Culture

Culture & Psychology 17(1) 3146 !
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Article
Defining the humanities
Anna Wierzbicka The Australian National University, Australia
Abstract The division of knowledge into science, social science, and the
humanities is deeply entrenched in ways of thinking prevailing in the Englishspeaking world and is reflected in many institutional structures. The English word
science, which excludes not only the humanities but also logic and
mathematics, does not have exact equivalents in other European languages. It is
a conceptual artefact of modern English and is saturated, so to speak, with
British empiricism. There is a pressure on speakers of English to regard natural
sciences as a paradigm of all knowledge, or at least all knowledge that modern
societies should value and pursue. The semantic changes that the English word
science has undergone in the last two centuries or so make empirically-based
knowledge of the external world seem central to all human knowledge. This
paper shows why the humanities constitute a field of inquiry that is
fundamentally different from science (and from social sciences modelled on
science) and yet essential to human knowledge and human understanding. In
doing so, the paper draws on the thought of the 18th-century Italian philosopher
Giambatista Vico and on the methodology of linguistic semantics, and in
particular on the NSM theory of language and thought.
Keywords British empiricism, Giambatista Vico, NSM semantics, psychology vs.
science and vs. the humanities, the concept of the humanities, the concept
of science
Introduction: Could psychology be the missing link?
The division of areas of knowledge into science, social sciences, and the
humanities is well established in the English-speaking world. It is not widely
agreed, however, what this division is based on. Nor is it always clear where a
particular discipline fits in this schema. For example, where does psychology
belong? At my own university, psychology is part of the Faculty of Science. At
some other Australian universities, it is part of the Faculty of Arts. At still others,
it is
Corresponding author: Anna Wierzbicka, Professor of Linguistics, FAHA FASSA,
School of Language Studies, Baldessin Precinct Building (#110), The Australian
National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia Email:
Anna.Wierzbicka@anu.edu.au
at Universitas Padjadjaran on August 25, 2016cap.sagepub.comDownloaded
from
part of a School, or a Faculty, of Social and Behavioural Sciences. The stated

Editorial Aims of the journal Culture & Psychology highlight the broad spectrum
of subjects which come under psychology and its strong links with other
disciplines:
Culture & Psychology addresses the centrality of culture necessary for a basic
understanding of the psychology of human beings: their identity, social conduct,
intra- and intersubjective experiences, emotions and semiotic creativity. By
drawing on diverse theoretical backgrounds, the editorial aim is to provide an
international and interdisciplinary forum for scholarly investigations and
discussions that will advance our basic knowledge of the self in its historical and
cultural contexts. The orientation of the journal is towards formulating new
conceptualizations of culture in psychology, together with theoretically relevant
empirical investigations. Contributions from anthropology, sociology, education,
ethnography, cultural history, linguistics, communication studies and philosophy
will further enhance the journals commitment to interdisciplinary psychology.
The definition of psychology provided by the American Psychological
Associations website is equally broad:
Psychology is the study of mind and behavior. The discipline embraces all
aspects of the human experience from the functions of the brain to the actions
of nations, from child development to care for the aged. In every conceivable
setting from scientific research centers to mental health care services, the
understanding of behaviour is the enterprise of psychologists.
The word scientific does feature in this definition, but so does the word mind
and the phrase human experience. On the whole, however, the definition of the
American Psychological Association, with its final emphasis on the
understanding of behaviour, appears to be tilted towards science, whereas that
of Culture & Psychology, with its emphasis on the centrality of culture and its
references to experience, emotion, and self, tilts towards the humanities. The
very fact that psychology cannot be readily pigeon-holed as belonging to this or
that branch of knowledge highlights the importance of approach and
perspective, alongside the subject-matter, in the division of knowledge into
science, social sciences, and the humanities, entrenched in ways of thinking
prevailing in the English-speaking world and reflected in many institutional
structures. There is also a growing trend in psychology not to restrict itself to one
perspective (say, one focussing on brain as opposed to mind, culture, and
experience, or vice versa), and to seek dialogue, interaction, and even
cooperation between different perspectives, methodologies, and disciplinary
traditions. The emergence of new journals such as, for example, Emotion Review,
The Journal of Positive Psychology, Theory and Psychology, and the Journal of
Social and Evolutionary Psychology bears witness to this widening of the horizons
and the growing
32 Culture & Psychology 17(1)

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recognition of a need for a multidisciplinary approach to the study of people, with
their inextricably connected minds, brains, and cultures. A rapprochement
between psychology and linguistics is particularly noticeable and, arguably,
particularly fruitful. It is in this context that the present paper situates itself (see
also Wierzbicka, 2005, 2009a, 2009b).
The different status of science and the humanities in contemporary English
Most speakers of English assume they know what science is: the word science is
part and parcel of ordinary, colloquial English. The same is not true, however, of
the humanities. For example, in the database Cobuild Bank of English (Collins
UK, 1991), science occurs about 50 times more often than humanities (50,000 vs
1000 occurrences). As these numerical contrasts indicate, the word humanities
belongs to a specialized, academic register of English. It is not surprising,
therefore, that many speakers of English have no clear idea of what this word
really means. The phrase the social sciences is not part of colloquial English
either, but most people would take it to be some kind of extension from science,
modified by the adjective social, which is used in English very widely. It is likely,
therefore, that the phrase social sciences would not appear to many speakers of
English as puzzling or incomprehensible, and that the association with science
would lend the phrase some of this words prestigious glow. This is not the case,
however, with the humanities. It is particularly important, therefore, that the
meaning of the phrase the humanities, and the idea behind it, should be
explained both to various funding bodies and to the general public. Without
some such explanations, it might not be clear to many people why the
humanities should have a claim on any institutional space or on the public
purse in countries like Australia, Canada, Britain, and the United States. For
example, it could be asked: What can the humanities contribute to human
knowledge and human understanding that neither science nor the social
sciences can? This paper will seek to provide a basis for an answer to this
question.
Science as a conceptual artefact of modern English
The English word science, which excludes not only the humanities but also logic
and mathematics, does not have exact equivalents in other European languages,
let alone languages further afield, and is saturated, so to speak, with British
empiricism (Wierzbicka, 2010a). For example, in German, the word Wissenschaft
(from wissen to know) embraces all systematic presentation of knowledge, and
its two branches Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften (from Natur
nature and Geist mind, spirit) do not privilege empirical, sense-derived
knowledge over any other kind. In French, too, there are les sciences exactes
(exact sciences) and les sciences de lhomme (human sciences), and the
French adjective scientifique is closer in
Wierzbicka 33

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meaning to the English words scholarly and academic than to the English word
scientific. But in English, knowledge based on experience (derived from the
senses) achieved such great prestige and such a privileged status in the edifice
of human knowledge that it shaped the modern concept of science itself.
Consequently, in the conceptualization of knowledge embedded in modern
English, there is no category of science or sciences which would include both
natural sciences and the humanities. Rather, the concept of science is very
prominent in modern English, and the concept of the humanities is not, and the
two are not seen (in ordinary thinking, reflected in ordinary language) as being
on a par. The modern English concept of science focuses on empirical and
objectively verifiable knowledge about things. The expression social sciences
purports to extend the empirical method and the requirement of verifiability to
the study of people rather than things, especially people studied as groups
rather than individuals. The prestige of social sciences derives from their
perceived (and purported) analogy with science.
The roots of the concept of the humanities in the thought of Giambattista Vico
The concept of the humanities evokes a field of inquiry which is fundamentally
different from science and which has its own goals and its own methods. The
subject-matter of the humanities is people, and people studied not in the way
in which things can be studied. The fundamental distinction between studying
things and studying people was introduced into European thought by the Italian
18th-century philosopher Giambattista Vico (1968). Although modern English has
since developed its own ways of categorizing knowledge, with its own concepts
of science, social sciences, and the humanities, Vicos basic idea lives on in
the modern English concept of the humanities (as it does in the German
concept of Geisteswissenschaften and in other comparable concepts in other
European languages). Essentially, the idea is that people can know things of
many kinds about people in a way they cant know things about anything else
(e.g., rocks, plants, or stars), that it is extremely important for people to know
things of these kinds about people, and further, that people can know things of
these kinds about people imaginatively, from inside, and that they can have a
better understanding of them than they can ever have of the natural world (the
world of things). To study people in the way one can study things would mean
(according to Vico) to ignore the distinction between human beings and nonhuman nature, between material objects and natural or emotional life (Berlin,
1976, p. 24). According to Vico, it is dicult but vitally important for people to
pursue knowledge about people that is different in kind from the knowledge
about the external world. Taking this contrast between the knowledge of the
external world and the knowledge of people as human beings as his point of
departure, Vico set out his

