W.E.B.

Du Bois, Hegel, and the Staging of Alterity

Author(s): Winfried Siemerling
Source: Callaloo, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter, 2001), pp. 325-333
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3300504
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CALLALOO

W.E.B. DU BOIS, HEGEL, AND THE STAGING OF ALTERITY

by Winfried Siemerling

In his 1995 study Dark Voices: W.E.B. Du Bois and American Thought, 1888-1903, Shamo
Zamir has provided us with one of the most detailed accounts to date of what he calls t
"drama of alterity" (115) that Du Bois stages in The Souls of Black Folk. Zamir offers us
particular a fascinating analysis of the role that Du Bois' complex encounter with Hegel
Phenomenology of Spirit played in his scripting of a drama that has become one of the m

important models for thinking about cultural difference today. In 1897, Du Bois first publish
"Strivings of the Negro People," which, in revised form and under the title "Of Our Spirit
Strivings," became the first chapter of The Souls of Black Folk in 1903.1 As is well known, Du

in this opening chapter describes a differential duality of "two souls, two thoughts, tw
unreconciled strivings" (364), a duality which the title associates with "black folk" in gener
and which has been related in particular to the black elite that Du Bois describes elsewher
the "Talented Tenth" (Zamir 116, 147-). What I am interested in here is a certain ambivalen
in the staging of the very terms of duality, "twoness," "doubleness" and "double consciou
ness."2 I will trace a shifting of semantic bonds and valencies of these terms themselves, r
through the context of Du Bois' appropriation of Hegel as it has been outlined by Zamir.
Eventually, I will extend this analysis to the language of visibility and ambivalent identi
cation that Du Bois expresses through the metaphor of the veil. The Biblical conceit of the lift
of the veil or drawing aside of the curtain is used as a metaphor for the progression fr
appearance toward self-consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology (Hegel 102-3)3; by contrast,
Zamir points out, in Souls the veil descends (Zamir 135-36), for the first time in a scene from
Bois' childhood in which another child refuses "with a glance" an exchange of gifts (363-6
This is a scene of initially negative and then ambivalent identification that marks here th
beginning of self-consciousness:
The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my
card,-refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned upon me

with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like,
mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by

a vast veil. I had thereafter no desire to tear down that veil, to creep
through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in

a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows. (364, emphasis

added).5

I will argue that a model of transparency that would undo the descending of the veil is not ea

available to Du Bois inside a Hegelian frame of reference of increasing visibility and ident
cation. This problem will keep closure in abeyance and double-code, at the very end of Du B
text, the language of visibility-a moment I will seek to locate with reference to another, qu

Callaloo 24.1 (2001) 325-333

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325

different reading of Hegel and a model of relation offered by Edouard Glissant that problematizes pure transparency and predictability in recognition.
The terms I will trace here are overdetermined, double-coded, and partially resemanticized
because of shifting, but often unresolved, frames of reference and of recognition-a problematic that speaks to many other narratives of collective emergence and cultural positionalities
marked by multiple perspectives. "Double consciousness" emerges in Du Bois' text in typically
ambivalent fashion. It can carry negative but also positive connotations, according to the stage
of the argument and the envisaged totality. On the one hand, double consciousness appears in
many formulations as an incomplete stage of reason. On the other hand, Du Bois articulates
African American difference as a surplus when relating it to the official values of the American

nation. His attempts to combine the words "American" and "Negro" harmoniously in a
collective self-assertion of the "American Negro" are staged, particularly in the first chapter but
also elsewhere in Souls, within a logic of recognition that is defined by "American" values; for
Du Bois, "there are to-day no truer exponents of the pure human spirit of the Declaration of

Independence than the American Negroes" (370). Yet this surplus is not only insufficiently
recognized in the incomplete project and reason of the nation; while the terms America and

Negro appear equalized in this formulation, Du Bois has earlier stressed the productive
difference of the contributions made by America's races.6
This ambivalence and surplus of meaning, I will argue, appears also in the making and

unmaking of such terms as "self-consciousness" (364) or "assimilation" (397). Full selfconsciousness, in one frame of reference, can actually imply full assimilation to dominant
values, and thus a kind of disappearance of specificity and difference; full self-consciousness
in another frame of reference will lead, in Du Bois, to a very different notion of assimilation.

