IFIM BUSINESS SCHOOL

PROJECT
ON
STATISTICS
To study the trend of the terrorist attacks in the time
period(2003-2008) by various banned/terrorist outfits

2009

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STATISTICS PROJECT REPORT

ON

……A STUDY
PRESENTED BY

TAPAS RANJAN OJHA, SOBHANSON DAS, SNEHASHISH

GOSWAMI, RASHMI NARAYAN SAMANTASINGHAR

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements...................................................................3

Objectives & Scopes..................................................................4

Introduction...............................................................................5

Statistics in studying the trend in terrorism...............................10

Appendices...............................................................................19

-Abbreviations...........................................................................19

-Definitions................................................................................20

-References...............................................................................21

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The most important acknowledgement, by far, is to the officers of the paramilitary
forces who helped us with invaluable data to bring this project into the current
shape. We thank Mr.Parminder Singh, from Intelligence Bureau, who put his
considerable experience and wisdom at our disposal in the early stages of the
project. We are highly indebted to all the personnel working with ADUGODI and
ANANDNAGAR police division to have helped us with vital data at various stages of
our project, directly or indirectly. We also extend our heartfelt thanks to the
Dy.Commandant ,CISF of ISRO division for having provided us with his priceless
time out of his highly busy schedule which formed a strong base for the foundation of
the project. Search engine GOOGLE and BING deserves a space for thanks for
without their miraculous tool the project would not have seen the light of the day.

Words will not be enough to express our gratitude to Mr.R.Ballasubramanian,

Mr.C.K.Sandhu, Mr.J.C.Gehlot whose work on understanding the trend of terrorism
was of immense help. We are again thankful to all the officers for allowing us to get
access to highly prohibited area to materialise the project.

Our heartfelt thanks are due to all the people who indirectly directed us to proper
authorities and the places where they can be approached for the most difficult part
of the project-“data collection”. We thank all the people who were directly or
indirectly associated with the project, as the space is not sufficient to name all of
them. It would be a huge injustice not to mention all the classmates who boosted our
morale high whenever we thought of scrapping the sensitive project and starting a
fresh one.

Last but not the least, we are highly thankful to our professor Mr.Shivakumar who,
not only provided us with the vision to undertake the project, But also put in
herculean endeavours to introduce significant statistical tools to us which helped us
all throughout the project.

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OBJECTIVES & SCOPES

1. To study the trend of the terrorist attacks in the time period (2003-2008) by
various banned/terrorist outfits.

SCOPE: In strategising counter terrorism policies making use of the past data and its
analysis.

2. To study the degree of association between

a) The strength(in numbers) of INFORMERS cum DIRECT FIELD OPERATION

PERSONNEL of IB & RAW

and

b) Number of major terrorist attacks in 2008.

SCOPE: In making optimum use of the strength and formulating deployment policies
learning from the mistakes committed.

3. To find out the chances of property being damaged when casualties are already
reported and casualties when properties have got damaged already, in course of a
militant attack.

SCOPE: In analysing the chances of both loss of life and public property in attacks to
come and how to equip ourselves to counter that situation

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INTRODUCTION
What is Terrorism?

Terrorism is not new, and even though it has been used since the beginning of
recorded history it can be relatively hard to define. Terrorism has been described
variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to
oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Obviously, a lot depends on whose
point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for
the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive
power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to
the secretive nature and small size of terrorist
organizations, they often offer opponents no clear
organization to defend against or to deter.

That is why pre-emption is being considered to be so

important. In some cases, terrorism has been a means to
carry on a conflict without the adversary realizing the
nature of the threat, mistaking terrorism for criminal
activity. Because of these characteristics, terrorism has
become increasingly common among those pursuing
extreme goals throughout the world. But despite its
popularity, terrorism can be a nebulous concept. Even
within the Indian Government, agencies responsible for
different functions in the ongoing fight against terrorism use different definitions.