from
vision of the Scienza nuova a phrase whose rendering as the new science can
be misleading to English readers, given that in contemporary English the word
science means something quite different from what scienza meant for Vico, and
indeed, from what science meant in 17th- and 18th-century English. Vicos
scienza nuova was not some extension of science (conceived of in the sense in
which this terms is used in modern English, that is, roughly, as the empirical
study of the external world), but a different kind of knowledge which includes a
perspective from within the subject-matter.1 Such thinking about human beings
can lead to true knowledge no less than what the naturalists do in a sense,
(Vico held), even more so2:
If, following Descartes rigorous rule, we allowed only that to be true knowledge
which could be established by physics or other natural sciences, we should be
confined to behaviourist tests, namely the uncritical assimilation of the human
world to the non-human the restriction of our knowledge to those
characteristics of men which they share with the non-human world; and
consequently the attempt to explain human behaviour in non-human terms, as
some behaviourists and extreme materialists, both ancient and modern, inspired
by the vision (or mirage) of a single, integrated, natural science of all there is,
have urged us to do. It may be that a good deal more can be said in such purely
physicalist language than its opponents have, at times, thought possible; but
certainly not enough. For we should find ourselves debarred by such selfimposed austerity from saying or thinking some of the most natural and
indispensable things that men constantly say or think about other human beings.
The reason is not far to seek: men can think of others only as being like
themselves. (Berlin, 1976, p. 24)
Vico concluded that, as Berlin puts it, Descartes is the great deceiver, whose
emphasis on knowledge of the external world as the paradigm of all knowledge
has set philosophy on a false path (Berlin, 1976, p. 25). For Vico, the intimate
knowledge of human beings, which is the proper aim of, as we might say today,
the humanities, is inextricably linked with the question of language. As Claudio
Ve liz (1994) puts it in his retelling of Vicos ideas, The crucial Vichian argument
rests on the primordial character of language. Immensely more important than
all other human artefacts, signs, symbols, and institutions, language is the
definitive element in culture (p. 16). It is also the one that portrays most
tellingly the modalities and transformations of the social ambit (p. 16) and the
modifications of our human mind (p. 131). In addition, the understanding and
interpretation of human conduct and behaviour cannot be strictly separated from
moral judgment. Natural sciences are widely taken to be value-free (and social
sciences tend to imitate science in this regard). The humanities, on the other
hand, do not aspire to be value-free. Thus, when a historian writes (with
reference to the historiographies of Stalinism and Nazism) that moral judgments
are [...] intrinsic to all historical understanding (Malia, 2002, p. 78), he is placing
history in the context of the humanities
Wierzbicka 35
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rather than the social sciences. This link with values and moral judgment, too,
needs to be taken into account in the full definition of the humanities.
How concepts can be defined and explained: A thumb-nail sketch of the NSM
methodology
The definition and explanation of the concept of the humanities to be presented
here is based on the NSM approach, developed over many years by the author
and her colleague Cliff Goddard (see, e.g., Wierzbicka, 1972, 1996, and Goddard,
1998), and tested, in numerous publications (inter alia, in Culture & Psychology),
by many scholars (see the NSM homepage:
http://www.une.edu.au/bcss/linguistics/ nsm/). The acronym NSM stands for the
Natural Semantic Metalanguage a mini-language which corresponds to the
intersection (the common core) of all languages. To define the meaning of a word
or an expression in NSM means to explain it through simple and universal human
concepts which do not require further explanation themselves and which can be
found as words (or word-like elements) in all languages. 17th-century European
philosophers like Descartes, Arnauld, and above all Leibniz advanced the idea
that only a small repertoire of self-explanatory simple concepts (his alphabet of
human thoughts; see Leibniz, 1903) can provide the bedrock of all human
understanding. The NSM approach to semantics and hermeneutics has adopted
this idea, and over more than three decades NSM researchers have undertaken
wide-ranging experimentation over many semantic domains, across many
diverse languages, and have identified within the languages under investigation
matching minimal sets of lexically embodied simple meanings in terms of which
all complex meanings and ideas could be intelligibly explained and compared.
The full NSM lexicon of universal semantic primes is set out, in summary form, in
Table 1, using English exponents (similar tables can be drawn for other
languages, see Goddard, 2008; Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2002; Peeters, 2006). The
universal mini-language based on these primes can be used effectively as a
natural semantic metalanguage for exploring and comparing ways of thinking
and categorizing experience reflected in different languages of the world and
different historical states of the same language (e.g., English).3
Defining the humanities
The concept of the humanities focuses on studying human experience: what
can happen to people and what people can do; possible ways of thinking, ways of
feeling, and ways of speaking; possible motives and possible values. The words
can and possible highlight the imaginative character of the research in the
humanities. They also highlight the double focus of the humanities: on
humanity as a whole and on individual (though culturally embedded) human
beings in all their immense diversity.

from
Drawing on Vicos insights and using the metalanguage of universal human
concepts, we can propose the following explication (that is, explanatory
definition) of the expression the humanities:
The humanities
a. some people do some things for a long time because they think like this:
b. it is good if people can know things of many kinds about people
c. it is good if people can know what kinds of things can happen to someone it is
good if people can know how someone can feel when these things happen
d. it is good if people can know how someone can think about things of many
kinds it is good if people can know how someone can feel when this someone
thinks about these things
e. it is good if people can know what kinds of things someone can say with words
it is good if people can know how someone can say these things with words
Table 1. Semantic primes English exponents (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2002)
I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING/THING, PEOPLE, BODY substantives KIND, PART
relational substantives THIS, THE SAME, OTHER/ELSE Determiners ONE, TWO,
SOME, ALL, MUCH/MANY, LITTLE/FEW quantifiers GOOD, BAD evaluators BIG,
SMALL descriptors THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR mental predicates SAY,
WORDS, TRUE speech DO, HAPPEN, MOVE, TOUCH action, events, movement,
contact
BE (SOMEWHERE), THERE IS, HAVE, BE (SOMEONE/SOMETHING)
location, existence, possession, specification LIVE, DIE life and death
WHEN/TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME
TIME, MOMENT
time
WHERE/PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE
space
NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF logical concepts VERY, MORE intensifier,
augmentor LIKE similarity
Notes: Primes exist as the meanings of lexical units (not at the level of lexemes).
Exponents of primes may be words, bound morphemes, or phrasemes. They can
be formally complex. Each prime has well-specified syntactic (combinatorial)

properties.
Wierzbicka 37
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f. it is good if people can know what kinds of things someone can do it is good if
people can know why someone can want to do these things
g. some people say about things of some kinds: it is good if someone does these
things other people say: it is not good if someone does these things it is good if
people can think about things like this
h. it is good if people can know how someone can live it is good if people can
think about things like this
i. when these people do these things, they do them like someone can do things if
this someone wants to know something about other people, not about things
j. if these people do these things well, afterwards people can know many things
of many kinds about people because of this
As this explication shows, the scope of the subject-matter of the humanities is
very broad. It embraces things that happen to people, things that people do, and
things that people say, as well as peoples thoughts, emotions, motivation, and
values. This broad scope of the subject-matter of the humanities explains why
fields as different as history, biography, literature, philology, linguistics, classics,
philosophy, and religious studies can all be seen (and can see themselves) as
part of the humanities. Some of these fields can also see themselves as part of
the social sciences, or at least as having one foot in the social sciences and
one in the humanities. Such overlaps are possible because the concept of the
humanities refers not only to a particular subject-matter but also to a particular
approach. This approach envisaged by the humanities is different
fundamentally different from that of science, and consequently from that of
the social sciences, which seek to emulate the approach of science. As already
noted, one key feature of the explication of the humanities which distinguishes it
from that of science is the use of the word can in most of the components, from
(b) to (h). According to the concept behind the word humanities, it is good for
people to know how someone can think, feel, speak, live, what kinds of things
can happen to someone, and what kinds of things someone can do. This use of
the modal can makes the concept of the humanities unempirical (in the sense
in which the word empirical is usually used): people cant study by observation or
experiment how someone else can think, feel, speak, or live. This can points to
a necessary effort of the imagination, which cannot be fully replicated and
empirically verified. Furthermore, the definition of the humanities outlined here
is not exclusively focussed on knowledge: as components (g) and (h) indicate,
the humanities seeks also to provide opportunities for people to think about
how someone can live, and

