Kalyvas, 2001

Trustees of Princeton University
"New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?

Author(s): Stathis N. Kalyvas
Source: World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Oct., 2001), pp. 99-118
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Research Note
"NEW" AND "OLD" CIVIL WARS

A Valid Distinction?
By STATHISN. KALYVAS*
decline of interstate armed conflict and perceived rise in the

THE
of civil wars
frequency
Europe2?have
interest focuses
contributed
since
the end of the cold war1?especially

in
of interest in civil wars.3 This
to a new wave
on ethnic
as a source of conflict and

competition
widely
war
era ("new" civil wars)
as funda
of
the
regards
post-cold
different
from their predecessors
("old" civil wars); "new" civil
mentally
wars are
as criminal,
rather
than
distinguished
political,
phenomena.
civil wars
Since the issue of ethnic competition has been effectively tackled by

recent
the distinction
between
research,4 this article instead challenges
to see funda
"new" and "old" civil wars by arguing
that the tendency
them is based on an uncritical
mental
differences
between
of
adoption
in a double mischaracterization.
and labels grounded
On the
categories
one hand, information
about recent or ongoing wars is typically
incom
on
on
wars
and
the
other
historical
research
earlier
biased;
hand,
plete
tends to be disregarded. This is compounded by the fact that the end of

the cold war
has
orderly,
ingly, the distinction
possible
maybe
predecessors
conceptual
*
The
that had made

analysts of the clear categories
wars.
civil
if ultimately
of
Accord
flawed,
coding
war conflicts
drawn between
and
their
post-cold
robbed
an
categories
attributable
than
more
to the demise
to the existence
of readily available
differences.
of profound
author thanks Pierre Hassner,

Sofia P?rez, Roger Petersen, Scott Straus, Libby Wood,
and
in the May 2000 CERl/lEP conference on "La guerre entre le local et le global," for their
participants
comments.
1
Recent
research shows that the prevalence of civil wars in the 1990s is attributable to a steady ac
cumulation of conflicts since the 1950s, not the end of the cold war. See James D. Fearon and David
at the
in Comparative
D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War"
(Paper presented
Laboratory
Ethnic Processes, Duke University,
2000).
2
Violence," Annual Review of Soci
Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist
24 (1998).
ology
3
Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," World Politics 49 (July 1997).
4
Fearon and Laitin (fn. 1); Nicholas
Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War:
Politics 52 (July 2000).
ical Critique of the Theoretical
Literature," World
WorldPolitics 54 (October 2001), 99-118

An Empir
100
WORLD
POLITICS
This article traces the origins of this distinction and then disaggre
causes
and motivations,
use of recent,
the
ethno
through
mosdy
or biased
on
recent
information
civil
incomplete
it along
three
and
violence.
support,
related
gates
dimensions:
I show,
research, how
graphic
wars taints our
interpretation;
recent historical
research
by using mostly
at
I demonstrate
of
old
civil
how
number
wars,
inadequate
large
to this kind of research affects our
tention
of
civil
past
understanding
wars. This
on the
with methodological
article concludes
suggestions
on a
wars.
study of civil
Origins
versions
Most
or
of the Distinction
of the distinction
that new
imply
cized, private,
civil wars
and predatory;
between
old and new
civil wars
stress
are
criminal,
characteristically
depoliti
old civil wars are considered
ideological,
political, collective, and even noble. The dividing line between old and
new
civil wars
The
when
the end of the cold war.

roughly with
recent or
ongoing
denigrate
wars?particularly
to one s own?is
not new.
civil wars are compared
coincides
tendency
other nations'
to
Consider the argument put forth in 1949, by F.A. Voigt, a British jour
nalist covering the Greek CivilWar:
In the English and American civil wars, there were high-minded patriots on ei
ther side. In these conflicts, the people were so evenly divided and the issues
were of such depth, scope, and variety, that it is not
possible for the historian to
condemn
one
side
and
utterly
to attribute
exclusive
righteousness
to the other,
even if he may have the conviction that the triumph of one sidewas a national
calamity
tion which
or the
reverse
attained
the
...
Such
magnitude
considerations
but
not
do not
the nature
apply
of an
to the Greek
indigenous
Sedi
revolu
tionary civil war. The Sedition is not to be explained in terms of any popular
grievances or of any failure on the part of the State.5
war manifestation
can be
of this type of argument
post-cold
'
ac
in part to
authors
who
articulated
"lay
best-selling
graphic
counts of recent civil wars
in places
like Liberia,
and Sierra
Bosnia,
a number of scholars in
In addition,
Leone.6
studies
and inter
security
The
traced
national
relations
have
also
advanced
various
versions
of this
argu
5
F. A Voigt, The Greek Sedition (London: Hollis
and Carter, 1949), 68-69.
6
Civil Wars: From LA. to Bosnia (New York: The New Press,
See Hans Magnus
Enzensberger,
(New York Vintage,
1994); Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History
1994); idem,
are
"The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation,
and Disease
Rapidly Destroying
44 (February 1994); Michael
the Social Fabric of our Planet," Atlantic Monthly
IgnatiefF, The Warriors
Honor: Ethnic War and theModern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1998).

101
"NEW" & "OLD" CIVIL WARS

ment.7
Even
some
tinction?between
and
are
criminal
demic
economists
have
"justice-seeking"
models
based on
building
The
enterprise.8
exercise insofar
adoption
as itmotivates
a related
adopted
and "loot-seeking"
the assumption
of the distinction
dis
analytical
civil wars?
of rebellion
as a
is not a mere
aca
specific policy demands,

including
For example,
the 1999 agreement
the civil war in Sierra Leone met with
from many
ending
opposition
human
and
makers
believed
who
rights activists,
journalists,
opinion
that the rebels were violent
criminals
and not political
revolutionaries
"humanitarian
and
that
them
to
it was
law-enforcement."9
to grant
immoral
in the new
government.10
therefore
participate
Three
them
amnesty
and
invite
Dimensions
old and new civil wars vary along three

accounts,
are summarized
These
broadly
stylized categories
as follows:11
In most
mensions.
related
in Table
di
1
7
Edward N. Lutwack,
"Great-powerless
Days," Times Literary Supplement, June 16,1995; Kalevi J.
The State, War, and the State ofWar, (Cambridge: Cambridge
Holsti,
Press, 1996); Chris
University
War: The New Politics of Conflicts
Hables Gray, Post-Modern
1997); Mark
(London: Routledge,
States and Private Protection," Civil Wars
"Post-modern Conflict: Warlords,
Duffield,
Post-adjustment
in Civil Wars,"
Functions of Violence
1, no. 1 (1998); David Keen, "The Economic
Adelphi Paper 320
(1998); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, Calif: Stanford
eds, Greed and Grievance: Economic Agen
Press, 1999); Mats Berdal and David M. Malone,
University
das in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
8
no. 2
Herschel
I. Grossman,
and Revolution,"
(April
"Kleptocracy
Oxford Economic Papers 51,
44, no. 6
1999); Paul Collier, "Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal
Activity," Journal of Conflict Resolution
for Policy," in Chester
and their Implications
(2000); Paul Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict
A. Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson,
and Pamela Aall, eds., Managing
Global Chaos (Washington D.C.:
Paul Azam and Anke Hoeffler,
U.S. Institute of Peace, forthcoming);
"Looting and Conflict between
Bank
inAfrica" (Paper presented at theWorld
Ethno-Regional
Groups: Lessons for State Formation
on "The Economics
Center for International
of Civil War," Princeton University,
Studies Workshop
in Civil
March
and Anke Hoeffler,
and Loot-Seeking
18-19, 2000); Paul Collier
"Justice-Seeking
in Civil War," World Bank
War," Manuscript, World
Bank, 1999); idem, "Greed and Grievance
Policy
Research Paper 2355 (Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 2000).
9
Kaldor (fn. 7), 66.
10
A United Nations
desire for amnesty in exchange for peace as
official described the populations
of justice. See Remy Ourdan,
"Le Prix de la Paix," Le
representing a peculiarly African understanding
the publication
of this article coincided with the announce
Monde, December
2,1999.
Interestingly,
ment of a peace agreement
in Northern
Ireland. Critics of the Irish agreement were in turn criticized
same media that condemned
the Sierra Leone deal, on the exact opposite grounds. For example,
by the
in
the amnesty agreement
the French newspaper Le Monde
condemned
(December 4, 1999), which
in the new
Sierra Leone praised the British journalist Hugo Young, who supported the participation
since without him, "there would be no
of a former IRA commander
government
suspected of murders,
on pragmatic grounds.
in Sierra Leone was also condemned
peace agreement." The peace agreement
it is the absence of law
It was pointed out that "from the rebels' point of view, why have peace when
the peace
In fact the rebels never had any intention of honoring
and order that enables one to loot?...
Reno, "When Peace
accord; they were only interested inwaging war and looting the country." William
IsWorse
thanWar," New York Times, May 11,2000. Yet could not the same argument be made about
the peace agreement
inMozambique,
which has since been widely hailed as a success story?
11
some dimen
into one, while others emphasize
Some scholars collapse many of these dimensions
sions at the expense of others. Kaldor (fn. 7) seems to compare new civil wars with old conventional

