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Aquinas and Aristotle's Distinction on Wealth

Article in History of Political Economy September 2000
DOI: 10.1215/00182702-32-3-649 Source: OAI

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Joao Cesar das Neves
Universidade Catlica Portuguesa
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AQUINAS AND ARISTOTL ES DISTINCTION ON WEALTH

Joo Csar das Neves1

Universidade Catlica Portuguesa
Palma de Cima P-1600 LISBOA
Tel: 351-1-7214270
Fax: 351-1-7270252
E-mail: cneves@fcee.ucp.pt

I wish to thank the two anonymous referees for the comments on a previous version.
The usual disclamer applies.

This brief note focuses on a specific point of Political Economy, the

Aristotelian distinction of two types of wealth. Such a philosophical and ethical
distinction was influential, and can be traced to several economic authors throughout
the centuries.
St. Thomas Aquinas, the most important of medieval philosophers and founder
of modern Catholic theology, is considered to be one of the greatest disciples of
Aristotle. It is then natural that Aquinas, who draws much of his Political Economy
from Aristotle, would have accepted the distinction.
The discussion of this acceptance must take into account several aspects in the
economic and intellectual medieval framework. But there is a decisive fact. In the
Summa Theologica Aristotles distinction is explicitly rejected. This is one case in
which Aquinas articulates a denial of one of Aristotles moral theories.
1. The Meaning of Aristotles distinction
One influential aspect of Aristotles Political Economy is the distinction
between natural wealth and artificial wealth in the first book of Politics
(Aristotle 1932, I, iii). Although lateral to his economic theory, better treated in the
Nicomachean Ethics, this distinction is important.
The Greek philosopher discriminates between commodities necessary for life
and other types of wealth, ni cluding money. The accumulation of the necessaries,
which is morally good, is considered as part of Oikonomia, the household art.
Money and artificial wealth is the object of wealth-getting, or Chrematistics,
which is both unlimited and morally disregarded (Lowry 1987, 231).
One kind of acquisition therefore in the order of nature is a part of the
household art, in accordance with which either there must be forthcoming or else that
art must procure to be forthcoming a supply of those goods, capable of accumulation,
which are necessary for life and useful for the community of city or household (...) But
there is another kind of acquisition that is specially called wealth-getting, and that is
so called with justice; and to this kind it is due that th ere is thought to be no limit to
riches and property (Aristotle 1932, 1256b.26-1257a.4).
The distinction of the types of wealth is related to the distinction between the
Homo Oeconomicus and the Homo Chrematisticus. It played a central role in
Aristotles economics, in particular in his theories of the polis and of money (see
e.g. Gordon 1975, 43-53, Langholm 1983, 4-5 and 53, Lowry 1987, 223-236, Meikle
1995, 43-67). It was also to be very important in economic thought. Among other
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things, Aristotles influential moral condemnations of trade (Aristotle 1932,

1257b.20) and interest (op. cit. 1258b.2-8) are considered to have derived from it.
This was to have consequences in economic policy for centuries. Economic writers as
late as Karl Marx were to be very much influenced by this distinction (see e.g.
Gordon 1975 p.37).
Recent research (Langholm 1983, 52-53, Lowry 1987, 230 and 1998, 31-32)
has pointed to some new aspects in Aristotles distinction. In particular, this wealth
doctrine is seen to be rooted in an extremely important but often ignored analytical
distinction made by Aristotle. This is his theory of the natural limit. As is developed
in greater detail in the beginning of Book VII of the Politics. (Lowry 1998, 31-32).
Here, Aristotle considers three types of goods: external goods, goods of the soul and
goods of the body (Aristotle 1932, 1323a25-30), the first of which is limited. For
external goods have a limit, as has any instrument (and everything useful is useful for
something), so an excessive amount of them must necessarily do harm, or do no good
for its possessor (op cit. 1323b7-8). The elimination of this natural limit for
external goods is the evil distortion in Chrematistics.
This interpretation allows for the famous quotes of book I of Politics to be
inserted in the specific economic situation of Ancient Greece. The traditional
assertion that Aristotle was hostile to commerce is based on a failure to distinguish
between the naturally limited and beneficial commerce that is within the community,
on the one hand, and the trade with outside merchants who drain the community of its
surpluses (Lowry 1998, 33, referring to Aristotle 1932, 1327a25-35).
2. Aquinas and the distinction
Aristotles influence in the 13th century was both deep and vast. In particular,
the presence of the Philosopher in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas is very important.
It is then natural to ask whether the sharp distinction between money and
commodities really carries the same meaning in Aquinas as in Aristotle.
Ever since the neo-Thomism revival in the late 19th century , there was a most
minute analysis of Aquinas thought. There is now a large body of literature to be
considered, discussing many different elements, both external and textual.
The external factors include both the economic environment and the
intellectual problems of the period. These give rise to some doubts about Aquinas
acritical acceptance of Aristotles distinction.