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whether it is good or not good for people to do things of some kinds. This is not
something open to empirical verification either. The appeal to the imagination
inherent in the recurring can links the work in the humanities in some ways to
the work involved in creative arts. It also connects with the component if these
people do these things well, which is absent from the explication of science:
science is not conceived of as cognate to art, and the two words (science and
art) can be contrasted. The word humanities, on the other hand, is normally not
contrasted with the word art. This is due, I suggest, not only to the avowedly
non-empirical character of the humanities and to its conceptual link with
creative imagination, but also to its implication of there being here some room
for individual mastery and excellence which cannot be fully captured by
measurable quality indicators (to use an expression from current bureaucratic
parlance). Another feature which links the concept of the humanities with that
of art is suggested by the word afterwards in component (k). Art produces, of
course, works of art, that is, some lasting products. The humanities, too, hope
to produce some tangible products perhaps more enduring and less likely to
become outdated than the results of scientific research tend to be. Often, these
products take the form of books (rather than journal articles), but they can also
take the form of critical editions, dictionaries, philological exegesis, and so on. As
we will see in the next section, science appears to aspire to being constantly on
the move and the scientists appear to always want to know more. By contrast,
the concept of the humanities includes an aspiration that afterwards, people
can know many things of many kinds about people because of this. The nonscientific and experiential aspect of the humanities is also reflected in
component (j), which refers, effectively, to the goal of understanding other
people. A social scientist seeks knowledge (of some kinds) about people, but
not about other people. The phrase other people makes room, as it were, for
the person of the researcher, for this persons empathetic understanding of other
human beings. This points to a pursuit of intersubjective rather than purely
objective knowledge and understanding, which again sets the humanities apart
from science and the social sciences. Such intersubjective understanding is
linked inextricably with self-understanding a feature of the humanities
highlighted by the moral philosopher Charles Taylor, who (like Vico) sees all
human understanding as closely related to the question of language. According
to Taylor, the goals of understanding and self-understanding can only be
achieved if the language of explanation makes sense to the human
agents/experiencers themselves. Commenting on, and cautioning against, the
great hold of natural science models in our entire enterprise of selfunderstanding in the sciences of human life, Taylor calls repeatedly on the
notion of making sense of ourselves and of our lives, of the actions and
feelings of ourselves and others (Taylor, 1989: 57), and in his view this can be
achieved only in a language in which people actually live their lives. Taylors
main point is that the approach, methods, and even the language of the
humanities need to be different from those of science and sciences. The

contrast he draws between the standpoint of
Wierzbicka 39
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the observer and that of the agent [...] making sense of his own thinking,
feeling, and acting echoes that drawn by Vico between, on the one hand, our
knowledge of the external world, and on the other, our knowledge of human
beings. Both Vicos and Taylors concern for the self-understanding of the agent
chimes with another feature of the explication proposed here (in addition to
other people), namely, its focus on someone (in the singular) rather than
people (in the plural) as the primary object of interest. Generally speaking,
science studies classes of things rather than individual objects, and social
sciences focus on populations and societies. The humanities, on the other
hand, have a double focus. On the one hand, they are interested in people in
general and they are predicated on the assumption that it is good if people can
know things of many kinds about people. On the other hand, however, they are
interested in individual human beings not necessarily in specific individuals as
such but in the whole range of human experience, human pursuits, emotions,
values, ways of thinking, and ways of living. Thus, the purpose of the
humanities is not to study particular societies or to compare societies across
places and times, but rather to understand human beings. This is in fact how
one of the best contemporary dictionaries of English, Collins Cobuild English
Language Dictionary (Collins UK, 1991), defines the word humanities: The
humanities are the subjects of study such as literature, philosophy, and history
which are concerned with human beings, their ideas, actions, and relationships,
rather than science subjects.
Defining science, the social sciences, and concepts like Wissenschaft
The main goal of this paper is to explicate the concept of the humanities. Since,
however, the concept of the humanities has been contrasted here with the
concept of science (and its extension social sciences), it is not possible to omit
altogether the question of the meaning, and of the history, of science.4 The
meaning of science has changed considerably in the course of the last two
centuries, and that this change has to do both with the scope and the
methodology of what can be described as science now and what could be so
described two centuries ago. For example, the 18th-century Scottish philosopher
Thomas Reid, in his Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man published in 1785,
referred to both mathematics and the study of what he called the operations of
the mind as sciences. The greatest difference between these two sciences is,
as Reid put it:
that the objects of mathematics being things external to the mind, it is much
more easy to attend to them, and fix them steadily in the imagination. The
diculty attending our enquiries into the powers of the mind serves to account
for some events respecting this branch of philosophy, which [...] remains, to this
day, in a very low state, and as it were in its infancy. (Reid, 2002 [1785], pp. 61
62)
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Thus, for Reid, science referred to, roughly speaking, any systematic and
rigorous pursuit of knowledge. What he called natural philosophy, and what we
might call today the empirical study of natural phenomena, was for Reid an
important branch of science, but only one branch among many. In present-day
English, however, what for Reid was a branch of science has become simply
science, and the other branches have found themselves outside the scope of
science as the word is now commonly understood. This is particularly clear in
the way the derived words scientific and scientist are now used. For example, in
his book about Darwin the evolutionary biologist and palaeontologist Niles
Eldredge (2005) states: Starting with Newton, the goal of every scientist, no
matter how religious they were, in England at least, was to classify natural
causes for natural phenomena (Quoted in Cosic, 2008, p. 16). Eldredge takes it
for granted that scientists study natural phenomena, and also that science
studies those phenomena empirically and relies, crucially, on evidence (a word
which recurs throughout Eldredges discussion). This is consistent with the
following explication of the word science (as it is used in present-day English):
Science
a. some people do some things for a long time because they think like this:
b. it is good if people can know many things about things of many kinds
c. it is good if people can know these things like someone can know some things
when it is like this:
d. this someone can see this something
e. this someones hands[M] can touch this something
f. this someone can say some things about this something with some number[M]
of words
g. because these people think like this, they do some things to some things
h. they do these things not like other people do things to many things, because
they want to know some things about some things well
i. when these people know some things about some things, they want to know
more things
Key features of science as presented in this explication include a focus on
knowing many things about things (rather than people) in component (b), an
experimental basis (not simply doing things but doing things to some things)
in (g), an empirical orientation (relying on evidence such as that provided by the
eye and the hand) in (d), and (e), an emphasis on numbers and measurements
in component (f), and an incremental, on-going, forward-moving character
(they
Wierzbicka 41
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want to know more) in (j). In addition, the references to seeing, touching, and
number words imply a kind of verifiable knowledge, accessible, in principle, to
anyone through clear procedures based on seeing, touching, and measurements.
The explication restricts sciences goals to providing knowledge about things
(rather than people), and it refers, implicitly, to the empirical method (ultimately
based on the senses, such as seeing and touching). The reference to doing
many things to some things, too, evokes laboratory research and the like, where
the scientists manipulate things of certain kinds in order to obtain knowledge of
a kind that can be derived from such experimental approaches. There is also a
reference here to people knowing things of some kinds well: the scope of
science may be limited (e.g., it excludes intimate knowledge about peoples
thoughts, feelings, and experiences), but at least the knowledge provided by it is
expected to be well established and clearly articulated. In all these respects, the
present-day meaning of science is different from, for example, that of the
German Wissenschaft, the French science, or the Russian nauka, as shown in the
following explication:
Wissenschaft
a. some people do many things because they think like this:
b. it is good if people can know many things about things of many kinds
c. because these people think like this, they do many things for a long time
d. they do these things not like other people do many things
e. these people want to do these things in this way because they want to know
many things about things of many kinds well
Component (b) shows that those pursuing Wissenschaft aim at comprehensive
knowledge extending over many domains. There is no reference here to pursuing
knowledge through doing things to some things (as in experimental science).
Furthermore, while there are references to a special approach and method in (d),
and to a high standard of knowledge in (e), there is no reference to empirical
investigations like those relying on the proverbial eye and hand in the tradition
of the great 17th-century experimental scientists (as we would call them now)
like Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, Isaac Newton, and the Royal Society of London
in general (see Wierzbicka, 2010a). As for the social sciences, they, like the
humanities, are interested in people rather than things. At the same time,
however, they are interested only in certain kind of things that can be known
about people those kinds that can be established by methods similar to
methods used by scientists.
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the social sciences
a. some people do many things because they think like this:
b. it is good if people can know many things of many kinds about people
c. it is good if people can know these things well
d. because these people think like this, they do many things for a long time
e. they want to do these things not like other people do many things
f. they want to do these things like scientists[M] do things
The concept of scientists (roughly, practitioners of science) appears to be
more central to social sciences than the concept of science itself. Of course,
the word scientist is derived from the word science. In trying to explicate the
social sciences by trial and error, one finds that an explication based on the
semantic molecule scientists works better than one based on the word science
itself. The implication seems to be that practitioners of social sciences model
their own work on the work of scientists: they want to approach their
subjectmatter (people) in the way that scientists approach theirs (things of
some kinds). This is different from the aspiration of the humanities to approach
the same subject-matter (people) from a perspective which is not open to
scientists investigating things and to gain insights different in kind from those
that scientists can and want to attain.
Conclusion
There is a pressure on speakers of English to regard natural sciences as a
paradigm of all knowledge at least all knowledge that modern societies should
value and pursue. As we have seen, the Italian Vico held the Frenchman
Descartes responsible for the undue absolutization of that particular paradigm. In
fact, however, neither Italian nor French (nor other European languages) have
absorbed this absolutization in the way English has. The semantic changes that
the English word science underwent in the last two centuries or so make
empirically-based knowledge of the external world seem central to all human
knowledge, and self-evidently so (see Wierzbicka, 2006, 2010). The pressure of
modern English suggests to speakers of English, in a subtle and insidious way,
that really there is no knowledge like scientific knowledge, and that if one wants
to focus on people rather than things, one should at least model ones
endeavours on those of the scientists, and to try to practise social science,

