Vesting means the Process by which authority, benefit, or privilege, or rights to or interest in

an asset or property, passes unconditionally to a particular entity and legacy means

gift of personal property or money to a beneficiary (legatee) of a will.
While
technically, legacy does not include realproperty (which is a
"devise"), legacy usually refers to any gift from the estate of one who has died. It is synonymous
with the word "bequest." (will, beneficiary, bequest, legatee)
S.2(h) of Indian Succession Act, 1925 provides that Will means the legal declaration of
the intention of a person with respect to his property, which he desires to take effect after his
death Will has been defined in Corpus Juris Secundum as A Will is the legal declaration of a
mans intention, which he wills to be performed after his death, or an instrument by which a
person makes a disposition of his property to take effect after his death.
Though it has at times been thought that a "will" was historically limited to real property
while "testament" applies only to dispositions of personal property (thus giving rise to the
popular title of the document as "Last Will and Testament"), the historical records show that the
terms have been used interchangeably.[1] Thus, the word "will" validly applies to both personal
and real property. A will may also create a testamentary trust that is effective only after the death
of the testator.
LEGACY DEFINITION
A gift of money or of personal property, title to which is passed under the terms of a will.A
bequest or gift of goods or chattels by testament. This word, though properly applicable to
bequests of personal estate only, has nevertheless been extended to property not technically
within its import, in order to effectuate the intention of the testator, so as to include real property
and annuities. Devise is the term more properly applied to gifts of real estate.
The testator's intention, if uncertain, is to be sought, and any words which manifest the
intention to give or create a legacy are sufficient.As to the interest given, legacies may be
considered as; absolute for life, or in remainder. A legacy is absolute when it is given without
condition and is to vest immediately.
A legacy for life is sometimes given with an executory limitation after the death of the
tenant for life to another person; in this case, the tenant for life is entitled to the possession of the
legacy, but when it is of specific article's, the first legatee must sign and deliver to the second, an
inventory of the chattels expressing that they are in his custody for life only and that afterwards
they are to be delivered and remain to the use and benefit of the second legatee. A bequest for
life, if of specific things, is a gift of the property.
In personal property there cannot be a remainder in the strict sense of the word and
therefore every future bequest of personal property, whether it be preceded or not by any
particular bequest or limited on a certain or uncertain event, is an executory bequest and falls
under the rules by which that mode of limitation is regulated. An executory bequest cannot be
prevented or destroyed by any alteration whatsoever, in the estate, out of which or after which it
is limited. And this privilege of executory bequests, which exempts them from being barred or
destroyed, is the foundation of an invariable rule; that the event on which an interest of this sort
is permitted to take effect, is such as must happen within a life and twenty-one years.
As to the right acquired by the legatee, legacies may be considered as vested and contingent. 1. A
vested legacy is one by which a certain interest, either present or future in possession, passes to
the legatee. 2. A contingent legacy is one which is so given to a person, that it is uncertain
whether any interest will ever vest in him.

A legacy may be lost by abatement, ademption and lapse. When the legatee dies before the
testator or before the condition upon which the legacy is given be performed or before the time at
which it is directed to vest in interest have arrived, the legacy is lapsed or extinguished.
As to the payment of legacies, it is proper to consider out of what fund they are to be paid;
at what time; and to whom. It is a general rule that the personal estate is the primary fund for the
payment of legacies. When the real estate is merely charged with those demands, the personal
assets are to be applied in the first place towards their liquidation.
When legacies are given generally to persons under no disability to receive them the
payments ought to be made at the end of a year next after the testator's decease. The executor is
not obliged to pay them sooner although the testator may have directed them to be discharged
within six months after his death, because the law allows the executor one year from the demise
of the testator, to ascertain and settle his testator's affairs; and it presumes that at the expiration of
that period and not before, all debts due by the estate have been satisfied and the executor to be
then able, properly, to apply the residue among the legatees according to their several rights and
interests.