Du Bois and Hegelian Teleology

Du Bois' reworking of Hegelian teleology is outlined in Zamir's Dark Voices: W.E.B. Du Bois
and American Thought, 1888-1903, which is the first major attempt to reconstruct in detail
Hegel's role in Du Bois' thought at this stage of his career.7 Zamir shows the relationship
between Hegel's Phenomenology and Du Bois' famous description of double consciousness. He
argues that Du Bois probably read the Phenomenology when he studied Hegel at Harvard in
1889-90 with George Santayana (Zamir 113, 248-49n2), possibly already in German.8 Zamir
analyses in particular how Du Bois' position differs significantly from the dominant American
Hegel reception at the time, which appropriated Hegel to emphasize a specific teleology in the
American context: "His use of Hegel can be read against the widespread adoption of Hegel in
support of American nationalism and manifest destiny in America in the nineteenth century,
from the voluminous productions of the St. Louis Hegelians to the essays of the young John
Dewey" (13). By contrast, Du Bois concentrates on Hegel's account of the "unhappy consciousness," early on in the Phenomenology, as a resource for his description of African American
"double-consciousness" (13). Du Bois therefore de-emphasizes the synthesis of a singular Geist
(or "soul" in the singular, rather than the plural of Du Bois' title) later in the Phenomenology
(Zamir 114-15). Zamir thus argues that Du Bois' appropriation of Hegel takes a rather unHegelian or, perhaps better, post-Hegelian form: "In focusing on the 'unhappy consciousness'
rather than on the metaphysical schema of history in the Phenomenology," he writes, "Du Bois
is ... rejecting idealist teleologies" (13).

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CALLALOO

Yet despite this shift that sets Du Bois' reading of Hegel

his American contemporaries, numerous passages in The
clearly teleological in many respects. A ubiquitous negativ
contrario in a long list of words in Souls, including "unansw

"uncalled," "uncertain," "unreconciled," "unrequited,"

then "unknown," "un-reasonable," and finally, "unresting

at least in Souls, sought in the context of a fulfillment o
"America" and the American nation as a project and a goa
state that Du Bois "radically adapts Hegel's Phenomenology
emphasis on the "unhappy consciousness" shifts the diag
national project and synthesis, yet does not-at this stage
as such. Teleology of the Hegelian kind is certainly at wo
"that some day on American soil two world-races may gi
both so sadly lack" (370), and then states-as we have alre
truer exponents of the pure human spirit of the Declaration
Negroes" (370). The continuation of this passage is wellthere is no true American music but the wild sweet melodies of the

Negro slave; the American fairy tales and folk-lore are Indian and
African; and, all in all, we black men seem the sole oasis of simple faith
and reverence in a dusty desert of dollars and smartness. Will America
be poorer if she replace her brutal dyspeptic blundering with lighthearted but determined Negro humility? or her coarse and cruel wit
with loving jovial good-humor? or her vulgar music with the soul of the
Sorrow Songs?" (370)

"America," indeed, is invoked in the last paragraph of Souls (which I will examine later
very subject and agent that-under certain circumstances and in the future-"shall ren
Veil" (545).
The ideal "pure human spirit" Du Bois sees embodied in the Declaration of Indepen
will come into its own, however, only in a difficult and complex relationship:

The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,-this

longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into
a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older

selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too
much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul

in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a

message for the world. (365)

While the merging of a "double self into a better and truer self" seems to indicate a d

synthesis and teleology, this merging implies here also, on the contrary, a stubborn maint

and separation of the particulars. The same unresolved ambiguity between dialectic sub
and dialogic difference returns with the notion of "assimilation" in Du Bois' text. It ap
here as an assimilation of both parts to a higher entity, not of the emergent (Negro) part
(white) dominant.

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CALLALOO

"Assimilation" and Recognition

Different relationships between emergence and assimi

chapter of Souls, "Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others.

by previous black leaders, Du Bois suggests that "the attitud
three main forms,-a feeling of revolt and revenge; an atte
to the will of the greater group; or, finally, a determined

development despite environing opinion" (395-96). Du Bois

be expected, with the second option here-identified with
adjustment and submission-but rather with the third. Th
maintains difference is typified for Du Bois by Frederick
still bravely stood for the ideals of his early manhood,assertion, and on no other terms" (397; emphasis in the or
maintenance of a different self, on the one hand, with a
on the other hand, and thus with a teleology in which the s
recognition of another, larger, entity.
Zamir suggests that Du Bois refuses to subsume the "p
experience into historicist teleologies" (126). But he also m
of alterity works within idealist frameworks. Its primar
emphasis added). Both comments seem accurate. Yet I wou
point to a contradiction that complicates significantly the d
redemption implicit in the metaphor of the veil and of its r
of particularity beyond its current, confined status cannot
in a totality derived from the visible status quo; this would
is not in Du Bois' sense. If the reality expressed as "partic
the posited, constraining definition that defines it as part
from the point of view of a totality that is not yet visible
the current one.

