On manufacturing and foreign investment in the Netherlands Indies

J. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden University)

Paper presented at the Second Workshop on Colonial Rule in the Netherlands Indies and
Belgian Congo , Antwerp, 7-8 October 2011

Draft version. Please do not quote.

E-mail: thomaslindblad@hotmail.com

1.

Introduction

The Rotterdam-trained economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo was a key figure in shaping

economic policy and promoting the science of economics in newly independent Indonesia. As
minister of trade and industry in the Natsir cabinet, a position to which he was appointed at
the age of thirty-three, he took the initiative to a full-scale scheme for industrialization in
Indonesia, the so-called Economic Urgency Plan, also referred to as the Sumitro Plan. The
plan was released in April 1951, when the Sukiman cabinet with another minister of trade and
industry had already taken charge. Sumitro had an acute grasp of the pressing need in
Indonesia for a balanced economic growth based on both agricultural and industrial
development (Thee 2010: 49-50). Despite short-term gains for Indonesia from the Korea War
boom due to rising demand for oil and rubber, a solid manufacturing base was lacking which
could have reduced the nation s extreme dependence on world markets for exports of primary
products. When assessing economic repercussions of colonial rule in the Netherlands Indies in
comparison to simultaneous developments in Belgian Congo, we need to understand why so
little industrialization had taken place prior to independence.
The Sumitro Plan was highly ambitious. Total outlays during the first two years of
execution alone required a capital injection of Rp. 920 million, a figure corresponding to onethird of total revenues from foreign exports in 1950 (Lindblad 2008: 81, 224). The Indonesian
government obviously had no capacity to finance investment at such an order of a magnitude,
even aside from the huge demands on public finance in the vein of current expenditure. Only
large-scale foreign investment could have solved the bottleneck in financing long-term
investment undertakings, but such inflows were for a variety of reasons drying up precisely at
a time when most needed. This signified a reversal of the trend during the late-colonial period
when foreign direct investment had played an increasingly large role in propelling the
Indonesian economy. This brings to the second matter that we need to better understand in the
context of a comparison of colonial rule in Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies: why
was foreign investment, in particular from the colonial mother-country, so strongly biased
against the secondary sector of the economy?
This essay explores the two interrelated questions formulated above in a straightforward
structure. We first survey the evidence on manufacturing in the Indonesian economy during
2

late-colonial period, from the turn of the century up to about 1940. We then turn to the
evidence on foreign investment under the aegis of colonialism.

2. Modernity in a traditional context

Indonesia today is a far cry from the stereotype image of a predominantly agrarian economy
that often lives forth in memories of colonial days. In 2010, manufacturing accounted for
almost 55 per cent of Gross Domestic product (GDP), twice as much as the tertiary sector and
more than three times as much as agriculture.1 The decisive transformation in the nation s
economic structure took place between 1965 and the 1980s when the secondary sector bypassed the primary sector as the prime engine of economic growth (World Bank 1992: 222).
The share of agriculture in total employment, likely to exceed the share in GDP, had fallen
below 50 per cent already by 1990 (Dick et al. 2002: 199). Such statistics testify to the
presence of a huge unused potential for industrialization during earlier phases of economic
development, including the late-colonial period.
The relevant question is how much earlier the thrust towards industrialization could have
taken place in Indonesia. In the event, the breakthrough only came during the 1980s and early
1990s when stabilization, or even decline of world oil prices, convinced the Suharto
government of the necessity to move away from the dependence on unprocessed exports .
Interestingly, various projects proposed in the Sumitro Plan that had remained on paper, such
as the Asahan aluminium smelter (North Sumatra) were then dusted off and implemented
(Hill 2000: 156-175; Dick et al. 2002: 220-223).
Discussions on the right moment for industrialization are invariably contingent upon the
quality of available statistics. The rich statistical heritage of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia
has permitted a reconstruction of national accounts that provides us with a useful point of
departure, even if figures needs to be used with caution because of the sometimes bold
assumptions made.2 The contribution of manufacturing towards GDP in the Netherlands
Indies, as projected by Van der Eng, remained stable at an unimpressive level throughout the
late-colonial period (Figure 1). The great structural transformation, from the primary to the
secondary sector, only took place at a far later date. The tertiary sector continued to occupy a
1

OECD data from: https://stats.oecd.org.