The economic situation in medieval times was, of course, very different from
that faced by Aristotle. Trade was very active in the new cities in which Aquinas lived
(Langholm 1998b, 442). All this created very different meaning to the problems of
wealth and trade, and had strong influence in the scientific development, a point
stressed by Kaye 1998. It was much harder for a medieval thinker to accept that
trade with outside merchants would drain the community of its surpluses. All
modern analysts point to the fact that, although an academic, St. Thomas was very
much aware of the specific problems of his time (see e.g. Langholm 1992, 221-248).
At the intellectual level, the problem of wealth and private property raised
some new questions in the 13th century. These came from some extreme positions of
the Franciscan school and from the controversies between mendicant and secular
masters. The issues of extreme poverty and total rejection of money were much
debated in the period (see e.g. Langholm 1992, 32-34, c.XIV, 208-211, and 1998b,
444-5). Aquinas, a member of the D ominican order, combined a mendicant position
with a balanced common sense attitude towards wealth. All this would point to a very
different interpretation of Aristotles distinction by his medieval disciple.
It should also be mentioned that this Aristotle doctrine was distorted in
medieval times by a translation problem. William of Moerbecke was the most
influential of all Aristotelian translators in 13th century. In his translation of Politics,
the rendering of the Aristotelian kaplik, trade, as campsoria, money changing,
limited the meaning of the text. To Latin readers, the Philosophers condemnation was
directed, not towards trade, but only to usury (see Langholm 1983,. 53 and 1992, 177178). But it should be noted that St. Thomas managed to bypass this difficulty,
(somewhat surprisingly) reading Aristotle more correctly than William of Moerbeck
(Langholm 1992, 222).
Although these external elements are very important, the final conclusions
must be found in textual analysis. Here also some different positions must be taken
into account.
In order to consider this problem one should not look at the commentaries St.
Thomas made on Aristotles texts. Barry Gordon has explicitly stated that: St.
Thomas comments on another writer should not be taken to commit him personally to
a labor or cost of production theory of value. He is not expressing his own views
(Gordon 1975, 160). Several authors also warn us on the dangers of taking Aquinas
comments on Aristotles as his own views on particular subjects (see e.g. Noonan
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1957, 86, Roover 1958, 421, Hollander 1965, 618, 623 and Langholm 1998a,. 27)
while some have fallen exactly into this trap (see Wilson 1975, 64, Worland 1977,
509, Meikle 1995, 51). One should also note that the Aquinas comments on both the
Ethics and Politics are sententia, meaning brief explanations, and not expositio,
deeper comments with text discussions (see Torrell 1993, 332, Langholm 1998a, 27).
But there is no need to use Aquinas comments. There is one text from the
Summa Theologica, which has been taken to state clearly the adherence of the
scholastic doctor to the Aristotelian distinction. It is also Barry Gordon, which
formulates this position.
The sharp distinction between money and commodities is redrawn in the
Summa (I-II,2,1) For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), viz.
natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his
natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while
artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented
by the art of man(Gordon 1975, 160). After Gordon s argument, the ascription of
Aristotles distinction to Aquinas was frequent, as some recent works show (e.g.
Meikle 1995, 51).
St. Thomas has frequently used the taxonomic distinction of external goods,
goods of the soul and goods of the body. And he explicitly subscribes the theory of
the natural limit, as is pointed by Langholm 1992, 209. In the same question of
the Summa quoted by Gordon above, it is said.
The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in
a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of
disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit.
i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign
good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved,
and other things despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. (...)
Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is
the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: (...)
The reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them:
and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not
consist therein. (I-II,Q.2,A.1, ad.3).
Gordon draws from the distinction between natural and artificial wealth
several consequences for Aquinas Political Economy. These are naturally parallel to
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his views on Aristotles consequences. In particular, it is taken to be the basis of the