102 WORLD POLITICS

1
Table
and New Wars
Old
New Civil Wars
Old Civil Wars

Causes
&, motivation
collective
loot
private
grievances
lack of popular
support
violence
gratuitous
broad
support
Support
popular
violence
Violence controlled
1.Old civilwars were political and fought over collectively articulated, broad,
even
noble
trast,
new
as social
such
causes,
civil wars
are criminal
to as
referred
change?often
"justice".
and are motivated
private
by simple
By
con
gain?
greed and loot.

2. At least one side in old civil wars enjoyed popular support; political actors
in new civil wars lack any popular basis.
3. In old civil wars acts of violence were controlled and disciplined, especially
when
committed
by rebels;
in new
civil wars
gratuitous
and
senseless
violence
is
meted out by undisciplined militias, private armies, and independent warlords

for whom
winning
Collective
not
may
even
be
an
objective.
versus Private Causes and Motivations
into account
the broad causes of civil wars and the individual
Taking
motivations
of their combatants,
scholars implicitly hold that old
many
civil wars were motivated
clearly articulated,
by broad, well-defined,
new
civil wars tend
of
social
universalistic,
ideologies
change,12 whereas,
to be motivated
by
concerns
Recent
gain.
simple private
distinction
dichotomous
that often
boil
work
economists
by
down
to little more
is premised
than
on
are
and greed?rebels
grievance
or are
actors
either bandits motivated
seeking
political
by private greed
to ameliorate
Kofi
Annan
collective
UN
Secretary-General
grievance.13
out that "the
of diamonds,
timber,
drugs,
pursuit
recently
pointed
between
wars. Keen (fn. 7) argues that

looting generates "rational" rather than gratuitous violence. The claim
to their
that new civil wars are motivated
by looting is sometimes made in contradistinction
purported
and looting are merged. For the former view
sometimes ethnic motivations
ethnic motivation?while
a
see Kofi Annan,
Culture of Prevention,"
UNDPl(New
"Facing the Humanitarian
Challenge: Towards
"The Banality of'Ethnic War,'" International Security
York, 1999); for the latter view see John Mueller,
25, no. 1 (2000).
12Kaldor (fn. 7), 6.
a
13Collier and Hoeffler,
2000 (fn. 8), 2-3; Collier
(fn. 8); Collier and Collier and Hoeffler
produce
inwhich rebellion begins as a collective grievance and is sus
number of mixed greed-grievance
models
to aWorld
distinction. According
tained by greed. All models, however, presuppose
this dichotomous
Bank Press Release: "New World
Bank research suggests that civil wars are more often fueled by rebel
for control of diamonds,
coffee, and other valuable pri
groups competing with national governments
wars are far more
rather than by political, ethnic, or religious differences...'Civil
mary commodities,
and therefore certain rebel groups
than by grievance,
likely to be caused by economic
opportunities
benefit from the conflict and have a very strong interest in initiating and sustaining it,' says [Paul] Col
lier."World
and Other
'Lootable' Commodities
Bank, "Greed for Diamonds
Release 2000/419/S,
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/news/pressrelease.nsf,
Fuels Civil Wars"

(News
accessed April 20,2001).

"NEW"
6c "OLD" CIVIL WARS
103
drives a number of today s

the capacity
of the State to extract
resources
to be
from society
and to allocate
is the prize
patronage
over.14
The
takes
criminal
forms.
For
Enzens
many
fought
metaphor
in new civil wars are "warrior
factions
berger, competing
gangs."15 Ka
wars
as
in Africa
civil
actions by bandits
criminal
and
plan describes
on
disenfranchised
child-soldiers
and
soldiers,
teenage
hooligans,
concessions
and other valuable
internal
wars.
drugs.16
Some
even
In some
commodities
countries
that new
civil wars
lack purpose
entirely. As En
s
wars
a
new
civil
and terrifying
argues: "What gives today
zensberger
slant is the fact that they are waged without
stakes on either side, that
are wars about
at all."17 Further,
"there is no longer any
they
nothing
to
need
has been freed from ideology,"
your actions. Violence
legitimize
argue
and the combatants
have
an innate
inability
to think
and act in terms of
and future.18
past
Such
are often based on

or biased
however,
arguments,
incomplete
evidence
derived
from journalistic
reports that tend to quote uncriti
of
and
members
cally city-dwellers
organizations.
progovernmental
Fieldworkers
have described
such views as paying
"scant regard to the
. .
own claims
the purpose
of their movement.
concerning
insurgents'
a view
and [preferring]
instead to endorse
among
widespread
capital
city elites
denying
and in diplomatic
circles."19 Gourevitch
points
are
the particularity
of the peoples who
making
out
that "by
and
history,
the possibility that they might have history, [such arguments] mistake
[their]
these
More
because
failure
to
recognize
what
is at stake
in events
for the nature
of
events."20
generally,
it is unclear
is analytically
the concept
of looting
it refers to the causes of war
whether
problematic
or the moti
vations of the combatants (or both). The first problem is the direction
14
Annan
(fn. 11).
15
(fn. 6), 22.
Enzensberger
16
Kaplan (fn. 6).
17
in original.
(fn. 6), 30. Emphasis
Enzensberger
18
Ibid., 20-1,29.
19
Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford:
Christian Geffray
James Currey, 1996), xvii. In his study of the war inMozambique,
anthropologist
[the war] on the ground," and international media that
castigates "journalists who cannot investigate
and analyses" reflecting the views of "urban elites, national intellectuals, and
reproduce "information
cause des armes au
d'une guerre civile
foreigners." Christian Geffray, La
Mozambique:
Anthropologie
(Paris: Karthala, 1990), 19.
20
We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will beKilled with Our Families: Sto
Philip Gourevitch,
riesfrom Rwanda
1998), 182.
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,