The most easily accessible tables are in Van der Eng 1992 and 2002 (updated version). A forthcoming new
textbook on Indonesian economic history, compiled by Jan Luiten van Zanden and Daan Marks, contains some
new statistical series that are likely to prove highly useful to future students.
2

rather constant proportion of GDP, between one-third and two-fifths, throughout the twentieth
century (Marks 2009: 80).

Figure 1. Sectoral composition of Indonesian

GDP, 1900-1940.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1900

1910

Agric.

1920

Manuf.

1930

1940

Serv.

Note: Gross Domestic Product estimated at 1983 level market prices in Rp. billion.
Source: Van der Eng 2002: 171-172

The strength of the bias against industrialization is evident from immediate postindependence developments when a structural retrogression of sorts seems to have taken
place. The less modern parts of the economy allegedly gained at the expense of those with a
greater potential for technological progress, a development obviously at variance with
professed priorities of economic policy as well as expectations among development
economists (Booth 1998: 70). Yet, this tendency in the opposite direction of modernization
does not appear to have been sustained. Other calculations show that manufacturing
accounted for 13.5 per cent of national income in 1958, an increase of almost 60 per cent
since the early 1950s and virtually the same as in the mid-1960s (Mangkusuwondo 1975: 13;
World Bank 1992: 220). There was undoubtedly scope for far more industrialization at
independence, and before, in Indonesia.
There was, of course, a wide array of manufacturing activity taking place in all parts of the
late-colonial economy. The number of factories and workshops in the Netherlands Indies
showed a steady increase during the 1910s and 1930s in particular (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Factories in Netherlands

Indies 1908-1940.
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0

1908

1915

1925

1935

Factories

Note: Numbers of factories and workshop as registered under the Factory Act of 1905.
Source: Segers 1987: 59-61.

A few examples illustrate the expansion. The number of rice mills, in particular in Java,
climbed from about 200 around 1910 to more than 800 in the mid-1930s. There were nearly
200 sugar processing plants in East and Central Java at the time of the First World War, but
this number was reduced to some 130 by a succession of mergers and closures during the
worldwide depression in the 1930s. In addition, there were large, modern oil refineries in
North Sumatra and East Kalimantan, a proliferation of textile factories in West Java,
numerous installations for manufacturing kretek cigarettes in Central Java, several shipyards
and engineering firms in Batavia and Surabaya. The share of manufacturing in the labour
force gradually increased, reaching a level of 140,000 persons by 1930 (Segers 1987: 59-61,
77). In addition, it must not be overlooked that many rural dwellers, identified in the census as
being engaged in agriculture, in fact pursued part-time economic activities in the secondary
sector as well (cf. Alexander, Boomgaard and White 1991).
Indigenous entrepreneurship played a particularly prominent role in kretek cigarette
manufacturing and textile production. Following the establishment of a large-scale cigarette
factory in 1910, Kudus in Central Java turned into a predominantly industrial town, a most
unusual development in the Indonesian countryside at the time. By 1933, Kudus counted 15
large factories, 48 medium-sized plants and 800 small production units (Lindblad 2008: 30).
The Sundanese textile industry emerged at a slightly later stage, supported by government
promotion of mechanization in the 1920s and increasingly replacing imports of textiles during

