54

H . 1'. C;r.ice

is ttre~cly;11i oliactorily cictel.minable property, it is not also at the samc timc n visually cleter~ninableproperty, then perhaps w e m a y be excused from replyi~ig.

T h e Intentionality of Sensation:
A Gra~nrnaticalFeature

Notcs
1. I am indebted to Rogers Alhritton for a number of extremely helpful criticisms and

G. E. M. Anscombc

suggestions concerning this essay.

2. This idea was sug1;cstcd to mc hy 0. P. Wood.

Berlteley calls "colours with their variatiorls and different proportions of light and
shade" the "propcr" and also tile " i ~ n ~ ~ l e d i a tobjects
c"
of sight.' T h c first a t any
rate long seemed obvious t(o everyone, both before Berkcley and since his timc.
But Berkeley's whole view is n o w in some disrepute. Sense-data, a thosouglily
Berkeleyan conception givcn that name by Russell, 11ave hccoinc ol2jects of r i d i c ~ ~ l e
and contempt a m o n g many 1-i.esent-day philosophers.
T h a t w o r d "object" wllicii comes in the phrase "object of sight" has sufferccl a
certain reversal of rncaning iii t11c Iiistory of 12Iiilos0l~liy,nncl s o has tlic connectccl
w o r d "subject," though the t \ v o reversals aren't historically connected. TIie subject
used to I>c \vhat tile prol~osition,say, is ; ~ \ x > L I ~ tlic
:
tliing itsclf as it is in rc;~lit~,unprocesseci by being conceived, as w e might say (in case there is some sort of processing there); objects 011 tllc otlicr hand wcsc formerly a l w ~ i y sobjects of -----.
Objects of desire, objects of rhought, are not objccts in one conimon modern senyc,
n o t indivtlual things, such as [he ol~jcclsJbirtld it2 11~caccrtsed rtlntt's pockcts.
I might illustrate the tloublc 1.eversa1 by a true scntcnce constructed to accord w i h
the old meanings: subjectively there must be s o m e dcfinite ~ ~ l u m b of
c r lcrtves o n a
spray that I sce, but objecti:~ely tlicrc necd not: that is, tlierc necd not bc sol-i~c
number. such that I see tliat number of leaves o n the spray.
When Descar-tes said that tile causc of a n idea must have a t least as much f o r n ~ a l
11
reality as the idea had objecrive reality, he meant that the cause I I I L I S ~ havc a t Ic;lst,
,
as much t o it as w h a t the iclc:~was of would have, if w h a t the idea w a s of acti~ally j
existed. The " ~ e n l i i n sohjeciiiio" of a n idea thus meant w h a t w c slioulcl call irs
"content"-namely
w h a t it is of, but considercd as belonging purely to thc idca.
" W h a t a pict~11-eis of" cnn c:isily be sccn to have t w o meanings: w h a t servctl as a

ruoclel, w h a t the picture w a s taken fronl-and w h a t is to be sec~xin thc picture itself,

which may not even have had a n original.
Thus formerly if s o ~ n c t h i i ~wg a s called a n object that woulcl have raised the
question "objcct of w h a t ? " It is harclly possible to usc the w o r d "object" in this
way nowatlays ~ ~ i l l c sits actually occurs in such a phrase as "object of desire" o r
"objcct of t l i o ~ ~ g l i t .S" ~ ~ p p o ssomebocly
e
says that the object of clesire, o r clesirccl
objcct, nccd n o t exist, ancl s o there nccd not bc a n y object which one desires. I-Ic
is obviously switching f r o m one use of the w o r d "objcct" to anotllcr. If, I~owever,
w e speak of objects of sight, o r s e e ~objects,
l
it will usually be assulned that "objects"
has the mo1.c nloc1c1-n s c ~ ~ s thcsc
c:
will I J C ol~jccts,tliings, entities, which one sccs.
N o w to p~.cvcntco~iflisioiiI will i~ltroclllcethe phrase "intentional~ol~jcct"
to niean
"objcct" in the oldcr sense \vhicll still occurs in "objcct of clcsire."
"Intentional" in these contexts is ofteii spelt with a n s. This was a n idea o f Sir
Willianl I-lamilton's; lie wanted t o turn the old logical w o r d "intention" into one
that looltcd more liltc "extcnsion." I prefer to lteep thc older spelling with t w o ts.
For the word is thc same as the one in c o m m o n use in con~lectionwith action. T h e
concept ol intention which we use there of course occurs also in connection with
s a y i ~ g T. h a t maltcs tlic hriclgc to the logician's use.
Tlicre arc thrcc salient things a h o u t intention which are relevant for my sul~ject.
First, not a n y tl-LICclesci-iption of w h a t you d o clescribes it as the action you intcndcd:
only LIIICICS certain of its clescriptions will it be intentional. ( " D o you mean to IJC
~ i s i n gthat pen?"-"Why,
w h a t a b o u t this pc~l?"-"It's Smith's pen."-"Oh
L.orcl,
no!") Scconcl, the dcscril,tions under which you intend w h a t you d o can be vague,
indctcr~ninatc.(You mean to put tllc I,ool< clown o n the tahlc all right, anci ~ O L Id o
SO,1)11tY O L I cIo not Incan to put it d o w n anywlicrc in particular o n thc table-thougli
you clo
it clown somcwlicrc in partici~lar.)T'liirtl, tlcscriptions under which you
i
a slip ol'the tongue
intend to d o w h a t you d o inay not come truc, as w l i c ~ yi o ~ inaltc
o r pen. You act, but your intended act does n o t happen.
Intentionality, whose n;lmc is taltcn from intention ancl cxprcsscs tlicsc characteristics of the conccpt ii~rclliiorz,is fount1 also in connection with inany other concepts. I shall argue that amolig thcsc arc conccpts of sensation. I,iltc many conccpts
marltecl by intentionality, though unlilie intention itself, these are expressed I>y verbs
commonly taking clircct ohjects. I shall speak of intentional verbs, taking intentional
objects. I have mentiortcd t l ~ chistory of thc w o r d "object" to forestall any impression that "an intentional objcct" ~ n e a l i s" a n inte~ltionalentity."

Obvious e x a ~ n p l e sof inteiltional verbs are " t o think of," " t o worship," " t o shoot
at." ( T h e verb "to intetlcl" comes by nletaphor froin the last-"ilztclzdere
arcill12
in," leading t o "ilztel~dereatii~liut?zilz.") W h e r e w e have such a verb taltiilg a n objcct,
features analogous to the thl-ee features of i n t e ~ l t i o ~ l a l ~ l in
e s saction rclate t o some
descriptions occurring as ol~ject-phrasesafter the verb.
T h e possible n o n - e x i s t e ~ ~ cofe the object, which is thc analogue of tlie possiblc
non-occurrence of tlie ilztel~tfzdaction, is w h a t has cxcitccl most attention a b o u t this
sort of verb. "Thiillting of" is a verb for which the topic of the non-existent object
is full of traps and temptations; "worshipping" is less dangerous and inay hell> us
to ltecp o u r heads. Considcr the cxprcssion "object of thought." I f I a n thinking
of Winston Churchill then he is tlie object of illy thought. Tliis is lilte " W h a t is the
object of these people's woi-ship?" Answer: "The moon." But n o w supposc thc
object of m y thought is Mr Pickwicl<, o r a uilicorn; a n d the object of my worship
is Zeus, o r unicorns. With the proper nanles I named n o m a n a n d n o gocl, since
they n a m e a fictitious lilall a n d a false god. Moreover Mr Picltwiclt and Zeus arc
nothing but a fictitious man a n d a false god (contrast tlie moon, which, thoug11 a
false god, is a perfectly good heavenly body). All the sanle it is clcar that "The
Greeks worshipped Zeus" is true. T h u s "X worshipped -"
and "X thoirght
of " are not to be a s s i ~ ~ i i l a t eto
d "X bit ." For, supposing "X" to bc
the n a m e of a real person, tlle name of s o m c t h i ~ i greal has to bc p ~ l in
t tllc bIc~n1<
space in "X bit " if tlie completed scntencc is to have s o much as a chance
of being true. Wliereas in "X worsliippecl ---" and "X thought of - ~ l i ; l t
is not so.
Tliis fact is readily ol~sc~il.ccl
I'ol u s bcc:lusc wit11 "X t h o ~ ~01'---~" l ~ t
t l ~ c111ol.c
frequent filling-in of thc l>l;~nI<
is a name o r clcscription of sornc~llin~:
sc;~l;IOI.~ \ , l i c ~ l
the blanlt is filled in s o in ;i ti-uc scntcncc, it is thc real tlling itself, not sonlc intermediary, that X thought oi. Tliis ~ilaliesit loolc as if the reality of tlic objcct inattered, as it does for biting. Nevertheless, it is obvious that vacuous names can
complete such sentence-fraincs. So perhaps they stand in such frames for somctiiiny,
with a sorl of reality. T h a t is the hazy state of mind one inay bc in a b o u t the mart-ce
A n o t very happy move to clarify it is t o say, "Well, X had his idea of Zeus, or
unicorns, o r M r Pickwick, a n d that gives you the objcct you want." Tliis is a n
uilliappy niolre 011 sevel-a1 C O L ~ I IFirst,
~ S . it maltes it seen1 that the idea is w h a t X was
worshipping o r thinking of. Second, the mere fact of real existence (is this ~ i o w
beginning to be opposcd to existence of s o n ~ eother ltind?) can't make s o very 11ii1c11
"

ruoclel, w h a t the picture w a s taken fronl-and w h a t is to be sec~xin thc picture itself,

which may not even have had a n original.
Thus formerly if s o ~ n c t h i i ~wg a s called a n object that woulcl have raised the
question "objcct of w h a t ? " It is harclly possible to usc the w o r d "object" in this
way nowatlays ~ ~ i l l c sits actually occurs in such a phrase as "object of desire" o r
"objcct of t l i o ~ ~ g l i t .S" ~ ~ p p o ssomebocly
e
says that the object of clesire, o r clesirccl
objcct, nccd n o t exist, ancl s o there nccd not bc a n y object which one desires. I-Ic
is obviously switching f r o m one use of the w o r d "objcct" to anotllcr. If, I~owever,
w e speak of objects of sight, o r s e e ~objects,
l
it will usually be assulned that "objects"
has the mo1.c nloc1c1-n s c ~ ~ s thcsc
c:
will I J C ol~jccts,tliings, entities, which one sccs.
N o w to p~.cvcntco~iflisioiiI will i~ltroclllcethe phrase "intentional~ol~jcct"
to niean
"objcct" in the oldcr sense \vhicll still occurs in "objcct of clcsire."
"Intentional" in these contexts is ofteii spelt with a n s. This was a n idea o f Sir
Willianl I-lamilton's; lie wanted t o turn the old logical w o r d "intention" into one
that looltcd more liltc "extcnsion." I prefer to lteep thc older spelling with t w o ts.
For the word is thc same as the one in c o m m o n use in con~lectionwith action. T h e
concept ol intention which we use there of course occurs also in connection with
s a y i ~ g T. h a t maltcs tlic hriclgc to the logician's use.
Tlicre arc thrcc salient things a h o u t intention which are relevant for my sul~ject.
First, not a n y tl-LICclesci-iption of w h a t you d o clescribes it as the action you intcndcd:
only LIIICICS certain of its clescriptions will it be intentional. ( " D o you mean to IJC
~ i s i n gthat pen?"-"Why,
w h a t a b o u t this pc~l?"-"It's Smith's pen."-"Oh
L.orcl,
no!") Scconcl, the dcscril,tions under which you intend w h a t you d o can be vague,
indctcr~ninatc.(You mean to put tllc I,ool< clown o n the tahlc all right, anci ~ O L Id o
SO,1)11tY O L I cIo not Incan to put it d o w n anywlicrc in particular o n thc table-thougli
you clo
it clown somcwlicrc in partici~lar.)T'liirtl, tlcscriptions under which you
i
a slip ol'the tongue
intend to d o w h a t you d o inay not come truc, as w l i c ~ yi o ~ inaltc
o r pen. You act, but your intended act does n o t happen.
Intentionality, whose n;lmc is taltcn from intention ancl cxprcsscs tlicsc characteristics of the conccpt ii~rclliiorz,is fount1 also in connection with inany other concepts. I shall argue that amolig thcsc arc conccpts of sensation. I,iltc many conccpts
marltecl by intentionality, though unlilie intention itself, these are expressed I>y verbs
commonly taking clircct ohjects. I shall speak of intentional verbs, taking intentional
objects. I have mentiortcd t l ~ chistory of thc w o r d "object" to forestall any impression that "an intentional objcct" ~ n e a l i s" a n inte~ltionalentity."

Obvious e x a ~ n p l e sof inteiltional verbs are " t o think of," " t o worship," " t o shoot
at." ( T h e verb "to intetlcl" comes by nletaphor froin the last-"ilztclzdere
arcill12
in," leading t o "ilztel~dereatii~liut?zilz.") W h e r e w e have such a verb taltiilg a n objcct,
features analogous to the thl-ee features of i n t e ~ l t i o ~ l a l ~ l in
e s saction rclate t o some
descriptions occurring as ol~ject-phrasesafter the verb.
T h e possible n o n - e x i s t e ~ ~ cofe the object, which is thc analogue of tlie possiblc
non-occurrence of tlie ilztel~tfzdaction, is w h a t has cxcitccl most attention a b o u t this
sort of verb. "Thiillting of" is a verb for which the topic of the non-existent object
is full of traps and temptations; "worshipping" is less dangerous and inay hell> us
to ltecp o u r heads. Considcr the cxprcssion "object of thought." I f I a n thinking
of Winston Churchill then he is tlie object of illy thought. Tliis is lilte " W h a t is the
object of these people's woi-ship?" Answer: "The moon." But n o w supposc thc
object of m y thought is Mr Pickwicl<, o r a uilicorn; a n d the object of my worship
is Zeus, o r unicorns. With the proper nanles I named n o m a n a n d n o gocl, since
they n a m e a fictitious lilall a n d a false god. Moreover Mr Picltwiclt and Zeus arc
nothing but a fictitious man a n d a false god (contrast tlie moon, which, thoug11 a
false god, is a perfectly good heavenly body). All the sanle it is clcar that "The
Greeks worshipped Zeus" is true. T h u s "X worshipped -"
and "X thoirght
of " are not to be a s s i ~ ~ i i l a t eto
d "X bit ." For, supposing "X" to bc
the n a m e of a real person, tlle name of s o m c t h i ~ i greal has to bc p ~ l in
t tllc bIc~n1<
space in "X bit " if tlie completed scntencc is to have s o much as a chance
of being true. Wliereas in "X worsliippecl ---" and "X thought of - ~ l i ; l t
is not so.
Tliis fact is readily ol~sc~il.ccl
I'ol u s bcc:lusc wit11 "X t h o ~ ~01'---~" l ~ t
t l ~ c111ol.c
frequent filling-in of thc l>l;~nI<
is a name o r clcscription of sornc~llin~:
sc;~l;IOI.~ \ , l i c ~ l
the blanlt is filled in s o in ;i ti-uc scntcncc, it is thc real tlling itself, not sonlc intermediary, that X thought oi. Tliis ~ilaliesit loolc as if the reality of tlic objcct inattered, as it does for biting. Nevertheless, it is obvious that vacuous names can
complete such sentence-fraincs. So perhaps they stand in such frames for somctiiiny,
with a sorl of reality. T h a t is the hazy state of mind one inay bc in a b o u t the mart-ce
A n o t very happy move to clarify it is t o say, "Well, X had his idea of Zeus, or
unicorns, o r M r Pickwick, a n d that gives you the objcct you want." Tliis is a n
uilliappy niolre 011 sevel-a1 C O L ~ I IFirst,
~ S . it maltes it seen1 that the idea is w h a t X was
worshipping o r thinking of. Second, the mere fact of real existence (is this ~ i o w
beginning to be opposcd to existence of s o n ~ eother ltind?) can't make s o very 11ii1c11
"