cognitive science, or some other science. Equally, there is a pressure on
funding
Wierzbicka 43
from
bodies in English-speaking countries to see excellence in research and
scholarship through the prism of the priorities and expectations of science, in
the modern English sense of the word. It is important, therefore, for those
working in the humanities to explain their own priorities and expectations to
their colleagues in science and to the society at large. It is also important for
linguists to draw attention to the historically-shaped semantic peculiarities of the
modern English words science, sciences, scientific, and scientists peculiarities
which may sometimes prevent speakers of modern English from making up their
own minds about the kinds of knowledge necessary for human beings and their
societies to flourish.
Notes 1.
AsdiscussedbyBerlin,VicosconceptofunderstandinghadadeepinfluenceontheGer
man philosopher Diltheys notions of Verstehen and Einfu hlen, and through
him it influenced many other modern scholars (see, e.g., Berlin, 1976, pp. 4, 27,
32, 97, 107, 173). 2. I am quoting here Berlins masterly account of Vicos idea,
rather than Vico himself, in order to save space and to ensure clarity. Vicos 18th
century prose can be obscure and convoluted, and to show clearly what he
means one would need to use many lengthy quotes. Berlins style, on the other
hand, is modern, lucid, and concise. 3. In addition to semantic primes
(unanalysable atoms of meaning), many NSM explications rely also (in a limited
way) on semantic molecules, especially in the area of concrete vocabulary. In
NSM explications, such molecules are marked with the symbol [M]. Molecules are
not necessary for explicating the humanities, but they are relevant to the
explication of science. For example, the explication of science includes the
words hands and number, which are not primes and whose meaning can be
decomposed into primes, but which function as units of meaning within the
concept science. Since molecules can be processed as single units, they allow
the mind to manipulate vast amounts of semantic content with relative ease.
Many molecules are foundational concepts in knowledge structures (see
Goddard, 2009, 2010; Wierzbicka, 2007, 2010b). 4. It is impossible to review in
the space of this paper the extensive literature on the subject of science, or on
distinctions such as those between nomothetic and idiographic sciences, or
between homological and dialogical sciences. For one relevant and congenial
recent discussion, see Salvatore and Valsiner, 2008. For a more detailed
discussion of the concept of science embedded in modern English, see
Wierzbicka, 2006, 2010a).
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intellectual powers of man. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University
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Clegg (Eds.), Yearbook of idiographic science (pp. 919). Rome: Firera and Liuzzo
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Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ve liz, C. (1994). The new world of the
gothic fox: Culture and economy in English and Spanish America. Berkeley, CA:
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Vico (T. Bergin & M. Fisch, Trans.). Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press.
Wierzbicka, A. (1972). Semantic primitives. Frankfurt: Athena um. Wierzbicka, A.
(1996). Semantics: Primes and universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wierzbicka, A. (2005). In defense of culture. Theory and Psychology, 15(4), 575
597. Wierzbicka, A. (2006). English: Meaning and culture. New York: Oxford
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Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Wierzbicka, A. (2009a). What makes a good life? A
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Author Biography Anna Wierzbicka is Professor of Linguistics at the Australian

