HOEING

IRLIN
PUBLISHED DUARTERl Y

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1983

r
WlImR OI'BIATlOfIS-KEEP IT CUAIII

PREPARATIOII RlR COLD WEATltER

PT2 BlGIIIE IIILET PROBE ICIIIG

AIRLIN R

0",,,,,,,

OClobt>I-OrcembrI1983

CONTENTS

Winter Opmtions K., It CINn . . . . . . . . . . . ..

Prtp.ntioll for Cold Weith... .
. .. _ .,
Pt2 Engine Inlet Probe Icing ............
Sunspotund HF Radios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wing Hi'" lift Controls-167 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Inllt Inif$tion: An Avoid.bl. Hlurd
Avionics Rep.ir Ind Modifltltion ........

10
11
13
20
23
Customer Support Reprmnt.tiYes
Back Cove,
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~------------------~

A. R. Mulally-Technology Chief hi/gi/leer. 707/727/737 Productioll Programs

M. D. SlIirkey-737 Stability and COII/roi Staff Lead Ellgineer
C R. Higgins-727 AerodY/lamics Staff Lead Engilleer

INTRODUCTION
Airplane contamination has been the topic of many articles by
individual airlines, certification agencies, The Boeing Com
pany, and others in the past. This article expands on the
effects of frost, snow, or ice contamination on airplane per
formance and handling characteristics using data obtained with
the 737. Taking off with an airplane contaminated with snow,
ice, or frost can be dangerous. is in violation of Federal Aviation
Regulations, and should be avoided. The purpose of this
article is to provide the operator further insight into the
importance of the "Keep It Clean" ground maintenance and
flight operations philosophy. In addition, operational proce

dures are suggested that increase safety margins in the event of

undetected contamination. Since the December 1981 AIRLINER article, Boeing has conducted wind tunnel, flight. and
simulator tests with the 737 to better understand the effects of
wing and horizontal tail contamination on airplane perform
ance and flight characteristics. The results of these studies
indicate that contamination significantly reduces wing lift
capability, increases stall speeds and decreases climb capability. Consequently. a pilot may enoounter buffet. pitch and
roll pre-stall flight characteristics before stide. shaker warning
during a normal takeoff maneuver as a result of wing and tail
contamination.

___________________________ 1

SIMULATED CONTAMINATION
CONFIGURATION TESTED

The characteristics of ground contamination vary as widely as

the atmospheric conditions under which contamination accu
mulates. To permit contamination is to lose control of the
aerodynamic configuration because the flight characteristics of
the aircraft are then unpredictable to the pilot. A clean,
uncontaminated aircraft is required to achieve certified takeoff
performance and handling characteristics and is a precept of
good airmanship. This is the fundamental basis of the Federal
Aviation Regulations "Keep It Clean" requirements.
Contamination configurations that can be detected, and
should be remO\led prior to takeoH, were simulated and tested.
Two levels of contamination are discussed and are identified as
"Frost A," and "Frost B." Frost A is roughly equivalent to
sandpaper in the 40 to 6O-grit range. Frost B is roughly equiv
alent to 16-to 24-grit sandpaper. Typical surface characteristics of these contamination levels can be observed from the
measured profiles shown in Figure 1 and the actual pnotographs shown in Figure 3. The simulated Frost A contamination was created by spreading epoxy poning compound over
3M Brand general-purpose safety walk and then roughening the
surface with a texture paint roller to create peaks and valleys.
A second coat of epoxy poning compound was applied and
further roughened to achieve the Frost B surface.
Figures 2 and 4 illustrate the wing areas that were covered by
the simulated contaminations. The areas noted as "CLEAN"
are not exposed when the flaps are retracted, and since it is
common practice in adverse weather to taxi to the takeoff
point with the flaps retracted, these areas are not subjected to
contamination on the ground.
The effect of partial cleaning
of the leading edge slats
through the use of a ground
operable Thermal Anti-Ice
(TAl) system was also evaluaCLEAN AREAS
ted during the tests. This was
SIMULATED
done by removing the con
CONTAMINATION
tamination from the leading
edge of the slats in steps while
leaving the upper wing surface
lEA01HG EDGE SLATS~,~->
COfltaminated.

FLAPS 5

"
"

FROST B
~1CI111 ~1lOYI:

WlNO ........Cl

-~

..
..
."

+
+

,.

I-

The first step, labeled TAI2 on FIgure 2. corresponds to the

predicated de-icing capability of the ground TAl sYstem at 0
degrees Fahrenheit. The second step, labeled TAl" represents
operation of the ground TAl system at 20 degrees Fahrenheit.

lEAOIHG EOGE FLAPS

TRAlLIfrtG EDGE FlAPS

'''''l.RS

F"'rI Z - Simlliltad
C1)ntamiutiDn confitu
rltiDM tlSted,IAI.ntiri
lilt conmmiRltH, (BI
TAIZ .fflCt It OOF
Imbi.nt. lei TAl, .fftet
It ZOoF ambienL

ENTIRE
SLAT

AllERO,..S

LEADING EDGE
SLAT CONTAMINATION
CONFIGURATIONS
TESTED

/;
/J/
1""

TAI 2

/.'

TAl,

/{ t

Frost A-Approximltefy lquiY*nt to 4D-6D

..it 51ndplptt.

Frost B-Approximltefy !quinl.nl to 16-24

grit 51ndplper.

..

Figurl J-Simulltld frost dllSHlp.

CONTAMINATtON DEGRADES LIFT, STALL

SPEEDS, DRAG, AND RATE OF CLIMB

FLAPS S

-~
LOSS IN

WU""UIO
~

"

Figura 5 - Conuminl'
<4 tion d!irades mlximum
lift

,~,

10

CAPAIlIL.t"

"

Figures 5 through 9 summarize the effects of contamination

on the lift and drag characteristics. The flight test data shown
are generally for Ftap position 5. flap positions 1 and 15 were
also tested and showed similar trends. Figure 5 presents the
test results for percent loss in maximum tift capability due to
contamination for Frost A and B. Frost A reduced maximum
tift capability by 18 percent whereas frost B reduced maximum lift capability by 32 percent.
Figure 6 presents the lift loss in terms of increased stall speeds.
The maximum lift toss at Flaps 5 equates to a 13 knot increase
in stall speed for Frost A and a 24 knot increase for Frost B.
The adverse effect of contamination on stall speeds decreases
with increasing flap setting.

"

FLAPS I

FLAPS S

FLAPS 15

.IIOST

IHClt(ASl; '"

.IIOST

S'~Uw(EO

oor TO
10
o;<>Hl"""lnOfl
... ot/OOTS

'~,"f

"
Figur8 6-ContlminUion intralSlS sull speeds.

FROST A
FLAPS 5

"
_UE"
STALL Sl"[lO
out TO
10
cO..... ~.'''HlnoH
... "HOTI

Figure 7 compares the stall speed increase for the three leading
edge slat contamination configurations. These data show that
at Ftaps 5. a ground~perable thermal anti-ice system reduces
the 13 knot stall speed increase due to Frost A to 10 knots .

......',.

-,~

."'

Figure 7 - Effect of
ground operable TAlon
sull speed increaws.

"

Figure 8 shows the effect of contamination on the stall speed

margin remaining at stick shaker activation for Flaps 5. With a
normal, clean wing. the stick shaker activates approximately 7
knots prior to reaching the stall speed, providing margin for
pilot reaction. In the case of Frost A, this margin is reduced
to less than 1 knot. For frost B. stall occurs before the stick:
shaker is actuated. This phenomenon will be further discussed
in the flight characteristics section.
The increased drag due to contamination manifests itself in
reduced climb capability at a given speed. The reduction in
all-engine and one-engineinoperative climb capability is shown
in Figure 9. The increased drag results in a 100 to 35Ofeetper minute reduction in all-engine climb capability. The effect
of contamination is much more pronounced on the one-engine
inoperative climb capability. The one-engine-inoperative climb
capability is reduced by about 50 percent by Frost A. The airplane cannot maintain altitude at V2 with one-engine-inoperative when contaminated with Frost B.

FLAPS 5

FLAPS 5

SPEED .... IlGlH

"'OVE ST"LL
FOllll'f1CK
lIHUUl

'.

Figure 8 - Contaminl~ tion reduces stick shaker

margins.

_ACro"noH
IIMOT'S

,
o L-'---'

0'--'-_

"

,~"

"'-,-__
Figure 9-Contlminltion dllCflaw rate of climb Clpability.

CONTAMINATION MAY RESULT IN IMPENDING

STAll FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS BEFORE
STiCK SHAKER WARNING
During any winter takeoff, when atmospheric conditions are
conducive to contamination. the pilot should be aware that
increasing buffet. pitch, and roll activity may be an indication
of premature stall caused by wing contamination. These indica
tions are an immediate signal to recover from an impending stall
consistent with ground proximity regardless of whether or not
the stick shaker has activated. This situation can be understood
by reviewing the general characteristics of airplane stalls.
"STAll ONSET" is the region preceding a full stall where the
airplane's flight is characterized by ever increasing buffet, pitch.
and roll activity. The magnitude of the buffet, pitch. and roll
activity varies with airplane type and flap setting. but the
"STAll ONSET" region exists on all airplanes. The "STAll
ONSET" sequence typically consists of four distinct events.
Usually, the first sign of an impending stall on a modern jet
transport is the activation of an artificial warning device as
shown in Figure 10. All Boeing aircraft use an electricallv
actuated column shaker for this artificial stall warning to
alert the pilot before "STAll ONSET" flight characteristics are
encountered. Activation of this stall warning stick shaker is
based on a preset angle of attack. Second. as the airspeed
is further reduced (and angle of attack is increasedl toward stall.
the airflow cannot remain attached over the entire wing and will
begin to momentarily separate near the wing trailing edge. A
buffeting, or mild shaking of the aircraft, results as the lift force
on the aircraft begins to fluctuate. The buffet intensity will
increase as the airspeed is decreased further (and angle of attack
is increasedl and the areas of separated flow expand. Third. as
the stall progresses, and the separated flow region further ex
pands, the center of lift moves forward, requiring less control
force from the pilot to continue raising the nose and decreasing

the airspeed. This pitch activity. which indicates "STAll ON

SET:' is typically referred to as reduced pitch stability or stick
forcelightening by flight test pilots. A fourth characteristic of
"STAll ONSET" is a noticeable increase in roll activity and a
corresponding increase in the lateral control action required by
the pilot to maintain wings level. Initially, this roll activity and
the associated lateral control action are caused bv asymmetries
in the fluctuating separation patterns on each wing. However,
as the "STALL ONSET" progression continues, the lateral con
trol action required to keep the wings level increases as the
separated flow regions expand to include the ailerons and
spoilers, causing them to be tess effective. The Federal Air
Regulations require that all certified airplanes have sufficient
pitch and roll control capability to recover at any time during a
stall maneuver.
When the wing is contaminated, the "STALL ONSET" buffet
pitch, and rot! activity flight characteristics are similar to a clea~
wing. However, Ihese "STALL ONSET" flight characteristics
may now occur within the clean airplane normal maneuvering
envelope, before Slick shaker activation, as is shown in figure
10. This is a result of the early flow separation caused by con
tamination. Consequently. the stick shaker may not provide
warning of "STALL ONSET" flight characteristics for the
contaminated airplane. 01 course, Ihe details of the contami
nated wing "STALL ONSET" flight characteristics will vary as
widely as the possible variations in the contamination accumula
tion. Buffet. pitch, and rolt activity "STALL ONSET" flight
characteristics are immediate signals to recover from an impend
ing stall consistent with ground proximity, whether or not the
stick shaker has activated. Test results indicate that even with
Ihe worst contamination tested, the pitot's pitch and roll con
trol capabilities were not significantly degraded. These ample
control capabilities allow positive recovery from "STALL
ONSET."