difference to the analysis of a sentence like "X thought of ." So i f the idea
is to be brotigiit in when the object doesn't exist, then equally it should be brought
in when tlic ohject ciocs exist. Yet o n e is thinking, surely, of Winston C h ~ ~ r c h i lnot
l,
of the idea of Iiin~,nncl just that fact started us off. When one reads Locke, one
wants to protest: "The niincl is not employed about ideas, but a b o u t things-unless
ideas arc what w e happen to be thinking about." Whatever purpose is served by
introclucing ideas, by saying, "Well, tiley hacl a n idea o f Zeus," w e cannot say that
the idea is tlie object of thought, o r worship. It will not be right t o say X worshippecl an idca. it is rather that the subject's having an idca is w h a t is neecled to
give tile proposition n chance of being true. This limy seen1 helpful lor "worshipping," I~lrtn o t lor "tliinlting oT"; "thinlcing of" ancl "having ari idea of" arc too
sinlil:~r; if the one is j>roblematic, then s o is the other,
I.et us concentrate o n tlie fact that Illany ~ x o l x ~ s i t i o containing
ns
intcntioilal vcrbs
arc true, ancl Ict LIS not be hypnotizccl by the possible non-existence of tlie ol,jcct.
There arc other Ccatt~rcstoo: 11on-sul?stitutaI,ility of clifferent descriptio~isof the
objcct, whcre it does exist; arid possible indeter~ninacyof tlie objcct. In fact all three
f e a t ~ i r e sare conncctetl. I call think of a Iiian without thinl<ing of a m a n of any particular Iicight; I cannot hit a Inan without hittillg a m a n of sonle particular height,
because there is n o such thing as a Inan of n o particiilar height. And the possibility of tliis intletcrnii~iacymakes it possible that when I an1 thinlcing of a particular
man, n o t every truc descriptio~lof hirii is one under which I a m thinlting of him.
I will n o w define a n intentional verb as a verb taking a n intentional object; intentional objects are tlie sub-class of direct objects characterized by these three connected f e a t ~ ~ r eBy
s . this clefinition, "to believe" and " t o intend" are rlot thelnselves
intentional verbs, which nlay seem paracloxical. But, say, " t o believe-to
be a
scoundrel" will accorcl with tlie definitioil, s o that it is not s o paradoxical as t o leave
o ~ l tbelief ancl intention altogether.
But n o w co~llesa cluestion: ought w e really to say that the intentional ohject is a
bit o f language, o r may w e speak as if it wcre what the bit of language stands for?
As grammarians ancl linguists use tlie w o r d s nowadays "direct object" allti "indirect objcct" stancl for parts of sentences. So if I call intentional objects a sub-class
of dircct objects, that niay seen1 already t o determine that an intentional object is
a bit of l a n g ~ ~ n ~ c .
I-Iowevel; tlie matter is not s o easily settled. Of course I d o not w a n t to oppose
the practice o f grammarians. n u t it is clear t h ~ l tthe concept of a ctircct ol,ject-;~nd
hence tlie identificatio~lof tlie sentence-part n o w called the direct object-is leariiccl

somewhat as follows: the teacher takes a senrcnce, say "John scnt M a r y a boolt"
and says: "What did Jo111l senel M a r y ? " Getting the answer "A book" he says:
"That's the direct object." N o w the question does not really suppose, and tlie 12~~pil,
if he goes along with the teachel; does not taltc it, that any particular pcoplc, o f
who111 the sentence is true; are in question, and s o we Inay say rhat when the tc:icl~ing is S L I C C ~ S S ~ Lthe
I ~ qllestioil is unclcrstood as equivalent to "What clocs the sentence 'John sent M a r y a book' say John scnt M a r y ? " T h e gramrnatic:il concept ol'
a clircct objcct is acquired by one w h o can answer any such question. T h e co~.i.cct
answer to such n q ~ ~ c s t - i gives
or
(in olclcr ~ ~ s ; l goc r) itself is (it1 11io1.c~.cc.ctltt~s,l!:c)
the direct object. N o w suppose tliat someone wcre to ask: "What is co~nnlunic;itccl
t o us by the phrase tliat \vc get in a correct answcr? Is the p h r ~ i s cbcing 11scii o r
mentioned?" It is clear tli:?t nothing is settled a b o u t this question by n clioicc
whether to say, lollowing cilclcr usage, tliat the plirasc gil~esthe dircct objcct or, i'ollowing more mocIcr11 usage, that "clil-cct objcct" is a name tor a scntcl1cc-l>nst.
I propose-for a purposc which will appear-to adopt the older ~lsngc.Thcii the
question " W h a t is the direct object o f the verb in this sentence?" is the sal-nc a s
"What does the sentence :.ay J o h n sent M a r y ? " ;111cl the question " W h a t clocs thc
phrase which is the ariswer to that q u e s t i o t ~c o m ~ i ~ u ~ ~ it oc aus,
t e i.c. is it being i~sctl
or ~iientioned?"can bc aslced in thc forru "Is the direct objcct a hit of Ianguusc o r
rather w h a t the bit of l a ~ i j i i ~ a gstatlds
e
for?"--and this is n o w not a mere question
of terminology, but a slibsta~ltive-seeti~i~ig
question of curious perplexity. For
someone pondering it may argue as follows: It won't d o t o say that in this cxamplc
a boolc is tlic clircct ol)jcct. I:or i f we say that we can bc asltccl: "Wllich bool<?";
but the sentence isn't being considered as true, and thcrc is no answer to the cji~cstion "Which book?" except " N o book"; ancl yet without d o u b t the verb has a tli~cct
ohject, given by tlie answcr "A b o o l ~ "So it must be wrojzg, and not just a ni:~ttcr
of terminology, to say that the g r a ~ n ~ n a t i c phrase
al
"direct object" stands for, 11ot
a bit of language, I ~ u rather
t
w h a t the bit of language stands for. And, if intentional
objects are a sub-class of direct ohjects, the j>lil-asc "intentiolial object" too will
stand for a bit of lang~lagerather than w h a t the language stands for; we arc cvide~itlyriot going to have to plunge into tlic I,og made by tlic fact that in tlie most
i ~ l i p o s t a ~ai nt d stsaiglitlor\.\:;iscl sense the pllrasc giving the intcntiorinl ol3jccr Inay
stand for nothing.
which is the intcntionnl
13ut wait-in
that case f~lrrstw e not say, " t l ~ c
rat]icr than "the p l ~ r a s cgiving tile iritc11tion:ll ol,jcct"? This is indccci 3 diTficulty. For the intentional object is told in answer 1-0 a cl~rcstion" W h a t ? " Bur the

difference to the analysis of a sentence like "X thought of ." So i f the idea
is to be brotigiit in when the object doesn't exist, then equally it should be brought
in when tlic ohject ciocs exist. Yet o n e is thinking, surely, of Winston C h ~ ~ r c h i lnot
l,
of the idea of Iiin~,nncl just that fact started us off. When one reads Locke, one
wants to protest: "The niincl is not employed about ideas, but a b o u t things-unless
ideas arc what w e happen to be thinking about." Whatever purpose is served by
introclucing ideas, by saying, "Well, tiley hacl a n idea o f Zeus," w e cannot say that
the idea is tlie object of thought, o r worship. It will not be right t o say X worshippecl an idca. it is rather that the subject's having an idca is w h a t is neecled to
give tile proposition n chance of being true. This limy seen1 helpful lor "worshipping," I~lrtn o t lor "tliinlting oT"; "thinlcing of" ancl "having ari idea of" arc too
sinlil:~r; if the one is j>roblematic, then s o is the other,
I.et us concentrate o n tlie fact that Illany ~ x o l x ~ s i t i o containing
ns
intcntioilal vcrbs
arc true, ancl Ict LIS not be hypnotizccl by the possible non-existence of tlie ol,jcct.
There arc other Ccatt~rcstoo: 11on-sul?stitutaI,ility of clifferent descriptio~isof the
objcct, whcre it does exist; arid possible indeter~ninacyof tlie objcct. In fact all three
f e a t ~ i r e sare conncctetl. I call think of a Iiian without thinl<ing of a m a n of any particular Iicight; I cannot hit a Inan without hittillg a m a n of sonle particular height,
because there is n o such thing as a Inan of n o particiilar height. And the possibility of tliis intletcrnii~iacymakes it possible that when I an1 thinlcing of a particular
man, n o t every truc descriptio~lof hirii is one under which I a m thinlting of him.
I will n o w define a n intentional verb as a verb taking a n intentional object; intentional objects are tlie sub-class of direct objects characterized by these three connected f e a t ~ ~ r eBy
s . this clefinition, "to believe" and " t o intend" are rlot thelnselves
intentional verbs, which nlay seem paracloxical. But, say, " t o believe-to
be a
scoundrel" will accorcl with tlie definitioil, s o that it is not s o paradoxical as t o leave
o ~ l tbelief ancl intention altogether.
But n o w co~llesa cluestion: ought w e really to say that the intentional ohject is a
bit o f language, o r may w e speak as if it wcre what the bit of language stands for?
As grammarians ancl linguists use tlie w o r d s nowadays "direct object" allti "indirect objcct" stancl for parts of sentences. So if I call intentional objects a sub-class
of dircct objects, that niay seen1 already t o determine that an intentional object is
a bit of l a n g ~ ~ n ~ c .
I-Iowevel; tlie matter is not s o easily settled. Of course I d o not w a n t to oppose
the practice o f grammarians. n u t it is clear t h ~ l tthe concept of a ctircct ol,ject-;~nd
hence tlie identificatio~lof tlie sentence-part n o w called the direct object-is leariiccl

somewhat as follows: the teacher takes a senrcnce, say "John scnt M a r y a boolt"
and says: "What did Jo111l senel M a r y ? " Getting the answer "A book" he says:
"That's the direct object." N o w the question does not really suppose, and tlie 12~~pil,
if he goes along with the teachel; does not taltc it, that any particular pcoplc, o f
who111 the sentence is true; are in question, and s o we Inay say rhat when the tc:icl~ing is S L I C C ~ S S ~ Lthe
I ~ qllestioil is unclcrstood as equivalent to "What clocs the sentence 'John sent M a r y a book' say John scnt M a r y ? " T h e gramrnatic:il concept ol'
a clircct objcct is acquired by one w h o can answer any such question. T h e co~.i.cct
answer to such n q ~ ~ c s t - i gives
or
(in olclcr ~ ~ s ; l goc r) itself is (it1 11io1.c~.cc.ctltt~s,l!:c)
the direct object. N o w suppose tliat someone wcre to ask: "What is co~nnlunic;itccl
t o us by the phrase tliat \vc get in a correct answcr? Is the p h r ~ i s cbcing 11scii o r
mentioned?" It is clear tli:?t nothing is settled a b o u t this question by n clioicc
whether to say, lollowing cilclcr usage, tliat the plirasc gil~esthe dircct objcct or, i'ollowing more mocIcr11 usage, that "clil-cct objcct" is a name tor a scntcl1cc-l>nst.
I propose-for a purposc which will appear-to adopt the older ~lsngc.Thcii the
question " W h a t is the direct object o f the verb in this sentence?" is the sal-nc a s
"What does the sentence :.ay J o h n sent M a r y ? " ;111cl the question " W h a t clocs thc
phrase which is the ariswer to that q u e s t i o t ~c o m ~ i ~ u ~ ~ it oc aus,
t e i.c. is it being i~sctl
or ~iientioned?"can bc aslced in thc forru "Is the direct objcct a hit of Ianguusc o r
rather w h a t the bit of l a ~ i j i i ~ a gstatlds
e
for?"--and this is n o w not a mere question
of terminology, but a slibsta~ltive-seeti~i~ig
question of curious perplexity. For
someone pondering it may argue as follows: It won't d o t o say that in this cxamplc
a boolc is tlic clircct ol)jcct. I:or i f we say that we can bc asltccl: "Wllich bool<?";
but the sentence isn't being considered as true, and thcrc is no answer to the cji~cstion "Which book?" except " N o book"; ancl yet without d o u b t the verb has a tli~cct
ohject, given by tlie answcr "A b o o l ~ "So it must be wrojzg, and not just a ni:~ttcr
of terminology, to say that the g r a ~ n ~ n a t i c phrase
al
"direct object" stands for, 11ot
a bit of language, I ~ u rather
t
w h a t the bit of language stands for. And, if intentional
objects are a sub-class of direct ohjects, the j>lil-asc "intentiolial object" too will
stand for a bit of lang~lagerather than w h a t the language stands for; we arc cvide~itlyriot going to have to plunge into tlic I,og made by tlic fact that in tlie most
i ~ l i p o s t a ~ai nt d stsaiglitlor\.\:;iscl sense the pllrasc giving the intcntiorinl ol3jccr Inay
stand for nothing.
which is the intcntionnl
13ut wait-in
that case f~lrrstw e not say, " t l ~ c
rat]icr than "the p l ~ r a s cgiving tile iritc11tion:ll ol,jcct"? This is indccci 3 diTficulty. For the intentional object is told in answer 1-0 a cl~rcstion" W h a t ? " Bur the

answer t o " W h a t d o they worship?" cannot be that they worship a phrase any more
than tliat they worship a n idea. A similar point holds, of coursc, for direct (and
indirect) objects in general.
It may be argued that this is n o a r g u ~ ~ l e n tPerhaps
.2
w e cannot say "What John
is said to have scnt is 21 phrasc." But then n o inore can we say "What Jolin is said
t o have sent is a direct object"--for
tlic sentence did not say J o h n sent M a r y a ciircct
object.
W h a t this shows is that there is a w a y of taking "The ciirect object is not a direct
objcct" which iilaltes this true; namely, by assimilatillg this sentence to "The dircct
object is 11ot 11 girl." ( O n e coilld imagine cxplai~ringto a cliiltl: "Tllc g i ~ - l isn't tlic
dircct object, but the book that J o l i n sent.")
Frcgc's c o ~ ~ c l u s i o"Thc
n
concept 1101-scis not a conccj>t" was l>asccl on tlic saliic
sort of troublc a b o u t different uscs of c x p r e s s i o ~ ~ W
s . h a t "cheval" stancls for is n
conccpt, ancl wliar "cbcual" stands for is a Ilorsc; these prcmisses d o not, however,
yield tlic result that i f Buccphalus is a I ~ o r s chc is a concept. Sin~ilarly,w h a t J o h n is
said t o have sent Mary is a book, a n d w h a t J o h n is saicl to have scnt M a r y is a
tlirect object; these prcillisses d o n o t yield tlie result that if J o h n gave M a r y a book,
he gave her a tlirect object.
Frege cvcntually proposed to dcal with the trouble by stipulating that such a
plirase as " W h a t 'cheval' stands for" should oitly be used predicatively. i'i parallel
stipulation in o u r case: " W h a t John is said to have sent M a r y is . . ." may ollly be
coiupleted with such cxpressiovls as could fill the blank in "John sent Mary. . . ."
T h e stipulatioil, while harmless, woulrl be based o n f a i l ~ ~ of
r e ear for the clift'crent use of thc phrase " W h a t John is saicf to have sent M a r y " in tlie explanatior~
" W h a t J o h n is saicl t o have sent M a r y is the direct object of the sentence." But a n
car for a differclit use cannot bc dispc~isedwith, a s the further coursc of thc argument shows.
T h e argulncnt bcgan with stating reasons why a clircct object can't be somctliing
that the direct-object phrase stancls for. Yet one can, one correctly docs, sap "A
book" in answer to the qucstiori "Wlzat does the sentence 'John sent M a r y a booli'
say JoI1i-r sent- Mary?" which asks the same thing as "What is the dircct ol>jcct in
that s c ~ ~ t c n c c ?Ncvcl-tliclcss
"
thc way the p 1 i 1 . a ~''a~ 11ook" is being ~isetlis such that
one can't sensibly ask "Which hook?"
Wc niust cctllcl~~clc
of "ol~jects" (tlirect, iliciivect a n d likewise intentional) that tlie
object is neither the plirase 11or w h a t the phrase stancis foc W h a t then is it? The