National University, and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities,
the Academy of Social Sciences of Australia, the Russian Academy of Sciences,
and the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has lectured extensively at
universities in Europe, America, and Asia, and she is the author of numerous
books, including Cross-Cultural Pragmatics (Mouton de Gruyter, 1991, 2nd
edition 2003),
Wierzbicka 45
from
Semantics: Primes and Universals (Oxford University Press, 1996), Understanding
Cultures Through Their Keywords (Oxford University Press, 1997), Emotions
Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals (Cambridge University
Press, 1999), What Did Jesus Mean? Explaining the Sermon on the Mount and the
Parables in Simple and Universal Human Concepts (Oxford University Press,
2001), English: Meaning and Culture (Oxford University Press, 2006), and
Experience, Evidence and Sense: The Hidden Cultural Legacy of English (Oxford
University Press, 2010). Her work spans a number of disciplines, including
anthropology, psychology, cognitive science, philosophy, and religious studies as
well as linguistics, and has been published in many journals across all these
disciplines. In 2010, she was awarded the International Dobrushin prize for her
work in semantics and the Polish Science Foundation prize for creating the NSM
theory of language and thought.
from
Budaya & Psikologi 17 (1) 31-46! Penulis (s) 2011 Cetak ulang dan izin:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10,1177 / 1354067X10388841
cap.sagepub.com
Artikel
Mendefinisikan 'humaniora'
Anna Wierzbicka The Australian National University, Australia
Abstrak Pembagian pengetahuan ke dalam 'ilmu pengetahuan,' 'ilmu sosial,' dan
'humaniora' dan mengakar kuat di cara berpikir yang berlaku di dunia berbahasa
Inggris dan tercermin dalam banyak struktur kelembagaan. Kata bahasa Inggris
ilmu pengetahuan, yang tidak termasuk tidak hanya 'humaniora' tetapi juga
logika dan matematika, tidak memiliki setara tepat dalam bahasa Eropa lainnya.
Ini adalah artefak konseptual Inggris modern dan jenuh, sehingga untuk
berbicara, dengan empirisme Inggris. Ada tekanan pada penutur bahasa Inggris
menganggap 'ilmu alam' sebagai paradigma semua pengetahuan, atau
setidaknya semua pengetahuan bahwa masyarakat modern harus menghargai
dan mengejar. Perubahan semantik bahwa bahasa Inggris ilmu kata telah
mengalami dalam dua abad terakhir ini membuat pengetahuan berbasis empiris
dari dunia luar tampaknya pusat untuk semua pengetahuan manusia. Makalah
ini menunjukkan mengapa 'humaniora' merupakan bidang penyelidikan yang
secara fundamental berbeda dari 'ilmu' (dan dari 'ilmu sosial' meniru 'ilmu') dan
belum penting untuk pengetahuan manusia dan 'pemahaman manusia.' Dengan
demikian, kertas mengacu pada pemikiran abad ke-18 filsuf Italia Giambatista
Vico dan metodologi semantik linguistik, dan khususnya pada 'NSM' teori bahasa
dan pikiran.
Kata kunci empirisme Inggris, Giambatista Vico, NSM semantik, psikologi vs 'ilmu'
dan vs 'humaniora', konsep 'humaniora', konsep 'ilmu'
Pengantar: Bisa psikologi menjadi missing link?
Pembagian bidang pengetahuan ke dalam 'ilmu pengetahuan,' 'ilmu-ilmu sosial,'
dan 'humaniora' mapan di dunia berbahasa Inggris. Hal ini tidak secara luas
disepakati, namun, apa divisi ini didasarkan pada. Juga tidak selalu jelas di mana
tertentu ts disiplin fi dalam skema ini. Misalnya, mana psikologi milik? Di
universitas saya sendiri, psikologi merupakan bagian dari Fakultas Ilmu. Di
beberapa universitas Australia lainnya, itu adalah bagian dari Fakultas Seni. Pada
yang lain, itu adalah
Sesuai author: Anna Wierzbicka, Profesor Linguistik, Faha FASSA, Sekolah Studi
Bahasa, Baldessin Precinct Building (# 110), The Australian National University,
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia Email: Anna.Wierzbicka@anu.edu.au
di Universitas Padjadjaran pada tanggal 25 Agustus,
2016cap.sagepub.comDownloaded dari
bagian dari Sekolah, atau Fakultas, Sosial dan Ilmu Perilaku. menyatakan
'Editorial Tujuan' The jurnal Budaya & Psikologi menyoroti spektrum yang luas
dari mata pelajaran yang datang di bawah psikologi dan link yang kuat dengan
disiplin ilmu lain:
Budaya & Psikologi alamat sentralitas budaya yang diperlukan untuk
pemahaman dasar psikologi manusia: identitas mereka, perilaku sosial,
pengalaman intra dan intersubjektif, emosi dan kreativitas semiotik. Dengan
menggambar pada latar belakang teoritis beragam, tujuan editorial adalah untuk
menyediakan sebuah forum internasional dan interdisipliner untuk penyelidikan
ilmiah dan diskusi yang akan memajukan pengetahuan dasar kita tentang diri
dalam konteks sejarah dan budayanya. Orientasi jurnal adalah menuju
merumuskan konseptualisasi baru budaya dalam psikologi, bersama-sama
dengan penyelidikan empiris teoritis yang relevan. Kontribusi dari antropologi,
sosiologi, pendidikan, etnografi, sejarah budaya, linguistik, studi komunikasi dan
filsafat akan lebih meningkatkan komitmen jurnal psikologi interdisipliner.
The Definisi dari 'psikologi' yang disediakan oleh situs American Psychological
Association adalah sama luas:
Psikologi adalah studi tentang pikiran dan perilaku. disiplin mencakup semua
aspek dari pengalaman manusia - dari fungsi otak untuk tindakan negara, dari
perkembangan anak untuk merawat orang tua. Dalam setiap pengaturan
dibayangkan dari pusat penelitian ilmiah untuk pelayanan perawatan kesehatan
mental, 'pemahaman tentang perilaku' adalah perusahaan dari psikolog.
Kata 'ilmiah' tidak fitur dalam definisi ini, tetapi begitu kata 'pikiran' dan frase
'pengalaman manusia.' Secara keseluruhan, bagaimanapun, definisi dari
American Psychological Association, dengan penekanan nal fi pada 'pemahaman
perilaku, 'tampaknya miring terhadap ilmu pengetahuan, sedangkan kebudayaan
& Psikologi, dengan penekanan pada' sentralitas budaya 'dan referensi untuk
pengalaman,' 'emosi', dan 'diri,' miring terhadap humaniora. Kenyataan bahwa
psikologi tidak dapat mudah merpati-bersembunyi sebagai milik ini atau itu
cabang pengetahuan menyoroti pentingnya pendekatan dan perspektif, di
samping subjek-materi, dalam pembagian pengetahuan ke dalam 'ilmu
pengetahuan,' 'ilmu-ilmu sosial, dan 'humaniora,' bercokol di cara berpikir yang
berlaku di dunia berbahasa Inggris dan kembali tercermin dalam banyak struktur
kelembagaan. Ada juga tren yang berkembang dalam psikologi tidak membatasi
diri dengan satu perspektif (misalnya, satu berfokus pada 'otak' sebagai lawan
dari 'pikiran,' 'budaya,' dan 'pengalaman', atau sebaliknya), dan untuk mencari
dialog, interaksi, dan bahkan kerjasama antara perspektif di ff erent, metodologi,
dan tradisi disiplin. Munculnya jurnal baru seperti, misalnya, Emotion Ulasan, The
Journal of Positive Psychology, Teori dan Psikologi, dan Journal of Sosial dan
Psikologi Evolusioner saksi pelebaran ini cakrawala dan berkembang
32 Budaya & Psikologi 17 (1)
Pengakuan dari perlunya pendekatan multidisiplin untuk mempelajari orang,
dengan pikiran mereka terhubung erat, otak, dan budaya. Sebuah pemulihan
hubungan antara psikologi dan linguistik terutama terlihat dan, bisa dibilang,
terutama berbuah. Dalam konteks ini bahwa tulisan ini menempatkan dirinya
(lihat juga Wierzbicka 2005, 2009a, 2009b).
Status yang berbeda dari 'ilmu' dan 'humaniora' dalam bahasa Inggris
kontemporer
Sebagian besar penutur bahasa Inggris berasumsi mereka tahu apa 'ilmu'
adalah: ilmu kata adalah bagian dari biasa, bahasa Inggris sehari-hari. Hal yang
sama tidak benar, bagaimanapun, dari 'humaniora'. Misalnya, dalam database
Cobuild Bank of English (Collins UK, 1991), ilmu terjadi sekitar 50 kali lebih sering
daripada humaniora (50.000 vs 1000 kejadian). Karena ini kontras numerik
menunjukkan, humaniora kata milik, daftar akademik khusus bahasa Inggris. Hal
ini tidak mengherankan, karena itu, bahwa banyak pembicara dari Inggris tidak
tahu yang jelas tentang apa kata ini benar-benar berarti. Ungkapan ilmu-ilmu
sosial bukan bagian dari bahasa Inggris sehari-hari baik, tetapi kebanyakan
orang akan mengambil itu menjadi semacam ekstensi dari ilmu pengetahuan,
modi fi ed oleh sosial kata sifat, yang digunakan dalam bahasa Inggris yang
sangat luas. Sangat mungkin, karena itu, bahwa frase ilmu-ilmu sosial tidak akan
muncul untuk banyak penutur bahasa Inggris sebagai membingungkan atau
dimengerti, dan bahwa hubungan dengan ilmu pengetahuan akan meminjamkan
frase beberapa cahaya bergengsi kata ini. Hal ini tidak terjadi, namun, dengan
humaniora. Hal ini sangat penting, karena itu, bahwa makna ungkapan
humaniora, dan ide di balik itu, harus dijelaskan - baik ke berbagai lembaga
donor dan masyarakat umum. Tanpa beberapa penjelasan seperti itu, mungkin
tidak jelas bagi banyak orang mengapa 'humaniora' harus memiliki klaim pada
setiap ruang kelembagaan - atau pada dompet publik - di negara-negara seperti
Australia, Kanada, Inggris, dan Amerika Serikat. Sebagai contoh, bisa bertanya:
Apa yang bisa 'humaniora' berkontribusi pengetahuan manusia dan pemahaman
manusia bahwa ilmu pengetahuan tidak pula ilmu-ilmu sosial bisa? Tulisan ini
akan berusaha untuk memberikan dasar untuk jawaban untuk pertanyaan ini.
'Ilmu' sebagai artefak konseptual Inggris modern
Kata bahasa Inggris ilmu pengetahuan, yang tidak termasuk tidak hanya
'humaniora' tetapi juga logika dan matematika, tidak memiliki setara tepat
dalam bahasa Eropa lainnya, biarkan bahasa sendiri lanjut sebuah lapangan, dan
jenuh, sehingga untuk berbicara, dengan 'empirisme Inggris' (Wierzbicka ,
2010a). Sebagai contoh, di Jerman, kata Wissenschaft (dari Wissen 'tahu')
mencakup semua presentasi yang sistematis pengetahuan, dan dua cabang Naturwissenschaften dan Geisteswissenschaften (dari Natur 'alam' dan 'pikiran,
semangat' Geist) - tidak istimewa empiris, rasa yang diturunkan pengetahuan
lebih jenis lain. Di Perancis, juga, ada les ilmu exactes ( 'ilmu pasti') dan les ilmu
de l'homme ( 'ilmu manusia'), dan Perancis kata sifat ilmiah que lebih dekat di
Wierzbicka 33
berarti kata-kata bahasa Inggris ilmiah dan akademik daripada kata bahasa
Inggris ilmiah. Tapi dalam bahasa Inggris, pengetahuan berdasarkan pengalaman
'(berasal dari indra) mencapai prestise besar tersebut dan status istimewa
seperti di edi kantor pengetahuan manusia yang berbentuk konsep modern' ilmu
