Professional Documents
Culture Documents
5 4 3 2 l
193-ddl
2001016548
TRANSLATORS' NOTE
CHAPTER
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1. A
"GREAT AND
WONDERFUL WAR"
CHAPTER
2.
\;
ll
15
18
24
27
29
36
40
44
46
48
50
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
3.
GERMANS, EUROPEANS,
GYPSIES, AND PAPUANS
CHAPTER
4.
5.
71
77
80
84
88
92
95
97
100
I 03
WAR, REVOLUTION,
AND CON SPIRA CY
CHAPTER
51
55
117
118
123
126
l 30
138
Contents
2. Nietzsche, the Will to Power, and the Struggle
against Nihilism
3. Mechanization and Standardization: Heidegger and Jaspers
4. Totality, Calculative Thought, and Standardization
CHAPTER
6.
144
149
155
1.
2.
3.
4.
CHAPTER
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
7.
165
169
174
178
182
187
192
An Apolitical Philosopher?
Two Opposed Criticisms of Modernity
Horkheimcr, Adorno, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment
Husserl, Modernity, and the Enlightenment
Heidegger, Croce, Gentile, and Liberalism
Liberal Tradition and the Criticism of Modernity
Radical Antimodernism and Nonactuality:
Nietzsche and Heidegger
Heidegger and His Time
206
211
214
219
221
223
228
233
BIBLIOGRAPHY
241
INDEX
251
TRANSLATORS' NOTE
n the original edition of this work most of the literature cited was translated into Italian directly by Professor Losurdo himself. Only rarely, he
notes, were the Italian translations consulted and modified for coherency
within the text. Given this, and given the range of the literature cited, it
has not proven feasible to undertake the bibliographical task of tracing
English translations of works originating in other languages and locating
the passages quoted by Professor Lostmio. For this reason, we have
retained the author's references to German, French, and Italian \vorks, for
example, but have, as far as possible, cited the English editions of works
originally written in that language. Where the standard English translations were consulted, bibliographical information has been included.
We \vish to thank Professor Losurdo for his invaluable assistance, and
our colleague Mark Miscovich for his carefol reading of the m;rnuscript.
Of course we accept sole responsibility for any .~hortcomings.
Jon
''GREAT AND
WONDERFUL WAR''
1.
he outbreak of the First World War was perceived by more than just
a few European intellectuals as the confirmation of the irreversible
crisis, not only of historic~! materialism, but of every "'unilateral, naturalisric way of thinking and feeling" as well-the expression, we will see,
is Husserl's. In the presence of this conflict, considered by a large political press to be a clash of opposed ideals and world visions, even as a religious and holy war, a Glaz1bm.ikrir;!},1 the economic and material
approach to the historical world was revealing its bankruptcy. What point
was there in continuing to speak of class struggle when faced with a conflict that seemed to transcend every material dimension? What were mere
material interests when faced with a war that seemed to demonstrate the
supcrioriry of the spiritual over the economical, and ho\\' relevant could
those material inrcrcsts be in the presence of a national community wonderfully and intimately llllitcd in the hour of danger:
Such experiences more often than not stray into the mystical. Stefan
Zweig provides a very lJO\vcrful description of the atmosphere in Vienna
immediately preceding the outbreak of the war:
As ne\'er before, thousands-hundreds of rhous:mds-fdt what they
should have felt in peacetime; that they belonged to a great nation ....
Each one wa.s called upon to cast his infinitesimal sdf into the glowing
mass, and there to be purified of all selfishness. All differences of class,
ll
12
religion and language were washed away by the great tee.ling of !Tater
niry.... Each individual experienced an exalrarion of his e.go; he was
no longer the isolated person of former times; he telt incorporated into
the mass, he was a part of rhe people, and his person, his hitherto unno
ticed person had been given meaning.2
[ DaSt:in J. 6
13
14
15
socialism of the State and of the narion"-an expression that will be used
by Benedetto Croce-triumphs nor only over Marxist sm'ialism, but
over liberalism and democracy as well. What seems to crystallize, aside
from the evenrs of the war, is the opposition between a "community"
heavily imbued-as Manh observes-with "aristocratic" and "ritual"
(kttltisch) elements, and a ".~ociety" not only democratic, but above all
profane. This latter society finds its most fulfilling and most repugnant
expression in Marxist socialism, which, even more than liberalism and
democracy, is alien to the authentic German national spirit.2
2.
16
A "'Socialism of the State and of the narion," forged upon the experience of military discipline and of war: this category so dear to Croce is
reminiscent of similar ones that were in vogue in Germany at the time:
"state socialism," "National Socialism," and the "socialism of war." The
latter rwo rder back to Johann Plcnge, who, even by way of the tide of
one of his books, was one of the principal figures involved in the juxtaposition of tJ1e "ideas of 1914" to the "ideas of 1789. "24 Srill, other
expressions in Croce's letter (cited above) merit further consideration.
"Regeneration of the present social life": more is expected of the war
than just military \ictory and some advantages in international politics.
And "historical tradition": war and danger stimulate an anxious search
for, and veneration of, one's roots in an organic community christened
by conflict (we.'ll see later the decisive role that the theme of "historicity," which be<irs an analogous meaning to "historical tradition," has
in German K1itg.rideologie).
Not only in Ge.rmany, therefore, but in all of the waning nations,
even in the most liberal ones, the unceasing call to action favors or renders inevitable the falling back upon a communal ideology able to
17
18
the "blood line" that ties and embraces all of its citizens together, but he
also defines and exalts war as an "absolute act": "through pain the
human soul is purified and rises to irs destiny," grasping the authentic
"spiritual reality {that J is not stagnanc water, bur. a burning flame. "29
These themes recall those largely present in German culture. Such
analogies, however, must not be generalized or exaggerated. The difterences between them are even more notable, and not only because of the
varying importance artribmed to the exaltation of Genuinschaft, which
in Germ.my has a much longer and established history behind it that
takes on particularly disturbing connotati.ons. There is another, more.
important diflerence. Croce, despite his commitment to promote Italian
patriotism, refuses ro ideologize war in any \Vay, and instead limits himself to considering it an expression of the struggle between different and
opposed vit.al forces and wills tO power. In France, on the other hand,
the war is propagated, by a huge lineup of imclkctuals among others, as
a sort of crusade for democracy and for the ideals of the French Revolution. As for Germany, there arc many different justifications for the war:
some of them, inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, exalt the will to power;
others highlight the necessity to defend or affirm national honor,
autonomy and dignity, and the cultural and material interests of the
coumry. Along with these, we find another theme, which bears notable
significance: the juxtaposition of the spiritual transfiguration of the war
and of the proximity of death to the banality, spiritual poverty, and
philistinism characteristic of everyday lite.
3.
19
here, life still produces many new things that make it worth living."~o
Actually, the military hospital seems to be a privileged point for observation precisely because of the daily drama that unfolds there:
Here we have proven that we are a grc.ar people of culture [rin,17r1;1/.?cs
KultuiPO/k]: men who live right in rhe middle of a refined culture and
then, outside of their natural cnvironmenr, are able to rise and meet the
horrors of war (iris certainly not a fr.at for a Negro from Senegal!) and
vet return home with dignity, like the great majority of our people: rhis
is whar it means to be aurhentk men [ echtes Afcnschentums].3 1
The experience and the tension of the war seem to even improve
Weber's health. After a long, hard day at work, even the hours of rest and
relaxation at home end up revolving around the theme of war. Marianne
reports:
Otten, injured friends return from the front for some time and are our
guests. They are the cenrer of atten!ion. They can nor srop telling sto
rie.s. In every one of them, in fact, the events are mirrored in a different
way; every one of them has a glow of happiness that comes from giving
rheir lives and dedicating themselves to a high goal. The expression on
those stern faces is magnificent. Some of them-still adolescents just a
short time ago-in uniform now look more like men. For the most part
the features of soldiers on lca\'e appear strangely tense: they reve.al a
constant internal vigilance, severe responsihility and the expt'.ricnce of
being close. to dearh.32
Here, the theme of community, of "dedication to a higher goal," is
fused with the idea of the formative, pedagogical efficacy of "being close
ro death." Certainly, it would be possible to trace signs of this theme in
the war ideologies of the Entente Powers as well, but in German culture
this idea would spread uniquely and take on a parricular significance.
One could almost say that proximity to death is now an integral pan of
authentic Bildung: A classic motif is revisited and reinterpreted in light
of the war..Marianne Weber continues evoking the war years: "The first
Christmas during the war was profoundly immersed in love, poetry and
solemnity." Max Weber addresses some soldiers on leave, g:lthe.red
around the Christmas tree:
He knows that they have Ill re.turn ro the front. His voice is like rhc
sound of an organ. He spe.aks of the greatness of death in battle. ln
20
everyda)' lite, Je,1th comes to us incomprehensible., like a destiny contrary to reason, and out of which iris impossible to make any sense. \Ve
must simply endure ir. But every one of you knows whar he is dying for
when he is struck br fare. Those who tall on rhe battlefield arc the seed~
of the ti.mire. Dying heroically for the liber1y and honor of our people
is the highest foat, and it serves as an example for our children and our
diildren 's children.-l.l
This speech is only partially similar to the usual calls fur sacrifice
characteristic of the war rhetoric in every country. The battlefield
becomes the privileged place to grasp the true meaning of life; the proximity of death impedes its usual repression, and is therefore able to
endow human existence with a profoundness and an intensity otherwise
unattainable.
These themes emerge even more clearly in a lecture given by
Edmund Husserl in November of 1917, in which the influence of war
on spiritual life is examined (""this war, chis destiny of our German
nation, great and severe beyond all imagination"):
Ideas and ideals are again in motion, and again find an open heart to
welcome them. The unilateral, naturalistic way of thinking and feeling
loses its force. This critical situation and death[ Not und Tod] arc now
our educarors. For years now death has been nothing exceptional; you
can no longer hide it behind pompous and solemn conventions,
bencarh piks of wreaths, falsi~1 ing it in irs stern majesty. Death has once
again regained its original sacred right. It is here again ro remind one
of eterniry. And rims again we have developed organs to see German
idealism. 34
The war, then, seems to establish itself as an opportune, healthy and
indispensable meditatio morti.r., it is a sort of spiritual exercise, which
allows one to escape from the banality and waste of daily life and to
regain the true meaning of life.
This is also the opinion of Georg Simmcl, and of Schcler. The former
celebrates the "absolute situation" (absolute Sitttatiim) found in war ( :md
in the proximity to death that comes with it). Beyond the banality of daily
life, beyond the "compromise" and "point of view of quanriry," this
,.absolute situation" demands an "absolute decision" (absolute Ent.rcheidtt~~IJ), and reveals the power of "ideas" as "utmost urgency," even to
those who "have never heeded or fathomed the word idea."35 A~ for
Schelcr: "War reestablishes in our consciousness the true, realistic rela-
2I
rionship between life and dearh." It puts an end to the blindness, or rather
the voluntary blindness, with which we face death, ending the "repression and concealment" that was carried out through "the deceptive veil of
a vital praxis that had become a dull habir."36 Mcditatit> mortis is once
more the result of the "metaphysics of war" theorized by Schder.'7
But in confirmation of how deeply the theme of war as a meditatio
m.ortis is rooted in German culture, we have recourse to Sigmun_d Freud:
on the whole he was certainly far from the Krie.gsidco/ogic, but in 19 l 5
he wrote an essay profoundly influenced by the debate and the spirit of
the time. It is an essay which is therefore appropriate to quote at length:
to
Lite is impoverished, loses interesr if you cannot risk that which is the
highest stake, that is, life itself. ... The tendency to exclude death from
the ledger oflifc has thus imposed upon us many other deprivations and
exclusions. And yet, the Hanseatk motto went: N1wiga1'e nccessc est,
riverc non necesse! Ir is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live!