The Indian Department of Defence defines terrorism as “the calculated use of

unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce
or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally
political, religious, or ideological.” Within this definition, there are three key
elements—violence, fear, and intimidation—and each element produce terror in its
victims. The CBI uses this: "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."
The RAW defines "terrorism" to be "premeditated politically-motivated violence

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perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine

agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

Outside the Indian Government, there are greater variations in what features of
terrorism are emphasized in definitions. The United Nations produced this definition
in 1992; "An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)
clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political
reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are
not the main targets." The most commonly accepted academic definition starts with
the U.N. definition quoted above, and adds two sentences totalling another 77 words
on the end; containing such verbose concepts as "message generators" and
'violence based communication processes." Less specific and considerably less
verbose, the British Government definition of 1974 is"…the use of violence for
political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public,
or any section of the public, in fear."

Terrorism is a criminal act that influences an audience beyond the immediate victim.
The strategy of terrorists is to commit acts of violence that .draws the attention of
the local populace, the government, and the world to their cause. The terrorists plan
their attack to obtain the greatest publicity, choosing targets that symbolize what
they oppose. The effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the
public’s or government’s reaction to the act. For example, in 1972 at the Munich
Olympics, the Black September Organization killed 11 Israelis. The Israelis were the
immediate victims. But the true target was the estimated 1 billion people watching
the televised event.

The Black September Organization used the high visibility of the Olympics to
publicize its views on the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Similarly, in October
1983, Middle Eastern terrorists bombed the Marine Battalion Landing Team
Headquarters at Beirut International Airport. Their immediate victims were the 241
U.S. military personnel who were killed and over 100 others who were wounded.
Their true target was the American people and the U.S. Congress. Their one act of
violence influenced the United States’ decision to withdraw the Marines from Beirut
and was therefore considered a terrorist success.

There are three perspectives of terrorism: the terrorist’s, the victim’s, and the
general public’s. The phrase “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”
is a view terrorists themselves would accept. Terrorists do not see themselves as
evil. They believe they are legitimate combatants, fighting for what they believe in,
by whatever means possible. A victim of a terrorist act sees the terrorist as a
criminal with no regard for human life. The general public’s view is the most
unstable. The terrorists take great pains to foster a “Robin Hood” image in hope of
swaying the general public’s point of view toward their cause. This sympathetic view
of terrorism has become an integral part of their psychological warfare and needs to
be countered vigorously

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Terrorist Behaviou
Behaviour

There is clearly a wide choice of definitions for terrorism. Despite this, there are
elements in common among the majority of useful definitions. Common threads of
the various definitions identify terrorism as:

• Political
• Psychological
• Coercive
• Dynamic
• Deliberate

Political
A terrorist act is a political act or is committed with the intention to cause a political
effect. Clausewitz' statement that "war is a continuation of policy by other means" is
taken as a truism by terrorists. They merely eliminate the intermediate step of
armies and warfare, and apply violence directly to the political contest.

Psychological
The intended results of terrorist acts cause a psychological effect ("terror"). They
are aimed at a target audience other than the actual victims of the act. The intended
target audience of the terrorist act may be the population as a whole, some specific
portion of a society (an ethnic minority, for example), or decision-making elites in the
society's political, social, or military populace.

Coercive
Violence and destruction are used in the commission of the act to produce the
desired effect. Even if casualties or destruction are not the result of a terrorist
operation, the threat or potential of violence is what produces the intended effect.
For example, a successful hostage taking operation may result in all hostages being
freed unharmed after negotiations and bargaining. Regardless of the outcome, the
terrorist bargaining chips were nothing less than the raw threat of applying violence
to maim or kill some or all of the hostages. When the threat of violence is not
credible, or the terrorists are unable to implement violence effectively, terrorism
fails.

Dynamic
Terrorist groups demand change, revolution, or political movement. The radical
worldview that justifies terrorism mandates drastic action to destroy or alter the
status quo. Even if the goals of a movement are reactionary in nature, they require
action to "turn back the clock" or restore some cherished value system that is
extinct. Nobody commits violent attacks on strangers or innocents to keep things
"just the way they are."