'itu sendiri. Akibatnya, dalam konseptualisasi pengetahuan tertanam dalam
bahasa Inggris modern, tidak ada kategori 'ilmu' atau 'ilmu' yang akan mencakup
'ilmu alam' dan 'humaniora.' Sebaliknya, konsep 'ilmu' sangat menonjol di Inggris
modern, dan konsep 'humaniora' tidak, dan keduanya tidak terlihat (dalam
berpikir biasa, tercermin dalam bahasa sehari) sebagai setara. Konsep Inggris
modern dari 'ilmu' berfokus pada empiris dan objektif veri fi pengetahuan
mampu tentang 'hal. "Ekspresi ilmu-ilmu sosial dimaksudkan untuk memperluas
metode empiris dan persyaratan kemampuan fi veri untuk mempelajari' orang
'daripada' hal, 'terutama' orang 'dipelajari sebagai kelompok daripada individu.
Prestise atau diperoleh 'ilmu sosial' dari analogi yang dirasakan mereka (dan
diakui) dengan 'ilmu.'
Akar konsep 'humaniora' dalam pemikiran Giambattista Vico
Konsep 'humaniora' membangkitkan medan penyelidikan yang fundamental di ff
erent dari 'ilmu' dan yang memiliki tujuan sendiri dan metode sendiri. Subjeksoal 'humaniora' adalah 'orang, dan orang-orang belajar tidak dalam cara di
mana' hal-hal 'dapat dipelajari. Perbedaan mendasar antara belajar hal-hal dan
mempelajari orang-orang diperkenalkan ke pemikiran Eropa dengan Italia filsuf
abad ke-18 Giambattista Vico (1968). Meskipun bahasa Inggris modern sejak
mengembangkan cara sendiri mengkategorikan pengetahuan, dengan konsep
sendiri dari 'ilmu pengetahuan,' 'ilmu-ilmu sosial,' dan 'humaniora,' ide dasar
Vico hidup dalam konsep bahasa Inggris modern dari 'humaniora' (sebagai itu
tidak dalam konsep Jerman Geisteswissenschaften dan konsep lain sebanding
dalam bahasa Eropa lainnya). Pada dasarnya, idenya adalah bahwa orang dapat
mengetahui hal-hal dari berbagai jenis tentang orang-orang dengan cara mereka
tidak dapat mengetahui hal-hal tentang apa pun (misalnya, batu, tanaman, atau
bintang), yang sangat penting bagi orang untuk mengetahui hal-hal ini jenis
tentang orang-orang, dan lebih lanjut, bahwa orang-orang dapat mengetahui
hal-hal semacam ini tentang orang-orang imajinatif, dari dalam, dan bahwa
mereka dapat memiliki pemahaman yang lebih baik dari mereka daripada yang
pernah mereka dapat memiliki satu 'alam' (dunia 'hal-hal' ). Untuk mempelajari
orang dengan cara yang satu dapat belajar 'hal-hal' berarti (menurut Vico) 'untuk
mengabaikan perbedaan antara manusia dan alam non-manusia, antara objek
material dan kehidupan alam atau emosional' (Berlin, 1976, hal. 24 ). Menurut
Vico, itu adalah di FFI kultus tetapi sangat penting bagi orang untuk mengejar
pengetahuan tentang orang-orang yang di ff erent dalam bentuk dari
pengetahuan tentang dunia luar. Mengambil kontras antara pengetahuan
tentang dunia luar dan pengetahuan orang sebagai manusia sebagai titik
tolaknya, Vico ditetapkan-Nya
visi nuova Scienza - frase yang render sebagai 'ilmu baru' dapat menyesatkan
para pembaca bahasa Inggris, mengingat bahwa dalam bahasa Inggris
kontemporer ilmu kata berarti sesuatu yang cukup di ff berbeda dengan apa
Scienza dimaksudkan untuk Vico, dan memang, dari apa ilmu dimaksud dalam
17th- dan Inggris abad ke-18. Vico Scienza nuova tidak beberapa ekstensi ilmu
(dikandung dari dalam arti di mana istilah ini digunakan dalam bahasa Inggris
modern, yaitu kira-kira, sebagai studi empiris dari dunia luar), tetapi jenis di ff
erent pengetahuan yang meliputi perspektif 'dari dalam' subjek-matter.1 berpikir
seperti itu tentang manusia dapat menyebabkan 'pengetahuan yang benar' tidak
kurang dari apa yang 'naturalis melakukan' - dalam arti, (Vico diadakan), bahkan
lebih SO2:
Jika, mengikuti aturan ketat Descartes, kita diperbolehkan hanya itu menjadi
pengetahuan sejati yang bisa dibentuk oleh fisika atau ilmu alam lainnya, kita
harus con fi ned untuk tes behavioris, yaitu asimilasi kritis dari dunia manusia ke
non-manusia - pembatasan pengetahuan kita untuk ciri-ciri laki-laki yang mereka
berbagi dengan dunia non-manusia; dan akibatnya upaya untuk menjelaskan
perilaku manusia dalam istilah non-manusia, karena beberapa behavioris dan
materialis ekstrem, baik kuno dan modern, terinspirasi oleh visi (atau
fatamorgana) dari satu, terpadu, ilmu alam dari semua yang ada, telah
mendesak kita melakukan. Mungkin banyak lagi yang bisa dikatakan sedemikian
murni bahasa 'fisikalis' dari lawan-lawannya telah, di kali, berpikir mungkin; tapi
tentu saja tidak cukup. Karena kita harus fi nd diri kita dihalangi oleh
penghematan diri dikenakan tersebut dari mengatakan atau memikirkan
beberapa hal yang paling alami dan sangat diperlukan bahwa laki-laki terus
berkata atau berpikir tentang manusia lain. Alasannya adalah tidak jauh untuk
mencari: pria bisa memikirkan orang lain hanya sebagai seperti mereka. (Berlin,
1976, hal. 24)
Vico menyimpulkan bahwa, sebagai Berlin katakan, 'Descartes adalah penipu
besar, yang menekankan pada pengetahuan tentang dunia luar sebagai
paradigma dari semua pengetahuan telah menetapkan filosofi di jalur yang
salah' (Berlin, 1976, hal. 25). Untuk Vico, pengetahuan yang mendalam tentang
manusia, yang merupakan tujuan yang tepat, seperti yang kita katakan hari ini,
'humaniora,' terkait erat dengan pertanyaan bahasa. Sebagai Claudio Ve' liz
(1994) menempatkan dalam menceritakan kembali tentang ide-ide Vico, 'The
penting Vichian argumen bertumpu pada karakter primordial bahasa. Sangat
lebih penting dari semua artefak manusia lainnya, tanda-tanda, simbol, dan
lembaga-lembaga, bahasa adalah unsur kognitif de fi dalam budaya '(hal. 16).
Hal ini juga salah satu yang 'menggambarkan sebagian tellingly modalitas dan
transformasi dari lingkup sosial' (hlm. 16) dan 'modi fi kasi dari pikiran manusia
kita' (hlm. 131). Selain itu, pemahaman dan interpretasi perilaku manusia dan
perilaku tidak dapat dipisahkan dengan tegas dari penilaian moral. 'Ilmu alam'
secara luas diambil untuk menjadi bebas nilai (dan 'ilmu-ilmu sosial' cenderung
meniru 'ilmu' dalam hal ini). 'The humaniora,' di sisi lain, tidak bercita-cita
menjadi bebas nilai. Jadi, ketika seorang sejarawan menulis (dengan mengacu
pada historiographies Stalinisme dan Nazisme) yang 'penilaian moral yang [...]
intrinsik untuk semua pemahaman sejarah' (Malia, 2002, hal. 78), ia
menempatkan sejarah dalam konteks dari 'humaniora'
Wierzbicka 35
bukan 'ilmu-ilmu sosial. "Link ini dengan nilai-nilai dan penilaian moral, juga,
perlu diperhitungkan dalam penuh definisi dari' humaniora. '
Bagaimana konsep dapat didefinisikan dan dijelaskan: Sebuah sketsa thumb-nail
dari metodologi NSM
The definisi dan penjelasan tentang konsep 'humaniora' yang akan disajikan di
sini adalah berdasarkan pendekatan 'NSM', dikembangkan selama bertahuntahun oleh penulis dan rekannya Cli ff Goddard (lihat, misalnya, Wierzbicka 1972,
1996, dan Goddard 1998), dan diuji, di berbagai publikasi (antara lain, di Budaya
& Psikologi), oleh banyak sarjana (lihat NSM homepage:
http://www.une.edu.au/bcss/linguistics/ NSM /). Akronim 'NSM' singkatan dari
Semantic metabahasa Alam - mini-bahasa yang sesuai dengan persimpangan
(inti umum) dari semua bahasa. Untuk mendefinisikan arti dari sebuah kata atau
ungkapan dalam NSM berarti untuk menjelaskannya melalui sederhana dan
universal konsep manusia yang tidak memerlukan penjelasan lebih lanjut sendiri
dan yang dapat ditemukan sebagai kata-kata (atau elemen kata-seperti) dalam
semua bahasa. abad ke-17 filsuf Eropa seperti Descartes, Arnauld, dan di atas
semua Leibniz mengajukan gagasan bahwa hanya repertoar kecil konsep
sederhana self-explanatory ( 'alfabet pikiran manusia' nya, lihat Leibniz, 1903)
dapat memberikan landasan semua pemahaman manusia . The NSM pendekatan
semantik dan hermeneutika telah mengadopsi ide ini, dan selama lebih dari tiga
dekade peneliti NSM telah dilakukan luas eksperimen lebih banyak domain
semantik, di banyak bahasa yang beragam, dan memiliki diidentifikasi dalam
bahasa diselidiki pencocokan set minimal leksikal diwujudkan makna sederhana
dalam hal mana semua makna kompleks dan ide-ide dapat dimengerti dijelaskan
dan dibandingkan. The NSM leksikon penuh bilangan prima semantik universal
ditetapkan, dalam bentuk ringkasan, pada Tabel 1, menggunakan eksponen
English (tabel yang sama dapat ditarik untuk bahasa lain, lihat Goddard, 2008;
Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2002; Peeters, 2006). Universal 'mini-bahasa'
berdasarkan bilangan prima ini dapat digunakan e ff ectively sebagai
'metabahasa semantik alami' untuk menjelajahi dan membandingkan cara
berpikir dan kategorisasi pengalaman tercermin dalam di bahasa ff erent dunia
dan di ff erent negara sejarah bahasa yang sama (misalnya, English) 0,3
Mendefinisikan 'humaniora'
Konsep 'humaniora' berfokus pada mempelajari pengalaman manusia: apa yang
bisa terjadi pada orang-orang dan apa yang orang dapat lakukan; mungkin cara
berpikir, cara merasa, dan cara berbicara; kemungkinan motif dan nilai yang
mungkin. '. Humaniora' kata-kata bisa dan mungkin menonjolkan karakter
imajinatif penelitian di Mereka juga menyoroti fokus ganda 'humaniora': di
'kemanusiaan' secara keseluruhan dan pada individu (meskipun tertanam
budaya) manusia dalam semua mereka keragaman besar.
Menggambar pada wawasan Vico dan menggunakan metabahasa konsep
manusia universal, kita bisa mengusulkan penjelasan berikut (yaitu, jelas
definisi) dari ekspresi humaniora:
humaniora
Sebuah. beberapa orang melakukan beberapa hal untuk waktu yang lama karena
mereka berpikir seperti ini:
b. itu adalah baik jika orang dapat mengetahui hal-hal dari berbagai jenis
tentang orang-orang
c. itu adalah baik jika orang bisa tahu apa hal-hal bisa terjadi pada seseorang itu
baik jika orang bisa tahu bagaimana seseorang bisa merasakan ketika hal ini
terjadi
d. itu adalah baik jika orang bisa tahu bagaimana seseorang dapat berpikir
tentang hal-hal dari berbagai jenis itu adalah baik jika orang bisa tahu
bagaimana seseorang bisa merasakan ketika seseorang ini berpikir tentang hal
ini
e. itu adalah baik jika orang dapat mengetahui hal-hal apa seseorang dapat
mengatakan dengan kata-kata itu adalah baik jika orang bisa tahu bagaimana
seseorang bisa mengatakan hal-hal ini dengan kata-kata
Tabel 1. bilangan prima Semantic - eksponen English (Goddard & Wierzbicka,
2002)
Aku, Kau, SESEORANG, SESUATU / HAL, ORANG, nominal-nominal BODY JENIS,