Freud sees war as the moment of the destruction of art.ificc and the
return to the authentic: "It eliminates the layers of sediment deposited
in us by civilization and it allows the primitive man to reappear." It is a
lesson not to forget. War does not allow itself to be eliminated. "The
problem that we are now faced with is this: wouldn't it be better for us
to give in, to resign ourselves to war.... Wouldn't it he preferable to
restore death, in reality and in our mind, to its rightful place ... ?" For
22
Freud there is no doubt: "Si i1is Pitam, parii mortem. If you want to be
able to endure lite, be ready to accept dcath."39
Ludwig Wittgenstein is an exception. After enlisting as a volunteer
at the outbreak of the war, he is immediately faced with the deepest disappointment. He feels himself surrounded by hate and overall "vulgarity "40 (the working-class troops were dratted and felt no sympathy for
the volunteers, mostly intellectuals from bourgeois families); he even
contemplates suicide.4L And yet, in Wittgenstein as well, contact with
death seems to serve a purifying and pedagogical function: "Now I
might have the possibility to be a decent person, because I find myself
face-to-face with dcath."42 And: "Maybe being dose to death will bring
me the light oflite."43 Ami finally: "Only death gives meaning to life."44
In turn, during the First World War, Thomas Mann highlights the
"religious elevation, the deeper knowledge and nobility of the soul"
whic.h can develop from being "constantly, for years, close to death."
Once again, we find the theme of death as an element of Bi/dung: "The
poor wife of the warrior who comes back from the world will welcome
a difterem man from the one she parted with." In d1is sense, the result
of war can well be a "superior humanity" (hohcie Menschlichkcit), an
"elevation, a maturity, a nobilization of the human. "45 This net spiritual
profit btings about an attitude tmvard death that excludes tear and
repression. Despite its horrors, war can produce ".freedom, freedom and
religious serenity, a detached attitude toward life, and the ability to hover
above tear and hope, which is undoubtedly the opposite of moral degradation, and thus, the overcoming of death. "46 It is within this same context that one can locate the theme of "sympathy with death" ( Sympathic
mit dem Ii1de), seen as "the formula and the fondamental resolution of
every romanticism," or rather as "the last n>ord of romanticism." Precisely because of this, sympathy for death is profoundly alien to Western
Zivilisation, a civilization based completely on the superficial faith in
"progress," "reason," and "happiness"; that is, fr.ltmded upon the
repression of the negative aspects of existence, and guilty, in the final
analyis, of "treason to the Cross" ( Verrat ain Kreuz). 47
In the Kricgsidealn._ljic, the nzeditatio morti.c is a central theme: It is
considered characteristic of the depth of the German soul, but alien to
the superficiality of the West. A life that has re.moved the. thought of
death-observes Freud-"becomes empty, as insipid as an American
flirt, in which it is clear from the very beginning that nothing must
happen, as opposed to a European love affair, where the two are contin-
23
uously conscious of the. serious consequences which they may face. " 48
The intensity of the vital experience of war and its proximity to death is
thus correlated to the intensity of a truly erotic expe1ience. Even more
significant, however, is that the repression of death, and life's consequent
dullness, occurs outside of Europe. Explicit reference is made to
America, but England is probably alluded to as well; regardless, both are
contrasted to continental Europe, above all to Germany. For his part,
Husserl sees the waning of the "unilateral and naturalistic W;ly of
thinking and feeling" (caused by war and by the expc1ience of death),
and the rebirth of"German idealism," particularly Fichte's, as happening
concomitantly.49 Likewise, Simmcl, in attributing to war the merit of
resroring the power of "ideas" to their original importance, recalls Kant:
What reemerges is the juxtaposition of Germany to her enemies' materi
ali.sm, narur-alism, superficiality, and lack of any spiritual, metaphysical, or
religious depth.so This theme will later find a cruder formulation in the
antithesis, dear to Werner Sombart, between German "heroes," and pri
marily British "merchants."
In light of all this one can understand the judgement made of Germany by the French staresman Georges Clemenceau in the years
ben.veen the tvilO world wars:
It is human nature ro love life. Ge.rmans do nor have this instinct ....
On the contrary, they are. imbued wirh a morbid, satanic nostalgia for
death. How the)' love death, rhese people! Quivering, as if drunk, and
with an ecstatic smile, they look upon death as a sort of divinity....
Even war for them is a pact with de<1th.51
The image Germany creates of her soul and of her essence serves as
an example even for her enemies, but with a reversed value judgment, of
course. In both cases, either a real historical tendency, or the dominating
ideology of a specific moment is petrified in a rigid national stereotype
which leaves little leeway for exceptions and alterations. One should not
forget, however, that this exaltation of war and of the proximity of death
as a sort of spiritual exercise meets resistance even in Germany and
within German-speaking cultures. Among the authors cired above,
included are those who distance themselves from the positions expressed
during the First World War. Wittgenstein does not even need to wait for
the end of the conflict to realize that the war, far from representing a
moment of spiritual development through medi:tatio mortis, really signifies "the complete victory of materialism and the waning of every sense
24
of good and evil. "52 It is a judgement that can be likened to the definition that Gyikgy Lukacs, applying one of Fichte's formulas, gives of his
age: the epoch of "fulfilled sinfulness."53 Lukacs's definition (as well as
Wittgenstein's) represents the most radical antithesis to the overwhelming veneration of war and the proximity of death in spiritual and
edifying tones, despite the fact that this antithesis is itself formulated in
a spirirualistic language. It is not by chance that Marianne Weber, who
better represents the German intellectual position, reproaches Lukacs for
a sort of innate spiritual insensitivity to the. "greatness" of war. 54
4.
SACRIFICE, DEATH,
AND THE GEMEINSCHAFT
25
who were about to return to the front. Certainly, in the cext of the ReliJJionssoziolo._qfr, what is highlighted is d1e sense that death in war is not the
:,bject of kmmrledge but rather the object of belie( But men Weber the
politician, animated by nationalistic pas_<;ion, can go well beyond the caution
of Weber the scientist, who must remain faithfol to value neutrality. And
when Weber, in the same context, adds that war kindles a sense of solidarity
with "those in need" that "breaks all the barriers of natural associations"
( natur...JJegebene Verbdnde),5li we cannot help but recall the above-mentioned observation made by Marianne Weber regarding the military hospital, where the soldiers and the injured people of the working class enjoyed
more care and attention than they had ever experienced before.
The intertwining of the themes of "community" and of "death" produces in Germany a particularly turbid and explosive ideological mixrnre.
In d1is context, the central figure is undoubtedly Ernst Hinger. In his
works, the theme of the "proximity of death" is radicalized and reiterated
in countless variations. The proximity to death makes life "more painful,"
but also "'s\veeter"; the "baptism of fire" becomes a true, bona fide celebration, a source of intoxication.5 7 Without a doubt, life is richer, more
intense, and more dazzling precisely where death is raging.58
Clemenceau's judgement becomes a clear, rigorous diagnosis when
applied to Ernst hinger: Death rises ro the level of the divine, and the
sacred rite acred out in its honor produces not only intoxication but also
"ccst;tsy." "This condition, which is typical of great .~aints, poets, and
lovers, is also accorded to the courageous"; the wanior is "made one
with the whole, and races tmvard the dark doors of death like a bullet
toward its target. "59 Participation in this sacred rite becomes the necessary prerequisite for participating in the authentic community. At the
front, "one great destiny carries tLs on the same wave. For once. we acted
wgether as a single organism [ OrganismusJ facing che hostile external
world, men who, despite. their little problems, sorrows and joys, were
bound together by a higher goal. "60 The exaltation of rhe "ritualistic
community" (kultisch GemcinscJ1aft), denounced by Thomas Mann afrer
the war as the central element of the Kriegsideolo..11ic, clearly revolves
around dcath,61 sacrifice,<>2 and blood. One can understand, then, why
for the Jiinger brothers this celebrated community is first of all a "warlike community,"6.:; and this kriegische Gemcinschaft, in turn, tends to
idenrify itself as a "community of blood" (Blut._Jfeitu:inschaft),<>4 a community christened by the blood spilt in war, and which easily, though not
necessarily, takc.s on racial or racist connotations.
26
At chis point, Nazism will inherit the Kric~qsideologie. Tne Nazi rise
to power in !933 is regarded by more than a few representatives of the
new regime, both militants and sympathizers, as a remake of the wonderful, communal experience of !914; "Suddenly, everything that had
divided the people (parries and unions) collapsed. "65 Didn't Wilhelm II,
when the first world war broke out, declare that. he no longer knew any
parties but the German ones? The description of Adolf Hitler's rise to
power rhus continues:
faeryone gachered close around that community, rhar parry which they
had seen struggle and win. We rhus experie.nced that wonderfol, unrestraiuable gathering of all the members of the people around the com
munity. It is perhaps the mpst sublime event of this age, che most powerfol thing known to history. We see a people, who for centuries had
been divided into difkrent religions, inro social classes, into formers
and ciry dwelkrs, rush to unite: now rhcrc arc no more barriers, all of
the walls collapse.66
27
And yet, thi.s sort of mystk community, strongly opposed not only
marerial interests, but also w "rationality," which is itself in turn considered susceptible to vulgar and "earthly" contaminations, is at the
same time decisively warlike and based upon the. krirgc1-ische Gcnieinscbaft model. In 1934, Paul Joseph Goebbels hails the German soldiers
as those who "brought back from the trenches a new way of thinking.
During thar time of terrible sacrifices and dangers, they experienced a
new type of community, one which could never have been known in
times of happiness"; from the experience of death, and of "equality" in
the face of death, arises the solemn commitment not to rokrate, above
all in "rimes of danger," a breach among the peoplc. 6 9 Thanks to its
intrinsic warlike nature, the "community of people" (or "socialism")
identifies itself with "camaraderie": This is not only Goebbels's conclusion; it is also shared by another Nazi leader, Robert Ley, whom Sombart quotes and agrees with.70 Nazism inhe1its, then, a key word from
the Krie.._11sideolo~qie. In fact, in 1936, a new expression is even coined, the
"community of the front" (Front11enzeinsclmft).71 And this finds its foundation in the "spirit of the soldier of the front" (Geist des Frontkarnpfutums) and in the "education of the front" ( frontl1ildun~q)72 Every ambiguity, not only those raised by Sombart, is finally clarified.
to
5.