STICK SHAKER
ACTUATES

rA l

V
CLEAN
AIRPLANE

10

NORMAL MANEUVER ENVELOPE

BELOW STICK SHAKER
WING
12 ANGLE OF14
ATTACK

STICK SH I(Er-

_18 _ _. 2 0 _
INCREASING WING LIFT

CONTAMINATED
AIRPLANE

Figur. 1O-Contamination results in "stili onset" flight charlcteristics befor. stick shaker,

CONTAMINATION EXPOSES THE PILOT TO

"STAll ONSET" DURING A NORMAL TAKEOFF
ROTATION MANEUVER
The Boeing Engineering Flight Simulator was programmed
with contaminated airplane aerodynamic characteristics based
on the results of the wind tunnel and flight test programs. A
number of simulated takeoff maneuvers were flown. with and
without the effects of symmetric contamination included. The
simulator results indicate that pilots may encounter "STALL
ONSET" flight characteristics during a normal takeoff rotation
maneuver when an airplane is contaminated if pitch rate and
attitude are not adequately controlled. This is illustrated in
Figure 11 where several key parameters of a clean airplane
takeoff are compared against a takeoff with a contaminated
airplane when pitch rate and attitude were not adequately
controlled.

40

STICK
FORCE
.... L8S

The pilot penetrated "STALL ONSET" with the contaminated

airplane because wing and tail contamination:

11
2)
3)

Reduce wing lift capability and result in the "STALL

ONSET" flight characteristics in the normal takeoff
maneuvering envelope before stick shaker;
Cause the airplane to be mistrimmed in the airplane
nose-up direction; and
Reduce the airplane's pitch stability.

A fourth contributing factor is the time required for a pilot to

react to the airplane flight characteristics that have been
changed by the contaminated wing and tail. As was shown in
Figure 10. contamination moves the "STAll ONSET" region
closer to the normal takeoff speeds and eliminates the
"STAll ONSET" warning provided by the stick shaker. The
takeoff stabilizer trim that is set by the pilot before brake

CLEAN AiRPLANE
CONTAMiNATED AIRPLANE
WING AND TAIL

I'.. I

20

28

TRIM CHANQE OUE

TO CONTAMINA nON

PUSH

-40

80
CONTROL
WHEel
ANGLE

-"',

With a clean airplane. the pilot has learned to make a stick

force input which results in a smooth pitch attitude and speed
transition to the climb targets. The pilot further expects the
airplane to be "in trim" for climb with essentially zero stick
force. Notice the additional maneuver margin available with
the clean airplane on the wing angle-<:lfattack trace.
With a contaminated airplane, the pilot's customary stick force
input results in a pitch response that is different than
anticipated. As pitch attitude approaches the climb larget, it
continues to increase. requiring a push force to capture the
desired climb target attitude. In addition, the pilot must hold
a push force to counter an apparent mistrim condition. Airspeed, although not alarmingly low, falls below the desired
climb airspeed target. The angle-<:lf-attack trace shows that
during the pitch overshoot, the contaminated aircraft actually
penetrated the contaminated airplane "STALL ONSET"
region where buffet. pitch, and roU activity occur. The
control wheel trace for the contaminated airplane shows the
pilot controlling the "STALL ONSET" roll activity. The
flight characteristics associated with a contaminated airplane
may be more or less severe than indicated in Figure 11, depend
ing on the nature and symmetry of the contamination accu
mulation.

jiF?U}.

-80

20
PITCH
AnnUDE
.... DEQ

L
12

__EItG'NE
CUMe
TARGET

20

28

ENGINE
CUMB
TARGT

160

/ _ - - - - - - - - - V2 .,5

A'RSf>EED
.... KCAS

120

-.~'-~1~2:---~2~'0:----:ti.;

4'"

v2

CLf,l,N ,I,!!!'!'\,ANE MUtMUM LIFT

20
WING
ANGLE

"

An,l,U
..... DEQ

,C:, ;
12

20

28

mIlE .... SECONtlS

Figure 11-Cootamioatioo exposes the pilot to "lbll onset" during

takeoff.
release is calculated to put the clean aircraft "in trim" for
climb. When the wing and tait are contaminated. the aircraft
trim characteristics are changed. creating an airptanenose-up
mistrim condition during the rotation maneUV1!r. The decrease
in pitch stability and mistrim caused by contamination results
in higher rotation rates for the same stick force input. The

pilot expects his aircraft to be free from contamination after

approved ground maintenance procedures and it takes him
time to recognize that his aircraft is not responding normally
and to take appropriate corrective action. The combination of
the pilot's reaction time with the higher rotation rates resulu
in the pitch attitude overshoot by the pilot of the contami
nated airplane shown in Figure 11. The simulator studies
further indicate that when the pilot suspected contamination
and was aware of how contamination affecu the airplane's
pitch response, the pilot used less stick force to rotate the
airplane which minimized pitch attitude overshooU. Test
resulu indicate that the airplane was controllable in pitch and
roll throughout the takeoff maneuver. The climb target air
speed is undershot because of the higher drag created during
the pitch attitude overshoot.

..
..

'11.,-._

..
-..

,.o~

.....
...o

~o
F"'CTO~

~1l0T'S

TU(OFl'

RelT"'''OIl

/t,l.....[V\I[R

"

" ".

'"

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES CAN

INCREASE TAKEOFF MARGINS

Further insight into the effect of contamination on the takeoff

maneuver;s provided in Figures 12-14, which present available
maneuver margins. Starting with the clean airplane as a base
line, Figure 12 shows the maneuver capability of the airplane
to stick shaker activation, "STALL ONSET," and maximum
lift. At the target climb speed, a pitch maneuver generating
1.57 g's would result in stick shaker activation. At 1.62 g's the
"STALL ONSET" region indicates that further increases in
load factor will produce buffeting, pitch, and roll activity. At
1.76 g's, maximum lift is achieved and the clean aircraft would
experience a complete stall. The "PI LOT'S TAKEOFF AOTA
TION MANEUVER" between VA and V2+15 shows the load
factor required to maneuver the airplane during a typical
takeoff rotation which stabilizes on the target climb speed. A
maneuver margin of 0.3 g's exists from the pilot's peak load
factor and "STALL ONSET." This ample "g" margin is available to maneuver the clean airplane over and above the requiremenU of the takeoff rotation maneuver without encountering
"STALL ONSET" flight characteristics.
A similar analysis is shown for an airplane with a contaminated
wing and tail in Figure 13. Note that the 18 percent loss in
maximum lift due to contamination reduces the maneuver capability available at any speed by 0.3 g's. As previously explained in Figure 10, the "STALL ONSET" region now has
correspondingly moved down before stick shaker activation,
into the normal takeoff maneuvering envelope. The shape and
location of the "PilOT'S TAKEOFF ROTATION MAN
EUVER" for the contaminated airplane is also different as a
direct result of the pitch attitude overshoot described in
Figure 11. The peak load factor is slightly higher and occurs
at a lowtr airspeed. The deep penetration of the "STALL
ONSET" region during this takeoff resulu in buffet, pitch, and
roll attitude excursions.
After approved maintenance procedures are completed,
margins can be increased by 11 rotating slower while targeting
higher airspeed; and 21 increasing the takeoff speeds. 80th of
these operational procedures move the "PilOT'S TAKEOFF
ROTATION MANEUVER" to higher speeds, away from the
"STALL ONSET" flight characteristics as shown in Figure 14.

FillUr.1Z-Clean lirpllne.

,..

-..

NOR..... ~
lO ... O
F... cTOR

..
"

L''00

".

",

'"

1,(0

... l/ISPEO ... "-"'OTS

'eo

150
\/1"'5

Filur.13-Conuminatld lirplill' willi and tlil.

..
-..

NORM"'L
lO ... O
F"'CTOR

..

_
-

SLaWl~

100'............ _

CL"."'U<>''''~''

........ U.mI" sPUDs

..

PLOrs
TAUOH
ROTAT1QH

OEUVeRS

"

l-:7

Fieur, 14-Contlminltld lirplln, winllnd tlil.

The use of increased takeoff speed must be accounted for in

dispatching the airplane. This will ensure that the airplane can
take off at the higher takeoff speeds within the available field
length. Winter weather operational procedures are contained in
the Operations, Maintenance, and Adverse Weather Perform
ance Manuals for each of the Boeing airplanes.

CONCLUSIONS
These test results provide further insight into the importance
of a comprehensive winter operations maintenance program
that results in clean airplanes during takeoff. Proper ground
maintenance procedures and pilot awareness need to be
emphasized. Frost or ice on the aircraft can seriously reduce
climb and maneuvering capabilities and expose the pilot to
"STALL ONSET" flight characteristics during the critical
phase of takeoff without a normal stick shaker stall warning.
With awareness of these hazards, the flight crew can assure safe
takeoff margins by rotating slower and using increased takeoff

s Winter approaches in much

of the world it is appropriate
to prepare to meet the necessary operational requirements. This
preparation should include a review
of the various documents and pro
cedures associated with cold weather. Typically, this review will be
accomplished by both maintenance
and flight operations personnel. This
article is intended to provide an
overview of pertinent cold weather
topics important to maintenance and
flight operations personnel. A listing
of applicable reference material avail
able from Boeing that should be
reviewed is also provided.
PREPARATION FOR FLIGHT MAINTENANCE
An airplane ready for flight will
not have snow, ice, or frost ad
hering to its surfaces. The rule is
MAKE IT CLEAN and KEEP IT
CLEAN.
Anti-icing is the use of glycol
based fluids on a CLEAN airplane to prevent snow, ice or
frost from adhering to airplane
surfaces.
A coating of undiluted antiicing
fluid applied to a CLEAN air

speeds when operating in atmospheric conditions that are

conducive to contamination. If contamination is suspected at
any time prior to the takeoff roll, partictJlarly if lengthy delays
occur after de-icing is completed, the aircraft should be
returned to maintenance for clean-iJp prior to takeoff. $afe
winter operations wilt be assured with continued alertness to
potential icing conditions; rigorous adherence to the "Keep It
Clean" ground maintenance philosophy; flight crew awareness
of the hazards associated with contaminated aircraft operations; and the use of operational procedures that increase
margins.

plane may offer protection from

snow, ice, or frost if it is applied
BEFORE THE CONDITIONS BE
GIN.
Deicing is the use of heated wa
ter or heated water/glycol mixtures to REMOVE accumulated
snow, ice or frost.
Apply ANTI-ICING fluid after
DEICING as a preventative mea
sure.
After taxiing or towing an airplane
into the gate position, REINSPECT
for accumulation of snow, frost,
or ice... KEEP IT CLEAN!

or met that might ad

versely affect the safety
of the flight.
(b) No person may take off
an aircraft when frost,
snow, or ice is adhering
to the wings, control sur
faces, or propellers of
the aircraft."

"FAR 121.629 Operation in Icing

Conditions

ICING DEFINITION:
"Icing conditions exist when
the OAT on the ground and
for takeoff is 10C [SoCI or
below or when TAT in flight
4
is 10 C or below and visible
moisture in any form is pres'
ent (such as clouds, fog with
visibilitY of one mite or less,
rain, snow, sleet ar"ld ice crystals).

la) No person may dispatch

or release an aircraft,
continue to operate an
aircraft enroute, or land
an aircraft when in the
opinion of the pilot in
command or aircraft dispatcher (domestic ar"ld
flag carriers only). icing
conditions are expected

Icing conditions also exist

when the OAT on the ground
and for takeoff is 10C [SoCI
or below when operating on
ramps, taxiways or runways
where surface snow, ice, stand
ing water, or slush may be in
gested by the engines or freeze
on engines, nacelles or engine
sensor probes."

AIRPLANE PREFLIGHT FLIGHT OPERATIONS

NOTE -

Bracketed ( ] temperatures are values

appropriate for all
727 and certain
767 models.
Consideration should be given to
adopting ., improved climb
loverspeedl policy.
higher than normal target climb

During preflight, check to see

that the airplane is free of s"ow,
ice 01' frost. When in doubt, fol
low recommended snow, ice, 01'
frost removal procedures... KEEP
IT CLEANI
DO NOT assume snow will blow off
the wings, a layer of ice could be
under the snow.
AntHcing/deicing procedures should
be followed whenever they are
needed... THERE IS NO SET
RULE REGARDING FREQUENCY
OF ANTIICING/DEICING.

downwind drift on slipperv runways with crosswind when us

ing reverse thrust.
DO NOT ATIEMPT to turn off
the runway until speed is reduced
to a PRUDENT le'IIet.

TAKEOFF PROCEDURES

If takeoff performance penTlIts, a

speed should be used.

As necessary, verifv that the airplane is FREE of snow 01" ice be

fore moving into position for
takeoff.

