doi:10.

1093/scan/nsn031

SCAN (2008) 3,192194

In this Issue

A neural signature of the current self

*In this Issue commentary on DArgembeau et al., Self-reflection across time: cortical midline structures
differentiate between present and past selves.

people distinguish selves from different life periods and

investigate whether the brain regions involved in representing this distinction share any similarity to the brain regions
that are involved in representing the distinction between self
and other in the present. Indeed, results suggest striking
similarities.
Previous research had shown greater activation in cortical
midline structures (CMS) when people made trait judgments
about themselves as opposed to others (e.g. Kelley et al.,
2002; DArgembeau et al., 2007). In the new research,
DArgembeau et al. (2008) added a temporal dimension to
the comparison, asking participants to make judgments
about the self and a friend in the present and in a previous
stage of life. Activation in CMS when making judgments
about the present replicated previous findings showing
greater activation for self than friend, but when making
judgments about the past there was no difference in CMS
activation for self versus friend. In fact, activation in CMS
when thinking about the past self was indistinguishable
from activation when thinking about the friend in either
time period.
Thus, it appears that rather than serving as a crude marker
of self vs other, activation in CMS more distinctly marks the
current self. DArgembeau et al. (2008) make the point that
the boundary defining the current self is likely to
be subjective. In their research the past selves that participants considered were from a different life period, and
DArgembeau et al. argue that this is likely crucial in
producing the effects they observed. If other individuals
thought about selves that were equally distant in the past but
part of their current life period, CMS activity presumably
would not be reduced for the past self. It will be important to
test this prediction, but there is good reason to believe it is
accurate. Just as DArgembeau et al. (2008) have identified
an area of the brain in which activation for past selves
resembles that for other people, research using social
psychological methods has identified ways in which people
experience and judge past selves as they do other people.
Further, these effects appear to depend not on the objective
temporal position of the past self but rather on subjective
and contextual factors.
For example, peoples evaluations of themselves in the
present tend to be more positive than their evaluations of
others, but peoples evaluations of their own past selves vary.
If the past self is part of the current time period people

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Because the self is such a familiar part of everyday

experience, it is easy to take its existence for granted.
However, upon reflection it becomes apparent just what a
puzzle this aspect of human psychology is. From a series of
fleeting moments of consciousness individuals construct a
notion of the self as a distinct entity that persists across time
from the past to the present and into the future. How and
why do people do this? Such questions have intrigued
psychologists since the beginning of the discipline (James,
1890/1950) and others long before (Locke, 1690/1979;
Hume, 1739/1975; Kant, 1798/1974). Modern psychology
has used a range of theoretical approaches and a variety of
methodologies in an attempt to understand the self. For
example, relevant to the question of how the self comes to be
defined as a distinct entity, research has investigated the
neural systems involved in distinguishing ones own actions
from others (Farrer et al., 2003), the development of the
ability to differentiate ones own thoughts and feelings from
others (Astington et al., 1988), and the social psychological
processes in attributing traits and causes to the self vs others
(Nisbett et al., 1973; Storms, 1973). Relevant to understanding the temporally extended dimension of the self, research
has investigated the neural and cognitive systems that allow
for mental time travel into the past and future (Wheeler
et al., 1997), the cognitive organization of autobiographical
memory (Conway, 2005) and the social psychological causes
and consequences of judgments about past and future selves
(Conway and Ross, 1984; Liberman and Trope, 1998).
While there is much to be learned by focusing on these
two aspects of the self separately, a growing body of work
suggests the importance of also considering how they may be
connected. In particular, it appears that processes involved
in distinguishing self from others are also used in the
construction of the self across time (Ross and Wilson, 2000;
Libby et al., 2005; Pronin and Ross, 2006). DArgembeau
et al. (2008, this issue) adopt this theoretical approach,
making a unique contribution by introducing neuroimagining methods. Part of creating a coherent identity across
time involves organizing the self into life periods and
social contexts and creating an overarching understanding
of how they all relate (McAdams, 2001; Conway, 2005).
DArgembeau et al. (2008) focus on the question of how