We have thus seen the community configure itself as a warlike community. Here again is a new charge against Gesellscha.ft: It is seen as synony
mous with the banal search for security and tranquillity rypica.I of the
bourgeois world (to which Marxism and the workers' movement arc
associated).73 "In the humanitarian bourgeois society, struggk is something which should not exist, or at best something \Vhich requires a justification. "74 Sombart's favorite theme reemerges: the clash between
"heroes" and "merchants." It is a theme that, though stripped of every
vitalistic and warlike exaggeration, found an echo even in Thomas Mann
during the war: "J\fankind" would be incomplete if it were not for the
figure of the "warrior" (Krieger), if the. only choice were between "merchants and literati. " 7 5 Condemned was the "bourgeois State of security,
the welfare State" that presumed to banish the "terrible" ( das Fu.rchtbare) and "elementary" (das Elementnrc) aspects oflik by establishing; a
"green, pastoral happiness," and thus "'a safe, danger-free, comfi:.>rtable,
28
29
6. OBEYING DESTINY
The rheroric of living dangerously culminates with the evocation of
"destiny": For Spengler, Schicksal is the opposite of "causality" and of a
rationality based upon causality, or upon clearcut categories. Therefore,
destiny is perceived as the antithesis both of "mechanical thought" and
of any rationality which presumes to be. easily expressed or communicable or, even worse, reducible to a "calculation."89 In this sense, destiny "does not allow itself to be defined," "it can only be lived"; it always
entails a margin of "secrecy," inaccessible to scientific investigation.
Above all, "destiny cannot be calculated. " 9 0 The conrrast between rationality and destiny is also present in Weber: "[D]cstill)\ certainly nor 'science' dominates" over the rationally indeterminable struggles between
contrasting values and world visions (for example., "between the value of
German versus French culttm:").91 Cerra.inly, thi.5 juxtaposition lacks
Spengler's irrational pathos. The fac.t remains that for Weber Germany
entered the war disregarding any calculations as ro the outcome of the
conflict, but rather, as we all know, in order ro defend her "honor" and
to "obey her destiny."92
Thomas Mann's terms are almost the same with regard to obeying
destiny: By involving herself "in the terrible struggle, temerarious and
irrational in the most powerful sense of the word, a struggle against the
civilization of the Entente powers," Germany gave proof of "her truly
Germanic obedience to her destiny." 9 3 Schicksal, therefore, is also
opposed to Zivilisation (which is identified with rationality and calculative thought). One can understand, then, why, at the beginning of the
war, Thorna5 Mann opposes Voltaire and Frederick II, whom he sees as
the respective symbols of France and Germany: the former as the rcpre
sentativc of "dry clarity," and the latter a.s the representative of "destiny
among the clouds." 9 4 Clearly, another key term of the Krie...qsidcola,_11ie
has emerged. For Spengler, Scbicksal is synonymous with the "tragic
conception oflife. " 9 5 For Sombart, it is the merchants who arc trying to
expunge "dcsr.iny" from their lives, or to neutralize it through the
grotesque attempt to make "business deals" vith it.96 hinger uses similar terms: The time demands courage, and "having courage means rising
to meet destiny. "97
The word in que.stion has many other meanings beyond the one
already indicated, though they can only be hinted at here. As the war
makes dear, it signifies the transccnde11Ce of the community be.yond the
30
limits of the individual. With Ernst Hinger, we see the "one great destiny" that unin.:s the soldiers of the front into an "organism." In 1916,
Weber observes in more moderate terms: "Woman is rooted in the soil
of German destiny [ drntsches Schicksa.l], and her fate [ Geschick], too,
depends on how the war ends."98 If Weber has rhe war situation foremost in mind, Ji.inger instead proceeds to make a general and radical
contrast between those societies founded upon a "contractual and revocable relationship," and those founded upon "destiny" (Schicksali. The
latter society's ties are indissoluble through life and death.99 In this
sense, the pathos of destiny is closely linked, not only to chc pathos of
dearh and danger, btit also to thar of the community. To deny the
Gemeinschaft-writes Franz Bohm, one of the Third Reich's most noted
ideologists-means to deny "common destiny" and a "sense of sacrifice. "100 Among the various meanings of the term "community," Sombart, quoting Grimm, mentions the ''community of destiny. "101 One
can better understand, then, why, according to Weber, the United States
lacks "historic destiny," and why in Spengler's eyes, both the United
States and the USSR lack "the authentic.ally tragic historical clement, the
great destiny which for centu1ics has educated and deepened the soul of
Western people," and above all the German people (cf. infra, chap. 6,
5 ). For Spengler, moreover, Zii1ili.1ation, giving primacy to the city
over the countryside, and consequently freeing itself from the "soil"
( Bodm) and be,orning "rootless," marks the disappearance of "destiny"
and the prevalence of mere "causality," that is, of calculative thought. !02
"Destiny" is the secular, millenarian saga of battles against danger and
death carried out by a community united by an intimate ideal bond, and
sometimes, in the most radical versions of this ideology, by an indissoluble tie to "soil," and even to "blood and soil."
Nazism inherits this brutal version of the Krit:gsideolo,,tJic's conception of destiny. The most significant role of the "education of the
front"-writes Ernst Krieck in 1934-is the perception of the "viJlkt"sch
totality as destiny"; it is the people's "overpersonal, viral connection
which emerges as the realm of their destiny." 103 Symptomatic is the fact
that the bitter battle that develops in the Nazi camp between friends and
adversaries of Heidegger revolves precisely armmd the category of "des
tiny," with the former group busy demonstrating how it is a central point
in Sein und Zcit, and the latter, instead, denouncing its abscncc.104
3l
NOTES
I. Werner Sombart, Hiindler und Heiden: Pati-iotischc Gcsinntmgcn
(Mi.inchen-Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1915), p. 3.
2. Eric J. Leed, No Man's Liind: Comba.t and Identity in World lfar I
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 42-43.
3. Max Weber, Deutsch/ands weltpolitischc LaJJC (OcLober 27, 1916); and
Zur Polirik im Weltkrie._q: Schriftcn und Reden 1914-1918. eds. W. J. Mommsen
and G. Hubinger (Tiibinge.n: J.C. B. Mohr. 1988), pp. 34lff
4. Max Weber, Ander Schwc/le des dritten K riegsjalmes (August l, l 916 );
and Zui Politik im J.Wltkrieg, p. 334.
5. Marianne Weber, Max lwber: Ein Lcb1msbild <Tiibingen, 1926 ). pp.
527' 530, 536.
6. Ibid., p. 529.
7. Ibid., p. 526.
8. Leed, No Man's Land, p. 43. Also in Max Schcler, "Der Genius des
Krieges und der demsche Krieg" ( 1915 ), in Gesammclu W.:-rkc, vol. 4, ed. Man
fred S. Fring.~ (BernMtinchen, 1982); c[ also Hanna Hatkeshrink, Unknown
Germany: An Inner Chronicle ofthe First World War Based on Letter.< and Dim-ies
(New Haven, 1948), p. 37.
9. The letter is now in Edmund Husserl, At({Siitzt und Von1t(qe (19111921), H11sserlian11, vol. 25, eds. Thoma~ Nenon and Hans R. Sepp (Den Haag,
1987), p. 293.
10. George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldfrn: Res/Japing the Memory ~(the Wiwld
Wnrs(Ncw York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 65.
11. Alan J. P. Taylor, En~qlislJ Hisror.v 1914-1945 {Oxford, 1965 j, pp. 95-97.
12. Leed, No Alan's !.,and, p. 44.
13. Weber, Max WebtT, p. 521.
14. Marianne Weber, "Fichtes Sozialismus und scin Vcrhalmis zur
Marx'schen Doktrin" (1900), in Hans Lindau and .Marianne Weber, Srhriftm
z11 ]. G. Fichtes Suzialphilosophie, eds. Hans M. Baumgarrner and Wilhelm G.
Jacobs (Hildesheim, 1987), pp. 96, 100, 113, 115.
l 5. Ibid., p. 106n. 2.
) 6. Thomas l\fann, "Kultur und Sozialismus" ( 1928 ), in Essa~vs, vol. 2, ed.
Hermann Kurzke (Frankfurt a.M., 1986 ), p. 96.
17. Ioid., pp. 99-101.
18. Schekr, "Der Genius des Krieges," p. 249.
19. See Domenico Losurdo, La catam-ofc defilr Gc1m.111ia c l'immn:.rfiuc
di Ht;11el (Milano: Guerini c associati, l 987), p . .=\9.
20. Mann, "Kulrur und Sozialisrnus,"pp. 98-100.
2 l. Benedetto Croce, Materialisino storico t:d economia marxism ( Rari,
197:1 ), pp. xii-xi\'.
32
33
34
35
T W 0
WAR, COMMUNITY,
AND DEATH
Jaspers and Heid(q_JJer
){Te should now a:k. ou.rselvcs_ if and to ~hat extent the central
of the Kru;._11ndcoln..qte ( commumry, death, danger, des-
V V themes
tiny), which were later radicalized and inherited by Nazism, arc present
also in the work of important twentieth-century philosophers such as
Karl Jaspers and Heidegger. Let us start with Jaspers. In what i.s considered his main work, Philosophic, written in 1932, he explicitly exalts the
"cmuaraderie that is created in war [and that] becomes imc1mditiona.f
loyalty. "l He repeatedly insists on the "loyalty to or(fJins, " 1 to "historicity": in order to realize one's authenticity, "the only possible way
... is to truly exist in one's hisroricity," and therefore "in dee.ermined
and irreplaceable relationships of loyalty. "3 A few decades later, Jaspers
himself will point out the fact that he was educated under the banner of
"loyalty and reverence for tradition. "4 But to return to the l 932 text: "I
would betray myself if I betrayed others, if I wasn't determined co
unconditiona/(v accept my people, my parents, and my love, since it is to
them that I owe myself. "5 "Unconditional loyalty" to one's community,
to one's "pc.ople," to onc.'s "historicity," is at the same time the acceptance of a common "destiny" ( Schicksal): "I immerse myself in my determined historicity.... Tnming myself to my hismriciry, I perceive des
tiny not only externally but, in amor .fati, as my own. "6
By starting from the pathos of historicit~', one can also understand
the juxtaposition of "community" and "society," which, although not
36
37
38
sory, given chat the only way to access the divine "is to truly exist within
one's historicity."
It is thus easy to understand why Christianity was criticized for its
universalism, whkh was considered disruptive of the "deepest human
rdationships":
At the time of the Franks' conquest, a Frisian chief~ before being christened, asked if in this war he would meet his father and ancestors in
hea\'Cn. They answered no, he.cause as heathens, they could only he in
hell. Taking a step backwards, he replied: "I v.-am to be where my
ancestors are." This answer expresses an existential choice and a
primeval philosophical posil'ion that: realizes itself in the world through
specific and. irreplaceable relationships of loyalty. In the case of a contlicr., these relationships are not subordinate to specific religious objectivities esrablished by mcn.17
This last observation highlights the fact that "loyalty" to one's people
and ro one's country must never be impaired by religious considerations
or by submission to ecclesiasr.ic authority. Such an observation can only
be understood if one keeps in mind the accusations against the Catholic
Church made in certain circles during the conflict, and in the years immediately following it. In 1924, Husserl himself complains about the ovcrcondcscendence which, according to him, manifested itself in Germany
duting the course of the war, with regard to the "Catholic imernationalism." 18 Whether philosophical, political, or religious, internationalism is
always regarded suspiciously by the Kriegsideol1t1Jic.