DO NOT use reduced thrust for

takeoff during icing conditions or
when runway is contaminated
with snow, ice, slush, or standing
water.
DO accomplish an engine runup
to as high a thrust as possible
and check for STABLE engine
operation BEFORE brake release.
After takeoff EPR has been set,
DO check to see that it is in agreement with N1 and other
cockpit indications are normal.
DO rOtate smOOthly and normally
lnot to elCCft(i 3 per second) at
VR' ..NOT BEFORE_

REFERENCE MATERIAL TO
REVIEW
FAA Approved
Manual -

TAXI

DESCENT AND LANDING

Maintain GREATER THAN NOR
MAL distance between airplanes
while taxiing on ice or snow
covered taxi and runway surfaces.
blown snow and slush CAN
ADHERE to YOUR airplane.
DO NOT use reverse thrust on
snow or slush covered ramps, tax
iways or runways unless ABSO
LUTELY NECESSARY. If reverse
thrust is used during taxi, the air
plane (especially the leading ed
ges) must be carefully reinspec
ted for accumlation of snow,
slush, ice and frost.
T,xi with FLAPS UP if taxi
route is through slush or standing
water in low temperatures. Do
not aa:om~ish takeoff checklist
until flaps are extended.
During icing conditions, periodi
cally run up the engines to as
HIGH a thrust setting as practica
ble. . . this is necessary to provide sufficient energy for icing
protection thereby REDUCING the
possibility of ICE ACCUMULA
TION on ENGINE PROBES.
During icing conditions, turn EN
GINE (and WING antiice if installed) ON IMMEDIATELY af
ter engine start.

ANTICIPATE the need for engine/

nacelle and/or wing antiice at all
times, especially DURING descent.
CLOUDS ARE considered visible
moisture when visibility is less
than one mile.
OBSERVE
Boeing
Operations
Manual minimum N1 limits during DESCENT when antiicing
systems are used.
If available, arm the AUTOBRAKE and AUTOSPQILER sys
terns before landing.
DEPLOY speed brakes IMMEDI
ATELY after main gear contact
with the nJnway.
Lower nose wheel to the runway
IMMEDIATELY as the speedbrakes and thrust re'llerseni are being actuated.
00 NOT hold nose gear off runway.
Apply brakes smoothly and sym
metrically with moderatetofirm
pressure UNTIL , safe stop is
ASSURED.
LET THE ANTI-SKID SYSTEM
DO ITS WORK.
DO NOT use asymmetric reverse
thrust on icy or slippery runways.
BE PREPARED for possible

Airplane

Flight

Section 1 - LIMITATIONS
Section 3 . NORMAL PROCEDURES
Section 4 PERFORMANCE
Boeing Operations Manual - Normal Procedures Section - Operation on Precipitation Covered
Runways discussion.
Boeing Maintenance Manual Chapter 12 COLD WEATHER
MAINTENANCE
Boeing AIRLINER article, OctoberDecember 1982, "Cold Wea
ther Operltion"
Boeing AIRLINER article, Octo
ber-December 1982, 'PT2 En
gine Inlet Probe Icing"
Boeing videocassette/16mm film .
"Cold Weath.,.. Awareness"

SUMMARY
The materi,l covered in this article
is not a "new, improved" version of
what you have heard before; but, it
is important. Each airline should
conduct a review of the available
materials and then communteate
them to the appropriate personnel
within the company.
Successful cold weather operations
require preparation on the part of
airline maintenance and fh~t opera
tions personnel. Review procedures
and prepare for cold weather oper..
tions beforehand. Advance prepar.
tion and procedures review WIll help
ensure a continued impressive safety
record is marntained during this wrn
ter's operations.

PT2 engine Inlet

P,..ohe Icing
Fred Kendrick, 7/7/7 Customer
Suppon Engineering
he Pt2 engine inlet sensing probe is mounted through

the center of the engine nose dome and is part of the

engine pressure ratio (EPR) system and, therefore, plays

a significant part in the establishment of proper engine operation. See Figure 1.

t
COMPARL".O_'
T,}--...-@].

"

. ._ _

PI1 PROBE

PI2PR~

Nl TACHOMETER

H:z TACHOMETER

EXHAUST GAS
THERMOCOUPLE

Under normal conditions,

bugged EPA is indiuted Ind
.11 other engine par.m.ters
coincida with
~04 EPR
indication.

Pt2 probe iced leoli-ice off).

Note thll while bugged EPA
;, indic.ted, other Intine
panmal.rs I~ too low. EPR
;, actuelly 1.70. ,ot 2.04.

Fillure1. Engine perameter indication pick-ilp points.

Figurl 2. Comperison of Inginl inmumant indications under normal
conditions .nd with In iced Pt2 problat same indiCited EPA.
A Pt2 probe that is blocked with ice will give an erroneous
EPA indication. The EPA indication with engine anti-ice off
will be significantly higher than actual EPA resulting in less
than full thrust for takeoff. Other engine parameter indications
Nl, N2, exhaust gas temperature, and fuel flow will be lower
than normal for a given EPR. Cross checking of all engine
parameter indications will help ensure correct engine thrust for
takeoff.
Figure 2 illustrates engine instrument indications at a takeoff
EPA of 2.04 at normal conditions and with the Pt2 probe
blocked. It will be noted that with the Pt2 probe blocked
Nl, N2, EGT, and fuel flow will be low, indicating a low
engine thrust; that is, the engine parameters indicate that the
engines are only producing a thrust equal to a "true" EPR of
1.70. As a general rule, the pilot should see Nl above 90 percent with the engines at takeoff thrust.
Ice build-up on the Pt2 engine inlet probe and the rewlting
less than full engine thrust for takeoff has been a contributing
factor in a number of takeoff incidents.
The use of engine anti-icing in compliance with Boeing Airplane
Flight Manual procedures when operating in icing conditions
will avoid incorrect EPR indications possible with ice buitd-up
on the Pt2 probe. The Flight Manual states:

10

When penetrating or operating in icing conditions inflight, maintain a minimum of 55 percent Nl RPM and
in moderate to severe icing conditions with TAT below
-6.50 C (20 0 F) use 70 percent Nl APM or higher, except
as required for landing.
The engine antiice system must be on during all ground
and flight operations when icing conditions exist or are
anticipated, except during climb and cruise when the
temperature is below -400C SAT. Engine anti-ice must
be on prior to and during descent in all icing conditions,
including temperatures below -4()OC SAT.
NOTE: Icing Conditions-Icing conditions exist when the
OAT on the ground or TAT inflight is looC (50 0 F) or
below and visible moisture in any form is present lsuch
as clouds, fog with visibility of one mile or less, rain,
snow, sleet, ice crystals), or standing water, slush, ice, or
snow is present on the ramps, taxiways, or runways.
An article in the Boeing AlA LINER, October-December 1982,
same title, gives a more detailed explanation of why ice build
up on the Pt2 probe affects EPA indication.

ost flight crews and h

(amateur) radio operato
are aware that high
quency (HF) radio syste
sometimes leave a 1 to be desired when reliable
communication links are re ulred. In many cases, the HF
radios on airliners have been written up for sub-standard oper-

ation or Iven removed from the aircraft and replaced. This

article will point out that often the apparent malfunctions are
due to sunspot activity, not problems in the set. The hams also
have a saying: "Lots of spots, lots of OX" (long-distance contacts) with the converse of course being true, A review of these

reasons is particularly timely because of the trend of current

sunspot activity.
As you are awar., airline HF radio communications is carried
out on assigned frequencies in the 2 to 18 MHz band, with the
higher frlllquencies used for long distance: communic.ltion. This
overthe-horizon communication on the HF radio bands is
made possible by utilizing ionized layers of the upper atmosphere that cause the radio signal to be bent back down to the
earth (Figure 11. These ionized layers, which affect long range
HF communication, are called "F" layers.

-----

Figurl1. Skywave proplDltion.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 11

The ionization of these reflective layers 15 dependent upon

sunspot activity. High sunspot activity provides the necessary
ionization of the f-Iayers required for good propagation of Hf
radio signals over long distances. Low sunspot activity reduces
the F.layer ionization. This allows the HF radio signals in the
11 to 18 MHz bands to pass through the reflective layers,
thereby reducing the probability of reliable long-range
communication.
It has been detennined through years of observing sunspot
activity that the frequency of occurrenal of this sunspot activo
ity repeats in cycles averaging approximately eleven years in
length. Twenty cycles have been observed since the year 1750
(FifJjre 2). What is Important to us now is the fact that we are
now near the halfway point on the downside of cycle 21,
which began in 1976, peaked in mid-1979, and is expected to
end in 1986/87 (Figure 3).
Now that the sunspot activity in this cycle is showing a
marked decrease, the lowered ionization of the F-Iayers is
reducing the reliability of aeron811ticallongrange communlca.
tion conducted on the frequencies in the 11 to 18 MHz band.
Conditions are expected to further deteriorate as the sunspot
activity cycle nears its minimum in 1986/87.
In the next few years, aeronautical long.range HF radio communication is expected to be conducted primarily in the 2, 5,
8, and 11 MHz bands, although with decreasing performance,

as the maximum usable frequency (MUF) arw:l the lower usable

frequency (LUF) are both lowered as Cycle 21 draws to a
close.
Though phenomenon can occur on any aircraft using HF
communication. It is more likely to happen on long haul oper
ations. An understanding of these facts will result in fewer
flight squawks and fewer expensive "non-confirmed" removals
for the airlines.

'N

..,
.N

.N

.0100'....

"

'N
N

..... "','c.ao ....,_

N
N
N

...-

'.14 .tl'1 'tl'1 "11

'.>. ,_ , ,.., , _ '..',_

.......

Figure 3. ObselVed and on.yelrahnd predicted smooth,d sunspot

nUlJ1ben.

17501760171017801790180181018201830184018518601870 1880 1890 190 1910 1920193019401950

'40
120

100
80
80

40

20

o
RELATIVE
SUN SPOT
NUMBER

Figur.2. 11 Year cycles of soler activity. 11501950.

12

~-'

FUEL CONSERVATION
NEW5LETTEI\.

IO"ItID

AIRLINER
O!;toblf-Dacember 1983

No.12

MAINTENANCE FOR REDUCEO

entitled, "Airplane Maintenanea for Fual

ConselVation for Boeing 701/721/737(747
Jet Transport,"

CONTENTS
MAINTENANCE FOR
REDUCED FUel BURN

ver the last decade airlines have significanlly reduced ovefall fuel burn and
today achieve .....ry clOSI to optimum
liveis. Many items contribute to this im
provement: adoption of fual aconomy
procedures and making personnal aware of
the importance of these; various types of
new equipment, such as flight management!
performance advisory/navigation systems;
improVfld ATC practices; waigh! saving
programs; maintenance for fuel conserva
tion, etc.
We intend to devote this Newsletter to the
last item, m.intenance for fuel conservation,
This is not intended to criticize the maintenance/engineering side of tha airlines. How
ever, decisions to instln Dr retrofit expan
sive equipment, such IS Performenca Managam.nt Systems, are being made on very
small fuel saving projections that can easily
be mOnl than cancelled by leek of an on
going maintenenca lor fuel conserv.tion
program. Consequantly a review of this sub
ject is consid.red worthwhila.

FUElBUAN
Meny operators are finding that devoting,
portion of airtralt maintenance schedules to
the identification and repaif of drag ,tlated

The document compares thl fuel bum pan

alty incuned with deteriorated/deficient
items (gallons and fuel costl with the
upenSi of comctive action (man hours and
labof cost). Maintenance Manual and Struc
tural Repair Menual references Ire providad.

items can hlVl significant impact on the

over,1I fUll efficiency of their fleet. This
article should aid .n operators in determin
ing the cortaffectiven.u of drill r,lated
maintenance work by describing the discr'Plncies fnquentlv foond on in-service
,irpllon, by id.ntifying the typical penal.
ties associated with the$8 discrepencies, Ind
by discussing tIlu appropriatt mlintsnanCI
aclion required to reduce the penalties,
Although the article is band on information
oathlfed during .'adynamic inspections of
in-servin 747s.the procedures described ere

Each Boeing modal (IXClpt 757 and 767) is

exemined in detail with items categori.tlld as
Aircraft Instrumentation, Seal Leakage, Surface Irregulerities or Control Surface Rig.
ging, Photographs and illustrations art
included to depict the various discflpancies.
A document covering 757 and 767 models
will be issued early in 1984,

epplicable to all models.