This argument hinges on the limits and potential pitfalls of a politics of recognition. It is
premised on the assumption that an absolute transparency in which all contradictions are
sublated could only be guaranteed from the point of view of one dominant, universal standard.
This leads to the obvious question: what is the frame of recognition, and who defines the terms
that set the stage?
Hegel discusses recognition in the Phenomenology in the section on self-consciousness, and

in particular in the chapter "Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship

and Bondage." Recognition is symmetrical before it enters into the dialectic of master and slave
(or lord and bondsman in A.V. Miller's translation). In this erstwhile symmetry, self-consciousness, recognizing the other first as object among objects, projects this same recognition onto the
other who thus becomes a symmetrical subject: "They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another" (Hegel 112). Such symmetrical, transparent identity triggers the fight for

dominance which in the Hegelian dialectic produces Master and Slave, and a subsuming of
erstwhile equal parts to a hierarchized whole. This can hardly be the envisaged totality that, for

Du Bois, in most formulations in Souls, remains a national American entity. And indeed the
process of recognition in Hegel moves beyond this point, since recognition after this struggle
is validated merely by the one who has lost it.9 Only the reciprocal recognition of equals can
validate both sides, and result in the kind of recognition Du Bois seems to have in mind when
he formulates the "end of this striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture" (365).10
The rending of the veil would be equivalent to this level of recognition. This perspective,
however, has at least two implications: First, if "assimilation" to an ideal of equal co-workers
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CALLALOO

is possible, as Du Bois hopes, but if this ideal is yet invisible

would equal assimilation to the currently visible reason o

second option laid out by Du Bois-the agenda of adjustmen

Booker T. Washington-and not to a "politics of trans

arguably judge indispensable for any "politics of fulfilme

ly, if Hegel's model is logically continuous, then even an
stages of a dialectic whose parts have been identified and de
status quo would ultimately lead to a model of sublation a
part of the self can be asserted that can be mediated in reci
whatever shape the dominant other will be revealed in t
correspond to an independent "self-realization and selfopinion," since part of this self will by necessity remain
recognition.
The hope for "true self-consciousness" in a Hegelian model of symmetrical transparency
thus offers a difficult answer to the condition Du Bois describes with the notion of double

consciousness, and problematizes the metaphor of the rending of the veil at the end of
Certainly with respect to a status quo of dominance, fully transparent self-mediation th
the other is problematic. Yet the following famous evocation of the metaphor of the veil in
first chapter of Souls, identifying "double-consciousness" with the absence of "true s
consciousness," clearly aims at a sublation of the terms Negro and American in a full, v
transparency of "true self-consciousness":

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and
Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and
gifted with second-sight in this American world,-a world which yields
him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the

revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-

consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes
of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on

in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings ....
(364; emphasis added)12

The gift of second-sight partially offsets the condition of the veil, and, one could argue
element that is ultimately unsublatable into a dominant vanishing point (see Chandler 27
Yet true self-consciousness and the rending of the veil would nonetheless depend upon a
transparent self-mediation in a context that is named as the American nation in this pas
This connection is also essential to most of the other, roughly two dozen passages in Soul
seek to conjoin the words Negro and American.
This account of double consciousness and its implications is also essentially a narrativ
the nation: the achievement of true self-consciousness is the equivalent of the reason
nation. Yet this full transparency of the self to the self, "this longing to attain self-con
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self," as I have tried to argu
problematic in a Hegelian model of recognition.
Consequently, crisscrossing at various angles the Hegelian stage of Du Bois' "drama
alterity," the attempt at mediating a (collective) self in the context and teleology of a prob
atic nation produces a double masking-or a double veil-throughout the text (which is
expressed in the prefixes of negation that I have mentioned): the mask or veil concealing
that cannot be fully mediated in that nation on the one hand, and on the other hand the
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CALLALOO

or veil of the "whirl and chaos" behind which-in Du Bois' re

text-might reside the principle that would reveal another A

This two-fold opaqueness, it seems to me, is itself dou

expresses, on the one hand, the un-completed mediation of t

that Du Bois stages and seeks to remedy throughout the text
African American specificity and particularity, as an unsu
vanishing point of the reason and teleology of the factually
tion. This America, for Du Bois, masquerades as the one th
invisible.