Many other themes present in Jaspers are connected co the
Kriegsideolo._qie, for example the celebration of "struggle" (an insurmountable "borderline situation" that can even take on the form of war)
as "an clement that creates, produces and shapes men." 19 Not only is the
ideal of "perpetual peace" unattainable, but its realization "wo-uld 1mllify man's very being."20 Moreover, struggle and war are contrasted to
the banal "tranquilliq'" of"philistinc contentment" and "bourgeois self
justification" (bii'11Jcrlichc Selbstgercchtigkeit).2 1 It is within this recurring
amiphilistine controversy that we can locate the tenderness with which
Jaspers speaks about the duel. This institution had become the target of
pacifist. circles, or of those who were. simply commitred to tracing a critical appraisal of Germany's role during the First World War. And yet, the
most chauvinistic or traditionalistic student groups supported, and
would always support, this institution, and they will enthusiastically wd-
39
come the full rehabilitation of the duel by the Nazi regime. 22 But here
is how Jaspers expresses himself in 1919:
To conquer selfwnsdous, man must dare to pm himself at srake. He
exists fr)r himself only if he acceprs the risk of nor hcing. Jn our age,
one of the motives of the duel is to he sought in rhis state of mind,
which, despite its primitiveness, always takes one back to one's roots,
and withom wh.ich the sublimated forms of spiritually self-conscious
Dascin are suspended in air. Daring to put one's existence ar stake gives
to one.'s authentic self a new consciousness which is enrhusiasrically
welcomed by the warrior rorn between daring and retrcaring.2~
The duel and war almost seem to appear as the main path to the conquest of authenticity: "The fact that man dares to pur his lik at stake
becomes for him the only living proof-although, in its generality, only
negative-that he is and is becoming a 'oneself.' In risking one's life,
empirical existence is made relative and in this way an absolute, ideall)' a
temporal 'oneself' is achieved. "24
Much later, Jaspers himself admits that the P.rychologie dcr Wdtanschammgen was written "under the pressure and the critical atmosphere
(Not) of the first [world] war. "2 5 Actually, the influence of the Kric.11sidr.olo..1Jie is undeniable, although it can still be perceived well beyond this
work. Together with the exalration of the "active heroism of risk," we ,.
find, again in 1932, the thesis according to which "the most authentic
lite i~ directed cowards death," whereas "the most shallow life is reduced
to anxiety when faced with death." Not only does "a higher life" form not fear death, but it may even crave it, not "for immediate or superfi- ,,.
cial reasons," of course, but rather to achieve in it "that accomplishment
which no concept can grasp.''2 6 We saw how Weber exalted sacrifice in
war as an act that could bestow meaning upon death and life itself. And
in 1932 Jaspers, in honor of Weber, the man whom he considers his
reachc.r, observes: "He had a profound venerarion and respect for dearh
in battle because through it man can give meaning to what we arc otherwise forced to endure passively. "2 7 If Simmcl exalts war and the proximity to death as the "absolute situation," Jaspers, instead, speaks of a
"borderline situation" ( GrenzJituation ); the fact remains, however, thar
removal or distance from daily lite and collective consc.iousncss is also
characteristic of borderline situations: "not everyone, only a very fe'w, are
able to look them in the face and experience them. "28
What ends up emerging, though indirectly, are the national stereo-
40
types we already know: "our philosophizing"-Jaspers observes-incorporates "the state of mind of the Nordic heroic spirit. "29 [n contrast to
this, we find the criticism of liberalism as "a-metaphysical" and "blind to
infinity," ge;tred only to "that which is limited" and immersed in a world
vision characterized by the mechanicaJ conception of nature, as well as by
the superstitious cult of progress and success.30 This analysis seems ro
criticize not only liberalism, but rhose com1t1ies in which ir had historic.ally developed, that is, the Entente powers, Germany's enemies. On the
other hand, we witness the condemnation of the contemporary world, a
world devastated by "a horrid lcvclirw process" and "characterized by
superticialiry, emptiness and indifference," and above all by the fact that
"historical civilizations arc uprooted and plunge into the technical, economical world and into shallow intellectualism." This condemnation
makes explicit reference to the ruinous int1uencc of "Anglo-Saxon posit.i\~sm. "3 1 And therefore, according to a stereotype we already know, besides being "a-metaphysical," the Anglo-Sa..xon world involves the loss of
historicity and roots; iris the world of technical, banausic standardization.
2.
In contrast to the central themes of the Krie,_qsidcologic, not only Germany's enemies, but the Weimar Republic as \Ve.II, were. tarnished by a
repulsive banality and shallmvness that aroused a treasonous accusation:
"The State. has become a mere servant to the masses, it has lost all ries to
authentic destiny." Moreover: "The man of the Sratt~ is no longer held
accoumable before God, but before the fickle masscs.''32 To all of this \VC
can add the apocalyptic tones of the Bolshevik Revolution and the threat
rhat it entails for the Western world (cf. njra, chap. 3, 7). At this point,
we can well understand the recent assertion made by a historian, according
to whom Die lJeistigc Situation der Zcit and all of) aspcrs 's works, were in
no way meant to dissuade the Germans from embracing Nazism.33
But faspers will never embrace the party or the regime. After the war,
he will, as is certainly understandable, mark the beginning of his opposi
tion to the regime with Hitler's coming to power. Historians, however,
must proceed more camiously and with a certain amount of skepticism.
In 1932, faspers publishes an essay, dedicated to Weber, that, because of
the publisher and the series in which it appears, as well as because of the
' subtitle that emphasizes "German essence," seems to fully share Weber's
41
nationalistic passion. The subtitle itself provokes some doubts and c1iticisms, even from a fond disciple of Jaspcrs's, Hannah Arendt.3 4 Furthermore, Jaspers applies Weber's ideas to a very difterent situation, one that
is already darkened by the shadow ofNazism's abrupt rise to power. And
anyway, for Jaspe.rs, there is no doubting that "German power" consists
in "'a universal-historical necessity," and that Germany was in no way able
ro avoid the war. She had been dragged into the conflict by the necessity
to defend not only her independence, but also the "uniqueness" of her
culture., which was threatened, on one hand, by "Anglo-Saxon conventions," and on the other, by the "Russian bureaucratic machine." The
clash had been inevitable, and Germany's possible hesitation was not
going to save her from involvement in the conflict. lt was only going to
deprive her-Jaspers here explicitly cites Weber-of the "consecration of
a German war" carried our in order to safeguard her interests and above
all to defend authentic German essence.35
Jaspers even seems to share Weber's harsh judgement on the
November Revolution which had given birth to the Weimar Republic
("'he speaks of the revolution as though it were a sort of narcotic"), and
he does not even distance himself from the most chauvinistic statement<>
("the first Pok who dares to set foot in Gdansk will be shot").36 Not by
chance, the said writing, although criticized by Hannah Arendt, is
greeted enthusiastically by Heidegger, \vho defines it as "great, beautiful,
simple and clear." His enthusiasm is only shadowed by the suspicion that
Jaspers might have excessively embellished, with regard to "German
essence," an author, Weber, whom Heidegger declares he knows little of,
but whom he more than disuusts,37 since he considers him. (cf. ir~fra,
chap. 2, 7) indissolubly tied to the decrepit world of liberalism.
Even in January 1933, on the eve of the Afachtei;gre~fung (that is, on
the eve of the Nazi Party's seizure of power), Jaspers, again following
Weber's lead, expresses the wish that Germany wi.11 be able to "return to
her ancient glory," even if within a "united Europe." And yet-Hannah
Arendt objects-the desired union of Europe should take place "at all
costs thanks to Germany's initiative." Jaspers's ambiguous relationship
with the "movement" appropriated by the National Socialists finds its
expression in this statement of 1933: "Our nationalistic youth have so
much good will and genuine elan tangled up in their wnfosed and
wrong-headed jabbering."38 We must not give too much significance to
Jaspers's later statement, according to which the aim of his work on
Weber had been to denounce, as much as possible, "the disaster caused
42
43
of the earth and of the blood. "45 Benedetto Croce is even more critical,
defining Heidegger's text as "something stupid and obsequious"; his
judgement seems to be shared for the most part by his interlocutor, the
German Romanist Karl Vossler. 46
Jaspers's position is quite different: Despite some reservations, he
reconfirms his "faith" in Heidegger's philosophy, and expresses his approval of the reference to "ancient Hellenism." Or perhaps even more
than approving, Jaspers is enthusiastic: Heidegger's rectorial speech is one
that ''v.111 remain," and its author is compared nor only ro Nietzsche, but
to a Nietzsche who will now succeed in translating his philosophy into
reality. Undoubtedly, despite these acknowledgments, he expresses some
reservations for the most zeitlJemaj? aspects of the speech, that is, those
most linked to the present; but this does not really mean that he is trying
to distance himself politically from Heidegger. Jaspers\ remarks go well
beyond praise for the author, referring somehow to the new regime as
well, which has been chosen to carry out Nietzsche's and Heidegger's
great ideas! Moreover, Jaspers expresses his agreement with the "aristocratic principle," and thus, with the Piihrcrprinzip. This principle was
already emerging in the universities of Baden and elsewhere in Germany,
establishing a new academic. hierarchy based upon rhe Reich's model of
the relationship between the people and their Fiihrer. 4 7 This is all the
more significant given the fact that Heidegger had already informed
Jaspers of his relationship or at least his contact with Alfred Baeumler and
Krieck (the breach between them will occur later), and with the classicist
Wolfgang Schadenwaldt, who had also sided with the regime.48
In .~aid letter to Heidegger (seen. 47), Jaspers seems to want to offer
above all his cooperation to the one who, in his opinion, is going to
become a sort of Praeaptor Germaniac. He tells him about one of his
books, which deals with the renovation of the unhersity given the new
political sir.uation, and which includes several concessions to the new
regime, beginning with support of the Fii.hrerprinzip. 49 Even the introduction of civil service and military education (Arbeitsdicnrt und
Wehnport) is hailed, with the argumenr that students must be "in contact
with the principles of the Dascin of the people," that they must learn to
"serve the Whole," assimilate "discipline," and have the necessary experience "of what may be more encompassing" (des Obergrcifendm).50
Even more important than his support for the new regime's measures is
the cheorctical justification of his posirion, which Jaspers a.>cribes to his
own philosophy. And so, as late as the summer of 1933, the philosopher,
44
far from disagreeing with the Nazi regime, is strongly tempted ro cooperarc with ir. Certainly, he is well aware of the obstacle presented by amiSemitism, and yet he re.gards it not with indignation, but rather with disappointment and a bit of regret. He would like r.o send his theses to the
new leaders, but he refrains from doing so: "I cannot do it if they do not
ask me, since I have been told that, as I am not a member of the party
and my wife is Jewish, I am only tolerated and cannot he trusted." At this
point, rather than rejecting the regime, Jaspers laments the fact that he is
being unjustly rejected by it. He writes to Heidegger in the secret hope
that the latter will mediate a solution allowing him to respectfully enter
the political debate regarding the university.51
It is rrue that, at the end of March 1933, having discussed Jaspers's
latest book, Die geistilfe Situation der Zeit, with its author, Heidegger is
profoundly disappointed: "I know now that it is possible to write about
the 'spiritual siruation of the time' ~ithout being touched by the acrual
events, and even without knowing anything about them. "52 Probably,
Heidegger's disappointment seems from Taspers's refusal to intervene
directly in the political scene, and his disillusionment is perhaps even
more bitter because the book did give rise to some hope. But although
Jaspers is more removed from the regime than Heidegger, this docs nor
imply a break or a separation from it, as can be confirmed by Jaspers's
letter dated July 10, 1933, written only a few months after this meeting.