The legacy under an universal title is that by which a testator bequeaths a certain proportion
of the effects of which the law permits him to dispose; e.g., a half, a third, all his immovables or
all his movables, or a fixed proportion of all his immovables or of all his movables.Every legacy
not included in the definition given of universal legacies and legacies under a universal title is a
legacy under a particular title.
KINDS OF LEGACIES
Legacies are of three kinds:
(1) General Legacy
(2) Specific Legacy
(3)Demonstrative Legacy.
(1) General Legacy: General Legacy has not been defined under the Indian Succession Act.
General Legacy is a legacy not of any particular or specific things. It is a legacy of something
which is to be provided out of the general estate of the testator. General legacy is directed to be
paid out of the general funds of the deceased. Section 148 of the Indian Succession Act provides
that where property comprised in a bequest to two or more persons in succession is not
specifically bequeathed, it shall, in the absence of any direction to the country, be sold, and the
proceeds of the sale shall be invested in such securities as the High Court may by any general
rule authorise or direct, and the fund thus constituted shall be enjoyed by the successive legatees
according to the terms of the will.
Illustration
A having a lease for a term of years, bequeaths all his property to B for life, and after B's death to
C. The lease must be sold, the proceeds invested as stated in this section and the annual income
arising from the fund is to be paid to B for life. At B's death the capital of the fund is to be paid
to C.
(2) Specific Legacy : Where a testator bequeaths to any person a specified part of his property,
which is distinguished from all other parts of his property, the legacy is said to be specific.
(Sec.142)
Illustrations:(i) A bequeaths to B - "the diamond ring presented to me by C": "my golden chain";

"all my households goods which shall be in or about my dwelling house in M. Street in Calcutta,
at time of my death"; my promissory notes of the Central Government for 10,000 rupees in their
4 per cent loan";
Each of the above legacies is specific. (ii) A, having property at Beneares and also in other
places, bequeaths to B all his property at Beneares. The legacy is specific.
(3) Demonstrative Legacy : Where a testator bequeaths a certain sum of money, or a certain
quantity of any other commodity, and refers to a particular fund or stock so as to constitute the
same the primary fund or stock out of which payment is to be made, the legacy is said to be
demonstrative. (Sec.150)
Explanation :- The distinction between a specific legacy and a demonstrative legacy consists in
this, that - Where specified property is given to the legatee, the legacy is specific; Where the
legacy is directed to be paid out of specified property, it is
demonstrative.
Illustrations :
(i) A bequeaths to B 1,000 rupees, being part of a debt due to him from W. He also bequeaths to
C 1,000 rupees to be paid out of the debt due to him from W. The legacy to B is specific, the
legacy to C is demonstrative.
(ii) A bequeaths to B - "ten bushels of the corn which shall grow in my field of Green Acre".
"10,000 rupees out of my five per cent promissory notes of the Central government";
LAPSING OF A LEGACY:
If the legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy cannot take effect, but shall lapse and form
part of the residue of the testator's property unless it appears from the will that the testator
intended that it should go to some other person.
In order to entitle the representatives of the legatee to receive the legacy, it must be proved that
he/ her (i.e. legatee) survived the testator. Lapsing of legacy, therefore, is failure of testamentary
gift owing to the death of the legatee before the death of the testator. As the will is operative from
the date of the death of the testator, the person who claims the legacy must be a person who has
survived the testator.
If a legacy is given to more than one legatee which show that the testator intended to give them
distinct shares of it, then if any legatee dies before the testator so much of the legacy as was
intended for him shall fall into the residue of the testator's property.
However, where a legacy is given jointly to two persons by way of joint tenancy on the death of
one of them, the surviving legatee will get the property.
However, to the rule of lapsing there is an important exception where a bequest has been made to
any child or lineal descendant of the testator, and the lineal descendant of him survives the
testator, the bequest shall not lapse but shall take effect as if the death of the legatee had
happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears from the
will.