suspicion with which Aquinas treats bankers: Like the vast majority of contemporary
theologians, he was content to treat the vocation of banker as an unusual and morally
suspect type of activity. The reason for this suspicion was the view of money as a form
of artificial wealth which had no limit to its accumulation as was the case with
commodities such as food, clothing and housing (op. cit. p.170).
Actually, Gordon presents no textual proof of this last assertion. It is taken to
follow directly from the distinction of the types of wealth, just like in Aristotles
theory. But, at the same time, Gordon notes that Aquinas attitude to banking
activities did not carry over to those of merchants. Unlike Aristotle, he gave them
definite approval, within certain limits (op. cit. p.170). It is thus clear that, if Aquinas
accepts the distinction, he does not draws from it all of Aristotles conclusions.
Recent investigations of the Aquinas position on usury have dropped the reference to
Aristotles distinction (e.g. Langholm 1998a, 4.2.).
All this may be taken to mean that Aquinas, although at a critical distance,
basically follows Aristotle in the distinction between two types of wealth.
3. Aquinas refusal of the distinction
This discussion overlooks one decisive element. There is a text in the Summa
in which St. Thomas alludes explicitly to the distinction in wealth. This text is placed
in a part of the Summa remote from the traditionally considered economic sections
of the Summa.
Gordon s quotations from the Summa Theologica are taken from one of the
so-called economic article of the Summa, devoted to the question of Whether
man's happiness consists in wealth? (I-II, Q.2, A.1). It seems clear that St. Thomas
here uses Aristotles distinction for a merely taxonomic purpose. St. Thomas is just
trying to examine all types of wealth. So we could say he draws here no philosophical
consequences from the distinction.
But in the second part of the second part, in the Treatise On Acts Which
Pertain Especially To Certain Men, studying the religious state, question 188 is
concerned with the discussion Of The Different Kinds Of Religious Life. Article 7
is devoted to Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in
common?. Answering one of the objections, St. Thomas says:
The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5,6) that bread, wine, and the like are natural
riches, while money is artificial riches. Hence it is that certain philosophers declined
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to make use of money, and employed other things, living according to nature.
Wherefore Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that it
comes to the same to have money and to possess other things necessary for life. And
though our Lord commanded those who were sent to preach not to carry these things
on the way, He did not forbid them to be possessed in common. How these wo rds of
our Lord should be understood has been shown above (II-II,Q.188,A.7, ad.5)
In this text, Aquinas explicitly rejects Aristotles distinction. He does so by
alluding to a commentary by St. Jerome on the Gospel of Matthew. The easiest way to
find this text by Jerome is to look into Aquinas own Catena Aurea (Aquinas 1997,
vol. I). This work is a collection of the comments on the Gospels from the Fathers
made by St. Thomas. We know that St. Thomas used this work as a background
reference for his latter theological investigations (see Introduction to the 1997
republished edition by Aidan Nichols O.P. in Aquinas 1997, ix)
The specific object of this sentence is a small section of St. Matthews Gospel
(Mt 10, 9-10): 9 Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses. 10 Nor
scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, nor yet staves: for the
workman is worthy of his meat. St. Thomas had already clarified before in the
Summa the theological meaning of this command from Christ (has been shown
above refers to II-II Q.185, A6 , ad 2; I-II, Q.108, A2, ad 3). But the use of the same
text in question 188 is very different. Here, St. Thomas refers to the commentary of
St. Jerome, which focus clearly on the distinction between riches and necessaries.
St. Jerome said: As He had cut off riches, which are meant by gold and
silver, He now almost cuts off necessaries of life; that the Apostles, teachers of the
true religion, who taught men that all things are directed by Gods providence, might
shew themselves to be without thought for the morrow (Aquinas 1997, 371). St.
