1.

216 scra 500

MECANO vs.COA
MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ
MECANO vs.COA

G.R. No. 103982

December 11, 1992

FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of

which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which
he is claiming from the COA.

In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the
RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of

duty. When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby
to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may
direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on
full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion
also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,
subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case
contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some

act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the
payment of the necessary hospital fees.

Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding
petitioners illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination
of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioners
claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim to

Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987.

Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73,
S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.

Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied
petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was
not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro

to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court if he so desires.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699
of the RAC

HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioners claim for benefits

NO

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent
law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by
incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific
law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are
implied repeals

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of

whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the
new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code.
This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?

It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or

designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example
of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior
acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.

There are two categories of repeal by implication.

Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable
conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of
the earlier one.
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended
as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor
attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.

According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear
is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago.

Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on
the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be
no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by

implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject
and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

NOTES:

1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated
in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed.
The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which
states:

WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new

Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and

xxx xxx xxx

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative
Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an
earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act,
since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.

2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar
the recovery of benefits under the Employees Compensation Program, the same
cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on
Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as
amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that the payment of compensation
under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699
of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the
system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.

2. G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005

tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions

the plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of un-repealable laws

FACTS:

GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public
bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994,
amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however,
subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City.

On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three
parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that
same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or
Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC.

During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local
Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also
withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC

HELD:

Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing
powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind
on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.

However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted
to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section,
are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily
follows that its exemption has been withdrawn.

Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting
exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the
amendatory second paragraph.

Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress

to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint
on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws.

Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the

amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored,
have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second
paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a
disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent
legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33
cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.

Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax
exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this
Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.

The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored
by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-

1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may
be collected by the City of Davao.

3. 250 scra 500

TY VS. TRAMPE
G.R. NO. 117577, DEC. 1, 1995.
FACTS:
Petitioners were assessed by the municipal assessor for realty taxes over
their real properties. They asked for reconsideration and thinking this is not
yet enough, they filed a petition for prohibition in the RTC.
HELD:
Coming down to specifics, Sec. 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of
values of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila area shall be prepared
jointly by the city assessors in the districts created therein: while Sec. 212 of
R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared "by the provincial, city
and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila
Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local
government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian
concerned. . . ." It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only
possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative
intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing these two provisions,
we arrive at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule, as
follows:

1. The assessor in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area

shall prepare his/her proposed schedule of values, in accordance with Sec.
212, R.A. 7160.
2. Then, the Local Treasury and Assessment District shall meet, per Sec. 9,
P.D. 921. In the instant case, that district shall be composed of the assessors
in Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong and San Juan, pursuant to Sec.
1 of said P.D. In this meeting, the different assessors shall compare their
individual assessments, discuss and thereafter jointly agree and produce a
schedule of values for their district, taking into account the preamble of said

P.D. that they should evolve "a progressive revenue raising program that will
not unduly burden the taxpayers"
3. The schedule jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published
in a newspaper of general circulation and submitted to the sanggunian
concerned for enactment by ordinance, per Sec. 212, R.A. 7160.

Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before

resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a wellsettled exception in cases
where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. In
the present case the parties, even during the proceedings in the lower court
on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are legal",
and thus, no evidence was presented in said court.
In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A.
7160 provides in Sec. 229 (b) that "(t)he proceedings of the Board shall be
conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts . . . ." It follows
that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are
involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is
needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount
assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in
a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under
protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not
act on his protest. In the case at bench however, the petitioners are
questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and
independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the
tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but
attacks on the very validity of any increase.
4. 251 scra 242

HAGAD VS. GOZO-DADOLE (1995)

Facts:
Mandaue City Councilors Dionson and Bercede filed administrative complaints with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Mayol, for having conspired to falsify Ordinance 018/92 to
increase the allocated appropriation from 3.4M to 7M. The councilors moved for the preventive

suspension of the said officials. Aside from opposing the motions, the said officials also moved
to dismiss the case on the ground that the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
They averred that Section 63 of the LGC vested the power to investigate and discipline local
officials (of provinces/highly urbanized cities/independent component cities) with the Office of
the President.

The Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and placed the officials under preventive
suspension. The officials filed for a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO with the RTC.
Respondent judge ruled in favor of the officials, enjoining the enforcement of the preventive
suspension, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman under Ombudsman Act of 1989 has been divested of his
authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue LGC of
1991?