A neural signature of the current self

193

self-concept involves not only differentiating self-knowledge

according to life periods and social contexts, but also
developing an overarching understanding of how these
disparate elements link together and thus how the self is
a coherent entity across time and place (McAdams, 2001;
Conway, 2005). Indeed, a defining feature of the phenomena
cited here in which people experience or judge past selves as
if they were other people is an accompanying awareness that
these past selves are in fact not other people. Even when
people derogate their past selves or picture them from an
outsiders third-person perspective, people still admit that
those past selves are in fact them. To fully account for such
discrepancies between subjective and objective understandings of the self, it may be necessary to consider not just what
is different when people think about past vs current selves
but also what is the same.
Consider an example from the realm of face recognition.
Capgras delusion is the belief that ones close friends and
relatives have been replaced by imposters. Observation of
individuals with this delusion revealed that they have an
impaired autonomic response to familiar faces. But, the role
of this deficit in accounting for the delusion is not fully
apparent without considering that the deficit in autonomic
response occurs along with an intact ability to visually
recognize faces. Capgras delusion appears to result from
people attempting to make sense out of the fact that they do
not experience the feeling of familiarity that they should
given that they recognize their friends and relatives facial
features (Ellis and Lewis, 2001). Analogously, the role of the
deficit that DArgembeau et al. (2008) discovered in CMS
activity for past selves may not be fully apparent without
considering that it occurs along with intact activation in
other areas that differentiate self from other. Framed in this
way, it could be said that when people think about selves
from outside the current period they do not experience the
activity in CMS that they should, given activation in other
areas of the brain that uniquely mark the self. This
disjunction may help to account for mismatches in
subjective and objective understandings of the self, and
may play a role in the construction of the temporally
extended self more generally.
In the end, DArgembeau et al.s results (2008) do not
solve the puzzle of the self, but they do open up novel ways
of understanding how some of the pieces fit together. Given
the scale of the puzzle, this is an exciting and important
contributionone that holds the potential to significantly
advance our understanding one of the most basic aspects of
human experience.
Lisa K. Libby
The Ohio State University

REFERENCES
Astington, J.W., Harris, P.L., Olson, D.R. (1988). Developing Theories of
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evaluate that self as positively as they do the present self, but

if the past self is part of a past time period people derogate
that self relative to the present (Wilson and Ross, 2001).
Peoples judgments of their past selves reveal that the
boundaries between time periods can be marked by developmental transitions (e.g. graduating from high school), as in
DArgembeau et al. (2008). The boundaries can also be
influenced by motivational factors. For example, people are
more likely to consider the past to be part of the current time
period when recalling events that represent personal
accomplishments and achievements than when recalling
events that represent personal faults and failures (Ross and
Wilson, 2002). Thus, if CMS activation does mark the
current self, CMS activation may vary not only according to
developmental transitions but also according to whether a
life event reflects positively or negatively on the self.
In addition to changing over time, the self also changes
across social contexts. For example, moving to a new country
can lead people to take on a new self consistent with the new
culture, but the self associated with the old culture is not
lost. People switch back and forth between selves depending
on linguistic and cultural cues in the present environment
(Marian and Neisser, 2000; Ross et al., 2002). People also
take on different identities in the context of different
relationships (Baldwin, 1992). If CMS plays a role in
representing the current self, then activation in CMS may
vary according to the match between the immediate social or
cultural context and the self a person thinks about. For
example, bicultural individuals may experience greater CMS
activation when thinking about the self that corresponds
with the cultural environment they are currently immersed
in than when thinking about the self that corresponds to
their other culture. A similar effect could occur when
individuals think about themselves in social roles that either
match or conflict with their current relational context.
Finally, the self extends into the future as well as the past,
and people sometimes experience and judge future selves as
they do other people (DArgembeau and Van der Linden,
2004; Pronin and Ross, 2006). Given that a common neural
system is believed to underlie mental time travel into the past
and into the future (Schacter et al., 2007), DArgembeau
et al.s (2008) findings may be relevant to understanding the
way people construct the self when looking into the future as
well as the past.
DArgembeau et al.s (2008) discovery of unique activation in CMS associated with thinking about the current self
is clearly intriguing and thought provoking. It represents an
important contribution to our understanding of the human
sense of self. However, in the excitement generated by this
result, there is a danger of overlooking another aspect of
DArgembeau et al.s (2008) findings that may prove equally
important. Some areas of the brain were similarly active
when thinking about past and current selves, and activation in these areas distinguished self from other regardless
of the time period. Forming a coherent temporally extended

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Lisa K. Libby