty rascals. And two sorts of offences correspond to class.
themb , the one committed from violence, the other from
The middle class:
roguery. The petty rogues are disinclined to hold office, whether their virtues.
military or civil, and their aversion to these two duties is as great
an injury to the state as their tendency to crime. Again, those who have too much of
the goods of fortune, strength, wealth, friends, and the like, are neither willing nor
able to submit to authority. The evil begins at home: for when they are boys, by
reason of the luxury in which they are brought upc , they never learn, even at school,
the habit of obedience. On the other hand, the very poor, who are in the opposite
extreme, are too degraded. So that the one class cannot obey, and can only rule
despotically; the other knows not how to command and must be ruled like slaves.
Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters and slaves, the one despising, the
other envying; and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in
states than this: for good fellowship tends to friendship; when men are at enmity with
one another, they would rather not even share the same path. But a city ought to be
composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally the

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middle classes. Wherefore the city which is composed of middle-class citizens is


necessarily best governed; they are, as we say, the natural elements of a state. And
this is the class of citizens which is most secure in a state, for they do not, like the
poor, covet their neighbours’ goods; nor do others covet theirs, as the poor covet the
goods of the rich; and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves plotted
against, they pass through life safely. Wisely then did Phocylides pray,—

‘Many things are best in the mean; I desire to be of a middle condition in my city.’

Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by They balance the
citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be state, and keep it from
well-administered, in which the middle class is large, and larger extremes
if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate than either
and factions.
singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and
prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. Great then The greater safety of
is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a democracies due to
moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, them.
and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or
a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either The best legislators of
a middle class.
extreme,—either out of the most rampant democracy, or out of
an oligarchy; but it is not so likely to arise out of a middle and 1296 a.
nearly equal condition. I will explain the reason of this hereafter,
when I speak of the revolutions of statesa . The mean condition of states is clearly
best, for no other is free from faction; and where the middle class is large, there are
least likely to be factions and dissensions. For a similar reason large states are less
liable to faction than small ones, because in them the middle class is large; whereas in
small states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or
poor, and to leave nothing in the middle. And democracies are saferb and more
permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more
numerous and has a greater share in the government; for when there is no middle
class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes
to an end. A proof of the superiority of the middle class is that the best legislators
have been of a middle condition; for example, Solon, as his own verses testify; and
Lycurgus, for he was not a king; and Charondas, and almost all legislators.

These considerations will help us to understand why most 1296 b.


governments are either democratical or oligarchical. The reason
is that the middle class is seldom numerous in them, and The middle class is
whichever party, whether the rich or the common people, generally small: rich
transgresses the mean and predominates, draws the government and poor contend with
each other for
to itself, and thus arises either oligarchy or democracy. There is supremacy.
another reason—the poor and the rich quarrel with one another,
and whichever side gets the better, instead of establishing a just Once only a middle
or popular government, regards political supremacy as the prize constitution existed in
of victory, and the one party sets up a democracy and the other Hellas.
an oligarchy. Both the parties which had the supremacy in Hellas
looked only to the interest of their own form of government, and established in states,
the one, democracies, and the other, oligarchies; they thought of their own advantage,

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of the public not at all. For these reasons the middle form of government has rarely, if
ever, existed, and among a very few only. One man alone of all who ever ruled in
Hellas was induced to give this middle constitution to states. But it has now become a
habit among the citizens of states, not even to care about equality; all men are seeking
for dominion, or, if conquered, are willing to submit.

What then is the best form of government, and what makes it the Of other states, that
best is evident; and of other states, since we say that there are which is nearest to the
many kinds of democracy and many of oligarchy, it is not best is best.
difficult to see which has the first and which the second or any
other place in the order of excellence, now that we have determined which is the best.
For that which is nearest to the best must of necessity be better, and that which is
furthest from it worse, if we are judging absolutely and not relatively to given
conditions: I say ‘relatively to given conditions,’ since a particular government may
be preferable for some, but another form may be better for others.

We have now to consider what and what kind of government is What governments
suitable to what and what kind of men. I may begin by assuming, suit what men? We
as a general principle common to all governments, that the begin by asking
portion of the state which desires permanence ought to be which element is the
stronger. If quantity,
stronger than that which desires the reverse. Now every city is democracy; if quality,
composed of quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, oligarchy.
wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity, superiority of
numbers. Quality may exist in one of the classes which make up the state, and
quantity in the other. For example, the meanly-born may be more in number than the
well-born, or the poor than the rich, yet they may not so much exceed in quantity as
they fall short in quality; and therefore there must be a comparison of quantity and
quality. Where the number of the poor is more than proportioned to the wealth of the
rich, there will naturally be a democracy, varying in form with the sort of people who
compose it in each case. If, for example, the husbandmen exceed in number, the first
form of democracy will then arise; if the artisans and labouring class, the last; and so
with the intermediate forms. But where the rich and the notables exceed in quality
more than they fall short in quantity, there oligarchy arises, similarly assuming
various forms according to the kind of superiority possessed by the oligarchs.

The legislator should always include the middle class in his The middle class the
government; if he makes his laws oligarchical, to the middle mediator.
class let him look; if he makes them democratical, he should
equally by his laws try ato attach this class to the statea . There 1297 a.
only can the government ever be stable where the middle class
Permanence due to
exceeds one or both of the others, and in that case there will be harmony and
no fear that the rich will unite with the poor against the rulers. moderation, not to the
For neither of them will ever be willing to serve the other, and if exaggeration of a
they look for some form of government more suitable to both, single principle.
they will find none better than this, for the rich and the poor will
never consent to rule in turn, because they mistrust one another. The arbiter is always
the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an arbiter. The more perfect the
admixture of the political elements, the more lasting will be the state. Many even of

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those who desire to form aristocratical governments make a mistake, not only in
giving too much power to the rich, but in attempting to overreach the people. There
comes a time when out of a false good there arises a true evil, since the
encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the state than those of the people.

The devices by which oligarchies deceive the people are five in Oligarchical devices
number; they relate to (1) the assembly; (2) the magistracies; (3) in respect of
the courts of law; (4) the use of arms; (5) gymnastic exercises.
(1) The assemblies are thrown open to all, but either the rich only (1) the assemblies;
are fined for non-attendance, or a much larger fine is inflicted
(2) the magistracies;
upon them. (2) As to the magistracies, those who are qualified by
property cannot decline office upon oath, but the poor may. (3) (3) the law-courts;
In the law-courts the rich, and the rich only, are fined if they do
not serve, the poor are let off with impunity, or, as in the laws of (4) the possession of
Charondas, a large fine is inflicted on the rich, and a smaller one arms, and (5)
gymnastic exercises.
on the poor. In some states all citizens who have registered
themselves are allowed to attend the assembly and to try causes;
but if after registration they do not attend in the assembly or at the courts, heavy fines
are imposed upon them. The intention is that through fear of the fines they may avoid
registering themselves, and then they cannot sit in the law-courts or in the assembly.
(4) Concerning the possession of arms, and (5) gymnastic exercises, they legislate in a
similar spirit. For the poor are not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not
having them; and in like manner no penalty is inflicted on the poor for non-attendance
at the gymnasium, and consequently, having nothing to fear, they do not attend,
whereas the rich are liable to a fine, and therefore they take care to attend.

These are the devices of oligarchical legislators, and in Democracies have


democracies they have counter devices. They pay the poor for their counter devices,
attending the assemblies and the law-courts, and they inflict no but moderation and a
penalty on the rich for non-attendance. It is obvious that he who mixture of principles
is better.
would duly mix the two principles should combine the practice
of both, and provide that the poor should be paid to attend, and The heavy-armed
the rich fined if they do not attend, for then all will take part; if should be the
there is no such combination, power will be in the hands of one governing class, and
party only. The government should be confined to those who those who share in the
government should
carry arms. As to the property qualification, no absolute rule can
exceed in number
be laid down, but we must see what is the highest qualification those who are
sufficiently comprehensive to secure that the number of those excluded.
who have the rights of citizens exceeds the number of those
excluded. Even if they have no share in office, the poor, provided 1297 b.
only that they are not outraged or deprived of their property, will
be quiet enough.

The poor should be


well treated.

Relation of political
to military power.

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But to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy thing, Cavalry the strength
since a ruling class is not always humane. And in time of war the of an oligarchy,
poor are apt to hesitate unless they are fed; when fed, they are
willing enough to fight. In some states the government is vested, the heavy-armed of a
not only in those who are actually serving, but also in those who polity or moderate
democracy.
have served; among the Malians, for example, the governing
body consisted of the latter, while the magistrates were chosen from those actually on
service. And the earliest government which existed among the Hellenes, after the
overthrow of the kingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally
taken from the knights (for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on
cavalrya ); indeed, without discipline, infantry are useless, and in ancient times there
was no military knowledge or tactics, and therefore the strength of armies lay in their
cavalry. But when cities increased and the heavy armed grew in strength, more had a
share in the government; and this is the reason why the states, which we call
constitutional governments, have been hitherto called democracies. Ancient
constitutions, as might be expected, were oligarchical and royal; their population
being small they had no considerable middle class; the people were weak in numbers
and organization, and were therefore more contented to be governed.

I have explained why there are various forms of government, and Summary of questions
why there are more than is generally supposed; for democracy, already discussed.
as well as other constitutions, has more than one form: also what
their differences are, and whence they arise, and what is the best form of government,
speaking generally, and to whom the various forms of government are best suited; all
this has now been explained.

Having thus gained an appropriate basis of discussion we will 1298 a.


proceed to speak of the points which follow next in order. We
will consider the subject not only in general but with reference to A new subject: the
particular states. All states have three elements, and the good distribution of
law-giver has to regard what is expedient for each state. When
(1) deliberative,
they are well-ordered, the state is well-ordered, and as they differ
from one another, constitutions differ. What is the elements first (2) executive,
(1) which deliberates about public affairs; secondly (2) which is
concerned with the magistrates and determines what they should (3) judicial, powers in
be, over whom they should exercise authority, and what should different states.
be the mode of electing them; and thirdly (3) which has judicial
power?

1. The deliberative
element.

In democracies either
(1) all share in the
government by turns,
but the magistrates
have the chief power;

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The deliberative element has authority in matters of war and or (2) there is an
peace, in making and unmaking alliances; it passes laws, inflicts assembly, but it rarely
death, exile, confiscation, audits the accounts of magistrates. All meets; and the
these powers must be assigned either to all the citizens or to magistrates retain
their power;
some of them, for example, to one or more magistracies; or
different causes to different magistracies, or some of them to all, (3) [? a repetition of
and others of them only to some. That all things should be 2];
decided by all is characteristic of democracy; this is the sort of
equality which the people desire. But there are various ways in (4) the assembly
which all may share in the government; they may deliberate, not supreme.
all in one body, but by turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the
Milesian. There are other states in which the boards of magistrates meet and
deliberate, but come into office by turns, and are elected out of the tribes and the very
smallest divisions of the state, until every one has obtained office in his turn. The
citizens, on the other hand, are assembled only for the purposes of legislation, and to
consult about the constitution, and to hear the edicts of the magistrates. In another
variety of democracy the citizens form one assembly, but meet only to elect
magistrates, to pass laws, to advise about war and peace, and to make scrutinies.
Other matters are referred severally to special magistrates, who are elected by vote or
by lot out of all the citizens. Or again, the citizens meet about election to offices and
about scrutinies, and deliberate concerning war or alliances, while other matters are
administered by the magistrates, who, as far as is possible, are elected by votea . I am
speaking of those magistracies in which special knowledge is required. A fourth form
of democracy is when all the citizens meet to deliberate about everything, and the
magistrates decide nothing, but only make the preliminary enquiries; and that is the
way in which the last and worst form of democracy, corresponding, as we maintain, to
the close family oligarchy and to tyranny, is at present administered. All these modes
are democratical.

On the other hand, that some should deliberate about all is In oligarchies (1)
oligarchical. This again is a mode which, like the democratical, Moderate
has many forms. When the deliberative class being elected out of qualification and rule
those who have a moderate qualification are numerous and they of law.
respect and obey the law without altering it, and any one who has
(2) Select
the required qualification shares in the government, then, just representatives and
because of this moderation, the oligarchy inclines towards polity. rule of law.
But when only selected individuals and not the whole people
share in the deliberations of the state, then, although, as in the 1298 b.
former case, they observe the law, the government is a pure
(3) Some oligarchies
oligarchy. Or, again, when those who have the power of cooptative and
deliberation are self-elected, and son succeeds father, and they hereditary.
and not the laws are supreme—the government is of necessity
oligarchical. Where, again, particular persons have authority in (4) Containing also
particular matters;—for example, when the whole people decide nonoligarchical
elements.
about peace and war and hold scrutinies, but the magistrates
regulate everything else, and they are elected either by vote or by
lot—there athe form of government is an aristocracy or politya . And if some
questions are decided by magistrates elected by vote, and others by magistrates

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elected by lot, either absolutely or out of select candidates, or elected both by vote and
by lot—these practices are partly characteristic of an aristocratical government, and
partly of a pure constitutional government.

These are the various forms of the deliberative body; they A democracy should
correspond to the various forms of government. And the have some
government of each state is administered according to one or oligarchical features,
other of the principles which have been laid down. Now it is for
the interest of democracy, according to the most prevalent notion and an oligarchy
some democratical
of it (I am speaking of that extreme form of democracy, in which features.
the people are supreme even over the laws), with a view to better
deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting courts 1299 a.
of law. For in oligarchies the rich who are wanted to be judges
are compelled to attend under pain of a fine, whereas in democracies the poor are paid
to attend. And this practice of oligarchies should be adopted by democracies in their
public assemblies, for they will advise better if they all deliberate together,—the
people with the notables and the notables with the people. It is also a good plan that
those who deliberate should be elected by vote or by lot in equal numbers out of the
different classes; and that if the people greatly exceed in number those who have
political training, pay should not be given to all, but only to as many as would balance
the number of the notables, or that the number in excess should be eliminated by lot.
But in oligarchies either certain persons should be chosen out of the mass, or a class
of officers should be appointed such as exist in some states, who are termed probuli
and guardians of the law; and the citizens should occupy themselves exclusively with
matters on which these have previously deliberated; for so the people will have a
share in the deliberations of the state, but will not be able to disturb the principles of
the constitution. Again, in oligarchies either the people ought to accept the measures
of the government, or not to pass anything contrary to them; or, if all are allowed to
share in counsel, the decision should rest with the magistrates. The opposite of what is
done in constitutional governments should be the rule in oligarchies; the veto of the
majority should be final, their assent not final, but the proposal should be referred
back to the magistrates. Whereas in constitutional governments they take the contrary
course; the few have the negative not the affirmative power; the affirmation of
everything rests with the multitude.

These, then, are our conclusions respecting the deliberative, that is, the supreme
element in states.

2. The distribution of
offices; their number,
tenure.

Mode of appointment.

Magistracies.

Definition of political
office.

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Next we will proceed to consider the distribution of offices; this, Office implies
too, being a part of politics concerning which many questions command.
arise:—What shall their number be? Over what shall they
preside, and what shall be their duration? Sometimes they last for six months,
sometimes for less; sometimes they are annual, whilst in other cases offices are held
for still longer periods. Shall they be for life or for a long term of years; or, if for a
short term only, shall the same persons hold them over and over again, or once only?
Also about the appointment to them,—from whom are they to be chosen, by whom,
and how? We should first be in a position to say what are the possible varieties of
them, and then we may proceed to determine which are suited to different forms of
government. But what are to be included under the term ‘offices’? That is a question
not quite so easily answered. For a political community requires many officers; and
not every one who is chosen by vote or by lot is to be regarded as a ruler. In the first
place there are the priests, who must be distinguished from political officers; masters
of choruses and heralds, even ambassadors, are elected by vote [but still they are not
political officers]. Some duties of superintendence again are political, extending either
to all the citizens in a single sphere of action, like the office of the general who
superintends them when they are in the field, or to a section of them only, like the
inspectorships of women or of youth. Other offices are concerned with household
management, like that of the corn measurers who exist in many states and are elected
officers. There are also menial offices which the rich have executed by their slaves.
Speaking generally, they are to be called offices to which the duties are assigned of
deliberating about certain measures and of judging and commanding, especially the
last; for to command is the especial duty of a magistrate. But the question is not of
any importance in practice; no one has ever brought into court the meaning of the
word, although such problems have a speculative interest.

1299 b.

In large states offices


should be numerous
and special.

In small states they


must be combined.

What combinations of
offices are desirable?

Should they differ


under different
constitutions? In some
cases.

1300 a.

E. g. the probuli an
oligarchic office, the
bule democratic,

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What kinds of offices, and how many, are necessary to the a censorship
existence of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet conduce to aristocratic.
its well-being, are much more important considerations, affecting
all states, but more especially small ones. For in great states it is possible, and indeed
necessary, that every office should have a special function; where the citizens are
numerous, many may hold office. And so it happens that vacancies occur in some
offices only after long intervals, or the office is held once only; and certainly every
work is better done which receives the solea , and not the divided attention of the
worker. But in small states it is necessary to combine many offices in a few handsa ,
since the small number of citizens does not admit of many holding office:—for who
will there be to succeed them? And yet small states at times require the same offices
and laws as large ones; the difference is that the one want them often, the others only
after long intervals. Hence there is no reason why the care of many offices should not
be imposed on the same person, for they will not interfere with each other. When the
population is small, offices should be like the spits which also serve to hold a lampb .
We must first ascertain how many magistrates are necessary in every state, and also
how many are not exactly necessary, but are nevertheless useful, and then there will
be no difficulty in judging what offices can be combined in one. We should also know
when local tribunals are to have jurisdiction over many different matters, and when
authority should be centralized: for example, should one person keep order in the
market and another in some other place, or should the same person be responsible
everywhere? Again, should offices be divided according to the subjects with which
they deal, or according to the persons with whom they deal: I mean to say, should one
person see to good order in general, or one look after the boys, another after the
women, and so on? Further, under different constitutions, should the magistrates be
the same or different? For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy,
should there be the same magistrates, although they are elected, not out of equal or
similar classes of citizens, but differently under different constitutions — in
aristocracies, for example, they are chosen from the educated, in oligarchies from the
wealthy, and in democracies from the free,—or are there different offices proper to
different constitutionsc , and may the same be suitable to some, but unsuitable to
others? For in some states it may be convenient that the same office should have a
more extensive, in other states a narrower sphere. Special offices are peculiar to
certain forms of government: — for example [to oligarchies] that of probuli, which is
not a democratic office, although a bule or council is. There must be some body of
men whose duty is to prepare measures for the people in order that they may not be
diverted from their business; when these are few in number, the state inclines to an
oligarchy: or rather the probuli must always be few, and are therefore an oligarchical
element. But when both institutions exist in a state, the probuli are a check on the
council; for the counsellor is a democratic element, but the probuli are oligarchical.
Even the power of the council disappears when democracy has taken that extreme
form, in which the people themselves are always meeting and deliberating about
everything. This is the case when the members of the assembly are wealthy or receive
pay; for they have nothing to do and are always holding assemblies and deciding
everything for themselves. A magistracy which controls the boys or the women, or
any similar office, is suited to an aristocracy rather than to a democracy; for how can
the magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors? Neither is it an
oligarchical office; for the wives of the oligarchs are too fine to be controlled.

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Enough of these matters. I will now enquire into the appointment The appointment of
of offices. There are three questions to be answered, and the offices.
combinations of answers give all possible differences: first, who
appoints? secondly, from whom? and thirdly, how? Each of these (1) By whom? by all
or by some.
three may further differ in three ways: (1) All the citizens, or
only some, appoint; (2) Either the magistrates are chosen out of (2) Out of whom? out
all or out of some who are distinguished either by a property of all or out of some.
qualification, or by birth, or merit, or for some special reason, as
at Megara only those were eligible who had returned from exile (3) How? by vote or
and fought together against the democracy; (3) They may be by lot.
appointed either by vote or by lot. Again, these several modes
Or by a combination
may be combined, I mean that some officers may be elected by of both.
some, others by all, and some again out of some, and others out
of all, and some by vote and others by lot. Each of these Possible varieties.
differences admits of four variations. (1) Either all may elect out
of all by vote, or all out of all by lot; and either out of all Democratical,
collectively or by sections, as, for example, by tribes, and wards,
oligarchical and other
and phratries, until all the citizens have been gone through; or the modes of
citizens may be in all cases eligible indiscriminately, and in some appointment.
cases they may be elected by vote, and in some by lot. Again (2),
if only some appoint, they may appoint out of all by vote, or out 1300 b.
of all by lot; or out of some by vote, out of some by lot, and
some offices may be appointed in one way and some in another, I mean if they are
appointed by all they may be appointed partly by vote and partly by lota . Thus there
will be twelve forms of appointment without including the two combinations in the
mode of election. Of these varieties two are democratic forms, namely, when the
choice is made by all the people out of all by vote or by lot, or by both, that is to say,
some by lot and some by vote. The cases in which they do not all appoint at one time,
but some appoint out of all or out of some by vote or by lot or by both, (I mean some
by lot and some by vote,) or some out of all and others out of some both by lot and
vote, are characteristic of a polity or constitutional government. That some should be
appointed out of all by vote or by lot or by both, is oligarchical, and still more
oligarchical when some are elected from all and some from some. That some should
be elected out of all and some out of some, or again some by vote and others by lot, is
characteristic of a constitutional government, which inclines to an aristocracy. That
some should be chosen out of some, and some taken by lot out of some, is oligarchical
b
though not equally oligarchicalb ; oligarchical, too, is the appointment of some out of
some in both ways, and of some out of all. But that all should elect by vote out of
some is aristocratical.

These are the different ways of constituting magistrates, and in Powers of magistrates
this manner officers correspond to different forms of different in kind.
government:—which are proper to which, or how they ought to
be established, will be evident when we determine the nature of their powersa . By
powers I mean such power as a magistrate exercises over the revenue or in defence of
the country; for there are various kinds of power: the power of the general, for
example, is not the same with that which regulates contracts in the market.

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Of the three parts of government, the judicial remains to be 3. Law-courts:


considered, and this we shall divide on the same principle. There
are three points on which the varieties of law-courts depend: — (1) How many?
The persons from whom they are appointed, the matters with
which they are concerned, and the manner of their appointment. I (2) Who are to be
judges?
mean, (1) are the judges taken from all, or from some only? (2)
how many kinds of law-courts are there? (3) are the judges (3) How appointed?
chosen by vote or by lot?

First, let me determine how many kinds of law-courts there are. (1) There are eight
They are eight in number: One is the court of audits or scrutinies; law-courts.
a second takes cognizance of [ordinary] offences against the
state; a third is concerned with treason against the government; the fourth determines
disputes respecting penalties, whether raised by magistrates or by private persons; the
fifth decides the more important civil cases; the sixth tries cases of homicide, which
are of various kinds, (1) premeditated, (2) unpremeditated, (3) cases in which the guilt
is confessed but the justice is disputed; and there may be a fourth court (4) in which
murderers who have fled from justice are tried after their return; such as the Court of
Phreatto is said to be at Athens. But cases of this sort rarely happen at all even in large
cities. The different kinds of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different
courts. (7) There are courts for strangers:—of these there are two subdivisions, (1) for
the settlement of their disputes with one another, (2) for the settlement of disputes
between them and the citizens. And besides all these there must be (8) courts for small
suits about sums of a drachma up to five drachmas, or a little more, which have to be
determined, but they do not require many judges.

Nothing more need be said of these small suits, nor of the courts for homicide and for
strangers:—I would rather speak of political cases, which, when mismanaged, create
division and disturbances in states.

Now if all the citizens judge, in all the different cases which I (2) The judges may be
have distinguished, they may be appointed by vote or by lot, or taken wholly or partly
sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote. Or when a certain class out of all or out of
of causes are tried, the judges who decide them may be some;
appointed, some by vote, and some by lot. These then are the
(3) by vote or by lot.
four modes of appointing judges from the whole people, and
there will be likewise four modes, if they are elected from a part 1301 a.
only; for they may be appointed from some by vote and judge in
all causes; or they may be appointed from some by lot and judge in all causes; or they
may be elected in some cases by vote, and in some cases taken by lot, or some courts,
even when judging the same causes, may be composed of members some appointed
by vote and some by lot. These then are the ways in which the aforesaid judges may
be appointed.

Once more, the modes of appointment may be combined, I mean, that some may be
chosen out of the whole people, others out of some, some out of both; for example,
the same tribunal may be composed of some who were elected out of all, and of
others who were elected out of some, either by vote or by lot or by both.

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In how many forms law-courts can be established has now been Which modes
considered. The first form, viz. that in which the judges are taken democratical, which
from all the citizens, and in which all causes are tried, is oligarchical, which
democratical; the second, which is composed of a few only who aristocratical.
try all causes, oligarchical; the third, in which some courts are
taken from all classes, and some from certain classes only, aristocratical and
constitutional.

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[Back to Table of Contents]

BOOK V.
The design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly What causes preserve
completeda . Next in order follow the causes of revolution in and destroy states.
states, how many, and of what nature they are; what elements
work ruin in particular states, and out of what, and into what they mostly change; also
what are the elements of preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and
by what means each state may be best preserved: these questions remain to be
considered.