Maint.nance Task Cards are also provided
for "Fuel Conservation Conditional
Checks:' covaring all items listed in th.
above document.

Detailed inspections performed by Boeing

on in-salVke 747s have shown that errOr1 in
Irimming and lirfrlme deterioration
account for increases In drag of up to two
pllfcenl. This incruses an airplane's annual
lUll consumption by approximately
250,000 gallons for e "typicel 747 oper
ator," Correcti'll maintenance action cen
usually eliminate eighty percent of this
incre&sad fual bum.

TYPICAL FUELBU RN PENALTIES

The following table is provided to show how
small (1%) drag Of fuel burn penalty
increases annual fuel consumption. Sinta
the valulSwili be affected bV utilization and
other variables, operetors may wish to
develop penalties appropriate to th.ir own
operation.

The increase in fuel eonSJmption due to

trimming errors is mort often attributed to
improper procedures and faulty instrumen
titian. Both are ea,ily rectified once identi
fied. The increase in fu.1 conSJmption asso
ci.ted with airframe d"erioration is dua to
fuSilage pressurization saal leakllllll, internal
airflow, misrigged control SJrfacts, mismatch.d surfaces, and incrnsed surface
roul,flneu. Boeing Document 0642B58
r.ferenced eartier Cln aid operators in a$Sllssing if dt19 rellted mainllnanc. items cln be
r9Paired in cost..ffeC1ivl mlnner. This
.rtiele expands on the identification of drlg
rellted it.ms.

21

AIACAAFTTRIMMING AND
INFLlGHT CHECKS

Summaries of informetion sources and typi- The table should be uS8d to r,lell tha 747
cal fuel penalties ani provided, togethar with penahies Quoted in Ihe next .nicle to other
a feature article entitled, "Maintenance for models.
Reduced Fuel Burn." The article is blStld on
Boeing aerodynamic inspections of inFUEL PENALTY FOR 1"OR"8
SllVice aircraft that heve been identified as MODEL U.s GALLO.IIVEAI
"high consumers:' A table summerizlS the I~~~===;.~;~~;:===~
_ _JV.1118
inspections and checks to be performed II 117

Ir--..,,.,"""""""':,..,.,,.,.,,..,,..,.....I

... ...

tabl.li~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~il
m

during
maintenance
in-flight
This and
has been
found veryand
useful
in planning
scheduling the aerodynamic inspections.

737
AVAILABLE MATERIAL

747

m
7tIl

Fuel Conservation News!e"er

...

Ensuring that In lirtraft is "properly"

trimmed during cruise un hlYel noticeable

implct on fu.1 consumption. SinCl .rrors in

trimming coold pllt. In .ircraft in I sidnlip
or croSHontrollld condition, it is importlnt
to ust the corrtct procedurll. Improp.r
trimming proc.durls Ind/or instnlmente
tion errors Ira normIlly thl soure. of trim
ming .rrors, which Cln Itcount for e fuel
burn incrust of up to 60,000 gellons p.r
y..rfore747.
It his betn found during fu.l mileage IUdits

tnat m.ny flight crews tre unftmili.r with

Boeing'l r.commended trimming proc.dure.
Some flight crews UII eXClssi'l1 rudder trim,
feering thl spoillr pick-op that can occur
with whetl trim. Spoiler pickup, however,
dO'1 not occur without Ilrg. units of wheel,
usutlly well in ucea of eccepttble trim
limits. Thereforl, the UI8 of ruddlr trim
only will most liklly plec. the .ireraft in
sideslip condition. To r.duc. fu.1 bum pen
thill, flight crews should periodically
revilw Bo.ing's recomm.nded trimming
proc.dure in thl Flight Crew Trlinlng
MenuIl,
An tircnft cen liso be mistrimmed into I
sid.slip condition by Irroneous instrumenta
t/on. A ftulty tum inditttor .rror surf.cn
whlO the lircraft h.s been properly
trimmed, the wings are level, the tum indio
cetion b.1I is centered but the .ircrah can
not m.int.in a hUding. In this CIS', whln
the aircrtft is return.d to the autopilot'l
control, it will heve to fly with slight benk
and sideslip to maintain. heading. The fuel
burn ceused by this lideslip condition cen
be eliminated simply by h....ing flight crews
cross-chtck the instrumlnn, which should
b. done as part of the trimming proceduf1l,
Alter prop.rly trimming the aircraft, while
the Mopilot is still disengagad, the flight
crew should monitor the INS heeding to
ensurl thet the .ircr.ft can m.intain its
h.eding. Th. nadings from the turn indio
cetors and the ADl's should then be cross
ch.cked. Any diICrep.ncies found during
this procedure should be wrinen up for
maint.nancction.
For a typical 747 5,000 lI.1I0nS of fu.1 p.r
year can be uved by h....lng flight crlWs
periodically retrim the horizont.1 stebllim
during cruise.
The autometic stibiUm trim unit (ASTU)
retrims the stabitillr wh.n th, elevelor
axceeds thl .I....tor angl. threshold. The
ASTU will typically retrim Iha stebilillr
only onc. during cruise. However, by
retrimming at ten minute intervals (using
the meChanical trim IlVersl, the aforeman
tionad fuel bum r.duction cln b. obtlin.d,

An infliltlt visu.1 ch.ck of the flight con

trois lids in idlntifyiOillmproplr alignment
and possible probl,mswith IICtultors and/or
axcessi'l. frH.pl.y In syst.ms. (This chack
can usu&lly only be performed when
observers er. onboard; for eumple, when
lValu'ting a "problem" .irpl,n.,) The chick
Ihoold be perform.d .hu rill lircraft ha
bean ''PROPERlY'' trimmed, linea errors
in trimming will result in erroneoul ObIlN"
tionl. Th. observ'rs Ihould record the posl
tion of the inbo.rd ,il.ron in rel.tion to the
Inboard Ind outbo.rd f1.ps, the position of
th. outbolrd Idg. of thl outboard flip in
relation to the fixed wing Itroclure, the
position of the Inboard ,dge of the OUI
board aileron in fllation to thl find winR
structure, end the gaps between th. trailing
edgl of the spoiler panels Ind tha flaps.

rtquired 10 conlct discreplnt arees varill

with the S8Vlrity of the damlllle; in m.ny
celli it il quit. trivial.
Up to S8IIenty percent of the fuel bum
Increase associeted with fUAI. pr.ssurill.
tlon SiIIaling d.terioration is du. to dam'lII
sustained by th, lower lobe Ind mein deck
lid. tarllO door lIal dapr'ssors from being
Itruck by lJfOund handling equipm.nt (lie
Figufl I), A se&l d.pressor th.t is b.nt out
of shap. cen usually be worked back into its
proplr contour. However, e S8IIerely dam
aged seal depr.ssor should be replac.d, or
Ipliced if only I small section needs repair.

FUSELAGE PRESSU RIZATION SEALING

The 747 air conditioning syJl.m consists of
three "AlC picks" which lUPply the
fuselage with I continuoul flow of lir from
the engints. Ouring flight, constant cabin
pressure is meinteined by expilling exClss
.ir through outflow valvts, The outflow
valvg gatel form a nOlll1 to accalerate the
flow and providl throst recovlry from the
discharged air. Thus, dlm.ged fulllalll
pressurization SUll, such IS theafles lround
doors Ind access panels, decrease perform.nce in two ways, lince the lukage disrupts
.irflow along th. fusel. end also .Iimlnates thrust rlCov,ry obtained when the lif
is exp.nld through the outflow 'IIlve.
Oeteriofltion of fuselelll preSllJriution IIlls
.ccountl for fual burn increases of between
14,000 and 38,000 gallons per ynr for I
typicel 747. Most of thil incrtall can bl
eliminated through a mlintenance proglllm
which includes identifying and repairing
leeks. The pressurintion chICk specified in
thl Maintenance Mlnual will ,How meinle
nance personnel to id.ntify luks .nd can be
P8rformad by four plopl. in two hours.
While thl airmlt is pressurized, III 8nlry
doors, access doors, cargo doors, and bilge
drain '1.1'111 shoold bl check,d and the 8r881
of I.ekag. noted. After depressurization, the
.relS notld should be check.d for sui or
11.1 depressor dam., Nicotine mins often
aid in Identifying these IrelS,
Inservice insp.ctions hlVl Ihown thet the
majority of leakl tand to b. concentnted in
the following .r881: 11 forward Ind aft
lower lobe cargo doors; 2) main dick lide
cargo door (on freighter Ind combi versions);
Ind, 3) bilge drein vel"es, Th. rework

FiRure 1. Forward cargo door seal depressor

b,fore r.p,i,.

Most of the remaining deterioretion is due

10 lukaO' throultl c10lllled or damtllld bilge
drBin valvII. 747 airplanes built efter line
number 324 h."e a spring loaded nylon
valvl which closes whln thl fuselage is preswrilld. The leakaga lSIocieted with these
velvu is not due to wear of the valve, but
insteed il I result of debris eccumulation
bemun the val"nd the fuselage which
causes th. val", to remein open during cabin
pressurintioR. Thil probl.m can b. easily
solved by blowing high pressure air through

Fuel Conservation Newsletter

lb. vm to elllr IWay th. d.bril. EIl'Ii.r

141'1 u. I Rlbbtr flIPper l1v. in lieu of
tht nylon vllv. With tim., tht RIbber flIP'
per will disintl9r1t .,d blow out, thus
8llowinll IlIhg. thf'OYgh the chin. Th. .
l1vts must than be ~Itud with .ither I
Rlbb live or ttl, nylon wive, wtlidl
nlJlifll approximlt,ly 3 mtnhoul1 per
vllvI.

for high timl 747.. Arlll most often found

with disc~lnt .'lil"lllln winglOWlf sur.
fK:t trliling td,. Idjunabl, p..,.ls, witlfbody fliring, INdif'llll ,dill flIPS, Ind Iinding
11'. doors. Insptttion of the . .Is in tha8
Il'UIshould r,quin no mOrl thin two man
houl1. The tim, rlquirtd to rlp.lir 'ny discr1Jlant . .b will vary with thl type of
rlWOrit naclllllV. Thl IIIling rlqui'.m,nu
... 'Pacified in the M,intlntnet MtlKlll.

INTERNAL AIRFLOW

FLIGHT CONTROL RIGGING

Mlny clYitits on the 747 hlY. bnn ..lltd
to prevlnt int,rnll lirflow through thlm. If
thlse elYitill w8rl not seilld, lir would IlIk
from 'rlas of high prlssur' to Irl'" of low
prelSUrl. During thl dllour through the
cavity, the lir lostl InlrlN Ind must be
ICClI'rlt,d by the lower prnsurl ,irflow It
thl tll/ity Ixit. Th, lirplanl in turn exp,ri.
,nClSln additionll fIIisttnce or dflg foru.
In FillUn 2 for Ixltmpll, the bulb ..,ion
the wing 1000r IlJrflCl trilling Idgt Idjust
tblt Pln.1 is not comprl. .d 19Iinst 1hl
_iKlnt flight control stRleturl, Illowing
lir to lltt through the 1ft winll ClVity. Thl
air not onty loses momentum but tlso
dtgrldll the lift on this _etion of the wing,
furtfl'r incrusing d~ Prop,r .11 compression can be vlrifitd by diding I thin m,ttl
strip Of rull bltw.n thl ..a1 Ind surftct.
With Id.qul1. comprnsion, I Imlll force
will b, rlquirld to t1mov, thl RIll. Dim
. d .,ls Cln be identifild by I simpl,
visu.1 inspection.

During the davllopmlnt of ttll 747 ut,n

livl testing Ind .nllYlis was dirtcted It
achilYing minimum lndue.d drlg by carl
fully dllignlng to I dlllr1d 11ft dinribulion
ICroSS thl winglnd thl horizontll stlbilizlr,
Th.se ,fforts .1 rlflKlld In thl current
Mlintenlnc. hI.nu.1 rigging tollrlnclI of
ttIl flight control surflCU. Owi.tions from
thlll tol'rlnclI will a1tlr the lift distribu
tion of the tifting ..rf.CI as w,1l as incrll"

'....

Improptf Ilignm,nt of thl inboml end ootboII'd .illronl typically found on in'lef'IIice
747's can inctUSI fuel blJrn by 2,500 to
5,000 gllIonl plr ytll'. Ail,ron Ilignmint
can b. Iasily chacked using thl M.intlnlnce
M.nu.. Sill menhoul1 should .. ffltt to
chICk thl t1ignm,nt tnd cornet any
discrtp,nci,s.