It is Jaspers himself who, on another occasion, dates his philosophical
break from the regime not from March of 1933, but from the following
year. Even this date, however, must not be interpreted as the beginning
of a radical separation: After all, according w Jaspcrs's memoirs, it was
his elderly father who inspired the brcak.53
3.
It is a well-known fact that not even Jaspcrs's works afcer 1934 are free
from ambiguity regarding the issue. In any case, there is no re.al change
of position in Vcrnimft imd fa:istenz, which was published in 1935. A~
in the pasr, the pathos of "historicity" recurs, and the "affirmation of a
truth" as .universally valid is made synonymous with "falseness"
( Unwahrhaft(qkeit).54 Once more, what is stressed is that "historicity"
cannot be transcended by the universal conrcpt," which is guilty offal
45
sifying philosophy, and of violating its indissoluble link to "concrete historicity." Hi.storicity cannot be transcended by religion, either, since
"atemporality" can only be grasped through the "temporalicy" of historicity. 55 Above all, Jaspers continues to insist on the "unconditional
ties" that bind men togcrhcr on the basis of a determined historicity.56
Thus, in VCrmmft und fa:istenz, there is a dear theoretical justification for faithfulness or loyalty to one's country, regardless of the regime
in power. This confirms the manr doubts surrounding Jaspers\ claim,
made after 1945, that he had begun to hope for Germany's defeat the
moment that Hirler came to power, or at least by 1934. If what he says
were true, he would be guilty of violating the "unconditional tic" that he
continues to discn<>s in 1935, and of forgetting or trampling upon the
"truth of the soil"' ( Wahrheit des Bodcns). He, too, would fall into a frame
of mind with no ties to the soil (Bodcnlos), "inauthentic'' (unccbt).57 In
reality, the pathos of historicity, which appears so often in Jaspers, is also
the pathos of the Gcm.einschaft, one of the Krit;.1Jsidcologic's beloved
themes, inherited and radicalized by Nazism. Certainly, the community
exalted by Jaspers lacks that racist component so dear to the new regime:
lt is, so to speak, a community of the soil, and not of the blood. And yet,
Jaspers unhesitatingly condemns "the empty game of imellectualism,"
which separates thinking consciousness from the being, and annihilates or
forgets the "responsibiliry to the being," which is, after all, "living
Da.rcin" (lebcndi._1re.r Dasein} in a concrete historical community. With
regard to spirinial activity and science, one cannot speak of complete
autonomy: "The will to know must not forget that it realizes itself as a
science in the community of human Dascin, and the spirit must not forget
that it is unconditionally dependent upon Dmci'.n."58 To shirk one's
"responsibility" w Dasein and m the community means to stain onself
with "lfttilt be.fore Dascin" (Schuld am Dascin).59
With regard to this last point, Jaspers refers to the distinction
between the ethics of responsibiliry and the ethics of conviction. Weber
had already used this disrincti.on ro condemn as "irresponsible" the atti
tudc of those pacifists who, by weakening Germany in front of her enemies, had eliminated any possibility of a peace agreement with no winners or losers. In other words, they had prevented the only outcome that
might have discredited war in the future, and so now the long conflict
would. end with considerable advantages for the Entente Powers. There
fore., "for the winners-or at least some of the winners-the war had
been politically profitable, this because of that pacifistic state of mind
46
which thwarted any resistance on our part. Hut then-when the time of
discouragement is over--not \var, but peace will be discredited as a consequence of absolute ethics," thar is, of conviction. Conviction had been
the cause of such ruin, the opposite of its good intentions, because it had
insisted on ignoring the fundamental rnle of the ethics of responsibility
("You must resist evil wirh violence, or you shall be responsible if it prcvails").00 It had thus sabotage.d the "just war of defense" (gcrechtt:
Krie..,qsnotwehr) 0 1 characr.eristic of Germany's participation during the
last phase of the conflict. In 1935, referring to the distinction made by
Weber between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction,
Jaspers observes that following the latter in the politirnl world would
mean "fr>rcing my people to be the weakest with regards to Dascin, to
be the impotent ones, those bound to be defeated [ Daseinschwiicheren,
Ohmntlchtigen, Unter.lfehmden J." 0 2 Not only is there no wish for Germany's defeat and military occupation, but there is precise philosophical
criticism of those who might wish for it.
Certainly, it would make no sense to attempt to reduce Jaspers's philosophy to the ideology of the Third Reich. In DicgdstilfC Sit11atum der
Zcit one can even de.tcct some criticism of "fascism" (which is itself
somehow involved in the condemnation of modem standardization).
Moreover, as Jaspers himself admits in a 1946 note, 6 3 this condemnation
was directed only toward Italy. What remains then, is Jaspers's disagreement with the official ideology of Nazism, not only as far as anti-Semitism and racism are concerned, but also with regards to rhc rejection of
the unconditional naturalization of "historicity." This naturalization is
still significantly exalted by Jaspers, even during the years in which Heidegger refers to this category in order to clarify the link between his
philosophirnl theoiies and his commitment to the Nazi regime (cf. infra,
chap. 3, 4 }. The fact is that, because of his strong connection to the
motifs of the Kriegsidcolo~qic, Jaspers cannor split with or distance himself from the Third Reich, the inheritor of this ideology.
4.
HEIDEGGER, CAMARADERIE,
AND THE GEMEINSCHAFT
47
48
rorical communicy of the Volk, and "the demigods, the creators" are
those who establish and save the Gemeinschaft.76 Destiny means accepting responsibility for the problems and sufferings associated wirh "historical Being-wirh Others" (geschichtliches Miti:inandersein),77 a "Beingwith Others" that, far from having a universal meaning, refers back to a
determined community that cannot be transcended, a community with
its own unique historicity and its own "land" (Boden). Destiny, then,
implies a Miteinandcrsein that is "in and of itself hisrorical, and therefore
tie.d ro the powers of history and determined l1:1~fii._qt] by them."78 In
this sense, destiny is synonymous with singularity and uniqueness, and
"this unique destiny is not considered a particular case of a general
essence known as destiny; rather this uniqueness has its own histmical
essentiality."' Yes, destiny in some way recalls essence or cssenrfality, but
"only an inrcllecrual or logical bias \\,'Otild maintain that essence must
always be universal and ge.neric fgattungmzafli._q]. "79 Destiny is essence
to the extent that it is a stable element throughout the ups and downs
of a historical community; but, precisely for this reason, it is synonymous
not with universality, but with irreducible uniqueness. The "authentic
community of the pcople"-a more political text declares-keeps safely
away from an "inconsistent and uninvolved universal brotherhood. " 80
5.
THE PHILOSOPHER,
THE "ABYSS OF DASEIN,"
AND "PRIMAL COURAGE"
Another theme central to the KrielfsidNiJo..qic, the condemnation of security, is very much present in Heidegger's work. His l 929-30 lecture bitterly argues against the overall "satiated comfort in the absence of danger
[sttttes Behagcn in cincr Gefahrlosi._qkeitJ," and against the "mediocre and
philistine modern man" who presume.s he can escape from the "dangerous part of existence." To this, Heidegger juxtaposes the necessity of
something "able to instill terror [Schreckcn] in our Dasein,"81 a theme we
are already well familiar with. In 1933, Spengler almost uses the same
words as Heidegger: "The coveted lite of peace and happiness, without
danger fohnc Gcjahr J and in pkasant comforr [ bre.ites Bcha._qen J, is boring,
senile, and, though contemplatable, is not possible."82
Heidegger's criticism of security is at the same time a criticism of the
ideal of happiness so dear to the mechanical and mediocre "last man"
49
50
6.
HEIDEGGER
As
A CRITIC OF MANNHEIM
The exaltation of the inr.clkctual's courage when faced with the "a bys~ of
Da.rein" goes hand in hand with the contrast of sciern:e rooted in the
community of the people, that is of the t>iilkischc Wissenschaft, to "a state
of mind wit.hour soil and power ( boden- imd 1tJa.cbtlos)."' This exaltation is
also concomitant with the condemnation of those intellectuals who,
hooked on "arr.ificially constructed conceprual systems, "99 think they can
avoid the "harsh danger of human Daseirt" and display indifference when
confronted with the "critical situation (Not) of a people's historirnl
Dascin." lOO It is here that the theorization and exaltation of the paniotic
intellectual at the center of hi~ community emerges. It is not by chance
rhat as early as 1930 we see Heidegger begin ro argue against "self
exhausting .frcisch111chmd speculacion."101 What is dearly criticized is the
frd.rd1wcbrnd (lircrally, floating in the air) intellectual theorized by Karl
Mannheim in his recently published ldeolq_qie uml Utopit. 102 This cypc of
intellectual is denounced, especially after l 9 33, by the propaganda of the
regime, to include Hans Freyer. In 1936, Freyer, Heidegger, Hans Heyse,
and others Jre sent to Rome in order to present the culture of the
German Third Rcich.10.:; This propaganda juxtaposes to the upromed
inrelkctual, the Nazi political leader, above all the Flihrcr, who has the
merit of not being "frcisdn11cbr.nd above the pe.ople." !04
It is within this frame\.vork that one finds Heidegger's 1933 theories
regarding nundatory "civil service and military education" (Arbcitsdicnrt
and Wd1rdienst), even fr>r students and intelkctuals. These obligations
stem from bc:ing a "member" of the. "community of the people," and from
sharing the responsibility for the "honor and destiny ! Gcschick] of the
5l
7.
52
53
54
ican culture, "the American man" and "American pseudo-philosophy,"126 is the point of departure. for a ruthless rereading of Western history and modcrniry that questions the "modern man. "127 With regard
to this rereading, Sombart's view, which interprets the war as a struggle
between the heroic German Welt1mschamm.._q and the mercantile Anglo-
1/
55
8.
56
The year 1929 is, incidentally, the year of the "worldwide economic
crisis."134 This sort of interpretation, which allmvs Habcrmas to place
Sein und Zcit in the category of pure .... theory," is not very persuasive. To
start with, there is the risk of economic reductionism when an excessively
close relationship is established between the economic crisis and the
move to neoconscrvative or reactionary positions. In support of his
thesis, Habermas cites a passage we are already familiar with, taken from
Heidegger's 1929-30 lecture, which violently criticizes the philistine
ideal of a life of comfort shelrered from danger. But it is Heidegger himself who refers back to the Kriegsideolo.l!ic when he complains that such
ideals continue ro linger despite the lessons of "an event of such proportion as a world war." 135 Heidegger's later lectures also accuse the
period of being incurably deaf to the "terrible cry of world war" despite
the fact that it has revealed the "death of the moral God," the Christian
God, to whom both enemies appealed.136 Bue Christianity's death also
announces the death of its surrogates: democracy, 131 "pacifism,"
socialism, and "universal happiness," or "happiness for the greatest
number."L38 All of these ideals arc inspired by the ambition of eliminating danger, risk, and uncertainry; they are all characterized by the
myth of "security" and a philistine vision of the world. The Christian
sects, busy dispensing the "security of salvation" (Heilsicherheit),139 ;tre
another integral part of the world of security which was revealed ro be
frivolous and inconsistent by the First World War. Once again there is a
link to the Kri&lfsideologie; it would be very hard indeed to believe that
this ideology did not influence Heidegger until 1929!