In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the Government is always
many forms of government which have sprung up there has based on some kind of
b
always been an acknowledgment of justice and proportionate justice.
equality, although mankind fail in attaining them, as indeed I
have already explainedc . Democracy, for example, arises out of Those who think they
have not
the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all
respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be 1301 b.
absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who
are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being got their rights, make
unequal, that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be revolutions.
unequal absolutely. The democrats think that as they are equal
Revolution of two
they ought to be equal in all things; while the oligarchs, under kinds: (1) when the
the idea that they are unequal, claim too much, which is one form constitution is
of inequality. All these forms of government have a kind of changed,
justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and,
therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government (2) when the persons
only are changed.
does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution.
Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for The change may be
they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal)a , but one of degree,
then they are of all men the least inclined to do sob . There is also
a superiority which is claimed by men of rank; for they are or partial;
thought noble because they spring from wealthy and virtuous
illustrations from
ancestorsc . Here then, so to speak, are opened the very springs Sparta and
and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes Epidamnus.
in governments; the one affecting the constitution, when men
seek to change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy
into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy, or from either of them into
constitutional government or aristocracy, and conversely; the other not affecting the
constitution, when, without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or
monarchy, or any other, they try to get the administration into their own handsd .
Further, there is a question of degree; an oligarchy, for example, may become more or
less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and in like manner the
characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly
maintained. Or, the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution
only, e. g. the establishment or overthrow of a particular office: as at Sparta it is said
that Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausaniase , the

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ephoralty. At Epidamnus, too, the change was partial. For instead of phylarchs or
heads of tribes, a council was appointed; but to this day the magistrates are the only
members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the Heliaea when an election
takes place, and the office of the single archonf [survives, which] is another
oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality
in which there is no proportion, for instance, a perpetual monarchy among equals; and
always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion.

Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional; by the Equality of two kinds,
first I mean sameness or equality in number or size; by the numerical and
second, equality of ratios. For example, the excess of three over proportional.
two is equal to the excess of two over one; whereas four exceeds
1302 a.
two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the
same part of four that one is of two, namely, the half. As I was
saying beforea , men agree about justice in the abstract, but they differ about
proportionb ; some think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely,
others that if they are unequal in any respect they are unequal in all. Hence there are
two principal forms of government, democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and
virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers are more common. In what city shall we find a
hundred persons of good birth and of virtue? whereas the poor everywhere abound.
That a state should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of
equality, is not a good thing; the proof is the fact that such forms of government never
last. They are originally based on a mistake, and, as they begin badly, cannot fail to
end badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed; numerical
in some cases, and proportionate in others.

Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution Democracy safer than
than oligarchyc . For in oligarchiesd there is the double danger of oligarchy.
the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the
people; but in democraciese there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs.
No dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. And we may
further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly
approximates to democracy than to oligarchya , and is the safest of the imperfect
forms of government.

In considering how dissensions and political revolutions arise, 1302 b.


we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them
which affect constitutions generally. They may be said to be The causes of
three in number; and we have now to give an outline of each. We revolutions;
want to know (1) what is the feeling? and (2) what are the
their general
motives of those who make them? (3) whence arise political character;
disturbances and quarrels? The universal and chief cause of this
revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned; viz. the desire enumeration of them;
of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who including the love of
have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality gain and honour
already mentioned,
and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they they are 7+4 in
think that they have not more but the same or less than their number.
inferiors; pretensions which may and may not be just. Inferiors

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revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. Such is
the state of mind which creates revolutions. The motives for making them are the
desire of gain and honour, or the fear of dishonour and loss; the authors of them want
to divert punishment or dishonour from themselves or their friends. The causes and
reasons of these motives and dispositions which are excited in men, about the things
which I have mentioned, viewed in one way, may be regarded as seven, and in
another as more than seven. Two of them have been already noticedb ; but they act in
a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and
honour—not, as in the case which I have just supposed, in order to obtain them for
themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them. Other causes are
insolence, fear, love of superiority, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part
of the state; causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about
trifles, dissimilarity of elements.

What share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions, (1, 2) Insolence and
and how they work, is plain enough. When the magistrates are avarice;
insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also
against the constitution from which they derive their power, (3) unequal
making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the distribution of
honours;
public. It is evident, again, what an influence honour exerts and
how it is a cause of revolution. Men who are themselves (4) predominance of
dishonoured and who see others obtaining honours rise in individuals;
rebellion; the honour or dishonour when undeserved is unjust;
and just when awarded according to merit. Again, superiority is a cause of revolution
when one or more persons have a power which is too much for the state and the
power of the government; this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a
monarchy, or a family oligarchy. And, therefore, in some places, as at Athens and
Argos, they have recourse to ostracisma . But how much better to provide from the
first that there should be no such preeminent individuals instead of letting them come
into existence and then finding a remedy.

Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have committed (5) fear;
wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to
suffer wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemyb . Thus (6) contempt;
at Rhodes the notables conspired against the people through fear
of the suits that were brought against them. Contempt is also a cause of insurrection
and revolution; for example, in oligarchies—when those who have no share in the
state are the majority, they revolt, because they think that they are the stronger. Or,
again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and anarchy of the state; at
Thebes, for example, where, after the battle of Oenophyta, the bad administration of
the democracy led to its ruin. At Megara the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat
occasioned by disorder and anarchy. And at Syracuse the democracy was overthrown
before the tyranny of Gelo arose; at Rhodes before the insurrection.

1303 a.

(7) disproportionate
increase;

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Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase (8) election intrigues;
in any part of the state. For as a body is made up of many
members, and every member ought to grow in proportiona , that (9) carelessness;
symmetry may be preserved; but loses its nature if the foot be
four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and, should the abnormal increase
be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal:
even so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly; for
example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states. And this
disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident, as at Tarentum, from a defeat in
which many of the notables were slain in a battle with the Iapygians just after the
Persian War, the constitutional government in consequence becoming a democracy;
or, as was the case at Argos, where, after the battle at Hebdomè, the Argives, having
been cut to pieces by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, were compelled to admit to
citizenship some of their perioeci; and at Athens, when, after frequent defeats of their
infantry in the times of the Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced in number,
because the soldiers had to be taken from the roll of citizens. Revolutions arise from
this cause in democracies as well as in other forms of government, but not to so great
an extent. When the richb grow numerous or properties increase, the form of
government changes into an oligarchy or a government of families. Forms of
government also change — sometimes even without revolution, owing to election
contests, as at Heraea (where, instead of electing their magistrates, they took them by
lot, because the electors were in the habit of choosing their own partisans); or owing
to carelessness, when disloyal persons are allowed to find their way into the highest
offices, as at Oreum, where, upon the accession of Heracleodorus to office, the
oligarchy was overthrown, and changed by him into a constitutional and democratical
government.

Again, the revolution may be accomplished by small degrees; I (10) neglect of trifles;
mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the
constitution through neglect of a small matter; at Ambracia, for instance, the
qualification for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to nothing. For the
Ambraciots thought that a small qualification was much the same as none at all.

Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not (11) incompatible


at once acquire a common spirit; for a state is not the growth of a elements, differences,
day, neither is it a multitude brought together by accident. Hence
the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their e.g. (a) of race,
foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution; for especially in colonies:
example, the Achaeans who joined the Troezenians in the 1303 b.
foundation of Sybaris, being the more numerous, afterwards
expelled them; hence the curse fell upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled
with their fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted too
much of it and were driven out. At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a
conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the people of Antissa, who had
received the Chian exiles, fought with them, and drove them out; and the Zancleans,
after having received the Samians, were driven by them out of their own city. The
citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists,
had a revolution; the Syracusans, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having admitted

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strangers and mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to blows;
the people of Amphipolis, having received Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all
expelled by them.

Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly
treated, because, as I said before, they are equals, and have not an equal share, and in
democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an
equal share.

Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when the (b) of place;
country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state.
For example, the Chytrians at Clazomenae did not agree with the (c) of virtue and vice;
people of the island; and the people of Colophon quarrelled with
the Notians; at Athens, too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are (d) of wealth and
poverty.
more democratic than those who live in the city. For just as in
war, the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every
cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest opposition
is confessedly that of virtue and vice; next comes that of wealth and poverty; and
there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is this difference of
place.

In revolutions the occasions may be trifling, but great interests The occasions may be
are at stake. Trifles are most important when they concern the trifling,
rulers, as was the case of old at Syracuse; for the Syracusan
constitution was once changed by a love-quarrel of two young but ‘hae nugae in
men, who were in the government. The story is that while one of seria ducunt.’
them was away from home his beloved was gained over by his Private quarrels have
companion, and he to revenge himself seduced the other’s wife. caused revolutions at
They then drew all the members of the ruling class into their Syracuse,
quarrel and made a revolution. We learn from this story that we
should be on our guard against the beginnings of such evils, and Hestiaea,
should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men. The
mistake lies in the beginning—as the proverb says—‘Well begun is half done;’ so an
error at the beginning, though quite small, has the proportion of a half to the whole
matter. In general, when the notables quarrel, the whole city is involved, as happened
in Hestiaea after the Persian War. The occasion was the division of an inheritance;
one of two brothers refused to give an account of their father’s property and the
treasure which he had found: so the poorer of the two quarrelled with him and enlisted
in his cause the popular party, the other, who was very rich, the wealthy classes.

At Delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage was the beginning 1304 a.


of all the troubles which followed. In this case the bridegroom,
fancying some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride, Delphi,
and went away without taking her. Whereupon her relations,
thinking that they were insulted by him, put some of the sacred Mitylene,
treasure [among his offerings] while he was sacrificing, and then Phocis,
slew him, pretending that he had been robbing the temple. At
Mitylene, too, a dispute about heiresses was the beginning of Epidamnus.

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many misfortunes, and led to the war with the Athenians in which Paches took their
city. A wealthy citizen, named Timophanes, left two daughters; Doxander, another
citizen, wanted to obtain them for his sons; but he was rejected in his suit, whereupon
he stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians (of whom he was proxenus) to
interfere. A similar quarrel about an heiress arose at Phocis between Mnaseas the
father of Mnason, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus; this was the beginning
of the Sacred War. A marriage-quarrel was also the cause of a change in the
government of Epidamnus. A certain man betrothed his daughter secretly to a person
whose father, having been made a magistrate, fined the father of the girl, and the
latter, stung by the insult, conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow the
state.

Governments also change into oligarchy or into democracy or Revolutions occur


into a constitutional government because the magistrates, or when some section of
some other section of the state, increase in power or renown. the state unduly
Thus at Athens the reputation gained by the court of the increases.
Areopagus, in the Persian War, seemed to tighten the reins of
Illustrations from
government. On the other hand, the victory of Salamisa , which Athens,
was gained by the common people who served in the fleet, and
won for the Athenians the empire of the sea, strengthened the Argos,
democracy. At Argos, the notables, having distinguished
themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Syracuse,
Mantinea, attempted to put down the democracy. At Syracuse,
Chalcis,
the people having been the chief authors of the victory in the war
with the Athenians, changed the constitutional government into Ambracia,
democracy. At Chalcis, the people, uniting with the notables,
killed Phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. At Ambraciaa , the people,
in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander,
transferred the government to themselves. And generally, it should be remembered
that those who have secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or
magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause
revolutions. For either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they
themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with
others.

Revolutions break out when opposite parties, e.g. the rich and the 1304 b.
poor, are equally balanced, and there is little or nothing between
them; for, if either party were manifestly superior, the other Unstable equilibrium
would not risk an attack upon them. And, for this reason, those of parties.
who are eminent in virtue do not stir up insurrections, being
always a minority. Such are the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and
revolutions to which every form of government is liable.

Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud. Revolutions are
Force may be applied either at the time of making the revolution effected either by
or afterwards. Fraud, again, is of two kinds; for (1) sometimes force or fraud.
the citizens are deceived into a change of government, and
afterwards they are held in subjection against their will. This was what happened in

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the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them that the king
would provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians, and when the
deception was over, still endeavoured to retain the government. (2) In other cases the
people are persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the persuasion, their
goodwill and allegiance are retained. The revolutions which affect constitutions
generally spring from the above-mentioned causesb .

And now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows from the
principles already laid down.

Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the Revolutions in


intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity democracies are
lay information against rich men until they compel them to caused by
combine (for a common danger unites even the bitterest demagogues, as at
enemies), or coming forward in public they stir up the people
Cos,
against them. The truth of this remark is proved by a variety of
examples. At Cos the democracy was overthrown because Rhodes,
wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At
Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, Heraclea,
but prevented them from making good to the trierarchs the sums
which had been expended by them; and they, in consequence of Megara,
the suits which were brought against them, were compelled to Cyme.
combine and put down the democracya . The democracy at
Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the 1305 a.
colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the
notables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in the
same manner the democracy at Megarab was overturned; there the demagogues drove
out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property.
At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and engaging and defeating the
people, established an oligarchy. The same thing happened with the democracy of
Cyme which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most
states the changes have been of this character. For sometimes the demagogues, in
order to curry favour with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to
combine;—either they make a division of their property, or diminish their incomes by
the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the
rich that they may have their wealth to confiscatec .

Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies Demagogues old and
changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were new.
originally demagoguesa . They are not so now, but they were
then; and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, Of old, great
magistrates became
for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in our day,
tyrants, as at Miletus;
when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead
the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them military leaders, like
from usurping power; at any rate instances to the contrary are Peisistratus,
few and slight. Formerly tyrannies were more common than they Theagenes,
now are, because great power was often placed in the hands of
Dionysius,
individuals; thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of

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the Prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important mattersb . Moreover, in
those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the fields, busy at their
work; and their chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity,
and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy,
they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction
against the men of the plainc , and Theagenes at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the
wealthy, which he found by the river side where they had put them to graze.
Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced
Daphnaeus and the rich; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the
people. Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy; for
where there is a popular election of the magistrates and no property qualification, the
aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at last even to set them above
the laws. A more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes,
and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates.

These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies.

There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies [one Revolutions in


coming from without, the other from within the government]: (1) oligarchies arise (1)
First, when the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is outside the governing
good enough to be their champion, especially if he be himself a class when they are
(a) oppressive, (b)
member of the oligarchy, as Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards exclusive,
came to be tyrant. But revolutions which commence outside the
governing class may be further subdivided. Sometimes, when the 1305 b.
government is very exclusive, the revolution is brought about by
persons of the wealthy class who are excluded, as happened at Massalia and Istros and
Heraclea, and other cities. Those who had no share in the government created a
disturbance, until first the elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted; for in
some places father and son, in others elder and younger brothers, do not hold office
together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional government,
but at Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was enlarged to 600. At Cnidos,
again, the oligarchy underwent a considerable change. For the notables fell out among
themselves, because only a few shared in the government; there existed among them
the rule already mentioned, that father and son could not hold office together, and, if
there were several brothers, only the eldest was admitted. The people took advantage
of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be their leader, attacked and
conquered the oligarchs, who were divided, and division is always a source of
weakness. The city of Erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, and ruled well, by the
Basilidae, but the people took offence at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed
the government.

(2) within the


governing class from
several causes.

(a) Demagogues who


practise either upon

1306 a.

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(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the the oligarchy or upon
personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the the people.
demagogue. Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of two sorts:
either (1) he practises upon the oligarchs themselves (for, (b) Attempts to
although the oligarchy are quite a small number, there may be a narrow the oligarchy.
demagogue among them, as at Athens the party of Charicles (c) Extravagance of
predominated among the Thirty, that of Phrynichus in the Four the rich.
Hundred); or (2) the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the
people. This was the case at Larissa, where the guardians of the (d) Faction.
citizens endeavoured to gain over the people because they were
elected by them; and such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the magistrates are
elected, as at Abydos, not by the class to which they belong, but by the heavy-armed
or by the people, although they may be required to have a high qualification, or to be
members of a political club; or, again, where the law-courts are independent of the
government, the oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a decision in their own
favour, and so they change the constitution; this happened at Heraclea in Pontus.
Again, oligarchies change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them; for then
those who desire equal rights are compelled to call in the people. Changes in the
oligarchy also occur when the oligarchs waste their private property by extravagant
living; for then they want to innovate, and either try to make themselves tyrants, or
install some one else in the tyranny, as Hipparinus did Dionysius at Syracuse, and as
at Amphipolisa a man named Cleotimus introduced Chalcidian colonists, and when
they arrived, stirred them up against the rich. For a like reason in Aegina the person
who carried on the negotiation with Chares endeavoured to revolutionize the state.
Sometimes a party among the oligarchs try to create a political change; sometimes
they rob the treasury, and then, either the other oligarchs quarrel with the thieves, as
happened at Apollonia in Pontus, or they with the other oligarchs. But an oligarchy
which is at unity with itself is not easily destroyed from within; of this we may see an
example at Pharsalus, for there, although the rulers are few in number, they govern a
large city, because they have a good understanding among themselves.

Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy is Dangers from


created within the original one, that is to say, when the whole mercenaries;
governing body is small and yet they do not all share in the
highest offices. Thus at Elis the governing body was a small from faction, which
leaves the state at the
senate; and very few ever found their way into it, because,
mercy of the army;
although in number ninety, the senators were elected for life and
out of certain families in a manner similar to the Lacedaemonian from private quarrels;
elders. Oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in war and in
peace; in war because, not being able to trust the people, the and excessive
oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries, and the general who despotism.
is in command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as
1306 b.
Timophanes did at Corinth; or if there are more generals than
one they make themselves into a company of tyrantsa . Sometimes the oligarchs,
fearing this danger, give the people a share in the government because their services
are necessary to them. And in time of peace, from mutual distrust, the two parties
hand over the defence of the state to the army and to an arbiter between the two
factions who often ends the master of both. This happened at Larissa when Simos and

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the Aleuadae had the government, and at Abydos in the days of Iphiades and the
political clubs. Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the
overthrow of one party among the oligarchs by another. Of quarrels about marriages I
have already mentionedb some instances; another occurred at Eretria, where Diagoras
overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had been wronged about a
marriage. A revolution at Heraclea, and another at Thebes, both arose out of decisions
of law-courts upon a charge of adultery; in both cases the punishment was just, but
executed in the spirit of party, at Heraclea upon Eurytion, and at Thebes upon
Archias; for their enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the
agora. Many oligarchies have been destroyed by some members of the ruling class
taking offence at their excessive despotism; for example, the oligarchy at Cnidus and
at Chios.

Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies Accidental change of


which limit the office of counsellor, judge, or other magistrate to qualification.
persons having a certain money qualification, often occur by
accident. The qualification may have been originally fixed according to the
circumstances of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only,
or in a constitutional government the middle class. But after a time of prosperity,
whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same property becomes
many times as large, and then everybody participates in every office; this happens
sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes quickly. These are the causes of
changes and revolutions in oligarchies.

We must remark generally, both of democracies and oligarchies, Changes in states may
that they sometimes change, not into the opposite forms of be of degree as well
government, but only into another variety of the same class; I as of kind.
mean to say, from those forms of democracy and oligarchy
which are regulated by law into those which are arbitrary, and conversely.

In aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when a few only share Causes of revolution
in the honours of the state; a cause which has been already in aristocracies:
shown to affect oligarchies; for an aristocracy is a sort of
oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy, is the government of a few, (1) jealousy,
although the few are the virtuous and not the wealthy; hence the
(2) pride of a class,
two are often confounded. And revolutions will be most likely to
happen, and must happen, when the majority of the people are (3) dishonour to high-
high-spirited, and have a notion that they are as good as their spirited men,
rulers. Thus at Lacedaemon the so-called Partheniae, who were
the [illegitimate] sons of the Spartan peers, attempted a (4) extremes of
wealth and poverty,
revolution, and, being detected, were sent away to colonize
Tarentum. Again, revolutions occur when great men who are at (5) ambition of great
least of equal merit are dishonoured by those higher in office, as men,
Lysander was by the kings of Sparta: or, when a brave man is
excluded from the honours of the state, like Cinadon, who 1307 a.
conspired against the Spartans under Agesilaus; or, again, when
some are very poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most often the
result of war, as at Lacedaemon in the days of the Messenian War; this is proved from

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the poem of Tyrtaeus, entitled ‘Good Order;’ for he speaks of certain citizens who
were ruined by the war and wanted to have a redistribution of the land. Again,
revolutions arise when an individual who is great, and might be greater, wants to rule
alone, as at Lacedaemon, Pausanias, who was general in the Persian War, or like
Hanno at Carthage.

Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly (6) when the elements
overthrown owing to some deviation from justice in the of the state are ill-
constitution itself; the cause of the downfall is, in the former, the compounded.
ill-mingling of the two elements democracy and oligarchy; in the
Constitutional
latter, of the three elements, democracy, oligarchy, and virtue,
governments safer
but especially democracy and oligarchy. For to combine these is than aristocracies,
the endeavour of constitutional governments; and most of the so- because they rest on a
called aristocracies have a like aima , but differ from polities by broader basis.
the addition of virtue; hence some of them are more and some
less permanent. Those which incline more to oligarchy are called The change may be in
either direction.
aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy
constitutional governments. And therefore the latter are the safer of the two; for the
greater the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal they are
contented. But the rich, if the government gives them power, are apt to be insolent and
avaricious; and, in general, whichever way the constitution inclines, in that direction it
changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional government becoming a
democracy, an aristocracy, an oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and
aristocracy may change into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea
that they are being wronged, force the constitution to take an opposite form. In like
manner constitutional governments change into oligarchies. The only stable principle
of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his
own.

What I have just mentioned actually happened at Thuriia , where Encroachments of the
the qualification for office, though at first high, was reduced, and notables at Thurii;
the magistrates increased in number. The notables had previously
acquired the whole of the land contrary to law; for the government tended to
oligarchy, and they were able to encroach. But the people, who had been trained by
war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until those who had too
much gave up their land.

Again, since all aristocratical governments incline to oligarchy, and at Lacedaemon.


the notables are apt to be grasping; thus at Lacedaemon, where
property has passed into few handsb , the notables can do too much as they like, and
are allowed to marry whom they please. The city of Locri was ruined by a marriage
connexion with Dionysius, but such a thing could never have happened in a
democracy, or in a well-balanced aristocracy.

1307 b.

Revolutions are
occasioned by trifles

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I have already remarked that in all states revolutions are and begin
occasioned by triflesc . In aristocracies, above all, they are of a imperceptibly.
gradual and imperceptible nature. The citizens begin by giving
up some part of the constitution, and so with greater ease the Illustration from
Thurii.
governmetn change something else which is a little more
important, until they have undermined the whole fabric of the
state. At Thurii there was a law that generals should only be re-elected after an
interval of five years, and some high-spirited young men who were popular with the
soldiers of the guard, despising the magistrates and thinking that they would easily
gain their purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold
perpetual commands; for they well knew that the people would be glad enough to
elect them. Whereupon the magistrates who had charge of these matters, and who are
called councillors, at first determined to resist, but they afterwards consented, thinking
that, if only this one law was changed, no further inroad would be made on the
constitution. But other changes soon followed which they in vain attempted to
oppose; and the state passed into the hands of the revolutionists who established a
dynastic oligarchy.

All constitutions are overthrown either from within or from Revolutions caused
without; the latter, when there is some government close at hand by foreign
having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This interference.
was exemplified in the old times of the Athenians and the
Lacedaemonians; the Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the
Lacedaemonians the democraciesa .

I have now explained what are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions in
states.

We have next to consider what means there are of preserving Revolutions how to
states in general, and also in particular cases. In the first place it be avoided. The
is evident that if we know the causes which destroy states, we knowledge of
shall also know the causes which preserve them; for opposites opposites is one.
produce opposites, and destruction is the opposite of
preservationb .

In all well-attempered governments there is nothing which The importance of


should be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience small matters.
to law, more especially in small matters; for transgression creeps
in unperceived and at last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of small
expenses in time eats up a fortune. The change does not take place all at once, and
therefore is not observed; the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which says that ‘if
each part is little, then the whole is little.’ And this is true in one way, but not in
another, for the whole and the all are not little, although they are made up of littles.

The statesman should


watch the

1308 a.

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In the first place, then, men should guard against the beginning beginnings of change
of change, and in the second place they should not rely upon the and not trust to
political devices of which I have already spokena , invented only political tricks.
to deceive the people, for they are proved by experience to be
useless. Further we note that oligarchies as well as aristocracies The people should be
well treated.
may last, not from any inherent stability in such forms of
government, but because the rulers are on good terms both with Among equals there
the unenfranchised and with the governing classes, not should be equality
maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but and therefore offices
b
introducing into it the leading spirits among them . They should should be held by
many persons for a
never wrong the ambitious in a matter of honour, or the common short time only.
people in a matter of money; and they should treat one another
and their fellow-citizens in a spirit of equality. The equality which the friends of
democracy seek to establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient
among equals. Hence, if the governing class are numerous, many democratic
institutions are useful; for example, the restriction of the tenure of offices to six
months, that all those who are of equal rank may share in them. Indeed, equals or
peers when they are numerous become a kind of democracy, and therefore
demagogues are very likely to arise among them, as I have already remarkedc . The
short tenure of office prevents oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands
of families; it is not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is
short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. For the
aspirants to tyranny are either the principalmen of the state, who in democracies are
demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great
offices, and have a long tenure of themd .

States are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance, and A common fear may
sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes unite a state.
the government keep in hand the state. Wherefore the ruler who
has a care of the state should invent terrors, and bring distant The quarrels of the
notables are to be
dangers near, in order that the citizens may be on their guard,
repressed.
and, like sentinels in a night-watch, never relax their attention.
He should endeavour too by help of the laws to control the contentions and quarrels of
the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in them from being
drawn in. No ordinary man can discern the beginning of evila , but only the true
statesman.

As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional The census should be


governmentsb by the alteration of the qualification, when this periodically revised.
arises, not out of any variation in the census but only out of the
increase of money, it is well to compare the general valuation of 1308 b.
property with that of past years, annually in those cities in which
the census is taken annually, and in larger cities every third or fifth year. If the whole
is many times greater or many times less than when the rates were fixed at the
previous census, there should be power given by law to raise or lower the
qualification as the amount is greater or less. Where in the absence of any such
provision the standard is raised, a constitutional government passes into an oligarchy,
and an oligarchy is narrowed to a rule of families; where the standard is lowered,

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constitutional government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional


government or democracy.