qucstioil is based o n a mistake, ~lalllelythat a n cxplailatory answer running say ")in

intentional (dircct, indirect) object is such-and-such" is possible and rcquisitc. Rut
this need not be so. Indeed rile o ~ i l yreasonable candidates t o be answcrs are tlic
ones w e have failed. Rut whnt is the actual use o f the tcrm? Given n sentence i l l
which a verb takes a n obicct, one proceclure for replying to the question: "What is
the object in this sente~ice?"is t o recite the objcct phrase.
If putting the object phrase in quotes inlplies tliat tlie object-i.e. what Joh11 is
said t o have scnt Mary, w h a t the Greelts worshipped-is a piece of language, that
is wrong; if its not being in quotes iiilplies that something rclerred t o by the objcct
phrasc is the objcct, tliat is wrong too. T o avoicl the Inttcr st~ggcstiono n c nligli~
insist o n putting in quotes; tci avoicl the forlner o n c lnight w a n t t o leave them oilt.
O n e is inclincd to invcnr i spccial sort of c l ~ ~ o t ch11t
s ; tlic clucstion is h o w thc plirnsc
within such new quotes wo~ilclfunction-ancl il wc ~ ~ n c l c r s t athat,
~ ~ d w e don't ncccl
a new sign. So elids the argument.
To repcat, I aln not opposing the practicc of grammarians a~icllinguists for whnni
the expression "direct object" is defined as a n expression for a plirasc; they usc tlint
as I use the expression :'dirc.ir-object plirase." But, as I have arguecl, thc qucstioii
"Whar does the sentelice say Jolill gave?" is fundalnentnl for ~ ~ l ~ c l c r s t a n c leirlicr
il~g
"direct objcct" o r "direct-object phrasc" as I a m using those cxprcssions; and he~icc
for ~ ~ ~ l d e r s t a n d"ciirecr
i ~ i g object" w l i e l ~it is used for a phrase. And though the cluestion is answered (like many qiiestions) by uttering a phrase-in this case "a booknthe phrase has a special rise in answer t o that questioxi " W h a t does the scntence say
J o h n gave?" I t can name neither a piece of language, n o r anything that thc piccc of
lang~lagenames o r otherwise relates to, nor inctcecl anything else. T h e interest ol
the questioil and answer is tlic rather special interest of getting grallimatical unclcrstandi~ig.Grammatical understanding a n d g r a r n ~ l ~ a t i c aconcepts,
l
evcn the most
familiar ones like sentence, x r b , noun, are not s o straightforward ai~clciown-toearth a matter of plain physical realities as I believe pcople sometimes suppose. T h e
c011cej1t of a noun, for example, is far less of a physical conccpt than that of a coin;
for someone might be traineci to recognize coins with fair success tliougl~he Icncw
nothing of money, but no onit coulcl I)c traincd t o i.ccoj;nize Ilorlns \vitlio\~t;igrc;\t
familiarity \vitJi langungc; ancl yct tllc conccpt of n notti1 is not one wl~icllIic \ \ ) i l l
a u t o ~ i ~ a t i c a l have
l y througli (li;it fa~niliarity,as lie will havc that o l a coil1 if l ~ oj7cr.c
ates with coined moncy. hdcccl tlie explanations of granlmatical tcrlns 2rc only hints
a t w h a t is really grasped from examples. TIILIS
n o one should thi~ilcthat by merely

answer t o " W h a t d o they worship?" cannot be that they worship a phrase any more
than tliat they worship a n idea. A similar point holds, of coursc, for direct (and
indirect) objects in general.
It may be argued that this is n o a r g u ~ ~ l e n tPerhaps
.2
w e cannot say "What John
is said to have scnt is 21 phrasc." But then n o inore can we say "What Jolin is said
t o have sent is a direct object"--for
tlic sentence did not say J o h n sent M a r y a ciircct
object.
W h a t this shows is that there is a w a y of taking "The ciirect object is not a direct
objcct" which iilaltes this true; namely, by assimilatillg this sentence to "The dircct
object is 11ot 11 girl." ( O n e coilld imagine cxplai~ringto a cliiltl: "Tllc g i ~ - l isn't tlic
dircct object, but the book that J o l i n sent.")
Frcgc's c o ~ ~ c l u s i o"Thc
n
concept 1101-scis not a conccj>t" was l>asccl on tlic saliic
sort of troublc a b o u t different uscs of c x p r e s s i o ~ ~ W
s . h a t "cheval" stancls for is n
conccpt, ancl wliar "cbcual" stands for is a Ilorsc; these prcmisses d o not, however,
yield tlic result that i f Buccphalus is a I ~ o r s chc is a concept. Sin~ilarly,w h a t J o h n is
said t o have sent Mary is a book, a n d w h a t J o h n is saicl to have scnt M a r y is a
tlirect object; these prcillisses d o n o t yield tlie result that if J o h n gave M a r y a book,
he gave her a tlirect object.
Frege cvcntually proposed to dcal with the trouble by stipulating that such a
plirase as " W h a t 'cheval' stands for" should oitly be used predicatively. i'i parallel
stipulation in o u r case: " W h a t John is said to have sent M a r y is . . ." may ollly be
coiupleted with such cxpressiovls as could fill the blank in "John sent Mary. . . ."
T h e stipulatioil, while harmless, woulrl be based o n f a i l ~ ~ of
r e ear for the clift'crent use of thc phrase " W h a t John is saicf to have sent M a r y " in tlie explanatior~
" W h a t J o h n is saicl t o have sent M a r y is the direct object of the sentence." But a n
car for a differclit use cannot bc dispc~isedwith, a s the further coursc of thc argument shows.
T h e argulncnt bcgan with stating reasons why a clircct object can't be somctliing
that the direct-object phrase stancls for. Yet one can, one correctly docs, sap "A
book" in answer to the qucstiori "Wlzat does the sentence 'John sent M a r y a booli'
say JoI1i-r sent- Mary?" which asks the same thing as "What is the dircct ol>jcct in
that s c ~ ~ t c n c c ?Ncvcl-tliclcss
"
thc way the p 1 i 1 . a ~''a~ 11ook" is being ~isetlis such that
one can't sensibly ask "Which hook?"
Wc niust cctllcl~~clc
of "ol~jects" (tlirect, iliciivect a n d likewise intentional) that tlie
object is neither the plirase 11or w h a t the phrase stancis foc W h a t then is it? The

qucstioil is based o n a mistake, ~lalllelythat a n cxplailatory answer running say ")in

intentional (dircct, indirect) object is such-and-such" is possible and rcquisitc. Rut
this need not be so. Indeed rile o ~ i l yreasonable candidates t o be answcrs are tlic
ones w e have failed. Rut whnt is the actual use o f the tcrm? Given n sentence i l l
which a verb takes a n obicct, one proceclure for replying to the question: "What is
the object in this sente~ice?"is t o recite the objcct phrase.
If putting the object phrase in quotes inlplies tliat tlie object-i.e. what Joh11 is
said t o have scnt Mary, w h a t the Greelts worshipped-is a piece of language, that
is wrong; if its not being in quotes iiilplies that something rclerred t o by the objcct
phrasc is the objcct, tliat is wrong too. T o avoicl the Inttcr st~ggcstiono n c nligli~
insist o n putting in quotes; tci avoicl the forlner o n c lnight w a n t t o leave them oilt.
O n e is inclincd to invcnr i spccial sort of c l ~ ~ o t ch11t
s ; tlic clucstion is h o w thc plirnsc
within such new quotes wo~ilclfunction-ancl il wc ~ ~ n c l c r s t athat,
~ ~ d w e don't ncccl
a new sign. So elids the argument.
To repcat, I aln not opposing the practicc of grammarians a~icllinguists for whnni
the expression "direct object" is defined as a n expression for a plirasc; they usc tlint
as I use the expression :'dirc.ir-object plirase." But, as I have arguecl, thc qucstioii
"Whar does the sentelice say Jolill gave?" is fundalnentnl for ~ ~ l ~ c l c r s t a n c leirlicr
il~g
"direct objcct" o r "direct-object phrasc" as I a m using those cxprcssions; and he~icc
for ~ ~ ~ l d e r s t a n d"ciirecr
i ~ i g object" w l i e l ~it is used for a phrase. And though the cluestion is answered (like many qiiestions) by uttering a phrase-in this case "a booknthe phrase has a special rise in answer t o that questioxi " W h a t does the scntence say
J o h n gave?" I t can name neither a piece of language, n o r anything that thc piccc of
lang~lagenames o r otherwise relates to, nor inctcecl anything else. T h e interest ol
the questioil and answer is tlic rather special interest of getting grallimatical unclcrstandi~ig.Grammatical understanding a n d g r a r n ~ l ~ a t i c aconcepts,
l
evcn the most
familiar ones like sentence, x r b , noun, are not s o straightforward ai~clciown-toearth a matter of plain physical realities as I believe pcople sometimes suppose. T h e
c011cej1t of a noun, for example, is far less of a physical conccpt than that of a coin;
for someone might be traineci to recognize coins with fair success tliougl~he Icncw
nothing of money, but no onit coulcl I)c traincd t o i.ccoj;nize Ilorlns \vitlio\~t;igrc;\t
familiarity \vitJi langungc; ancl yct tllc conccpt of n notti1 is not one wl~icllIic \ \ ) i l l
a u t o ~ i ~ a t i c a l have
l y througli (li;it fa~niliarity,as lie will havc that o l a coil1 if l ~ oj7cr.c
ates with coined moncy. hdcccl tlie explanations of granlmatical tcrlns 2rc only hints
a t w h a t is really grasped from examples. TIILIS
n o one should thi~ilcthat by merely

a t l o l x i ~ ~tlic
g usage o i inoclcrn glammai.ialis, for who111 tile direct ollicct is a ivorcl
o r worcls, Iie lias avoideel llaiicllil~gclifficult concepts ai;tt reru;li~lcd in a plain iilaii's
worlcl of plaiil thillg.

"Tlie c l ~ t c object
i~
is wliar John sent'' (= "wirat the sentence iayr jo1111 r c ~ i t " ) .
v F h e ~ et w o seiltences arc pamllel. It is for tlie srLe of l ~ a r a l l e l i s ~tliat
~ i rve optcii
for thc olci fashiollccl Llsagc of "cli~.cctol~jcct."For cvc11 in that Ltsagc, n o olie will
be tenipteci t o t11i11k that tliucct ohjects as such arc a special ty!>c clf entity, J u s t
this t c i i ~ p t a t i c )exists
~ ~ very strongly for objccts of t h o ~ ~ g laiiti
i t scnsatiui~;~ l l a tis,
for intentional objects, which appear as entities uncler the names "idea" a ~ ~ d
,
~mprcssion."
It may I)e ol~jecteci:the context "The sentence says John sent Mary ,, .
1S
itself i~lrcntio~~:ll.
I-Iow, then, can lily considerations a b o u t tlirecr objects throw light
o n intcntional ohjects? 12\lllyspcllcd o u t they arc thcmselvcs merely examples of scntcnccs whose objects arc intentional objects.'
T h e answer is tll:it what is said i l l the o l > j c c t i o is
~ ~trtle. 13~1tthcsc cxa~n~,les,
~\~lle~-c
wc talk a b o u t tlirccc objects, arc I~arinlessancl profitable because certain so1.t~of
suggestion : ~ l ) o t ~clircct
t
ol>jccts arc patcut nonsense. For cxaml,lc no olle would
tllil~bthat if a seiltcoce says Joliii sent M a r y a book, w h a t it immediately and directly
says he scnt Ilcr w a s a direct objcct, a l ~ donly in some illdirect fashion, via this inlmeiliare object. cloes it say lie sent her a buol<. I want, that is. to use s comparisoii
y i t h patent nonsense a b o ~ i tclircct objects in orcler t o exllose as l a t e ~ nonsense
~t
of
just the same I<i~ldsome very persuasive views a b o u t iclcas ancl impl-cssion. N o t that
icicns allti ilnprcssions are t o be cxcluclecl from considcration; but as thcy enter into
cpisternology they will be rightly regardcil as grammatical notions, whose role is
readily ~ n i s u ~ i d c r s t o o dAiicl
. "grammatical" is here being used in its o r d i ~ l a r yscnsc.
We must n o w ask: does any plirase that gives the direct object of a n intcntional
vcrb in a sentence nccessal.ily give all ir~ter~tional
ohject? N o . Consider: "Tllese
people worsllip Ombola; that is t o say, they worship a n-iere h u n k of wood." (cf.
"They worship sticks and stoilcs.") O r ''They worsliip the sun, that is, tbey worsilip
w h a t is ~lothjligbut a great inass of frightlully hot s t ~ ~ f f T
. "h e w o l - ~ h i ~ ~tllcm~crs
selves will not ackiiowlcdge tile descriptio~ls.Tileis idol is for them a clivinizeci piece
of w o o d , one that is ~ ~ l l l also
~ h a~ god;
w and sii~iiiarlyfor the surl.
I'

An intentional object is given 1,y a w o r d

j wlyich.

(11-phrase

which gives

:I

descriptiotr ~rirrler.

It will help if w e consider shooting at, aiming. A man aims a t a stag; but the tIii17j:
he tool< for a stag was his fa!lier, a n d he shoots liis father. A wit~icssreports: "I-ic
a i ~ i ~ e ac tl his father." N o w t1-11:;is a ~ i i b i g ~ ~I on ~the
~ s s. c ~ i s cin wllicll give11 the situ,ition as w e have describeci it, this report is true, tllc pllrase "his father" cloes 11!1t
give all intcntional objcct. Let iis introduce the term "material ol,jcctn: "liis fathci-"
gives, w e sliall say, the inntci.iizl object of the verb in tlic sentence "I-Ie aimed a t his
father" in tile sense in which this w a s trrle. N o t because hc hit I ~ i sfather-he might
after all luerely have gonc w i c l e of the ~liarlt.But \xcause the thing he tool< f o l . a
stag actnally w a s his father. \TIC can asli w h a t he was cloing-what he w a s ai~nii~!:
at-in that he was aiming a t a stag: this is to ask for another tiescription "X"stich
that in "IHc was aiming a t X" w e still have a n intcntional ol~jcct,hut the clcsc1-il7tion " X " gives us something cliat exists in the situation. For example, he w a s aimiiig
a t tliat dark p t c h against thc i'oliagc. T h e dark patch against tlic foliage w a s in fact
his father's h a t with his fathcr's head in it.
Thus, the given intention:il object (tlie stag) being nonexistent in the situation,
w e looltcd for another intenrioiial objcct until w e founcf o n c 1i1;lt c \ i ( \ c s i s ~ I'licn
.
the phrase giving that intcnr-ionfllobject, nncl arly o~licr.t r ~ clcscriptio~~
~c
oi 1 1 1 ~ .existent t h i t ~ gin q~lestion,gives the ,itntcrial objcct o i "I-Ic ;~ilncclat. . . ."
Iloes this account ctepcnd on the report's being true? N o ; but i f the witness l ~ c s
o r is q ~ ~ iniistalien,
tc
all the s,inle hc call be q~~cstionccl
a b o u t w h a t his rcport meailt.
Does hc mearz the phrase "his father" to give the intentional, o r only tllc material;
object? If only the ~ n a t e r i a lol~jcct,w h a t does hc lncar~by "I-lc :limed at . . . " ? ' T l l ~ t
yo11 COLIICI see that tlie Inan \vas taltiug aim, ancl wlicrc his targct lay? T1-icr.c migilt
not be t r ~ i canswers to tllcse i j ~ ~ c s t i o nhs t, ~ the
t witness h:~sgoc to 171-etcndtl1cl.c :11-c
o r be confoiil~decl.
Ancl now, for greater ease of expression, I will speali, as is natural, of the IIicitcrial and il~telitioi~al
object:; of aiming, of worshipping, of thilil<ing. 7'his slioulcl
always I,e interprctahlc in tei.i~isof the vcrhs ar~clthcir objects.
There l ~ e c dnot be a m;ltcl.inI objcct (]I aiming. If a rnan wcrc totally I~allucinatcil,
a n d , sliooting a t s o n ~ e t h i l ~i g~ his
i
h a l l u c i ~ ~ a t o scene,
ry
hit his Iathcl; thlit w o ~ i l d11ot
make his father the ~ ~ l u t e r i nobjcct
i
o f liis a i l i ~ i ~ i Similarly,
g.
if tl1cl.c is n o tlcscrii>tion, still giving the inte~ition:iIobjcct of worship, which cicscrii>cs allything a c t ~ i ~ ~ l ,
the worshippers, rnatcrially s,ic;ll<itlg, worship a nothing, so~llethirtgt h a t clocs 11ot
exist.
N o t that it ivill thcii tio I ( , say "Tlicy worship nothing," h u t only: "Wllat thcy
\vorshil~is ~ l o t i ~ i n g .For
" '"I'iiey worship ~iothing" woultl imply t h a t 110 scntcllic

a t l o l x i ~ ~tlic
g usage o i inoclcrn glammai.ialis, for who111 tile direct ollicct is a ivorcl
o r worcls, Iie lias avoideel llaiicllil~gclifficult concepts ai;tt reru;li~lcd in a plain iilaii's
worlcl of plaiil thillg.