BAGIAN nominal-nominal relasional INI, SAMA, LAIN / ELSE Beberapa ketentuan
SATU, DUA, BEBERAPA, SEMUA, BANYAK / BANYAK, SEDIKIT / bilangan BEBERAPA
BAIK, evaluator BAD BIG, deskriptor KECIL berpikir, TAHU, MAU, MERASA,
MELIHAT, MENDENGAR predikat jiwa KATAKAN, KATA, pidato BENAR DO, tERJADI,
MOVE, tindakan SENTUH, peristiwa, gerakan, kontak
BE (TEMPAT), ADA, MEMILIKI, BE (SESEORANG / SESUATU)
lokasi, keberadaan, kepemilikan, spesifikasi LANGSUNG, DIE hidup dan mati
KETIKA / WAKTU, SEKARANG, SEBELUM, SETELAH, WAKTU PANJANG, WAKTU
SINGKAT, UNTUK WAKTU BEBERAPA, MOMENT
waktu
MANA / TEMPAT, DI SINI, DI ATAS, BAWAH, FAR, DEKAT, SIDE, INSIDE
ruang
TIDAK, MUNGKIN, BISA, KARENA, JIKA konsep logis SANGAT, LEBIH intensifier,
augmentor seperti kesamaan
Catatan: Primes ada sebagai arti dari unit leksikal (tidak pada tingkat leksem).
Eksponen bilangan prima mungkin kata-kata, morfem terikat, atau phrasemes.
Mereka bisa secara resmi kompleks. Setiap prime telah baik-ditentukan sintaksis
(kombinasi) properti.
Wierzbicka 37
f. itu adalah baik jika orang bisa tahu apa hal-hal seseorang dapat melakukannya
baik jika orang bisa tahu mengapa seseorang bisa ingin melakukan hal-hal
g. beberapa orang mengatakan tentang hal-hal dari beberapa jenis: 'itu adalah
baik jika seseorang melakukan hal-hal ini' orang lain mengatakan: 'itu tidak baik
jika seseorang melakukan hal-hal ini' itu baik jika orang dapat berpikir tentang
hal-hal seperti ini
h. itu adalah baik jika orang bisa tahu bagaimana seseorang dapat hidup itu
adalah baik jika orang dapat berpikir tentang hal-hal seperti ini '
saya. ketika orang-orang ini melakukan hal-hal ini, mereka melakukannya seperti
seseorang dapat melakukan hal-hal jika seseorang ini ingin mengetahui sesuatu
tentang orang lain, bukan tentang hal-hal
j. jika orang-orang ini melakukan hal-hal baik, setelah itu orang bisa mengetahui
banyak hal dari berbagai jenis tentang orang-orang karena ini
Seperti penjelasan ini menunjukkan, ruang lingkup subjek-soal 'humaniora'