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Deliberate
Terrorism is an activity planned and intended to achieve particular goals. It is a
rationally employed, specifically selected tactic, and is not a random act. Since the
victims of terrorist violence are often of little import, with one being as good for the
terrorists' purposes as another, victim or target selection can appear random or
unprovoked. But the target will contain symbolic value or be capable of eliciting
emotional response according to the terrorists' goals. Remember that the actual
target of terrorism is not the victim of the violence, but the psychological balance

Media Exploitation
Terrorism's effects are not necessarily aimed at the victims of terrorist violence.
Victims are usually objects to be exploited by the terrorists for their effect on a third
party. In order to produce this effect, information of the attack must reach the target
audience. So any terrorist organization plans for exploitation of available media to
get the message to the right audiences. Victims are simply the first medium that
transmits the psychological impact to the larger target audience. The next step in
transmission will depend on what media is available, but it will be planned, and it will
frequently be the responsibility of a specific organization within the terrorist group
to do nothing else but exploit and control the news cycle.

Some organizations can rely on friendly or sympathetic news outlets, but this is not
necessary. News media can be manipulated by planning around the demands of the
"news cycle", and the advantage that control of the initiative gives the terrorist.
Pressures to report quickly, to "scoop" competitors, allow terrorists to present
claims or make statements that might be refuted or critically commented on if time
were available. Terrorists often provide names and details of individual victims to
control the news media through its desire to humanize or personalize a story. For
the victims of a terrorist attack, it is a certainty that the impact on the survivors (if
there are any) is of minimal importance to the terrorists. What is important is the
intended psychological impact that the news of their death or suffering will cause in
a wider audience.

Operations in Permissive Societies

Terrorists conduct more operations in societies where individual rights and civil
legal protections prevail. While terrorists may base themselves in repressive
regimes that are sympathetic to them, they usually avoid repressive governments
when conducting operations wherever possible. An exception to this case is a
repressive regime that does not have the means to enforce security measures.
Governments with effective security forces and few guaranteed civil liberties have
typically suffered much less from terrorism than liberal states with excellent security
forces. Al Qaeda has shown, however, that they will conduct operations anywhere.

Illegality of Methods
Terrorism is a criminal act. Whether the terrorist chooses to identify himself with
military terminology (as discussed under insurgencies below), or with civilian
imagery ("brotherhood", "committee", etc.), he is a criminal in both spheres. The
violations of civil criminal laws are self-evident in activities such as murder, arson,
and kidnapping regardless of the legitimacy of the government enforcing the laws.
Victimizing the innocent is criminal injustice under a dictatorship or a democracy. If
the terrorist claims that he is justified in using such violence as a military combatant,
he is a de facto war criminal under international law and the military justice systems
of most nations.

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Preparation and Support

It's important to understand that actual terrorist operations are the result of
extensive preparation and support operations. Media reporting and academic study
have mainly focused on the terrorists' goals and actions, which is precisely what the
terrorist intends. This neglects the vital but less exciting topic of preparation and
support operations. Significant effort and coordination is required to finance group
operations, procure or manufacture weapons, conduct target surveillance and
analysis, and deliver trained terrorists to the operational area. While the time and
effort expended by the terrorists may be a drop in the bucket compared to the
amounts spent to defend against them, terrorist operations can still involve large
amounts of money and groups of people. The need for dedicated support activities
and resources on simple operations are significant, and get larger the greater the
sophistication of the plan and the complexity of the target.

Goals and Motivations of Terrorists

Ideology and motivation will influence the objectives of terrorist operations,

especially regarding the casualty rate. Groups with secular ideologies and non-
religious goals will often attempt highly selective and discriminate acts of violence to
achieve a specific political aim. This often requires them to keep casualties at the
minimum amount necessary to attain the objective. This is both to avoid a backlash
that might severely damage the organization, and also maintain the appearance of a
rational group that has legitimate grievances. By limiting their attacks they reduce
the risk of undermining external political and economic support. Groups that
comprise a "wing" of an insurgency, or are affiliated with aboveground, sometimes
legitimate, political organizations often operate under these constraints. The
tensions caused by balancing these considerations are often a prime factor in the
development of splinter groups and internal factions within these organizations.