"Tlie c l ~ t c object
i~
is wliar John sent'' (= "wirat the sentence iayr jo1111 r c ~ i t " ) .
v F h e ~ et w o seiltences arc pamllel. It is for tlie srLe of l ~ a r a l l e l i s ~tliat
~ i rve optcii
for thc olci fashiollccl Llsagc of "cli~.cctol~jcct."For cvc11 in that Ltsagc, n o olie will
be tenipteci t o t11i11k that tliucct ohjects as such arc a special ty!>c clf entity, J u s t
this t c i i ~ p t a t i c )exists
~ ~ very strongly for objccts of t h o ~ ~ g laiiti
i t scnsatiui~;~ l l a tis,
for intentional objects, which appear as entities uncler the names "idea" a ~ ~ d
,
~mprcssion."
It may I)e ol~jecteci:the context "The sentence says John sent Mary ,, .
1S
itself i~lrcntio~~:ll.
I-Iow, then, can lily considerations a b o u t tlirecr objects throw light
o n intcntional ohjects? 12\lllyspcllcd o u t they arc thcmselvcs merely examples of scntcnccs whose objects arc intentional objects.'
T h e answer is tll:it what is said i l l the o l > j c c t i o is
~ ~trtle. 13~1tthcsc cxa~n~,les,
~\~lle~-c
wc talk a b o u t tlirccc objects, arc I~arinlessancl profitable because certain so1.t~of
suggestion : ~ l ) o t ~clircct
t
ol>jccts arc patcut nonsense. For cxaml,lc no olle would
tllil~bthat if a seiltcoce says Joliii sent M a r y a book, w h a t it immediately and directly
says he scnt Ilcr w a s a direct objcct, a l ~ donly in some illdirect fashion, via this inlmeiliare object. cloes it say lie sent her a buol<. I want, that is. to use s comparisoii
y i t h patent nonsense a b o ~ i tclircct objects in orcler t o exllose as l a t e ~ nonsense
~t
of
just the same I<i~ldsome very persuasive views a b o u t iclcas ancl impl-cssion. N o t that
icicns allti ilnprcssions are t o be cxcluclecl from considcration; but as thcy enter into
cpisternology they will be rightly regardcil as grammatical notions, whose role is
readily ~ n i s u ~ i d c r s t o o dAiicl
. "grammatical" is here being used in its o r d i ~ l a r yscnsc.
We must n o w ask: does any plirase that gives the direct object of a n intcntional
vcrb in a sentence nccessal.ily give all ir~ter~tional
ohject? N o . Consider: "Tllese
people worsllip Ombola; that is t o say, they worship a n-iere h u n k of wood." (cf.
"They worship sticks and stoilcs.") O r ''They worsliip the sun, that is, tbey worsilip
w h a t is ~lothjligbut a great inass of frightlully hot s t ~ ~ f f T
. "h e w o l - ~ h i ~ ~tllcm~crs
selves will not ackiiowlcdge tile descriptio~ls.Tileis idol is for them a clivinizeci piece
of w o o d , one that is ~ ~ l l l also
~ h a~ god;
w and sii~iiiarlyfor the surl.
I'

An intentional object is given 1,y a w o r d

j wlyich.

(11-phrase

which gives

:I

descriptiotr ~rirrler.

It will help if w e consider shooting at, aiming. A man aims a t a stag; but the tIii17j:
he tool< for a stag was his fa!lier, a n d he shoots liis father. A wit~icssreports: "I-ic
a i ~ i ~ e ac tl his father." N o w t1-11:;is a ~ i i b i g ~ ~I on ~the
~ s s. c ~ i s cin wllicll give11 the situ,ition as w e have describeci it, this report is true, tllc pllrase "his father" cloes 11!1t
give all intcntional objcct. Let iis introduce the term "material ol,jcctn: "liis fathci-"
gives, w e sliall say, the inntci.iizl object of the verb in tlic sentence "I-Ie aimed a t his
father" in tile sense in which this w a s trrle. N o t because hc hit I ~ i sfather-he might
after all luerely have gonc w i c l e of the ~liarlt.But \xcause the thing he tool< f o l . a
stag actnally w a s his father. \TIC can asli w h a t he was cloing-what he w a s ai~nii~!:
at-in that he was aiming a t a stag: this is to ask for another tiescription "X"stich
that in "IHc was aiming a t X" w e still have a n intcntional ol~jcct,hut the clcsc1-il7tion " X " gives us something cliat exists in the situation. For example, he w a s aimiiig
a t tliat dark p t c h against thc i'oliagc. T h e dark patch against tlic foliage w a s in fact
his father's h a t with his fathcr's head in it.
Thus, the given intention:il object (tlie stag) being nonexistent in the situation,
w e looltcd for another intenrioiial objcct until w e founcf o n c 1i1;lt c \ i ( \ c s i s ~ I'licn
.
the phrase giving that intcnr-ionfllobject, nncl arly o~licr.t r ~ clcscriptio~~
~c
oi 1 1 1 ~ .existent t h i t ~ gin q~lestion,gives the ,itntcrial objcct o i "I-Ic ;~ilncclat. . . ."
Iloes this account ctepcnd on the report's being true? N o ; but i f the witness l ~ c s
o r is q ~ ~ iniistalien,
tc
all the s,inle hc call be q~~cstionccl
a b o u t w h a t his rcport meailt.
Does hc mearz the phrase "his father" to give the intentional, o r only tllc material;
object? If only the ~ n a t e r i a lol~jcct,w h a t does hc lncar~by "I-lc :limed at . . . " ? ' T l l ~ t
yo11 COLIICI see that tlie Inan \vas taltiug aim, ancl wlicrc his targct lay? T1-icr.c migilt
not be t r ~ i canswers to tllcse i j ~ ~ c s t i o nhs t, ~ the
t witness h:~sgoc to 171-etcndtl1cl.c :11-c
o r be confoiil~decl.
Ancl now, for greater ease of expression, I will speali, as is natural, of the IIicitcrial and il~telitioi~al
object:; of aiming, of worshipping, of thilil<ing. 7'his slioulcl
always I,e interprctahlc in tei.i~isof the vcrhs ar~clthcir objects.
There l ~ e c dnot be a m;ltcl.inI objcct (]I aiming. If a rnan wcrc totally I~allucinatcil,
a n d , sliooting a t s o n ~ e t h i l ~i g~ his
i
h a l l u c i ~ ~ a t o scene,
ry
hit his Iathcl; thlit w o ~ i l d11ot
make his father the ~ ~ l u t e r i nobjcct
i
o f liis a i l i ~ i ~ i Similarly,
g.
if tl1cl.c is n o tlcscrii>tion, still giving the inte~ition:iIobjcct of worship, which cicscrii>cs allything a c t ~ i ~ ~ l ,
the worshippers, rnatcrially s,ic;ll<itlg, worship a nothing, so~llethirtgt h a t clocs 11ot
exist.
N o t that it ivill thcii tio I ( , say "Tlicy worship nothing," h u t only: "Wllat thcy
\vorshil~is ~ l o t i ~ i n g .For
" '"I'iiey worship ~iothing" woultl imply t h a t 110 scntcllic

- wo~.sllipsr~cli-;inti-sucl~" will be tl.i~e;a114 is1 chc case sr~pposedsome silch

Ihe)!
1 sentence is true.
'',

Q ~ ~ c s t i oa~blosu t thc identity of an intentional object, when this cannot be reci~lcetl

I to the identity of n lllntcvinl object, arc obviously of solile interest. H o w clo we
; dcciclc that t w o peol>lc 01. ~>coples
worshil7 o r clo not worship tile same g o ~ 1 ?/\gain,
I
i when a proper name is ol>scure ancl remote in its historical ~.clcl-cncc,
like "Al-tll~lr,"
/ t h e qlrcstion may arise whetlicr t w o people arc tllil~ltingof: the same man-if tiley

i have dificrcnt, incompatihlc, pictures of

hi~ii.
But I perceive that my saying "when this cannot be reduced to tile identity of a

!
i

1 u~o~cviill
ol>jcctn]nay mislead: fclr by rr~nlerinlo[>jccts I clo not n-rean what asc now
! called "material ol?jccts"-tables, planets, I~umpsof butter ancl s o on. 'To give a clear
! .
installce: a clcbt of five clollars is not a matcrial objcct in t l ~ i slatter sense; hut givcri
I that someone hacl contractecl such a debt, 111y t h o u p l ~ t"tllat dcht of five dollars"

I
Iwoultl linvc as its niatel-ial object something dcscrihecl a n d inclicatcd by the phrase
I

'

,grving tlie intentional ol>ject of my thought. W h e ~ iit is I~eyondcluestion that tlie

~ p h r n s cgiving a11 intentional objcct does describe a n d indicate a matcrial object i i i
'this scnsc, tile11 the qocstioil 21s to rile idc~itityof tlie iotcntional objcct redoces to
I question as to tlic iclentity o f the matcrial object. Arc we referring to the same
jdckt? T h a t is, ~ ~ c r h a pnot
s , t o o cliffic~lltto establish. But when either there is no real
debt or it is very obsci~l.ewhether tlicre is, the case is altcrcti.
I lie fact t l ~ a rwe can ~ ~ the
s cconcept of identity i l l co~lncctionwith intentional
I
iubjccts slioulci not lent1 11s to tilink there is ally sense in qr~cstionsas to the kind ol.
I
~ c s i s t c ~ ~ c c - t honrological
c
status-of i11tcntion;ll objccts a s such. /Ill s l ~ c hclucstiotis
arc nonsensical. Once 111ol-cwe can clear o ~ Iic;tds
~ r I>y thinlting of direcr ol>jccrs.
j'rlic answcr t o ''What is the clircct objcct in 'John scnt Mal-y a I ~ o o k ' ? "is "i\ book."
!This is the right answer as r n ~ ~ cwhen
li
the s e ~ l t c ~ l cisc false as whcn it is true, ~incl
also whcn it is only nlaclc up, 3s it is i l l this c;ise, to illustrate a point. It is cviclent
,~ionsenscto ask al>outtlic no tic of existence o r o ~ ~ t o l o g i cstatus
al
of tlie clirect object
a s such: o r t o aslz w h a t lzincl of thiiig LI boo/< is, as it is thought of in answer t o tlie
:cluestion a l ~ o u tthe direct ol~jcct.

/tile

"ortlinary l a n g ~ ~ a g ephilosopl~y,
"
says tliat 011 thc contrary wc a t ally r : ~ scc
~ c ol>jccts
(in the iciide n l o d c r ~ isense whicll w o ~ l l dinclutle, c.g, shadows) without any sucll
intermediaries. It is usually part of this positioil t o insist that I can't scc (or,
feel, heal; taste o r smell) somct!iiilg that is ~ i o licrc,
t
any more t h a ~ Ii can liit somcthing that is not there: I ciln only tl~ilzkI see (ctc.) something i l it isn't there, o r oilly
ill s o ~ n eextcnclecl usage of "scc" d o 1 scc wll;~t isn't there. I shall say most a b o ~ i t
seeing, as most people d o in tiiscussing this topic. T'lie other vcr11s arc for goocl
reasons (which aren't very relevilnt to 11ly topic) often treated rathcr tliffercntly, espccially by orcli~larylar~guagephilosophy.
I wish to say that both these positio~lsarc wrong; tliat both nlisuncierstancl v e r l ~ s
of sense-perception, because th,:sc verbs are inte~ltionalo r essentially I ~ a v can isitentional aspect. Tile first position ~ ~ i i s c o n s t r u ei~itentional
s
objects as matcrial objccts
of sensation; tile other allows only 17zater.inl objects of sensation; o r a t any ratc docs
not allow for a description of w h a t is seen which is c.g. neutral as betwccsl its being
a real spot ( a stain) o r an aftel--image, giving only the content of a n expcrie~iccof
seeing concerning which o n e docs not yct k n o w whether one is seeing a real spot
o r an after-image."
To see the intentionality of s e ~ r s a t i o ~itl is only necessary to look a t a few cxnmples which bring it out.

( I ) " W h e ~ iyo11 screw

from it."

your
~
eyes Ioolzing at a light, you scc rays shooting out

(2) "I scc the print very 1)lurrcc.i: is it blurrccl, o r is it

III~
eyes?"

(3) "Move these handles until yoti see the bird in tlie i ~ c s t . "(Squint-testing apparatus; thc hiril ancl thc liest arc o n scparatc cnrcls.)

(4) "I scc six buttons on tliat 1n21n'scoat, I mercly see a lot of s n o w flakes framccl
by this window-frame-no defiiiite n ~ ~ ~ n h c r . "
(5) ". . . a mirage. An approacliing pedestrian may have n o fcet (they arc replaced
by a bit of sky).'"

(6) "With this hearing aid, w1:cn y o ~ ltalk I heal some screeching noises; n o low
tolies and the consonants arc ucsy indistinct."

(7) "I hear a ringing in m y ears."

In the philosophy of sense-j~crccptionthcrc are t w o opposing positions. O n e says
that what w e arc immediately a w a r e of in sensation is sense-imprcssio~is,callecl
"iclcas" by IScrlielcy ancl "scnsc-clata" l ~ yI<iisscll. T h e otlicl; taltcn i ~ ~p l o w a d a y sIly

(8) "I heard a trcmcndous roal-ing noise outsiile, and wondercd with alarm for a
moment what great machine or floodwater could be malting it. And then I rcalizccl
that it was only my little d o g sr~oriugclose a t hai~cl.""