VESTING OF LEGACIES
Vesting means the Process by which authority, benefit, or privilege, or rights to or interest in an
asset or property, passes unconditionally to a particular entity and legacy means
gift of personal property or money to a beneficiary (legatee) of a will. While technically, legacy
does not include realproperty (which is a
"devise"), legacy usually refers to any gift from the estate of one who has died. It is synonymous
withthe word "bequest" (will, beneficiary, bequest, legatee).

The following section deals with the vesting of legacies :

S.119. Date of vesting of legacy when payment or possession postponed.-Where by the terms
of a bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed, a right to
receive it at the proper time shall, unless a contrary intention appears by the will, become vested
in the legatee on the testator's death, and shall pass to the legatee's representatives if he dies
before that time and without having received The legacy, and in such cases the legacy is from
the testator's death said to be vested in interest.
Explanation.--An intention that a legacy to any person shall not become vested in interest in him
is not to be inferred merely from a provision whereby the payment or possession of the thing
bequeathed is postponed, or whereby a prior interest therein is bequeathed to some other person,
or whereby the income arising from the fund Bequeathed is directed to be accumulated until the
time of payment arrives, or from a provision that, if a particular event shall happen, the legacy
shall go over to another person.
Illustrations
(i) A bequeaths to B 100 rupees, to be paid to him at the death of C. On A's death the legacy
becomes vested in interest in B, and if he dies before C, his representatives are entitled to the
legacy.
(ii) A bequeaths to B 100 rupees, to be paid to him upon his attaining the age of 18. On A's death
the legacy becomes vested in interest in B.
(iii) A fund is bequeathed to A for life, and after his death to B. On the testator's death the legacy
to B becomes vested in interest in B.
(iv) A fund is bequeathed to A until B attains the age of 18 and then to B. The legacy to B is
vested in interest from the testator's death.
(v) A bequeaths the whole of his property to B upon trust to pay certain debts out of the income,
and then to make over the fund to C. At A's death the gift to C becomes vested in interest in him.
(vi) A fund is bequeathed to A, B and C in equal shares to be paid to them on their attaining the
age of 18, respectively, with a proviso that, if all of them die under the age of 18, the legacy shall
devolve upon D. On the death of the testator, the shares vested in Interest in A, B and C, subject
to be divested in case A, B and C shall all die under 18, and, upon the death of any of them
(except the last survivor) under the age of 18, his vested interest passes, so subject, to his
representatives.
S.120. Date of vesting when legacy contingent upon specified uncertain event.(1) A legacy bequeathed in case a specified uncertain event shall happen does not vest until that
event happens.
(2) A legacy bequeathed in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen does not vest until
the happening of that event becomes impossible.
(3) In either case, until the condition has been fulfilled, the interest of the legatee is called
contingent.
Exception.--Where a fund is bequeathed to any person upon his attaining a particular age, and
the will also gives to him absolutely the income to arise from the fund before he reaches that age,
or directs the income, or so much of it as may be necessary, to be
applied for his benefit, the bequest of the fund is not contingent.
Illustrations
(i) A legacy is bequeathed to D in case A, B and C shall all die under the age of 18. D has a
contingent interest in the legacy until A, B and C all die under 18, or one of them attains that age.

(ii) A sum of money is bequeathed to A "in case he shall attain the age of 18," or "when he shall
attain the age of 18". A's interest in the legacy is contingent until the condition is fulfilled by his
attaining that age.
(iii) An estate is bequeathed to A for life, and after his death to B if B shall then be living; but if
B shall not be then living to C. A, B and C survive the testator. B and C each take a contingent
interest in the estate until the event which is to vest it in one or
in the other has happened.
(iv) An estate is bequeathed as in the case last supposed. B dies in the lifetime of A and C. Upon
the death of B, C acquires a vested right to obtain possession of the estate upon A's death.