It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchyc , and every No individual should


other form of government not to allow the disproportionate be too powerful.
increase of any citizen, but to give moderate honour for a long
time rather than great honour for a short time. For men are easily Opposite elements
should be combined
spoilt; not every one can bear prosperity. But if this rule is not
and extremes avoided.
observed, at any rate the honours which are given all at once
should be taken away by degrees and not all at once. Especially should the laws
provide against any one having too much power, whether derived from friends or
money; if he has, he and his followers should be sent out of the countrya . And since
innovations creep in through the private life of individuals, there ought to be a
magistracy which will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the
government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. And for a like reason an
increase of prosperity in any part of the state should be carefully watched. The proper
remedy for this evil is always to give the management of affairs and offices of state to
opposite elements; such opposites are the virtuous and the many, or the rich and the
poor. Another way is to combine the poor and the rich in one body, or to increase the
middle class: thus an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from inequality.

But above all every state should be so administered and so 1309 a.


regulated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make
moneyb . In oligarchies special precautions should be used Office should not be
against this evil. For the people do not take any great offence at lucrative, especially
in oligarchies.
being kept out of the government—indeed they are rather
pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their private An unpaid
business—but what irritates them is to think that their rulers are magistracy, to which
stealing the public money; then they are doubly annoyed; for all are eligible, the
they lose both honour and profit. If office brought no profit, then only way of
and then only could democracy and aristocracy be combined; for combining aristocracy
and democracy.
both notables and people might have their wishes gratified. All
would be able to hold office, which is the aim of democracy, and Financial corruption
the notables would be magistrates, which is the aim of should be prevented.
aristocracy. And this result may be accomplished when there is
no possibility of making money out of the offices; for the poor In democracies the
rich should be spared.
will not want to have them when there is nothing to be gained
from them—they would rather be attending to their own In oligarchies the
concerns; and the rich, who do not want money from the public poor.
treasury, will be able to take them; and so the poor will keep to
their work and grow rich, and the notables will not be governed Limitation of gift and
by the lower class. In order to avoid peculation of the public of inheritance.
money, the transfer of the revenue should be made at a general
All but the highest
assembly of the citizens, and duplicates of the accounts deposited offices should be
with the different brotherhoods, companies, and tribes. And open to those who
honours should be given by law to magistrates who have the have less share in the
reputation of being incorruptible. In democracies the rich should government.
be spared; not only should their property not be divided, but their

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incomes also, which in some states are taken from them imperceptibly, should be
protected. It is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are willing,
from undertaking expensive and useless public services, such as the giving of
choruses, torch-races, and the like. In an oligarchy, on the other hand, great care
should be taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should go to them; if any of the
wealthy classes insult them, the offender should be punished more severely athan one
of their own class for a like offencea . Provision should be made that estates pass by
inheritance and not by gift, and no person should have more than one inheritance; for
in this way properties will be equalised, and more of the poor rise to competency. It is
also expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have
less share in the government (for example, to the rich in a democracy and to the poor
in an oligarchy) an equality or preference in all but the principal offices of state. The
latter should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the governing class.

There are three qualifications required in those who have to fill The qualifications for
the highest offices,—(1) first of all, loyalty to the established great offices.
constitution; (2) the greatest administrative capacity; (3) virtue
and justice of the kind proper to each form of government; for, if The good general is
not always the good
what is just is not the same in all governments, the quality of
man.
justice must also differ. There may be a doubt however, when all
these qualities do not meet in the same person, how the selection 1309 b.
is to be made; suppose, for example, a good general is a bad man
and not a friend to the constitution, and another man is loyal and When virtue and
just, which should we choose? In making the election ought we when skill is to be
preferred.
not to consider two points? what qualities are common, and what
are rare. Thus in the choice of a general, we should regard his
skill rather than his virtue; for few have military skill, but many have virtue. In
keeping watch or in any office of stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule
should be observed; for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an
office, but the necessary knowledge is of a sort which all men possess.

It may, however, be asked what a man wants with virtue if he Why virtue is needed.
have political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone
will make him do what is for the public interest. But may not men have both of them
and yet be deficient in self-control? If, knowing and loving their own interests, they
do not always attend to them, may they not be equally negligent of the interests of the
public?

The loyal should


outnumber the
disloyal.

The mean should be


observed.

Proportion in states
like proportion in the
human form.

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Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enactments Neither oligarchy nor
are held to be for the interest of states, all these preserve states. democracy should be
And the great preserving principle is the one which has been pushed to extremes.
a
repeatedly mentioned ,—to have a care that the loyal citizens
1310 a.
should outnumber the disloyal. Neither should we forget the
mean, which at the present day is lost sight of in perverted forms
of government; for many practices which appear to be democratical are the ruin of
democracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies.
Those who think that all virtue is to be found in their own party principles push
matters to extremes; they do not consider that disproportion destroys a state. A nose
which varies from the ideal of straightness to a hook or snub may still be of good
shape and agreeable to the eye; but if the excess be very great, all symmetry is lost,
and the nose at last ceases to be a nose at all on account of some excess in one
direction or defect in the other; and this is true of every other part of the human body.
The same law of proportion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy, although
a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government, but if
any one attempts to push the principles of either to an extreme, he will begin by
spoiling the government and end by having none at all. Wherefore the legislator and
the statesman ought to know what democratical measures save and what destroy a
democracy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy. For neither
the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich and poor are
included in it. If equality of property is introduced, the state must of necessity take
another form; for when by laws carried to excess one or other element in the state is
ruined, the constitution is ruined.

There is an error common both to oligarchies and to The oligarchical oath


democracies:—in the latter the demagogues, when the multitude should be reversed.
are above the law, are always cutting the city in two by quarrels
with the rich, whereas they should always profess to be maintaining their cause; just
as in oligarchies, the oligarchs should profess to maintain the cause of the people, and
should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For there are cities in
which they swear—‘I will be an enemy to the people, and will devise all the harm
against them which I can;’ but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very opposite
feeling; in the form of their oath there should be an express declaration—‘I will do no
wrong to the people.’

But of all the things which I have mentioned that which most The young should be
contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation trained in ‘the spirit of
of education to the form of governmenta , and yet in our own day the constitution.’
this principle is universally neglected. The best laws, though
sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail unless What this phrase
means.
the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the
constitution, if the laws are democratical, democratically, or Liberty is not licence.
oligarchically, if the laws are oligarchical. For there may be a
want of self-discipline in states as well as in individuals. Now, to have been educated
in the spirit of the constitution is not to perform the actions in which oligarchs or
democrats delight, but those by which the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy
is made possible. Whereas among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an

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oligarchy live in luxurya , but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil,
and hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolutionb . And in
democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which
is contradictory to the true interests of the state. For two principles are characteristic
of democracy, the government of the majority and freedom. Men think that what is
just is equal; and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will; and that freedom
and equality mean the doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as
he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, ‘according to his fancy.’ But this is all
wrong; men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution;
for it is their salvation.

I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and destruction of states,
and the means of their preservation and continuance.

I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its 1310 b.


destruction and preservation. What I have said already respecting
other forms of government applies almost equally to royal and to Royal and tyrannical
tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, rule, how differing.
and a tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and democracy in their
Tyrannies established,
most extreme forms; it is therefore most injurious to its subjects,
being made up of two evil forms of government, and having the (1) by demagogues;
perversions and errors of both. These two forms of monarchy
differ in their very origin. The appointment of a king is the (2) by ambitious
resource of the better classes against the people, and he is elected kings;
by them out of their own number, because either he himself or
(3) by great
his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions; whereas a tyrant magistrates;
is chosen from the people to be their protector against the
notables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. Examples.
History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues who
gained the favour of the people by their accusation of the notablesa . At any rate this
was the manner in which the tyrannies arose in the days when cities had increased in
power. Others which were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to
overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become despots. Others again grew
out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates; for in ancient times the
people who elected them gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, a long
tenure. Others arose out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some
individual supreme over the highest offices. In any of theseb ways an ambitious man
had no difficulty, if he desired, in creating a tyranny, since he had the power in his
hands already, either as king or as one of the officers of statec . Thus Pheidon at
Argos and several others were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants;
Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding
great offices. Whereas Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth, Peisistratus at
Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others who afterwards became tyrants,
were at first demagogues.

Royalty like
aristocracy based on
merit.

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And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is 1311 a.
based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or
on benefits conferredd , or on these claims with power added to them. For all who
have obtained this honour have benefitted, or had in their power to benefit, states and
nations; some, like Codrus, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war;
others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled or gained a
territory, like the Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and Molossian kingsa . The idea of a
king is to be a protector of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people against
insult and oppression. Whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has no regard to
any public interest, but only to his private ends; his aim is pleasure, the aim of a king,
honour. Wherefore also in their desires they differ; the tyrant is desirous of riches, the
king, of what brings honour. And the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyrant
mercenariesb .

That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and oligarchy is Tyranny like
evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end is wealth; (for by oligarchy in the love
wealth only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his of wealth, like
luxury). Both mistrust the people, and therefore deprive them of democracy in hatred
of the nobles.
their arms. Both agree too in injuring the people and driving
them out of the city and dispersing them. From democracy Causes of
tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables conspiracies against
and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them monarchs.
because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power; and
also because plots against them are contrived by men of this class, who either want to
rule or to escape subjection. Hence Periander advised Thrasybulusc to cut off the tops
of the tallest ears of corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens
who overtop the rest. And so, as I have already intimated, the beginnings of change
are the same in monarchies as in other forms of government; subjects attack their
sovereigns out of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated by
them. And of injustice, the most common form is insult, another is confiscation of
property.

Sometimes the office


is attacked,
sometimes the life of
the monarch.

The latter when insult


has been offered, as
by the Peisistratidae,

Periander,

Philip,

Amyntas,

Evagoras,

Archelaus,

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The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, whether 1311 b.


tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by
conspiracies against other forms of government. Monarchs have Cotys.
great wealth and honour which are objects of desire to all
mankind. The attacks are made sometimes against their lives, sometimes against the
office; where the sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. Any sort of insult
(and there are many) may stir up anger, and when men are angry, they commonly act
out of revenge, and not from ambition. For example, the attempt made upon the
Peisistratidae arose out of the public dishonour offered to the sister of Harmodius and
the insult to himself. He attacked the tyrant for his sister’s sake, and Aristogeiton
joined in the attack for the sake of Harmodius. A conspiracy was also formed against
Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because, when drinking with a favourite youth, he
asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was
attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted by Attalus and his
friends, and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, because he boasted of having enjoyed his
youth. Evagoras of Cyprus, again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult; for
his wife had been carried off by Evagoras’ son. Many conspiracies have originated in
shameful attempts made by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. Such was the
attack of Crataeus upon Archelaus; he had always hated the connexion with him, and
so, when Archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did
not give him either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to the king of
Elymaea, when he was hard pressed in a war against Sirrhas and Arrhibaeus, and the
younger to his own son Amyntas, under the idea that he would then be less likely to
quarrel with the son of Cleopatra—Crataeus made this slight a pretext for attacking
Archelaus, though even a less reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of the
estrangement was the disgust which he felt at his connexion with the king. And from a
like motive Hellanocrates of Larissa conspired with him; for when Archelaus, who
was his lover, did not fulfil his promise of restoring him to his country, he thought
that the connexion between them had originated, not in affection, but in the
wantonness of power. Parrhon, too, and Heracleides of Aenos, slew Cotys in order to
avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for the wanton
outrage which he had committed in mutilating him when a child.
a
Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they The Penthalidae.
deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill officers
of state and royal princes by whom they have been injureda . Penthilus.
Thus, at Mitylene, Megacles and his friends attacked and slew
the Penthalidae, as they were going about and striking people Archelaus.
with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who had been beaten and
torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew him. In the conspiracy against Archelaus,
Decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack; he was enraged
because Archelaus had delivered him to Euripides to be scourged; for the poet had
been irritated at some remark made by Decamnichus on the foulness of his breath.
Many other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies which have arisen
from similar causes.

Other causes.

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Fear is another motive which has caused conspiracies as well in Fear.


monarchies as in more popular forms of government. Thus
Artapanes conspired against Xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would be accused
of hanging Darius against his orders,—he being under the impression that Xerxes
would forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that the offence would be
forgiven.

Another motive is contempt, as in the case of Sardanapalus, 1312 a.


whom some one saw carding wool with his women, if the story-
tellers say truly; and the tale may be true, if not of him, of some Contempt,
one elsea . Dion attacked the younger Dionysius because he
despised him, and saw that he was equally despised by his own including expectation
of success.
subjects, and that he was always drunk. Even the friends of a
tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt; for the confidence which he
reposes in them breeds contempt, and they think that they will not be found out. The
expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt; the assailants are ready to strike,
and think nothing of the danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands.
Thus generals of armies attack monarchs; as, for example, Cyrus attacked Astyages,
despising the effeminacy of his life, and believing that his power was worn out. Thus,
again, Seuthes the Thracian conspired against Amadocus, whose general he was.

And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, like Mixed motives.
Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly out of
contempt and partly from the love of gain.

Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military position, are most likely to
make the attempt in the expectation of success; for courage is emboldened by power,
and the union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory.

Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise from other The glory of
causes. There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of tyrannicide.
gains and rewards however great, but who nevertheless regard
the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous
and honourable in the world; they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but a name. It is
rare, however, to find such men; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose
his life if he fail. He must have the resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon
Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying ‘that whatever measure of success
he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he
landed; such a death would be welcome to him.’ But this is a temper to which few can
attain.

Once more, tyrannies, like all other governments, are destroyed 1312 b.
from without by some opposite and more powerful form of
government. That such a government will have the will to attack Tyrannies destroyed
them is clear; for the two are opposed in principle; and all men, if from without by some
opposite form of
they can, do what they will. Democracy is also antagonistic to
government;
tyranny, on the principle of Hesiod, ‘Potter hates Potter,’ because
they are nearly akin, for the extreme form of democracy is tyranny; and royalty and

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aristocracy are both alike opposed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a
different type. And therefore the Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and
so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well-governed.

Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, when the reigning and from within.
family are divided among themselves, as that of Gelo was, and
more recently that of Dionysius; in the case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother
of Hiero, flattered the son of Gelo and led him into excesses in order that he might
rule in his name. Whereupon the family conspired to get rid of Thrasybulus and save
the tyranny; but the party who conspireda with them seized the opportunity and drove
them all out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked and expelled
him with the assistance of the people; he afterwards perished himself.

There are two chief motives which induce men to attack Chiefly through
tyrannies — hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, hatred and contempt,
and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus hatred including
we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their anger.
power, but those who have inheritedb , have lost it, almost at
once; for living in luxurious ease, they have become contemptible, and offer many
opportunities to their assailants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and
produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even more ready to strike—the angry are
more impetuous in making an attack, for they do not listen to reason. And men are
very apt to give way to their passions when they are insulted. To this cause is to be
attributed the fall of the Peisistratidae and of many others. Hatred is more reasonable,
but anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred
is painlessa .

In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned as destroying Royalty, generally
the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and the extreme lasting, but may be
form of democracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny; indeed destroyed from
the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed among within.
several persons. Kingly rule is little affected by external causes,
Decline of kingly rule
and is, therefore, lasting; it is generally destroyed from within. in Hellas.
And there are two ways in which the destruction may come
about; (1) when the members of the royal family quarrel among Danger of hereditary
themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer the monarchy.
state too much after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their
1313 a.
authority contrary to the law. There are now no royalties;
monarchies, where they exist, areb tyrannies. For the rule of a
king is over voluntary subjects, and he is supreme in all important matters; but in our
own day men are more upon an equality, and no one is so immeasurably superior to
others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office. Hence
mankind will not, if they can help, endure it, and any one who obtains power by force
or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies a further cause of
destruction is the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and, although possessing not
tyrannical but only royal power, are apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then
readily effected; for there is an end to the king when his subjects do not want to have
him, but the tyrant lasts, whether they like him or not.

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The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these and the like causes.

And they are preserved, to speak generally, by the opposite Royalty preserved by
causes; or, if we consider them separately, (1) royalty is limitation,
preserved by the limitation of its powers. The more restricted the
functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired; as at Lacedaemon.
for then they are more moderate and not so despotic in their
Story of Theopompus.
ways; and they are less envied by their subjects. This is the
reason why the kingly office has lasted so long among the Molossians. And for a
similar reason it has continued among the Lacedaemonians, because there it was
always divided between two, and afterwards further limited by Theopompus in
various respects, more particularly by the establishment of the Ephoralty. He
diminished the power of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly
office, which was thus made in a certain sense not less, but greater. There is a story
that when his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons a
royal power which was less than he had inherited from his father, ‘No indeed,’ he
replied, ‘for the power which I leave to them will be more lasting.’

As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite 1313 b.


ways. One of them is the old traditional method in which most
tyrants administer their government. Of such arts Periander of Tyrannies preserved,
Corinth is said to have been the great master, and many similar by arts such as those
devices may be gathered from the Persians in the administration of Periander and of
the Persians.
of their government. There are also the ancient prescriptions for
the preservation of a tyranny, in so far as this is possible; viz. Men of spirit should
that the tyrant should lop off those who are too high; he must put be cut off;
to death men of spirit; he must not allow common meals, clubs,
education, and the like; he must be upon his guard against confidence destroyed;
anything which is likely to inspire either courage or confidence
publicity of life
among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or other enforced.
meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to
prevent people from knowing one another (for acquaintance The people should be
begets mutual confidence). Further he must compel the terrified by informers,
a a
inhabitants to appear in public and live at his gates ; then he
weakened by quarrels
will know what they are doing: if they are always kept under, among themselves,
they will learn to be humble. In short he should practise these
and the like Persian and barbaric arts which all have the same oppressed by great
object. A tyrant should also endeavour to know what each of his works,
subjects says or does, and should employ spies, like the ‘female
detectives’ at Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers whom Hiero was heavy taxes,
in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting; for the wars.
fear of informers prevents people from speaking their minds, and
if they do, they are more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is to sow quarrels
among the citizens; friends should be embroiled with friends, the people with the
notables, and the rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his subjects; he
thus provides money for the support of his guardsb , and the people, having to keep
hard at work, are prevented from conspiring. The Pyramids of Egypt afford an
example of this policy; also the offerings of the family of Cypselus, and the building

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of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean
monuments at Samos; all these works were alike intended to occupy the people and
keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the manner of
Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects should bring
into the treasury their whole property. The tyrant is also fond of making war in order
that his subjects may have something to do and be always in want of a leader. And
whereas the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic of a tyrant
is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men want to overthrow him, and
they above all have the powerc .

Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy 1314 a.
are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power given to women in
their families in the hope that they will inform against their Licence allowed by
husbands, and the licence which is allowed to slaves in order that tyranny and by
extreme democracy to
they may betray their masters; for slaves and women do not
women and slaves.
conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly to
tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have a good time. For the
people too would fain be a monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant,
the flatterer is held in honour; in democracies he is the demagogue; and the tyrant also
has his humble companions who flatter him.

Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to The tyrant loves
be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a freeman in him flatterers;
will demean himself by flattery; good men love others, but they
do not flatter anybody. Moreover the bad are useful for bad dislikes men of
independent spirit;
purposes; ‘nail knocks out nail,’ as the proverb says. It is
characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or favours foreigners.
independence; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any one who
claims a like dignity or asserts his independence encroaches upon his prerogative, and
is hated by him as an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes
foreigners better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table; for
the one are enemies, but the others enter into no rivalry with him.

Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he Summary. The three
preserves his power; there is no wickedness too great for him. aims of the tyrant.
All that we have said may be summed up under three heads,
which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. These are, (1) the humiliation of his
subjects; he knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody: (2)
the creation of mistrust among them; for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to
have confidence in one another; and this is the reason why tyrants are at war with the
good; they are under the idea that their power is endangered by them, not only
because they will not be ruled despotically, but also because they are loyal to one
another, and to other men, and do not inform against one another or against other
men: (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one
attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they
are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed
up, and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred: (1) he sows distrust
among his subjects; (2) he takes away their power; (3) he humbles them.

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This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are Tyranny may also be
preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon a different preserved in an
principle of action. The nature of this latter method may be opposite way.
gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy
The tyrant should be
kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to
like a king, but he
make the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a must preserve his
tyranny is to make it more like the rule of a king. But of one power.
thing the tyrant must be careful; he must keep power enough to
rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once He should save the
gives this up he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be public money;
retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or keep accounts;
appear to act in the character of a king. In the first place he
should pretend a care of the public revenues, and not waste 1314 b.
money in making presents of a sort at which the common people
get excited when they see their miserable earnings taken from 1315 a.
them and lavished on courtezans and strangers and artists. He
he should levy taxes
should give an account of what he receives and of what he only for state
spends (a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants); for purposes;
then he will seem to be the manager of a household rather than a
tyrant; nor need he fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he he should assume the
will ever be in want of money. Such a policy is much more character of a
statesman even if he
advantageous for the tyrant when he goes from home, than to
has it not;
leave behind him a hoard, for then the garrison who remain in
the city will be less likely to attack his power; and a tyrant, when should avoid
he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians of immodesty and
his treasure than the citizens, for the one accompany him, but the sensuality, and keep
up appearances,
others remain behind. In the second place, he should appear to
collect taxes and to require public services only for state should adorn the city,
purposes, and that he may form a fund in case of war, he ought to reverence the Gods,
make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they
belonged, not to him, but to the public. He should appear, not honour men of merit,
harsh, but dignified, and when men meet him they should look
upon him with reverence, and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him but not make any one
man great.
to be respected if he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever
virtues he may neglect, at least he should maintain the character He should be modest,
of a statesman, and produce the impression that he is one. considerate, lenient,
Neither he nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the affectionate.
least offence against modesty towards the young of either sex
who are his subjects, and the women of his family should observe a like self-control
towards other women; the insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies. In the
indulgence of pleasures he should be the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not only
begin at dawn and pass whole days in sensuality, but want other men to see them, that
they may admire their happy and blessed lot. In these things a tyrant should be
especially moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices to the world; for a
drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised and attacked; not so he who is temperate
and wide awake. His conduct should be the very reverse of nearly everything which
has been said before about tyrants. He ought to adorn and improve his city, as though
he were not a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should appear to be

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particularly earnest in the service of the Gods; for if men think that a ruler is religious
and has a reverence for the Gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his
hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because they believe him to
have the very Gods fighting on his side. At the same time his religion must not be
thought foolish. And he should honour men of merit, and make them think that they
would not be held in more honour by the citizens if they had a free government. The
honour he should distribute himself, but the punishment should be inflicted by
officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which is taken by all monarchs not to
make one person great; but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they may
look sharply after one another. If after all some one has to be made great, he should
not be a man of bold spirit; for such dispositions are ever most inclined to strike. And
if any one is to be deprived of his power, let it be diminished gradually, not taken
from him all at oncea . The tyrant should abstain from all outrage; in particular from
personal violence and from wanton conduct towards the young. He should be
especially careful of his behaviour to men who are lovers of honour; for as the lovers
of money are offended when their property is touched, so are the lovers of honour and
the virtuous when their honour is affected. Therefore a tyrant ought either not to use
force at all; or he should be thought only to employ fatherly correction, and not to
trample upon others, — and his acquaintance with youth should be supposed to arise
from affection, and not from the insolence of power, and in general he should
compensate the appearance of dishonour by the increase of honour.

Of those who attempt assassination they are the most dangerous, He should guard
and require to be most carefully watched who do not care to against the desperate
survive, if they effect their purpose. Therefore special precaution assassin.
should be taken about any who think that either they or their
relatives have been insulted; for when men are led away by passion to assault others
they are regardless of themselves. As Heracleitus says, ‘It is difficult to fight against
anger; for a man will buy revenge with lifea .’

And whereas states consist of two classes, of poor men and of He should conciliate
rich, the tyrant should lead both to imagine that they are the poor or the rich,
preserved and prevented from harming one another by his rule, whichever is the
and whichever of the two is stronger he should attach to his stronger party.
government; for, having this advantage, he has no need either to
emancipate slaves or to disarm the citizens; either party added to the force which he
already has, will make him stronger than his assailants.

But enough of these details;—what should be the general policy 1315 b.


of the tyrant is obvious. He ought to show himself to his subjects
in the light, not of a tyrant, but of the master of a household and ‘The father of his
of a king. He should not appropriate what is theirs, but should be people.’
their guardian; he should be moderate, not extravagant in his way
of life; he should be the companion of the notables, and the hero of the multitude. For
then his rule will of necessity be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better
menb whose spirits are not crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an object of
hatred, and of whom he is not afraid. His power too will be more lasting. Let his

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disposition be virtuous, or at least half virtuous; and if he must be wicked, let him be
half wicked only.

Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy and Tyrannies short-lived,


tyranny. The tyranny which lasted longest was that of Orthagoras except (1) that of
and his sons at Sicyon; this continued for a hundred years. The Orthagoras and his
reason was that they treated their subjects with moderation, and sons;
to a great extent observed the laws; and in various ways gained
the favour of the people by the care which they took of them. Cleisthenes, in
particular, was respected for his military ability. If report may be believed, he
crowned the judge who decided against him in the games; and, as some say, the
sitting statue in the Agora of Sicyon is the likeness of this person. (A similar story is
told of Peisistratus, who is said on one occasion to have allowed himself to be
summoned and tried before the Areopagus.)