104
WORLD
POLITICS
to be
war in order to loot or do
of causality?do
they loot
people wage
able to wage war?21 If the latter is the case, then looting may be no dif
taxation'.
of "revolutionary
ferent from the widely
practice
accepted
au
not
the
it
is
is
clear
who
Second,
looting?elites,
always
doing
tonomous
loot
the linkages between
armed peasants? Third,
militias,
are
and fluid.22 Can we seriously reduce the

complex
even
riots to a phenomenon
of "looting"
though
take
other
many
Finally,
things?did
place?
looting?among
are serious
in
of empirical
significance
empirical
problems. The
ing and grievances

1992 Los Angeles
much
there
dicators
for "lootable"
proxying
resources
raises
of
important
questions
of
To
causality.
problems
is mainly
Leone
about dia
to address
internal
validity?beyond
failing
in Sierra
say, in short, that the civil war
a
to
monds
be
gross oversimplification.23
appears
and Sudan are even less amenable
bia, Somalia,
Researchers
who
ernment
officials?provide
the grievance/looting
verse
and
include
Richards
have
and-file
members
matized
studied
zones?as
in war
fieldwork
have
new
Civil wars
civil wars
to
opposed
very nuanced
in Colom
to such
simplification.24
by conducting
victims
interviewing
accounts
lengthy
and gov
that fail to support
dichotomy. They find rebel motivations
are di
concerns
that go beyond mere banditry.25 Peters and

for example,
Sierra Leone,
that many
rank
rebel movements
that have been stig
of the African
shown
about
as lacking any ideology
appear in fact to have had a
of their own
Their
political understanding
participation.26
are
not
to observers
motivations
visible
look
ideological
simply
always
'
for
"Western
of
and
discourse.
make
the
patterns
ing
allegiance
They
that organizations
idioms and local
flawed assumption
using religious
sophisticated
21
the direction of causality may be irrelevant for predicting
the likelihood of civil wars, it
Although
matters when deriving
about civil wars.
theoretical, and normative
empirical,
implications
22
Collier
and Hoeffler
the complexity
of the possible connections
between
(fn. 8) acknowledge
"greed" and "grievance."
23
Richards
(fn. 19).
24
Mauricio
Romero,
"Changing Identities and Contested
Settings: Regional Elites and the Para
in Colombia,"
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 14, no. 1 (2000); Isabelle
militaries
or
Duyvesteyn,
"Contemporary War: Ethnic Conflict, Resource Conflict
Something Else?" Civil Wars
"Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence: The Dissolution
of
3, no. 1 (2000); Catherine Besteman,
American Ethnologist 23, no. 3 (1996).
the Somali Nation-State,"
25
A psychologist who treated hundreds of fighters in the Liberian Civil War drew the following
someone
16 and 35 years of age, who may have decided to become a
usually between
profile: "He is
combatant for several reasons: to get food for survival, to stop other fighters from killing his family and
friends, was forced to become a combatant or be killed, sheer adventurism etc." E. S. Grant, quoted in
an
ofLiberia and the Religious Dimension
Stephen Ellis, The Mask ofAnarchy: The Destruction
of African
Civil War (New York: New York University
Press, 1999), 127.
26
in Sierra Leone,"
Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, "'Why We Fight': Voices of Youth Combatants
no. 2 (1998).
Africa 68,

"new"
& "old"
to mobilize
cultural practices
universalistic
appeals?lack
wars
civil
105
than easily recognizable

use of traditional
people27?rather
The
any ideology.
is central inAfrican
of initiation,
for example,
rebel organiza
processes
s
tions.28 Chingono
of
argues that Re
study
Mozambique
emphatically
and
oudooks
of the world,
namo, "by resuscitating
peasant
defending
.
.
.
was
which
had been suppressed
peasant
articulating
by Frelimo
ideologies."29
To understand
as warlords30?a
ature
modern
useful
on warlordism
feature
of warlordism
rebel
leaders?often
source
of insight
on China),
(focusing
is rule rather than
mere
referred
is the relevant
to
pejoratively
historical
liter
which
argues that the key

are never
Warlords
looting.
area
virtue
of
their
capac
by
are lords of a
bandits;
they
particular
to wage war.31 Whereas
bandits?in
and elsewhere?must
China
hit
ity
and run in order to survive, warlords
administer
taxes,
levy
justice,
some
assume
maintain
the burdens
of
degree of order, and generally
areas
are
state
in
the
control.32
builders.
Saint
government
they
They
Augustine
observed
this very phenomenon:
"If by accessions
of desper
ate men this evil [brigandage] grows to such proportions that it holds
seizes upon states and subjugates

settlements,
it assumes
the name of a kingdom."33
in
Rebel
peoples,
organizations
as
mere
a
often
dismissed
criminal
Africa,
gangs, develop
ap
complex
areas
is less visible but not
paratus of rule in the
they control?which
lands,
establishes
very different
rebels.34 These
fixed
from
the
order
oriented"
implemented
by "justice
in
also
and
engage
organizations
systematic,
organized,
raw
interactions with foreign firms, which
economic
buy
sophisticated
materials
and sell weapons,35
mentation
implied by many
an
activity
views.
at odds with
the extreme
frag
27
theWar
inMozambique,"
in Paul B. Rich and
Tom Young, "AVictim of Modernity?
Explaining
State: Guerrilla Warfare and State-Building
in the Twenti
Stubbs, eds., The Counter-Insurgent
eth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 136-37; Stephen L.Weigert,
Religion and Guerrilla
Warfare inModern Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Ellis (fn. 25); Thomas H. Henriksen,
sWar
Revolution
and Counterrevolution: Mozambique
(Westport, Conn.:
of Independence, 1964-1974
Richard
Greenwood
Press, 1983), 76.
28
Richards
(fn. 19), xix.
29
Mark F. Chingono,
The State, Violence, and Development: The Political Economy ofWar inMozam
1975-1992
(Aldershot: Avebury,
1996), 55.
bique,
30
See, for example, Reno (fn. 10).
31
James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career ofFeng Yu-hsiang (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Uni
versity Press, 1966), 1.
32
Ibid., 19.
33
Saint Augustine,
The City of God, trans. John Healey
(London: J.M. Dent; New York: E. P. Dut
ton, 1931), IV:iv.
34Stephen Ellis, "Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence," African Affairs
no. 375 (1995), 165-197; Duffield
(fn. 7); Geffray
(fn. 19).
35
William
Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

94,
106
WORLD
POLITICS
The typical picture of "ideologically oriented" actors in old civilwars,

for
as well.
Such actors have often
misrepresented
activities,
large-scale
looting, and the pronounced
to represent.
of the populations
whose
grievances
they claimed
a
is recurring element
of civil wars,
the most
looting
including
its part, is often

in criminal
engaged
coercion
Indeed,
ones
ideological
anticolonial
Even
such
as the Russian
such
Lenin
and Chinese
as the one
rebellions,
into agreements
entered
Revolutions36
in Indonesia
with
"criminal
and
in the
1940s.37
elements"
during
the Russian Civil War. The behavior of the Red Army in Kharkov and
Kiev in 1919, as it emerges from Soviet records, led the historian
Vladimir N. Brovkin to assert that "in plain English, the Bolshevik
rulers were
and rapists."38 "Taxation" is a key rebel activity in all

civil wars,
and incumbents
do not shy away from outright
looting.
one
Vietnam
the
could find among
South Vietnamese
War,
During
thieves
former criminals "who preferred fighting to sitting in jail,"
militiamen
while
American
advisers
Provincial
often
allowed
Reconnaissance
Units
the members
of
the
CIA
to
sponsored
"keep money
captured
their operations."39
The
during
paradigmatic
ideological
political
were
the members
of the French
de
actors,
armies,
Revolutionary
as
scribed by their contemporaries
"highwaymen,"
"vagrants," "robbers,"
and "vicious, bloodthirsty
Nor
should one
"vagabonds,"
hooligans."40
to
their
that
the counterrevolutionaries,
resorted
adversaries,
forget
as well.41
banditry
the importance
Furthermore,
wars has been
greatly overstated.
stemic bias
in old civil
motivations
of ideological
To begin with,
there is a clear epi
in favor of the
that old civil wars (as well as most
assumption
individuals participating in them) were motivated by grand ideological