In contrast, religiously oriented and millenarian groups typically attempt to inflict as

many casualties as possible. Because of the apocalyptic frame of reference they
use, loss of life is irrelevant, and more casualties are better. Losses among their co-
religionists are of little account, because such casualties will reap the benefits of the
afterlife. Likewise, non-believers, whether they are the intended target or collateral
damage, deserve death, and killing them may be considered a moral duty. The
Kenyan bombing against the U.S. Embassy in 1998 inflicted casualties on the local
inhabitants in proportion to U.S. personnel of over twenty to one killed, and an even
greater disparity in the proportion of wounded (over 5000 Kenyans were wounded
by the blast; 95% of total casualties were non-American ). Fear of backlash rarely
concerns these groups, as it is often one of their goals to provoke overreaction by
their enemies, and hopefully widen the conflict.

The type of target selected will often reflect motivations and ideologies. For groups
professing secular political or social motivations, their targets are highly symbolic of
authority; government offices, banks, national airlines, and multinational
corporations with direct relation to the established order. Likewise, they conduct
attacks on representative individuals whom they associate with economic

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exploitation, social injustice, or political repression. While religious groups also use
much of this symbolism, there is a trend to connect it to greater physical
devastation. There also is a tendency to add religiously affiliated individuals, such as
missionaries, and religious activities, such as worship services, to the targeting
equation.

Another common form of symbolism utilized in terrorist targeting is striking on

particular anniversaries or commemorative dates. Nationalist groups may strike to
commemorate battles won or lost during a conventional struggle, whereas religious
groups may strike to mark particularly appropriate observances. Many groups will
attempt to commemorate anniversaries of successful operations, or the executions
or deaths of notable individuals related to their particular conflict. Likewise, striking
on days of particular significance to the enemy can also provide the required impact.
Since there are more events than operations, assessment of the likelihood of an
attack on a commemorative date is only useful when analyzed against the
operational pattern of a particular group or specific members of a group's
leadership cadre.

The Intent of Terrorist Groups

A terrorist group commits acts of violence to -

• Produce widespread fear

• Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause by attracting
the attention of the media
• Harass, weaken, or embarrass government security forces so that the the
government overreacts and appears repressive
• Steal or extort money and equipment, especially weapons and ammunition
vital to the operation of their group
• Destroy facilities or disrupt lines of communication in order to create doubt
that the government can provide for and protect its citizens
• Discourage foreign investments, tourism, or assistance programs that can
affect the target country’s economy and support of the government in power
• Influence government decisions, legislation, or other critical decisions
• Free prisoners
• Satisfy vengeance
• Turn the tide in a guerrilla war by forcing government security forces to
concentrate their efforts in urban areas. This allows the terrorist group to
establish itself among the local populace in rural areas

STATISTICS IN STUDYING THE TREND IN TERRORISM

Having discussed, “what terrorism is about”? , The attributes of the terrorist’s
mindsets which provoke them to actuate merciless ideas and the goals and
motivations that are standardized behind this inhuman act of violence,it is high
time,we introduce certain simple mathematical tools to analyse the trend of
terrorism in the time frame 2003-2008.

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Let us mathematically illustrate the tendencies that this heinous crime against
mankind has witnessed during 2003-2008.

For this analysis,we make use of the data pertaining to various banned/terrorist
outfits and the attacks they have given shape during the time period 2003-2008,as
labelled against them by the ministry of defence, Government of India.The data are
as enunciated under :

TERRORIST/BANNED GROUP INCIDENTS(2003-2008)

CPI(M) 67

ULFA 32

AM 15

JeM 36

HuJI 31

SIMI 8

AQ 8

JuD 14

IM 17

HuJeI 8

TeJ 1

HM 34

LeT 69

The above table illustrates the number of attacks carried out by the respective
outfits during 2003-2008.

We calculated the mean for the above distribution which came out to be 26.15

Mean=26.15

Which itself is an indicative of the dreaded situation. The above data infers that on an
average 26 terrorist attacks have taken place which were given shape by the above
mentioned groups in 6 years which implies that more than 4 major attacks have

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taken place each year on an average for the last six years which itself is the sleeve
up alert for the defence system of India.