On the. other hand, Habermas himself hints at rhe "peculiar conno
cations" of categories such as Schicksa/ and Geschick in Sein 1md Zeit.140
In realiry, we come across all of the key words in the Krie.1Jsideolo..1Jit::
"community," "loyalty," "destiny." To emphasize common destiny, Heidegger, in Sein und Zeit, uses t:he term Geschick to refer to "predeter
mined individual destinies." 141 In this light, one recognizes the pathos
of "loyalry to that which is to be repeated, "142 loyalty that characterizes
authentic existence (inauthentic existence, on the other hand, "looks for
nothing bur that which is modern").14.~ His analysis of inauthentic existence ends up becoming a criticism of modernity, despite Heidegger's
assurance in Sein und Zcit that he wants to avoid the "'moralizing" attitude of the "philosophy of culture."144
As is the case with the K1iegsideololJie, the theme of destiny immediately refers back tO the theme of the c.ommunity:
57
Bue if fatefol Dasdn, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Beingwith Others, its hisroricizing is a rn-historizing and is detcnninarive for
it as destiny [ Geschickj. This is how we designate the hisrori.:izing of the
communiry, of a people.
58
59
Therefore, it doesn't make any sense ro speak of the "ncoconscrvative" ideological change of l 929, espcciallr since Hahcrmas himself recognizes the profound political implications, "neoconscrvarive" or reactionary, of the analysis of the inauthentic life of das Man in Sein und
7-eit.160 With regard to the "one," Heidegger observes in 1927, "The
extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit may
change in the course of history."161 So, one can well understand the
hopes of the years following 1927. The ei._11cntlichcs Miuinandtr in Sein
1md Zeit calls to mind the tmbedingtes Z1ieinandc1;gchiiren of Heidegger's
1934-35 lecture; Geschick, common destin_v in Sein und Zcit, later
becomes dctttschcs Schicksal, particularly during Heidegger's rectorial
period; while the pathos of the Gemcinscha.ft remains idenrical. Camaraderie and the community presuppose-he states during his 1934-35
lecrure-thc "proximity of death" and anxiety, provided that the anxiety
is not confused with the "vain quivering of a cowardice that has lost its
head" (hilfo>JeJ Bebcn eine1 kop.flosen I:"ei._qheit).162 But Sein und Zeit also
distinguishes between "cowardly fear" (fe(qc Fttrcbt) and the anxiety that
is being-toward-death, and which is only characteristic of a "resolute"
Dascin that "knows no fear." 163 It should be added that during the
course of the Second World War, Heidegger continues to gh1e a militant,
warlike interpretation of anxiety. This is not meant to be perceived as the
"psychological state of those who are full of 'anxiety' or cowardice"
(Feigen), those who are incapable of the "serene and courageous st.ate of
mind." To the contrary, "what would courage be if it did not find in the
experience of essential anxiety its constant opposite?"l64 The lecture of
1934-35 asserts that "camaraderie derives from anxiety."l<i5
We have to ask ourselves if rhis category of being-toward-death
shouldn't be tied to the mcditatio mortis that develops with the K 1iegs
ideolo_iJie. In 1929-the effects of the First World War were srill being
fdt-Marianne Weber tells of the impression that one of Heidegger's
conferences (Was ist Metaphysik ?) made on her: "His philosophy of death
would surface by way of tranquil and penetrating explanations, rhetorically very well constructed. And his grave manner was very engaging." 166 While this may not be an expert's analysis, it docs come from a
person who lived through and effectively described the spiritual and
emotional climate of the war years, which exalted the proximity of death
as the moment when individual authenticity was retrieved from rhe
banality of everyday life. The theme is also present, as we have seen, in
the works of other authors such as Husserl and Scheler_ In parricular, we
60
6l
NOTES
l. Karl Jaspers, Philosophic (Berlin-Heidelberg, 1948 ), p. 222.
2. Ibid., p. 413.
3.
Ibid.~ p.
272.
62
lish translation, Man in the Alodcrn A"-qc, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Garden
City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1957), p. 25.
8. Jaspers, Die ,tJeistigc Situa#on der 7.eit, pp. 34ff.
Ibid., p. 73.
Tbid., pp. 8 ltT.; Man in the Modern Age, p. I 01.
Jaspers, Die geisti._qe Situation der Zeit, p. 22.
Ibid., pp. 70ff
13. Jaspers, Pbilosophie, p. 632.
14. Jaspers, Die gr:istige Situation der Zeit, p. 71.
l 5. Ibid., p. 96.
9.
IO.
l l.
12.
63
ct:
64
'I
48. et: a lerter d;ited April 3, 1933, in Heidegger and Jaspers, Brief:
wechsel, pp. 15 l ff (Ar this point, air.hough disagreeing with Krieck's agenda of
cultural policy, Heidegger ackn01vledges in him "some authentic impulses," ar
least with rcg:mis to his intentions and state of mind: cf. a letter dated March
30, 1933, ro Elis.lbcth Blochmann, in Martin Heidegger and Elisabeth Blochmann, Bricji1ecbsel 1918-1969, ed. Joachim W. Storck [l'vfarbach, 1990), pp.
60ff.) As for Schadcnwaldt's relation w the Nazi regime, cf Luciano Canfora,
ldeologit de! dassicismo (Torino, 1980), pp. l 35ff
49. Karl Jaspers, "Thescn zur Frage der Hochschulerneuerung,"
jahrbudJ dcr OsterreidJisch1'1I Ka.rt-Jaspers G~scllschaft 2 (1989): 5-27.
50. Ibid., p. 22.
51. Cf n. 4 to rhe above-mentioned lencr by Jaspers, in Heidegger and
Jaspers, Brief't'chsd, pp. 259ff
52. Cf. a letter dated March 30, 1933, in Heidegger and Blochman,
BricfJPedJSel, p. 176.
53. His father is said to have exclaimed: "Son, we have lost our motherland": d~ a letter to Heidegger dared fuly 10, 1949, in Heidegger and Jaspers,
Briefivuhsel, p. 176.
54. Karl Ja.~pers, ternutifr imd faistenz (Bremen, 1947), p. 79.
55. Ibid., p. 44.
56. [bid., p. 70.
57. lhid., pp. 56, 45.
58. Ibid., pp. 66ff
59. Ibid., p. 67; italics are Jaspers's.
60. Max Weber, "Politik als Berur' (1919), in Gesammelte politische
ScJniften, ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tubingen, 1971 ), pp. 550ff
61. Cf: alerter dated November 13, 1918 in Weber, Max Weber, p. 615.
62. Jaspers, Vernm~ft und F..xistenz, pp. 67ff
63. With regard ro the condemnation of fascism, cf Jaspers, Die geist(JJe
Situation der z,it, pp. 79, 94; for the nore, cf. ibid., p. 242.
64. In Ort, Martin Hcide,_lf.!Jer, p. 218.
65. Heidegger, Dfr Selbstbeht111pt1mlt, p. 15.
66. Schneeberger, Nncblese zu Heidegger, p. 149.
67. Ott, Aiarrin Heide.!1_(ftr, p. 245.
68. Marrin Hddegger, "Holdcrlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der
Rhein'" (1934-35), in Gemmt1ws,_qabe, vol. 39 (Frankfurt a.M., 1980),
pp. 72ff
69. Ore, ilfartitt HciditlJflT, pp. 151 ff.
70. Cf. faspcrs's resrimony, Pbilosop/Jifche Auwbiographie, p. 101.
71. Ott, 1Ha1ti11 Heidegger, p. 151.
72. Heidegger, Die' Sclbstbehaupt1m._11, p. 14.
n. Ott, Afanin Heidet1H1:r, p. 229.
74. Heidegger, Dit Selbsthdmupttm~tf, p. 15.
65
66
'"
:~!'
1937 expanded English edition. The one considered here, instead, is the origi11JI text of 1929.) The relationship between Heidegger and Mannheim does not
seem to have heen given much attention yet. And still, the sociologist l\hnnheim often refers ro Heidegger's work, highlighting its importance (rogerher
with Scheler's, as an example ofrhe "Phenomenological current" in "opposition
ro the modern imellecrualism," which is the sociology of knowledge: cf. ibid.,
p. 15511.). Mannheim even makes reference to Heidegger's lectures (cf. Karl
Mannheim, Wismtssoziologie: Aurwahl a.us dem Werk, ed. Kurt H. Wolff [Berlin,
1964], pp. 623, 388n. and passim). Heidegger's influence on Mannheim's most
imporram work can also be interred by certain terms used, such as rhe adjective
"onric" (onri.cdJ) (ct: ldeologfr und Utopfr, p. 80i which is then abandoned, at
leasr in rhe 1953 English edition. Even more interesting is chat in the ensuing
debate over the sociology of knowledge, Heidegger's vision of man as Being-in
the-World is ofi:en cited as evidence of the inevitable ontological conditioning of
knowledge, and so close ro the central theme of ldeolo._qic und Utopic (cf. Karl
Mannheim, Dci Strcii um dfr WiJSmss11zioJo._11ie, ed. Volker Meja and Nico Stehr
[Frankfurt, 1982}, passim). Bur in reality, as will he made evident in rhe next
par.igraph, Heidegger and Mannheim are very far apart, not only with regard to
rhe role of intellc.:tuals, but even \\-1th regard ro the relationship between science
and world vision.
103. Cf Karl J..Owith, Mein Leben in Deutsch/and vor 1md mull 1933: Ein
B1!rid1qSruttgart, 1986), p. 87.
HM. Wilhelm Stapel, printed in Lfon Poliakov and Joseph Wulf, Das
Dritu Reich und seine Denker (Miinchen, 1978), p. 66. His Hitlerism notwithstanding, Stapel is not considered by Rosenberg to he Orthodox enough: cf.
ibid., p. 64.
105. Heidegger, Die Sclbstbebaupnm,(f, p. 15.
106. Schneeberger, Nachtese zu Heideglfer, pp. 180ff.
107. Heidegger, Die Sclbstbe/J(mptung, pp. I 5ff.
108. Alessandro Dal Lago ("La polirica del filosofo: Heidegger e ooi," in
Alessandro Dal Lago and Pier Aldo Rovani, Elq_qio del pudore: Per 1m. pmsiero
dt~bolt [Milano, 1989], pp. 62-103; cf in parricular pp. 84, 99) who, with
regard to the discourse on Die Sclbstbchauptung dcr dcutschrn Universiti:ir,
repeatedly asserrs that Piaro was a "philosophical shadow throughout Heidegger's rex1," probably "the author that Heide.gger had in from of him when
writing the book."
109. Manin Heide.gger, ''Das Rektorar 1933-34: Tatsachcn und
Gedanken" (1945), published as an appendix ro Dfr Sclbstbehattptunlf, p. 27.
110. The author of the review is Hugo Marx (Zurich): cf. Zeitsch1ift fur
Sozia~f'orsclmng 3 ( 1934): 137-42. Ernst Kriei;:k's text is entitled Die
Emeur.run~q der de1ttschcn Univcrsitat.
ll l. Martin Heidegger, "'Zur Besrimmung dcr Philosophie" (1919), in
GcsamttW{qabc, vols. 56--57, p. 7.
67
112. Max Weber, "Die Wissenschaft als Beruf~" in Gt'Sammcltt Aufsiirzc zit.r
Wi.1Stnschaftsldm, 6th ed., ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tiibingen, 1985), p. 604.