(v) A legacy is bequeathed to A when she shall attain the age of 18, or shall marry under that age
with the consent of B, with a proviso that, if she neither attains 18 nor marries under that age
with B's consent, the legacy shall go to C. A and C each take a
contingent interest in the legacy. A attains the age of 18. A becomes absolutely entitled to the
legacy although she may have married under 18 without the consent of B.
(vi) An estate is bequeathed to A until he shall marry and after that event to B. B's interest in the
bequest is contingent until the condition is fulfilled by A's marrying.
(vii) An estate is bequeathed to A until he shall take advantage of any law for the relief of
insolvent debtors, and after that event to B. B's interest in the bequest is contingent until A takes
advantage of such a law.
(viii) An estate is bequeathed to A if he shall pay 500 rupees toB. A's interest in the bequest is
contingent until he has paid 500 rupees to B.
(ix) A leaves his farm of Sultanpur Khurd to B, if B shall convey his own farm of Sultanpur
Buzurg to C. B's interest in the bequest is contingent until he has conveyed the latter farm to C.
(x) A fund is bequeathed to A if B shall not marry C within five years after the testator's death.
A's interest in the legacy is contingent until the condition is fulfilled by the expiration of the five
years without B's having married C, or by the occurrence within that period of an event which
makes the fulfilment of the condition impossible.
(xi) A fund is bequeathed to A if B shall not make any provision for him by will. The legacy is
contingent until B's death.
(xii) A bequeaths of B 500 rupees a year upon his attaining the age of 18, and directs that the
interest, or a competent part thereof, shall be applied for his benefit until he reaches that age. The
legacy is vested.
(xiii) A bequeaths to B 500 rupees when he shall attain the age of 18 and directs that a certain
sum, out of another fund, shall be applied for his maintenance until he arrives at that age. The
legacy is contingent.
S.121. Vesting of interest in bequest to such members of a class as shall have attained
particular age.-Where a bequest is made only to such members of a class as shall have attained
a particular age, a person who has not attained that age cannot have a vested interest in the
legacy.
Illustration
A fund is bequeathed to such of the children of A as shall attain the age of 18, with a direction
that, while any child of A shall be under the age of 18, the income of the share, to which it may
be presumed he will be eventually entitled, shall be applied for his maintenance and education.
No child of A who is under the age of 18 has a vested interest in the bequest.
CASE LAWS

A.M. Kuppuswami Mudaliar vs W. Ranganatha Mudaliar , AIR 1937 Mad 835

On 6th July 1911 one W. Parthasarathi Mudaliar made a will (Ex. A) and died a few days
afterwards. He left two sons named Jayaram and Ramachandra. Jayaram died on 21st April 1923
leaving a son, the plaintiff in this suit, and Ramachandra died on 31st August 1923 without issue
and on 14th September 1923 his widow adopted defendant 2. Clause 32 of the will according to
the Court translation reads as follows:Should the executors think that my sons have received
education, etc., are of good behaviour and have good association, and would safeguard my
properties without making any wasteful expenditure, and they hand over to them all the
properties remaining after paying my debts and meeting the aforesaid expenses, the whole of my
estate shall be handed over after Jayaram Mudaliar, of my sons, attains the age of 35 and
Ramachandra Mudaliar the age of 30. Even if so handed over, both my sons may only enjoy but
shall not have the power to mortgage or sell. Only the issue of my two sons shall, at the proper
time, use and enjoy absolutely with rights to gift, mortgage, exchange and sell. Neither my sons
nor my other heirs have any right.
The class amongst whom the estate is to be distributed is the issues of Jayaram and
Ramachandra, that is the grandsons of the testator. The difficulty in this case is caused by the
adoption of defendant 2 after the death of Ramachandra. He had not been adopted on the date of
Ramachandra's death and the only grandson of the testator then alive was the plaintiff. As the
class was to be determined only at some time after defendant 2 was adopted, it follows that
defendant 2 is entitled to a half share in the suit property. Section 121, Succession Act, provides
for such cases where the property apparently did not vest in the class until a certain contingency
arose .