Proceeding further we calculated the median which came out to be 17

Med=17

Since, the data set comprises of extreme values as the lowest number of incidents
registered is 1 whereas the highest being 69,the median is likely to provide a better
measure of central location than the mean. Even with the consideration of median,
the threat to the security is hardly curtailed as the average number of attacks an
year still amounts to more than 2.While the attack on November 26, 2008 at Taj hotel
Mumbai left 380 casualties and over 1300 injured, hence, an estimated occurrence
of more than 2 major incidents a year is a huge setback to the security system and a
threat to life and property alike.

The mode for the above distribution comes out to be 8

Mode=8

From the table above, it can also be inferred that the major challenge to the security
of India is internal than external. With the frequency of attacks by CPI(M) highly
active in central, eastern and south eastern belt of India, this group is proving to be a
major warning to the internal security of the territory and study shows that its area of
operation is rapidly expanding and is now trying to cover the south western India too
under its terror map.

LeT with its notorious blasts in J&K and along the line of border with few of
bombings at McMahan border line is another big threat to the internal security of
India. Their frequencies of blast have augmented in past 3 years along the border of
Pakistan.

ULFA in the North-East have also accentuated their dynamic participation in

violence as the number of incidents reported are 32 which is 4 less than the
incidents given shape by JeM,an external agency.

From the above observation it can be inferred that the distribution is positively
skewed as Mean>Med>Mode

Hence, the concentration of values is more towards the right side of the average of
the distribution

Hence, The above distribution can be represented as under :

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Where, Mean>Med>Mode

Let us now proceed to find the Standard Deviation of the above distribution. The
standard deviation on calculation comes out to be 21.79 which is mathematically a
high figure.

STDEV=21.79

Hence the extent of scatterings of the data in the above data set from the central
value is high. Had there been a consistency in the occurrence of the terrorist
incidents in the given time frame, the STDEV would have been less, but as the
STDEV for the above data set is high, it can be inferred that the occurrence of these
incidents were inconsistent, and hence, it was difficult to obtain a pattern as to
which time during a year the frequency of attacks were more and hence a proper
counter measure could not be formulated.

Let us formulate the z-scores of each of the observations pertaining to each group

ZCPI(M)=1.8

ZULFA=0.26

ZAM=-0.5

ZJeM=0.45

ZHuJI=0.22

ZSIMI=-0.83

ZAQ=-0.83

ZJuD=-0.56

ZIM=-0.41

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ZHuJeI=-0.83

ZTeJ=-1.15

ZHM=0.36

ZLeT=1.9

Hence, From above values of z-scores it can be inferred that there are no outlayers
as the z-score lies between -1.15 and 1.9.There are no values of z-score which
corresponds to either >3 or >-3.

LeT is 1.9 STDEV away from mean i.e. farthest in positive side(more) and TeJ is -
1.15 STDEV away from mean, i.e. farthest in the negative side(less than)

Now, let us compute the value of (Mean-1STDEV) and (mean+1STDEV)

The range comes out to be 4.09 and 48.67

Now, we might simply notice that the values 1,69 and 67 does not fall into this range.
Rest all the 10 values are within this range which makes 76 percentage of the total
values in the data set.

Empirical rule states that at least 68 percentage of the values will fall in the aforesaid
range which holds good in this scenario.

Now, similarly let us get the value for (Mean +2STDEV) and (Mean-2STDEV).The
range comes out to be -18.2 and 69.73.As the number of incidents can not be
negative let us confine the minimum limit to zero. Hence from the observation we
might see that all the data values fall in this range.

Empirical rule states that at least 95 percentage of the values should lie in the
aforesaid range which holds good again in this scenario.

Hence, the data in the data set are believed to approximate the positively skewed
normal distribution.

Now, let us consider a bivariate distribution. This bivariate distribution analysis will
essentially throw light on the effectiveness of the operation of IB&RAW personnel
during the year 2008.

Let, X represents the strength (in numbers) of INFORMERS cum DIRECT FIELD
OPERATION PERSONNEL of IB & RAW

And, Y represents number of major terrorist attacks in 2008.