113. Marrin Heidegger, "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers 'Psychologie der
Weltanschauungen'" (1919-21), in Gesamtaus._11abe, vol. 9, pp. 4lff.
114. In addition to his review of )aspe.rs, Weber is cited in Martin Hei
degger, "Metaphysischc Anfangsgriinde dcr Logik" (1928), in Giesamtaruga-bc,
vol. 26, p. 64, and in "Nietzsche: Der europaische Nihilismus," p. 18. Together
with rhe theory of value-neutraliry, Heidegger rejects Weher's theory that
Entzattberung is a necessary condition for the technological and industrial development of the West (cf. above, chap. 5, 3 ).
115. Heidegger, "Nietzsches metaphysische Grundste.llung,~ p. 127.
116. Ibid., p. 113.
117. Heidegger, "H6ldcrlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein,'"
p. 195.
118. Victor Farias, Heilk;g..tre1 und dtr Natirmalsozinlismus (Frankfurt,
1989), p. 283.
119. Marrin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen de.r menschlichen Freiheit: Einleimng in die Philosophic" (1930), in Gcsmntaut11abc, vol. 31, p. 273. Cf: also
"Bcirriige zur Philosophie," p. 53.
120. Heidegger, "Holderlins Hymncn 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein,' "pp.
26-28.
121. Ibid., p. 28.
122. Marrin Heidegger, "Einfiihrung in die Mmphysik" (1935), in
Gcsamt1:mt1Jabe, vol. 40, p. 208.
123. For example, Hennann Glockner and Karl Larenz who, immediately
after the Ma.chtt:r;_lfl'tiftmg, decide to retitle their magazine Logos as Zeitschrift.fiir
dcutschc Kulturphilosophie, in order to underscore the tie ro the "German vision
of the. world." Cf. the introduction of t:he rwo directors and the article,
"Deutsche Philosophic," by H. Glockner, in the Lo/JOS l ( 1935 ): 2, 4.
124. Heidegger, "Eintlihnmg in ctie Mctaphysik," pp. 40ff America is
made analogous to the USSR which, from a "metaphvsical'' point of view, is
nothing different (ibid.). In fact, "Bolshevism is merely a different version of
that which is American": "Holderlins Hymnc 'Der Isrer' " ( 1942 ), in Guam
tausgabe, vol. 53, p. 86. These are culrural and political stereotypes that are
prevalent in fascist Italy as well: cf. Michela Nacci, L"'a.ntia.mcricanismo in Italia
negli a.mii trcnta (Torino, 1989).
125. Heidegger, "Hlilderlins Hymne 'Der Ister,'" p. 86.
126. Martin Heidegger, "Grund.bcgriffe" (1941 ), in Gcsamtausgabc, vol.
51, pp. 14, 84.
127. Ibid., p. 14.
128. fbid., pp. 84, 92.
129. Heidegger, "Nietzsche: Der europaische Nihilismus," pp. 212ff
130. Cf. Mannheim, Ide<1logic rmd Utopir, p. 71.
68
~::
69
70
~I
GERMANS,
EUROPEANS, GYPSIES,
AND PAPUANS
ne might say that with the war, a sort of anthropological nominalism, which aims at refuting the universal concept of man, begins
to circulate in Germany. Not by chance, an author who becomes very
popular in this period is Edmund Burke: In the past, he had criticized
the French Re.volution, juxtaposing typically English rights, which were
handed down as heritage., to the rights of the universal man. These rights
referred to a historically and concretely determined community rather
than to humanir:y. World War I is raging, but Sombart dQes not feel
uneasy about referring to Burke; and since Burke, as a British man,
be.longed to a people of "merchants," the German nationalist Sombart
bestows upon him a sort of honorary citizenship, declaring that, in
reality, he is "anti- British." l During and after the war, .both Ernst
Troeltsch2 and Schmitt,3 two representatives of the "conservative revolution," like Arthur Moeller van der Bruck and Georg Quabbc, 4 speak
of Burke with respect and admiration. Even rigorous historiographical
texts reveal how enthusiastically Burke was regarded, on the political
level as well as others. According to Friedrich Meinecke, Burke is credited nor only with drawing attention to man's historical and communal
links as they oppose the "doctrine of natural law," but also of highlighting some important values which are the basis of "Western States."
Not by chance, this author has a "profrmnd influence on romantic Ger-
71
i2
73
74
.... .
~
~~-:'
:;::".,
ne.ss. This exaltation becomes even more radical when the reclaiming of
historicity demands the ability m oppose not only a threatening international lineup, but also, and within Germany, a prevailing public opinion
that stems from the. ruinous uprooting that occurred in the past, and
that therefore bears the mark of inauthenticity.
Although Jaspers's position in the period between the two wars is less
radical than Heidegger's, both share a hostility "t01i>ards all universals
(like humanity, the International, and Catholicism)."15 Heidegger speaks
of a son of anthropological nominalism, partly inherited by Nietzsche.
Nietzsche explicitly refers to the nominalistic positions that emerged
<luting the scholastic debate over universals in order to criticize "general
concepts" as empty "abstractions." He then bitterly attacks the universal
concept of man, which he analyzes and denounces throughout its historical development, particularly from Christianity through to socialism.16
Baeumlcr exalts Nietzsche as the. "highest point of nominalism,"1 7
and anothc:r ideologist of the regime, Heyse, makes reference to the
medieval debate on universals: Hcyse considers it the result of the
colossal, catastrophic misunderstanding of Greek culmre on the part of
Christianity, which foolishly rheorizes " 'humanity' in a 'general' and
'universal' sense." Thus, what causes the downfall of the West is considered the construction of the universal concept of man. This concept
starts to take shape already in the late Roman era, but it is again questioned and even destroyed by Nazism. In place of" 'universal' and 'universally human' ideas and ideologies," Nazism chooses to make the
"German man," "our own historic.al Dasein," and "German historical
existence," the center of attention.18
It is necessary ro keep in mind this historicocultural context in order
to solve the apparent contradiction in Heidegger between individualism,
which seems to charnctcrizc exiscenti.al analytics, and the pathos of the
authentic Ge1neinschaft, which is already present in SeiJ1 imd Zeit. ln
reality, "its starting point is never the common [ Gcmeinsames] unifying
elemem," but always the irreducible uniqueness "of the individual, or
even the nation." This leads from the "Dasein" of the individual to that
of the. German nation or community.1 9 The category of the "Dasein,"'
with that particle ( Da) that emphasizes the here and now, aims at
denying the category of mankind. If we regard the subject as daseinm~/Xig, that is, in accordance with the category of Dascin, we can never
subsume it under the category of "character" ( Gattung).10 Even before
Sein 1,md Zeit, Heidegger had observed that life is "always lived hie et
75
nzmc" in a specific "historic.ospiritual situation" (gcistqqeschichtlichc Situation). Therefore, the "actual experience oflik ... is not the universal
76
_;:;;;;;:
.::::--"
ness of Dasein to both the individual and to a specific human community. The result, however, is the disappearance of any higher emiry, overnational or "generic," th.at is, able to incorporate all people. Even
though the individual's irreducible uniqueness is still exalted, the individual himself is swallowed up into the determined, nontranscendable
historical community of which he is part ("destiny"). In other words,
one could say that organicism, the pathos of the Gemeinschaft, is strictly
connected to the emphasis of the Jemeinfr1kcit, that is, of unrepeatable
uniqueness; organicism is, in the final analyis, the result of nominal ism.
It is cle;w, then, how the category of historicity, in its various fornrnlations and through manifold and complex mediations, has an important rok, first in rhe. Kriegsideolo._qic, then in the "conservative revolu"
rion," and finally in N,1zism and in its circles. In Schmitt as well, the
pathos of the "historico-concrcte"25 community goes hand in hand with
the negation of man's rights: "liberal individualism" is guilty of speaking
of "man" and of "personality" in general, without taking into account
concret.e historicornltural, ethnic, or racial differences.26 In reality,
"there are as man}' rypes of fi.tndamcntal rights [ GrundrechteJ as there
are types of human communities. "27 Nazism and Fascism have therefore
the merit of "substituting for the concept of 'man,' the concepts of 'citizen' and 'foreigner.' "28 Already before the Nazi rise to power, Schmitt
had written: "Every culture I KulturJ and every cultural epoch has its
own concept of civilization. All the essential presuppositions of man's
spiritual sphere are existential and not normar.ive." The negation of universal laws is carried out, in this case, not by the retcrence to determined
historicity, but by "concrete historical existence, "29 and yet rhe political
meaning and even the cultural sources seem to be the same.
The category of historicity emerges also in the works of the more or
les~ official ideologists of the regime. They use it to criticize modern
thought, accusing it of moving increasingly "away from historical life. "30
Also, through historicity they exalt "historical commitment"
(qcschichtliche1 Einsatz), or-using a type of language once again reminiscent of Heidegger and Jaspers-the "commitment t(i existence" ( Einsatz.
der E.xistenz), which is basically the commitment to a community well
determined in its historical existence. 31 The theory of the "essence of historicity" is even used to dismiss the recently defeated Weimar Republic as
the "time ofhismriographic knowledge" (Zdt des historischen Wissens), and
to celebrate the new regime. as the rime of authentic "hfrtoric.al consciousncss."32 Again, we arc faced with the contrast bct\Veen Geschichtc and HiJ-
77
t.orie, which is fundamental in Sein 1md Zcit, but which Bohm passes over
in silence (the Third Reich's internal struggles have already begun).
Sometimes, the reference to Heidegger and Jaspers is explicit: Their lesson
is considered precious and neccs.wy, and it make.~ any further discourse on the
intrinsic "historicity of our Dasein" superfluous. This new historical acquisition
is used to highlight the unavoidable viillt.isch foundation of the authentic community. It invites people to fight "against the modem society of fuithless world
Zivilisatinn and la\\iess democracy," and it celebrates the new n:gime.33
2.
"HISTORICITY," "DIFFERENCE,"
AND "STRUGGLE"
given the rise ofhistorktl consciousness, it is no longer possible ro consider humanity a.s a truly existing whole consisting of various peoples;
rathe.r, there are different peoples fighting against each other. The var
ious peoples appear as the ultimate units, those who act and have an
effect, whereas humanity is only a universal concept, not a re.al unit. .l5
To forget this means not only falling into a serious theoretical error,
bur above all to being guilty of "trcas11n against /Jisturical ocistcncc. "3 6
From the category of historicity, the inevitable contrast between one
people and another is inferred. Spengler had clearly underscored the fact
that the universal concept of man is incompatible not only with the category of historicity, but also with that of "struggle":
"Man as such," in the sense perceived by blabbering philosophers, does
not exist. There exist only men of a determinate time, in a determined
place, of a dete.rmine.d race, with personal characteristics; men who rise
or fall in the struggle against a given world, while the whole universe
around them remains still, in god-like indiffere.nce. This struggle is lifr
and, in a Nietzschean sense, a struggle for the will co power, a cruel,
inexorable, merciless struggle.37
78
~I!~-
...
- ..