concerns.
Because
intellectuals
tend
to be
primarily
ogy, they tend to assign overwhelmingly
motivated
ideological motives
by ideol
to both
36
Lincoln Li, The Japanese Army inNorth China, 1937-1941:
Problems ofPolitical and Economic Con
trol (Tokyo: Oxford University
theMasses: Building
Press, 1975), 229; Odoric Y.K. Wou, Mobilizing
Revolution
inHenan
Press, 1994), 154; Orlando Figes, A Peoples
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University
1891-1924
The Russian Revolution,
(New York: Penguin,
1997), 666-67.
Tragedy:
37
Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries:
The Jakarta Peoples Militia
and the Indonesian Revo
of Hawaii Press, 1991), 54.
lution, 1945-1949
(Honolulu: University
38
in Russia, 1918-1922
Vladimir M. Brovkin, Political Parties and Social Movements
(Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1994), 121.
39
Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIAs Secret Campaign toDestroy the Viet Cong (An
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 168.
napolis,
40
Richard Cobb, The People sArmies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1987), 5.
41
Charles Tilly, The Vend?e (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1964), 6.


participants
107
in civil wars.42 Moreover,

or local claims, universalistic
and civilians
ethnic
when
not
crudely
ideological
"disguising"
appeals
were
means
of traditional
cultural idioms often not un
by
propagated
in new civil wars. For example, Lan has
like those used by movements
shown how the "progressive" Zimbabwean
rebels who
against
fought
racist regime used traditional
the country's
(and its practition
religion
to infer the
In addition,
it is a grave mistake
ers) to mobilize
peasants.43
motivations
of rank-and-file
members
tion of its ideological messages.44

Microlevel
historical
studies
from
consistently
their
leadership's
demonstrate
how
articula
super
ficial was the adoption of ideological claims (typically expressed in

across
a range of civil wars. A common

of old civil wars
is that at the mass
baffling
acronyms)
numerous
studies
ones. Dallin
ideological
Soviet Union,
where
about German-occupied
point
or the
was
to side with
decision
the Germans
partisans
considerations
tended
to trump
in
finding
local
level,
et al. make
this
an individual's
not determined
and evaluations
of the merits
and demerits
by "abstract considerations
nor
even
or
two
of the
under
regimes,
by likes and dislikes
experiences
the Soviet regime before the occupation."45
subtle
Swedenburg's
analy
sis of Palestinian collaboration with the British during the 1936-39

Palestinian
rebellion
makes
of the ideological
influences
the
same
McKenna's
Likewise,
focus
narratives"
rebels and supporters
in the Southern
reveals
"that
Muslims'
ordinary
perceptions
Philippines
of the war were often conspicuously
and representations
independent
on the "unauthorized
point.46
of Muslim
of any separatist
leaders
or, for that matter,
42
is not directiy caused by individual, radical ideologies even in

It turns out that political violence
as Delia Porta shows in her
terrorist organizations.
study of Italian and German
Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of
Porta, Social Movements,
Press, 1995), 196. As Barrington Moore
puts it:
Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University
"The discontented
intellectual with his soul searchings has attracted attention wholly out of proportion
to his political importance,
records and also
partiy because these searchings leave behind them written
because those who write history are themselves
intellectuals." Barrington Moore,
Social Origins ofDic
of theModern World (Boston: Beacon Press,
tatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in theMaking
urban environments,
See Donatella Delia
480
1966),
43
in Zimbabwe
David Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums
(London: James Currey,
1985). See also Henriksen
(fn. 27), 76, forMozambique.
44
1919-1944
Paul Jankowski, Communism and Collaboration: Simon Sabiani and Politics inMarseille,
(New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989), ix, xii.
45
and
andWilhelm
Alexander Dallin, Ralph Mavrogordato,
"Partisan Psychological Warfare
Moll,
of
in John A. Armstrong,
ed., Soviet Partisans inWorld War II (Madison: University
Popular Attitudes,"
Wisconsin
46
Ted
Press, 1964), 336.

Rebellion
Swedenburg, Memories
ofRevolt: The 1936-1939
of Minnesota
Press, 1995), 169-70.
(Minneapolis: University
and the Palestinian National

Past
108
WORLD
POLITICS
in
of any elite
effective
insurgent
group."47 Observing
performance
that rebels are highly
combat has often led to the erroneous
inference
cause. However,
numerous
to an
studies have
ideological
in combat are usually motivated
that men
by group pressures
dedicated
concluded
and processes involving: (1) regard for their comrades, (2) respect for
their leaders, (3) concern for their own reputation with both, and (4) an
to their success of the
urge to contribute
group.48 Recent
sociological
a
even more amenable
on
to ide
research
"choice"
conversion,
religious
considerations
than politics,
shows that doctrinal
ological
appeal does
not
lie at the heart
become
their
process: most people do not

to the doctrines
of their new faith until
of the conversion
attached
very
conversion.49
processes
Usually,
dynamics.
Stark, Wickham-Crowley,
of joining
a movement.50
are rooted
of joining
and Petersen
argue
really
after
in network
that
social
network ties (especially friendship and kin ties) are the best predictors
As Hart
out
points
about
the Irish Revolu
tion and Civil War:

The most important bonds holding Volunteers together were those of family
and neighborhood. Indeed, IRA companies were very often founded upon such
.
. . Twelve
networks
of
side. None
republican
a clue";
hadn't
"It was
very
their
ranks.
their decisions
"The
veterans
remember
confusing
Cork veterans, the Treaty

within
thirteen
the
could
I interviewed
making
altogether."
had
choice
specific
Judging
by
the
fought
to do
on
the
so. "I
recollections
of
itself and republican ideology were rarely discussed
politics
of
it was
second
place
at times." Most
couched
in the same collective terms they used to describe their joining
the organization.51
In short,
the familiar
the handy
of coherent
presence
conceptual
categories
along
to the com
which
blinded
casual observers
axis,
left-right
of civil wars, appears to have led to a significant
plexity and messiness
overstatement
content
of old civil wars via unwar
of the ideological
47
Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the
Southern Philippines
of California
Press, 1998), 194-95. Collective
grievances
(Berkeley: University
tend to be expressed only under restrictive conditions.
"Pride in Rebellion:
In
See Elisabeth Wood,
Collective
in
El
New
York
Action
Salvador" (Manuscript,
University,
surrectionary
Spring 2001).
48
Dave Grossman,
On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning toKill inWar and Society (Boston:
and Criti
Little, Brown, and Company,
1995), 89-90; Walter
Laqueur, Guerilla Warfare: A Historical
cal Study (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction,
this does not answer the question
1998), 272. Obviously,
of how and why an organization
capable of providing such training and leadership emerges.
49
Became the
the Obscure, Marginal
Stark, The Rise of Christianity: How
Jesus Movement
Rodney
a
Dominant
1997),
Religious Force in the Western World in Few Centuries (New York: Harper Collins,
14-17.
50
on Latin American
Ibid.; Timothy Wickham-Crowley,
Insurgency and
Exploring Revolution: Essays
M. E. Sharpe, 1991), 152; Roger Petersen, Resistance and Rebel
Revolutionary
Theory (Armonk, N.Y.:
lion: Lessons from Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
51
Peter Hart, The LR.A. and Its Enemies: Violence and Community
in Cork, 1916-1923
(New York:
Clarendon Press, 1999), 209,264.