Simple tdjtlrtments to the PCM'lf control

pacbgt will conw::t InY misalignmenl If
the upper Ind lower RIdder split IS ,itot
ltatic: prtSlUr. is incrMDd during thl
grtlUnd chick, the ruddlr nlia mtc;h...ism
bncktt .hgnmtnt "ould Iba be checltad.
A full lIVing of 6,300 ",lions plr yur is
obrJintbl, for tYpical 747 oplfltor by
Insuring tMt inbo.rd .\(1 outboard , .
lton IR properly Ili,nld. This ch,ck
rlqtllrtl Ins ttlln four mlflhoun with onlv
simple Idjurtmlntl to thl .IMtor POWII'
PKkllI1 Input rNelI needed to cornet .ny
ml..lignmlnt
MISMATCHED SURFACES
Plnlltill Incurred by surf.tI Irngul.ritlll
lmlsmltchtd ..rftcll, rou~nllS, ItC.l will
dlplnd on thl !ottlion of thl discrtp.nt
ittm, sinea IOml .IIS of the .irplan
mOrl critical thlll othln. Crital .rllS 'rI,
in gtntraI, thl fulll. forwtrrl af thl mid
wil'lll position .nd thl forward p.rt of wlna.
Implnntgt, MClnll ami IIRlts. Mism.lch,d
IUrfItts rtfm to tbt stlPl thlt oaur
lI'oul'd doors, C&ntrol .UfKb, .ocI ICCta
plll'ltls. Shown in FitUrt 3 is positive Ind
nlglliNt misml1ch or I forw.d tnd .ft
IlCing SlIP. A d~ forte on thl .irpllnt
rllUlts from the exttmtl .i' flON lurting
I positivi prtSIJrt forCl on ttli fOrwlrd
fleingartl .nd I nttt1iv, prtSSUrl forca on
the .ft feting artl. Itlms most olttn found
to hWI exC,ssivl misml1eh Irl Ingin' cowll
.nd ItRlU, spoillrs, winglow,r IlJrftcl ulil
ing edlll adjustabll pln.ls, Ind Ixtlrn.1
rlp.lr p.tches.

Fiturt 3. Slips un.d lIlMJn, colJttW sur

faces, .nd

ICCIIS ,."L

O~ dUI to dillrioration in the IIlling of

the. twitilS etn typically lCeount for I
bum increase of 12,500 ",lIonl pit
y.ar, or .s much IS 33,000 ",lIonl plr Yllr

ru.1

Fuel Conservltion Newsletter

Ensuring ttllt the Rldders Irl prop.rt'(

tin SI'i' 5,000 III110ns of futl p.r
year. Inspteling ttl. rudd'r Ilignment
rlquirls IPProximltlly six mlnhours.

II9Itd

Mismlu:htd .uftCII on elMls of JT90

loginn (txeluding JT9070A Ind JT907Q
.ng,nlll (In inerNSll fuel bum by up to
25,DOO gIIlons Plf Yllr. Thl mismltchll.rI

created by Inginl "clocking:' th.t is, the

rotation of various engine componenlS.
Since the cowls on th.st enginlS are .nginl
mounlld, the mounting rails have I
tendency to twin. This results in a displactm.nt of the cowl hee Figure 41. Pratt &
Whitney hu ISSlJed S.rvice Bulletins 3B58,
4436 and 4471, which can be incorporated
during .ngine refurbishments, to prevlnt
Ing;nl clocking.

rtplaced with permanenl ones as soon as it

is feasibl.; th. importance of a smooth sur
face finish should be strtssed for both
temporary and penn.nent rtpairs. The drag
of ,xllrn,1 doublers can be reduCid by
simp Iv chamfering thl fOlWlrd and aft edge
of thl doubler or fairing with saalant. Th.
fu.1 burn incruse associ.lld with all .xternal repairs on a typical .ircraft with 30,000
flight hours could be reduc.d bv over 1,200
gallons per veer.
SURFACE ROUGHNESS

Surface roughness r.fers to fastener flush

ness, surface smoothness, and skin wavinm.
All of thest result in additional frictional
resistanc. to the passage of the airplanl sur
face through th. eir. The incrussd surf.ce
roughness typically found on in-service 747s
can waste over 18,000 gallons of luel per
vear. A glnllal inspection of the aircraft for
excessive SUrfacl roullhness raquires two
manhours. The types of roughnass most
often found on in-servit. aircraft ere exces-

sivi "sand gl1lin roughnlSs" on paint finish,

and due to a build.up of grease and dirt
"Sand glllin rough nus" refalS to a texture
resembling sandpaper. Paint with sand grain
roughn.ss should be sandld smooth and
th.n hev. a smooth coat of paint applild.
To r.duci the penalty associaltd with
deposits of grease and dirt. Boeing encour
ages lirlinn 10 wash airplants, which also
.nhlncn thl Mnhetics of tha airer,ft
The potential improvement lVailable shows
thet e diligent program to uncovII and cor
rltt sources of drag can b. beneficial. Th.
follOWing tables outlinl the .ntift series of
insp&Ctions performld by Baaing during in
servica investigations. For most airlines,
devoting 8 portion of IVery other C ch.ck
(once lV.ry 6,000 to 8,000 hours) to pII
form these insplctions and plliodically
reviewing Bo.ing's recommlnded trimming
procedure with pilots should noticnblv
improv.fl8l1 performance.

Tillft
IIrOUllllO

I""CTIO"
A'"CRAfT
flAM IUI'f'OIIT
IVIn. .
'TlIII
1'(111 CHt:el(
"10U'"10
IIlau,IIEO
'NlPleT'OHS TO" """0"11110 OlmlNG MAIMT1I""NCI

Figurl4. Enginl "clocking."

A gap between the spoiler panel trailing

edge and th. mid.flap upper wrfaet in
exc.ss of the Mainltnenc. Menuallolerenet
creates an excessivl st.p during flillhl. This
typic.lly accounu for a fuel burn p.nalty of
epproximately 5,000 l'Illons p.r year.
Insp.ction of thell panels requires four
manhours. Re.rigging any discrepant panels
requires approximately one m.nhour per
p.nel.

EXllrnal repairs er. common on in-sarvite

eirplanes. The dr.g.ssociated with the steps
on these r.pairs cln oft.n b. reduced by
.mphes;zing high quelity workmanship.
Temporary fiblrgl.ss rtpairs should b.

"_Ill

....

2__

" ...........

_------ -- -.--_.
.
.
--...._
.... .........-'---..--_.
------_.--.....
='="'_.......
-......-.. ... '- .-.- ---_
_
..
..............
--- ..-.........- --. . .... '-'- -'- -..'-- .......
_
..--.....................
v..........
'---,~

r--.._
_.......

CoMtaI-'-

Excessive mismatches betwlKln wing lower

surface tl1liling edll8 adjustable panel end
the adjatlnt flight control wrfatls typically
account for e fuel burn increall of 2,500
gallons per year. Inspection of thell panels
requiru two manhours. In addition, if th.
mismatches ar. large enough to create a gap
between the pan.I's bulb .al and the
edjecenl flight control S1Jrface, eif will b.
el10wed to flow through the cavity u discussed earli.r. In all but I few areas, the.
pan.ls can be raised or lowered as n.tlSSlry
by adjusting thl sefTalld plat. or the adjust.
able rod on the panel S1Jpports.

........I'OM.II

AOOITIOHAL.
Sl.I'POllt,
IOUII'MINT
"rDIIIIIIO

"'OU'Flro

2........

,.." ...... .".,

3........

,............~..-

.............-

----

tn

, ,
ttr

:=,.--

AfOU _ _

1IJP.,.a,-<
_ _I

,...

..... ""*-'"

'-"

_1lI

I .......

31 ..... '
...............1
__

-'"
_

...............,....

, "

...

r-...,....
__

----.oy,
"'-

2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . _ ' " T_ ......._

.....

._..

2.....

" .. _

1 2,..-.

" .....

2-'"

......

2. . . . . . . . _

Ue

,...

"--

.......

IS

.......................U

....-.

I ....

....
. . ""',,*-D WITH Alllf'\.AIIII-....oJlTID n

".U."T

~.C'IONI

10....".....-0

....................

...................

10-._ ""_

CHlCI(

P1f
...... - . . .............
_ _IrIU.1lI

......................-c
NOTE IYSTI"

LANDlNlI .....

QJI,.,

........

' . . . ' " e:-

' - . . . . . .DI

QUI.....NTS . . . .
tNTlNAlIlICa MANUAl '011 0""" 1illCJDI....

Fuel Conservation Newsletter

uti
by [)QV;d C. &U", and
767 EJectrictJl Systmu Project

he 767200 airplanes now in service incorporate the

latest technology in wing aerodynamic efficiency, This
efficiency IS reflected in the outstanding performance
capabilities of the 767200 with bener takeoff field perform

ance both at sea level and under high or hot conditions,

improved climb time and distance, higher initial cruise alti

tudes, hi~er engine out altitudes, lower approach speeds and
shorter landing field distances all combined with the beSt fuel
efficiency of any wide body twin.

p~u, G.

Stevenson
767 ~condDry Controls Project

Supporting this aerodynamic capability other new tachnology

in the form of the 'Wing High Lift Control System" is uti
lized. The purpose of the wing high tift system il the lame as
any other jet airplane; that is: to change the wing crou section
to provide the desired aerodynamic characteristics required for
best eHiciency In each phase of the fll!ilt profile. To meet this
requirement. portions of the Wing's leading and traIling edges
are extended from their normal positions by a conUtM system
which combines mechanical, hydrlUlic and electrical/elec-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 13

tronic devices. Together, the~ devices provide both a primary

and an alternate drive, and monitor the entire system for
proper operation.
This article presents en overview of the 767 wing high lift system, concentrating primarily on the control system. After a
brlef discussion of the structural high 11ft devices, the thru
main functions of the control system are described in detail:
primary drive provided by a hydraulic and mechanical system,
alternate drive provided by an electrical and mechanical system, and the monitoring function performed by a microprocessor-based electronic unit.
Wing High lift Structures-Flaps and mats
High lift on the 767 Is provided by a well-proven combination
of movable wing leading edge surfaces known as slau, and
tra11ing edge surfaces known as flaps. FI~re 1 shows the locations of these structures. On each wing, thera is one leading

edge slat and one trailing edge flap inboard of the engine, and
five sleu and one flap outboard of the engine. (Actually the
inboard flap Is made up of two Individual surfaces, a main and
an aft flap, which separate as the flaps are extended..Except
for the linkage In the flap It~lf which separates the two, these
are driven by the control systam as though they were a single
surface,)
The leading edge slau are positioned by rollers on tracks
attached to the wing structure. They are rolled out on these
tracks by a simple linkage housed within the wing and slat
contour. The trailing edge flaps are driven and positioned by a
linkage housed In the wing-to-body fairing and In three speelal
fairings which hang below the wing.
The wing high lift system Is independent of other flight control systems except for one connection between the trailing
edge flap drive and the ailerons: the Aileron Droop Gearbox.
This device trims all ailerons to a ten.<Jegree down position,
whenever flaps are extended, to provide additional lift.

Inbd LE Slats
(1 Per Wing)

Outbd LE Slats
(5 Per Wing)

Inbd TE Flap
(1 Per Wing)
Outbd TE Flap
(1 Per Wing)

14

Figllr, 1. Th, 767 trailing ,dge fltps and I..ding edil slats
ar. shown her, in their fully ftlrac:ted positions.. By ,xt,ndin; these SUrflCes, the wing tross-sac:tion may b, varitd to
provida additional lift for liking off and landing.

During I typic.l fli{tlt, three different wing configurltions Ire

used: one for takeoff, another for CNise, and I third for IlndIng. Typical configurations of the outboard wing are shown in
Figure 2. For takeoff, there is I single partially extended slit
position (called the sealed position because the upper surface
of 1M silts is nearly continuous with thilt of the wing) and
four flip positions (the 1,5,15, Ind 20 degree positions). The
proper flap setting is chosen by the flight crew on the basis of
takeoff conditions and airline procedures.
four configurations provide the higher lift needed for I takeoff Ind low drag
to aid acceleration. While cruising, both flaps and slats are
fully retracted (the zero degree or UP position) to ensure maximum fuel efficiency for the duration of the flight. For Iinding,
a single, fully extended slat position Is used (called slotted or
gapped because of the gap between the slat and wing upper
surfaces) and one of two flap positions (25 or 30 degrees).
again chosen based on the conditions and procedures in effect.
80th configurations provide the higher lift and drag needed for
a wello(;ontrolled. low-speed Ipproach and touchdown.