- wo~.sllipsr~cli-;inti-sucl~" will be tl.i~e;a114 is1 chc case sr~pposedsome silch

Ihe)!
1 sentence is true.
'',

Q ~ ~ c s t i oa~blosu t thc identity of an intentional object, when this cannot be reci~lcetl

I to the identity of n lllntcvinl object, arc obviously of solile interest. H o w clo we
; dcciclc that t w o peol>lc 01. ~>coples
worshil7 o r clo not worship tile same g o ~ 1 ?/\gain,
I
i when a proper name is ol>scure ancl remote in its historical ~.clcl-cncc,
like "Al-tll~lr,"
/ t h e qlrcstion may arise whetlicr t w o people arc tllil~ltingof: the same man-if tiley

i have dificrcnt, incompatihlc, pictures of

hi~ii.
But I perceive that my saying "when this cannot be reduced to tile identity of a

!
i

1 u~o~cviill
ol>jcctn]nay mislead: fclr by rr~nlerinlo[>jccts I clo not n-rean what asc now
! called "material ol?jccts"-tables, planets, I~umpsof butter ancl s o on. 'To give a clear
! .
installce: a clcbt of five clollars is not a matcrial objcct in t l ~ i slatter sense; hut givcri
I that someone hacl contractecl such a debt, 111y t h o u p l ~ t"tllat dcht of five dollars"

I
Iwoultl linvc as its niatel-ial object something dcscrihecl a n d inclicatcd by the phrase
I

'

,grving tlie intentional ol>ject of my thought. W h e ~ iit is I~eyondcluestion that tlie

~ p h r n s cgiving a11 intentional objcct does describe a n d indicate a matcrial object i i i
'this scnsc, tile11 the qocstioil 21s to rile idc~itityof tlie iotcntional objcct redoces to
I question as to tlic iclentity o f the matcrial object. Arc we referring to the same
jdckt? T h a t is, ~ ~ c r h a pnot
s , t o o cliffic~lltto establish. But when either there is no real
debt or it is very obsci~l.ewhether tlicre is, the case is altcrcti.
I lie fact t l ~ a rwe can ~ ~ the
s cconcept of identity i l l co~lncctionwith intentional
I
iubjccts slioulci not lent1 11s to tilink there is ally sense in qr~cstionsas to the kind ol.
I
~ c s i s t c ~ ~ c c - t honrological
c
status-of i11tcntion;ll objccts a s such. /Ill s l ~ c hclucstiotis
arc nonsensical. Once 111ol-cwe can clear o ~ Iic;tds
~ r I>y thinlting of direcr ol>jccrs.
j'rlic answcr t o ''What is the clircct objcct in 'John scnt Mal-y a I ~ o o k ' ? "is "i\ book."
!This is the right answer as r n ~ ~ cwhen
li
the s e ~ l t c ~ l cisc false as whcn it is true, ~incl
also whcn it is only nlaclc up, 3s it is i l l this c;ise, to illustrate a point. It is cviclent
,~ionsenscto ask al>outtlic no tic of existence o r o ~ ~ t o l o g i cstatus
al
of tlie clirect object
a s such: o r t o aslz w h a t lzincl of thiiig LI boo/< is, as it is thought of in answer t o tlie
:cluestion a l ~ o u tthe direct ol~jcct.

/tile

"ortlinary l a n g ~ ~ a g ephilosopl~y,
"
says tliat 011 thc contrary wc a t ally r : ~ scc
~ c ol>jccts
(in the iciide n l o d c r ~ isense whicll w o ~ l l dinclutle, c.g, shadows) without any sucll
intermediaries. It is usually part of this positioil t o insist that I can't scc (or,
feel, heal; taste o r smell) somct!iiilg that is ~ i o licrc,
t
any more t h a ~ Ii can liit somcthing that is not there: I ciln only tl~ilzkI see (ctc.) something i l it isn't there, o r oilly
ill s o ~ n eextcnclecl usage of "scc" d o 1 scc wll;~t isn't there. I shall say most a b o ~ i t
seeing, as most people d o in tiiscussing this topic. T'lie other vcr11s arc for goocl
reasons (which aren't very relevilnt to 11ly topic) often treated rathcr tliffercntly, espccially by orcli~larylar~guagephilosophy.
I wish to say that both these positio~lsarc wrong; tliat both nlisuncierstancl v e r l ~ s
of sense-perception, because th,:sc verbs are inte~ltionalo r essentially I ~ a v can isitentional aspect. Tile first position ~ ~ i i s c o n s t r u ei~itentional
s
objects as matcrial objccts
of sensation; tile other allows only 17zater.inl objects of sensation; o r a t any ratc docs
not allow for a description of w h a t is seen which is c.g. neutral as betwccsl its being
a real spot ( a stain) o r an aftel--image, giving only the content of a n expcrie~iccof
seeing concerning which o n e docs not yct k n o w whether one is seeing a real spot
o r an after-image."
To see the intentionality of s e ~ r s a t i o ~itl is only necessary to look a t a few cxnmples which bring it out.

( I ) " W h e ~ iyo11 screw

from it."

your
~
eyes Ioolzing at a light, you scc rays shooting out

(2) "I scc the print very 1)lurrcc.i: is it blurrccl, o r is it

III~
eyes?"

(3) "Move these handles until yoti see the bird in tlie i ~ c s t . "(Squint-testing apparatus; thc hiril ancl thc liest arc o n scparatc cnrcls.)

(4) "I scc six buttons on tliat 1n21n'scoat, I mercly see a lot of s n o w flakes framccl
by this window-frame-no defiiiite n ~ ~ ~ n h c r . "
(5) ". . . a mirage. An approacliing pedestrian may have n o fcet (they arc replaced
by a bit of sky).'"

(6) "With this hearing aid, w1:cn y o ~ ltalk I heal some screeching noises; n o low
tolies and the consonants arc ucsy indistinct."

(7) "I hear a ringing in m y ears."

In the philosophy of sense-j~crccptionthcrc are t w o opposing positions. O n e says
that what w e arc immediately a w a r e of in sensation is sense-imprcssio~is,callecl
"iclcas" by IScrlielcy ancl "scnsc-clata" l ~ yI<iisscll. T h e otlicl; taltcn i ~ ~p l o w a d a y sIly

(8) "I heard a trcmcndous roal-ing noise outsiile, and wondercd with alarm for a
moment what great machine or floodwater could be malting it. And then I rcalizccl
that it was only my little d o g sr~oriugclose a t hai~cl.""

(9) "Do you I<now Izow a taste call sonletlmes be qulte ~ndeternlrnateunt11 you
k n o w what you are e a t ~ n g ? "
(10) "I keep o n smelling tllc a~ilellof h ~ ~ r n ~ilibber
n g wben, as I fii~ilout, rhere 1s
n o such t h ~ n g . "

Someonc w h o wislies to say that the verbs of sense are used right in normal cases
otzly with real things as objects, and even with real things correctly characterizeti,
lnay say that these arc exceptional uses. Either the context (eye-testing apparatns)
o r what is saicl, with thc tone of voice and special cmphasis appropriate to it, siiows
this. There w a s p r c s ~ ~ m a b al ytlcfinite nunlbcr of snowflal<cs falling s o as to he seen
from a certain position, a n d that w a s the number seen; only the subject did not
ltnow liow m a n y tlierc were, was n o t able to tell by looking as he could tell the
number of buttons o n the coat. Me expressed this by saying he did not see a definite number of snowflaltes; but this is a n ocid LISC of "see," cliffererit from the more
normal use w e gct in the following example:
( I 1) "I saw somcone 111 the study lust now." "Nonsense! You can't have, because
there isn't anyone thcre." "Well, I wonder w h a t I saw, then."

N o w this may hc; o n the other h a n d the oculist testing the degree of a squint
docs not have t o teach a new usc of "see" o r of "I see a (picture of a ) bird in a
nest" before he can ask " D o you see the bircl in the nest?"-the bird-picture and the
n e s t - p i c t ~ ~ being
rc
in fact spatially separated. To call such a use "new" simply means
that s o ~ l i cdifference bctwcen it a n d w h a t is being called the old use strikes ~ r sas
iml)or.tfint.
'These is intleed a n important difference; though it is wrong to regard the uscs
which it marks as, s o t o speak, rlcvia~zt,for o u r concepts of sensation are built u p
by our having all tliese uses. T h e difference w e are attending to is that in these cases,
object phrases arc ~rsedgiving objt:cts which are, wholly o r in part, merely illtentional. This corlles o u t in t w o features: neither possible non-existence (in the situation), nor i~zcleterlninacy,of the object is any objection to the truth of w h a t is said.
N o w "ordinary l a n g ~ ~ a g evicws
"
and "sense-daturn" views m a k e the same niistalte, that of failing to recognize the intentionality of se~lsation,though they take
opposite positions in conscqucnce. This failure comes o u t clearly o n the part of a n
ordi~lary-languagep11ilosophe1-if: he insists that w h a t I say I see must really hc there
if I aln not lying, rnistaltcn, o r ~ ~ s i l ilanguage
g
in a "quecr," extendeel (and therefore discountable) way.
maltes the same mistake in his insistence
T h e Bcrl<eleyan sense-datum
that, c,g., one sccs visual i~llprcssions,visual data. I w o ~ ~ say
l d that sucli a pl~iloso-

pher maltes a n incorrect inference from the truth of the grammatical statement that
tlie intentional object, the imp~:ession,the visual object, is w h a t you see. I-Ie takes
the expression "what yo11 sec" materially. "Thc v i s ~ ~ i~iipression
al
is w h a t y o u sec,"
which is a p~.opositionlike " T l ~ edil-cct object is w h a t hc sent," is ~iiisconstrueclso
as to lead to "You sce a n i~iipression," as the other ncvcr would be rnisconstrl~ctl
so as to lead t o "I-Ie sent her a direct object."
This is a rliore interesting and permanently tempting mistakc t l ~ a nthe o t i ~ c ~ . ,
whose appeal is merely that of a comlnon-sense revolt against a Bcrltelcyan type of
view, B L Iboth
~ doctrines havc a great deal of p o i n t . To calic rhc "orcIin;lsy l a ~ i g l ~ a g ~ "
doctri~ie:
Firsi, w h a t I shall call the material use o l verbs of scnsc exists. T h e material ~ i s c
of "see" is a use which demai-icis a ~rzaterialobject of the verb. "You can't havc secn
a unicorn, u ~ ~ i c o r ndon't
s
exist." L ' Y ocan't
~ ~ have seen a lion, there wasn't any lion.
there to see." These uscs arc quite commonplace. It is not ~ n e r c l ythat the ohjcctphrase is taken materially---IS w e have seen, that may be the case with all intcntional verb without reflectills on its intentionality. Here the vcrh " t o sec" is not
allowed t o t a l e a t ~ ~ ~ r ei~ltciltional
ljl
object; non-existence of thc object (absolutely,
o r in the situation) is a n objection to the trutll of the sentence. We see tlie doublc
use of the verb "see" hy coi~trastingit wit11 "worship." No one wo~ilclcvcr s;ly:
"They cannot have worshippecl unicorns, because thcrc are n o sucli things."
Second, the words giving the object of a verb of sense arc ~ ~ e c c s s a r i most
ly
oftcil
intended as giving 17iaterial i)l~jectsof sense: for this is their prirnn~.)lalll?lic;~ric~rl.
To see this, co~isidcrthc follo\\ii~lg.Suppose 11 I,rigllt red ~>l;~stic
coy clcl,li;irl~ looks
greyish-brown to me in a cest;ii~llight. Only if I clo not ltnow tliut the j;rcyish-bro\vn
colour is merc appcaraucc tlo I say without ally special context (c.g. that of cicscribitlg impressions), o r apology, o r Iiurnour: " I see a greyish-brown plastic toy
elephant." This is because:. we undcrstancl the clescril>tion-ol-a~~-;~pl~car.nncc
"greyish-brown" by understailding the description "greyisll-bro\vnn: this dcscrii~cs
\vhat the a1,pearance is of. To d o that, it I I I L I S ~in the first i~istancebc a tlcscsiption
of such a thing as it woulcl bc true of (for t l ~ cappearance is an appcarance of that)really, and not merely in aplwara~icc:this will he its primary application. But, being
a description of a sensible property, it must also i r i its primary application cntcr into
the object phrases for tlie appropriate verbs of scnsc, since w e get t o k n o w sensi1)Ic
properties by the appropriate: senses.
Fi~rther,w e ought to say, not: "Being red is loolting red in normal light to tlte
normal-sigllted," b ~ l trather .'Looking scd is looking as a thing that is red loolts in
normal light to the normal-sighted." For if we ought rathcr to say the first, tlicn

(9) "Do you I<now Izow a taste call sonletlmes be qulte ~ndeternlrnateunt11 you
k n o w what you are e a t ~ n g ? "
(10) "I keep o n smelling tllc a~ilellof h ~ ~ r n ~ilibber
n g wben, as I fii~ilout, rhere 1s
n o such t h ~ n g . "

Someonc w h o wislies to say that the verbs of sense are used right in normal cases
otzly with real things as objects, and even with real things correctly characterizeti,
lnay say that these arc exceptional uses. Either the context (eye-testing apparatns)
o r what is saicl, with thc tone of voice and special cmphasis appropriate to it, siiows
this. There w a s p r c s ~ ~ m a b al ytlcfinite nunlbcr of snowflal<cs falling s o as to he seen
from a certain position, a n d that w a s the number seen; only the subject did not
ltnow liow m a n y tlierc were, was n o t able to tell by looking as he could tell the
number of buttons o n the coat. Me expressed this by saying he did not see a definite number of snowflaltes; but this is a n ocid LISC of "see," cliffererit from the more
normal use w e gct in the following example:
( I 1) "I saw somcone 111 the study lust now." "Nonsense! You can't have, because
there isn't anyone thcre." "Well, I wonder w h a t I saw, then."