109

ranted
inferences
the elite to the mass
from
of the cold war
seems
to have
caused
level. In this regard, the end

cat
of the
conceptual
the demise
wars rather than a decline

in the
egories used to interpret civil
ideolog
at the mass
ical motivations
of civil wars
level. Ironically,
detailed
research
about
analysts
pictions
conducted
years later tends to be ignored by
civil wars who keep relying on the flawed de
the old civil wars were ongoing.
Support versus Lack of Support
Popular
Since
these wars
of contemporary
produced when
old civil wars were
grievances,
port?at
to grow out of accumulated

supposed
popular
to be based on considerable
assumed
popular sup
were
they
least for the rebels.
By
fought by political actors who
contrast,
new
civil wars
appear
to be
to
lack any such support. According
as articulated
at least in
"Whereas
guerrilla warfare,
theory
by
or Che Guevara,
to capture 'hearts and minds,'
aims
the
Tse-tung
new warfare
borrows
from counterinsurgency
of destabi
techniques
lization aimed at sowing Tear and hatred.'"52 Similarly, Nordstrom
de
Kaldor:
Mao
as "a
rebels of the Renamo
lethal
particularly
no
or
that has virtually
ideology
popular
support,"
formed by foreign powers
intent on destabilizing
the country, and re
for "over 90 percent
of all atrocities
Likewise
committed."53
sponsible
a
war
war
not
in
P?caut
the
is
civil
that
Colombia
because
the
argues
scribed
the Mozambican
rebel movement
does not support any side at all.54

population
are often based upon
Such statements
incomplete
mation.
Nordstrom's
views with
government
refugees
forces"
or biased
infor
on inter
for example,
relies exclusively
account,
in areas
from
liberated
Renamo
control
"recently
by
or
and information
provided
by progovernmental
of Mozambican
(such as the Organization
Women),
ganizations
relay
the
view
of
the
rebels.
that "in
She
ing
government's
reported
is generally
referred to as bandidos armados
[the Renamo]
Mozambique,
in all civil wars use such
that incumbents
(armed bandits),"
ignoring
terms
to describe
insurgents.55
Recent
studies
based
on evidence
that
52
Kaldor (fn. 7), 8.
53
and JoAnn Martin,
"The Backyard Front," in Carolyn Nordstrom
eds., The
Carolyn Nordstrom,
Paths toDomination,
of California Press, 1992), 271-72.
Resistance, and Terror (Berkeley: University
54
une guerre contre la soci?t?," Le Monde, October
Daniel P?caut, "En Colombie,
Simi
10,1999.
lar statements are commonly made about Sierra Leone. See, for example, Reno (fn. 35).
55
a more nuanced
In a subsequent
in
account, Nordstrom
provided
portrayal of the situation
"War on the Front Lines," in Carolyn Nordstrom
and Antonius
Mozambique.
Carolyn Nordstrom,
C. G. M. Robben,
eds., Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival(Berkeley:
of California Press, 1995), 142.
University

110
WORLD
POLITICS
was hard (if not impossible) to collect while the civil war was ongoing
a considerable
level of popular
enjoyed
support.56
areas
was
in
This
rural
controlled
where
support
present
by Renamo,
in
than
researchers
and journalists
the
cities
rather
rarely traveled,
under governmental
control.57
indicate
that Renamo
Conversely,
the perception
that
in old
rebellions
civil wars
were
based on widespread popular support has been repeatedly called into

the view
that leftist
rebellions,
begin with,
were
on
and elsewhere,
based mostly
and
widespread
sual popular
has
been
careful
participation
by
questioned
research.58 Likewise,
the Vietcong
oriented
relied on extensive
to what Kaldor
the civilian population.59
against
Contrary
question.
America
To
mass
new?as
is nothing
population
displacement
suggested
classic wars as the Russian,
and
Civil wars.
Chinese
Spanish,
Furthermore,
are often
wars,
individual
informed
in old
loyalties
less by impersonal
civil wars,
discourses
fluid, shifting, and often locally based cleavages.Many
in Latin
consen
micro
coercion
argues,60
by such
as in new
civil
and more
by
studies describe
a
often characterized
between
processes,
disjunction
by
underly
on the one hand, and violent conflict and identities on the
ing cleavages
in Ireland from
other. For
Hart's
of Cork County
analysis
example,
messy
1916 to 1923 unearths a high level of variation in political attitudes at
an
the microlevel,
"array of?often
loyalties
conflicting?local
turned every part of Cork into a political patchwork."61 When,
a civil war, the decision
Irish nationalists
about which
fought
was
join
divisions
as
always, by group loyalties
"shaped,
became political
battle lines."62
and rivalries.
[which]
in 1923,
side to
Factional
56
also points out that "while Renamo would not have
(fn. 29). Chingono
Young (fn. 27); Chingono
survived without
external support, exclusive focus on external factors equally distorts the reality and
own
are reduced to mere
denies theMozambicans'
and
passive victims of manipulations
history; they
machinations
of powerful external forces."
57
Similar observations have been made about Liberia
and Sierra Leone. See Ellis (fn. 34); Richards

(fn. 19).
58
and the Story ofAll Poor Guatemalans
See, for example, David Stoll, Rigoberta Mench?
(Boulder:
Iv?n Degregori,
Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat
of
Westview,
1999); Carlos
"Harvesting
in Ayacucho,"
in Steven J. Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in
Sendero Luminoso
Peru, 1980-1995
(Durham and London: Duke University
Press, 1998), 128-57. The same is true for
anticolonial wars in Africa. See Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge:
Press, 1992).
University
Cambridge
59
and Techniques of theNational Liberation Front of South
Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization
Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966).
60
Kaldor (fn. 7), 8.
61
Hart (fn. 51), 220.
62
Ibid., 265-66.

"new"
& "old"
civil
111
wars
Family and faction dictated the course of the IRA split in units all over Ireland,
often in highly predictable fashion. Once again, itwas the Brennans against the
in east Limerick,
Barretts in Clare, the Hanniganites against theManahanites
inDonegal as all the old feuds were
and the Sweeneys versus the O'Donnells
reignited.63
Similar
are observable
dynamics
in most
old civil wars.
For example,
the South Vietnamese village of Binh Nghia displayed a "lukewarm at

titude
had
the Viet
toward
across
originated
the local communist

Cong" because
the river, in the Phu Long hamlets,
movement
with
which
they had a long-standing and hostile feud over fishing rights.64
whom
As Manrique
describes,
in the central
Peruvian
of Canipaco
valley
the
population enjoyed a "kind of honeymoon" with Shining Path, which

a
two communities
dispute
erupted between
of lands previously
usurped by haciendas.65
is often articulated
of rebellions
Because
the meaning
ended when
over
the dis
tribution
of national
observers
language
cleavages, many
as
support along
actually mobilizing
popular
In his analysis of the Cultural
workers
disagree.
nese
by elites in the
code them
erroneously
those
Field
cleavages.
one
in
Revolution
Chi
factions used the language of

reports that warring
each
faction
that the other represented
struggle,
claiming
landlords
and counterrevolutionary
elements. Hinton,
found
however,
village,
Hinton
class
with
that the conflict