Jerome notes the fact that Christ mentions both types of wealth. But St. Thomas uses
St. Jerome s opinion to go a step further.
The quote is taken not to focus on the distinction but as stressing the
similarities between gold and goods. Although they are different, the Lord had
mentioned both, which means that, at least in one sense, they are alike. This
similarity, which derives from the fact that the Lord mentions them both, is enough to
eliminate Aristotles philosophical distinction. Thus, it is not in Jerome that we find
the argument used by St. Thomas. It is St. Thomas himself, which, behind the
authority of the Father, is refusing Aristotles distinction.
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This quote comes from the part of the Summa dealing with the religious state.
The context clearly introduces the reasoning in the debate surrounding the extreme
Franciscan positions about wealth and money. St. Thomas has always followed a very
balanced position in the issue (see Langholm 1992, 209-220). It must be added that in
the debate such an argument would have been very powerful, coming directly from
the Gospel, through the authority of St. Jerome.
4. Conclusion
The clear conclusion from this quote is that St. Thomas does not accept
Aristotles distinction between natural and artificial wealth. This, along with the
central role the distinction had in Aristotelian economics, carries consequences for
Aquinas Political Economy. Its meaning is enhanced by the fact that this is one of the
cases in which the reverent Dominican friar is explicitly critical of the Philosopher.
And it is important to note that this rebuke is made in the field of his Political
Economy.
These fact stresses that the motivations for St. Thomas economic thought are
wider and deeper than is common knowledge. It is true, in his Political Economy as in
the rest of his works, that the philosophy of Thomas is not a new edition of the
philosophy of the old Aristotle, made for pure philosophical reasons and laboriously
harmonised with the Christian faith. Thomas is from the start a Christian
philosopher (Pesch 1988, 38)
Schumpeter also makes this point. He warns against considering St. Thomas
as simply the man who had succeeded in harnessing Aristotle for the service of the
Church. This misconception of the revolution of the thirteen century and, in
particular, of St. Thomas performance was not corrected but, on the contrary, was
fostered by the scientific practice of the next 300 years (Schumpeter 1954, 89). And
Langholm says, Thomas was not at all overawed by Aristotle (Langholm 1992,
207).
The parallel between Aristotle and Aquinas is complex. The Christian
philosopher, although a sincere Aristotles disciple, was an even more committed
disciple of the Church.
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Dominican Province: Benziger Bros.

Aquinas, St. Thomas 1997. Catena Aurea - Commentary on the four Gospels
collected out of the works of the Fathers. English translation first published in
1841, edited by John Henry Newman, ed. Southampton: Saint Austin Press.
Aristotle 1932. Politics , translated by H.Rackam, M.A.. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press (The Loeb Classical Library, vol. XXI).
Blaug, M. (Ed) 1991. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Aldershot: E.Elgar (Pioneers
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Gordon, Barry 1975. Economic Analysis before Adam Smith, London: MacMillan,
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Exchange and the Emergence of Scientific Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
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Pesch, Otto H. 1988. Thomas von Aquin. Grenze und Grsse mittelalterlicher
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Abstract - Aristotles distinction between natural and artificial wealth has been
an important issue in the analysis of this authors Political Ec onomy. St. Thomas
Aquinas, in the Aristotelian tradition, has been considered to accept this point of
his theory. The interpretation of the meaning of this distinction and the very
different medieval environment has created some doubts on this acceptance. The
decisive element is, nevertheless, that St. Thomas explicitly denies the value of
the Aristotelian distinction, in question 188 of II -II of the Summa. Such a
rejection has consequences in the foundations of Aquinas Political Economy.

Keywords - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, wealth, Political Economy

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