the economic depression in the 1930s. Production centered at Majalaya in West Java, which
by the late 1930s alone counted 275 weaving mills and almost 3,300 handlooms (Lindblad
2008: 32). Kudus and Majalaya both used labour-intensive production techniques and
relatively simple technologies while benefitting from an unlimited access to a large and
growing domestic market of consumers.
Ethnic Chinese often mixed trading with activities in the secondary sector. The foremost
example of a late-colonial Chinese tycoon, erecting a virtual empire of firms, is, of course,
Oei Tiong Ham in Semarang, whose concern included sugar mills and light manufacturing.
But there are other examples. Tiong A Fie in Medan in the early 1920s (Claver 2006: 366369). Ethnic Chinese were also successful in already existing branches such as the Sundanese
textile industry or kretek manufacturing in both Kudus and the Brantas Valley in East Java.
Here indigenous producers increasingly operated as subcontractors to Chinese factory-owners
with more capital.
The distinguishing characteristic of manufacturing initiated by European investors in the
colony was access not only to capital but also to modern technology. The refinery built by
Shell at Balikpapan at the turn of the century was known as one of the most technologically
advanced in the region, clearly outpacing the rival one at Pangkalan Brandan (North
Sumatra), erected earlier by Royal Dutch (Koninklijke). After having been set up as a jointly
owned subsidiary by Royal Dutch and Shell, the BPM (Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij)
counted as the colony s single largest industrial enterprise. Sugar factories applying the
newest machinery mushroomed in the Javanese countryside during the 1920s. By the late
1930s, there were about 125 of them and the industry has aptly been characterized as a firstworld industry in a third-world field (Lindblad 2008: 53; Knight 1996: 155). Industrial
ventures outside the oil sector were not confined to Java. Indonesia s first cement factory
began operations near Padang, West Sumatra, in the early 1910s. An enterprise named
Insulinde, for processing copra from Sulawesi underwent a very rapid expansion during the
late 1910s but went bankrupt already in the early 1920s (Kamerling 1982).
During the 1920s and 1930s, a whole host of leading international concerns erected modern
factories in and around Batavia. Examples include General Motors, Unilever, Goodyear, Bata
and Philips. Late-colonial Indonesia became self-sufficient in a wide range of industrial
consumer goods, for instance cigarettes, beer, shoes and confectionery, whereas margarine,
biscuits, batteries and bicycles were also being produced on a significant scale (Dick et al.
2002: 160-161). The proliferation of manufacturing enterprises during the final decade of
uncontested colonial rule is corroborated by information from an annual directory of private
6

business firms, incorporated under Western law, which, incidentally, would exclude virtually
all indigenous operations (Handboek 1888-1940).
Colonial economic policy played a key part in the somewhat haphazard and inconsistent
industrial development from the late nineteenth century until the end of effective Dutch
colonial rule over the entire archipelago in 1942. Extreme liberalism held its sway in
economic policy as implemented in the Netherlands Indies from the 1870s until the early
1930s. This implied both a virtually unlimited access of imports in the domestic market and
free play for foreign direct investment. The former reduced the scope for import-substituting
industrialization under the protective umbrella of import tariffs whereas the latter linked much
new industrial activity to the simultaneous expansion of exploitation of natural resources with
the use of foreign capital and technology. Foreign imports benefitted from the increasing
demand for industrial consumer goods and foreign firms were mostly interested in enhancing
capabilities in export production. In the absence of an explicit industrial policy, there was an
inherent bias against easy industrialization and in favour of specific types of difficult
industrialization during most of the late-colonial period.
Change only occurred as a response to declining incomes and rising competition from cheap
Japanese imports in the early 1930s. The Crisis Import Ordinance of 1933, effectively, if not
overtly, directed against Japanese industrial products, was followed in 1934 by an Industry
Regulation. This was the first step towards a comprehensive policy of industrialization,
although preceded, as mentioned above, by the promotion of mechanization in textile
production in West Java during the 1920s. A major aim of the colonial government was to
streamline efforts towards industrialization, for instance by imposing capacity controls in
production in order to prevent excessive competition (Van Oorschot 1956: 46). Local industry
centres were set up from 1936 to further support industrialization. In the late 1930s, the newly
created Department of Economic Affairs in Batavia expanded rapidly and began designing a
strategy of full-fledged industrialization, which, interestingly, included some projects that
were later to figure in the Sumitro Plan. In 1941, on the eve of the Japanese occupation, when
the colonial mother-country itself was occupied, the so-called Visman committee was busy
formulating specific targets of industrialization. It was too late in the day.
Returning to the question of timing of a possible industrial breakthrough, we consider three
options: at an early stage, very late and not at all. The first possibility one has been suggested,
somewhat provocatively, by Dick, putting Surabaya on par with Bombay and Osaka in terms
of industrial development in the 1880s or 1890s. For a variety of reasons, a take-off as in
Japan failed to materialize in Java at the turn of the century (Dick 1993: 138; Dick 2003: 2557