sangat luas. Ini mencakup hal-hal yang terjadi pada orang, hal-hal yang orang
lakukan, dan hal-hal yang orang mengatakan, serta orang-orang pikiran, emosi,
motivasi, dan nilai-nilai. lingkup yang luas ini dari subjek-soal 'humaniora'
menjelaskan mengapa fi ladang sebagai di ff erent sejarah, biografi, sastra,
filologi, linguistik, klasik, filsafat, dan studi agama semua dapat dilihat (dan
dapat melihat diri mereka) sebagai bagian dari ' humaniora. 'Beberapa medan ini
juga dapat melihat diri mereka sebagai bagian dari' ilmu-ilmu sosial, 'atau
setidaknya sebagai memiliki satu kaki di' ilmu-ilmu sosial 'dan satu di'
humaniora. 'tumpang tindih seperti ini dimungkinkan karena konsep dari
'humaniora' mengacu tidak hanya untuk subjek-materi tertentu, tetapi juga
untuk pendekatan tertentu. Pendekatan ini dibayangkan oleh 'humaniora' adalah
di ff erent - fundamental di ff erent - dari yang 'ilmu pengetahuan, dan akibatnya
dari yang' ilmu-ilmu sosial, 'yang berusaha untuk meniru pendekatan Seperti
telah dicatat, salah satu fitur kunci' ilmu. ' dari penjelasan dari humaniora yang
membedakannya dari yang ilmu adalah penggunaan kata dapat di sebagian
besar komponen, dari (b) sampai (h). Menurut konsep di balik humaniora kata,
itu baik bagi orang untuk mengetahui bagaimana seseorang bisa berpikir,
merasa, berbicara, hidup, apa hal-hal bisa terjadi pada seseorang, dan apa jenis
hal seseorang dapat melakukan. Penggunaan ini dari modal dapat membuat
konsep 'humaniora' unempirical (dalam arti di mana kata empiris biasanya
digunakan): orang tidak dapat belajar dengan observasi atau percobaan
bagaimana orang lain bisa berpikir, merasa, berbicara, atau tinggal . Ini 'dapat'
poin ke e ff Ort diperlukan imajinasi, yang tidak dapat sepenuhnya direplikasi
dan secara empiris diverifikasi. Selanjutnya, definisi dari 'humaniora' diuraikan di
sini tidak eksklusif difokuskan pada pengetahuan: sebagai komponen (g) dan (h)
menunjukkan, 'humaniora' berusaha juga untuk memberikan kesempatan bagi
orang untuk berpikir tentang bagaimana seseorang dapat hidup, dan
apakah itu baik atau tidak baik bagi orang untuk melakukan hal-hal dari
beberapa jenis. Ini bukan sesuatu yang terbuka untuk empiris verifikasi baik.
Banding ke imajinasi yang melekat dalam berulang 'bisa' menghubungkan
pekerjaan di 'humaniora' dalam beberapa cara untuk pekerjaan yang terlibat
dalam seni kreatif. Hal ini juga menghubungkan dengan komponen 'jika orangorang ini melakukan hal-hal baik,' yang absen dari penjelasan ilmu: ilmu tidak
dipahami sebagai serumpun dengan seni, dan dua kata (ilmu dan seni) dapat
dibandingkan. Humaniora kata, di sisi lain, biasanya tidak kontras dengan seni
kata. Hal ini disebabkan, saya sarankan, tidak hanya untuk karakter terus terang
non-empiris 'humaniora' dan untuk nge-link konseptual dengan imajinasi kreatif,
tetapi juga untuk implikasinya dari sana berada di sini beberapa ruang untuk
penguasaan individual dan keunggulan yang tidak dapat sepenuhnya ditangkap
oleh terukur 'indikator kualitas' (untuk menggunakan ekspresi dari istilah
birokrasi saat ini). Fitur lain yang menghubungkan konsep 'humaniora' dengan
yang 'seni' yang disarankan oleh kata 'setelah' dalam komponen (k). 'Art'
menghasilkan, tentu saja, 'karya seni,' yaitu, beberapa produk abadi. 'The
humaniora,' juga, berharap untuk menghasilkan beberapa nyata 'produk' mungkin lebih abadi dan cenderung menjadi usang dari hasil penelitian ilmiah
cenderung. Seringkali, ini 'produk' berbentuk buku (bukan artikel jurnal), tetapi
mereka juga dapat mengambil bentuk edisi kritis, kamus, tafsir filologis, dan
sebagainya. Seperti yang akan kita lihat pada bagian berikutnya, 'ilmu'
tampaknya bercita-cita untuk menjadi selalu bergerak dan 'ilmuwan' tampaknya
selalu 'ingin tahu lebih banyak. "Sebaliknya, konsep' humaniora 'mencakup
aspirasi yang 'setelah itu, orang dapat mengetahui banyak hal dari berbagai
jenis tentang orang-orang karena ini. "The' non-ilmiah 'dan aspek pengalaman
dari' humaniora 'juga tercermin dalam komponen (j), yang mengacu, e ff
ectively, untuk tujuan 'memahami orang lain.' Seorang ilmuwan sosial mencari
pengetahuan (dari beberapa jenis) tentang 'orang', tapi bukan tentang 'orang
lain. "ungkapan orang lain membuat ruangan, karena itu, bagi orang peneliti,
untuk orang ini pemahaman empati manusia lainnya. Ini menunjuk ke sebuah
mengejar intersubjektif bukan murni 'obyektif' pengetahuan dan pemahaman,
yang lagi-lagi menetapkan humaniora terpisah dari ilmu pengetahuan dan ilmuilmu sosial. pemahaman intersubjektif tersebut terkait erat dengan pemahaman
diri - fitur 'yang' humaniora 'disorot oleh filsuf moral yang Charles Taylor, yang
(seperti Vico) melihat semua pemahaman manusia terkait sebagai erat dengan
pertanyaan bahasa. Menurut Taylor, tujuan dari pemahaman dan pemahaman
diri hanya dapat dicapai jika bahasa penjelasan masuk akal untuk manusia
agen / experiencers sendiri. Mengomentari, dan memperingatkan terhadap,
'pegangan besar model ilmu alam di seluruh perusahaan kami pemahaman diri
dalam ilmu kehidupan manusia,' Taylor menyebut berulang kali pada gagasan
'masuk akal' dari diri kita sendiri dan hidup kita, ' tindakan dan perasaan diri
sendiri dan orang lain (Taylor, 1989: 57), dan dalam pandangannya ini dapat
dicapai hanya dalam bahasa yang orang benar-benar hidup mereka. Titik utama
Taylor adalah bahwa pendekatan, metode, dan bahkan bahasa kebutuhan
'humaniora' menjadi di ff erent dari orang-orang dari 'ilmu dan' ilmu. 'Kontras ia
menarik antara sudut pandang
Wierzbicka 39
'Pengamat' dan bahwa 'agen [...] membuat rasa pemikirannya sendiri, perasaan,
dan bertindak' gema yang ditarik oleh Vico antara, di satu sisi, pengetahuan kita
tentang dunia luar, dan di sisi lain , pengetahuan kita tentang manusia. Kedua
kepedulian Vico dan Taylor untuk pemahaman diri dari 'agen' timpal dengan fitur
lain dari penjelasan yang diusulkan di sini (di samping 'orang lain'), yaitu, fokus
pada 'seseorang' (dalam bentuk tunggal) daripada ' orang '(dalam bentuk jamak)
sebagai objek utama bunga. Secara umum, 'ilmu' studi kelas hal ketimbang
objek individu, dan fokus 'ilmu sosial' pada populasi dan masyarakat. 'The
humaniora,' di sisi lain, memiliki fokus ganda. Di satu sisi, mereka tertarik pada
'orang' pada umumnya dan mereka didasarkan pada asumsi bahwa 'itu baik jika
orang dapat mengetahui hal-hal dari berbagai jenis tentang orang-orang. "Di sisi
lain, bagaimanapun, mereka tertarik pada individual manusia - tidak harus dalam
spesifik individu seperti tetapi di seluruh jajaran pengalaman manusia, kegiatan
manusia, emosi, nilai-nilai, cara berpikir, dan cara hidup. Dengan demikian,
tujuan dari 'humaniora' tidak belajar masyarakat tertentu atau untuk
membandingkan masyarakat di tempat dan waktu, tetapi lebih untuk memahami
'manusia. "Ini sebenarnya bagaimana salah satu kamus kontemporer terbaik dari
Inggris, Collins Cobuild English Kamus bahasa (Collins UK, 1991), mendefinisikan
humaniora kata: 'The humaniora adalah subjek penelitian seperti sastra, filsafat,
dan sejarah yang prihatin dengan manusia, ide-ide mereka, tindakan, dan
hubungan, bukan mata pelajaran sains. '
Mendefinisikan 'ilmu pengetahuan,' 'ilmu-ilmu sosial, dan konsep-konsep seperti'
Wissenschaft '
Tujuan utama dari makalah ini adalah untuk menjelaskan konsep 'humaniora.'
Karena, bagaimanapun, konsep 'humaniora' telah kontras di sini dengan konsep
'ilmu' (dan ekstensi 'ilmu-ilmu sosial'), itu tidak mungkin untuk menghilangkan
sama sekali pertanyaan dari makna, dan sejarah, dari science.4 arti ilmu telah
berubah dalam perjalanan dari dua abad terakhir, dan bahwa perubahan ini ada
hubungannya baik dengan ruang lingkup dan metodologi apa yang dapat
digambarkan sebagai 'ilmu' sekarang dan apa yang bisa jadi menggambarkan
dua abad yang lalu. Misalnya, pada abad ke-18 Skotlandia filsuf Thomas Reid,
dalam Essays pada Intelektual Daya Manusia yang diterbitkan pada tahun 1785,
disebut kedua matematika dan studi apa yang disebut 'operasi pikiran' sebagai
'ilmu.' Terbesar di ff selisih antara dua 'ilmu' ini, seperti Reid mengatakan:
bahwa objek matematika menjadi hal luar pikiran, itu jauh lebih mudah untuk
menghadiri kepada mereka, dan fi x mereka terus dalam imajinasi. The di FFI
culty menghadiri pertanyaan kami ke dalam kekuatan pikiran berfungsi untuk
menjelaskan beberapa peristiwa menghormati cabang filsafat, yang [...] tetap,
sampai hari ini, dalam keadaan yang sangat rendah, dan karena itu dalam masa
pertumbuhan. (Reid, 2002 [1785], hlm. 61-62)
Dengan demikian, untuk Reid, ilmu disebut, berbicara kasar, setiap mengejar
sistematis dan ketat pengetahuan. Apa yang disebut 'filsafat alam, dan apa yang
kita sebut hari ini studi empiris fenomena alam, adalah untuk Reid cabang
penting dari' ilmu pengetahuan, 'tetapi hanya satu cabang di antara banyak. Di
masa kini bahasa Inggris, namun, untuk apa Reid adalah cabang dari 'ilmu' telah
menjadi hanya 'ilmu pengetahuan, dan cabang-cabang lain telah menemukan
diri mereka di luar lingkup' ilmu 'sebagai kata yang sekarang umum dipahami.
Hal ini terutama jelas dalam cara kata-kata yang berasal ilmiah dan ilmuwan
sekarang digunakan.
Ilmu
Sebuah.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
saya.
Sebuah.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Sebuah.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Kesimpulan

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Culture & Psychology 17(1) 3146 !

The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and

part of a School, or a Faculty, of Social and Behavioural Sciences. The stated

at Universitas Padjadjaran on August 25, 2016cap.sagepub.comDownloaded

at Universitas Padjadjaran on August 25, 2016cap.sagepub.comDownloaded

at Universitas Padjadjaran on August 25, 2016cap.sagepub.comDownloaded

36 Culture & Psychology 17(1)

be formally complex. Each prime has well-specified syntactic (combinatorial)

38 Culture & Psychology 17(1)

humanities need to be different from those of science and sciences. The

endeavours on those of the scientists, and to try to practise social science,

dictionary. London: HarperCollins. Cosic, M. (2008). Evolution of a big idea.

Author Biography Anna Wierzbicka is Professor of Linguistics at the Australian

Aku, Kau, SESEORANG, SESUATU / HAL, ORANG, nominal-nominal BODY JENIS,

Seperti penjelasan ini menunjukkan, ruang lingkup subjek-soal 'humaniora'

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