Usha Subbarao vs B.E. Vishveswariah & Ors on 8 July, 1996(SCC)
By virtue of Section 119, in a case where bequest is of a vested interest and by the terms of
the bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed, the right
to receive it at the proper time becomes vested in the legatee on testator's death and in the event
of the death of the legatee without having received the legacy the said right to receive it passes to
the legal representatives of the legatee. This is however, subject to a contrary intention being
expressed in the Will. But in the case of a contingent bequest, Section 120 prescribes that
legacyvests in the legatee only after the happening or not happening of the contingency which
means that in the ever of the legatee dying prior to happening of that contingency no interest
passes to his legal representatives. Although the question whether the interest created is
a vested or a contingent interest is dependent upon the intention to be gathered from a
comprehensive view of all the terms of the document creating the interest, the court while
construing the document has to approach the task of construction in such cases with a bias in
favour of vested interest unless the intention to the contrary is definite and clear
Rajes Kanta Roy v. Santi Devi, 1957 SCR 77,
The determination of the question as, to whether an interest created by such is deed
is vested or contingent has to be guided generally by the principles recognised under,ss. 19 and
21 of theTransfer of Property Act, 1882, and ss. 119 and 120 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
The learned Judges of the High Court relied on illustration (v) to s. 119 of the Indian Succession
Act and the decision in Ranganatha Mudaliar v. A. Mohana Krishna Mudaliar. As regards Wills
the rule is that "where there is doubt as to the time of vesting, the presumption is in favour of the
early vesting of the gift and, accordingly it vests at the testator's death or at the earliest moment
after that date which, is possible in the contest."

The Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax vs Dr. E.D. Anklesaria AIR 1964 Guj 240,
Where the will directs that an annuity shall be provided for any person out of the proceeds
of property, or out of property generally, or where money is bequeathed to be invested in the
purchase! of any annuity for any person, on the testator's death the legacy vests in interest in the
legatee, and he is entitled at his option to have an annuity purchased for him or to receive the
money appropriated for that purpose by the will."
This Section on a plain and grammatical construction declares that where a will directs that
an annuity shall be provided for any person out of the proceeds of property, or out of property
generally, or where money is bequeathed to be invested in the purchase of any annuity for any
person, on the testator's death two consequences follow: (1) the legacy vests in interest in the
annuitant; and (2) the annuitant can at his option have an annuity purchased for him or receive
the money appropriated for that purpose by the will. The legal effect of the first consequence
which is illustrated by the second illustration to the Section is that even though the annuitant may
die before the annuity is purchased for him or he is given the money appropriated for the purpose
by the will, the legacy would pass on his death by testamentary or intestate succession and his
heirs or legatees, as the case may be would be entitled to the legacy which would be the money
appropriated for the purpose by the will. The second consequence clearly contemplates an
alternative between two rights. The first right is to have an annuity purchased while the second
right is to receive the money appropriated for the purpose by the will.
Gomathi Ammal And Ors. vs Pitchammal And Ors. (1997) 1 MLJ 678
The plaint properties originally belonged to one Krishnaswami Iyer, who died in the year
1932. He had a son by name Venkataraman, who died in the year 1958. Krishnaswami Iyer had a
daughter and her daughter by name Gomathi Ammal, is the 1st defendant herein. It is seen that
Krishnaswami Iyer executed a Will on 15.1.1932. As per the provisions of the Will, he did not
provide anything for his son, but bequeathed his properties to Ramanathan, son of Venkataraman,
for his life and the vested reminder to the male issues of Ramanathan. But Ramanathan died
issueless. The plaintiffs herein are the daughters of Venkataraman, i.e., sisters of Ramanathan.
