G.R. No.

L-68053 May 7, 1990

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES,
ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil
Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626
entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly
and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots
Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the
subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual
damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate
court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which
were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with
an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds
of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child,
Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she
could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four
hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of
the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a
result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace
time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went
there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694
describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered
under OCT No. 8804.

The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the
name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said
transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered
under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration
of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were
issued in Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia
R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a
court order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for
P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots
773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint
against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also
prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be
made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent
due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as
damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B
and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were
issued to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other
plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the
therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the
defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in
Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to
reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said
lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the
aforesaid decision.

However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of
service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been
subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had
purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was
"not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private
respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to
produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not
Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien
or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not
be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could
neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it
had long become final and executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court,
in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates
of title mentioned therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the
lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question,
ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the
case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with
damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez,
Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the
cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance
of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service
dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery
thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and
Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render
an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the
defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages
of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B,
having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res
judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez
stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of
limitation and estoppel." 27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the
properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was
a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their
failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to
protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they

recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason
was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in
the following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are
(sic) hereby dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the
legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum
of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00
representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal
rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants,
Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby
ordered to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31,
1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A
and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the
sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees,
respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered
defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded
the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied
the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and
properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.

2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if
ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has
been docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by
statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022,
supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit
4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents
had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged
rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia
Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962
(Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly
denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of
Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is
any, could be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the
petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme
Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute
to herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with the
possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No.
5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to
appeal the decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must
come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right
has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an
unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent
suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the
detriment of the administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally
adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence
presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in
question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case
No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having
been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about
the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond
question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr.
Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo
Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount

of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order
defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an
innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be
rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the
undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought
to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No.
5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext
that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court.
Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed
their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the
enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made
by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or
of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs.
Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of
law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady
vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs
(Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is
ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim

in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial
rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history
of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person,
the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the
persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of
its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences
of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did
not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary
equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that
the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other
properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private
respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Bidin J., took no part.

G.R. No. 3083

March 18, 1907

RAFAELA PAVIA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
BIBIANA DE LA ROSA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
R. Salinas for appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellees.

TORRES, J.:
By an amended complaint filed on the 23rd of November, 1904, in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the plaintiffs prayed that a judgment be rendered in their favor and against the defendants
for the sum of 15,000 pesos, Philippine Currency, as damages, together with costs of action, alleging
in effect that by reason of the death of the testator, Pablo Linart e Iturralde, Francisco Granda e
Iturralde was appointed executor under the will of the said deceased, in which will the minor Carmen
Linart y Pavia was made the only universal heir, and that owing to the death of the executor
Francisco Granda toward the end of December, 1893, there was substituted as executor Jose de la
Rosa, who took possession of the personal property of the state, amounting to 10,673 pesos,
Mexican Currency, as well as the property situated at No. 27 Calle Solana, Walled City, likewise the
property of the testator; that during the month of April, 1904, the plaintiff, Rafaela Pavia, in her own
behalf, and as guardian of Carmen Linart y Pavia, executed a power of attorney in behalf of the
aforesaid Jose de la Rosa with the powers therein expressed, and the attorney having accepted
such power proceeded to administer the aforesaid estate in a careless manner until the 20th of
August, 1903, neglecting the interests of the plaintiffs and wasting the capital, and causing damages
amounting to over 15,000 pesos, Philippine currency, owing to the fact of having retired or disposed
of without any necessity the sum of 7,207 pesos Mexican currency, together with interest thereon
amounting to 360.25 pesos, which amounts would have produced 12,321.90 pesos, Mexican
currency, for the plaintiffs; that the executor and attorney De la Rosa neglected to appraise, count,
and divide the estate of Linart, deceased, notwithstanding it was his duty to do so, and leased the
aforesaid house No. 27 Calle Solana to his relatives from December, 1893, to August, 1903, at a
much lower rental than could have been obtained, thereby causing the plaintiffs losses amounting to
6,570 pesos, Mexican Currency; that the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa died on the 14th of September,
1903, leaving the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa as his only heirs and representatives,
Eusebio Canals being the husband of the said Bibiana.
The demurrer filed by the defendants was overruled and through their attorney, Ramon Salinas, they
answered the former amended complaint praying judgment in their behalf, as against the plaintiffs
for the payment of the sum of 1,794.42 5/8 pesos, Mexican currency, as a counterclaim, and for the
costs, and denying specifically facts 1, 2, and 9 of the amended complaint; admitting facts 3, 4, 6, 7,
10, and 11 of the same; that they admit the facts stated in paragraph 5 and 8, respectively, in that the
said De la Rosa at the death of said Granda substituted him, the said Granda, as executor, and the
fact regarding the omission of the making of the partition of the properties pertaining to the estate
deceased, and denying all others referring to the properties taken charge of by the said De la Rosa
and the rendering of accounts; that in their special defense they allege that they, the defendants, are
not responsible for the personal actions of the person from whom they deprived their possession and
title, against whom the plaintiffs neglected to bring action during his lifetime, and even then being
without any justifiable reason as they now actually pretented; that the deceased De la Rosa upon his
taking charge of the properties of the said estate only received from the window of the former
execution the draft of payment on the Caja de Depositos(Savings Bank) for the said sum of 7,207
pesos together with interest at the rate of 5 per cent, and not the amount referred to by the plaintiffs,
as well as taking over the charge of the said property at No. 27.
They further admitted that in 1894, De al Rosa, duly authorized by the plaintiff Rafaela Pavia and
with the formalities of law and in order to attend to the maintenance or subsistence of same (the
plaintiffs) who were them in Spain, withdrew from the Caja de Depositos (Saving Bank) the said
capital, together with interest thereon, which two sums together with the rentals of the aforesaid
house have been paid out in full by De la Rosa in the maintenance and support of the plaintiffs and