Relation and Non-Transparency

In this respect, the evasion of equation, the maintenance of difference seems essential. Zamir
describes clearly Du Bois' temptation to resolve a difficult relation: "Du Bois' own project of a
possible resolution of historical division in a 'kingdom of culture' may seem like a utopian
negation of the tragic substance of historical particularity and multiplicity" (115). According to
Zamir, Du Bois tests this idealism through historical location of his own drama of alterity (115).
Yet it is also in Du Bois' re-coded terms of assimilation, self-consciousness, and an overdeter-

mined double consciousness" (which is both incomplete and also richer), that this opaqueness
keeps asserting itself against the tempting resolutions of Hegelian teleology, the nation, and
recognition defined in its terms.
In this perspective, the notion of double consciousness not only appropriates Hegel's
formulation of the "unhappy consciousness" by shifting emphasis away from the end-point of
Hegel's teleology to an earlier point in the dialectic; it also maintains another model of alterity
beyond-and against-even the reconstructed Hegelian stage that seems to provide the setting
for Souls. For another articulation of this resistance to resolution and in order to accentuate

these less Hegelian elements in Souls, I will invoke here briefly another (un-)reading of H
In Edouard Glissant's "poetics of relation" as it is formulated, for instance, in his Introduc
a une Poetique du Divers, the insistence on relation contrasts with systems of thinking in wh
being is absolute and fully transparent. The term "relation" for him involves, not the transp
ency of what he calls the false universality of systems, but a certain opaqueness in wh
difference and otherness are recognized as such and respected.
A certain indeterminacy and unpredictability are for Glissant signs of relation and diff
ence that he sees as an alternative to subsuming all particularity under a centralized syste
thinking. Glissant actually formulates a right to be recognized on different terms, or not to
recognized only in universalized terms of recognition and sameness, as an alternative t
certain kind of barbarism: "Le droit a l'opacite serait aujourd'hui le signe le plus 6vident d
non-barbarie" (54; "The right to opaqueness would be today the most evident sign of n
barbarism"). If particularity and difference are not constructed from one single perspec
afforded by a specific system of thinking, the resulting opaqueness may appear as "ch
rather than as systematic order and transparency. Yet this "chaos" can therefore also desig
the relation between given teleologies, on the one hand, and that which is not yet visibl
given systems of understanding, on the other hand. Glissant calls this globalized condi
"chaos-monde"-a chaos-world which, for him, does not signify the apocalyptic end of the wo
(53) but rather carries positive connotations.
In Du Bois's Souls, the word "chaos" occurs once, significantly in the last paragraph of
text (before the transcription of the chorus of "Let Us Cheer the Weary Traveller" in "Of
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CALLALOO

Sorrow Songs" and the subsequent "Afterthought"). Chaos a

opposition to the nation of reason and simultaneously as th
would lead to true self-consciousness:

If somewhere in this whirl and chaos of things there dwells Eternal

Good, pitiful yet masterful, then anon in His good time America shall
rend the Veil and the prisoned shall go free. (545, emphasis added)13

The agent of this narrative is here still the liberating nation, America, that "shall rend the
The possibility and condition of this agency, however, dwell in "chaos." In Glissant's term
potential for relation would indeed reside in a chaos-monde, rather than in a nation formula
along the lines of a telos, which would resemble that of the epic. With reference to the

chapter of Hegel's Aesthetics, Glissant characterizes the epic as the as yet naive consciou
that articulates the narrative of a chosen community or chosen people (communaute elue)
epic narrative operates an inherently exclusive principle that is bound to malfunction
multiple contexts such those explored by Du Bois, since its teleology and its hero tend to
a being that is absolute. This being has therefore a tendency to exclude internal relation
notion d'etre et d'absolu de l'etre est liee a la notion d'identite 'racine unique' et d'exclus
de l'identite" (25). This kind of nation negates the opaqueness that for Glissant is inhere
relation, and a national narrative of this kind would thus in fact silence "the 'other' Du Bois"

located by Zamir in The Souls of Black Folk. This is the not-so-teleological Du Bois who cuts across
the Hegelian stage in Souls and who refuses the subsuming of particularity. This Du Bois seems

closer to Glissant's notion of "chaos-monde" and the poetics of "Relation" than to Hegelian
being as transparent self-consciousness and the concomitant teleology of nation.