N o w this may hc; o n the other h a n d the oculist testing the degree of a squint
docs not have t o teach a new usc of "see" o r of "I see a (picture of a ) bird in a
nest" before he can ask " D o you see the bircl in the nest?"-the bird-picture and the
n e s t - p i c t ~ ~ being
rc
in fact spatially separated. To call such a use "new" simply means
that s o ~ l i cdifference bctwcen it a n d w h a t is being called the old use strikes ~ r sas
iml)or.tfint.
'These is intleed a n important difference; though it is wrong to regard the uscs
which it marks as, s o t o speak, rlcvia~zt,for o u r concepts of sensation are built u p
by our having all tliese uses. T h e difference w e are attending to is that in these cases,
object phrases arc ~rsedgiving objt:cts which are, wholly o r in part, merely illtentional. This corlles o u t in t w o features: neither possible non-existence (in the situation), nor i~zcleterlninacy,of the object is any objection to the truth of w h a t is said.
N o w "ordinary l a n g ~ ~ a g evicws
"
and "sense-daturn" views m a k e the same niistalte, that of failing to recognize the intentionality of se~lsation,though they take
opposite positions in conscqucnce. This failure comes o u t clearly o n the part of a n
ordi~lary-languagep11ilosophe1-if: he insists that w h a t I say I see must really hc there
if I aln not lying, rnistaltcn, o r ~ ~ s i l ilanguage
g
in a "quecr," extendeel (and therefore discountable) way.
maltes the same mistake in his insistence
T h e Bcrl<eleyan sense-datum
that, c,g., one sccs visual i~llprcssions,visual data. I w o ~ ~ say
l d that sucli a pl~iloso-

pher maltes a n incorrect inference from the truth of the grammatical statement that
tlie intentional object, the imp~:ession,the visual object, is w h a t you see. I-Ie takes
the expression "what yo11 sec" materially. "Thc v i s ~ ~ i~iipression
al
is w h a t y o u sec,"
which is a p~.opositionlike " T l ~ edil-cct object is w h a t hc sent," is ~iiisconstrueclso
as to lead to "You sce a n i~iipression," as the other ncvcr would be rnisconstrl~ctl
so as to lead t o "I-Ie sent her a direct object."
This is a rliore interesting and permanently tempting mistakc t l ~ a nthe o t i ~ c ~ . ,
whose appeal is merely that of a comlnon-sense revolt against a Bcrltelcyan type of
view, B L Iboth
~ doctrines havc a great deal of p o i n t . To calic rhc "orcIin;lsy l a ~ i g l ~ a g ~ "
doctri~ie:
Firsi, w h a t I shall call the material use o l verbs of scnsc exists. T h e material ~ i s c
of "see" is a use which demai-icis a ~rzaterialobject of the verb. "You can't havc secn
a unicorn, u ~ ~ i c o r ndon't
s
exist." L ' Y ocan't
~ ~ have seen a lion, there wasn't any lion.
there to see." These uscs arc quite commonplace. It is not ~ n e r c l ythat the ohjcctphrase is taken materially---IS w e have seen, that may be the case with all intcntional verb without reflectills on its intentionality. Here the vcrh " t o sec" is not
allowed t o t a l e a t ~ ~ ~ r ei~ltciltional
ljl
object; non-existence of thc object (absolutely,
o r in the situation) is a n objection to the trutll of the sentence. We see tlie doublc
use of the verb "see" hy coi~trastingit wit11 "worship." No one wo~ilclcvcr s;ly:
"They cannot have worshippecl unicorns, because thcrc are n o sucli things."
Second, the words giving the object of a verb of sense arc ~ ~ e c c s s a r i most
ly
oftcil
intended as giving 17iaterial i)l~jectsof sense: for this is their prirnn~.)lalll?lic;~ric~rl.
To see this, co~isidcrthc follo\\ii~lg.Suppose 11 I,rigllt red ~>l;~stic
coy clcl,li;irl~ looks
greyish-brown to me in a cest;ii~llight. Only if I clo not ltnow tliut the j;rcyish-bro\vn
colour is merc appcaraucc tlo I say without ally special context (c.g. that of cicscribitlg impressions), o r apology, o r Iiurnour: " I see a greyish-brown plastic toy
elephant." This is because:. we undcrstancl the clescril>tion-ol-a~~-;~pl~car.nncc
"greyish-brown" by understailding the description "greyisll-bro\vnn: this dcscrii~cs
\vhat the a1,pearance is of. To d o that, it I I I L I S ~in the first i~istancebc a tlcscsiption
of such a thing as it woulcl bc true of (for t l ~ cappearance is an appcarance of that)really, and not merely in aplwara~icc:this will he its primary application. But, being
a description of a sensible property, it must also i r i its primary application cntcr into
the object phrases for tlie appropriate verbs of scnsc, since w e get t o k n o w sensi1)Ic
properties by the appropriate: senses.
Fi~rther,w e ought to say, not: "Being red is loolting red in normal light to tlte
normal-sigllted," b ~ l trather .'Looking scd is looking as a thing that is red loolts in
normal light to the normal-sighted." For if we ought rathcr to say the first, tlicn

how d o we uncierstand "loolting red"? N o t by understa~lcli~ig

"red" and "looking."
It would have to be explained as a simple idea; and so would looking any other
colouc It may be repliecl: Tllcse all are simple ideas; "loolting yellow" and "looking
recl" are the right expressions for what you show someone when you sho\v hi111

yellow and red, for he will only learn

anci "~:cd"from the examples if they
1001< yellow ancl look rctl; so it is loo1:ing-jlcllo~u ant1 lool~itzg-rcclthat he really gets
holtl of allcl has Occn i ~ ~ t r - o d ~to,
~ c eeve11
~ l t l l o ~ ~ gYOLI
h SCIY y o ~ lare explaining
"yellow" ancl "recl." This woulcl come to saying that in strictllcss " l o o k i ~ ~ gshould
"
be part of every colour worcl ill rcports of perception: it will the11 cease to pcrform
the actual functio~lof tlie worcl "loolting." It was plausible to say: O11ly if it loolts
reti to hi111will he Icarn what is 11ica11t;but wrong to infer: What he then grasps as
the correlate of tlic word "red" is a rccl look. Even granted that hc Itnows lie is to
learn the name of a coloul; still it invites ~i~is~~tlclerstaliciillg
to rely on sometliing
that only looks red to teach hini tlie word; if lie notices that it only loolts recl, liow
l i a t ~ ~ u for
a l him to suppose that "red" was the name of the colour that it actually
is. If you tell him: "It's tlie c o l o ~ ~that
r this 'loolts,'" this presupposes that "looks
C" ancl "C" are originally, anci not just subsequently, distinct: that, in short, "being
red" is not after all to he explained as a certain Ioolti~lg-red.
Again, things do not always loolc the same shape, colour, size and so on, hut we
com~iionlylook at and tlcscribe thcm, saying, e.g., "It's rectangulal-, black and about
six foot in height," without paying attention to how they look-indeed we might
say that often things look to us, strike us, not as they look but as they are! (Cotiviction that 0111j1 so is "loolts" used riglitly was the cause of confusion to an ovcrconfident ordinary-langt~agcpl~ilosophcron an occasiorl famous i l l Oxforcl: I;. Ciofli
brought in a glass vessel of water with a stick in it. "Do ~ O L mean
I
to say," he aslted,
"that this stick docs not look be~lr?""No," said the other bravely: "It loolts like a
straight stick in watcs." So Cioffi took it out and it ~uirsbent.)
So m ~ ~ catl lleast there is to bc saicl on the side of the "ordinary-larigu~~ge"
philosophc1: But, tnr~lingto the sense-ilnj~rcssio~~
philosophy, how much it poi~itso ~ and
~ t
can investigate which often gets querulously dis~liisseclby the other side! Tliere is
such a tliing as simply rlcscribing impressions, simply describing the sensil3le appearances that present thcnlsclves to one situated tlius ancl thus-or- to t~~yself.
Seconrl, tlie sense-i~llprcssio~l
pliiloso~~hy
will be right in its way of taking tlie
I'latonic dictl~m:"I-Ie who sees must scc something." Plato co~-ripareclthis to "I fc
who thinlts must tliinlt so~nething,"and has sometimes been criticized on the ground
that "seeing" is a relation of a subject to an object in the nod ern sense of that last

word, wliile thi~ikingis diilerent: that such-anel-such is the case isn't a thing. i\ut
"I-Ie who sees must see something" is being wro~iglyralten if taken as meanii~g:
"Whenever anyone can rigl~tiybe saicl to see, there must be something there, which
is wliat he sees." Taken in that sense, it is not true; to say it is ~ S L I Cis to Icgislilte
against all except the material use of "see." The sense in which it is true is that if
somcone is seeing, these is some conccnt of his vis11al cxpcricncc. I I Ilc saps hc can
see ("can see" is English iclion~for "is sccing") we can aslc him "What can you scc?"
I-Ie may say "I tlon'r it no\\^." l'erhaps that mealis that he doesn't know what the
material object of his seei~igis; perhaps simply that he is at a loss to make out lO/lOt
what he (in any sense) sees looks like. Rut then we can say: well, at any rnte, dcsc~.i\)c
what colours, wliat variation of light ancl clarlt you see. He may say: "It's fri~:litfully difficult, it all cliangcs so fast, so many colours shifting all tlic time, I c;lii't
describe it, it doesn't stay long enoughn-and that's a description. Rut he car>~iot
say: "how do you i-neali, what I see? I o~ilysaid I could see, I didn't say I could scc
something-there's 1-10 need of a 'tuhat' that I see." That woulcl be unintclligiblc.
This brings out the tliirtl point in favour of the sense-impressio~lphilosoi~Ii)r,
which offers it sollie support even in its strict Bcrkeleyan form. The m i ~ l i ~ l ~ u r n
descriptioli that must l e possible if someone can see, will he of colours with their
variations of light ant1 darkness. One cannot say "Coloul; light and dark? N o q~lcstion of any such things," irr response to a j1rese71t enquiry about what one sees.
That is to say, it is so wiih us. Perhaps we coulcl imagine people whose Iangunge
has no colour vocabulary, though they are sighted, i.e. they use eyes and need light
to get about s ~ ~ c c e s s f ~ ~
etc.
l l y'4, man of such a people, taught to read by sight, le~irrls
names of letters, could r.eail o ~ wortls
~ t which were black on white, but coulcl not
unclerstand the worcls "black" ancl "wllite." We'cl say we clo not know "ho\\~he
tells" the vvords, tlie sliapcs. But is that to say anything but that for us appeal to
colo~lrsis used in an accou~il-of how we tcll sliapcs? Whcrcas
for Iiim tlicre
is in this sense no such thiiig as a " l ~ o whe tells"-any more than there is for us
with the colours t l ~ e m s e l ~ ~We
e s . don't ask for- a "how we tell" it's red, as we ask
for a "hom~we tell" it's the ivord "recl" and accept as part of the answer "by sccirlg
these sl~apes,i.e. colour p~itchesof tllcsc shapes". We may wontlcr "How coultl
there be such recognitio~~
of n thing lilte the pattern of a worcl-rrr~t~~cdiaterlrccognition? I-Tow could it huc bc irlediatcd by perception of colour?" (One of the origins
of the notion of simple ideas, clemcnts.) But although i n this case we have an account
of the perception of the pattern as mcdiatcd by the j,crccption of colour, thinl; of
our recognition of hu~l-rancspressions. We feel that this is the kitzd of thing to be

how d o we uncierstand "loolting red"? N o t by understa~lcli~ig

"red" and "looking."
It would have to be explained as a simple idea; and so would looking any other
colouc It may be repliecl: Tllcse all are simple ideas; "loolting yellow" and "looking
recl" are the right expressions for what you show someone when you sho\v hi111

yellow and red, for he will only learn

anci "~:cd"from the examples if they
1001< yellow ancl look rctl; so it is loo1:ing-jlcllo~u ant1 lool~itzg-rcclthat he really gets
holtl of allcl has Occn i ~ ~ t r - o d ~to,
~ c eeve11
~ l t l l o ~ ~ gYOLI
h SCIY y o ~ lare explaining
"yellow" ancl "recl." This woulcl come to saying that in strictllcss " l o o k i ~ ~ gshould
"
be part of every colour worcl ill rcports of perception: it will the11 cease to pcrform
the actual functio~lof tlie worcl "loolting." It was plausible to say: O11ly if it loolts
reti to hi111will he Icarn what is 11ica11t;but wrong to infer: What he then grasps as
the correlate of tlic word "red" is a rccl look. Even granted that hc Itnows lie is to
learn the name of a coloul; still it invites ~i~is~~tlclerstaliciillg
to rely on sometliing
that only looks red to teach hini tlie word; if lie notices that it only loolts recl, liow
l i a t ~ ~ u for
a l him to suppose that "red" was the name of the colour that it actually
is. If you tell him: "It's tlie c o l o ~ ~that
r this 'loolts,'" this presupposes that "looks
C" ancl "C" are originally, anci not just subsequently, distinct: that, in short, "being
red" is not after all to he explained as a certain Ioolti~lg-red.
Again, things do not always loolc the same shape, colour, size and so on, hut we
com~iionlylook at and tlcscribe thcm, saying, e.g., "It's rectangulal-, black and about
six foot in height," without paying attention to how they look-indeed we might
say that often things look to us, strike us, not as they look but as they are! (Cotiviction that 0111j1 so is "loolts" used riglitly was the cause of confusion to an ovcrconfident ordinary-langt~agcpl~ilosophcron an occasiorl famous i l l Oxforcl: I;. Ciofli
brought in a glass vessel of water with a stick in it. "Do ~ O L mean
I
to say," he aslted,
"that this stick docs not look be~lr?""No," said the other bravely: "It loolts like a
straight stick in watcs." So Cioffi took it out and it ~uirsbent.)
So m ~ ~ catl lleast there is to bc saicl on the side of the "ordinary-larigu~~ge"
philosophc1: But, tnr~lingto the sense-ilnj~rcssio~~
philosophy, how much it poi~itso ~ and
~ t
can investigate which often gets querulously dis~liisseclby the other side! Tliere is
such a tliing as simply rlcscribing impressions, simply describing the sensil3le appearances that present thcnlsclves to one situated tlius ancl thus-or- to t~~yself.
Seconrl, tlie sense-i~llprcssio~l
pliiloso~~hy
will be right in its way of taking tlie
I'latonic dictl~m:"I-Ie who sees must scc something." Plato co~-ripareclthis to "I fc
who thinlts must tliinlt so~nething,"and has sometimes been criticized on the ground
that "seeing" is a relation of a subject to an object in the nod ern sense of that last

word, wliile thi~ikingis diilerent: that such-anel-such is the case isn't a thing. i\ut
"I-Ie who sees must see something" is being wro~iglyralten if taken as meanii~g:
"Whenever anyone can rigl~tiybe saicl to see, there must be something there, which
is wliat he sees." Taken in that sense, it is not true; to say it is ~ S L I Cis to Icgislilte
against all except the material use of "see." The sense in which it is true is that if
somcone is seeing, these is some conccnt of his vis11al cxpcricncc. I I Ilc saps hc can
see ("can see" is English iclion~for "is sccing") we can aslc him "What can you scc?"
I-Ie may say "I tlon'r it no\\^." l'erhaps that mealis that he doesn't know what the
material object of his seei~igis; perhaps simply that he is at a loss to make out lO/lOt
what he (in any sense) sees looks like. Rut then we can say: well, at any rnte, dcsc~.i\)c
what colours, wliat variation of light ancl clarlt you see. He may say: "It's fri~:litfully difficult, it all cliangcs so fast, so many colours shifting all tlic time, I c;lii't
describe it, it doesn't stay long enoughn-and that's a description. Rut he car>~iot
say: "how do you i-neali, what I see? I o~ilysaid I could see, I didn't say I could scc
something-there's 1-10 need of a 'tuhat' that I see." That woulcl be unintclligiblc.
This brings out the tliirtl point in favour of the sense-impressio~lphilosoi~Ii)r,
which offers it sollie support even in its strict Bcrkeleyan form. The m i ~ l i ~ l ~ u r n
descriptioli that must l e possible if someone can see, will he of colours with their
variations of light ant1 darkness. One cannot say "Coloul; light and dark? N o q~lcstion of any such things," irr response to a j1rese71t enquiry about what one sees.
That is to say, it is so wiih us. Perhaps we coulcl imagine people whose Iangunge
has no colour vocabulary, though they are sighted, i.e. they use eyes and need light
to get about s ~ ~ c c e s s f ~ ~
etc.
l l y'4, man of such a people, taught to read by sight, le~irrls
names of letters, could r.eail o ~ wortls
~ t which were black on white, but coulcl not
unclerstand the worcls "black" ancl "wllite." We'cl say we clo not know "ho\\~he
tells" the vvords, tlie sliapcs. But is that to say anything but that for us appeal to
colo~lrsis used in an accou~il-of how we tcll sliapcs? Whcrcas
for Iiim tlicre
is in this sense no such thiiig as a " l ~ o whe tells"-any more than there is for us
with the colours t l ~ e m s e l ~ ~We
e s . don't ask for- a "how we tell" it's red, as we ask
for a "hom~we tell" it's the ivord "recl" and accept as part of the answer "by sccirlg
these sl~apes,i.e. colour p~itchesof tllcsc shapes". We may wontlcr "How coultl
there be such recognitio~~
of n thing lilte the pattern of a worcl-rrr~t~~cdiaterlrccognition? I-Tow could it huc bc irlediatcd by perception of colour?" (One of the origins
of the notion of simple ideas, clemcnts.) But although i n this case we have an account
of the perception of the pattern as mcdiatcd by the j,crccption of colour, thinl; of
our recognition of hu~l-rancspressions. We feel that this is the kitzd of thing to be

L
-

70

(I.