MONTH X Y
JAN 625 1

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FEB 559 0

MARCH 521 3

APRIL 530 1

MAY 510 1
JUNE 536 0

JULY 532 2
AUG 517 1
SEP 517 4
OCT 523 4
NOV 579 1
DEC 583 1

As we see from the above table, we can generalize the performance of the IB and
RAW in the year 2008.From February to march there was decline in the strength
which gave way for 3 major attacks in march, one blast in the army camp at
Kupwada, another at Dras and an attack in CRPF camp at Beladila. On April, there
was sudden rise in strength owing to the attacks in preceding months hence the
attack dropped down to 1,maoist attack on RPF camp at Jhajha.But there after there
had been a aberrant trend that was seen

The strength kept on decreasing and hence, the attacks augmented, the IB and RAW
could come into action only on December by the time major attacks like the one in
November at Nariman point, Victoria terminal and Taj, one of the major, already took
place.

Let us find out the degree of association among these 2 variables

Using Karl-pearson’s correlation,

SDx=35.05

SDy=1.38

COV(X,Y)=-17.61

Therefore, r =-17.61/(35.05X1.38)=-0.36

From the value of r, it can be inferred that the two variables are moderately
negatively co-related.Hence,i t would not be wrong to put in question the
effectiveness of the personnel’s performance of RAW & IB to optimum the optimum
level.

Now with the data observed in 2008,

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Let N be the no. Of incidents took place in 2008.

A be the event of people being killed when an attack takes place.

B be the event of property being damaged when an attack takes place.

Now, in total of the 19 cases there were 17 cases where there had been casualties.

And in 18 cases, property has been damaged.

Hence P(A)=f/N=17/19=0.89

P(B)=f/N=18/19=0.94

Where,

f is the frequency favouring the event and N is the total number of occurence

These two events are not mutually exclusive

Hence, the chances of casualties occurring in next terrorist attacks are at a very
higher side slated to be around 89 %

And the chances that the next attack would bring in damage to the property is about
94 percent

The number of events wherein both, there have been casualties as well as damage
to property are essentially 17.

Hence, P(A intersection B)=17/19=0.89

Now,probability that in an attack there have been casualties while damage to

property has already taken place = P(A|B)=P(A intersection B)/P(B)=0.89/0.94=0.95

And the chances of vice versa is=P(B|A)=P(A intersection B)/P(A)=0.89/0.89=1

THIS IS ALMOST SURE!

Hence, statistically there is a lot that can be predicted about the future. Let us see
what it would look like based on our evaluation and input by Terrorism expert, IB,
Mr.Gehlot

Future Trends in Terrorism

As a conflict method that has survived and evolved through several millennia to
flourish in the modern information age, terrorism continues to adapt to meet the
challenges of emerging forms of conflict, and exploit developments in technology
and society. Terrorism has demonstrated increasing abilities to adapt to counter-
terrorism measures and political failure. Terrorists are developing new capabilities

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of attack and improving the efficiency of existing methods. Additionally, terrorist

groups have shown significant progress in escaping from a subordinate role in
nation-state conflicts, and becoming prominent as international influences in their
own right. They are becoming more integrated with other sub-state entities, such as
criminal organizations and legitimately chartered corporations, and are gradually
assuming a measure of control and identity with national governments

Adaptive Capabilities of Terror Groups

Terrorists have shown the ability to adapt to the techniques and methods of counter-
terror agencies and intelligence organizations over the long term. The
decentralization of the network form of organization is an example of this. Adopted
to reduce the disruption caused by the loss of key links in a chain of command, a
network organization also complicates the tasks of security forces, and reduces
predictability of operations.

Terrorists have also been quick to use new technologies, and adapt existing ones to
their uses. The debate over privacy of computer data was largely spurred by the
specter of terrorists planning and communicating with encrypted data beyond law
enforcement's ability to intercept or decode this data. To exchange information,
terrorists have exploited disposable cellular phones, over the counter long-distance
calling cards, Internet cafes, and other means of anonymous communications.
Embedding information in digital pictures and graphics is another innovation
employed to enable the clandestine global communication that modern terrorists
require.