AIr

terns, and acts as a back-up for flight controls on the left and
r91t hydr&llic JVstems. Pressure for the center systam comes
from two electric pumps and an lir driven pump.
Each motor is part of a Power Drive Unit (PDUI which also
includes alternate drive system devices IdisQJ$sed liter in this
article) and mechanical control devices which precisely posi
tion the surfaces being driven. A block diagram of one slat
POU is shown in Fi~re 3 {the flap POU is similarl. Mechanical
closed-loop control of the h~ 11ft devices is performed by the
Mechanical Control Unit. which is made up of an Input cam
whose position reflects the desired slat configuration, I follow
up cam whose position corrtsPonds to the actual configuration, and a summing lever which compares the two cam posl
tions, The cam surfaces which move the summing lever are
stepped rather than continuous, Illowing the flaps and slats to
assume only the discrete positions defined by the step heights.
The summing lever drives the Hydraulic Control Module, ,
valve which directs hydraulic fluid to the up or down port of

....
,,-_

Orto<.

(POUI

Tra6'19 Edllt'

""
Fiture 2. Typicll position of fl.ps .nd dlts for tJktoff, eruiSl, end
lendin,. IAl tJktoff, or p.rt"lIy extended, position providn hilh lift
Ind low stili spHd ehlraet.ristic:s. (B) (nIise, or fully rttrleted, position pruvidn I "dun willi" for low dflt. (e) Iinding, or fUlly extendlld.
position providn hith lift end inerenld dra..
The wing high lift surfaces are not moved bV the autopilot, so,
except for one special case (flip load relief, discuued liter in
this article), the flap and slat positiom are controlled directlv
bV the flight crew. Normal operation of the surfaces is the
function of the primary drive system, described below.
Primary Drin-Hydraulic..,d Mtd\..,iceI System
Three hydraulic moton drive the flaps and slats in primary
operation. One of these moton drives the intxlard and out
board trailing edge flaps, another drives the inboard leading
edge slats and the third drives the outboard slats_ All three
motors are powered bV the airplane's center hydraulic system,
which also powers the spoiler/speedbrake and landing gear sys

Fieure 3. Typicll primary driV1 system for I..ding lid.. diu (flip
drin ts limi.rl. Fudblek from thlgurbox to thl m.eh.ltial control
unit .nsures prutse positionin, of the Wrflcn blilll driven.
the motor, such that the motor lets through the ll8arbox to
move the surfaces toward the desired position. The desired
high lift configuration must. of course, come from the fl'lt
deck. One of the seven flap and slat configurations is selected
with a flap lever 00 the right side of the control stand. at the
co-pilot's left hand. and the command is transmitted to thrM
POU's via a single loop control cable. The lever is spring loaded
to snap into detented positions, one for each of the seven confi9Jrations; these detents ensure a discrete input to the
Mechanical Control Unit.
Motion from each PDU is transmitted through torque tubes to
the surface being driven. The high-RPM torque tube motion Is
converted to a slower motion of the drive control linkage by
rotary actuators. The trailing edge rotary actuators are located
In underwing fairings and the leading edge actuators In the

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 15

wing leading edge. The trailing edge actuators also contain

torque limiters: brake-like devices which ground the drive train
to wing structure if the input torque exceeds a desirable level.
All rotary actuators contain "no-back" devices which keep air
loads on the surfaces from back~riving the drive train if
hydraulic or electric power Is lost.

Most flap and slat operations are done with this primary sys
tem. However, even if a failure occurs in flight, an alternate
drive system Is pr.ovlded to extend the leading and trailing
edges to the proper config.Hation for landing.
Alternata Drive-Electric and Mechanical Systam

Figure 4 shows the complete primary drive train from flap

lever to rotary actuator.
Flap lever

Three electric moton drive the flaps and slats in alternate

operation. These motonare mounted on the ttuee Power Drive
Inbd Slat Power Drive Unit
Outbd Slat 110 Places)
Unitsand,likethehydraulicmotors,
inbo ard Slat (2 Places)
drive the trailing edge flaps, the inboard leading slats, and the out
board slats separately.

Inbd Slat
Rotary
Actuator
(4 Places)

UP

FWtl
figurl4. Drive Sysum. A singll loop control Clble trlnsmiu flip levlr com minds to III threl power
drivt units. Torque tubes transmit motion from POUs to rotary IctultOl1, which moye luh surfICe.

To Lell
lnbd Flap

Power DrIve UnitIPDU}

B. TYPICAL SLAT ALTERNATE DRIVE SYSTEM

16

The flap and slat alternate drives

are like the primary drives, closed
loop systems (that is, actual position
information is fed back to a device
which compares this to the desired
position and moves the surface in
the appropriate direction). Block
diagrams of the closedloop flap
and inboard slat alternate drive
systems are shown in Figure 5; the
outboard drive is identical to the
inboard, The central element in the
loop is a Flap!Slat Electronic Unit
(FSEU! which also has a number of
monitoring functions to be discussed later. The FSEU compares
the desired surface position, selected
with a rotary switch in the cockpit.
to the actual position, and operates
the electric motors accordingly.
Actual position of the flaps is
sensed with a Rotary Variable
Differential Transformer (RVDT)
attached to a right inboard flap
rotary actuator. The RVDT converts flap position into an alternating current (AC) signal, which is in
turn converted to a direct ament
(DC) signal by a Flap/Stabilizer
Position Module (FSPMJ. and the
FSEU receives this signal. Actual
position of the slats is sensed with
RVDTs driven the the Mechanical
Control Units in the two slat PDUs;
the FSEU uses these AC signals
directly.
Figure 5. Alteullte drive systtms.. (A)
in the flap altlfnata drive, felHlback of
surface position comes from In RVOr
.... on onl flip rotlfY actultor, through In
FSPM. (B) in the slat liternate drive,
fHdback coma directly from In RVDT
on thl POU_

Figures 3 and 5 both show Alternate Arming Switches which

are used to choose between the two drive systems. There are
two switches located below the alternate position select switch
in the cockpit: one arms the trailing edge electric drive, the
other arms both inboard and outboard leading edge drives.
When the switches are in the "Armed" position, bypass valves
on each PUD cut off pressure in the hydraulic motors and connect the motors' extend and retract ports so that the electric
motors run without opposition from trapped hydraulic fluid,
the electric motor clutch engages, and an arming circuit
energizes allowing the FSEU to direct power to the motOr5. A
brake on the electric motor holds the drive train in position
until the FSEU direeu power to the motors.
The same mechanical drive train from the PDU's to the different surfaces is used by both primary and alternate systems.
Hiltl Lift Monitor-Etectrical/Electrontc System
Monitor functions in the high-lift system can be divided into
three categories: system protection, flight deck indication, and
data distribution. Protection and indication are handled by the
Flap/Slat Electronic Unit {FSEU} alone; distribution of high.
lift configuration data to other systems is a function of the
FSEU, the Proximity Switch Electronic Unit (PSEU) and three
Flap/Stabilizer Position Modules (FSPM's).
The basic function of an FSPM has already been discussed in
relation to alternate drive. All three FSPM's convert AC signals,
from RVDT's on three separate flap rotary actuators, to DC
signals and provide these DC signals representing flap position
to the FSEU and to other airplane systems. They also provide
discrete (twostate) signals to other systems, for example. flaps
retracted or not retracted, and flaps in a takeoff position or
not. IFSPM's also provide DC stabilizer position signals but
these have no part in the high lift system.) Three FSPM's are
required on the 767 to supply the triple-redundant autopilot
with three independent flap position signals.
The PSEU is a general purpose unit which monitors the states
of proximity switches throughout the airplane. These switches
sense the proximity of metal targets mounted on various moving structures such as doors, thrust reversers, landing gear, and
leading edge slats. The lack of moving pans in the switches
makes them ideal in these areas, where regular mechanical
switches could wear out too quickly. Twenty-four switches on
the fixed leading edge structure and forty-eight targets on
moving slat structure provide the PSEU with enough information to determ ine in which of the three positions each of the
twelve slats is in. The PSEU then provides a number of discrete
signals to the FSEU and to other systems based on these perceived slat positions.
The FSEU is the main electronic element in the high lift system. The unit integrates signals from the PSEU, the three

FSPM's, two Air Data Computer5, Flight Deck switches. and

position transmitters on flaps, slat PDU's, and the flap lever,
and provides signals which alert the flight crew of unusual
conditions, keep these unusual conditions from having undesirable consequences, simplify flight procedures by automatically
performing some control functions, and direct the alternate
drive operation. The FSEU 15 made up of three Independent
microprocessor-based subsections, each performing separate
functions so that if one section becomes inoperative, the
others will continue to operate normally. Though the design of
the electrical system allows hydraulic drive operation even
with the FSEU removed, so many protective, indication, and
back-up functions are performed by the unit that it is consid
ered minimum equipment: the airplane may not take off
without a fully operational FSEU.
High lift indication in the cockpit is, for the most part, provided by the FSEU. The flight crew gets feedback on system
configuration in three ways: a flap position indicator, a pair of
amber caution lights, and a pair of Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)
displays controlled by the Engine Indication and Crew Alert
System (EICAS) computers. These are shown in Figure 6.
The flap position indicator contains a pair of needles. These
needles are driven, in takeoff and landing positions ILe., from
1 10 30 degrees). by signals coming directly from transmitters
attached to the outboard-most left and right trailil1g edge
rotary actuators. When the cruise position is selected, the
needles are positioned by the FSEU and PSEU in two steps:
the FSEU switches from the flap position transmitters to a
fiXed-signal transmitter which drives the needles to a position
between 1 and UP when the slats leave the takeoff position.
The PSEU then switches to another fixed transmitter which
drives the needles to UP when the slats are fully retracted.
These discrete movements between UP and 1 may look
unusual to anyone accustomed to the smooth, continuous
motion of flap needles on airplanes which only monitor trail
ing edge flap position.
The EICAS displays show the flight crew short printed messages whenever the high lift system operates incorrectly or fails
to operate when it should. Signals from the FSEU tell the
EICAS computer to display these messages in conjunction
with protective action taken by the FSEU. The two amber
lights, one for leading edge cautions and the other for trailing
edge, are illuminated to draw the flight crew's attention to an
EICAS message that advises why the li!tlt is on.
The FSEU performs a variety of protective functions when the
primary drive system is used. These include shutting dOwn the
Power Drive Units in the event of system failure. forced
seQUencing of flap and slat motion between cruise and takeoff
positions, and automatic trailing edge flap retraction when airspeed exceeds recommended limits for the 300 flap configura.
tion. The FSEU controls six devices which directly affect

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 17

Figurt 6. High lift control.nd indication dmus on thl767 flight dICk,

primary system operation to providf! these functions: the three

bypass valves described earlier. two hydraulic shutoff valves,
and a flap load rehef actuator.
The three bypass valves are driven to the bypass position by

the FSEU to shut down the primary drive system under conditions of uncommanded motion or flap/slat asymmetry. Both
of these conditions are the result of system failures and could
result in an undesirable aerodynamic confi~ration. Uncommanded motion is motion of the surfaces away from agreement with the flap lever command. To identify suctl an event,
the FSEU monitors lever position with an RVDT in the con
trol stand and surface position with RVDT's in the slat PDU's
and with FSPM signals. EICAS status messages identify the
system which has been shut down and, if the system is shut
down in a position where it disagrees with the lever, an EICAS
caution message annunciates the fact, The caution messages