in the care of the building and property and other expenses well known to the same plaintiffs; that,
during the time of his administration, De la Rosa rendered accounts on two different occasions,
which said accounts showed all transactions had during the entire period of his administration; that
Seora Pavia did not object to the first account rendered although she had the same in her
possession for three years; that the rents mentioned were adequate with respect to the value of the
building erected on land belonging to some other person; that having paid out in expenses all of the
money belonging to the estate, of which estate the daughter of the testator is the only heir and the
owner of the said house, the partition of same was therefore impracticable, and that the plaintiffs
were then indebted to De la Rosa in the amount claimed in the counterclaim and which amount is
the balance due to De la Rosa and mentioned in the last account rendered.
After hearing the oral testimony presented by both parties, including the documentary evidence
attached to the record herein, the court below, on October 13, 1905, rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants for 3,488.27 pesos, Mexican currency, equivalent to
P3,171.09, Philippine currency, together with interest thereon at rate of 6 per cent per annum from
the 27th day of June, 1904, and the costs of the action, from which judgment the defendants filed an
exceptions and moved for a new trial, which motion was also denied.
The action brought by the plaintiffs, as has been seen, has for its object that of making effective, or
of collecting by means of a judgment of the court, the amount of damages alleged to have been
caused by De la Rosa, now deceased, to the plaintiffs in the performance of his duties during his
lifetime, as attorney for Rafaela Pavia, guardian of the minor Carmen Linart.
The defendants, Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa and her husband, in answering the complaints filed
by the plaintiffs allege, among other reasons, that they are not responsible for the personal acts of
De la Rosa, now deceased, and from whom they derived their right and title; and perhaps owing to
this allegation the plaintiffs, with the consent of the court, filed in writing the additional pleading on
March 10, 1905, in the Court of First Instance, amending their amended complaint in the following
terms:
That the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa on September 14, 1903, leaving as his only heirs and
representatives the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa and that said defendants
Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa received and accepted from the estate of the said Jose de la
Rosa the aforesaid inheritance without benefit of inventory and received and divided among
and between themselves, as such heirs, all of the estate, property, and effects left by the
aforesaid deceased Jose de la Rosa.
It has not been shown, as appears by the record in this cause, that the estate or the intestate
succession of the deceased, Jose de la Rosa, was ever opened or that an such inventory ever been
presented in evidence in this cause, notwithstanding that at the time of the death of De la Rosa, on
the 14th day of September, 1903, the Code of Civil Procedure that is, Act No. 190 was already
in force, and that in accordance with its provisions the estate of the deceased should have been
administered and liquidated.
The provisions of this law of procedure have abrogated, among others, the provisions of article 1003
of the Civil Code and other in relation to the same article with regard to the simple acceptance of the
estate of a deceased person, or to that made with benefit of inventory and the consequences
thereof.

In accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act No. 190 it is understood that a estate or
intestate succession of a deceased person is always accepted and received with benefit of
inventory, and his heirs, even after having taken possession of the estate of the deceased, do not
make themselves responsible for the debts of said deceased with their own property, but solely with
that property coming from the estate or intestate succession of said deceased.
The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a testate or intestate
succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate is to be administered, the
appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of an inventory of the estate of the deceased,
and the appointment of two or more commissioners for the purpose of appraising the property of the
estate and deciding as to the claims against said estate (Secs. 641, 642, 656, 660, 668, 669, Code
of Civil Procedure.)
Section 596 of the aforesaid code provides, nevertheless, for the extrajudicial division of an intestate
estate among the heirs of legal age, whether the succession is free from debts or whenever such
debts have been paid by the heirs, without proceedings in court, and without prejudice to the right of
any creditor therein within the period of two years commencing from the date of the partition of the
property belonging to the estate, a right recognized in section 597 of the said code.
The powers and duties of the commissioners are established in section 686, and those following, of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which sections determine the proceedings which must be followed to
admit, hear, and examine all claims filed against the estate of the deceased.
With regard to the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased, section 702 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides:
An executor or administrator may commence, prosecute, or defend, in the right of the
deceased, actions which survive to such executor or administrator and are necessary for the
recovery and protection of the property or rights of the deceased, and may prosecute or
defend such actions or suits commenced in the lifetime of the deceased.
From the above-quoted, as well as from the following sections and others included in Part II of the
aforesaid Code of Civil Procedure, it is deduced that after the death of a person the only entity which
may lawfully represent a testate or intestate succession is the executor or administrator appointed by
the court charged to care for, maintain, and administer the estate of the deceased in such of lands,
or for damages done to such lands, shall be instituted or maintained against him by an heir or
devisee, until such time as there is entered s decree of the court assigning such lands to the heir or
devisee, or until the time or period allowed for paying the debts of the estate has expired, unless the
executor or administrator surrenders the possession of the lands to the heir or devisee. (Sec. 704,
Code of Civil Procedure.)
And lastly for the partition of the properties belonging to the estate, section 753 of said code
provides:
After payment of the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, and the
allowances, if any, made for the expense of maintenance of the family of the deceased, the
court shall assign the residue of the estate to the person entitled to the same, and the court
in its decree shall name the persons and proportions or parts to which each is entitled, and

such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or from any other person having the same in his possession.
From the legal provisions contained in the aforesaid code with regard to estate or intestate
succession, it is deduced that the heir lawfully succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his
inheritance only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same and the
adjudication of the residue of the estate of said deceased, and in the meantime the only person in
charge by law to consider all claims against the estate of the deceased and to attend to or consider
the same is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent judge or court.
From the above it appears evident that whatever may be the rights of action on the part of Rafaela
Pavia and the minor, Carmen Linart, the latter represented by the former as guardian, as to the
obligations assumed by Jose de la Rosa, now deceased, it must be prosecuted against the executor
or administrator of the estate of said deceased Jose de la Rosa, whose executor or administrator is
at this time the only representative of the estate or intestate succession of said deceased; and that in
view of this fact and considering the law before us, they should not have brought action against
Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa for the mere fact that they were the sisters of said deceased Jose de
la Rosa, inasmuch as it is actually shown that the defendant De la Rosa died intestate or left during
his lifetime any will, or that the two defendants are the heirs of the deceased by virtue of an executed
will or by reason of existing law, or whether or not the deceased has left properties, or who is the
executor or administrator of the said properties, or whether the properties belonging to the estate of
the deceased brother of the defendants were ever adjudicated or partitioned by virtue of an order of
court in favor of the defendants.
Wherefore, taking into consideration the reasons and facts hereinbefore given, we reverse the
judgment appealed from, and find for the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa, and Eusebio
Canals, without special finding as to the costs herein, reserving to the plaintiffs to right to institute
proper action against the executor or administrator of the properties of the estate of the deceased,
Jose de la Rosa, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure now in force
covering the subject-matter herein.
After the expiration of twenty days from the date of the notification of this decision, let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from
whence it came for proper action. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.