I.,

----

kl / l ~ r s ~ o i ~ r l ~ ~ ~

mediated, but fail in o u r attempts t o describe tlie elements and their arrangelllents,
secing which we recognize a c h e e r f ~ o~rl ironical expression. But, one niay say, optically speaking he must 11e being affected by light of the wavelengths helonging to
tlie cliffcrent colours. Yes-but cloes t11:lt s h o w that, s o to speak, thc content of a
colour c o ~ i c c p tis 17us11cclinto him, s o that all he has to d o is litter it in a name,
whose use he will later malte to fit with other people's in its range of application?
I believe this is thought. (cf. Quine a b o u t "square" a n d each man's retinal projcct1o11
of a ~~~~~~~e rile.)' I ; o r m ~ ~ l a t e dthis
, loses its plausil~ility.For one thing, the optical
process cloes 11ot cxhibit anything to the mall in who111 it takes place. For ;lnother,
no concept is si~iiplygiven; every one involves a complicated t e c l i n i q ~ ~of
c application oC the w o r d for it, which c o ~ ~ l 11ot
c l ~ ~ 1ljc
s t prcscntccl by a n cxllericncc-content.
The fact that thcrc is 110 " h o w w e tell" a b o u t colo~11--recognition
does not mean that
training in practices-most striltingly the practices co~nprisingthat tecliniq~ieof
app1ic;ition-is
n o t as necessary for tllc acquisition of colour concepts as those of
substances o r squ,i.l e roots.
Pursuant to this false conception of the primitively given, Berkeley-and Russellthouglit that all else in descriptiorl of the seen, all besides the arrarlgemetlt of colour
patches in tlie visllal field, w a s inference ancl construction. This is not acceptable.
There are impressions of clistancc and size, f o r example, independent of assumptions a120~1tw1i;it a thing is. O n e may be utterly perplexed w h a t a thing is just because o n e is sccing it ns a t a different distance from the right one, ancl hence as the
wrong sizc. O r vice versa. I once opened 111y eyes and s a w the blaclt striking SIII-fncc
of il latchbo box wliicll was stiinding o n one cnd; thc otlicr sicles of the Imx wcre not
visible. This w a s a few inches from my eye a n d I gazed a t it in astonish~nentwondering w h a t it could he. Aslted t o describe the i m p r e s s i o ~as~ I remember it, I say:
"Something black a n d rectangular, o n end, some feet away, and some feet high." I
took it for three o r lour lcct tlistant, ant1 it loolwd, if anytlling, like a thick post,
but I I<new there could be n o such thing in niy beciroom. O r I have tal<et~a small
blaclt praycr book for a great family Biblc s o r t of v o l u ~ n c ,judging that it lay on a
footrest solnc fcct away inste;lcl of a oea1.1~yIcdgc ticarer eye-level. These wcre not
judge~ncntsof tlistancc bnsccl on itlentifications of things-the s~p17c)sitiorlof wh;it
thing it might 11e was hascd o n a n i~nprcssionof sizc which went with a false irnj>ression of dist311cc.
Departing, then, from P,erlceley, w e can note that tiescriptions of visual i ~ n p r e s sions can l)e vet-y rich ancl various. Tlicre c a n Ile i~iipressionsof clcpth and clistancc

and relative positions a n d sizc; of Itinds of things and kinds of stuff ancl texture aiid
even temperature; of facial esi~i-essionand emotion and mood and thought and character; of action and movemc.i-it (in tllc stntiotinry impression) and life and deatll.
Even within the compass of rhe description "colours with their variations of liglit
asid shade" there are diverse kinds of impression.
It r e ~ n a i n st o sort out tlie ~ e i a t i o n sbetween thc intentional ancl material objects,
of sensation; as I have clone most of the time, I will concentrate on seeing.
While there must be a n inceutional object of seeing, these need n o t ; ~ l w a ) ~I)cs a
nlaterial object. T h a t is to sa), "Xs a w A" where "saw" is used ruaterially, iniplics
some proposition "X s a w ---"
where "saw" is ~ ~ s e intentionally;
cl
but thc converse docs not Iiojcl. Tliis Ici~clsto tllc Cocling chat rlic intentional use is so~iicllow
prior to the material use. T h c feeling sccnls to r u n contrary to the rccognitioti, the
feeling, that for descriptions of objects of sight the material ; ~ p l ~ l i c : ~ t iiso nthe prior
one. Both feelings are-legiti~ilatcly-satisfied
by allowing tliat a n intentional objcct
is necessarily involvecl in seeii~g,while granting that this docs not confcr c l ~ i s t c n ~ o logical priority on purely intentional sentences, which inclcccl, in a host of the most
ordinary cases of reportetl sccing, are never f o r m ~ ~ l a t e or
c t cotisiclcrcd.
J o h n Austin, w h o opposed the view that there are t w o senses of "see" according as the seeing has to be veridical o r not, remarked casually that there were
perhaps t w o senses of "o\,jeii- of sight." I think it w a s it1 this c o ~ l ~ l e c t i othat
n he
co~ltrastcd"Today I saw a m . ~ uborn in Jerusalem" ancl "Today I saw a man shavctl
in Oxford"-both
said in O ~ l o r c l At
. a n y rate, o u c says, you clidn't see him born
today; perliaps you did see someone 11cing shaved. So the one clcscription, w l ~ i l c
true of w h a t you saw, in a sL:ilsedocs not givc w h a t you saw. A clescription cvhisli
is true of a material object L I the
~
verb "to see," b ~ l twhich states something thnt
absolutely 01- in tlie circumst-,111ces "you can't liave scelz," ncccssarily gives olzly a
~liatcrialohicct of sccing.
I11 speaking of the nlatcrial object of aiming, I saicl tliat if a llian aimed a t that
dark patch against the f o l i a ~ ~and
c , that patch was his father's hat with his fathe~.'s
head in it, thcn liis fathcr w ; ~ sa 111i1tcrialolljcct of liis ai111;I)LI[ if' hc iiirtlctl ;it S O I I I C
patch in a totally hallucinatory sccnc, ancl hit his father, you coulti not s ; ~ ytllat.
N o w if w e try t o al-rply this explanation to tlie case of sceing w e r u n into difiiculties which reflcct bacli 011 ~ l casc
~ c ol aiming. But in the casc consitlcrccl the n1;iterial ohject of aiming was a~.~:uablya n irz~eiitiotlnlobject of seeing. F o r w h a t clscit might 11e asked-is a dark patch against the foliage?

L
-

70

(I.

I.,

----

kl / l ~ r s ~ o i ~ r l ~ ~ ~

mediated, but fail in o u r attempts t o describe tlie elements and their arrangelllents,
secing which we recognize a c h e e r f ~ o~rl ironical expression. But, one niay say, optically speaking he must 11e being affected by light of the wavelengths helonging to
tlie cliffcrent colours. Yes-but cloes t11:lt s h o w that, s o to speak, thc content of a
colour c o ~ i c c p tis 17us11cclinto him, s o that all he has to d o is litter it in a name,
whose use he will later malte to fit with other people's in its range of application?
I believe this is thought. (cf. Quine a b o u t "square" a n d each man's retinal projcct1o11
of a ~~~~~~~e rile.)' I ; o r m ~ ~ l a t e dthis
, loses its plausil~ility.For one thing, the optical
process cloes 11ot cxhibit anything to the mall in who111 it takes place. For ;lnother,
no concept is si~iiplygiven; every one involves a complicated t e c l i n i q ~ ~of
c application oC the w o r d for it, which c o ~ ~ l 11ot
c l ~ ~ 1ljc
s t prcscntccl by a n cxllericncc-content.
The fact that thcrc is 110 " h o w w e tell" a b o u t colo~11--recognition
does not mean that
training in practices-most striltingly the practices co~nprisingthat tecliniq~ieof
app1ic;ition-is
n o t as necessary for tllc acquisition of colour concepts as those of
substances o r squ,i.l e roots.
Pursuant to this false conception of the primitively given, Berkeley-and Russellthouglit that all else in descriptiorl of the seen, all besides the arrarlgemetlt of colour
patches in tlie visllal field, w a s inference ancl construction. This is not acceptable.
There are impressions of clistancc and size, f o r example, independent of assumptions a120~1tw1i;it a thing is. O n e may be utterly perplexed w h a t a thing is just because o n e is sccing it ns a t a different distance from the right one, ancl hence as the
wrong sizc. O r vice versa. I once opened 111y eyes and s a w the blaclt striking SIII-fncc
of il latchbo box wliicll was stiinding o n one cnd; thc otlicr sicles of the Imx wcre not
visible. This w a s a few inches from my eye a n d I gazed a t it in astonish~nentwondering w h a t it could he. Aslted t o describe the i m p r e s s i o ~as~ I remember it, I say:
"Something black a n d rectangular, o n end, some feet away, and some feet high." I
took it for three o r lour lcct tlistant, ant1 it loolwd, if anytlling, like a thick post,
but I I<new there could be n o such thing in niy beciroom. O r I have tal<et~a small
blaclt praycr book for a great family Biblc s o r t of v o l u ~ n c ,judging that it lay on a
footrest solnc fcct away inste;lcl of a oea1.1~yIcdgc ticarer eye-level. These wcre not
judge~ncntsof tlistancc bnsccl on itlentifications of things-the s~p17c)sitiorlof wh;it
thing it might 11e was hascd o n a n i~nprcssionof sizc which went with a false irnj>ression of dist311cc.
Departing, then, from P,erlceley, w e can note that tiescriptions of visual i ~ n p r e s sions can l)e vet-y rich ancl various. Tlicre c a n Ile i~iipressionsof clcpth and clistancc

and relative positions a n d sizc; of Itinds of things and kinds of stuff ancl texture aiid
even temperature; of facial esi~i-essionand emotion and mood and thought and character; of action and movemc.i-it (in tllc stntiotinry impression) and life and deatll.
Even within the compass of rhe description "colours with their variations of liglit
asid shade" there are diverse kinds of impression.
It r e ~ n a i n st o sort out tlie ~ e i a t i o n sbetween thc intentional ancl material objects,
of sensation; as I have clone most of the time, I will concentrate on seeing.
While there must be a n inceutional object of seeing, these need n o t ; ~ l w a ) ~I)cs a
nlaterial object. T h a t is to sa), "Xs a w A" where "saw" is used ruaterially, iniplics
some proposition "X s a w ---"
where "saw" is ~ ~ s e intentionally;
cl
but thc converse docs not Iiojcl. Tliis Ici~clsto tllc Cocling chat rlic intentional use is so~iicllow
prior to the material use. T h c feeling sccnls to r u n contrary to the rccognitioti, the
feeling, that for descriptions of objects of sight the material ; ~ p l ~ l i c : ~ t iiso nthe prior
one. Both feelings are-legiti~ilatcly-satisfied
by allowing tliat a n intentional objcct
is necessarily involvecl in seeii~g,while granting that this docs not confcr c l ~ i s t c n ~ o logical priority on purely intentional sentences, which inclcccl, in a host of the most
ordinary cases of reportetl sccing, are never f o r m ~ ~ l a t e or
c t cotisiclcrcd.
J o h n Austin, w h o opposed the view that there are t w o senses of "see" according as the seeing has to be veridical o r not, remarked casually that there were
perhaps t w o senses of "o\,jeii- of sight." I think it w a s it1 this c o ~ l ~ l e c t i othat
n he
co~ltrastcd"Today I saw a m . ~ uborn in Jerusalem" ancl "Today I saw a man shavctl
in Oxford"-both
said in O ~ l o r c l At
. a n y rate, o u c says, you clidn't see him born
today; perliaps you did see someone 11cing shaved. So the one clcscription, w l ~ i l c
true of w h a t you saw, in a sL:ilsedocs not givc w h a t you saw. A clescription cvhisli
is true of a material object L I the
~
verb "to see," b ~ l twhich states something thnt
absolutely 01- in tlie circumst-,111ces "you can't liave scelz," ncccssarily gives olzly a
~liatcrialohicct of sccing.
I11 speaking of the nlatcrial object of aiming, I saicl tliat if a llian aimed a t that
dark patch against the f o l i a ~ ~and
c , that patch was his father's hat with his fathe~.'s
head in it, thcn liis fathcr w ; ~ sa 111i1tcrialolljcct of liis ai111;I)LI[ if' hc iiirtlctl ;it S O I I I C
patch in a totally hallucinatory sccnc, ancl hit his father, you coulti not s ; ~ ytllat.
N o w if w e try t o al-rply this explanation to tlie case of sceing w e r u n into difiiculties which reflcct bacli 011 ~ l casc
~ c ol aiming. But in the casc consitlcrccl the n1;iterial ohject of aiming was a~.~:uablya n irz~eiitiotlnlobject of seeing. F o r w h a t clscit might 11e asked-is a dark patch against the foliage?

This may seem to plurigc 11s into confusion. For surely w h a t is oirly a n intentional
object of seeing can't be a ~ n a t e r i a lobject o f aiming? Then when cloes a dcscril>tioil
givc a ntatcrial object of sight? O n e Itind of case w e have seen: when a tlescriptio~i
is true of w h a t is seen, hut does u o t give a n intentional object. "I see a man \vhose
great nnclc clicd in n lunatic asylum"-tl~e relative cla~iscgives an a l ~ s o l ~ r t c lnony
intcntional description. "I see a girl w h o has a ~ n o l ebetween her shoulder-bladesnin thc circumstntlccs it gives n non-intentional clcscriptiorl. For she is facing mc, ctc.
"YOLIcan't have seen that," ~ I I Csays.
But w h y ? If I can't see that, w h y c a n I see Professor Price's tomato? It has a backside that I don't see. M r TI~OIIIPSOI~
Clarke draws o u r attention t o the fact that
a vicw o f a tomato ancl a half-toillato rnay bc exactly thc sainc. T h a t is so; but it
is not liltc the fact that a vicw of soillcolle with a n d without a mole between his
shouldel blaclcs may be exactly the same. If you look a t a tomato a n d take only a
si11g1c vicw, you trztrst scc w h a t rltight be only a half tomato: that is w h a t seci~ig
a tonlato is. Whereas there is a vicw of the mole; a n d 110 front view is a vicw of a
mole I~etwecnthe slioulcler blacles. Suc11 a mole does n o t s t a m p thc front view as
may approaching cleat11 o r a load o f troubles, and s o there is n o i~nprcssionof itjust as tlicre is n o "born-in-Jerusalem" look a b o u t a man.
I9it a ~ n a t c r i a lobject of seeing is not. ~leccssarilygiven by a description of w h a t
is before lily eyes when they arc open ancl I arn seeing; if I a m totally hailucinated,
the11 in n o scilse d o 1 see w h a t is before my eyes. T h u s it is essential to a material
object of seeing that it is give11 by a descriptio~lwhich is true o f what is srcit; a n d
w c havc to enquire into the sigrtificance here of this phrase " W h a t is seer^."
T h e jxoblcm is this: there is a material object of cp-ing if there is a phrase giving
a n intcntional object of p i n g which is also a description of w h a t exists in a suitable relatioli to tlte cp-el: N o w this can't be a description of w h a t exists merely by
describing the intentional objcct of some other act (he aims a t tlie d a r k patch that
ltc sees); i f simply describing a n ii~tcntionalol7jcct of p i n g will not-as of course it
will not-guarantee
that we have described a ~-natc~.ial
object of cp-ing, then how
can it givc a material o l ~ j c c tof some othcr vcrb, cp-ing?
All wou1tl I)e plain sailing if' w e coulii say: w c have a material object of sight o n l y
if soilrc i~ilcntionalclcsci.iption is also true of w h a t rcally-physically-exists.
And
pcrllaps we can say that tlte clarlc patch agaiust the foliage is n o t merely a n i'i1tc.ntional objcct of secing; there really is n tlarlc object o r a region of cl a ).I cncss tlicrc.
nllt this is not always the case when we scc. Suppose I havc clcfcctive sight: all
I sce is a shiny blur over t11c1.c. T h a t blur, w e say, is my watch. We therefore say I