18

("LE SLAT DISAGREE" and "TE FLAP DISAGREE") come

on any time the appropriate system disagrees with the flap
lever and is not moving toward agreement for any reason. The
FSEU also turns on the Leading Edge or Trailing Edge Light in
aSSOCiation with these messages, and the EICAS computer
turns on the Master Caution Light and an IUrai alert.
Asymmetry is a condItion in which one or more control surfaces disagree in position with the others, regardless of lever
position. Position transmItters on each of the eight trailing
edge rotary aetuatOr1 a~ used to monitor flap .symmetry.
These transmitters, uJled resolvers, are connected In sym
metrical pairs in suctl way that the output of each pair is
proportional to the difference In position between the two
resolvers. When the output exceeds an acceptable level, the
flaps are shut down. Asymmetry of the inboard and outboard
leadIng edge slats is detected by the PSEU using the proll:imity

switches. Inboard and outboard slat asymmetries are monitored separately so that the FSEU is able to shut down only
the discrepant system. Because the proximity switches provide
a less 8CO.Jrate measure of asymmetry than the resolvers on the
trailing edges, the leading edges are not shut down immech
ately upon detection of an asymmetric condition by the
PSEU. Instead, the FSEU allows them to move to their commanded position and then, if the asymmetry remains when the
flap lever is moved again. the appropriate slat POU is shut
down. EICAS messages {"LE SLAT ASYM" itfld "TE FlAP
ASYM"1 annunciate the shutdown. accompamed by the ~e
lights and aural alert whICh accompany the disagreement
messages. Both uncommanded motion and asymmetry shutdowns are latched in the FSEU, so that even ifthe conditions
which led to the shutdown go away, the affected PDU remains
bypassed, The $hutdown may be cleartd in the FSEU software by arming and then disarming the attemate flap or slat
system With the appropriate Alternate Arming SWItch.
(Cycling circuit lKeaken is not a recommended procedure for
clearing a shutdown because it is not guaranteed to clear the
FSEU software.) If the conditions which led to the shutdown
remain after the switch is cycled, the system will again be shut
down.
The two hydraulic shutoff valves are operated by the FSEU to
cut off hydraulic pressure to the flap POU and to both slat
POU's when no surface motion has been commanded. This
reduces valve erosion within the PDU's and protects the rest of
the center hydraulic system in the event of a POU or hydraulic
line failure. tn addition, the shutoff valves are used to
sequence flap and slat motion between the cruise and takeoff
pOSItions. This function ensures that the flaps are always fully
retracted unless the slau are at least in the takeoff position
(that is, between cruise and takeoff the slats always extend
first and the flaps always retract first). In flight, operating procedures require that the flap lever not be moved past the
gated 10 detent until the flap indicator confirms the proper
system configuration. This results in proper sequencing with
out the use of the shutoff valves; however, if the procedure is
not followed, the back~p protection provided by the FSEU
through the shutoff valves guarantees that no configuration
with undesirable aerodynamic characteristics will be reached.
After landing, the flap lever is sometImes moved from a landing position to the 10 detent in one motion. The interlock
function of the FSEU stops the slats before they reach the 10
position, which causes I "lE SLAT DISAGREE" EICAS meso
sage to appear until the flaps have retracted and the slats are
then allowed to complete their movement.
Flap load relief is I protectIve functton performed by the
FSEU during a landing approach when airspeed exceeds the
design limit for the trailing edge flaps. The FSEU monitors airspeed from the AIr Data Computers when the flaps are in the
JOO position. and energizes an actuator if the speed becomes

too high. The actuator changes the input to the flap PDU such
that the flaps retract to the 250 position. load relief operation
is r.()nsidered normal so no EICAS message annunciates the
actuation; if the actuator fails, though, an EICAS message
("FLAP lD RELIEF" is displayed and the Trailing Edge
LIght iIIuminatl!'S to advise the flight crew that the flaps should
be retracted with the lever_
The FSEU, PSEU and FSPM's, like the other advanced elec-

tronic eqtupment in the 767, lndude Built In Test Equipment

(BITE) to aid in maintenance and repair of the high lift system. This Test Equipment consists of hardware and software,
built in to the unit under test, which independently determines whether the unit is operating property. In the PSEU,
faults occurring in flight are recorded for fubJre display. In all
units, BITE provides a ground test ftatu~ by which maIntenance crews can verify operation of components througt'lout
the airplane by simply pressing a button on the front panel of
the unit. In this way, proximity switches, position transmitters,
and the units themselves can all be checked from one location
in the electrical e<!tupment bay. (In general, these ground tests
do not interfere with normal operatIOn of the units; how
ever, on some early 767 aIrplanes, FSPM BITE presented a
signal to the FSEU which was interpreted as uncommanded
motion of the flaps. On these airplanes, it was necessary to
cycle the Flap Alternate Arming Switch after each FSPM
ground test to clear any failure protection shutdown that may
have oco.med. (This system anomaly has been corrected by
service bulletin.)
Summary
New features of the 767 wing high lift system include:

Electronic c1osed.loop alternate drive of flaps and slats.

Centralization of electrical high lift functions (protection,

indication, and alternate control) in a single microprocessor
based unit, the FSEU.

Improved asymmetry protection through the use of high

speed digital techniques.

Centralization of flap and slat position data in the FSPM's

and PSEU.

Built In Tl!'St features on 9O'lI. of the electrical system.

The 767 high 11ft system used a combinatton of proven techniques and new technology to Improve ease-of-use and reliabIlity. The simple command and indication features help make a
two.penon flight crew possible; the BITE features and centralized electronics help make system maintenaooe quicker and
easIer.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 19

eports of thirteen events since 1969 in which personnel

have been ingested into JTBO engines on 737 airplanes
underscore the importance of understanding and protecting against this hazard. It is the purpose of this article to identify high risk factors and to suggest appropriate safeguards.
Reports indicate that eight people were ingested while troubleshooting engine oil leaks and excessive oil consumption, three

while performing tasks involving engine trim, Ol'll! while adjusting engine oil pressure and one during refueling operations. A
risk of ingestion while performing tasks with the engine running on a 737 is significant becaJse the engine inlets are near
the ground. Thus, m()(e body surface is subject to high inflow
velocity. (See Figure 1.) However, these engine maintenance
tasks can be safety performed if proper care is taken.

/
Figurl 1. These views of thl Model 757 engine (left) .nd thl Model 737 enginlS (right) clearly revell the greater inlel wction forn expowre
experienced by a person near thl lower engine on the Model 737.

20

Failure to follow procedures and safety precautions published

in the maintenance manual appears to be the cause of all
known ingestion incidents.

Figure 2. It is impossible to exit the 737 cowl area in the fOlWard dirK'
tion without entering into the intake haurd area.

The 737 Maintenance Manual calls for the engine cowl panels
to be removed before work is performed on a running engine.
Removal allows maintenance personnel to more easily enter
and exit the engine work area from the side, thus avoiding the
inlet hazard area. However, incident reports and a sampling of
737 operators make it apparent that cowl panel removal is
often omitted. Figure 2 illustrates that violation of the hazard
area is unavoidable when exiting the cowl in the forward
direction.
The inlet hazard areas for idle and aboveidle thrust as defined
by diagrams in the 737 Maintenance Manual are shown in Figure 3. At idle thrust. the inlet hazard area extends aft from the
lip inlet to the forward end of the cowl panels. When the
engine is operating above idle thrust, the hazard area extends
two feet further aft or five feet aft of the nose cowl inlet lip.
(See Fi~He 4.) To better understand at which point a person
would experience an incipient upsetting force. suction forces
on the human body were calC\Jlated from engine flow field
data and compared to the force required to destabilize a walk
ing person. An allowance was included for an average wind
velocity of 16 knots. A comparison of the calC\Jlated boundary
where that upsetting force occurs and the inlet hazard areas
diagrammed in the 737 Maintenance Manua' showed that
while the manual diagrams provide a safety margin beyond the
calculated boundary, the margin is smaller aft of the inlet lip
than elsewhere. Therefore. persons working on the engine aft
of the inlet should take special care to strictly avoid the hazard
area defined in the maintenance manual.

{
I

12'
INTAKE
DANGER
AREA

5' NOSE COWL

FORWARD EDGE

TAKE-OFF THRUST

INTAKE
DANGER
AREA

l15'-

NOSE COW"FT EDGE

IDLE THRUST

Figure 3. Intake hlZlrd Ireas IS defined in the 737 MaintenanceManuai.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 21

Loose dothing is partiwlarly dangerous. It will balloon,

increasing the surface subjected to the inlet airflow. The main
tenance manual clearly warns against wearing loose clothing,
yet reports indicate that this was a factor in many ingestion
incidents.
The use of remote trim equipment for engine trim operations
and a maximum pointer indicator for breather pressure test
can reduce the possibility of personnel aa:idents. This equip
ment is defined in the 737 Maintenance Manual and was
developed to accommodate performance of these maintenance
tasks without having personnel in close proximity to an oper
ating engine. In addition, to the maximum extent possible,
leak checks should be performed after engine shutdown.
Figure 4. lntlke hazlrd area extends three feet 1ft of inlet lip at idle
thrust Ind five feet 1ft of lip at Ibove idle thrust. Note that the idle
thrust Irea extends aft of the forward edge of the cowl pinel.

The most effective way to prevent future ingestions is to

understand and follow the cautions, warnings and procedures
as described in the 737 Maintenance Manual. Know and avoid
the entire inlet hazard area as diagrammed. Remember that
within that area the engine is capable of developing enough
suction to pull a person up to it or into it. Do not wear loose
clothing. Ensure that helmet, headset, hat, glasses, wipe rags
and all articles of clothing are strapped securely in position or
removed before working around the engine. If equipment 9r
clothing is dropped near the engine intake, do not try to
retrieve it. Remove engine cowl panels before performing tasks
on a running engine. Take extra care if winds are high or gusty
or ramps or aprons are slippery. Guard against the possibility
of tripping or stumbling toward the inlet or from momentary
inattention while working or gesturing. Remember that care
lessness around a running engine can be deadly.

It is important to realize that a person may feel a false sense of

security at the outer edge of the diagrammed inlet hazard area.
Figure 5 illustrates how suction exerted on the body increases
within the hazard area. Suction increases almost imperceptibly
at first, but as the person moves nearer the inlet the suction
force builds up until entering the darker colored area where
the suction more than quadruples with the first twofoot step.
This force could double if a person turns to face the inlet and
triple if he changes from a crouched to a standing position.
Changes in airflow direction near the inlet can cause a person
to twist, stumble, or lose control. High gusty wind, slippery
ramps or aprons, or an inadvertent misstep or careless gesture
while working further increases the risk of ingestion. Fig.ae 5
also confirms the
need for strictly
observing the safety
margins identified
NOTE INTENSITt'
in the maintenance
OF SUCnoN FORef.
IMIolEOI"TELY
"FT
manual.
OF NOS( COWL UP

Figure 5.
Suction forces stead
ily increase with near
ness to the inlet. The
suction intensity is.
represented by the
deeper color. Note
how the intense suc
tion Irea extends 1ft
of the inlet.

INTAKE
DANGER
AREA

COWL PANEL FORWARD EDGE

IDLE THRUST
22

Avionics Repai,.
andModification

By Sharon L. Sharpe alld J. H. Bucher

BESD Customer Ser1!ice Training

Significant portion of Boeing's commitment to excellence

in the design, manufacture, and support of commercial
airplanes begins after the airplane is delivered. The Boeing
Commercial Airplane Company's customers afe assured repair
and modification service on avionics components due to the
efforts of Boeing Electronic Support Division and Boeing Elec
tronics, Inc., Dallas Division.

SEATTLE OPERATIONS

The Renton Electronics Manufacturing Operation (REMOJ.

located in a suburban area of Seattle, Washington is one of

BEl Materio.l

four plants operated by The Boeing Electronics Support Division (BESD). REMO concentrates on the manufacture of com
mercial electronics and electromechanical assemblies. The
facility occupies 78,000 sq. ft. of floor space and includes the
5000 sq. ft. aESD Customer Service Repair and Modification
Facility.

Prior to emergence of the 757/767 aircraft, which carry more

digital electronics than their predecessors, repair and modification work for electronics hardware was accomplished in the
production area by factory personnel. In anticipation of
increasing requirements for quick turnaround repair and modi

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 23

fication operations, Boeing Electronic Support Division

designed and installed a separate repair and modification facility to support 757/767 avionics. This has resulted in establish
ing and meeting a turnaround time objective of ten manufacturing days. The facility was FAA certified and brought on
line in August of 1982 in time for delivery of the first 767.
DALLAS/FORT WORTH OPERATIONS
Boeing Electronics. Inc., Dallas Division (BEll. operates a
100,000 square feet electronics manufacturing facility cen
trally located in the Dallas/Fort Worth area of Texas, a mere
5 miles from the OFW Regional Airport. which is served by
over 43 domestic and international flag carriers.
In the Texas facility, BEl currently has manufacturing and
service responsibility for all Boeing built electronic hardware
for the 707, 727, 737, and 747 commercial airplanes. Additionally, BEl is beginning to manufacture digital avionics for
757 and 767 applications. Recognized as a certified FAA
repair station for this type of hardware since August of 1981,
BEl has set aside approximately 5,000 square feet of its manufacturing area for repair and modification.