261). The second option rests upon the counterfactual hypothesis that the Japanese army had
not invaded Indonesia and

by logical corollary

Indonesia would have stayed a Dutch

colony a bit longer. Then, Indonesia would have been first to industrialize in Southeast Asia,
not a late-comer lagging behind its neighbours (Dick et al. 2002: 162). In the final analysis,
the third option, coinciding with historical reality, appears the most probable one, even if Van
der Eng s optimistic assessment that manufacturing by 1940 contributed one-fifth of GDP can
be taken at face value (Van der Eng 2002: 172). The climate had never been conducive for
industrialization except for a few years towards the very end of the late-colonial period.
Despite tremendous hardships, it is unlikely that the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian
Revolution would have completely annihilated an industrial base had there been one in the
first place in 1942.

3.

The different faces of capitalism

Private foreign investment only developed in the Netherlands Indies during the late-colonial
period and required a relatively long gestation period after the colonial state had withdrawn
from direct involvement in production, from 1870 onwards. A significant increase in foreignheld asset holdings only occurred in the very early twentieth century, especially in regions
outside Java that had just or barely been brought under effective colonial rule. Accumulated
foreign direct investment rose from 750 million guilders in 1900 to 1.7 billion guilders in
1914. A specular increase followed during the First World War and the 1920s, pushing the
accumulated aggregate towards four billion guilders by 1930, an amount to be adjusted
downwards by divestment during the depression of the 1930s. Dutch firms accounted for
about 70 per cent of the total. More than one-half of all foreign investment was in estate
agriculture and almost one-fifth in the oil industry alone (Lindblad 1998: 14). Only a small
proportion of foreign direct investment entered manufacturing, which is all the more striking
considering the strong reliance on foreign capital in the final thrust towards industrialization
during the 1970s and 1980s (Hill 1988: 80-83).
In order to understand the apparent bias against the secondary sector in incoming foreign
investment during the late-colonial period, we need to take a closer look at the character and
8

function of such investment. A significant feature was the skewed size distribution containing
a small number of large enterprises as well as large numbers of small- and medium-sized
firms. The foreign-owned enterprise at the top, BPM, had a registered paid-up equity of 300
million guilders. Two other leading Dutch-owned concerns, NHM (Nederlandsche HandelMaatschappij, Netherlands Trading Association) and KPM (Koninklijke PaketvaartMaatschappij, Royal Packet Company), were good for respectively 80 and 30 million guilders
of equity (Lindblad 1998: 77).
The skewed size distribution needs to be linked with firm identity. The context of
colonialism offered a peculiar distinction by shade of foreignness. Dutch-owned companies
were obviously foreign compared to indigenous ones but still less so than firms with British
or American owners since they operated under the same authorities and in the same legal
system as at home in the Netherlands. It also made a difference whether the Dutch-owned
firm was run from headquarters in the Netherlands or in the colony. In the latter case, the firm
was technically not foreign but it was managed in the interests of overseas owners. The large
Dutch-owned firms were generally run from the Netherlands. Around 1930, companies in this
category held at least 70 per cent of all foreign-owned equity against only 14 per cent held by
Dutch-owned firms with headquarters in the Netherlands, a category making up almost onehalf of all companies known to have foreign proprietors (Lindblad 1998: 77, 79). The fine
distinctions with regard to identity are completed by adding companies owned by ethnic
Chinese residents in the colony. These firms were technically not foreign at all but effectively
treated as such, a tendency that was only to be reinforced after independence.
Investing in the Netherlands Indies held a threefold attraction for Dutch owners of capital.
In the first place, the Indonesian archipelago offered unique opportunities for the exploitation
of rich natural resources