see my watch, thong11 very indistinctly; and I w a n t t o say that m y ~ v a r c his the
tllaterial object o f seciog. But I iliay not be able t o see it as a watch; 311 I scc is a
shiny blur. But the desct-iption "a shiny blur" is not true of anything that physically
exists in the contcxt. S~ipj?osingthe father had a d a r k h a t on, it would follow that,
to mention the puzzle that perplexed M o o r e for s o long, the ciarlc parch against t i ~ c
foliage w a s p n ~ of
i the swtfclce o f a rnnlerinl object (1nodert7 seitse); b ~ i certainly
t
"a
blur" is n o part of tlie sucfnce of my watch. But it may bc I liavc n o othcr clcscription of w h a t I see than "a shiny blur over there." So is there ally intentional description which, is also a clescriptioll of a material object of sight?
Yes; for even if lliy watch is nor a blur, it is a shiny thing ancl it is over tiicrc.
Suppose I had said: I scc a roughly triangular red blur herc, anel soui+ic c;tusal connection via tlie visual centres in the brain could havc been cliscovcrcti l~ctwccilthnt
and thc presence of my \v:-itclt over t h c r ~ - w o ~ ~ l (itI ltavc I,cc~i ~.it;lltI O say: '\Y/lint
I a m seeing is nly wittcl~"?I bclicvc not.
AII interesting case is that o f ntuscae riolitaiitcs, as thcy are callccl. You go to the
doctor and you say: "I wonder if there is something wrong with nly eycs o r my
brain? I seen-or perhaps you say "I see171 to seen-"floating
specks bclorc nty
eyes." The doctor say's: "That's not vcry scrious. They're there all sight" (or: "YOLI
see them all right")--"the!, are j~istthe floating debris in the fluids of the eye. Yo11
are a bit tired ancl s o your \>raindoesn't knock them out, that's all." T h c things he
says you see are not otit there wherc you say you see thcm-ihnt p a r t of your iiitcntional description is not tsue of anything I-elevant; but lie does not say that ~vltat
you are seeing is that debris only because the dcbris is the cause. There rcally arc
floating specks. If thcy caciscd you to scc a litrlc red clcvil or figlire o l eight, I\
should not say you s a w theill. It may be possible to thinl< of cascs where thew
nothing in the intentio~lalobject that s~iggcstsa clcscription o l w h a t is materially
being seen. I d o u b t w l ~ c t l ~ this
c s could bc so except in cascs of vcry c o n f ~ ~ s c pertl
ception-how coulci a very clef-inite intcntioilal clcscription bc conncctccl with a clilitc
different ~llaterialobject of secing? In such cascs, i f w e arc in d o u b t , we resort to
moving tlie supposed matcsinl objcct t o scc if the blurred, not colour-true ant1 n-iisplaced image of it Inoves.
W h e n you said: "I sce"--bclicving
t1t:it the objects were quite illusory-yo11
interzdeci your clcscriptiol~\>\!rely as a n intentional one; you wcrc giving the wortis
"floating speclcs" a scconc1;ii.y applic;ltion, It c;imc as a SLII.J>I.~SC
to yoti t1i;it yo!^
would havc hacl the riglit to intcncl thc worcts materially. In thc well-known case of

This may seem to plurigc 11s into confusion. For surely w h a t is oirly a n intentional
object of seeing can't be a ~ n a t e r i a lobject o f aiming? Then when cloes a dcscril>tioil
givc a ntatcrial object of sight? O n e Itind of case w e have seen: when a tlescriptio~i
is true of w h a t is seen, hut does u o t give a n intentional object. "I see a man \vhose
great nnclc clicd in n lunatic asylum"-tl~e relative cla~iscgives an a l ~ s o l ~ r t c lnony
intcntional description. "I see a girl w h o has a ~ n o l ebetween her shoulder-bladesnin thc circumstntlccs it gives n non-intentional clcscriptiorl. For she is facing mc, ctc.
"YOLIcan't have seen that," ~ I I Csays.
But w h y ? If I can't see that, w h y c a n I see Professor Price's tomato? It has a backside that I don't see. M r TI~OIIIPSOI~
Clarke draws o u r attention t o the fact that
a vicw o f a tomato ancl a half-toillato rnay bc exactly thc sainc. T h a t is so; but it
is not liltc the fact that a vicw of soillcolle with a n d without a mole between his
shouldel blaclcs may be exactly the same. If you look a t a tomato a n d take only a
si11g1c vicw, you trztrst scc w h a t rltight be only a half tomato: that is w h a t seci~ig
a tonlato is. Whereas there is a vicw of the mole; a n d 110 front view is a vicw of a
mole I~etwecnthe slioulcler blacles. Suc11 a mole does n o t s t a m p thc front view as
may approaching cleat11 o r a load o f troubles, and s o there is n o i~nprcssionof itjust as tlicre is n o "born-in-Jerusalem" look a b o u t a man.
I9it a ~ n a t c r i a lobject of seeing is not. ~leccssarilygiven by a description of w h a t
is before lily eyes when they arc open ancl I arn seeing; if I a m totally hailucinated,
the11 in n o scilse d o 1 see w h a t is before my eyes. T h u s it is essential to a material
object of seeing that it is give11 by a descriptio~lwhich is true o f what is srcit; a n d
w c havc to enquire into the sigrtificance here of this phrase " W h a t is seer^."
T h e jxoblcm is this: there is a material object of cp-ing if there is a phrase giving
a n intcntional object of p i n g which is also a description of w h a t exists in a suitable relatioli to tlte cp-el: N o w this can't be a description of w h a t exists merely by
describing the intentional objcct of some other act (he aims a t tlie d a r k patch that
ltc sees); i f simply describing a n ii~tcntionalol7jcct of p i n g will not-as of course it
will not-guarantee
that we have described a ~-natc~.ial
object of cp-ing, then how
can it givc a material o l ~ j c c tof some othcr vcrb, cp-ing?
All wou1tl I)e plain sailing if' w e coulii say: w c have a material object of sight o n l y
if soilrc i~ilcntionalclcsci.iption is also true of w h a t rcally-physically-exists.
And
pcrllaps we can say that tlte clarlc patch agaiust the foliage is n o t merely a n i'i1tc.ntional objcct of secing; there really is n tlarlc object o r a region of cl a ).I cncss tlicrc.
nllt this is not always the case when we scc. Suppose I havc clcfcctive sight: all
I sce is a shiny blur over t11c1.c. T h a t blur, w e say, is my watch. We therefore say I

see my watch, thong11 very indistinctly; and I w a n t t o say that m y ~ v a r c his the
tllaterial object o f seciog. But I iliay not be able t o see it as a watch; 311 I scc is a
shiny blur. But the desct-iption "a shiny blur" is not true of anything that physically
exists in the contcxt. S~ipj?osingthe father had a d a r k h a t on, it would follow that,
to mention the puzzle that perplexed M o o r e for s o long, the ciarlc parch against t i ~ c
foliage w a s p n ~ of
i the swtfclce o f a rnnlerinl object (1nodert7 seitse); b ~ i certainly
t
"a
blur" is n o part of tlie sucfnce of my watch. But it may bc I liavc n o othcr clcscription of w h a t I see than "a shiny blur over there." So is there ally intentional description which, is also a clescriptioll of a material object of sight?
Yes; for even if lliy watch is nor a blur, it is a shiny thing ancl it is over tiicrc.
Suppose I had said: I scc a roughly triangular red blur herc, anel soui+ic c;tusal connection via tlie visual centres in the brain could havc been cliscovcrcti l~ctwccilthnt
and thc presence of my \v:-itclt over t h c r ~ - w o ~ ~ l (itI ltavc I,cc~i ~.it;lltI O say: '\Y/lint
I a m seeing is nly wittcl~"?I bclicvc not.
AII interesting case is that o f ntuscae riolitaiitcs, as thcy are callccl. You go to the
doctor and you say: "I wonder if there is something wrong with nly eycs o r my
brain? I seen-or perhaps you say "I see171 to seen-"floating
specks bclorc nty
eyes." The doctor say's: "That's not vcry scrious. They're there all sight" (or: "YOLI
see them all right")--"the!, are j~istthe floating debris in the fluids of the eye. Yo11
are a bit tired ancl s o your \>raindoesn't knock them out, that's all." T h c things he
says you see are not otit there wherc you say you see thcm-ihnt p a r t of your iiitcntional description is not tsue of anything I-elevant; but lie does not say that ~vltat
you are seeing is that debris only because the dcbris is the cause. There rcally arc
floating specks. If thcy caciscd you to scc a litrlc red clcvil or figlire o l eight, I\
should not say you s a w theill. It may be possible to thinl< of cascs where thew
nothing in the intentio~lalobject that s~iggcstsa clcscription o l w h a t is materially
being seen. I d o u b t w l ~ c t l ~ this
c s could bc so except in cascs of vcry c o n f ~ ~ s c pertl
ception-how coulci a very clef-inite intcntioilal clcscription bc conncctccl with a clilitc
different ~llaterialobject of secing? In such cascs, i f w e arc in d o u b t , we resort to
moving tlie supposed matcsinl objcct t o scc if the blurred, not colour-true ant1 n-iisplaced image of it Inoves.
W h e n you said: "I sce"--bclicving
t1t:it the objects were quite illusory-yo11
interzdeci your clcscriptiol~\>\!rely as a n intentional one; you wcrc giving the wortis
"floating speclcs" a scconc1;ii.y applic;ltion, It c;imc as a SLII.J>I.~SC
to yoti t1i;it yo!^
would havc hacl the riglit to intcncl thc worcts materially. In thc well-known case of

he was able to describe w h a t he saw-a

great pile of leaves o n his counterpane,
again liave a seco~iciaryapplication: the words
which he knew n o t t o be there-we
"a pile of Icavcs" were intcr~clctlo ~ l l yas a description of a n i~i>prcssion.
It is important t o notice that very o f t c ~ there
i
is n o answer to the question whether
peoplc intend the worcl "see" in its ~rzaterialuse or not: that is, whether they are so
using the word "see" that they w o ~ i i dhave t o take it back supposir~gthat w h a t they
saicl rliey s a w w a s not there. T f they were mis-seeing something that was there, they
would usually 'ivrint t o correct thernselvcs, finding o u t "wliat they really saw." But
what if the seeing were hallucinatory?
T h e question would be: supposing that turned o u t to be tlie case, would you claini
that you mean "sce" in such a a w a y that all you have t c d o is alter your intentions
~ the object, from intellding it in its prittzary application as a
for tlie t l e s c r i p t i o ~of
description of the tt~rrtcricllobject of sight to illtending it in a sccoitclnry application
as a description of ;I nlere itii/~ressioiz?
Facecl with such a question, w e have in general the right t o reject it, saying like
Tomniy Traclcllcs: But it isn't so, y o i ~know, s o we won't supposc it i f you don't
mind. And cvcn i f we have n o t this right, we generally entcrrai~ino sucii supposition and therrfore are unpl.cpared with an answer. Wc neecl not have determinately
nicant the worcl "see" onc way o r thc other.
We may make a s i ~ n i l a rpoint a b o u t "pl-lantom limb." I take tile part of tlie body
where pain is felt to be thc object of a transit.ive ver1,-like expression "to feel pain
in ---." Then wlicn there is, e.g., n o foot, but X, not knowing this, says he fecls
pain in his foot, he nlay say hc w a s wrong ("I did 1iot see a lion thcre, for t1ic1-e
w a s n o lion") o r he may alter liis undersranding of tlie phrase "my foot" s o tllnt it
becomcs a j,urely intentional object of the verb-like expression. I3ut it need not be
deterlnillecl in advancc, in the normal case of feeling pain, whettlcl- one s o intends
the cxpt-cssion "I fccl pain in -----"
as to withdraw it, o r ~nerelyalters one's intentions for the clescriprion of the place of the pain, if one should learn that the ~71acc
was missi~ig.

Notes
1. Throughout this paper 1 use double quotes for ordinary quotations (and so singles for
quotes within quotes) and si~~gles
I use as scare c111otes.
2. This was arguctl to me Ily MI. G. EIartiian, for which I am ol,liged to him.

3. I am indebted for this objection and the discussion of it to Professors Bernard Williailis
and Arthur Prior and Mr 1'. T. Geach.
4. 1 a m obliged to Professor Frarik Ebersole for telling nie of an cxpcricncc of his which supplied this cxarnplc.
5. Example from M. Lucliiesh.
6. Example trom W. James.
7. Word L Z I T ~OOject (Carrtbridjie. Mass., 1960), p. 7.

he was able to describe w h a t he saw-a

great pile of leaves o n his counterpane,
again liave a seco~iciaryapplication: the words
which he knew n o t t o be there-we
"a pile of Icavcs" were intcr~clctlo ~ l l yas a description of a n i~i>prcssion.
It is important t o notice that very o f t c ~ there
i
is n o answer to the question whether
peoplc intend the worcl "see" in its ~rzaterialuse or not: that is, whether they are so
using the word "see" that they w o ~ i i dhave t o take it back supposir~gthat w h a t they
saicl rliey s a w w a s not there. T f they were mis-seeing something that was there, they
would usually 'ivrint t o correct thernselvcs, finding o u t "wliat they really saw." But
what if the seeing were hallucinatory?
T h e question would be: supposing that turned o u t to be tlie case, would you claini
that you mean "sce" in such a a w a y that all you have t c d o is alter your intentions
~ the object, from intellding it in its prittzary application as a
for tlie t l e s c r i p t i o ~of
description of the tt~rrtcricllobject of sight to illtending it in a sccoitclnry application
as a description of ;I nlere itii/~ressioiz?
Facecl with such a question, w e have in general the right t o reject it, saying like
Tomniy Traclcllcs: But it isn't so, y o i ~know, s o we won't supposc it i f you don't
mind. And cvcn i f we have n o t this right, we generally entcrrai~ino sucii supposition and therrfore are unpl.cpared with an answer. Wc neecl not have determinately
nicant the worcl "see" onc way o r thc other.
We may make a s i ~ n i l a rpoint a b o u t "pl-lantom limb." I take tile part of tlie body
where pain is felt to be thc object of a transit.ive ver1,-like expression "to feel pain
in ---." Then wlicn there is, e.g., n o foot, but X, not knowing this, says he fecls
pain in his foot, he nlay say hc w a s wrong ("I did 1iot see a lion thcre, for t1ic1-e
w a s n o lion") o r he may alter liis undersranding of tlie phrase "my foot" s o tllnt it
becomcs a j,urely intentional object of the verb-like expression. I3ut it need not be
deterlnillecl in advancc, in the normal case of feeling pain, whettlcl- one s o intends
the cxpt-cssion "I fccl pain in -----"
as to withdraw it, o r ~nerelyalters one's intentions for the clescriprion of the place of the pain, if one should learn that the ~71acc
was missi~ig.

Notes
1. Throughout this paper 1 use double quotes for ordinary quotations (and so singles for
quotes within quotes) and si~~gles
I use as scare c111otes.
2. This was arguctl to me Ily MI. G. EIartiian, for which I am ol,liged to him.

3. I am indebted for this objection and the discussion of it to Professors Bernard Williailis
and Arthur Prior and Mr 1'. T. Geach.
4. 1 a m obliged to Professor Frarik Ebersole for telling nie of an cxpcricncc of his which supplied this cxarnplc.
5. Example from M. Lucliiesh.
6. Example trom W. James.
7. Word L Z I T ~OOject (Carrtbridjie. Mass., 1960), p. 7.