Next in duration to the tyranny of Orthagoras was that of the (2) of the Cypselidae;
Cypselidae at Corinth, which lasted seventy-three years and six
months: Cypselus reigned thirty years, Periander forty-four, and (3) of the
Psammetichus the son of Gordius three. Their continuance was Peisistratidae;
due to similar causes: Cypselus was a popular man, who during
(4) of Hiero and Gelo.
the whole time of his rule never had a body-guard; and
Periander, although he was a tyrant, was a great soldier. Third in duration was the rule
of the Peisistratidae at Athens, but it was interrupted; for Peisistratus was twice driven
out, so that during three and thirty years he reigned only seventeen; and his sons
reigned eighteen—altogether thirty-five years. Of other tyrannies, that of Hiero and
Gelo at Syracuse was the most lasting. Even this, however, was short, not more than
eighteen years in all; for Gelo continued tyrant for seven years, and died in the eighth;
Hiero reigned for ten years, and Thrasybulus was driven out in the eleventh month. In
fact, tyrannies generally have been of quite short duration.

I have now gone through all the causes by which constitutional 1316 a.
governments and monarchies are either destroyed or preserved.

Plato’s treatment of
revolutions criticized.
(1) The number of the
state will not explain
the first decline;

(2) Why is this


decline peculiar to the
ideal state?

(3) Why should time


be a special cause?

(4) What is the


principle of his cycle?

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In the Republic of Platoa , Socrates treats of revolutions, but not (5) What form
well, for he mentions no cause of change which peculiarly succeeds tyranny?
affects the first or perfect state. He only says that nothing is The perfect state?
abiding, but that all things change in a certain cycle; and that the
Nay, but this is
origin of the change is a base of numbers which are in the ratio
refuted by facts.
of four to three, and this when combined with a figure of five
gives two harmonies,—(he means when the number of this figure (6) Plato
becomes solid); he conceives that nature will then produce bad misunderstands the
men who will not submit to education; in which latter particular causes of the change
he may very likely be not far wrong, for there may well be some into oligarchy,
men who cannot be educated and made virtuous. But why is such (7) which, in
a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state, and not rather consisting of rich and
common to all states, nay, to everything which comes into being poor, good and bad, is
at all? aOr how is the state specially changed by the agency of only like other states.
time, which, as he declares, makes all things change? And things
which did not begin together, change togethera , for example, if (8) Out of many
causes of revolutions
something has come into being the day before the completion of he mentions one only,
the cycle, it will change with it. Further, why should the perfect
state change into the Spartan? For governments more often take 1316 b.
an opposite form than one akin to them. The same remark is
applicable to the other changes; he says that the Spartan constitution changes into an
oligarchy, and this into a democracy, and this again into a tyranny. And yet the
contrary happens quite as often; for a democracy is even more likely to change into an
oligarchy than into a monarchy. Further, he never says whether tyranny is, or is not,
liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them, or into what form it
changes. And the reason is, that he could not very well have told: for there is no rule;
according to him it should revert to the first and best, and then there would be a
complete cycle. But in point of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny, as that at
Sicyon changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of Cleisthenes; into oligarchy, as
the tyranny of Antileon did at Chalcis; into democracy, as that of Gelo did at
Syracuse; into aristocracy, as at Carthage, and the tyranny of Charilaus at
Lacedaemon. Often an oligarchy changes into a tyranny, like most of the ancient
oligarchies in Sicily; for example, the oligarchy at Leontini changed into the tyranny
of Panaetius; that at Gela into the tyranny of Cleander; that at Rhegium into the
tyranny of Anaxilaus; the same thing has happened in many other states. And it is
absurd to suppose that the state changes into oligarchy merely because, [as Plato says a
,] the ruling class are lovers and makers of money, and not because the very rich think
it unfair that the very poor should have an equal share in the government with
themselves. Moreover in many oligarchies there are laws against making money in
trade. But at Carthage, which is a democracy, there is no such prohibition; and yet to
this day the Carthaginians have never had a revolution. It is absurd too for him to say
that an oligarchy is two cities, one of the rich, and the other of the poorb . Is not this
just as much the case in the Spartan constitution, or in any other in which either all do
not possess equal property, or in which all are not equally good men? Nobody need be
any poorer than he was before, and yet the oligarchy may change all the same into a
democracy, if the poor form the majority; and a democracy may change into an
oligarchy, if the wealthy class are stronger than the people, and the one are energetic,
the other indifferent. Once more, although the causes of revolutions are very

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numerous, he mentions only onec , which is, that the citizens become poor through
dissipation and debt, as though he thought that all, or the majority of them, were
originally rich. This is not true: though it is true that when any of the leaders lose their
property they are ripe for revolution; but, when anybody else, it is no great matter.
And an oligarchy does not more often pass into a democracy than into any other form
of government. Again, if men are deprived of the honours of state, and are wronged,
and insulted, they make revolutions, and change forms of government, even although
they have not wasted their substance because they might do what they liked—of
which extravagance he declares excessive freedom to be the causea .

Finally, although there are many forms of oligarchies and (9) and he does not
democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there recognize the
were only one form of either of them. different forms either
of oligarchies or of
democracies.

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[Back to Table of Contents]

BOOK VI.
We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or Subjects already
supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of law- discussed.
courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted to
different forms of governmenta . We have also spoken of the destruction and
preservation of states, how and from what causes they ariseb .

Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many How the several kinds
kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes of government are
of organization which are proper and advantageous to each, constructed.
adding what remains to be said about them. Moreover, we ought
to consider the various combinations of these modes themselvesc 1317 a.
; for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another,
so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments
incline to democraciesd .

When I speak of the combinations which remain to be Various


considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean combinations.
such as these:—when the deliberative part of the government and
the election of officers is constituted oligarchically, and the law-courts
aristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are
oligarchical, and the election to offices aristocratical, or when in any other way there
is a want of harmony in the composition of a state.

I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities, and
what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms of
government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of these governments is
the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to considera how these and other forms
of government are to be established.

First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to The varieties of
light the opposite form of government commonly called democracy depend on
oligarchy. For the purposes of this enquiry we need to ascertain
all the elements and characteristics of democracy, since from the (1) differences of
population;
combinations of these the varieties of democratic government
arise. There are several of these differing from each other, and (2) different
the difference is due to two causes. One (1) has been already combinations of the
mentionedb ,—differences of population; for the popular element democratic elements.
may consist of husbandmen, or of mechanics, or of labourers,
and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only
does the democracy become better or worse, but its very nature is changed. A second
cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the various properties and characteristics of
democracy, when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will
have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these
characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to

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establish some new form of democracy, or only to remodel an existing onec .


Founders of states try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of
the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs, as I have already remarked d
when speaking of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the
principles, characteristics, and aims of such states.

The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the 1317 b.


common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a
state;—this they affirm to be the great end of every democracye . Liberty, the great end
One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and of democracy, means
(1) numerical
indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not
equality;
proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority must
be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the (2) absence of control.
end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and
therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are
more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This, then, is one note of
liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a
man should live as he likesa . This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, and, on the
other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second
characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none,
if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and so it coincides
with the freedom based upon equality [which was the first characteristic].
b
Such being our foundation and such the nature of democracy, its Characteristics of
characteristics are as followsb :—the election of officers by all democracy.
out of all; and that all should rule over each, and each in his turn
over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those All out of all, all over
which require experience and skill , should be made by lot; that each, each in turn
c
over all, in person or
no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a by deputy.
very low one; that no one should hold the same office twice, or
not often, except in the case of military offices; that the tenure of 1318 a.
all offices, or of as many as possible, should be brief; that all
men should sit in judgment, or that judges selected out of all Pay.
should judge in all matters, or in most, or in the greatest and
Vestiges of antiquity
most important,—such as the scrutiny of accounts, the in a democracy.
constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly should be
supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, Lot.
and the magistrates over none or only over a very fewd . Of all
institutions, a council is the most democratice when there is not ‘Everybody to count
for one and nobody
the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are paid even for more than one.’
this is robbed of its power; for the people then draw all cases to
themselves, as I said in the previous discussiona . The next characteristic of
democracy is payment for services; assembly, law-courts, magistrates, everybody
receives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to
the law-courts and to the stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at
least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together. And whereas
oligarchy is characterised by birth, wealth, and education, the notes of democracy
appear to be the opposite of these, — low birth, poverty, mean employment. Another

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note is that no magistracy is perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient
change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be
elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are points common to all democracies; but
democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of
democratic justice, that all should count equally; for equality implies that the rich
should have no more share in the government than the poorb , and should not be the
only rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their numbersc . And in this
way men think that they will secure equality and freedom in their state.

Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Is By what arrangement
the qualification to be so distributed that five hundred rich shall of the qualification is
be equal to a thousand poor? and shall we give the thousand a equality to be
power equal to that of the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the secured?
mode, ought we, still retaining the same ratio, to take equal
numbers from each and give them the control of the electionsd and of the courts? —
Which, according to the democratical notion, is the juster form of the
constitution,—this or one based on numbers only? Democrats say that justice is that to
which the majority agree, oligarchs that to which the wealthier class; in their opinion
the decision should be given according to the amount of property. In both principles
there is some inequality and injustice. For if justice is the will of the few, any one
person who has more wealth than all the rest of his class put together, ought, upon the
oligarchical principle, to have the sole power—but this would be tyranny; or if justice
is the will of the majority, as I was before sayinga , they will unjustly confiscate the
property of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality in which they both
agree we must enquire into their respective ideas of justice.

Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the In what sense is the
majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. Granted:—but not will of the majority
without some reserve; since there are two classes out of which a law?
state is composed,—the poor and the rich, — that is to be
deemed law, on which both or the greater part of both agree; and 1318 b.
if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number,
and by those who have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are
ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is
disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the
party of the poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a
case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the
greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than
at present, when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse is had to the lot,
or to some similar expedient. But, although it may be difficult in theory to know what
is just and equal, the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they
like, encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice,
but the stronger acare for none of these thingsa .

(1) The best material


of democracy an
agricultural
population, dwelling

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Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the previous far away from the
discussionb , the best is that which comes first in order; it is also town, and always at
the oldest of them all. I am speaking of them according to the work.
natural classification of their inhabitants. For the best material of
democracy is an agricultural populationc ; there is no difficulty in In such a democracy
the magistrates are
forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by elected by all out of
agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no leisure, the educated and
and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having wealthy, and are
the necessaries of life they are always at work, and do not covet responsible to all.
the property of others. Indeed, they find their employment
There is good
pleasanter than the cares of government or office where no great government and
gains can be made out of them, for the many are more desirous everybody is satisfied.
of gain than of honourd . A proof is that even the ancient
tyrannies were patiently endured by them, as they still endure Various modes of
oligarchies, if they are allowed to work and are not deprived of encouraging small
land-owners.
their property; for some of them grow quickly rich and the others
are well enough off. Moreover they have the power of electing 1319 a.
the magistrates and calling them to accounte ; their ambition, if
they have any, is thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although they do not all
share in the appointment of offices, except through representatives elected in turn out
of the whole people, as at Mantinea;—yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the
many are contented. Even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy,
and was such at Mantinea. Hence it is both expedient and customary in such a
democracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law-
courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons
having a qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no
offices for which a qualification is required, then those who are marked out by special
ability should be appointed. Under such a form of government the citizens are sure to
be governed well, (for the offices will always be held by the best persons; the people
are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of the good). The good and the
notables will then be satisfied, for they will not be governed by men who are their
inferiors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call them to
account. Every man should be responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to
do just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to
restrain the evil which is inherent in every man. But the principle of responsibility
secures that which is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule and are
prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due. It is evident that this is
the best kind of democracy, and why? because the people are drawn from a certain
class. The ancient laws of many states which aimed at making the people husbandmen
were excellent. They provided either that no one should possess more than a certain
quantity of land, or that, if he did, the land should not be within a certain distance
from the town or the acropolis. Formerly in many states there was a law forbidding
any one to sell his original allotment of landa . There is a similar law attributed to
Oxylus, which is to the effect that there should be a certain portion of every man’s
property on which he could not borrow money. A useful corrective to the evil of
which I am speaking would be the law of the Aphytaeans, who, although they are
numerous, and do not possess much land, are all of them husbandmen. For their

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properties are reckoned in the census, not entire, but only in such small portions bthat
even the poor may have more than the amount requiredb .

Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, are a (2) A pastoral
pastoral people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained democracy
of any for war, robust in body and able to camp out. The people
of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them, for 1319 b.
their life is inferior; there is no room for moral excellence in any
is also good. (3) The
of their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders or democracy of towns
labourers. Besides, people of this class can readily come to the far inferior.
assembly, because they are continually moving about in the city
and in the agora; whereas husbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet,
or equally feel the want of assembling together. Where the territory extends to a
distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy or
constitutional government; for the people are compelled to settle in the country, and
even if there is a town population the assembly ought not to meet when the country
people cannot come. We have thus explained how the first and best form of
democracy should be constituted; it is clear that the other or inferior sorts will deviate
in a regular order, and the population which is excluded will at each stage be of a
lower kind.

The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one (4) Extreme
which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless democracy has a
well regulated by laws and customs. The more general causes precarious existence.
which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government have
now been pretty fully considereda . In order to constitute such a How constituted.
democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in Where it should stop.
the habit of including as many as they can, and making citizens
not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the illegitimate, Often preserved by
and of those who have only one parent a citizen, whether father reorganization.
or motherb ; for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a
Licence granted in the
democracy. This is the way in which demagogues proceed.
extreme democracy to
Whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions slaves and women.
when the number of the commonalty exceeds that of the notables
or of the middle class,—beyond this not to go. When in excess of this point the state
becomes disorderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy, as
in the insurrection at Cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it
increases it strikes the eye. Measures like those which Cleisthenesa passed when he
wanted to increase the power of the democracy at Athens, or such as were taken by
the founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of
democracy. Fresh tribes and brotherhoods should be established; the private rites of
families should be restricted and converted into public ones; in short, every
contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and
get rid of old connections. Again, the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all
of them to be democratic; such, for instance, as the licence permitted to slaves (which
may be to a certain extent advantageous) and also that of women and children, and the
allowing everybody to live as he likesb . Such a government will have many
supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober manner.

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The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or To preserve a


principal business of the legislator, or of those who wish to democracy more
create such a state, for any state, however badly constituted, may difficult than to create
last one, two, or three days; a far greater difficulty is the one.
preservation of it. The legislator should therefore endeavour to
Moderation safer than
have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid excess.
down concerning the preservation and destruction of statesc ; he
should guard against the destructive elements, and should make 1320 a.
laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the
preservatives of states. He must not think the truly democratical The rich should be
spared, confiscation
or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest discouraged.
amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make
them last longestd . The demagogues of our own day often get The false accuser
property confiscateda in the law-courts in order to please the punished.
people. But those who have the welfare of the state at heart
should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned which
goes into the treasury should not be public but sacred. Thus offenders will be as much
afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain,
will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials
are as few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who bring
groundless accusations; for it is the practice to indict, not members of the popular
party, but the notables, although the citizens ought to be all equally attached to the
state, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.

Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens Few meetings and
are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless short sittings should
they are paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues be the rule.
presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be
The surplus revenue
obtained by a property-tax and confiscations and corrupt
should not be thrown
practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown away in largesses to
many democracies); where, I say, there are no revenues, the the poor,
government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts
should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This but should be saved
system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the and employed to start
them in life.
expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the
poor are paid; and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy Good example of the
persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their Carthaginians,
own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts.
Where there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed and Tarentines.
after their manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always
In elections vote and
receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is lot should be
like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the combined.
people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty
lowers the character of the democracy; measures also should be 1320 b.
taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is
equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be
accumulated and distributed among them, if possible, in such quantities as may enable
them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade and

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husbandry. And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be


distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the meantime the rich
should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies; and
should in return be excused from useless public services. By administering the state in
this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections of the people; their policy is from
time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns, where they grow richa .
It is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them,
and give them the means of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum is
also well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the
poor, they gain their good willb . Moreover, they divide all their offices into two
classes, one-half of them being elected by vote, the other by lot; the latter, that the
people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better
administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the same officesc , so as to have
two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot.

Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted.

From these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing How to construct an


what should be the constitution of oligarchies. We have only to oligarchy.
reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with
the corresponding form of democracy.

The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a 1321 a.


constitutional government. In this there ought to be two
standards of qualification; the one high, the other low—the lower The best kind of
qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the oligarchy should
include the best.
higher for the superior ones. He who acquires the prescribed
qualification should have the rights of citizenship. The nature of The worst and most
those admitted should be such as will make the entire governing precarious is the
body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen dynastic.
should be always taken out of the better class of the people. The
principle, narrowed a little, gives another form of oligarchy; until at length we reach
the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy,
which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its badness. For as healthy
bodies and ships well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive
them, whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very
least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require the greatest care. The
populousness of democracies generally preserves them (for number is to democracy
in the place of justice based on proportion); whereas the preservation of an oligarchy
clearly depends on an opposite principle, viz. good order.

The preservation of
oligarchies.

Cavalry and heavy


infantry oligarchical
forces.

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As there are four chief divisions of the common Light infantry and the
people,—husbandmen, mechanics, retail traders, labourers; so naval element
also there are four kinds of military forces,— the cavalry, the democratical.
a
heavy infantry, the light-armed troops, the navy . When the
country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely to The younger citizens
should be trained in
be established. For the security of the inhabitants depends upon a light infantry
force of this sort, and only rich men can afford to keep horses. exercises.
The second form of oligarchy prevails when there are heavy
infantryb ; for this service is better suited to the rich than to the Deserving persons
poor. But the light-armed and the naval element are wholly should be taken into
the government.
democratic; and nowadays, when they are so numerous, if the
two parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in Magistracies should
the struggle. A remedy for this state of things may be found in be made expensive
the practice of generals who combine a proper contingent of and the magistrates
light-armed troops, with cavalry and heavy-armed. And this is should be munificent.
the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil
1321 b.
contests; being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against
cavalry and heavy infantry. An oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower
classes raises a power against itself. And therefore, since the ages of the citizens vary
and some are older and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while
they are still young, taught the agile movements of light-armed troops; and some,
when they grow up, should be selected out of the youth, and become light-armed
warriors in reality. The oligarchy should also yield a share in the government to the
people, either, as I said before, to those who have a property qualificationa , or, as in
the case of Thebesb , to those who have abstained for a certain number of years from
mean employments, or, as at Massalia, to men of merit who are selected for their
worthiness, whether [previously] citizens or not. The magistracies of the highest rank,
which ought to be in the hands of the governing body, should have expensive duties
attached to them, and then the people will not desire them and will take no offence at
the privileges of their rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine for their dignity.
It is fitting also that the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent
sacrifices or erect some public edifice, and then the people who participate in the
entertainments, and like to see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings,
will not desire an alteration in the government, and the notables will have memorials
of their munificence. This, however, is anything but the fashion of our modern
oligarchs, who are as covetous of gain as they are of honour; oligarchies like theirs
may be well described as petty democracies. Enough of the manner in which
democracies and oligarchies should be organized.

Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their How to arrange the
number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have offices in a state.
a
already spoken . No state can exist not having the necessary
offices, and no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend to
preserve harmony and good order. In small states, as we have already remarkedb ,
there need not be many of them, but in larger there must be a larger number, and we
should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated.

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First among necessary offices is that which has the care of the (1) The warden of the
market; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and market.
to maintain order. For in every state there must inevitably be
buyers and sellers who will supply one another’s wants; this is (2) The warden of the
city.
the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing and so fulfil the
purpose for which men come together into one statec . A second (3) The warden of the
office of a similar kind undertakes the supervision and country.
embellishment of public and private buildings, the maintaining
and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes (4) The Treasurer.
about boundaries and other concerns of a like nature. This is
(5) Registrar.
commonly called the office of Citywarden, and has various
departments, which, in more populous towns, are shared among
different persons, one, for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the
fountains, a third of harbours. There is another equally necessary office, and of a
similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the
country:—the magistrates who hold this office are called Wardens of the country, or
Inspectors of the woods. Besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of
taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which they distribute among the
various departments; these are called Receivers or Treasurers. Another officer
registers all private contracts, and decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and
also all preliminary proceedings. This office again is sometimes subdivided, in which
case one officer is appointed over all the rest. These officers are called Recorders or
Sacred Recorders, Presidents, and the like.

Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most (6) Executioner,
necessary and also the most difficult, viz. that to which is
committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines 1322 a.
from those who are posted up according to the registers; and also
the custody of prisoners. The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is
attached to it; no one will undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any one
who does is loth to execute the law. Still the office is necessary; for judicial decisions
are useless if they take no effect; and if society cannot exist without them, neither can
it exist without the execution of them. It is an office which, being so unpopular,
should not be entrusted to one person, but divided among several taken from different
courts. In like manner an effort should be made to distribute among different persons
the writing up of those who are on the register of the condemned. Some sentences
should be executed by officers who have other functions; penalties for new offences
should be exacted by new offices; and as regards those which are not new, when one
court has given judgment, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens
of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora, and others
again should exact the fines imposed by them. For penalties are more likely to be
exacted when less odium attaches to the exaction of them; but a double odium is
incurred when the judges who have passed also execute the sentence, and if they are
always the executioners, they will be the enemies of all.

and jailor.

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In many places one magistracy has the custody of the prisoners, How their functions
while another executes the sentence, as, for example, ‘the may be rendered less
Eleven’ at Athens. It is well to separate off the jailorship, and try odious.
by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite
as necessary as that of the executioner; but good men do all they can to avoid it, and
worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it; for they themselves require a guard,
and are not fit to guard others. There ought not therefore to be a single or permanent
officer set apart for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they
are organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should take
charge of it.

These are the indispensable officers, and should be ranked first: 1322 b
— next in order follow others, equally necessary, but of higher
rank, and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such are the (7) Military offices.
offices to which are committed the guard of the city, and other
military functions. Not only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend
the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal the citizens. In some states there are
many such offices; in others there are a few only, while small states are content with
one; these officers are called generals or commanders. Again, if a state has cavalry or
light-armed troops or archers or a naval force, it will sometimes happen that each of
these departments has separate officers, who are called admirals, or generals of
cavalry or of infantry. And there are subordinate officers called naval and military
captains, and captains of horse; having others under them: — all these are included in
the department of war. Thus much of military command.

But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public (8) Auditors.
money, there must of necessity be another office which examines
and audits them, and has no other functions. Such officers are (9) Senators or
called by various names, — Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants, councillors.
Controllers. Besides all these offices there is another which is
supreme over them, and to this, which in a democracy presides over the assembly, is
often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of measures. For that power
which convenes the people must of necessity be the head of the state. In some places
they are called ‘probuli,’ because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy
more commonly ‘councillorsa .’ These are the chief political offices.

Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of (10) Priests.


religion; priests and guardians see to the preservation and repair
of the temples of the gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may
be enough in small places, but in larger ones there are a great many besides the
priesthood; for example superintendents of sacrifices, guardians of shrines, treasurers
of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the officers
appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices, except any which the law
assigns to the priests; such officers derive their dignity from the public hearth of the
city. They are sometimes called archons, sometimes kingsb , and sometimes prytanes.

Summary of
necessary offices.

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These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up 1323 a.
as follows: offices concerned with matters of religion, with war,
with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbours,
with the country; also with the courts of law, with the records of contracts, with
execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and
accounts of magistrates; lastly, there are those which preside over the public
deliberations of the state. There are likewise magistracies characteristic of states
which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order:
such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of the laws, guardians of
children, and directors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic and
Dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles. Some of these are clearly not
democratic offices; for example, the guardianships of women and childrenc —the
poor, not having any slaves, must employ both their women and children as servants.

Once more: there are three forms of the highest elective offices Different offices in
in states—guardians of the law, probuli, councillors,—of these, different states.
the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the probuli an
oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. Enough of the different kinds of
offices.

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[Back to Table of Contents]

BOOK VII.
He who would duly enquire about the best form of a state ought Proœmium. The
first to determine which is the most eligible life; while this individual and the
remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be state; what is the best
uncertain; for, in the natural order of things, those may be life; and is it the same
for both?
expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best
manner of which their circumstances admit. We ought therefore
to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the
same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals.

Assuming that enough has been already said in exoteric For the best life all
discourses concerning the best life, we will now only repeat the the three classes of
statements contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute the goods are required.
propriety of that partition of goods which separates them into
three classesa , viz. external goods, goods of the body, and goods This would be
generally admitted,
of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have all three. For but people differ
no one would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a about the relative
particle of courage or temperance or justice or prudence, who is importance of them.
afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will commit
any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or 1323 b.
drink, who will sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of half-a- Virtue is not acquired
farthing, and is as feeble and false in mind as a child or a or preserved by
madman. These propositions are universally acknowledged as external goods, but
b
soon as they are uttered , but men differ about the degree or external goods by
relative superiority of this or that good. Some think that a very virtue.
moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their
The goods of the soul
desires of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. To never in excess; they
whom we reply by an appeal to facts, which easily prove that are of primary, other
mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods of secondary,
goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that importance.
happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is
more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their
character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who
possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities; and this
is not only matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in
accordance with reason. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other
instrumenta , and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of
them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every
good of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful as well as
noble is appropriate to such subjects. No proof is required to show that the best state
of one thing in relation to another is proportioned to the degree of excellence by
which the natures corresponding to those states are separated from each other: so that,
if the soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in
relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the
other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body

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are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and
not the soul for the sake of them.

Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of The divine nature
happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and witnesses to the truth
wise action. God is a witness to us of this truthb , for he is happy that happiness is
and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself independent of
external goods.
and by reason of his own nature. And herein of necessity lies the
difference between good fortune and happiness; for external
goods come of themselves, and chance is the author of them, but no one is just or
temperate by or through chancea . In like manner, and by a similar train of argument,
the happy state may be shown to be that which is [morally] best and which acts
rightly; and rightly it cannot act without doing right actions, and neither individual nor
state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, justice, and
wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the qualities which give the
individual who possesses them the name of just, wise, or temperate.