The 7th defendant in this case is the widow of Ramanathan. It is the case of the plaintiffs that
since Ramanathan died issueless on 20.11.1965 the vested reminders did not take effect and to
that extent, there is intestacy. If so, the plaintiffs, who are daughters of Venkataraman, will be the
legal heirs. They sought recovery of the properties claiming their right stating that the vested
reminder has not taken effect. Section 119 coming under chapter VIII deals with 'vesting of
legacies'. Provides on Date of vesting of legacy when payment or possession postponed . on a
reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that there is vesting on the death of
Krishnaswami Iyer, even though the legacy is in favour of the grand-children is postponed during
the life time of Ramanathan, it is not opened till his death. The male children of Ramanathan will
be entitled to the properties immediately on the death of Krishnaswami Iyer. They will not be
entitled to possession during the lifetime of Ramanathan.
In this case, Ramanathan died without leaving any issues. If so, the vesting in favour of the
grant children cannot take place Ramanathan was given only a right of enjoyment. The
proprietary right, which is bequeathed to the grand-children, cannot take effect and to that extent,
there is intestacy, as found by the courts below. That proprietary right can only vest on the legal
heirs of Krishnaswami Iyer and the same has to be identified as on the date of his death. Even
during the lifetime of Ramanathan, his father, Venkataraman died. If the succession opened in

1932, naturally, the legal heirs will be the sisters of Ramanathan, i.e., the daughters of
Venkataraman. Here, there is contingent bequest. Though the grandchildren are to take the
properties on the death of Ramanathan, his death was a certainty; but the date of death was
uncertain. So, a vested interest, which was created, could not take effect.
Adilatchumy Ammal And Anr. vs Ramasamy Reddiar (1979) 2 MLJ 348
The suit properly belonged to one Royalu Reddiar. Tinder Exhibit A-1, dated 10th April,
1946, Royalu Reddiar disposed of all his properties under a notarial testament. Royalu Reddiar
died issueless. Under the will which he made in a French territory he bequeathed the suit
property to' his sister Kamalammal to be enjoyed by her for the term of her life without any
power to mortgage, gift or sell the same. He gave his other properties both moveable and
immoveable to his wife Adilakshmi Ammal and again granted, a life-estate to her over such
properties without any right to alienate them in any manner. After creating such life-estates in
favour of his sister and wife, he made the following bequest:
After the death of Kamalammal and Adilakshmi Ammal, my aforesaid properties shall
belong, in full ownership and with all powers of alienation, to my nephew Sambasiva Reddiar, I
also decide that after my death, my business concern shall be run by Sambasiva Reddiar and
accounts in respect thereof rendered by him to my wife. The said Sambasiva Reddiar will
perform all my funeral ceremonies and those of my wife, Adilakshmi Ammal.
In accordance with the tenor and recitals in the will, Kamalammal took possession of the
property in pursuance of the bequest as above. It 19 common ground that Sambasiva, who is the
ultimate beneficiary under the will and the universal legatee therein died sometime after the
death of Royalu Reddiar, who died on 26th October, 1946 and the plaintiff is admittedly the heir
of Sambasiva as his brother. It appears that on 10th September, 1958, under Exhibit A-2
Kamalammal sold the suit property to the first defendant. Kamalammal died on 17th May, 1967.
The plaintiff filed the present suit against the first defendant and also her husband for annulment
of the sale deed dated 10th September, 1958, Exhibit A-2. The trial Court dismissed the suit. On
appeal the plaintiff was unsuccessful. The plaintiff carried up the matter in second appeal to this
Court. Maharajan, J. was of the view that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration as prayed for
and after declaring the plaintiff's title to the suit property directed the defendants to deliver
possession of the same to the plaintiff. He however granted leave to appeal under Clause 15 of
the Letters Patent.
Under Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act the date of vesting of the legacy when
possession is postponed is made clear by the language of that section.Thus the bequest in favour
of Kamalammal did not enable her to convey, an absolute interest to the first defendant and the
right which the first defendant secured was only the bare right of enjoyment over the suit
property so long as Kamalammal was alive. If it intended to convey any better right to the first
defendant, it was void, as Kamalammal herself did not have such a conveyable interest. The
plaintiff therefore would be entitled to a declaratory decree that he is the owner of the suit
property and for a consequential direction that the defendants do deliver possession of the suit
property to him.