Terrorists have also demonstrated significant resiliency after disruption by counter-

terrorist action. Some groups have redefined themselves after being defeated or
being forced into dormancy. The Shining Path of Peru (Sendero Luminosa) lost its
leadership cadre and founding leader to counter-terrorism efforts by the Peruvian
government in 1993. The immediate result was severe degradation in the operational
capabilities of the group. However, the Shining Path has returned to rural operations
and organization in order to reconstitute itself. Although not the threat that it was,
the group remains in being, and could exploit further unrest or governmental
weakness in Peru to continue its renewal.

In Italy, the Red Brigades (Brigate Rossi) gradually lapsed into inactivity due to
governmental action and a changing political situation. However, a decade after the
supposed demise of the Red Brigades, a new group called the Anti-Capitalist Nuclei
emerged exhibiting a continuity of symbols, styles of communiqués, and potentially
some personnel from the original Red Brigade organization. This ability to
perpetuate ideology and symbology during a significant period of dormancy, and re-
emerge under favorable conditions demonstrates the durability of terrorism as a
threat to modern societies.

Increasing Capabilities of Terrorists

Terrorists are improving their sophistication and abilities in virtually all aspects of
their operations and support. The aggressive use of modern technology for
information management, communication and intelligence has increased the
efficiency of these activities. Weapons technology has become more increasingly

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available, and the purchasing power of terrorist organizations is on the rise. The
ready availability of both technology and trained personnel to operate it for any
client with sufficient cash allows the well-funded terrorist to equal or exceed the
sophistication of governmental counter-measures.

Likewise, due to the increase in information outlets, and competition with increasing
numbers of other messages, terrorism now requires a greatly increased amount of
violence or novelty to attract the attention it requires. The tendency of major media
to compete for ratings and the subsequent revenue realized from increases in their
audience size and share produces pressures on terrorists to increase the impact
and violence of their actions to take advantage of this sensationalism.

Today, most experts believe that certain parts of the Middle East, Pakistan and
Afghanistan are turning out to be the main power centers for terrorism. Decades of
lawlessness and corruption have seen Islamic terrorist groups fill the power vaccum
in this region and continue to turn out an alarming number of religiously motivated
terrorists.

THANK YOU

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APPENDICES

1. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE PROJECT

IB Intelligence bureau

RAW Research & Analysis Wing

CPI(M) Communist Party of

India(Maoist)

ULFA United Liberation Front of

Assam

AM Al Mansurian

LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba

JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed

HuJI Harkat-ul-jihad-Islami

SIMI Students Islamic Movement of

India

AQ Al-Qaeda

JuD Jamat-ud-Dawa

IM Indian Mujahideen

HuJeI Harkat-ul-Jihad_e-islami

TeJ Tehrik-e-Jaffiria

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HM Hizbul mujaideen

SDx Standard deviation of x

SDy Standard deviation of y

COV COVARIANCE

STDEV Standard deviation

Med Median

2. DEFINITIONS

a) Z-score : The standard score is

where:

x is a raw score to be standardized;

µ is the mean of the population;
σ is the standard deviation of the population.

The quantity z represents the distance between the raw score and the
population mean in units of the standard deviation. z is negative when the raw
score is below the mean, positive when above.

b)Mean : The arithmetic mean is the "standard" average, often simply called
the "mean".

Where:

N is the number of observation

Xi is the ith observation

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c)Standard deviation:

Where : xi-u represents the gap from the mean

And n is the number of observation. N=n-1

d)covariance: The covariance between two real-valued random variables X and Y, with
expected values and is defined as

e)Correlation:

Degree of relationship between the variables under study

f) Probability:

It is a numerical measure of the possible outcomes of a non-deterministic

experiment.

3.REFERENCES
a)Crime journal

b)Gazette of India

c)The Hindu

d) Web Portals

-Naxalwatch.blogshot.com

-Democratic.undergronud.com

-world-check.com

-worldpress.com

-dawn.com

-indiamart.news.com

-news.outlookindia.com

-Bing.com

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-Google.com

-terrorwatch.com

-cdi.org

-fas.org/irp/world/india/ib

e) Terrorism and homeland security : An introduction-Jonathan R.White

f) Inside Terrorism- Bruce Hoffman

g) Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse- Bard O'Neill

h)Oxford English Lexicon

i)26/11 commission report

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