both fertile soils for growing sugar, tobacco, rubber, coffee, tea and

palm oil, to name only the most successful cash crops, and mineral wealth, in particular oil
and tin. Massive access to cheap, unskilled labour was not in itself conceived as a major asset
of the colonial economy, but only so to the extent that when labour-intensive techniques were
applied in the exploitation of natural resources, especially in estate agriculture. The second
source of attraction for Dutch investors was colonial rule itself offering advantages that would
not have been obtained to the same degree elsewhere. Such advantages concerned language,
institutional connections, legal protection and political leverage, even affinity with social and
cultural life. It was no coincidence that the Dutch ranked first and the British second in the
Netherlands whereas it was exactly the other way around in British Malaya. Finally, investing
in Southeast Asia in general, and in colonial Indonesia in particular, served as a chief vehicle
9

of globalization of business activities of Dutch corporations. Mutual trade between the

Netherlands and its colony had been of paramount importance in the nineteenth century but in
the twentieth century the mutual trading relationship was dwarfed by the interests of
investment capital (Dick et al. 2002: 128-130).
The strong orientation towards exports of primary products to the world market is crucial to
our understanding why so much foreign direct investment resulted in so little industrialization.
This may be substantiated by comparing export figures with estimates of investment
commitments over a period of time. Trade figures are readily available but investment
commitments on an annual basis can only be inferred for Dutch equity from extrapolations
from claims for indemnification submitted by Dutch companies after nationalization by the
Sukarno administration in the late 1950s.3 The time series of total exports and estimated
accumulated Dutch-held equity do indeed show a high degree of congruence during the three
decades between 1910 and 1940 (Figure 3). The visual correspondence between the two
variables can be corroborated by simple regression analysis producing a statistically
significant correlation (R2=0.66).4

Figure 3. Dutch capital investment and

exports from Netherlands Indies 19101939.

mill.

2000
1500
1000
500

Dutch K

19
35
/3
9

19
30
/3
4

19
25
/2
9

19
20
/2
4

19
15
/1
9

19
10
/1
4

Exports

Note: Five-year averages of estimated new investment of Dutch capital and value of foreign
exports at current prices.
Sources: Creutzberg 1977: 17-18; Korthals Altes 1987: 41.
3

Balance of payments data on incoming capital transactions offer only a partial picture since much new
investment was done by re-investing profits.
4
Recalculation to express these variables in constant prices would admittedly offer a more adequate
representation of changes in magnitude over time but would make no difference with regard to the comparison of
variations around the mean in the two variables.

10

Profitability was always rumoured to be high in colonial investment and indeed examples
of spectacular returns on invested capital were not lacking. In the second half of the 1920s,
profits from the tin mines of Billiton permitted a pay-out ratio of 70 per cent to shareholders,
whereas a leading manager of agricultural estates such as HVA (Handels Vereeniging
Amsterdam , Amsterdam Trading Association) paid out dividends at 30 per cent or more
during the same decade. The jointly owned subsidiary of Royal Dutch and Shell, the BPM,
generated such lavish profits that even the firm s experienced directors began feeling
embarrassed (Lindblad 1998: 58, 82; Van Zanden et al. 2007: 267). Judging from dividend
payments in the 1920s, profits were lavish also at famous Dutch enterprises such as the
Billiton tin mining company on the island of Belitung and the Deli tobacco company in North
Sumatra (Lindblad 1996: 218). Generally speaking, a dividend ratio of 11 per cent of paid-up
equity was normal in the late 1920s with sugar and oil scoring better than average (Lindblad
2008: 23). This level of profits was respectable by any business standards in the Netherlands,
also when considering that part of the profits may not have been designated for dividend
payment but rather for re-investment in the company.
The case for high and sustained levels of profitability in foreign direct investment in the
Netherlands Indies is reinforced by an argument pertaining to the time horizon in management
strategy. Colonial rule offered an environment for foreign investment that for decades at
length appeared extremely safe. There was little urgency for short-run priorities of pocketing
profits as soon as possible but rather considerable scope for long-term commitment. This
becomes apparent when we compare the late-colonial situation with the turbulent 1950s when
extraordinary opportunities to reap gains abroad from the Korea War boom coincided with
unprecedented and mounting pressures in the domestic economy At that time, remittance of
profits to the metropolitan country was awarded top priority, which often meant tedious
controversies in dealing with the Indonesian authorities (Lindblad 2008: 159). Although
difficult to substantiate without scrutiny of business accounts of individual companies, such
considerations lend support to the idea that profitability in the late-colonial setting might in
reality have been even better than as inferred from dividend payments.
Foreign direct investment is generally welcomed not so much for filling up the savings gap
in developing countries but for providing access to the newest technology. In this regard, we
notice a wide variety of technological applications in the late-colonial context, ranging from
extremely labour-intensive production using little technology in estate agriculture to highly
capital- and technology-intensive processing in oil refineries and sugar factories.
11