Aniruddha Mitra vs Administrator General Bengal (1949) 51 BOMLR 971
In the will By Clause 5, the testator has given the right of residence in the family house and
the use of the furniture therein to his wife, his son (the appellant) and his wife (unnamed for their
respective lives). By Clause 7, he has allowed maintenance of Rs. 700 per mensem for his wife,

to his son and his son's wife Navanani during their lives. The clause also provides how the
allowance is to be distributed in the event of the death of one or other of them. By Clause 8, an
annuity of Rs. 4,000 per mensem is granted to the Calcutta University. By Clause 11 if a son is
not born to, or adopted by, the appellant during the testator's lifetime the income of the estate
after meeting the "expenses aforesaid" was directed to be paid to the Calcutta University until
such time as a son shall be born or shall be adopted by the appellant or his wife (not named).
By Clause 9 the testator proceeds to make the bequest in favour of person or persons
unborn, these persons being a class designated as "the legitimate son or sons" of the appellant
"whether natural born or validly adopted." The clause says they "shall become entitled to all the
rest and residue of my property" (the italics are by their Lordships), i.e., the residuary estates.
Then it says that if there is only one son, the residue "shall be made over" to him on his
completing the age of 21 years; if there are more sons than one, the residue is to be made over to
them in equal shares, on the youngest son attaining the age of 21 years. The clause ends with the
statement that until the youngest son of such son or sons attains the age of 21 years the executor
shall pay Rs. 700 to each son for maintenance and expenses.
After carefully considering the scope and meaning of the term "validly adopted" the it was
held that the bequest extended to any son who might be adopted by the appellant's wife. Subject
to the limitations and provisions contained in Sections 113, 114, 113 and '116, of the Indian
Succession Act, 1023, no bequest shall be invalid by reason only that any person for whose
benefit it may have been made was not born at the date of the testator's death." It follows that a
son adopted by any widow of Aniruddha, properly authorised, no matter how long it may take
place after Aniruddha's death and even when such widow was not alive at the testator's death, the
adopted son became one of the legatees of the bequest and his interest will vest within the
statutory period prescribed in Section 114.
Navnitlal Sakarlal vs Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax, 1977 106 ITR 512 Guj
The Wealth-tax Officer, feeling aggrieved by the order made by the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, carried the matter in further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The
Tribunal, after analysing the provisions of the will and discussing the relevant provisions of
theIndian Succession Act, 1925, and the Act, held that the estate of deceased Balabhai vested
absolutely in specified shares in the two legatees upon his death. This conclusion was arrived at
on the basis that Balabhai, not having appointed any administrator or executor under the will, the
question of administration of the estate did not arise and the vesting of the properties which were
the subject-matter of the legacy could not be postponed to any further date.
Section 104 and 119 provide respectively for the vesting of legacy when it is in general
terms and when the payments or possession thereof is postponed. In the first case, that is, when
the legacy is given in general terms without specifying the time when it is to be paid, the legacy
vests in possession in the legatee from the day of the death of the testator and if the legatee dies
without having received it, it passes to his representatives. In such a case, the legatee would be
entitled to demand possession immediately and if the assets are sufficient for the payment of
debts and for meeting other expenses designated by the testator, the executor might pay or
deliver the legacy although he is not bound to do so until the expiration of one year from the
testator's death (vide section 337). In the other case, that is where by the terms of a bequest the
legatee is not entitled to immediate possession, a right to receive it at the proper time, unless a
contrary intention appears by the will, becomes vested in the legatee on the testator's death and it
passes to the legatee's representatives if he dies before such time the testator death, is said to be

vested in interest and the legatees has no immediate right possession or payment of his legacy
until the time fixed by the will has arrived.