NO

Ratio:

The LCG did not repeal the Ombudsman Act.

SC agreed with the SolGen that there is nothing in th LGC to indicate that it has repealed
the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. Repeal of laws by implication are not favored, unless the
two laws are absolutely incompatible.

In the old LGC of 1983, the authority to conduct administrative investigation and to
impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted
to the Minister of Local Government. With the passage of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Ombudsman was vested with concurrent authority. Since Sections 61 & 63 of the new LGC were
adopted from the old LGC, except for the substitution of the Minister of of Local Government
by the Office of the President, no other change was effected except for such substitution.

The 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is
not repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the LGC.

The two laws govern differently.

The 6-month preventive suspension under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act may be imposed on
all public officials, whether elective or appointive and to justify it, the evidence of guilt should
be strong, and
a. the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty
b. the charges should warrant removal from the service; or
c. the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him

On the other hand, to justify the imposition of the 60-day preventive suspension under Section 63
of LCG of 1991 on an elective local official, it would be enough that the issues have been joined
and
a. there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of,
b. the evidence of culpability is strong,
c. the gravity of the offense so warrants, or
d. the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

Hearing is not a requirement before preventive suspension is imposed.

In this case, the Ombudsman imposed the preventive suspension after the officials filed their
opposition and Mayor Ouano filed his memorandum. Being a preventive measure merely aimed
to aid to the investigation and not to serve as penalty, there is no need for a finding of guilt

before it can be imposed. The charges being of very serious nature, it was within the
Ombudsman's judgment to determine of the imposition was proper.

The RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for remedy.

Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act provides that no court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law.

Oder of the RTC ANNULLED.

5. 306 scra 593
intia vs. coa
Ty v. Trampe
ISSUE: whether PD 921 on real estate taxes has been repealed impliedly by RA 7160, otherwise
know as the Local Government Code of 1991 on the same subject.
RULING: that there has been no implied repeal. It is clear that the two law are not coextensive
and mutually inclusive in their scope and purpose. RA 7160 covers almost all governmental
functions delegated to local government units all over the country. PD 921 embraces only
Metropolitan Manila Area and is limited to the administration of financial services therein. Sec.9
PD921 requires that the schedule of values of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila Area
shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors states that the schedules shall be prepared by the
provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within Metropolitan Manila Area
for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for
enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Sec.19 RA 6670, the Ombudsman Act grants disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to
discipline elective and appointive officials, except those impeachable officers, has been repealed,
RA 7160, the Local Government Code, insofar as local elective officials in the various officials
therein named.

RULING: both laws should be given effect because there is nothing in the Local Government
Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly.
The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to uphold one and strike down the other.
Two laws must be incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn.
Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus, i. e every statute must
be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form uniform system of jurisprudence.
The legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to
have enacted conflicting statutes.

Initia, Jr v. CoA

Implied repeal will not be decreed unless there is an irreconcilable inconsistency

between two provisions or laws is RA 7354 in relation to PD 1597.

RA 7354 in part of the Postmaster General, subject to the approval of the Board
of Directors of the Philippines Postal Corporation, shall have the power to determine the
staffing pattern and the number of personnel, define their duties and responsibilities, and fix their
salaries and emoluments in accordance with the approved compensation structure of the
Corporation.

Sec.6 PD 1597 exemptions notwithstanding, agencies shall report to the

President, through the Budget Commission, on their position classification and compensation
plans, policies, rates and other related details following such specifications as may be prescribed
by the President.
ISSUE: WoN Sec6 of PD1597, the two laws being reconcilable.
RULING: While the Philippine Postal Corporation is allowed to fix its own personnel
compensation structure through its board of directors, the latter is required to follow certain
standards in formulating said compensation system, and the role of DBM is merely to ensure that
the action taken by the board of directors complies the requirements of the law.
6,147192
7. 26551
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

FACTS:
Appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in
1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. After the death of Feliz,
Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of an affidavit of
self-adjudication executed and had the land declared in her name and paid the
estate and inheritance taxes thereon. Cornelia cites Art. 133 which provides that
Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. The lower
court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at
the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the
Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.

HELD:
Yes. While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the
spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that
what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written.
Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is
too prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted
by one spouse on the other, there is no reasn why this prohibition shall not apply
also to common-law relationships.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law
is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of
fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not
necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a
widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister
to the other half.