which
dominated
Shen
was
family, which played

same
lage.66 The
discovery
1927 Haifeng
clans: the Lu family,

competing
and larger section of the village, and the
a
major role in the southern section of the vil
polarized
the northern
around
was made
by the writer
of a report
on the
uprising in South China, a region polarized into com
63
Ibid., 266.
64
"The hostility between the Phu Longs and Binh Nghia was generations
old, focused on a feud
over
was natural that the Phu
as well as
Longs assumed economic
fishing rights. It
political power
when the Viet Cong were on the rise and this was done at the direct expense of fishermen
from Binh
the Viet Cong came across the river to spread the gospel, there were many in
So later when
Nghia.
Binh Nghia who resented them and any cause they represented. The police chiefs had fed this resent
ment with money and had built a spy network." See F. J.West,
of
Jr., The Village (Madison: University
Wisconsin
Press, 1985), 146-47.
65
of armed Shining Path cadres on the side of one of the communities
in a
"The participation
a confederation
a rupture with the latter,
of rival communities
massive confrontation
against
provoked
in
who decided to turn over two senderista cadres they had captured in the scuffle to the authorities
in the execution of thirteen
Huancayo. This action provoked Shining Path reprisals, which culminated
in the central
from their communities
and assassinated
peasant leaders. The victims were kidnapped
"TheWar for the Central Sierra," in Stern (fn. 58), 204-5.
plaza of Chongos Alto." Nelson Manrique,
66
in a Chinese
William
Hinton,
Shenfan: The Continuing Revolution
Village (New York: Vintage
Books,
1984),
527.

WORLD POLITICS
112
peting alliances of villages known as Red Flag and Black Flag, which
had grown out of lineage struggles: "When the Red Army arrived fly
ing red banners,
the troops were
greeted
and peasants
by landowners
alike from Red Flag villages who thought theywere allies in the strug
gle against
Moreover,
the common
ways?wealthy
and its rival
locally
enemy,
segmented
peasants may
in a
neighboring
the Black
Flag
villages."67
in misleading
cleavages often aggregate
one
one
actor
in
support
political
region
can be
merchants
region;68 wealthy
in an otherwise
death
by poor right-wing
squad members
or
sets
of
diverse
not) regional
conflict;69
class-polarized
(overlapping
and local cleavages,
such as socio-economic,
factional,
clan,
lineage,
to
combine
mislead
tribal, gender, or generational
cleavages,
produce
targeted
aggregate
ingly uniform
cleavages; vertical relationships
(patron-client)
ties (communities,
and vertical
townlands,
neighborhoods,
parishes,
or kin) often
horizontal
factions,
clans,
trump
corporations,
cleavages.70
are often "localistic
interests
and region-specific;"71
individual
Group
are not
motivations
informed
by impersonal
cleavage
necessarily
even
related grievances,
but often by local and personal
conflicts,72
by
common
crime.73 As Tilly has observed
about the Vend?e:
"The most
we have on communal
in southern
information
microscopic
politics
Anjou
resists
forcing
into categories
of class and locality
alone,
and calls
for hunches about kinship, family friendships, the residues of old feuds,
same
societies
that are sharply polarized
applies for
of class75 and ethnicity.76
Social relations and the connections
a matter
of "constant
formed
identities
before
the war become
and the like."74 The

in terms
that
67
Robert Marks, Rural Revolution
in South China: Peasants and theMaking
inHaifeng
ofHistory
ofWisconsin
1570-1930
(Madison: University
Press, 1984), 263.
County,
68
David H. Close, "Introduction,"
inDavid H. Close, ed., The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950:
Studies
in Polarization
(London and New York: Roudedge,
(fn. 19).
1993), 1-31; Geffray
69
of a Death
"The Operation
J. Demarest,
Benjamin D. Paul andWilliam
Squad in San Pedro la
Laguna," in Robert M. Carmack, ed., Harvest
of Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis
of Oklahoma
(Norman: University
Press, 1988), 128,150.
70
Hart
(fn.
(fn. 51), 177; McKenna
(fn. 66), 527; Marks
(fn. 47), 162; Kriger (fn. 58), 8; Hinton
67), 264.
71
(fn. 46), 131-33; Wickham-Crowley
(fn. 29), 16; Swedenburg
Young (fn. 27), 138-42; Chingono
(fn. 50), 131.
72
(fn. 69).
See, for example, McKenna
(fn. 47); Swedenburg
(fn. 46); Paul and Demarest
73
Mueller
When Colombia Bled: A His
(fn. 11); Paul and Demarest
(fn. 69); James D. Henderson,
of Alabama Press, 1985).
tory of the Violencia in Tolima (University, Ala.: University
74
(fn. 41), 191.
75Tilly
Stoll (fn. 58).
76
Et ils sont devenus Harkis
Richards
(Paris: Fayard, 1993); Jan T.
(fn. 19), 6;Mohand
Hamoumou,
Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland sWestern Ukraine and Western Belorussia
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1988).

113
a medium
In many ways,
civil wars provide
for a
to be realized within
of grievances
the space of the great
variety
er conflict and
use of violence. As Lucas argues about the
the
through
reformulation."77
in southern
Revolution
a
for
language
other
France,
conflicts
"the revolutionary
struggle provided
a social,
or
communal,
personal
of
nature."78
In short, micro-oriented
studies of old civil wars offer a ground-level
wars
as
of civil
"welters of complex
rather than as
struggles,"79
sup
simple binary conflicts between
organizations
crystallizing
popular
In old civil
port and collective
grievances
along well-defined
cleavages.
view
was
and lost during the war, often
wars, popular
support
shaped, won,
means
of
coercion
and
and
violence
and local
by
along lines of kinship
was not
it
and
ideo
fixed,
immutable,
ity;
purely consensual,
primarily
as
wars
are
new
not
In
this
old
civil
different
from
civil
respect,
logical.
wars as
to be.
they appear
versus Gratuitous
Controlled
in new
Violence
civil wars
as both horrific and

is consistently
described
out
mercenar
and paramilitaries,
senseless, meted
by assorted militia
war
and
warlords
for
whom
the
ies,
may not even
independent
winning
be an objective.80 Human
the
and
press described
rights organizations
Violence
the gruesome
massacres
that took place

and
less," "wanton,"
"incomprehensible"
often come with
ery."81 Such descriptions
in
Algeria
instances
a culturalist
in 1997
as "sense
of "random
shade.
butch
In the last
Serb soldiers massacred

1998, when
days of September
twenty-one
and elderly people near the village of Gornje Obrinje
women,
children,
a detailed
in Kosovo,
account concluded
itwas an instance
journalistic
a
of "the
tra
of
is
violent
time-honored
revenge [which]
practice
taking
are often
in the Balkans."82 These
dition
descriptions
by
complemented
to
acts of violence
that attempt
arguments
explain
by simply
their effects. A psychologist
victims
who
treated the maimed
stating
of the
77
of California Press,
Mary Elizabeth Berry, The Culture of Civil War inKyoto (Berkeley: University
1994), xxi.
78
Colin Lucas, "Themes
in Southern Violence
in Gwynne
Lewis and Colin
after 9 Thermidor,"
1794-1815
Lucas, eds., Beyond the Terror: Essays in French Regional and Social History,
(Cambridge:
Press, 1983), 152-94.
University
Cambridge
79
Susan F. Harding, Remaking Ibieca: Rural Life in
of
Aragon under Franco (Chapel Hill: University
North Carolina Press, 1984), 59.
80
Kaldor (fn. 7), 93.
81
Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic ofMassacres
and
in Algeria," Rationality
11, no. 3 (1999), 243-85.
Society
82
Stands as Gruesome
of Serb Revenge," Interna
Evidence
Jean Perlez, "Kosovo Clans Massacre
tional Herald Tribune, November
16,1998.