In Bhagabati Barmanya V. Kali Charan Singh, 38 I. A. 54: (10 I. C. 611), a child. less Hindu
testator directed that after his death his wife and mother should take possession of his properties
and that "on the death of my mother and my wife, the sons of my sisters .... shall in equal shares
hold the said properties in possession and enjoyment by right of inheritance."
In Natvarlal v. Banchhod, 22 Bom. L. R. 71: (A.I.R. (7) 1920 Bom. 295), the testator by his
will left all the properties to his son's widow for her life, but permitted her to adopt a son. The
boy, if adopted, was to be owner of the properties. The will provided that if the son's widow died
without taking a boy in adoption, his grand daughter and her sons were to be owners of the
properties. It was held that inasmuch as there was, on the death of the testator, no direct gift of
the remainder to the grand-daughter, but a gift contingent on the happening of an uncertain event,
viz. the dying of son's widow without having taken a boy in adoption, the contingency could not
be regarded as having occurred in view of the fact that the son's widow had in fact made an
adoption.
In Shivappa v. Virbhadrappa 45 Bom, L. R. 844 : A.I.R. (30) 1943 Bom. 423, the will directed
that the two widows should take possession of the properties after the testator's death and enjoy
them during their lifetime and that after their deaths, Gurappa or his heirs should take possession
of the properties and enjoy them. It was also stated in the will that no one had any right of
interference in regard to immovable properties during the lifetime of the widows. On an
interpretation of the terms of the will, Lokur J. came to the conclusion that the testator did not
purport to expressly give his properties to Gurappa individually, that the testator contemplated
the possibility that Gurappa might not survive the widows and had, therefore, said that the
properties should be taken possession of by Gurappa or his heirs, that the testator was not
anxious to make a bequest in favour of Gurappa but only to see that his lawful heirs succeeded
one after another, and that consequently, the properties did not vest in Gurappa on the testator's
death
Vithalbhai Gokalbhai And Ors. vs Shivabhai Dhoribhai AIR 1950 Bom 289, (1950) 52
BOMLR 301
Gokalbhai Bapuji Patel who had no issue made a will with regard to these properties.
They are referred to as lots Nos. 1 to 6 in the will. He stated in the will that his wife should take
possession of all his properties after his death and should meet the expenses of his funeral
ceremonies from lots Nos. 4 and 5. He further directed that his wife should maintain herself from
the income of the remaining properties and that after her death, these properties should go to his
two sisters, Jijiben and Raibaben. One of these properties, lot No. 6, had been mortgaged with
possession, and in regard to that property he stated that it should be redeemed by his two sisters.
At the end of the will, he stated that if his wife gave birth to a son or daughter after his death, he
or she was to be the owner of all his properties.
The provision of sec.119 of the sucession Act 1925 provides that An intention that a legacy
to any person shall not become vested in interest in him is not to be inferred merely from a
provision whereby the payment or possession of the thing bequeathed is postponed, or whereby a
prior interest therein is bequeathed to some other person, or from a provision that, if a particular
event shall happen the legacy shall go over to another person
In the present case, Gokalbhai was the sole surviving coparcener at the time he executed
the will. He was, therefore, the full owner of all the properties in his possession and was
competent to alienate them inter vivos or by a will, The will made by him has also been given

effect to. The house, Lot No, 6, was redeemed from mortgage, as directed in the will, by Jijiben's
son, Shankar Laldas, and Baibabsn and was subsequently sold by them in 1901, Bai Raliat sold
lot No. 4 in order to meet the expenses of the funeral ceremonies of Gokalbhai. The heirs of
Jijiben and Raibaben also sold the other properties to the plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title, subject
to the rights of Bai Raliat, and this could only be done by them by virtue of the legacies given to
them by the will. The dispositions made by the will are, therefore, binding upon defendant 2,
who was adopted about 47 years after Gokalbhai's death and he cannot challenge them. The
plaintiffs are consequently entitled to possession of the properties purchased from the heirs of
Jijiben and Raibaben.