Thus much may suffice by way of preface: for I could not avoid touching upon these
questions, neither could I go through all the arguments affecting them; these must be
reserved for another discussion.

Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and The best life;
states, is the life of virtue, having external goods enough for the
performance of good actions. If there are any who controvert our 1324 a.
assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over, and consider
their objections hereafter.

There remains to be discussed the question, Whether the the same for
happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state, or individuals and state.
different? Here again there can be no doubt—no one denies that
they are the same. For those who hold that the well-being of the individual consists in
his wealth, also think that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and those who
value most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the
greatest number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more
virtuous a city is, the happier it is. Two points here present themselves for
consideration: first (1), which is the more eligible life, that of a citizen who is a
member of a state, or that of an alien who has no political ties; and again (2), which is
the best form of constitution or the best condition of a state, either on the supposition
that political privileges are given to all, or that they are given to a majority only?
Since the good of the state and not of the individual is the proper subject of political
thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political discussion, while the first
of these two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject
of our enquiry.

1324 b.

The different lives of


men: some say

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Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which (1) that even a
every man, whoever he is, can act for the best and live happily. political or
But even those who agree in thinking that the life of virtue is the constitutional rule is
most eligible raise a question, whether the life of business and detrimental to the
character; (2) that the
politics is or is not more eligible than one which is wholly political is the true
independent of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life, life;
which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a
philosopher. For these two lives—the life of the philosopher and (3) that happiness is
the life of the statesman—appear to have been preferred by those despotic power.
who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our
The laws of most
own and in other ages. Which is the better is a question of no nations, however
small moment; for the wise man, like the wise state, will confused, make
necessarily regulate his life according to the best end. There are power and conquest
some who think that while a despotic rule over others is the their aim.
greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over them, Illustrations.
even though not unjust, is a great impediment to a man’s But is domination the
individual well-being. Others take an opposite view; they true object of
maintain that the true life of man is the practical and political, statesmanship? Nay,
and that every virtue admits of being practised, quite as much by it is unjust.
statesmen and rulers as by private individuals. Others, again, are
1325 a.
of opinion that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with
happiness; indeed, ain some states the entire aim of the lawsa is A city placed where
to give men despotic power over their neighbours. And, war is an
therefore, although in most cities the laws may be said generally impossibility may still
to be in a chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at be happy.
the maintenance of power: thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the
The ideal of the
system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed lawgiver relative to
with a view to wara . And in all nations which are able to gratify circumstances.
their ambition military power is held in esteem, for example
among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts. In some nations there are
even laws tending to stimulate the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told
that men obtain the honour of wearing as many rings as they have served campaigns.
There was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should wear
a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to
drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a
warlike nation, the number of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by the
number of obelisks which are fixed in the earth round his tomb; and there are
numerous practices among other nations of a like kind, some of them established by
law and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the
statesman should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over
others, whether they will or not. How can that which is not even lawful be the
business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without
regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right. The other arts and
sciences offer no parallel; a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his
patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet many appear to think that a
despotic government is a true political form, and what men affirm to be unjust and
inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed of practising towards others; they
demand justice for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing

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about it. Such behaviour is irrational; unless the one party is born to command, and
the other born to serve, in which case men have a right to command, not indeed all
their fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects; just as we ought not to
hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which are intended
for food or sacrifice, that is to say, such wild animals as are eatable. And surely there
may be a city happy in isolation, which we will assume to be well-governed (for it is
quite possible that a city thus isolated might be well-administered and have good
laws); but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest
of enemies,—all that sort of thing must be excluded. Hence we see very plainly that
warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed honourable, are not the supreme
end of all things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should enquire how states
and races of men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness
which is attainable by them. His enactments will not be always the same; and where
there are neighboursa he will have to deal with them according to their characters, and
to see what duties are to be performed towards each. The end at which the best form
of government should aim may be properly made a matter of future considerationb .

Let us now address those who, while they agree that the life of Is the life of the
virtue is the most eligible, differ about the manner of practising freeman better than
it. For some renounce political power, and think that the life of that of the ruler?
the freeman is different from the life of the statesman and the
Better than the life of
best of all; but others think the life of the statesman best. The
the despot certainly.
argument of the latter is that he who does nothing cannot do
well, and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. To But all rule is not that
both we say: ‘you are partly right and partly wrong.’ The first of the despot.
class are right in affirming that the life of the freeman is better
than the life of the despot; for there is nothing grand or noble in Not better, inasmuch
as happiness implies
having the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave; or in issuing activity.
commands about necessary things. But it is an error to suppose
that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great
a difference between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves as there is
between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I have said enough at
the commencement of this treatisea . And it is equally a mistake to place inactivity
above action, for happiness is activity, and the actions of the just and wise are the
realization of much that is noble.

But perhaps some one, accepting these premises, may still But, if so, he who has
maintain that supreme power is the best of all things, because the most power can do
possessors of it are able to perform the greatest number of noble the most good.
actions. If so, the man who is able to rule, instead of giving up
Reductio ad absurdum
anything to his neighbour, ought rather to take away his power;
of this doctrine.
and the father should make no account of his son, nor the son of
his father, nor friend of friend; they should not bestow a thought Only the supremely
on one another in comparison with this higher object, for the best best man has a right
is the most eligible and ‘doing well’ is the best. There might be to absolute power.
some truth in such a view if we assume that robbers and
1325 b.
plunderers attain the chief good. But this can never be; and hence
we infer the view to be false. For the actions of a ruler cannot

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really be honourable, unless he is as much superior to other men as a husband is to a


wife, or a father to his children, or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who
violates the law can never recover by any success, however great, what he has already
lost in departing from virtue. For equals share alike in the honourable and the just, as
is just and equal. But that the unequal should be given to equals, and the unlike to
those who are like, is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is
good. If, therefore, there is any oneb superior in virtue and in the power of performing
the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey, but he must have the capacity for
action as well as virtue.

If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be The life of virtuous
virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for the city activity the best, but
collectively, and for individuals. Not that a life of action must this is not confined to
necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are external actions.
those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for
There may be an
the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and inward energy, like
contemplations which are independent and complete in the divine, both in
themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore action, is an states and individuals.
end, and even in the case of external actions the directing mind is
most truly said to act. Neither, again, is it necessary that states which are cut off from
others and choose to live alone should be inactive; for there may be activity also in the
parts; there are many ways in which the members of a state act upon one another. The
same thing is equally true of every individual. If this were otherwise, God and the
universe, who have no external actions over and above their own energiesa , would be
far enough from perfection. Hence it is evident that the same life is best for each
individual, and for states, and for mankind collectively.

Thus far by way of introduction. In what has preceded I have 1326 a.


discussed other forms of government; in what remains the first
point to be considered is what should be the conditions of the The materials of the
ideal or perfect state; for the perfect state cannot exist without a ideal state.
due supply of the means of life. And therefore we must
presuppose many purely imaginary conditionsb , but nothing impossible. There will
be, a certain number of citizens, a country in which to place them, and the like. As the
weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan must have the material proper for his work
(and in proportion as this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be nobler), so
the statesman or legislator must also have the materials suited to him.

Population.

Extent.

The largest state not


always the greatest.

The number of
warriors and
councillors the test.

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First among the materials required by the statesman is A limit necessary,


population: he will consider what should be the number and
character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and as in works of art,
character of the country. Most persons think that a state in order plants, animals.
to be happy ought to be large; but even if they are right, they
1326 b.
have no idea what is a large and what a small state. For they
judge of the size of the city by the number of the inhabitants; A state should be
whereas they ought to regard, not their number, but their power. neither too large nor
A city too, like an individual, has a work to do; and that city too small; but large
which is best adapted to the fulfilment of its work is to be enough to be self-
sufficing, small
deemed greatest, in the same sense of the word great in which enough to be well-
Hippocrates might be called greater, not as a man, but as a governed.
physician, than some one else who was taller. And even if we
reckon greatness by numbers, we ought not to include everybody, for there must
always be in cities a multitude of slaves and sojourners and foreigners; but we should
include those only who are members of the state, and who form an essential part of it.
The number of the latter is a proof of the greatness of a city; but a city which produces
numerous artisans and comparatively few soldiers cannot be great, for a great city is
not to be confounded with a populous one. Moreover, experience shows that a very
populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed; since all cities which have a
reputation for good government have a limit of population. We may argue on grounds
of reason, and the same result will follow. For law is order, and good law is good
order; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly: to introduce order into the
unlimited is the work of a divine power—of such a power as holds together the
universe. Beauty is realized in number and magnitudea , and the state which combines
magnitude with good order must necessarily be the most beautiful. To the size of
states there is a limit, as there is to other things, plants, animals, implements; for none
of these retain their natural power when they are too large or too small, but they either
wholly lose their nature, or are spoiled. For examplea , a ship which is only a span
long will not be a ship at all, nor a ship a quarter of a mile long; yet there may be a
ship of a certain size, either too large or too small, which will still be a ship, but bad
for sailing. In like manner a state when composed of too few is not as a state ought to
be, self-sufficing; when of too many, though self-sufficing in all mere necessaries, it
is a nation and not a state, being almost incapable of constitutional government. For
who can be the general of such a vast multitude, or who the herald, unless he have the
voice of a Stentor?

A state then only begins to exist when it has attained a The citizens should
population sufficient for a good life in the political community: it know one another.
may indeed somewhat exceed this number. But, as I was saying,
there must be a limit. What should be the limit will be easily ascertained by
experience. For both governors and governed have duties to perform; the special
functions of a governor are to command and to judge. But if the citizens of a state are
to judge and to distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other’s
characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and
the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the population is very large they are
manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not to be. Besides, in an
overpopulous state foreigners and metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for

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who will find them out? Clearly then the best limit of the population of a state is the
largest number which suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single
view. Enough concerning the size of a city.

Much the same principle will apply to the territory of the state: They should have
every one would agree in praising the state which is most leisure.
entirely self-sufficing; and that must be the state which is all-
producing, for to have all things and to want nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent
it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live temperately and liberally in the
enjoyment of leisurea . Whether we are right or wrong in laying down this limit we
will enquire more precisely hereafterb , when we have occasion to consider what is
the right use of property and wealth: a matter which is much disputed, because men
are inclined to rush into one of two extremes, some into meanness, others into luxury.

It is not difficult to determine the general character of the The territory should
territory which is required; there are, however, some points on be defensible.
which military authorities should be heard; they tell us that it
should be difficult of access to the enemy, and easy of egress to The city should have
a good central
the inhabitants. Further, we require that the land as well as the
position.
inhabitants of whom we were just now speaking should be taken
in at a single view, for a country which is easily seen can be 1327 a.
easily protected. As to the position of the city, if we could have
what we wish, it should be well-situated in regard both to sea or land. This then is one
principle, that it should be a convenient centre for the protection of the whole country:
the other is, that it should be suitable for receiving the fruits of the soil, and also for
the bringing in of timber and any other products.

Whether a communication with the sea is beneficial to a well- Should it be near the
ordered state or not is a question which has often been asked. It sea? Much to be said
is argued that the introduction of strangers brought up under for and against.
other laws, and the increase of population, will be adverse to Reasons against.
good order (for a maritime people will always have a crowd of
Many reasons for.
merchants coming and going), and that intercourse by sea is
inimical to good governmentc . Apart from these considerations, it would be
undoubtedly better, both with a view to safety and to the provision of necessaries, that
the city and territory should be connected with the sea; the defenders of a country, if
they are to maintain themselves against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by
land and by sea; and even if they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, they
will have less difficulty in doing mischief to their assailants on one element, if they
themselves can use both. Moreover, it is necessary that they should import from
abroad what is not found in their own country, and that they should export what they
have in excess; for a city ought to be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself.

The city should not be


a market for the
world: but still the
port may be
conveniently

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Those who make themselves a market for the world only do so connected with the
for the sake of revenue, and if a state ought not to desire profit of town.
this kind it ought not to have such an emporium. Now a days we
often see in countries and cities dockyards and harbours very conveniently placed
outside the city, but not too far off; and they are kept in dependence by walls and
similar fortifications. Cities thus situated manifestly reap the benefit of intercourse
with their ports; and any harm which is likely to accrue may be easily guarded against
by the laws, which will pronounce and determine who may hold communication with
one another, and who may not.

There can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate naval 1327 b.


force is advantageous to a city; the citizens require such a force
for their own needs, and they should also be formidable to their Advantages of a naval
neighbours in certain casesa , or, if necessary, able to assist them force.
by sea as well as by land. The proper number or magnitude of
The sailors need not
this naval force is relative to the character of the state; for if her be citizens.
function is to take a leading part in politicsb , her naval power
should be commensurate with the scale of her enterprizes. The population of the state
need not be much increased, since there is no necessity that the sailors should be
citizens: the marines who have the control and command will be freemen, and belong
also to the infantry; and wherever there is a dense population of Perioeci and
husbandmen, there will always be sailors more than enough. Of this we see instances
at the present day. The city of Heraclea, for example, although small in comparison
with many others, can man a considerable fleet. Such are our conclusions respecting
the territory of the state, its harbour, its towns, its relations to the sea, and its maritime
power.

Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will proceed to The citizens should be
speak of what should be their character. This is a subject which of an intermediate
can be easily understood by any one who casts his eye on the character, combining
more celebrated states of Hellas, and generally on the spirit and intelligence;
of that character
distribution of races in the habitable world. Those who live in a which distinguishes
cold climate and in [northern] Europe are full of spirit, but the Hellenes from
wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they keep their other races.
freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of
ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent Attack upon Plato.
and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they
1328 a.
are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic
race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in Friendship contains
character, being high-spirited and also intelligenta . Hence it an element of passion
continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it which is also the basis
could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world. both of authority and
liberty.
There are also similar differences in the different tribes of Hellas;
for some of them are of a one-sided nature, and are intelligent or
courageous only, while in others there is a happy combination of both qualities. And
clearly those whom the legislator will most easily lead to virtue may be expected to be
both intelligent and courageous. Some [like Platob ] say that the guardians should be
friendly towards those whom they know, fierce towards those whom they do not

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know. Now, passion is the quality of the soul which begets friendship and inspires
affection; notably the spirit within us is more stirred against our friends and
acquaintances than against those who are unknown to us, when we think that we are
despised by them; for which reason Archilochus, complaining of his friends, very
naturally addresses his soul in these words,

‘For wert thou not plagued on account of friendsa ?’

The power of command and the love of freedom are in all men based upon this
quality, for passion is commanding and invincible. Nor is it right to say that the
guardians should be fierce towards those whom they do not know, for we ought not to
be out of temper with any one; and a lofty spirit is not fierce by nature, but only when
excited against evil-doers. And this, as I was saying before, is a feeling which men
show most strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a wrong at
their hands: as indeed is reasonable; for, besides the actual injury, they seem to be
deprived of a benefit by those who owe them one. Hence the saying,

‘Cruel is the strife of brethrenb ;’

and again,

‘They who love in excess also hate in excessb .’

Thus we have nearly determined the number and character of the citizens of our state,
and also the size and nature of their territory. I say ‘nearly,’ for we ought not to
require the same minuteness in theory as in factc .

As in other natural compounds the conditions of a composite Parts not to be


whole are not necessarily organic parts of it, so in a state or in identified with
any other combination forming a unity not everything is a part, conditions.
which is a necessary conditiond . The members of an association
have necessarily some one thing the same and common to all, in To find the parts of a
state we must
which they share equally or unequally; for example, food or land enumerate the
or any other thing. But where there are two things of which one conditions of one.
is a means and the other an end, they have nothing in common
except that the one receives what the other produces. Such, for 1328 b.
example, is the relation in which workmen and tools stand to
their work; the house and the builder have nothing in common, but the art of the
builder is for the sake of the house. And so states require property, but property, even
though living beings are included in ita , is no part of a state; for a state is not a
community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best life
possible. Now, whereas happiness is the highest good, being a realization and perfect
practice of virtue, which some attain, while others have little or none of it, the various
qualities of men are clearly the reason why there are various kinds of states and many
forms of government; for different men seek after happiness in different ways and by
different means, and so make for themselves different modes of life and forms of
government. We must see also how many things are indispensable to the existence of

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a state, for what we call the parts of a state will be found among them. Let us then
enumerate the functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit what we want:

First, there must be food; secondly, arts, for life requires many instruments; thirdly,
there must be arms, for the members of a community have need of them in order to
maintain authority both against disobedient subjects and against external assailants;
fourthly, there must be a certain amount of revenue, both for internal needs, and for
the purposes of war; fifthly, or rather first, there must be a care of religion, which is
commonly called worship; sixthly, and most necessary of all, there must be a power
of deciding what is for the public interest, and what is just in men’s dealings with one
another.

These are the things which every state may be said to need. For a state is not a mere
aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of lifeb ; and if
any of these things be wanting, it is simply impossible that the community can be self-
sufficing. A state then should be framed with a view to the fulfilment of these
functions. There must be husbandmen to procure food, and artisans, and a warlike and
a wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide what is justa and expedient.

Having determined these points, we have in the next place to 1329 a.


consider whether all ought to share in every sort of occupation.
Shall every man be at once husbandman, artisan, councillor, Should every man
judge, or shall we suppose the several occupations just hold every office?
mentioned assigned to different persons? or, thirdly, shall some
The meaner sort must
employments be assigned to individuals and others common to be excluded.
all? The question, however, does not occur in every state; as we
were saying, all may be shared by all, or not all by all, but only some by someb ; and
hence arise the differences of states, for in democracies all share in all, in oligarchies
the opposite practice prevails. Now, since we are here speaking of the best form of
government, and that under which the state will be most happy (and happiness, as has
been already said, cannot exist without virtuec ), it clearly follows that in the state
which is best governed the citizens who are absolutely and not merely relatively just
men must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and
inimical to virtued . Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is necessary both
for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties.

Again, there is in a state a class of warriors, and another of Should the same
councillors, who advise about the expedient and determine persons be both
matters of law, and these seem in an especial manner parts of a warriors and
state. Now, should these two classes be distinguished, or are both councillors?
functions to be assigned to the same persons? Here again there is
Yes; but at different
no difficulty in seeing that both functions will in one way belong ages.
to the same, in another, to different persons. To different persons
in so far as their employments are suited to different ages of life, The governing classes
for the one requires wisdom, and the other strength. But on the should be in easy
other hand, since it is an impossible thing that those who are able circumstances.
to use or to resist force should be willing to remain always in
subjection, from this point of view the persons are the same; for those who carry arms

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can always determine the fate of the constitution. It remains therefore that both
functions of government should be entrusted to the same persons, not, however, at the
same time, but in the order prescribed by nature, who has given to young men
strength and to older men wisdom. Such a distribution of duties will be expedient and
also just, and is founded upon a principle of proportion. Besides, the ruling class
should be the owners of property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state
should be in good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other class whose art
excludes the art of virtue have no share in the state. This follows from our first
principle, for happiness cannot exist without virtue, and a city is not to be termed
happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in regard to them alla . And clearly
property should be in their hands, since the husbandmen will of necessity be slaves or
barbarians or Perioecib .

Of the classes enumerated there remain only the priests, and the Those who are past
manner in which their office is to be regulated is obvious. No the service of the state
husbandman or mechanic should be appointed to it; for the Gods should enter the
should receive honour from the citizens only. Now since the service of the Gods.
body of the citizens is divided into two classes, the warriors and
the councillors; and it is beseeming that the worship of the Gods should be duly
performed, and also a rest provided in their service for those who from age have given
up active life—to the old men of these two classes should be assigned the duties of the
priesthood.

We have shown what are the necessary conditions, and what the parts of a state:
husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of
states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and councillors. And these are
distinguished severally from one another, the distinction being in some cases
permanent, in others not.

It is no new or recent discovery of political philosophers that the 1329 b.


state ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors
should be separated from the husbandmen. The system has Caste an Egyptian
continued in Egypt and in Crete to this day, and was established, institution. The
as tradition says, by a law of Sesostris in Egypt and of Minos in Syssitia came to Crete
from Italy.
Crete. The institution of common tables also appears to be of
ancient date, being in Crete as old as the reign of Minos, and in Digression on Italian
Italy far older. The Italian historians say that there was a certain geography.
Italus king of Oenotria, from whom the Oenotrians were called
Italians, and who gave the name of Italy to the promontory of ‘There is nothing new
under the sun.’
Europe lying between the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are
distant from one another only half-a-day’s journey. They say that Antiquity of Egypt.
this Italus converted the Oenotrians from shepherds into
husbandmen, and besides other laws which he gave them, was the founder of their
common meals; even in our day some who are derived from him retain this institution
and certain other laws of his. On the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the Opici,
who are now, as of old, called Ausones; and on the side towards Iapygia and the
Ionian Gulf, in the district called Syrtisa , the Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian
race. From this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the

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separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is
of far greater antiquity than that of Minos. It is true indeed that these and many other
things have been invented several times overb in the course of ages, or rather times
without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions
which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that
other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. And we
may infer that in political institutions the same rule holds. Egypta witnesses to the
antiquity of all things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the most ancient;
and they have laws and a regular constitution [existing from time immemorial]. We
should therefore make the best use of what has been already discoveredb , and try to
supply defects.

I have already remarked that the land ought to belong to those Land should belong to
who possess arms and have a share in the governmentc , and that a ruling, and be tilled
the husbandmen ought to be a class distinct from them; and I by a subject, class.
have determined what should be the extent and nature of the
territory. Let me proceed to discuss the distribution of the land, 1330 a.
and the character of the agricultural class; for I do not think that
property ought to be common, as some maintaind , but only that by friendly consent
there should be a common use of it; and that no citizen should be in want of
subsistence.

As to common meals, there is a general agreement that a well- Common meals


ordered city should have them; and we will hereafter explain should be established
what are our own reasons for taking this view. They ought, at the public cost.
e
however, to be open to all the citizens . And yet it is not easy for
Land to be half
the poor to contribute the requisite sum out of their private
private, half public,
means, and to provide also for their household. The expense of and to be divided into
religious worship should likewise be a public charge. The land double lots.
must therefore be divided into two parts, one public and the other
private, and each part should be subdivided, half of the public The cultivators to be
land being appropriated to the service of the Gods, and the other slaves.
half used to defray the cost of the common meals; while of the Slaves should be well
private land, half should be near the border, and the other near treated and
the city, so that each citizen having two lots they may all of them encouraged by the
have land in both places; there is justice and fairness in such a hope of freedom. 11.
a
division , and it tends to inspire unanimity among the people in
their border wars. Where there is not this arrangement, some of them are too ready to
come to blows with their neighbours, while others are so cautious that they quite lose
the sense of honour. Wherefore there is a law in some places which forbids those who
dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations about wars with neighbours,
on the ground that their interests will pervert their judgment. For the reasons already
mentioned then, the land should be divided in the manner described. The very best
thing of all would be that the husbandmen should be slaves, not all of the same raceb
and not spirited, for if they have no spirit they will be better suited for their work, and
there will be no danger of their making a revolution. The next best thing would be that
they should be perioeci of foreign racec , and of a like inferior nature; some of them
should be the slaves of individuals, and employed on the private estates of men of

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property, the remainder should be the property of the state and employed on the
common landd . I will hereafter explain what is the proper treatment of slaves, and
why it is expedient that liberty should be always held out to them as the reward of
their services.

We have already said that the city should be open to the land and The city itself should
to the seae , and to the whole country as far as possible. In be healthy;
respect of the place itself our wish would be to find a situation
for it, fortunate in four things. The first, health—this is a should have a site
necessity: cities which lie towards the east, and are blown upon convenient for war
and administration,
by winds coming from the east, are the healthiest; next in
healthfulness are those which are sheltered from the north wind, a good water supply,
for they have a milder winter. The site of the city should likewise
be convenient both for political administration and for war. With and good air.
a view to the latter it should afford easy egress to the citizens,
1330 b.
and at the same time be inaccessible and difficult of capture to
a
enemies . There should be a natural abundance of springs and
fountains in the town, or, if there is a deficiency of them, great reservoirs may be
established for the collection of rain-water, such as will not fail when the inhabitants
are cut off from the country by war. Special care should be taken of the health of the
inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on the healthiness of the locality and of the
quarter to which they are exposed, and secondly, on the use of pure water; this latter
point is by no means a secondary consideration. For the elements which we use most
and oftenest for the support of the body contribute most to health, and among these
are water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is a want of pure water, and
the supply is not all equally good, the drinking water ought to be separated from that
which is used for other purposes.

As to strongholds, what is suitable to different forms of Different positions


government varies: thus an acropolis is suited to an oligarchy or suitable to different
a monarchy, but a plain to a democracy; neither to an aristocracy, forms of government.
but rather a number of strong places. The arrangement of private
How the streets
houses is considered to be more agreeable and generally more
should be laid out.
convenient, if the streets are regularly laid out after the modern
fashion which Hippodamusb introduced, but for security in war the antiquated mode
of building, which made it difficult for strangers to get out of a town and for assailants
to find their way in, is preferable. A city should therefore adopt both plans of
building: it is possible to arrange the houses irregularly, as husbandmen plant their
vines in what are called ‘clumps.’ The whole town should not be laid out in straight
lines, but only certain quarters and regions; thus security and beauty will be
combined.