Mechanization was only sparingly introduced, for instance in tin and coal mines depending on
large work forces. Spill-over effects from scattered instances of applications of advanced
technologies imported directly from the metropolitan country are likely to have been few and
far between in the Netherlands Indies. It is also worth noting that the promotion of
mechanization in the textile industry in the 1920s, following the establishment of the Textile
Institute in Bandung in 1919, was directed primarily at Sundanese or Chinese producers, not
foreign-owned firms (Van Oorschot 1956: 43).
The relationship between foreign firms and domestic demand also needs to be kept in mind.
Foreign firms producing manufacturing goods in the Netherlands Indies would in effect be
competing in the domestic market with imports from the Western world, supplied by related
companies or even on occasion the very same business concern. Import substitution was not
in the interest of foreign firms. The state of affairs formed a logical corollary to the extreme
liberalism in colonial trade policy prevailing from the early 1870s until 1933.
There are two good reasons why foreign direct investment retained its built-in bias against
undertakings in manufacturing. The first one stems from the very character and functionality
of foreign direct investment in the colony. It was geared towards exports and participation in
the world market, not towards meeting demand in the domestic market. As such, it was highly
profitable. There was simply no urgency to change direction. The second reason has to do
with colonial economy policy. There was no overt policy with respect to foreign direct
investment, except openness. No effort was made to channel incoming investment into lines
of production with a greater potential for sustained economic growth.

4.

Conclusion

This essay set out to answer two questions. Why did so little industrialization take place in the
Netherlands Indies during the late-colonial period? Why was foreign direct investment in the
colony biased against manufacturing? In both cases, it is instructive to distinguish between
fundamental currents in macroeconomic development on the one hand and colonial economic
policy on the other.
Macroeconomic determinants of development are governed by long-term perspectives of
gain. In this respect, colonial Indonesia was
boom of the 1970s

just as Soeharto s Indonesia during the oil

in a sense cursed by its exceptionally favourable endowment of

resources. There was little urgency to develop other lines of production than those directly
12

linked to the availability of natural resources. Only the obvious potentials inherent in mass
consumption of kretek cigarettes and cheap textiles offered an impetus for industrial ventures
but that was not enough to stage a full-scale industrialization and a take-off into sustained
economic growth. The lack of urgency applied not in the least to those entrepreneurs who
would have been best equipped to undertake manufacturing investment and apply
sophisticated technologies, that is, the foreign firms that played such a vital role on the latecolonial economy. The lack of urgency to change the direction of economic development
grew into a path dependency that was to affect, or haunt, Indonesia for most of the twentieth
century.
The role of the colonial government reinforced the strength of the path dependency. Farreaching economic liberalism explains both the absence of any industrial policy until it was
too late and the lack of market incentives to import substitution. Such policies were
intrinsically bound up with the colonial context as such, a situation in which the economic
development of the colony does not necessarily warrant a priority in its own right but is rather
seen as complementary to development of the metropolitan economy, in particular the
internationalization of private companies operating there. Industrialization failed to take place
in the Netherlands Indies despite ready access to investment capital precisely because it was a
colony.