Plrts Control and Inventory M.nagement .t BESe Customer Service

Support repair facility.

COMPUTERIZED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Both manufacturing facilities are supported by computerized
Production Management Systems (PMSI. PMS is a vital element of the manufacturing operation and provides data to all
other functional organizations within the plants. At the heart
of the PMS is an interactive computer network system. It
allo~ maximum flexibility in scheduling, material forecasting,
and labor utilization to meet the customer airlines' require
ments. PMS also furnishes real time visibility to every element
of the manufacturing process-from initial planning to final
delivery. Computerized control allows these facilities to
respond quickly and efficiently to almost any production
situation or customer requirement.

All electronic assemblies Illturned for repairs or overhaul are

hlndled thrDU~ the W.rrlnty and Overhaul.rea.

24

The BESD Customer Service Repair and Modification Facility

in the Seattle area is equipped with its own on-line computer
system called Customer Support System ICSS). CSS has the
same capabilities as PMS. but is for the exclusive use of repair
and modification personnel. A number of other computerized
systems, developed as part of Boeing's production operations,
support the repair and modification facility and help assure
fast and efficient operations. Complete historical data is maintained by both repair and modification facilities so that failure
trend and other analyses can be performed thus benefiting all
Boeing customers.

The Boeing service Ind replir facilities use IUtomlted tllSt equipment
to assurl rapid and accurate testing
of repaired or modified units.

Stores, 1001 foom Ind b1uepfint

fillS 10f the Renton replif fecility
Ira combined into one compact Irll.

The Hughes FACTPC circuit Ind wire Inalyzer is used to functionilly

tlst wired Issemblies. This is I computer controlled lutomltic tllSt
system thlt ISSUres III functions of I module will be tested properly.
AUTOMATED TEST AND INSPECTION CAPABILITY
State-of-theart automated test equipment are utilized in
Boeing Electronics Repair and Modification centers. Included
are Boeing.designed automatic test stations, Hughes Fact PC
wire and circuit analyzers, temperature cycling chambers, and
sophisticated bench test equipment. The repair facilities have
the capability to run continuity and leakage tests as well as full
functional tests at both the circuit card and module level.
SERVICE AND REPAIR PERSONNEL
Most of the personnel in the repair and modification organizations were drawn from the production areas. As a result, most
of these people are highly experienced, many with multiple
skills, which has made the repair and modification facilities
more efficient resulting in shorter flow times.

SUMMARY
Boeing has modern, efficient electronics manufacturing operations and FAA certified service and repair facilities in both the
Puget Sound and the Dallas/Fort Worth areas. The operations
are designed for maximum efficiency and are supported by
state-of-the... rt management systems and automated test and
inspection equipment. Repair and modification facilities are
located in proximity to the production areas and this enables
sharing of experience, technology developments, and problem
solving expertise. Most of the manpower for the repair and
modification facilities was drawn from the experienced production workforce, and, therefore, training has not been a
major factor. The shops have been serving the customers'
needs very well and it appears that both Boeing and the cus
tomers are pleased with the results.
Inquiries regarding Boeing repair and modification services
may be directed to The Boeing Commercial Airplane Company,
P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124; Attention Director
of Warranties, Org. 6' 151, M.S. 6W30_

25

BOE''''&

CUSTOMER SUPPORT
CUSTOMER SUPPORT REPRESENTATIVES
HEADOUARTERS, FIELD SERVICE UNIT

seattle, Washington
O. S. KALOTAY, FIELD SERVICE DIRECTOR

Region FIN

Region One
'TULSA
CHICAGO
DALLAS

GREENSBORO

KANSAS CITY
MEMPHIS
MINNEAPOLIS
MONTREAL.
NEW YORK

NEWARK
PITTSBURGH

TORONTO

WASHINGTON, D.C.
WINNIPEG
WINSTON/SALEM

T. J. EUI REGION ... L DIRECTOR. 11 .....2113

L F. Hunl. W. StilUlenbe'8. 11 ....322707
J. JonH. 11 .... 32-2.~
F. Joyce. K. Anderaon, W. Johnaon.
312-681-3371
J. Uaewyd'l. 21"353-12$2. G. Tottlln
R. Pet..aon. fll.2II2-1512 ut. 234
R. F-'Io... D. Gilbert, .1 ...." ... 9&1

J. E..

~n.1I01.7fl7-6811

D. W.ll. J. 8IIrtuhy, II2.12f.2flll

M. Tumer, S. Giani. 51 ..631-2177
B. "'acller. W. Dlrlla.n. D. Romine. F. GUlhrle,
C. &anqe. 212.5-1707
D. Supalnak
201HI5185
II. t1U_r<:I. R
AJII,I
u22I2n7fl
G. L Smith. R. l.hnh
41 ....7&-230-'
D. L B..-.., 301735-ItiSO
D.
:zot-t85-5944
V. Rabbelt., ".717-542:1

'PARIS
PAR'S
PARIS DRY

ICDOI

ALGIERS
BELGRADE

CASABLANCA

CONAKRY

DOUALA

JOHANNESBURG

LAGOS
LISBON

lUa...
MADRID
ROME
TUNIS

ea..y.

Region Six

Region Two
'SAN FRANCISCO

CALGARY
DENVER
LOS ANGELES
MEXICO CITY
PHEONIX
SEA-TAC
VANCOUVER, B.C.

S. R. He..... n. REGIOH ...l DIRECTOR. 415-.7704111

J......
C).nlfl,llo. R. Hegel. J. Krell.lberg,

IxI'" ...

J. R_rio, S. VIftdlrtftf1
F. "lzuno. G. Lowry. 403--278-0515
R. lIraon. L Bran.. h. 303-398-4125
M. Cohen, S. BIlII. G. GlIlberto. B. BergtTllln,
21:H17G-07U
I. M.arquQ. (5) 7112,'111
R. s..... 1102"'94-0&00, ,xl. 257
G. Miller. 20&-433-3373 0< e33-37113
W. l. Trimble. lI04-27G-5351 ICP"'), R. AMce.
1504-27&-75111 (PW"')

'OUBAI

AMMAN

ATHENS
BAGHDAD
BOMBAY

ISTANBUL
JEODAH
KARACHI

KUWAIT

MANAMA

NEW DELHI

SANAA

ATLANTA
BOGOTA
BUENOS AIRES
MONTEVIDEO
RIO DE JANEIRO
SAO PAULO

R. E. Prather. REGION ... l DIRECTOR. 30$-593--1747

G. R. Nlt;Oll. R. L p,lI..aon. R. Oner.
..... All,len, S. Got.nkl. 305-593--1147
G. GeboI". E....-n. 8. Snyder. R. Frick, L SMgmJUer,
R....tIderaon, R. POOl R........JIlII... C. Youn"
404-71$-3120 or 715-3129
O. o.lbot.qu 2-44-"'1
J. Wuaon. 8. Wood. 1120-0II20
D. MorTI', (2) 50-81-50
W. Smith. D. PorItTllln, 393--2525. UI. 1M
.... Colon, R. "'tTllln. J. Conn.ll, ..... Cruz. L HUbOen:l.
S. Gurlera, .... Gray, G. G..y. S. Gold.n, 240-701"
721

A. Cue"... REGION"'l DIRECTOR. f.J 2280111

H. R. Clark. (011) 53340
W. H. Boom. 111340ll
H. W. Schuettkl, 551m:xI. 327
R. B.own.II~'I50. IX" 240
H. Sumner f15) 737012
O. CorrlO, G. Johnaon. W. Eo Shew. 635-5011
E. Shoo... 431'41-53&3
C.... nderaon, 716350
R. 1(1tl1y. 323594
H. I(rueger, 3t2061
B. K. Sohm, 71215x.. 11

Region Sewn

Region Three
'MIAMI

C..... Von Thlelmann, REGION...l DIRECTOR. 72:J..55-<11

J. o.e.IlI4-IOlII
R. Fri.,..... P. Frank. J. Flun.y, K.liold.I, ""0<47
S. &.quei, 711-4:J..50, ,xl. 252
L Gllll'-, 1175'15
G. l. Norden. 33l1O-OO, .xl. 30lI
E. w. Pettlll. """,lI-" (Gnond Ho," 0. l'k~ldenClj
... Hemllton. 4251-'3
M. ~. 175-7421
C. StrubM, llOO471. exl. 412
... JoIlnaon. 119923
E. D.y, 2444.
C. Virgil, 205I3OlI
T. LIM, 6011135
R. P. Verol... 23e-OO xl. 2001

'SINGAPORE
AUCKLAND
BRISBANE

HONOLULU

JAKARTA

KUALA LUMPUR
MELBOURNE

PERTH
SYDNEY

w. C. T.I1..... I, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, 7:14-2097

T. H. BIll, G. V.n dI V...., J. lynch, 545-5033
K. Smhh. 2753111 tIl21 or 4'"
R. '111111111 (7) UlI-I3Il7 or UlI-U44
A. AllY. 1O&-U&-.211
J. s.rber, 101101 xl_ 311
T. Bray, 761655. ex" 2117
C. OIIlnn. F. HofltTllln. W. KCll*"eIl. A. Perry.
C. R1lked.xhl. 331-3713
D. lkhontxIrll"ll) 47...11224
J. E. Harp. R. Whltn.y, H.72511

x"

.x..

Region E/fIIrt
Region Four
'LONDON
AMSTERDAM
COPENHAGEN
DUBUN
FRANKFURT
GATWICK
HAMBURG
LUTON
TEL AVIV
ZURICH

IlL J. H.lncvrow, REGION...l DIRECTOR. (lj572.-Nl11

J. HIghI.ms.. W. Randell, T. PremwlH', R. SctoucMl,
D. RhocleI, J. "..callum. (1) lIt7-1515
O. WIn:l, K. Down, E. AlaxanderHn, (20) 456474
M. C. VogI.(1) 5321:1.
R. Nlederltom, 37fl1OOxl. 5121 0< 5122
I. J. Jlmena, R. Jekobe. f1l11) 1196-2311 0< lIfl6.4l151
I. J. Vogwll, R. Hown, C. Per.more. J. Ml:ln,
12e3)5104U
W. Sh.IprOlkl. E. Johnaon.(40) 50$-3630
E. W. Berthlloull'll. 424155. exl. 2737,
E....1..... 41111"'0< 424211, .:xI. 2t5
R. S. Sh.IIw. S. SlIllwell. W. PortIr.(3) 171-147
II. khlnd.... R. Wyent, 112-7510 or I1G-3OO1

8OIHG AIRUNER
OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1ta3

'TOKYO
TOKYO (ANA)
TOKYO (JAL)
BANGKOK

BEIJING

GUANGZHOU
HONG KONG

MANILA

NAHA

OSAKA

SeOUL

TAIPEI

J. E."1l. REGIOHAL OIRECTOA.. 516-4155

... Bocl.ky.l'l. JoIlnlon. A. AoIavw. R. Buma, .... Chumney.
... Cookaon. R. Mollenblrg. R. Auward. (3) 1475745
L Boll. J. RoKoI. 7.7-0015
F. PlwlnitDlY.INlrttlj, 047&-32-'945
C. "'rmstrong, H. 1II"- 52:3-1100, IX" ,.,
Eo Eo BIll<, 52-2e31, .xl. 51
L T.bor. E. Che"", T. Trox". P_ C ......so.I2I2), 'II.
W. Go Mcc.m.nt, (3) 12i12f1O
W. Edml._, 131.(1l137 0< 832... 2227t. 1:xI. 2271
J. Sh.nar. 57-UII

ao--.

H.
D. BIlye, F. 8 ......, O. K"I., (ll) lse-nll4
R. D. Hoell. -.011 ,-8 xl. 2117
T. Tem. II. "'nd..aon, R. Cornwell, 833023 Of
13--4251, .:xI. 4111

'REGIONAL HEADOUARTERS