Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS:
Disputed in this case is the ownership of
six (6) parcels of land. The trial court awarded
three (3) parcels to petitioner and the other
three (3) to private respondent, but the Court of
Appeals held otherwise and awarded all six (6)
to private respondent.
In a complaint filed before the trial court,
private respondent Cornelia Tibe, as plaintiff,
sought the annulment of certain contracts and
other documents which became the bases for
the transfer of six (6) parcels of land from
private
respondent
to
petitioner
PacianoRemalante, the defendant below. Private
respondent claimed that petitioner, through
fraud, deceit, abuse of confidence and
misrepresentation, induced her to sign three (3)
affidavits of transfer (Exhibits I-3, K and M),
purported to be bail bonds, that transferred
three (3) parcels of land under Tax Declaration
Nos. 20280, 20273 and 20274 to petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter presented the affidavits to
the Provincial Assessor and caused the three (3)
parcels of land to be declared under Tax
Declaration Nos. 20323, 20324 and 20325.
Private respondent also claimed that
petitioner forged her signature in a deed of
absolute sale (Exhibit 22) whereby her other
three parcels of land described under Tax
Declaration Nos. 13959, 17388 and 16999 were
transferred to petitioner's name.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
RULING
Thus, while previously petitioner asked
the Court of Appeals to modify the decision or
the trial court which awarded him only three (3)
parcels of land and awarded the other three (3)
parcels of land to private respondent, by
awarding him all six (6) parcels of land, now,
with the second assignment of error, he wants
this Court to reinstate the decision of the trial
court from which he appealed.
His prayer causes even more confusion.
In his petition (entitled 'Appeal By Certiorari'),
petitioner prayed "that defendant-appellant be
declared as the real and absolute owner of the
properties declared and described in Tax
Declaration Nos. 20323,20324 and 20325 and
that plaintiff appellant been joined to deliver the
ownership and possession of the same also to
defendant-appellant plus costs of suit." [Rollo, p.
9]. However, in his brief he prayed "that a new
decision be promulgated reversing the previous
decision of the Court of Appeals by
adoptingintoto the decision of the trial court."
[Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, p. 13].
Petitioner's
change
of
midstream takes him nowhere.
theory
at
FACTS:
Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons
Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the
Courts resolution of March 29, 1996, which
set
aside
the
Courts December
1,
1995 decision and affirmed in toto the
Court of Appeals decision dated August 12,
1994.
It is argued, albeit erroneously, that the
case should be referred to the Court En
Banc as the doctrines laid down in Abrenica
v. Gonda and De Gracia, 34 Phil.
739, Talosig v. Vda. deNieba, 43 SCRA 473,
and Villonco Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc.,
et. al., 65 SCRA 352, have been modified or
reversed. A more circumspect analysis of
thesecasesvis-a-vis the case at bench
would inevitably lead petitioner to the
conclusion that there was neither reversal
nor modification of the doctrines laid down
in
the Abrenica, Talosigand Villonco cases. In
fact, the inapplicability of the principle
enunciated in Abrenica and Talosig to this
case
has
already
been
extensively
discussed in the Courts resolution, hence
the same will not be addressed anew. As
regards the case of Villonco, petitioner
mistakenly assumes that its case has a
similar factual milieu with the former. The
Court finds no further need to elaborate
on the issue, but will simply point out the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should have
be decided by the court en banc.
RULING:
Corollarily, as the petitioners exhibits
failed to establish the perfection of the
contract of sale, oral testimony cannot take
their place without violating the parol
evidence rule.[9] It was therefore irregular
for the trial court to have admitted in
evidence testimony to prove the existence
of a contract of sale of a real property
between the parties despite the persistent
objection made by private respondents
counsels as early as the first scheduled
hearing. While
said
counsels
crossexamined the witnesses, this, to our view,
did not constitute a waiver of the parol
evidence rule. The Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba,
[10]
and Abrenica
v.
Gonda
and
de
Gracia[11]cases cited by the Court in its
initial decision, which ruled to the effect
that an objection against the admission of
any evidence must be made at the proper
time, i.e., x xx at the time question is
asked,[12] and that if not so made it will be
understood to have been waived, do not
apply as these two cases involved
facts[13] different
from
the
case
at
bench. More importantly, here, the direct
testimonies
of
the
witnesses
were
presented in affidavit-form where prompt
objection to inadmissible evidence is hardly
ISSUE:
whether a holographic will which was
lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.
FACTS;
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower
court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration
dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated
July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to