114
POLITICS
WORLD
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone pointed out that "it
was
the goal of the rebels to take away their role as men,

fathers and
states that "Renamo, with
its tactics of sever
husbands/'83
Nordstrom
ears of civilians,
seems to reclaim the
ing the noses,
original
lips, and
sense of the absurd."84
to "the autistic nature of
points
Enzensberger
perpetrators, and their inability to distinguish between destruction and

A book
self-destruction."85
ofDarkness.u
Such senseless
violence
ad nauseam
quoted
just
was
is Joseph
as
not
prevalent
that
argues
Enzensberger,
were
and
Civil
Wars
"there
Russian,
Spanish
regular
structures
to carry
the central command
attempted
in a
strict control of
objectives
planned way through
we
are to believe
who
Conrads
Heart
in old civil wars
if
in the American,
armies and fronts;
out
their
their
strategic
troops. As a
rule there was political aswell asmilitary leadership, following clearly

defined
goals,
and ready and able to negotiate
when
necessary."87
Yet
quick perusal of the evidence from old civilwars conveys a quite differ
ent
image.
the perception
that civil wars are particularly
cruel
begin with,
new civil wars?it
one of the most
is
consistent
and
predates
enduring
stressed by observers
and participants
observations,88
alike, ever since
war in
of
the
civil
Thucydides'
depiction
Corcyra.89
To
While
the violence
of ethnic
conflicts
has
received
sustained
atten
tion
is in fact the central component

of all kinds of civil
lately, violence
a
ethnic
and
non-ethnic
alike.
For
war,
example,
nineteenth-century
French
leader remarked
that "excesses are insepa
counterrevolutionary
rable from wars of opinion."90
Madame
de Sta?l observed
Likewise,
that "all civil wars
heaval
in which
are more
they
or less similar
throw men
and
in their
in the influence
in the up
to vio
they give
atrocity,
83
Norimitsu
Terror in Severed Limbs," New York Times, August
"Sierra Leone Measures
Onishi,
22,1999.
84
Nordstrom
(fn. 55), 142.
85
(fn. 6), 20.
Enzensberger
86
See, for example, Ignatieff (fn. 6), 5.
87
(fn. 6), 15.
88Enzensberger
Nico H. Frijda, "The Lex Talionis: On Vengeance,"
in Stephanie H.M. Van Goozen, Nanne E.
Van de Poll, and Joseph Sergeant, eds., Emotions: Essays on Emotion Theory (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates,
1994), 267.
89
war there as a situation in which
"there was death in every shape
Thucydides
depicted the civil
and form. And, as usually happens
in such situations, people went to every extreme and beyond it."
trans. Rex Warner
N.Y.: Penguin
(Harmondsworth,
Thucydides,
History
of the Peloponnesian War,
the inherent
literature sentiments
Books, 1977), 241. One easily finds in the historical
emphasizing
war. See Claude Petitfr?re, La Vend?e et les Vend?ens (Paris: Galli
cruelty and ravaging nature of civil
1981), 50; and John G?nther, Behind the Curtain (New York: Harper,
1949), 129.
mard/fulliard,
90
1997), 237.
Roger Dupuy, Les Chouans (Paris: Hachette,

115
Latin America
has been a privileged
tyrannical
passions."91
of
civil
violent
but
non-ethnic
wars.92 Descriptions
very
setting
mostly
in such old civil wars as the Russian
of extreme violence
and Spanish
are abound.93 The
militia
is
of using
local semi-independent
practice
actors.94
the
oriented
Likewise,
among many "ideologically"
widespread
in order to turn them into fighters may be asso
abduction
of children
lent and
ciated with new civil wars inAfrica but itwas consistently practiced in
many
motivated"
"ideologically
rebellions,
such
as the
Afghan
insur
gency following the Soviet invasion95 and the Shining Path insurgency
in Peru.96
Many
and Nicaragua.97
children
became
During
the most
the
fighters
in Guatemala,
El
Salvador,
Chinese
Cul
"ideological")
(supremely
of young
violent groups were composed
to
in
from
fifteen.98
Guards,
age
ranging
eight
to new civil wars,
to
it is important
Turning
begin by pointing
tural Revolution,
Red
out
that our understanding of violence is culturally defined.99 Killings by

knife
and machete
tend
to
horrify
us more
than the often
incomparably
more massive killings by aerial and field artillery bombings. As Crozier

put
high
nate
make
of the strong may express itself in

ago: "The violence
are no less discrimi
These
bombs.
weapons
explosives
napalm
than a hand-grenade
tossed from a roof-top;
indeed,
they will
more
innocent
victims. Yet they arouse less moral
indignation
it forty years
or
the "senseless" violence

of new
firesides."100 Moreover,
as it appears. The massacres
not as
in Al
gratuitous
as
was
the violence
often highly
and strategic,101
selective
around Western
civil wars
geria
were
is often
91
Madame
de Sta?l, Des circonstances actuelles qui peuvent terminer la r?volution et des principes qui
doivent fonder la r?publique en France, ?d. Lucia Omacini
1979), 10.
(1798; Geneva: Librairie Droz,
92
Tina Rosenberg,
Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America (New York: Penguin,
1991), 7.
93
and Revolu
Tradition,
See, for example, Julio de la Cueva, "Religious Persecution, Anticlerical
tion: On Atrocities
against the Clergy during the Spanish Civil War," Journal of 'Contemporary History
33, no. 3 (1998); Figes (fn. 36); Brovkin (fn. 38).
94
(fn. 58).
(fn. 69); Degregori
Kalyvas (fn. 81), 265-77; Paul and Demarest
95
sAccount
Artyom Borovik, The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist
of the Soviet War inAfghanistan
(London: Faber and Faber, 1991), 25.
96
Ponciano Del Pino H., "Family, Culture, and 'Revolution: Everyday Life with Sendero Lumi
(Durham and
noso," in Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995
London: Duke University
Press, 1998), 171.
97
llene Cohn and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill,
Child Soldiers: The Role of Children inArmed Conflict (Ox
in Thomas W. Walker,
ford: Clarendon
"The Former Contras,"
ed.,
Press, 1994); Ariel C. Armony,
207.
without Illusions (Wilmington,
Del.: Scholarly Resources),
Nicaragua
98
Causes of Violence in Chinas Cultural Rev
III, Policies of Chaos: The Organizational
Lynn T. White
olution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1989), 280-81.
99
of
and Sacrament (Reno and Las Vegas: University
Joseba Zulaika, Basque Violence: Metaphor
Nevada Press, 1988).
100
Brian Crozier, The Rebels: A Study of Postwar Insurrections (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 158.
101
Kalyvas (fn. 81).