NOTES

1. See Stepto (53-56) for an analysis of some of the changes made by DuBois.
2. These terms are also closely related in Souls to the thematics of doubt; Mark Taylo
the etymological relation between "double" and "doubt," which is even clearer in t
"Zwei" and "Zweifel" (xxii-xxiii).
3. In the first instance, the German "in sinnlicher Hiulle" (134) is rendered by M
sensuous covering" (102) while the translation by Baillie offers "in a covering vei
(qtd. in Zamir 135).
4. After the triple appearance of the word "veil" in the "Forethought," this is the first
in the main text.

5. See Zamir 139-40 for an analysis of the gaze in this scene in terms of the master-slave struggle,

and with appropriate reference to this theme in Sartre's Being and Nothingness and Frantz

Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks. For another analysis of this "primal scene" and drama in Fanon

see Bhabha's discussion in "The Other Question-the Stereotype and Colonial Discourse" (75);
see also Siemerling (63-64).
6. Cornel West suggests that Du Bois is here "following his mentor [and Harvard supervisor
Albert Bushnell] Hart's racialist view of history in which each 'race' possesses certain gifts and

endowments" (West 143). Du Bois discusses the same issue in greater detail in his essay "The
Conservation of Races," which appeared in 1897 (the year in which "Strivings of the Negro
People" was published). He writes: "We are apt to think in our American impatience, that
while it may have been true in the past that closed race groups made history, that here in

conglomerate America . . . we have changed all that, and have no need of this ancient

instrument of progress. This assumption of which the Negro people are especially fond, can not

be established by a careful consideration of history" (817). Du Bois continues: " . . . the full,
complete Negro message of the whole Negro race has not as yet been given to the world....

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CALLALOO

The question is, then: How shall this message be delivered . .

development of these race groups, not as individuals, but as r
of this essay, see Appiah, "Uncompleted Argument"; see also
and Gutmann. Adolph L. Reed, Jr. interprets Du Bois' positi
Lamarckian thinking about race, evolution, and social hierarc
reform-oriented, fin-de-siecle American social science" (91). Z

philosophy of history that is proposed in the 'Conservatio

Spiritual Strivings," in particular because Du Bois' rework
Marx's, Sartre's, and Alexandre Kojeve's existentialist and mat
than any other accounts of Hegel" (14; see also 108-9).
7. See also Williamson (399-413), Broderick, Gooding-William
Lindberg (284-86), Adell (11-19), Lemke (59-60).
8. Zamir points out that Santayana preferred teaching texts in
Bois had learned German at Fisk and was able to do graduate
9. See Sundquist (40-41, 123-24, 156) for further examples of t
10. See Zamir (114, 249n3) for his mapping of the parallels betw
Spiritual Strivings" and Hegel's Phenomenology.

11. Gilroy writes: "The first [the politics of fulfilment] involves

towards the rational pursuit of a good life, while the second [th
best be described as accepting the fact that in a racially stru
going to be somehow anti-social and probably defensive in ch
credits Seyla Benhabib's Critique, Norm and Utopia with this di
izing it as follows: "The politics of fulfilment is mostly conten
its own game. It necessitates a hermeneutic orientation that can
and textual. The politics of transfiguration strives in pursuit
present the unpresentable. Its rather different hermeneutic fo
dramatic, and performative" (Gilroy 38). The second case wou
Bois' Souls (and its strategy of contrapuntal deployment of mu

has called a "cultural performance" (53-69) and a "singing

suggested that Du Bois "structured his volume on the basi
subliminal language that challenged the ability of his audien
comprehend his book" (537-38).
12. Critical discussions of this passage are too numerous to
substantial number of comments; see also Lewis (280-83 and

interpretations of philosophical influences on Du Bois and relev

connection with Emerson (who speaks of "double consciou

Transcendentalist") is discussed for instance in Goldman, Som

Gilroy suggests that the list of "world-historic peoples" a

pointedly supplements Hegel's (somewhat different) enumerat

ry, the very text that excludes Africa "from the official drama
135); for recent discussions of Hegel and Africa see Bernascon
13. See Zamir (181-88) for his reading of the entire paragraph.
passage in which Du Bois listens to the singing "fresh young vo
caverns of brick and mortar below." Zamir reads this passage

both the initial hope for transcendence in Du Bois' "own

spirituals at Nashville's Jubilee Hall that opens the chapter o

well-known allegory of the cave in his Republic, with Du Bois a

between the light of the sun and the darkness of the caverns
Bois' own complex relationship to the tradition and promise

which for him creates a "paradox of desired immersion an

interpretive authority" (Zamir 182).

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