13

Bibliography
Alexander, Paul, Peter Boomgaard and Benjamin White (eds) (1991). In the shadow of
agriculture; Non-farm activities in the Javanese economy; Past and present. Amsterdam:
Royal Tropical Institute.
Booth, Anne (1998). The Indonesian economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; A
history of missed opportunities. London; Macmillan.
Creutzberg, P. (1977). Changing Economy in Indonesia; III. Expenditure on fixed assets. The
Hague: Nijhoff.
Dick, Howard (1993). Nineteenth-century industrialization; A missed opportunity? , in: J.
Thomas Lindblad (ed.), New challenges in the modern economic history of Indonesia. Leiden:
Programme of Indonesian Studies, 123-148.
Dick, Howard (2003). Surabaya, city of work; A socioeconomic history, 1900-2000.
Singapore: Singapore University Press.
Dick, Howard, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad and Thee Kian Wie (2002). The
emergence of a national economy; An economic history of Indonesia, 1800-2000. Crows Nest,
NSW: Allen & Unwin.
Eng, Pierre van der (1992).

The real domestic product of Indonesia, 1880-1989 ,

Explorations in Economic History 29: 343-373.

Eng, Pierre van der (2002). Indonesia s growth performance in the twentieth century , in:
Angus Maddison, D.S. Prasada and William F. Shepherd (eds), The Asian economies in the
twentieth century. Cheltenham/Northampton, MA: Elgar, 143-179.
Handboek (1888-1940). Handboek voor cultuur- en handelsondernemingen in NederlandschIndi. Amsterdam: De Bussy [published annually].
Hill, Hal (1988). Foreign investment and industrialization in Indonesia. Singapore: Oxford
University Press.
Hill, Hal (2000). The Indonesian economy since 1966. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Kamerling, R.N.J. (1982). De N.V. Oliefabrieken Insulinde in Nederlands-Indi;
Bedrijfsvoering in het onbekende. Franeker: Wever.
Knight, G.R. (1996). Did Dependency really get it wrong? The Indonesian sugar industry,
1880-1942 , in: J. Thomas Lindblad (ed.), Historical foundations of a national economy in
Indonesia, 1890s-1990s (Amsterdam: North-Holland) 155-174.

14

Korthals Altes, W.L. (1987). Changing Economy in Indonesia; VII. Balance of payments,
1822-1939. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute.
Lindblad, J. Thomas (1996). Business strategies in late colonial Indonesia , in: J. Thomas
Lindblad (ed.), Historical foundations of a national economy in Indonesia, 1890s-1990s
(Amsterdam: North-Holland) 207-227.
Lindblad, J. Thomas (1998). Foreign investment in Southeast Asia in the twentieth century.
London: Macmillan.
Lindblad, J. Thomas (2008). Bridges to new business; The economic decolonization of
Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press.
Mangkusuwondo, Suhadi (1975). Indonesia , in Shinichi Ichimura (ed.), The economic
development of East and Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1-57.
Marks, Daan (2009). Accounting for services; The economic development of the Indonesian
service sector, ca. 1900-2000. Amsterdam: Aksant.
Oorschot, H.J. van (1956). De ontwikkeling van de nijverheid in Indonesi. The Hague: Van
Hoeve.
Segers, W.A.I.M. (1987). Changing Economy in Indonesia; VIII. Manufacturing industry
1870-1942. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute.
Thee Kian Wie (2010). The debate on economic policy in newly-independent Indonesia
between Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo , Itinerario 34: 35-56.
World Bank (1992). World development report 1992. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zanden, Jan Luiten van, Joost Jonker, Stephen Howarth and Keetie Sluyterman (2007). A
history of Royal Dutch Shell; I. From challenger to joint industry leader, 1890-1939. New
York: Oxford University Press.

15

This document was created with Win2PDF available at http://www.win2pdf.com.

The unregistered version of Win2PDF is for evaluation or non-commercial use only.
This page will not be added after purchasing Win2PDF.