As to walls, those who saya that cities making any pretension to 1331 a.
military virtue should not have them, are quite out of date in their
notions; and they may see the cities which prided themselves on Should there be walls
this fancy confuted by facts. True, there is little courage shown to the city?
in seeking for safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar
in character and not much superior in number; but the superiority of the besiegers may

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be and often is beyond the power of men to resist, and too much for the valour of a
few; and if they are to be saved and to escape defeat and outrage, the strongest wall
will be the best defence of the warrior, more especially now that catapults and siege
engines have been brought to such perfection. To have no walls would be as foolish as
to choose a site for a town in an exposed country, and to level the heights; or as if an
individual were to leave his house unwalled, lest the inmates should become cowards.
Nor must we forget that those who have their cities surrounded by walls may either
take advantage of them or not, but cities which are unwalled have no choice.

If our conclusions are just, not only should cities have walls, but Yes; and the walls
care should be taken to make them ornamental, as well as useful may be made
for warlike purposes, and adapted to resist modern inventions. ornamental as well as
For as the assailants of a city do all they can to gain an useful.
advantage, so the defenders should make use of any means of
defence which have been already discovered, and should devise and invent others, for
when men are well prepared no enemy even thinks of attacking them.

As the walls are to be divided by guardhouses and towers built at The guardhouses will
suitable intervals, and the body of citizens must be distributed at serve for Syssitia.
common tables, the idea will naturally occur that we should
establish some of the common tables in the guardhouses. The The temples and
arrangement might be as follows: the principal common tables of government buildings
should be ‘high and
the magistrates will occupy a suitable place, and there also will lifted up.’
be the buildings appropriated to religious worship except in the
case of those rites which the law or the Pythian oracle has The freemen’s agora.
a
restricted to a special locality . The site should be a spot seen far
and wide, which gives due elevation to virtue and towers over The traders’ agora.
the neighbourhood. Near this spot should be established an
1331 b.
agora, such as that which the Thessalians call the ‘freemen’s
agora;’ from this all trade should be excluded, and no mechanic, husbandman, or any
such person allowed to enter, unless he be summoned by the magistrates. It would be
a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of the elder men were
performed there. For bin this noble practice different ages should be separatedb , and
some of the magistrates should stay with the boys, while the grown-up men remain
with the magistrates [i.e. in the freeman’s agora]; for the presence of the magistrates is
the best mode of inspiring true modesty and ingenuous fear. There should also be a
traders’ agora, distinct and apart from the other, in a situation which is convenient for
the reception of goods both by sea and land.

But in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget another The government
section of the citizens, viz. the priests, for whom public tables offices.
should likewise be provided in their proper place near the
temples. The magistrates who deal with contracts, indictments, summonses, and the
like, and those who have the care of the agora and of the city respectively, ought to be
established near the agora and in some public place of meeting; the neighbourhood of
the traders’ agora will be a suitable spot; the upper agora we devote to the life of
leisure, the other is intended for the necessities of trade.

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The same order should prevaila in the country, for there too the Similar arrangements
magistrates, called by some ‘Inspectors of Forests,’ and by others in the country.
‘Wardens of the Country,’ must have guardhouses and common
tables while they are on duty; temples should also be scattered throughout the country,
dedicated, some to Gods, and some to heroes.

But it would be a waste of time for us to linger over details like these. The difficulty is
not in imagining but in carrying them out. We may talk about them as much as we
like, but the execution of them will depend upon fortune. Wherefore let us say no
more about these matters for the present.

Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to determine out The well-being of the
of what and what sort of elements the state which is to be happy state depends upon
and well-governed should be composed. There are two things in the choice of a good
which all well-being consists, one of them is the choice of a right end and of good
means for the
end and aim of action, and the other the discovery of the actions attainment of it.
which are means towards it; for the means and the end may agree
or disagree. Sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they fail to
attain it; in other cases they are successful in all the means, but they propose to
themselves a bad end, and sometimes they fail in both. Take, for example, the art of
medicine; physicians do not always understand the nature of health, and also the
means which they use may not effect the desired end. In all arts and sciences both the
end and the means should be equally within our control.

The happiness and well-being which all men manifestly desire, 1332 a.
some have the power of attaining, but to others, from some
accident or defect of nature, the attainment of them is not granted; for a good life
requires a supply of external goods, in a less degree when men are in a good state, in a
greater degree when they are in a lower state. Others again, who possess the condition
of happiness, go utterly wrong from the first in the pursuit of it. But since our object is
to discover the best form of government, that, namely, under which a city will be best
governed, and since the city is best governed which has the greatest opportunity of
obtaining happiness, it is evident that we must clearly ascertain the nature of
happiness.

We have said in the Ethicsa , if the arguments there adduced are Absolute and relative
of any value, that happiness is the realization and perfect good.
exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. And I
used the term ‘conditional’ to express that which is External goods the
condition not the
indispensable, and ‘absolute’ to express that which is good in
cause of happiness.
itself. Take the case of just actions; just punishments and
chastisements do indeed spring from a good principle, but they are good only because
we cannot do without them—it would be better that neither individuals nor states
should need anything of the sort—but actions which aim at honour and advantage are
absolutely the best. The conditional action is only the choiceb of a lesser evil; whereas
these are the foundation and creation of good. A good man may make the best even of
poverty and disease, and the other ills of life; but he can only attain happiness under
the opposite conditionsc . As we have already said in the Ethicsd , the good man is he

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to whom, because he is virtuous, the absolute good is his good. It is also plain that his
use of other goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense good. This makes men
fancy that external goods are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that a
brilliant performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument and not to the
skill of the performer.

It follows then from what has been said that some things the They depend on
legislator must find ready to his hand in a state, others he must fortune;
provide. And therefore we can only say: May our state be
constituted in such a manner as to be blessed with the goods of virtue on will.
which fortune disposes (for we acknowledge her power):
whereas virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of
knowledge and purpose. A city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a
share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the
government; let us then enquire how a man becomes virtuous. For even if we could
suppose all the citizens to be virtuous, and not each of them, yet the latter would be
better, for in the virtue of each the virtue of all is involved.

There are three things which make men good and virtuous: these 1332 b.
are nature, habit, reasona . In the first place, every one must be
born a man and not some other animal; in the second place, he Three elements of
must have a certain character, both of body and soul. But some virtue: (1) nature; (2)
qualities there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered by habit; (3) reason.
habit, and there are some gifts of nature which may be turned by
habit to good or bad. Most animals lead a life of nature, although in lesser particulars
some are influenced by habit as well. Man has reason, in addition, and man onlyb .
Wherefore nature, habit, reason must be in harmony with one another; [for they do not
always agree]; men do many things against habit and nature, if reason persuades them
that they ought. We have already determined what natures are likely to be most easily
moulded by the hands of the legislatorc . All else is the work of education; we learn
some things by habit and some by instruction.

Since every political society is composed of rulers and subjects, Are rulers and ruled
let us consider whether the relations of one to the other should to interchange?
interchange or be permanentd . For the education of the citizens
will necessarily vary with the answer given to this question. No and yes; they are
to be the same
Now, if some men excelled others in the same degree in which
persons, but at
gods and heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general, different times of life.
having in the first place a great advantage even in their bodies,
and secondly in their minds, so that the superiority of the governors aover their
subjects was patent and undisputeda , it would clearly be better that once for all the
one class should rule and the others serveb . But since this is unattainable, and kings
have no marked superiority over their subjects, such as Scylax affirms to be found
among the Indians, it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens
alike should take their turn of governing and being governed. Equality consists in the
same treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand which is not founded
upon justice. For [if the government be unjust] every one in the country unites with
the governed in the desire to have a revolution, and it is an impossibility that the

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members of the government can be so numerous as to be stronger than all their


enemies put together. Yet that governors should excel their subjects is undeniable.
How all this is to be effected, and in what way they will respectively share in the
government, the legislator has to consider. The subject has been already mentioned c .
Nature herself has given the principle of choice when she made a difference between
old and young (though they are really the same in kind), of whom she fitted the one to
govern and the others to be governed. No one takes offence at being governed when
he is young, nor does he think himself better than his governors, especially if he will
enjoy the same privilege when he reaches the required age.

We conclude that from one point of view governors and 1333 a.


governed are identical, and from another different. And therefore
their education must be the same and also different. For he who Hence their education
would learn to command well must, as men say, first of all learn must be the same yet
different.
to obeya . As I observed in the first part of this treatise, there is
one rule which is for the sake of the rulers and another rule Service may be
which is for the sake of the ruledb ; the former is a despotic, the honourable and a
latter a free government. Some commands differ not in the thing preparation for
commanded, but in the intention with which they are imposed. command.
Wherefore, many apparently menial offices are an honour to the
free youth by whom they are performed; for actions do not differ as honourable or
dishonourable in themselves so much as in the end and intention of them. But since
we sayc that the virtue of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man, and
that the same person must first be a subject and then a ruler, the legislator has to see
that they become good men, and by what means this may be accomplished, and what
is the end of the perfect life.

Two parts of the soul,


the lower and the
higher; the end is to
be sought in the
higher.

Hence there are two


classes of actions and
two corresponding
kinds of education, a
higher and a lower.

1333 b.

1334 a.

Failure of the Spartan


system.

War and conquest are


not the end of man’s
existence.

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Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of which has The military ideal
reason in itself, and the other, not having reason in itself, is able useless in peace.
to obey reasond . And we call a man good because he has the
virtues of these two parts. In which of them the end is more likely to be found is no
matter of doubt to those who adopt our division; for in the world both of nature and of
art the inferior always exists for the sake of the better or superior, and the better or
superior is that which has reason. The reason too, in our ordinary way of speaking, is
divided into two parts, for there is a practical and a speculative reasone , and there
must be a corresponding division of actions; the actions of the naturally better
principle are to be preferred by those who have it in their power to attain to both or to
all, for that is always to every one the most eligible which is the highest attainable by
him. The whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisurea , war
and peace, and all actions into those which are necessary and useful, and those which
are honourable. And the preference given to one or the other class of actions must
necessarily be like the preference given to one or other part of the soul and its actions
over the other; there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of
leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honourable. All these points
the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he should consider the
parts of the soul and their functions, and above all the better and the end; he should
also remember the diversities of human lives and actions. For men must engage in
business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is
necessary and useful, but what is honourable is better. In such principles children and
persons of every age which requires education should be trained. Whereas even the
Hellenes of the present day, who are reputed to be best governed, and the legislators
who gave them their constitutions, do not appear to have framed their governments
with a regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to
all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which promised to be
more useful and profitable. Many modern writers have taken a similar view: they
commend the Lacedaemonian constitution, and praise the legislator for making
conquest and war his sole aimb , a doctrine which may be refuted by argument and
has long ago been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire in the hope of
accumulating the goods of fortune; and on this ground Thibron and all those who have
written about the Lacedaemonian constitution have praised their legislator, because
the Lacedaemonians, by a training in hardships, gained great power. But surely they
are not a happy people now that their empire has passed away, nor was their legislator
right. How ridiculous is the result, if, while they are continuing in the observance of
his laws and no one interferes with them, they have lost the better part of life. These
writers further err about the sort of government which the legislator should approve,
for the government of freemen is noble, and implies more virtue than despotic
governmenta . Neither is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised
because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain dominion over their neighbours,
for there is great evil in this. On a similar principle any citizen who could, would
obviously try to obtain the power in his own state,—the crime which the
Lacedaemonians accuse king Pausanias of attemptingb , although he had so great
honour already. No such principle and no law having this object is either
statesmanlike or useful or right. For the same things are best both for individuals and
for states, and these are the things which the legislator ought to implant in the minds
of his citizens. Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those

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who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their
own enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed,
and not for the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third place they
should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves. Facts, as well as
arguments, prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures
to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of these military
states are safe only while they are at warc , but fall when they have acquired their
empire; like unused iron they rustd in time of peace. And for this the legislator is to
blame, he never having taught them how to lead the life of peace.

Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of War is for the sake of
the best man and of the best state must also be the same; it is peace; the virtues of
therefore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the business and leisure
virtues of leisure; for peace, as has been often repeated, is the are alike necessary,
and leisure is the
end of war, and leisure of toil. But leisure and cultivation may be crown of toil.
promoted, not only by those virtues which are practised in
leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to businessa . Dangers of prosperity.
For many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we can
have leisure. Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and 1334 b.
able to endure: for truly, as the proverb says, ‘There is no leisure
for slaves,’ and those who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of any invader.
Courage and endurance are required for business and philosophy for leisure,
temperance and justice for both, more especially in times of peace and leisure, for war
compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the
leisure which comes with peace tends to make them insolent. Those then, who seem
to be the best-off and to be in the possession of every good, have special need of
justice and temperance,—for example, those (if such there be, as the poets say) who
dwell in the Islands of the Blest; they above all will need philosophy and temperance
and justice, and all the more the more leisure they have, living in the midst of
abundance. There is no difficulty in seeing why the state that would be happy and
good ought to have these virtues. If it be disgraceful in men not to be able to use the
goods of life, it is peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use them in time of
peace,—to show excellent qualities in action and war, and when they have peace and
leisure to be no better than slaves. Wherefore we should not practise virtue after the
manner of the Lacedaemoniansb . For they, while agreeing with other men in their
conception of the highest goods, differ from the rest of mankind in thinking that they
are to be obtained by the practice of a single virtue. And since these goods and the
enjoyment of them are clearly greater than the enjoyment derived from the virtues of
which they are the end, we must now consider how and by what means they are to be
attained.

We have already determined that nature and habit and reason are The education of the
requireda , and what should be the character of the citizens has body precedes that of
also been defined by us. But we have still to consider whether the mind.
the training of early life is to be that of reason or habit, for these
two must accord, and when in accord they will then form the best of harmonies.
Reason may make mistakes and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, band there
may be a like evil influence of habitb . Thus much is clear in the first place, that, as in

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all other things, birth implies some antecedent principle, and that the end of anything
has a beginning in some former end. Now, in men reason and mind are the end
towards which nature strives, so that the birth and moral discipline of the citizens
ought to be ordered with a view to them. In the second place, as the soul and body are
two, we see also that there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational c ,
and two corresponding states—reason and appetite. And as the body is prior in order
of generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. The proof is that
anger and will and desire are implanted in children from their very birth, but reason
and understanding are developed as they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the body
ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow:
none the less our care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care of the body
for the sake of the sould .

Since the legislator should begin by considering how the frames The education before
of the children whom he is rearing may be as good as possible, birth.
his first care will be about marriage—at what age should his
citizens marry, and who are fit to marry? In legislating on this The proper age for
subject he ought to consider the persons and their relative ages, marriage.
that there may be no disproportion in them, and that they may When procreation
not differ in their bodily powers, as will be the case if the man is should begin.
still able to beget children while the woman is unable to bear
them, or the woman able to bear while the man is unable to 1335 a.
beget, for from these causes arise quarrels and differences
between married persons. Secondly, he must consider the time at which the children
will succeed to their parents; there ought not to be too great an interval of age, for
then the parents will be too old to derive any pleasure from their affection, or to be of
any use to them. Nor ought they to be too nearly of an age; to youthful marriages
there are many objections—the children will be wanting in respect to the parents, who
will seem to be their contemporaries, and disputes will arise in the management of the
household. Thirdly, and this is the point from which we digressed, the legislator must
mould to his will the frames of newly-born children. Almost all these objects may be
secured by attention to one point. Since the time of generation is commonly limited
within the age of seventy years in the case of a man, and of fifty in the case of a
woman, the commencement of the union should conform to these periods. The union
of male and female when too young is bad for the procreation of children; in all other
animals the offspring of the young are small and ill-developed, and generally of the
female sex, and therefore also in man, as is proved by the fact that in those cities in
which men and women are accustomed to marry young, the people are small and
weak; in childbirth also younger women suffer more, and more of them die; some
persons say that this was the meaning of the response once given to the
Troezenians—[‘Shear not the young field,’]—the oracle really meant that many died
because they married too young; it had nothing to do with the ingathering of the
harvest. It also conduces to temperance not to marry too soon; for women who marry
early are apt to be wanton; and in men too the bodily frame is stunted if they marry
while they are growing (for there is a time when the growth of the body ceases).
Women should marry when they are about eighteen years of age, and men at seven
and thirtya ; then they are in the prime of life, and the decline in the powers of both
will coincide. Further, the children, if their birth takes place at the time that may

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reasonably be expected, will succeed in their prime, when the fathers are already in
the decline of life, and have nearly reached their term of three-score years and ten.

Thus much of the age proper for marriage: the season of the year 1335 b.
should also be considered; according to our present custom,
people generally limit marriage to the season of winter, and they The season of the
are right. The precepts of physicians and natural philosophers year.
about generation should also be studied by the parents
themselves; the physicians give good advice about the right age of the body, and the
natural philosophers about the winds; of which they prefer the north to the south.

What constitution in the parent is most advantageous to the The constitution of


offspring is a subject which we will hereafter consider when we the parents.
speak of the education of children, and we will only make a few
general remarks at present. The temperament of an athlete is not suited to the life of a
citizen, or to health, or to the procreation of children, any more than the
valetudinarian or exhausted constitution, but one which is in a mean between them. A
man’s constitution should be inured to labour, but not to labour which is excessive or
of one sort only, such as is practised by athletes; he should be capable of all the
actions of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to both parents.

Women who are with child should be careful of themselves; they Care of pregnant
should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. The first of these women.
prescriptions the legislator will easily carry into effect by
requiring that they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where they can worship the
gods who preside over birtha . Their minds, however, unlike their bodies, they ought
to keep unexercised, for the offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants
do from the earth.

As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that Regulations as to
no deformed child shall live, but where there are too many (for in exposure of infants.
our state population has a limit), when couples have children in
excess, and the state of feeling is averse to the exposure of Abortion.
offspring, let abortion be procured before sense and life have
begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question
of life and sensation.

And now, having determined at what ages men and women are to When procreation
begin their union, let us also determine how long they shall should cease.
b
continue to beget and bear offspring for the state ; men who are
too old, like men who are too young, produce children who are defective in body and
mind; the children of very old men are weakly. The limit, then, should be the age
which is the prime of their intelligence, and this in most persons, according to the
notion of some poets who measure life by periods of seven years, is about fiftyc ; at
four or five years later, they should cease from having families; and from that time
forward only cohabit with one another for the sake of health, or for some similar
reason.

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As to adultery, let it be held disgraceful for any man or woman to Laws about adultery.
be unfaithful when they are married, and called husband and
wife. If during the time of bearing children anything of the sort 1336 a.
occur, let the guilty person be punished with a loss of privileges
in proportion to the offenced .

After the children have been born, the manner of rearing them Young children
may be supposed to have a great effect on their bodily strength. should be healthy and
It would appear from the example of animals, and of those hardy. Their food,
nations who desire to create the military habit, that the food
which has most milk in it is best suited to human beings; but the exercise,
less wine the better, if they would escape diseases. Also all the clothing,
motions to which children can be subjected at their early age are
very useful. But in order to preserve their tender limbs from distortion, some nations
have had recourse to mechanical appliances which straighten their bodies. To
accustom children to the cold from their earliest years is also an excellent practice,
which greatly conduces to health, and hardens them for military service. Hence many
barbarians have a custom of plunging their children at birth into a cold stream; others,
like the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper only. For human nature should be early
habituated to endure all which by habit it can be made to endure; but the process must
be gradual. And children, from their natural warmth, may be easily trained to bear
cold. Such care should attend them in the first stage of life.

The next period lasts to the age of five; during this no demand amusements,
should be made upon the child for study or labour, lest its growth
be impeded; and there should be sufficient motion to prevent the tales and stories,
limbs from being inactive. This can be secured, among other
ways, by amusement, but the amusement should not be vulgar or screams. [Plato
criticized.]
tiring or riotous. The Directors of Education, as they are termed,
should be careful what tales or stories the children heara , for the They should live at
sports of children are designed to prepare the way for the home, but not be left
business of later life, and should be for the most part imitations to slaves.
of the occupations which they will hereafter pursue in earnestb .
They should neither
Those are wrong who [like Plato] in the Laws attempt to check
see nor hear what is
the loud crying and screaming of children, for these contribute indecent, and should
towards their growth, and, in a manner, exercise their bodiesa . not be taken to certain
Straining the voice has an effect similar to that produced by the religious ceremonies,
retention of the breath in violent exertions. Besides other duties, or to comic
the Directors of Education should have an eye to their bringing spectacles.
up, and should take care that they are left as little as possible 1336 b.
with slaves. For until they are seven years old they must live at
home; and therefore, even at this early age, all that is mean and low should be
banished from their sight and hearing. Indeed, there is nothing which the legislator
should be more careful to drive away than indecency of speech; for the light utterance
of shameful words is akin to shameful actions. The young especially should never be
allowed to repeat or hear anything of the sort. A freeman who is found saying or
doing what is forbidden, if he be too young as yet to have the privilege of a place at
the public tables, should be disgraced and beaten, and an elder person degraded as his

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slavish conduct deserves. And since we do not allow improper language, clearly we
should also banish pictures or tales which are indecent. Let the rulers take care that
there be no image or picture representing unseemly actions, except in the temples of
those Gods at whose festivals the law permits even ribaldry, and whom the law also
permits to be worshipped by persons of mature age on behalf of themselves, their
children, and their wives. But the legislator should not allow youth to be hearers of
satirical Iambic verses or spectators of comedy until they are of an age to sit at the
public tables and to drink strong wine; by that time education will have armed them
against the evil influences of such representations.

We have made these remarks in a cursory manner, — they are 1337 a.


enough for the present occasion; but hereafterb we will return to
the subject and after a fuller discussion determine whether such Early associations are
liberty should or should not be granted, and in what way granted, strongest.
if at all. Theodorus, the tragic actor, was quite right in saying that
The division of life by
he would not allow any other actor, not even if he were quite sevens.
second-rate, to enter before himself, because the spectators grew
fond of the voices which they first heard. And the same principle of association
applies universally to things as well as persons, for we always like best whatever
comes first. And therefore youth should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and
especially to things which suggest vice or hate. When the five years have passed
away, during the two following years they must look on at the pursuits which they are
hereafter to learn. There are two periods of life into which education has to be
divided, from seven to the age of puberty, and onwards to the age of one and twenty.
[The poets] who divide ages by sevensa are not always rightb : we should rather
adhere to the divisions actually made by nature; for the deficiencies of nature are what
art and education seek to fill up.

Let us then first enquire if any regulations are to be laid down about children, and
secondly, whether the care of them should be the concern of the state or of private
individuals, which latter is in our own day the common custom, and in the third place,
what these regulations should be.

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[Back to Table of Contents]

BOOK VIII.
No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention Education relative to
above all to the education of youth, or that the neglect of the form of
education does harm to states. The citizen should be moulded to government.
suit the form of government under which he livesa . For each
government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to
preserve it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of
oligarchy creates oligarchy; and always the better the character, the better the
government.

Now for the exercise of any faculty or art a previous training and It should be public,
habituation are required; clearly therefore for the practice of the same for all,
virtue. And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that
education should be one and the same for all, and that it should and tending to
promote the good of
be public, and not private,—not as at present, when every one
all.
looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate
instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of
common interest should be the same for all. Neither must we suppose that any one of
the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a
part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. In
this particular the Lacedaemonians are to be praised, for they take the greatest pains
about their children, and make education the business of the stateb .

That education should be regulated by law and should be an What is to be taught?


affair of state is not to be denied, but what should be the
character of this public education, and how young persons should 1337 b.
be educated, are questions which remain to be considered. For
mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, Conflicting theories.
whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear Some useful things
whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with should be taught,
moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knows
on what principle we should proceed—should the useful in life, and some liberal arts
or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge, be the aim of should only be carried
to a certain extent.
our training; all three opinions have been entertained. Again,
about the means there is no agreement; for different persons,
starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about the
practice of it. There can be no doubt that children should be taught those useful things
which are really necessary, but not all things; for occupations are divided into liberal
and illiberal; and to young children should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge
as will be useful to them without vulgarizing them. And any occupation, art, or
science, which makes the body or soul or mind of the freeman less fit for the practice
or exercise of virtue, is vulgar; wherefore we call those arts vulgar which tend to
deform the body, and likewise all paid employments, for they absorb and degrade the
mind. There are also some liberal arts quite proper for a freeman to acquire, but only
in a certain degree, and if he attend to them too closely, in order to attain perfection in

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them, the same evil effects will follow. The object also which a man sets before him
makes a great difference; if he does or learns anything for his own sakea or for the
sake of his friends, or with a view to excellence, the action will not appear illiberal;
but if done for the sake of others, the very same action will be thought menial and
servile. The received subjects of instruction, as I have already remarkedb , are partly
of a liberal and partly of an illiberal character.

The customary branches of education are in number four; they The received
are—(1) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, (3) music, education.
to which is sometimes added (4) drawing. Of these, reading and
writing and drawing are regarded as useful for the purposes of Music is not directly
life in a variety of ways, and gymnastic exercises are thought to useful for the business
of life, but for
infuse courage. Concerning music a doubt may be raised—in our relaxation and
own day most men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure, but intellectual enjoyment
originally it was included in education, because nature herself, as in leisure.
has been often said, requires that we should be able, not only to
work well, but to use leisure well; for, as I must repeat once and 1338 a.
againa , the first principle of all action is leisure. Both are
required, but leisure is better than occupation; and therefore the question must be
asked in good earnest, what ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we ought not to
be amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the end of life. But if this is
inconceivable, and yet amid serious occupations amusement is needed more than at
other times (for he who is hard at work has need of relaxation, and amusement gives
relaxation, whereas occupation is always accompanied with exertion and effort), at
suitable times we should introduce amusements, and they should be our medicines,
for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and from the pleasure we
obtain rest. Leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life,
which are experienced, not by the busy man, but by those who have leisure. For he
who is occupied has in view some end which he has not attained; but happiness is an
end which all men deem to be accompanied with pleasure and not with pain. This
pleasure, however, is regarded differently by different persons, and varies according
to the habit of individuals; the pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from
the noblest sources. It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education
which we must study with a view to the enjoyment of leisure, and these are to be
valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in
business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of other things. And
therefore our fathers admitted music into education, not on the ground either of its
necessity or utility, for it is not necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as
reading and writing, which are useful in money-making, in the management of a
household, in the acquisition of knowledge and in political life, nor like drawing,
useful for a more correct judgment of the works of artists, nor again like gymnastic,
which gives health and strength; for neither of these is to be gained from music. There
remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure; which appears to
have been the reason of its introduction, this being one of the ways in which it is
thought that a freeman should pass his leisure; as Homer says—

‘How good is it to invite men to the pleasant feasta ,’

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and afterwards he speaks of others whom he describes as inviting

‘The bard who would delight them allb .’