WORLD POLITICS
116
RENAMO.
extreme
found that the most
Young
by
a
of
drawn?and
part
carefully
largely successful?plan
used
were
atrocities
to battle
harden
young, mostly forcibly conscripted young guerrillas. Likewise, atrocities

committed
ern
against
Mozambique,
were concentrated
at
in south
the population
large
where
the FRELIMO government
had a strong base.102
Paul Richards, an anthropologist who

a nuanced
Leone,
provides
in this country:
violence
studied the civil war in Sierra
of the strategically
analysis
motivated
rebel
Take, for instance, a spate of incidents in villages between Bo andMoyamba, in

1995 inwhich rebels cut off the hands of village women.
September-October
What clearer instance could there be of a reversion to primitive barbarity? Im
ages flood into the mind of hands cut off*for the manufacture of magic potions.
But behind this savage series lay, in fact, a set of simple strategic calculations.
The insurgent movement spreads by capturing young people. Short of food in
the
pre-harvest
the movement
period,
and return
commence. How
harvest.
(the
When
rice granary
some
captives,
irrespective
to their
the
villages where
of
the
early
risks, sought
harvest was
to
about
defy
to
could the rebels prevent such defections? By stopping the

news
the
of
the
of
rebel
affected
in central
Sierra Leone
amputations
spread
were
to venture
few women
prepared
region)
out in the fields. The harvest ceased ... Having decided not to take part in the
1996
February
away would-be
the
elections
voters?cutting
rebels
then
off
the
started
to use
hands
that
the
same
might
tactic
otherwise
to scare
cast
vote.103
commissioner
the European
for humanitarian
Indeed,
as
in Sierra Leone
the atrocities
committed
carefully
tralized rather than gratuitous
and random.104
To
summarize,
the perception
or understandable
both
limited,
disciplined,
new civil wars
is senseless,
gratuitous,
in
the
available
evidence.
support
that violence
and
affairs described
planned
and cen
in old civil wars
is
that violence
in
the view
and uncontrolled
102
?By virtue
fails
to find
of its supporters could not be achieved by

0f the numbers involved, the elimination
a handful of local party officials. Such violence was less evident in areas where
off
simply picking
FRELiMO influence and presence had been eliminated and renamo was
In
relatively well established.
the Gorongosa
coexistence with the civilian popu
region there was reasonably good and co-operative
seems to have been less brutal
lation and little apparent fear. The renamo
presence in the Zambezia
and better organised from its first arrival in the area." Young (fn. 27), 132-33.
103
Richards
(fn. 18), xx.
104
in Africa. They are the result of an orches
"Such atrocities are not part of traditional warfare
trated strategy to terrorize civilians, carried out by troops trained in such barbarous techniques. The
systematic pattern of these crimes, as well as the scale of the terror, do not support claims that the
rebels are retreating, isolated and beyond control. Field reports indicate that rebel movements
could
not take
control and supplies from the outside. Crimes on this scale are
communication,
place without
usually orchestrated." Emma Bonino, "No Court to Deter the Barbarity in Sierra Leone," International
HeraldTribune,
July 8,1998.

117
Conclusion
The
parallel
of emerging
reading
research
on new
civil wars
and over
looked historical research on old civilwars suggests that the distinction

between them should be strongly qualified. Civil wars undoubtedly dif
fer from
idence
argued
mously
in a number
of respects. However,
the available ev
to
tend
be less pronounced
than usually
suggests that differences
and that they may not array themselves
and
dichoto
neatly
around the end of the cold war.
each other
The demise of the cold war potentially affected the way inwhich
civil wars were
fought,
if not
their
frequency.
the disappearance
Clearly,
of external sources of legitimation and funding provided by competing

on local resources. Yet, the exact mechan
superpowers
puts a premium
to lootable resources?
isms that link funding and war?from
diasporas
are
in which
remain
and how they affect the ways
civil wars
fought
inadequately
specified.
At the same time, it is often
that the end of the cold war
overlooked
has decisively affected how civilwars are interpreted and coded by both
and observers.
participants
By
if flawed,
coherent,
removing
political
categories and classificatory devices, the end of the cold war has led to
an
of the criminal
exaggeration
of recent
aspects
civil wars
and a con
comitant neglect of theirmanifold political aspects. It ishighly possible

of recent
that
interpretations
and criminalization
tual categories
war
per
civil wars
are attributable
generated
that stress
more
their depoliticization
of the concep
to the demise
war
by the cold
to the end of the cold
than
se.
the demise of the conceptual

categories
engendered
by
an
a
us to
is
it
rather
than
allows
opportunity
handicap;
core of civil wars unhindered
of externally
probe the
by the constraints
con
to
would
be
lenses.
The
research
wrong
again coin
imposed
path
events
current
in
rather than good theory.
ceptual categories
grounded
Nonetheless,
the cold war
in this respect. As
is particularly
The
vulnerable
study of violence
reac
it
Horowitz
"has
been
characterized
points out,
by considerable
to the occurrence
events of various classes.
has
of
violent
tivity
Theory
to events and the
twisted and turned in response
changing
identity of
the protagonists."105
Flawed
and
the
derived
categories
assumptions
from
them undermine
In turn, good
105
Donald
2001), 33.
theory
Horowitz,
even
the most
requires
The Deadly
Ethnic
sound
Riot
sophisticated
conceptual
(Berkeley:
modeling
categories
University
exercises.
and reli
of California

Press,
118
WORLD
POLITICS
a
by
only be generated
research. For example,
pat
levels of war centralization,
or levels of violence. We
can
able empirical
indicators.
Such categories
and empirical
of
process
parallel analytical
or
terns of
not
may
covary with
looting may
ethnic
commitment,
polarization,
ideological
em
to
the
mechanisms
key
identify the relevant
specify
carefully,
accurate
and
collect
and
data.
Further
indicators,
pirical
appropriate
the importance
of historical
research cannot be overemphasized.
more,
on civil wars must be
in sustained,
research
system
Clearly,
grounded
need
or
at the
observation
reconstruction
atic, and long-term
ethnographic
mass
level coupled with archival research. Such research is essential be
cause civil wars are
to the trade-off between
vis
vulnerable
particularly
ibility and significance. Highly

discourses
or
advertised
visible
information,
such as elite
can be
outwardly misleading
evidence
about crucial but
atrocities,
widely
is less
than
hard-to-collect
significant
undertheorized
and underresearched
such as the
aspects of civil wars,
resource
of
warfare
and
the
forms
of
and the
actors,
extraction,
type
and
patterns of violence. By illustrating the potential pitfalls of failing to do

so, this article
must embrace
argues that a research

such approaches.
program
for the study of civil wars


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Trustees of Princeton University

"New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?

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"NEW" AND "OLD" CIVIL WARS

decline of interstate armed conflict and perceived rise in the

the end of the cold war1?especially

as a source of conflict and

Since the issue of ethnic competition has been effectively tackled by

tends to be disregarded. This is compounded by the fact that the end of

that had made

author thanks Pierre Hassner,

WorldPolitics 54 (October 2001), 99-118

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old and new

the end of the cold war.

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"NEW" & "OLD" CIVIL WARS

specific policy demands,

old and new civil wars vary along three

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102 WORLD POLITICS

New Civil Wars

Old Civil Wars

greed and loot.

meted out by undisciplined militias, private armies, and independent warlords

versus Private Causes and Motivations

wars. Keen (fn. 7) argues that

Fuels Civil Wars"

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6c "OLD" CIVIL WARS

drives a number of today s

and other valuable

and the combatants

and act in terms of

are often based on

for the nature

This content downloaded from 128.239.123.173 on Tue, 11 Mar 2014 09:40:24 AM

and fluid.22 Can we seriously reduce the

ing and grievances

dichotomy. They find rebel motivations

that go beyond mere banditry.25 Peters and

as lacking any ideology

appear in fact to have had a

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than easily recognizable

argues that the key

this very phenomenon:

seizes upon states and subjugates

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The typical picture of "ideologically oriented" actors in old civilwars,

its part, is often

and rapists."38 "Taxation" is a key rebel activity in all

former criminals "who preferred fighting to sitting in jail,"

individuals participating in them) were motivated by grand ideological

ogy, they tend to assign overwhelmingly

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"NEW" & "OLD" CIVIL WARS

in civil wars.42 Moreover,

tion of its ideological messages.44

ficial was the adoption of ideological claims (typically expressed in

a range of civil wars. A common

sis of Palestinian collaboration with the British during the 1936-39

or, for that matter,