And in another place Odysseus says there is no better way of passing life than when

‘Men’s hearts are merry and the banqueters in the hall, sitting in order, hear the voice
of the minstrelc .’

It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in which It is therefore part of a


parents should train their sons, not as being useful or necessary, liberal education.
but because it is liberal or noble. Whether this is of one kind
only, or of more than one, and if so, what they are, and how they Reading, writing, and
are to be imparted, must hereafter be determined. Thus much we drawing should also
have a liberal end.
are now in a position to say that the ancients witness to us; for
their opinion may be gathered from the fact that music is one of In education the body
the received and traditional branches of education. Further, it is goes before the mind;
clear that children should be instructed in some useful the habits before the
things,—for example, in reading and writing,—not only for their reason.
usefulness, but also because many other sorts of knowledge are 1338 b.
acquired through them. With a like view they may be taught
drawing, not to prevent their making mistakes in their own purchases, or in order that
they may not be imposed upon in the buying or selling of articles, but rather because
it makes them judges of the beauty of the human form. To be always seeking after the
useful does not become free and exalted soulsa . Now it is clear that in education habit
must go before reason, and the body before the mind; and therefore boys should be
handed over to the trainer, who creates in them the proper habit of body, and to the
wrestling-master, who teaches them their exercises.

Of those states which in our own day seem to take the greatest Athletic training
care of children, some aim at producing in them an athletic habit, injurious; the
but they only injure their forms and stunt their growth. Although Lacedaemonians
the Lacedaemonians have not fallen into this mistake, yet they avoid this error, but
mistake roughness for
brutalize their children by laborious exercises which they think courage. Even on
will make them courageous. But in truth, as we have often their own ground they
repeated, education should not be exclusively directed to this or are now beaten,
to any other single end. And even if we suppose the
Lacedaemonians to be right in their end, they do not attain it. For and have quite lost
their prestige.
among barbarians and among animals courage is found
associated, not with the greatest ferocity, but with a gentle and
lion-like temper. There are many races who are ready enough to kill and eat men,
such as the Achaeans and Heniochi, who both live about the Black Seab ; and there
are other inland tribes, as bad or worse, who all live by plunder, but have no courage.
It is notorious that the Lacedaemonians, while they were themselves assiduous in their
laborious drill, were superior to others, but now they are beaten both in war and
gymnastic exercises. For their ancient superiority did not depend on their mode of
training their youth, but only on the circumstance that they trained them at a time
when others did not. Hence we may infer that what is noble, not what is brutal, should

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have the first place; no wolf or other wild animal will face a really noble danger; such
dangers are for the brave mana . And parents who devote their children to gymnastics
while they neglect their necessary education, in reality vulgarize them; for they make
them useful to the state in one quality only, and even in this the argument proves them
to be inferior to others. We should judge the Lacedaemonians not from what they
have been, but from what they are; for now they have rivals who compete with their
education; formerly they had none.

It is an admitted principle, that gymnastic exercises should be 1339 a.


employed in education, and that for children they should be of a
lighter kind, avoiding severe regimen or painful toil, lest the The young should not
growth of the body be impaired. The evil of excessive training in be overtasked;
early years is strikingly proved by the example of the Olympic
and we should not
victors; for not more than two or three of them have gained a work mind and body
prize both as boys and as men; their early training and severe at the same time.
gymnastic exercises exhausted their constitutions. When
boyhood is over, three years should be spent in other studies; the period of life which
follows may then be devoted to hard exercise and strict regimen. Men ought not to
labour at the same time with their minds and with their bodiesb ; for the two kinds of
labour are opposed to one another, the labour of the body impedes the mind, and the
labour of the mind the body.

Concerning music there are some questions which we have Music again;
already raised; these we may now resume and carry further; and
our remarks will serve as a prelude to this or any other discussion why to be studied?
of the subject. It is not easy to determine the nature of music, or
why any one should have a knowledge of it. Shall we say, for the Some say (1) as an
amusement;
sake of amusement and relaxation, like sleep or drinking, which
are not good in themselves, but are pleasant, and at the same time others (2) because it
‘make care to cease,’ as Euripidesa says? And therefore men rank affects character;
them with music, and make use of all three,—sleepb , drinking,
music,—to which some add dancing. Or shall we argue that others (3) because it
contributes to the
music conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can form our
enjoyment of leisure.
minds and habituate us to true pleasures as our bodies are made
by gymnastic to be of a certain character? Or shall we say that it Need we play and
contributes to the enjoyment of leisure and mental cultivation, sing ourselves?
which is a third alternative? Now obviously youth are not to be
instructed with a view to their amusement, for learning is no 1339 b.
pleasure, but is accompanied with pain. Neither is intellectual
enjoyment suitable to boys of that age, for it is the end, and that which is imperfect
cannot attain the perfect or end. But perhaps it may be said that boys learn music for
the sake of the amusement which they will have when they are grown up. If so, why
should they learn themselves, and not, like the Persian and Median kings, enjoy the
pleasure and instruction which is derived from hearing others? (for surely skilled
persons who have made music the business and profession of their lives will be better
performers than those who practise only to learn). If they must learn music, on the
same principle they should learn cookery, which is absurd. And even granting that
music may form the character, the objection still holds: why should we learn

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ourselves? Why cannot we attain true pleasure and form a correct judgment from
hearing others, like the Lacedaemonians?—for they, without learning music,
nevertheless can correctly judge, as they say, of good and bad melodies. Or again, if
music should be used to promote cheerfulness and refined intellectual enjoyment, the
objection still remains—why should we learn ourselves instead of enjoying the
performances of others? We may illustrate what we are saying by our conception of
the Gods; for in the poets Zeus does not himself sing or play on the lyre. Nay, we call
professional performers vulgar; no freeman would play or sing unless he were
intoxicated or in jest. But these matters may be left for the present.

The first question is whether music is or is not to be a part of Music may be


education. Of the three things mentioned in our discussion, considered (1) an
which is it?—Education or amusement or intellectual enjoyment, amusement;
for it may be reckoned under all three, and seems to share in the
nature of all of them. Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and relaxation is of
necessity sweet, for it is the remedy of pain caused by toil, and intellectual enjoyment
is universally acknowledged to contain an element not only of the noble but of the
pleasant, for happiness is made up of both. All men agree that music is one of the
pleasantest things, whether with or without song; as Musaeus says,

‘Song is to mortals of all things the sweetest.’

Hence and with good reason it is introduced into social (2) may be regarded
gatherings and entertainments, because it makes the hearts of as having an ethical
men glad: so that on this ground alone we may assume that the influence,
young ought to be trained in it. For innocent pleasures are not
more than painting or
only in harmony with the perfect end of life, but they also
statuary.
provide relaxation. And whereas men rarely attain the end, but
often rest by the way and amuse themselves, not only with a 1340 a.
view to some good, but also for the pleasure’s sake, it may be
well for them at times to find a refreshment in music. It 1340 b.
sometimes happens that men make amusement the end, for the
end probably contains some element of pleasure, though not any The various melodies
ordinary or lower pleasure; but they mistake the lower for the and rhythms have
higher, and in seeking for the one find the other, since every various ethical
pleasure has a likeness to the end of actiona . For the end is not effects.
eligible, nor do the pleasures which we have described exist, for
the sake of any future good but of the past, that is to say, they are the alleviation of
past toils and pains. And we may infer this to be the reason why men seek happiness
from common pleasures. But music is pursued, not only as an alleviation of past toil,
but also as providing recreation. And who can say whether, having this use, it may not
also have a nobler one? In addition to this common pleasure, felt and shared in by all
(for the pleasure given by music is natural, and therefore adapted to all ages and
characters), may it not have also some influence over the character and the soul? It
must have such an influence if characters are affected by it. And that they are so
affected is proved by the power which the songs of Olympus and of many others
exercise; for beyond question they inspire enthusiasm, and enthusiasm is an emotion
of the ethical part of the soul. Besides, when men hear imitations, even

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unaccompanied by melody or rhythm, their feelings move in sympathy. Since then


music is a pleasure, and virtue consists in rejoicing and loving and hating aright, there
is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the
power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good dispositions and
noble actionsa . Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness, and
also of courage and temperance and of virtues and vices in general, which hardly fall
short of the actual affections, as we know from our own experience, for in listening to
such strains our souls undergo a change. The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere
representations is not far removed from the same feeling about realitiesb ; for
example, if any one delights in the sight of a statue for its beauty only, it necessarily
follows that the sight of the original will be pleasant to him. No other sense, such as
taste or touch, has any resemblance to moral qualities; in sight only there is a little, for
figures are to some extent of a moral character, and [so far] all participate in the
feeling about them. Again, figures and colours are not imitations, but signs of moral
habits, indications which the body gives of states of feeling. The connexion of them
with morals is slight, but in so far as there is any, young men should be taught to look,
not at the works of Pauson, but at those of Polygnotusa , or any other painter or
statuary who expresses moral ideas. On the other hand, even in mere melodiesb there
is an imitation of character, for the musical modes differ essentially from one another,
and those who hear them are differently affected by each. Some of them make men
sad and grave, like the so-called Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the
relaxed harmonies, others, again, produce a moderate and settled temper, which
appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian; the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm. The
whole subject has been well treated by philosophical writers on this branch of
education, and they confirm their arguments by facts. The same principles apply to
rhythmsc : some have a character of rest, others of motion, and of these latter again,
some have a more vulgar, others a nobler movement. Enough has been said to show
that music has a power of forming the character, and should therefore be introduced
into the education of the young. The study is suited to the stage of youth, for young
persons will not, if they can help, endure anything which is not sweetened by
pleasure, and music has a natural sweetness. There seems to be in us a sort of affinity
to harmonies and rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the soul is a
harmony, others, that she possesses harmony.

And now we have to determine the question which has been Should children be
already raisedd , whether children should be themselves taught to taught to sing and
sing and play or not. Clearly there is a considerable difference play?
made in the character by the actual practice of the art. It is
Yes: it enables them
difficult, if not impossible, for those who do not perform to be
a to judge, and keeps
good judges of the performance of others . Besides, children them out of mischief.
should have something to do, and the rattle of Archytas, which
people give to their children in order to amuse them and prevent them from breaking
anything in the house, was a capital invention, for a young thing cannot be quiet. The
rattle is a toy suited to the infant mind, and [musical] education is a rattle or toy for
children of a larger growth. We conclude then that they should be taught music in
such a way as to become not only critics but performers.

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The question what is or is not suitable for different ages may be When grown up they
easily answered; nor is there any difficulty in meeting the may cease to perform;
objection of those who say that the study of music is vulgar. We and they must not
reply (1) in the first place, that they who are to be judges must become professionals.
also be performers, and that they should begin to practise early,
1341 a.
although when they are older they may be spared the execution;
they must have learned to appreciate what is good and to delight in it, thanks to the
knowledge which they acquired in their youth. As to (2) the vulgarizing effect which
music is supposed to exercise, this is a question [of degree], which we shall have no
difficulty in determining, when we have considered to what extent freemen who are
being trained to political virtue should pursue the art, what melodies and what
rhythms they should be allowed to use, and what instruments should be employed in
teaching them to play, for even the instrument makes a difference. The answer to the
objection turns upon these distinctions; for it is quite possible that certain methods of
teaching and learning music do really have a degrading effect. It is evident then that
the learning of music ought not to impede the business of riper years, or to degrade
the body or render it unfit for civil or military duties, whether for the early practice or
for the later study of them.

The right measure will be attained if students of music stop short of the arts which are
practised in professional contests, and do not seek to acquire those fantastic marvels
of execution which are now the fashion in such contests, and from these have passed
into education. Let the young pursue their studies until they are able to feel delight in
noble melodies and rhythms, and not merely in that common part of music in which
every slave or child and even some animals find pleasure.

From these principles we may also infer what instruments should What instruments
be used. The flute, or any other instrument which requires great should be used? not
skill, as for example the harp, ought not to be admitted into the flute, which is
education, but only such as will make intelligent students of over exciting.
music or of the other parts of education. Besides, the flute is not
Historical remarks on
an instrument which has a good moral effect; it is too exciting. on the use of the flute.
The proper time for using it is when the performance aims not at
instruction, but at the relief of the passionsa . And there is a The myth of Athene
further objection; the impediment which the flute presents to the throwing away the
use of the voice detracts from its educational value. The ancients flute.
therefore were right in forbidding the flute to youths and 1341 b.
freemen, although they had once allowed it. For when their
wealth gave them greater leisure, and they had loftier notions of excellence, being
also elated with their success, both before and after the Persian War, with more zeal
than discernment they pursued every kind of knowledge, and so they introduced the
flute into education. At Lacedaemon there was a Choragus who led the Chorus with a
flute, and at Athens the instrument became so popular that most freemen could play
upon it. The popularity is shown by the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated when he
furnished the Chorus to Ecphantides. Later experience enabled men to judge what was
or was not really conducive to virtue, and they rejected both the flute and several
other old-fashioned instruments, such as the Lydian harp, the many-stringed lyre, the
‘heptagon,’ ‘triangle,’ ‘sambuca,’ and the like—which are intended only to give

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pleasure to the hearer, and require extraordinary skill of handa . There is a meaning
also in the myth of the ancients, which tells how Athene invented the flute and then
threw it away. It was not a bad idea of theirs, that the Goddess disliked the instrument
because it made the face ugly; but with still more reason may we say that she rejected
it because the acquirement of flute-playing contributes nothing to the mind, since to
Athene we ascribe both knowledge and art.

Thus then we reject the professional instruments and also the The vulgar vulgarize
professional mode of education in music—and by professional music.
we mean that which is adopted in contests, for in this the
performer practises the art, not for the sake of his own improvement, but in order to
give pleasure, and that of a vulgar sort, to his hearers. For this reason the execution of
such music is not the part of a freeman but of a paid performer, and the result is that
the performers are vulgarized, for the end at which they aim is badb . The vulgarity of
the spectator tends to lower the character of the music and therefore of the performers;
they look to him—he makes them what they are, and fashions even their bodies by the
movements which he expects them to exhibit.

We have also to consider rhythms and harmonies. Shall we use Melodies and
them all in education or make a distinction? and shall the rhythms.
distinction be that which is made by those who are engaged in
education, or shall it be some other? For we see that music is produced by melody and
rhythm, and we ought to know what influence these have respectively on education,
and whether we should prefer excellence in melody or excellence in rhythm. But as
the subject has been very well treated by many musicians of the present day, and also
by philosophers who have had considerable experience of musical education, to these
we would refer the more exact student of the subject; we shall only speak of it now
after the manner of the legislator, having regard to general principles.

1342 a.

Classification of
melodies.

Ethical melodies to be
preferred in
education; passionate
melodies purify the
troubled soul.

Music for the


multitude.

The Dorian mode


ethical and
educational.

Plato is wrong in
retaining the
Phrygian;

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We accept the division of melodies proposed by certain 1342 b.


philosophers into ethical melodies, melodies of action, and
passionate or inspiring melodies, each having, as they say, a mode or harmony
corresponding to it. But we maintain further that music should be studied, not for the
sake of one, but of many benefits, that is to say, with a view to (1) education, (2)
purification (the word ‘purification’ we use at present without explanation, but when
hereafter we speak of poetrya , we will treat the subject with more precision); music
may also serve (3) for intellectual enjoyment, for relaxation and for recreation after
exertion. It is clear, therefore, that all the harmonies must be employed by us, but not
all of them in the same manner. In education ethical melodies are to be preferred, but
we may listen to the melodies of action and passion when they are performed by
others. For feelings such as pity and fear, or, again, enthusiasm, exist very strongly in
some souls, and have more or less influence over all. Some persons fall into a
religious frenzy, whom we see disenthralled by the use of mystic melodies, which
bring healing and purification to the soul. Those who are influenced by pity or fear
and every emotional nature have a like experience, others in their degree are stirred by
something which specially affects them, and all are in a manner purified and their
souls lightened and delighted. The melodies of purification likewise give an innocent
pleasure to mankind. Such are the harmonies and the melodies in which those who
perform music at the theatre should be invited to compete. But since the spectators are
of two kinds — the one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed of
mechanics, labourers, and the like—there ought to be contests and exhibitions
instituted for the relaxation of the second class also. And the melodies will correspond
to their minds; for as their minds are perverted from the natural state, so there are
exaggerated and corrupted harmonies which are in like manner a perversion. A man
receives pleasure from what is natural to him, and therefore professional musicians
may be allowed to practise this lower sort of music before an audience of a lower
type. But, for the purposes of education, as I have already said, those modes and
melodies should be employed which are ethical, such as the Dorian; though we may
include any others which are approved by philosophers who have had a musical
education. The Socrates of the Republica is wrong in retaining only the Phrygian
mode along with the Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute; for the
Phrygian is to the modes what the flute is to musical instruments—both of them are
exciting and emotional. Poetry proves this, for Bacchic frenzy and all similar
emotions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to the Phrygian
than to any other harmony. The dithyramb, for example, is acknowledged to be
Phrygian, a fact of which the connoisseurs of music offer many proofs, saying, among
other things, that Philoxenus, having attempted to compose his Talesb as a dithyramb
in the Dorian mode, found it impossible, and fell back into the more appropriate
Phrygian. All men agree that the Dorian music is the gravest and manliest. And
whereas we say that the extremes should be avoided and the mean followed, and
whereas the Dorian is a mean between the other harmonies [the Phrygian and the
Lydianc ], it is evident that your youth should be taught the Dorian music.

wrong also in
altogether rejecting
the relaxed

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Two principles have to be kept in view, what is possible, what is harmonies, such as
becoming: at these every man ought to aim. But even these are the Lydian.
relative to age; the old, who have lost their powers, cannot very
well sing the severe melodies, and nature herself seems to suggest that their songs
should be of the more relaxed kind. Wherefore the musicians likewise blame Socrates,
and with justice, for rejecting the relaxed harmonies in education under the idea that
they are intoxicating, not in the ordinary sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to
excite men), but because they have no strength in them. And so with a view to a time
of life when men begin to grow old, they ought to practise the gentler harmonies and
melodies as well as the others. And if there be any harmony, such as the Lydian above
all others appears to be, which is suited to children of tender age, and possesses the
elements both of order and of education, clearly [we ought to use it, for] education
should be based upon three principles—the mean, the possible, the becoming, these
three.

[1 ]The subjects of the Essays will be as follows:—

1. The Life of Aristotle.


2. The Structure and Formation of some of the Aristotelian Writings, to which
are added three Appendices:
(i) On Books V, VI, VII of the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics:
(ii) On the Order of the Books of the Politics:
(iii) On the Order of the Books of the Metaphysics.
3. On the Style and Language of the Politics.
4. On the Text of the Politics.
5. Aristotle as a Critic of Plato.
6. Aristotle’s Contributions to History.
7. Aristotle’s Politics.
8. The Spartans and their Institutions.
9. Aristotle as a Political Philosopher.

[a ]Cp. Plato Politicus, 258 e foll.

[b ]Cp. c. 8. § 1.

[a ]Or, with Bernays, ‘how the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and
generally whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.’

[b ]Eurip. Iphig. in Aulid. 1400.

[c ]Op. et Di. 405.

[a ]Or, reading with the old translator (William of Moerbek) ?μοκάπνους,


‘companions of the hearth.’

[b ]Od. ix. 114, quoted by Plato Laws, iii. 680, and in N. Eth. x. 9. § 13.

[a ]Il. ix. 63.

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[b ]Cp. c. 8. § 12.

[c ]Cp. vii. 13. § 12.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. v. 6. § 4.

[b ]Reading with the MSS. ο?κονομίας.

[a ]Plato in Pol. 258 e foll., referred to already in c. 1. § 2.

[b ]Hom. II. xviii. 376.

[a ]Or, ‘ of harmony [in music].’

[a ]Cp. § 2.

[a ]Cp. c. 4. § 5.

[b ]Plato Polit. 258 e foll., referred to already in c. 1. § 2.

[a ]Cp. vii. 14. § 21.

[b ]Cp. c. 1. § 3.

[a ]Or, ‘whose labour is personal.’

[a ]Cp. c. 7. § 5, and vii. 14. § 21.

[b ]Or, with Bernays, ‘which by nature is a part of the management of a household.’

[c ]Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Solon, iv. 12. v. 71.

[a ]Or, more simply, ‘shared in many more things.’

[a ]Cp. c. 8. § 14.

[b ]Reading κτήσεως χρη?σις.

[a ]Cp. c. 8. § 1.

[a ]Cp. c. 8. § 10.

[a ]Or, ‘We are free to speculate about them, but in practice we are limited by
circumstances.’ (Bernays.)

[a ]Reading ε?ρημα with Bernays.

[b ]Cp. c. 3. § 1.

[c ]Cp. c. 3-7.

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[d ]Cp. ii. 2. § 6; iii. 17. § 4.

[e ]Herod. ii. 172, and note on this passage.

[a ]Or, with Bernays, ‘inconclusive.’

[b ]Plato Meno, 71-73.

[c ]Soph. Aj. 293.

[a ]‘His father who guides him’ (Bernays).

[b ]Cp. c. 7. § 4.

[c ]Plato Laws, vi. 777.

[d ]Cp. v. 9. § 11-15; viii. 1. § 1.

[a ]Plato Laws, vi. 781 B.

[a ]Or, as Bernays, taking πάντως with σο?ίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ‘we are anxious to
make a sophistical display at any cost.’

[b ]Rep. v. 457 c.

[a ]Or, ‘dispersed in villages, but are in the condition of the Arcadians.’

[b ]Or, ‘reciprocal proportion.’

[c ]N. Eth. v. 8. § 6.

[a ]Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 345-6.

[b ]Cp. i. 12. § 2; iii. 17. § 4.

[c ]Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 352.

[d ]Pl. Rep. v. 462 c.

[a ]Cp. Herod. iv. 180.

[b ]Cp. Hist. Anim. vii. 6, p. 586 a. 13.

[a ]Cp. vii. 10. § 13.

[b ]Cp. N. Eth. viii. 1. § 4.

[c ]Cp. c. 2.

[d ]Symp. 189-193.

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[e ]Cp. c. 3.

[f ]Rep. iii. 415.

[a ]Cp. Rep. ii. 374.

[b ]Cp. Rep. iv. 424 a.

[c ]Cp. N. Eth. ix. 8. § 6.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. iv. 1. § 1.

[b ]Rep. v. 464, 465.

[c ]Cp. c. 2. § 2.

[a ]Cp. Rep. iv. 422 e.

[b ]Or (with Bernays), ‘He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while
the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real citizens;’ see note.

[b ]Rep. iv. 425 d.

[a ]Rep. v. 464, 465.

[b ]Rep. iv. 425 d.

[c ]Rep. v. 464 c.

[d ]Cp. c. 9. § 2.

[e ]These words are bracketed by Bekker.

[f ]Cp. Rep. v. 451 d.

[a ]Cp. Rep. iii. 415 A.

[b ]Rep. iv. 419, 420.

[c ]Cp. vii. 9. § 7.

[a ]Laws, vi. 781.

[b ]Laws, v. 737 e.

[c ]Rep. iv. 423 a (but see note on this passage).

[d ]Cp. vii. 4. § 2.

[e ]Perhaps Laws, 703-707 and 747 d (?).

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[f ]Cp. c. 7. § 14.

[g ]Cp. vii. 6. § 7.

[h ]Cp. vii. c. 2. and 3.

[i ]Laws, v. 737 d.

[j ]Cp. vii. 5. § 1.

[a ]Omitting ?ξεις and reading ?ρεταί with the MSS., or, reading with Bekk. ?ξεις
α?ρεταί, ‘eligible qualities.’

[b ]But see Laws, v. 740.

[c ]Cp. vii. 5. § 1; 10. § 11; 16. § 15; but the promise is hardly fulfilled.

[a ]Laws, v. 734 e, 735 a.

[b ]Laws, v. 744 e.

[c ]Laws, v. 745, but cp. infra, vii. 10. § 11.

[d ]Cp. iv. § 7; 7. § 4; 9. § 7-9.

[e ]vi. 756 e; cp. iv. 710.

[a ]Laws, vi. 755, 763 e, 765.

[b ]Laws, vi. 764 a; and Pol. iv. 9. § 2; 14. § 12.

[c ]Laws, vi. 756 b-e.

[d ]Omitting either τον? τετάρτου or τω?ν τετάρτων.

[a ]c. 6. § 15.

[a ]Cp. c. 5. § 12.

[b ]Il. ix. 319.

[a ]Cp. c. 6. § 7.

[b ]Or reading ? τι, ‘what amount of wealth.’

[a ]Cp. § 10.

[b ]Or, reading with Bernays ?κη, ‘the remedy for such evils.’

[c ]Putting a comma after ε??ναι and removing the comma after ?ργαζομένοις.

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[a ]Cp. Thuc. ii. c. 46.

[a ]Cp. Thucyd. i. c. 5 and 6.

[b ]Or, referring ?μοίους to γηγενε??ς, ‘whether they were born of the earth or were
the survivors of some destruction, who were no better (?μοίους) than earth-born men,
may be supposed to have been ordinary foolish people.’

[c ]Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 677 a; Polit. 271 a; Tim. 22 c.

[d ]Cp. Plato, Polit. 295 a.

[a ]Or ‘himself’ (Bernays).

[b ]Cp. c. 10. § 5.

[a ]Cp. i. 13. § 16.

[a ]Cp. iv. 9. § 10; v. 9. § 5.

[b ]Reading τ? α?τόν, not τόν, as Bekker, 2nd edit., apparently by a misprint.

[a ]Cp. iii. 14 foll.

[b ]Cp. c. 10. §§ 7, 8.

[c ]Reading ?ϊδίοις.

[d ]Laws, i. 630.

[a ]Cp. vii. 14. § 22.

[a ]Cp. vii. 10. § 10.

[a ]vii. 16 (?).

[b ]Cp. supra, c. 9. § 21.

[a ]Cp. iii. 1. §§ 10, 11; and see note at end.

[a ]Cp. c. 9. § 2.

[b ]Cp. Plato, Rep. ii. 374 a.

[a ]Or, removing the comma after πλουτε??ν, and adding one after μέρος, ‘by
enriching one portion of the people after another whom they send to their colonies.’
Cp. vi. 5. § 9, which tends to confirm this way of taking the words.

[a ]Cp. v. 4. § 8; viii. 6. § 11.

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[b ]Cp. iii. 11. § 8.

[a ]Or (with Bernays), ‘to make out an unbroken series of great legislators,
Onomacritus being considered the first.’

[a ]Cp. Laws, ii. 671 D-672 A.

[b ]Cp. Laws, vii. 794 D.

[c ]Cp. N. Eth. iii. 5. § 8.

[a ]Cp. c. 3. § 1.

[a ]‘Dicast’ = juryman and judge in one: ‘ecclesiast’ = member of the ecclesia or


assembly of the citizens.

[b ]Cp. c. 6. § 11.

[a ]Cp. ii. 11. § 7.

[b ]An untranslateable play upon the word δημιουργοί, which means either ‘a
magistrate’ or ‘an artisan.’

[c ]Cp. c. 1. § 12.

[a ]Inserting καί before μετοίκους with Bekker in his second edition. If καί is omitted,
as in all the MSS, we must translate—‘he enrolled in tribes many metics, both
strangers and slaves:’ or, ‘he enrolled in tribes many strangers, and metics who had
been slaves.’

[b ]Cp. c. 1. § 1.

[a ]Cp. ii. 6. § 6.

[b ]Cp. vii. c. 4 and c. 5.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. v. 2. § 11.

[a ]Fragment from the Aeolus, quoted in Stobaeus, 45. 13.

[a ]Viz. that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the ruler. Cp. infra, §
14.

[b ]Cp. i. 7. §§ 2-5.

[c ]Cp. viii. 2. § 5.

[a ]Cp. i. 13. § 9.

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[b ]Cp. Rep. iv. 428.

[c ]Cp. Rep. x. 601 d, e.

[d ]Cp. c. 5. § 10; c. 18. § 1; iv. 7. § 2; vii. 14. § 8.

[e ]Or, ‘for this man (i. e. the meaner sort of man) is a citizen and does not exercise
rule’ (see below, § 3, ε? δ? κα? ον??τος πολίτης). According to the way of taking the
passage which is followed in the text, ον??τος = ? ?χων τ?ν τοιαύτην ?ρετήν:
according to the second way, it refers to βάναυσος.

[a ]Cp. vi. 7. § 4.

[a ]Cp. v. 4. § 16.

[b ]Il. ix. 648.

[c ]Cp. c. 1. § 1; iv. 1. § 10.

[a ]Cp. i. 2. §§ 9, 10.

[b ]Cp. Plato Polit. 302 a.

[c ]Or, ‘in our popular works.’

[d ]Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 341 d.

[a ]Cp. ii. 2. §§ 6, 7.

[b ]Cp. Eth. viii. 10.

[a ]Nicom. Ethics, v. 3. § 4.

[b ]Or, with Bernays, ‘either in the case of the original contributors or their
successors.’

[c ]Cp. c. 1. § 4.

[a ]Or, ‘virtue must be the care of a state which is truly so called, and not merely in
name.’

[a ]Cp. i. 2. § 8; N. Eth. i. 7. § 6.

[a ]Cp. Plato Rep. i. 351, 352.

[b ]Cp. c. 11. § 20.

[a ]Cp. ii. 12. § 5.

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[a ]Cp. c. 10. § 1.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. v. 10. § 4.

[b ]Cp. c. 10. § 5.

[c ]Cp. i. 1. § 1; N. Eth. i. 1. § 1.

[d ]Cp. c. 9. § 1.

[e ]Cp. N. Eth. v. 3.

[a ]Cp. iv. 4. §§ 12-16.

[b ]Cp. c. 9. §§ 14, 15.

[a ]Cp. i. 6. § 7.

[b ]Cp. i. 2. § 16.

[c ]Cp. N. Eth. v. 1. § 15.

[a ]Cp. § 4.

[a ]Cp. v. 10. § 13.

[a ]Cp. v. 3. § 3.

[b ]Cp. v. 3. § 6; 9. § 7; vii. 4. 10; Rep. iv. 420.

[c ]Or, ‘Monarchies do not differ in this respect (i. e. the employment of compulsion)
from free states, but their government must be,’ etc.

[a ]Or, ‘as if in the division of offices among the citizens, mankind,’ etc. Or, with
Bernays, ‘as if in accordance with the principle of rotation in succession to offices,
mankind,’ etc.

[b ]ii. 9. § 29.

[c ]Omitting ?ν τινι βασιλεί?, which is bracketted by Bekker in his 2nd edit.

[a ]Il. ii. 391-393. The last clause is not found in our Homer.

[b ]Cp. i. 2. § 4.

[c ]Cp. v. 10. § 10.

[a ]Or, ‘banquet-odes,’ σκόλια.

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[b ]Cp. v. c. 10. § 3.

[a ]Cp. Plato Polit. pp. 293-295.

[a ]Cp. supra, c. 11. § 2.

[a ]Cp. infra, § 15.

[b ]Cp. c. 14. § 12.

[c ]Cp. iv. 6. § 5; 13. § 10.

[a ]Cp. c. 15. § 2.

[b ]Cp. v. 1. §§ 10, 11; 4. § 7.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. v. 4. § 7.

[a ]Cp. c. 13. § 25.

[b ]Il. x. 224.

[c ]Il. ii. 372.

[d ]? δικαστής.

[e ]Cp. for similar arguments c. 15. § 9.

[a ]Or: ‘for there are men who are by nature fitted to be ruled by a master, others to be
ruled by a king, others to live under a constitutional government, and for whom these
several relations are just and expedient; but there are no men naturally fitted to be
ruled by a tyrant,’ etc.

[b ]C. 13. § 25, and § 5, infra.

[c ]Omitting the words πλη?θος ? πέ?υκε ?έρειν, which appear to be a repetition from
the previous clause.

[d ]Omitting κα? ?ν.

[e ]Cp. c. 7. § 4.

[a ]Cp. c. 9. § 15.

[b ]Or: ‘but differing in the manner already laid down.’

[c ]Omitting κα? ?ρχειν, which is inserted, without MS. authority, in Bekker’s 2nd
edit.

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[d ]Cp. c. 4.

[a ]Retaining the words of the MSS, ’Ανάγκη δ? τ?ν μέλλοντα περ? α?τη?ς
ποιήσασθαι τ?ν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν, which are omitted by Bekker in his 2nd edit.

[a ]The numbers in this paragraph are made to correspond with the numbers in the
next.

[a ]Cp. ii. 6. § 16.

[b ]Cp. § 4.

[c ]Or: ‘laws, though in themselves distinct, show the character of the constitution.’

[a ]Book iii. 7; N. Eth. viii. 10.

[b ]Cp. iii. 17. § 8.

[c ]Plato Polit. 303 a.

[a ]C. 4-6.

[b ]C. 7-9 and 11.

[c ]Or: ‘after the perfect state; and besides this what other there is which is
aristocratical and well constituted, and at the same time adapted to states in general.’

[d ]C. 12.

[e ]Book vi.

[f ]Book v.

[g ]Or: ‘and again both of rich and poor some are armed and some are unarmed.’

[a ]Reading either πολέμους with v. tr. (Moerbek) and Bekk. 2nd edit., or πολεμίους
with the Greek MSS; cp. c. 13. § 10; vi. c. 7. § 1.

[b ]Not in what has preceded, but cp. vii. 8.

[a ]Cp. iii. 8. § 3-7.

[a ]Cp. c. 3. § 1.

[a ]Rep. ii. 369.

[a ]Or, ‘Different functions appear to be often combined,’ etc.

[b ]Cp. iii. c. 6.

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[a ]Or, reading ?ρχειν with Victorius, ‘that the poor should no more govern than the
rich.’ The emendation is not absolutely necessary, though supported by vi. 2. § 9,
?σον γ?ρ τ? μηθ?ν μα?λλον ?ρχειν το?ς ?πόρους ? το?ς ε?πόρους μηδ? κυρίους ε??ναι
μόνους ?λλ? πάντας ?ξ ?σου κατ’ ?ριθμόν.

[a ]Il. 2. 204.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. v. 10. § 7.

[b ]Cp. v. 1. § 8.

[a ]Or, ‘which is proper to it.’

[a ]Cp. ii. 11. §§ 5-10.

[a ]Cp. iii. 7.

[b ]Omitting ?λλ? πονηροκρατουμένην.

[a ]Cp. c. 13. § 6.

[a ]Cp. ii. 9. § 21.

[b ]iii. 14-17.

[a ]N. Eth. vii. 13. § 2.

[b ]Cp. iii. 3. §§ 7, 8.

[a ]Cp. Pl. Rep. iv. 421 c, d ff.

[b ]Laws viii. 831 e.

[c ]Cp. v. 9. § 13.

[a ]Cp. Bk. v.

[b ]Cp. v. 1. § 15; 7. § 6.

[a ]Or, if προσάγεσθαι can govern το??ς νόμοις, ‘to win this class over to his laws.’

[a ]Cp. c. 3. § 3; vi. 7. § 1.

[a ]Cp. vi. 2. § 5.

[a ]Reading with several of the MSS ?ριστοκρατία ? πολιτεία, and omitting μέν. Or,
with Bekker’s text, ?ριστοκρατία μ?ν ? πολιτεία, ‘the government is an aristocracy.’

[a ]Cp. ii. 2. § 6.

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[a ]Cp. vi. 8.

[b ]Cp. Note on i. 2. § 3.

[c ]See note.

[a ]i. e. partly out of all and partly out of some, and partly by vote and partly by lot
(see infra c. 16. § 6).

[b ]These words are bracketted by Bekker in both editions.

[a ]Omitting καί with some MSS and the old translator.

[a ]Cp. iv. c. 2.

[b ]Reading καί with the MSS and Bekker’s first edition.

[c ]Cp. iii. 9. §§ 1-4.

[a ]Cp. iii. 13. § 25.

[b ]Cp. c. 4. § 12.

[c ]Cp. iv. 8. § 9.

[d ]Cp. iv. 5. § 3.

[e ]Cp. vii. 14. § 20.

[f ]Cp. iii. 16. § 1.

[a ]Cp. § 2; iii. 9. §§ 1-4.

[b ]Or, placing a comma (as Bekker has done in his second edition) after τ? κατ’
?ξίαν, ‘while men agree that justice is proportion, they differ in thinking—some that,’
etc.

[c ]Cp. iv. 11. § 14.

[d ]Cp. c. 6.

[e ]Cp. c. 5.

[a ]Omitting ? before τω?ν ?λίγων.

[b ]Supra §§ 2, 3.

[a ]Cp. iii. 13. § 15.

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[b ]Cp. c. 5. § 2.

[a ]Cp. iii. c. 13. § 21.

[b ]Reading ε?πόρων.

[a ]Cp. ii. 12. § 5; viii. 6. § 11.

[a ]Cp. supra c. 3. § 10, and infra c. 10. § 16.

[b ]Cp. supra c. 2. § 1.

[a ]Cp. supra c. 3. § 4.

[b ]Cp. c. 3. § 5, and iv. 15. § 15.

[c ]Cp. infra c. 8. § 20.

[a ]Cp. c. 10. § 4; Plato Rep. viii. 565 d.

[b ]Cp. infra c. 10. § 5.

[c ]See Herod. i. 59.

[a ]Cp. c. 3. § 13.

[a ]δυναστεία.

[b ]Cp. c. 4. §§ 5-7.

[a ]Cp. iv. c. 7.

[a ]Cp. c. 3. § 12.

[b ]Cp. ii. 9. § 14.

[c ]c. 4. § 1.

[a ]Cp. iv. c. 11. § 18.

[b ]Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 1. § 4.

[a ]Cp. iv. 13. § 1.

[b ]vi. 7. § 4.

[c ]Supra c. 6. § 6.

[d ]Cp. c. 5. § 6.

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[a ]Cp. c. 4. §§ 1-3.

[b ]Cp. c. 3. § 8; c. 6. §§ 16-18.

[c ]Or, adding κα? μοναρχί?, ‘monarchy,’ with many MSS. and Bekker’s first edition.

[a ]Cp. c. 3. § 3; iii. 13. § 15.

[b ]Cp. c. 12. § 14.

[a ]Or: ‘than if he had wronged one of his own class.’

[a ]Cp. iv. 12. § 1; vi. 6. § 2.

[a ]Cp. i. c. 13. § 15.

[a ]Cp. iv. 11. § 6.

[b ]Cp. Pl. Rep. viii. 556 d.

[a ]Cp. c. 5. § 6; Plato Rep. 565 d.

[b ]Retaining τούτοις, which is omitted in Bekker’s second edition, apparently by


mistake.

[c ]Cp. c. 5. § 8.

[d ]Cp. iii. 14. § 12.

[a ]Cp. c. 11. § 2.

[b ]Cp. iii. 14. § 7.

[c ]Cp. iii. 13. § 16.

[a ]Or: ‘Many persons too, even of those connected with the government or the royal
family,’ taking τω?ν περί, etc. with the subject.

[a ]Cp. i. 11. § 8.

[a ]Omitting κατ’ inserted by Bekker in 2nd ed.

[b ]Cp. Plato Laws, iii. 695.

[a ]Cp. Rhetoric, ii. 4. § 31.

[b ]Omitting καί with Bekker’s 2nd ed.

[a ]Or, ‘at their doors.’

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[b ]Reading ? τε with Bekker’s 2nd ed.

[c ]This, which is probably the meaning of the passage, cannot be elicited from the
text as it stands. The addition is required of some such phrase as α?τ?ν καθελε??ν,
which is not wholly without manuscript authority.

[a ]Cp. c. 8. § 12.

[a ]Fragm. 69 (ed. Mullach).

[b ]Cp. i. 5. § 2.

[a ]Rep. viii. 546.

[a ]Placing a note of interrogation after μεταβάλλειν. Or: ‘And in the period of time
which, as he says, makes all things change, things which did not begin together
change together.’

Bekker in his 2nd edition has altered the reading of the MSS. διά τε τον? χρόνου to
διά γε τ?ν χρόνον. The rendering of the text agrees with either reading; that of the
note with the reading of the MSS. only.

[a ]Rep. viii. 550 e.

[b ]Rep. viii. 551 d.

[c ]Rep. viii. 555 d.

[a ]Rep. viii. 564.

[a ]Bk. iv. 14-16.

[b ]Bk. v.

[c ]Cp. Bk. iv. 7-9.

[d ]Cp. iv. 8. § 3.

[a ]Cp. iv. 2. § 5.

[b ]Cp. iv. 4. § 21.

[c ]Cp. iv. 1. § 7.

[d ]v. 9. § 7.

[e ]Cp. Plato Rep. viii. 557 foll.

[a ]Cp. v. 9. § 15.

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[b ]Or (taking ?ρχή in the sense of ‘beginning’), ‘Such being our foundation, and such
being the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as
follows:’

[c ]Cp. iv. 14. § 6.

[d ]See note.

[e ]Cp. iv. 15. § 11.

[a ]Cp. iv. 6. § 5.

[b ]Transposing ?πόρους and ε?πόρους, with Bekker’s 2nd ed.

[c ]Cp. iv. 4. § 22.

[d ]Reading with Bekker’s 2nd ed. α?ρέσεων from conjecture for διαιρέσεων, which
is the reading of the MSS. See note.

[a ]Cp. iii. 10. § 1.

[a ]Or, ‘care nothing for the weaker.’

[b ]Cp. iv. 4. § 22.

[c ]Cp. iv. 6. § 2.

[d ]Cp. iv. 13. § 8.

[e ]Cp. ii. 12. § 5.

[a ]Cp. ii. 7. § 7.

[b ]Or, ‘that the qualification of the poor may exceed that of the rich.’

[a ]Cp. v. 5.

[b ]Cp. iii. 5. § 7.

[a ]Cp. iii. 2. § 3; v. 3. § 5.

[b ]Cp. v. 11. § 11.

[c ]Cp. Bk. v.

[d ]Cp. v. 11. §§ 2, 3.

[a ]Cp. v. 5. § 5.

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[a ]Cp. ii. 11. § 15.

[b ]Cp. ii. 5. § 8.

[c ]Reading τη?ς α?τη?ς ?ρχη?ς with Bekker’s 2nd ed.

[a ]Cp. iv. 3. §§ 2, 3.

[b ]Reading ?πλίτην with Bekker’s 1st ed.

[a ]Cp. c. 6. § 2.

[b ]Cp. iii. 5. § 7.

[a ]Cp. iv. 15.

[b ]Cp. iv. 15. §§ 5-7.

[c ]Cp. i. 2. § 8; Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 4; Pl. Rep. ii. 369.

[a ]Cp. iv. 15. § 11.

[b ]Cp. iii. 14. § 14.

[c ]Cp. iv. 15. § 13.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. i. 8. § 2.

[b ]Omitting ?σπερ, which is bracketted by Bekker in his second edition.

[a ]Cp. i. 8. § 15.

[b ]Cp. c. 3. § 10; N. Eth. x. 8. § 7; Met. xii. 7.

[a ]Ethics i. 9. § 6.

[a ]Or, inserting καί before νόμων (apparently the reading of the old translator), ‘in
some cases the entire aim both of the constitution and the laws.’

[a ]Cp. Plato Laws i. 633 ff.

[a ]Cp. ii. 6. § 7; 7. § 14.

[b ]Cp. c. 14.

[a ]Cp. i. c. 5, 6, 7.

[b ]Cp. iii. 13. § 25, and 17. § 7.

[a ]Cp. c. 1. § 10.

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[b ]Cp. ii. 6. § 7.

[a ]Cp. Poet. 7. § 4.

[a ]Cp. v. 9. § 7.

[a ]Cp. ii. 6. § 9.

[b ]Cp. c. 8-10 infra (?).

[c ]Cp. Plato Laws iv. 704 ff.

[a ]Cp. ii. 6. § 7.

[b ]Reading πολιτικόν with the MSS. and Bekker’s first edition.

[a ]Cp. Plato Rep. iv. 435 e, 436 a.

[b ]Rep. ii. 375.

[a ]Or: ‘For surely thou art not plagued on account of thy friends?’ The line is
probably corrupt. Better to read with Bergk, σ? γ?ρ δ? παρ? ?ίλων ?πήγχεο, ‘for thou
indeed wert plagued by friends.’

[b ]Eurip. Frag. 51 Dindorf.

[c ]Cp. 12. § 9, infra.

[d ]Cp. iii. 5. § 2.

[a ]Cp. i. 4. § 2.

[b ]Cp. supra, c. 5. § 1.

[a ]Reading δικαίων with Bekker in his second edition.

[b ]Cp. iv. c. 4 and 14.

[c ]Cp. c. 8. § 5.

[d ]Cp. Plato Laws xi. 919.

[a ]Cp. ii. 5. §§ 27, 28.

[b ]Cp. infra, c. 10. §§ 13, 14.

[a ]Retaining the reading of the MSS., which Bekker in his second edition has altered
into Σιρ??τις, a conjecture of Goettling’s.

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[b ]Cp. Plato Laws iii. 676; Aristotle Metaph. xi. 8. 1074 b. 10; and Pol. ii. 5. § 16
(note).

[a ]Cp. Metaph. i. c. 1. § 16; Meteor. i. 14. 352 b. 19; Plato Timaeus 22 b; Laws ii.
656, 657.

[b ]Reading, with Bekker in his second edition, ε?ρημένοις: which may have been
altered into ε?ρημένοις from a confusion of ε?ρηται πρότερον in § 9 infra.

[c ]Cp. supra, c. 9. §§ 5-7.

[d ]Cp. ii. 5.

[e ]Cp. ii. 9. § 31.

[a ]Cp. Plato Laws v. 745, where the same proposal is found. Aristotle, in Book ii. 6.
§ 15, condemns the division of lots which he here adopts.

[b ]Cp. Plato Laws vi. 777.

[c ]Cp. c. 9. § 8.

[d ]Cp. ii. 7. § 23.

[e ]Cp. c. 5. § 3.

[a ]Repetition of c. 5. § 3.

[b ]Cp. ii. 8. § 1.

[a ]Cp. Plato Laws vi. 778, 779.

[a ]Cp. Plato Laws vi. 778; viii. 848; v. 738; vi. 759.

[b ]Or, ‘this institution should be divided according to ages.’

[a ]Reading νενεμη?σθαι with Bekker’s first edition.

[a ]Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 7. § 15; x. 6. § 2; and cp. c. 8. § 5, supra.

[b ]Retaining the MSS. reading α?ρεσις with Bekker’s first edition.

[c ]Nic. Eth. i. c. 10. § 12-14.

[d ]Nic. Eth. iii. c. 4. §§ 4, 5; E. E. vii. 15. § 4; M. M. ii. 9. § 3.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. x. 9. § 6.

[b ]Cp. i. 2. § 10.

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[c ]Cp. supra, c. 7. § 4.

[d ]Cp. iii. 6. § 9.

[a ]Or, taking το??ς ?ρχομένοις with ?ανερ?ν, ‘was undisputed and patent to their
subjects.’

[b ]Cp. i. 5. § 8; iii. 13. § 13.

[c ]Cp. c. 9. § 5.

[a ]Cp. iii. 4. § 14.

[b ]Cp. iii. 6. § 6.

[c ]Cp. iii. 4. and 5. § 10.

[d ]Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 13. §§ 18, 19.

[e ]Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 1. § 5: 11. § 4.

[a ]N. E. x. 7. § 6.

[b ]Plato Laws i. 628, 638.

[a ]Cp. i. 5. § 2.

[b ]Cp. v. 1. § 10; 7. § 4.

[c ]Cp. ii. 9. § 34.

[d ]Lit. ‘they lose their edge.’

[a ]i. e. ‘not only by some of the speculative but also by some of the practical virtues.’

[b ]Cp. ii. 9. § 34.

[a ]Cp. 13. § 12.

[b ]Or, ‘and yet a man may be trained by habit as if the reason had not so erred.’

[c ]Cp. N. Eth. i. 13. § 9 ff.

[d ]Cp. Plato Rep. iii. 410.

[a ]Omitting ? μικρόν.

[a ]Cp. Plato Laws vii. 789.

[b ]λειτουργε??ν.

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[c ]Cp. Solon Fragm. 25 Bergk.

[d ]Cp. Laws viii. 841.

[a ]Plato Rep. ii. 377 ff.

[b ]Plato Laws i. 643; vii. 799.

[a ]Plato Laws vii. 792.

[b ]Unfulfilled promise (?), but cp. viii. c. 5. § 21.

[a ]Cp. supra, c. 16. § 17.

[b ]Reading ο? καλω?ς, with the MSS. and Bekker’s first edition: or, reading ο?
κακω?ς, a conjecture of Muretus, which Bekker has adopted in his second edition,
‘are in the main right; but we should also observe, etc.’

[a ]Cp. v. 9. §§ 11-16.

[b ]Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 13.

[a ]Cp. iii. 4. § 13.

[b ]§ 3 supra.

[a ]As in vii. 15. §§ 1, 2, and N. Eth. x. 6.

[a ]Or, ‘to invite Thalia to the feast,’ an interpretation of the passage possibly intended
by Aristotle, though of course not the original meaning.

[b ]Od. xvii. 385.

[c ]Od. ix. 7.

[a ]Cp. Plato Rep. vii. 525 ff.

[b ]Cp. N. Eth. vii. 5. § 2.

[a ]Cp. Nic. Eth. iii. 6. § 8.

[b ]Cp. Plato Rep. vii. 537 b.

[a ]Bacchae, 380.

[b ]Reading (with Bekker’s 2nd ed.) ?πν?, a correction which seems necessary, and is
suggested by ?πνου κα? μέθης above.

[a ]Cp. N. Eth. vii. 13. § 6.

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[a ]Cp. Plato Rep. iii. 401, 402; Laws ii. 658, 659.

[b ]Cp. Plato Rep. iii. 395.

[a ]Cp. Poet. 2. § 2; 6. § 15.

[b ]Cp. Plato Rep. iii. 398, 399.

[c ]Rep. iii. 399 e, 400.

[d ]c. 5. §§ 5-8.

[a ]Cp. supra, c. 5. § 7.

[a ]Cp. c. 7. § 3.

[a ]Cp. Plato Rep. iii. 399 d.

[b ]Cp. Plato Laws iii. 700.

[a ]Cp. Poet. c. 6, though the promise is really unfulfilled.

[a ]Plato Rep. iii. 399.

[b ]Retaining the MS. reading μύθους. Cp. Poet. c. 2. § 7.

[c ]Cp. c. 5. § 22.

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