79
tombs." 47
Nazism inherit~ the categories of historicity and struggle, exa.spcrating them and applying them to a social Darwinism immune to any
norm. As Germany's situation in the war is getting worse, Hitler, too,
feels the nce.d to make reference ro the "serious and profound thesis of
a great military philosopher, according to whom stl'l'!J..f!le, and therefore
conflict fder Kri~q], is the father c~f all things. "48 Even though hardly recognizable under the military uniform that, in this atmosphere of total
mobilization, has been put on him, this is Heraclitus. Now he has been
made a prophet of a ruthless struggle, in which the only "world order"
is that might makes right, a law imposed by namre.4 9 Therefore, there is
80
no point in speaking of "lmmanity, universal Church," etc., as these categories are, according t0 Rosenberg, an intolerable "violence against.
nature in rhc name of abstractions." One. must, instead, reject once and
for all "the dogma of a presumed 'general evolution of humanity' " and
dismiss "all 'absolute' and 'universalistic' systems which, on the basis of
a presumed humanity, once again demand the eternal unity of all
souls. " 50 "Humanity" is alway!> "prc.sume.d" tO be; it is only a flatus vocis,
the unfortunate remnant of a theology that is thankfolly declining. The
destruction of the universal concept of man has thus reached its most
extreme consequences.
3.
..
-~:t
:I!;;;_:.
"'1t'"'
~:,..,.'
;?i::;
..
. .............1:
Criticism of universal norms and values meshes 1,vith criticism of the intellccmal figure. The intellecmal seems to embody the arrogant presumption of an illusory universality with no dimension of historicity. Certainly,
behind this diattihe there is a long tradition that is not worth reviewing.
What is imeresring here is the latest chapter of this history. This begins
with the First World War and with the link that the Kric,_{fsideologie establishes between two elements: on the one hand, the figure of the intellectual, and on the other, the society and culture, or the lack the.re.of, as is
the case of Germany's enemies. To Ziiilisation belongs not only the
"merchant," whom Sombart attacks most violently of all, but also the
"man of letters," the Zivilisationsliterat.51 The expression is Thomas
Mann's, who even considers it a "pleonasm," since the. two terms are so
indissolubly tied together. The "man of letters" he refers ro is none other
than a distant descendant of the philosoj>hcs, whose country of choice is
France, and whose motro is basic.lily that which emerged in, or was
inspired by, the 1789 revolution: "humanity, freedom, and reason. "52 He
i~ the "political intellectual," committed just like he was at the time of the
Dreyfus affair.S3 He is anti-German, even when he is born and lives in
Germany; he is therefr>re "antinational," and characterized by a "lack of
roots and of essence. " 54 In his struggle for universal democracy, this man
of letters continually speaks of "spirit" (Geist), which he purs in contrast
to "power': (lHacht), or to the "saber. "55 It would be a mistakeobserves Thomas Mann-to superficially reduce Zivilisation to the cult
of "material" elements. On the contrary, not only does it have "some-
81
thing spiritual, but. it is, rather, spirit itself-spirit in the sense of rt'.ason,
good manners, doubt, enlighr.enmcnt and disinte.qration.."5 6 In other
words: " 'Spirit' is the spirit of time, of the new, of democracy, "57 of the
acritical exaltation of modernity and the philistine adjustment to it. Due
to its corrupting effect, and as a cause and expression of the leveling and
uprooting process, Geist eventually becomes synonymous with "revolution" as well. Not by chance, the Jacobins make reference wit while carrring out their fanatical bloodbath.58
These committed "men of letters" and intellectuals of democratic
universalism, of ZiPilisation and of subversion, love to denounce their
adversaries as "traitors of the spirit. "59 In curn, they are accused by Ernst
hinger of "high treason of the spirit against lite. "60 This denunciarion is
present, almost a leitmot~f, throughout a famous book by Ludwig
Klages,61 as can be gathered from the title, Der Geist als Widersache1 tier
Seelc. The great ~nfluence of this book is highlighted by Thoma,s Mann
in 1930_ As Germany moves headlong toward catastrophe, Mann, by
now solidly settled on the ground of democracy, makes an "'appeal to
reason." In it, he invites his fellow citizens not to let themselves be
seduced any further by the thesis that presumes to condemn the "spirit"
(and the "intellectuals" who embody it) as a "criminal against life"
(lcbensmorderisch).62 Klages is instead quoted approvingly by Rosenberg,
whose only disagreement is that, in Klages's book, the condemnation of
the "spirit" seems r.o include also "reason" and even "will." On the contrary, for Aryans and Germanophiles, both reason and will are untainted,
not marred hy an abstract, sterile, and corrupting intellectualism.63 If
Klages contrasts the "soul" (Seel) to the "spirit" (Geist), Rosenberg
makes use of this exaltation of the "soul," even though he reinterprets it
as "the race seen from within," and perceives the race as "the outward
side of a soul."64 He underscores the condemnation not only of the
"spitit," but of a rootless, intrinsically subversive, intellectualism. This
theme recurs also in the work of another ideologist of the regime, Heyse,
who in turn juxtaposes the "historical community" to the "modern idea
of spirit, which has separated itself from every existence. "65 With Hitler's
rise to power, as his followers and admirers sometimes observe with satisfaction, the "spirit" becomes "anachronism. "66
Certainly, the term Geist is not always used in a negative sense_ Afrer
all, as Ernst Hinger states, to "high tre.ason of the spirit against life" one
can ans\\'er \\.'ith "high treason of the spi.rit against the 'spirit.' "6 7 One
could, and should, oppose one culture to another: "Spiritual" weapons
82
~-
......
~i!;:::
should not remain the exclusive possession of the enemy. And yet, precisely because of its ambiguity, rhe rerrn Geist remains suspic.ious. This is
the key to understanding Heidegger's rectorial speech, which has been
inrerprctcd as an unconditional exaltation of the spirit; and this exaltation in turn has been used to explain, or to confirm, Heidegger's
encounter with Nazism.68 At least as far as his relationship \\1th Nazism
is concerned, we seem to have provided enough proof to the contrary.
Similar conclusions are drawn when we reread his rcctorial speech: It is
imbued with hostility and suspicion regarding that "spirit" that had
already been attacked by the Kriegsideologie. In 1918, Thomas Mann
criticizes "men of letters" because they insist on contrasting "spirit" and
"power," and he condemns the spirit's "lack of roots and e.sscnce." Heidegger, in mrn, denounces the "idolatry of a rootless and powerless philosophy [ bodenlos imd machtlos]" (cf. supra, chap. 2, 6 ). As for J(inger,
he condemns the "high rreason of the spirit against life," but he regards
the "spirit which has a relationship to history"' in a positive way.69 In his
rectorial speech, Heidegger constantly speaks of a "world," or of a "historico-spiritual Dascin. " 70 The spirit can have a positive value only if it is
subordinated to historicity. And against any ambirion for autonomy,
Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes the "predominance of the constitutive
powers of the human Dasein's world," or of the "human-spiritual
Dasein": "n:arurc, history, language, people, customs, State," and so on,
as well as the "forces of the earth and of the blood. "71 When, instead,
rhe spirit presumes to rise to "universal reason," co enunciate "essentialiry and values in themselves," and to carry out a corrupting process
of "intellectualistic dismemberment," then it is harshly condemned, put
in quotes, and sternly ordered to respect historicity and the "Dasein of
the people and of the Statt:."72 In another speech ddivered during his
rectorial period, Heidegger triumphantly announces the end of those
concepts of'' 'spirit' and of 'spiritual work,' with which the 'intellectual'
[ Gebildeter.J has lived thus far." He also proclaims the coming of something radically new, a "spirit"-this time >vithout quotes-intimately
connected to "German Dasein," and therefore characterized by "willingness to sac1ifice," "resoluteness," and "decisive commitment." 73
Once again, what is condemned is the spirit as synonymous with
uprooting, that spirit which, instead of being bodenrtand~q, presumes tc
be .freischwebmd, and to freely hover in the void that results from the los!
of historicity and of any ties to the soil.
Similar arguments may also be applied to Heidegger's Einfiihrunfi
83
in die Jft:taphysik, which was written in 1935. Here, too, the "spi1it" is
guarded by historicity, and solidly inserted in a DaJein that allows little
leeway for universalistic diversions. ln this sense, Heidegger speaks again
of "historico-spiritual Da.rcn," 74 and exalts the spirir in polemic.ll contmst to M~u-x and to historical materialism, the latter of which prcsumcs7~ to reduce. it to a "superstructure." And yet, Heidegger still
regards with horror the Geist that manifests itself as "intelligence"
(lntclli._qenz),76 and that finds its expression in a class of uprooted, subversive intellectuals, "men of letters" suffering from "\';miry," as Heidegger had defined them a few years earlicr,7 7 or the "rootlcs.<> ones"
(B11denloseni, as he will define them dming another kcture.78
If one keeps in mind these two different meanings and aspects of the
rerm "spirit," the continuity in Heidegger's development appears evident. Already before Se.in und Zcit, Heidegger contrasts the concreteness
of the "historico-spiritual situation" to every attempt at f()rmulating a
universal discourse on man (cf. supra, chap. 3, l ). In 1929, he insists
that roots must be given back to "German spiritual life" in order to pro
teer it from the danger of"Judaization" (cf. infra, chap. 4, 4): "Spirit"
and "spiritual" have a positive meaning only inasmuch as they reveal a tic
to the soil and to a people's unique hi~toricity. In this case, the Bodcnstandigkeit must be defended from the corrosive action of uprooted
intellectuals. In l 940, Heidegger condemns the "bourgeois 'spirituality'
and culture" that snubs Nazi Germany's blazing victories by ascribing
them solely to the technical efficiency of the Third Reich's ,,;ar machine
(cf. infra, chap. 6, 2). The "spirit" that, appealing to universal values,
presumes to oppose itself to "power," and even to lay down the law fix
it, is still satirized and condemned, a.~ in the Kric/1sidcolo..1Jic. Heidegger's
rectorial speech fits perfectly within this framework. Sein und Zeit
declares that it is preferable to avoid using the category of "spirit"; this
is true for the categories of "subject," "soul," and even for ''man." It is
the well-known rejectfon of the universal concept of man that for Hei
deggcr is none other than the "'Christian definition ... deprived of irs
theological character," "in modern times. "79 This is the formulation of
a theme that will be developed and radicalized (cf. infn:1, chap. 5, 2 ),
following Niet7A<;che's example, during the years between the MnchterlJre~fun..JJ and the first phase of the war \\foch witnesses Germany's
blazing victories; the years, that is, of Heidegger's strongest involvement
with the Nazi party and regime.
"Ill'
~:'~ .
.~
84
4.
.... ..
~~
;-
DETRANSCENDENTALIZATION AND
DEUNIVERSALIZATION OF THE SUBJECT
At this point, any attempt to keep Sein und Zeit safely within the realm of
pure "theory," would be vain. Heidegger himself continues to refer back
to it even after 1933 (or 1929, which is indicared by Habermas as the
turning point). This happens, in particular, in Beim'(qe zur Philosophic,
wrirten between .1936 and 1938: It makes constant reference to Sein und
Zcit, and is characterized from beginning to end hy a sorrowful denunciation of the "escape of the. idols" from the modern world (cf. infra, chap.
5, 3). This denunciation would be defined by Habermas as "a confused,
neoconservativc-like diagnosis of the epoch." Heidegger refers to Sein
und Zeit rhroughour his harsh diatribe against the liberal ideal of value
neutrality, or Standpunktfreibt'it (cf. supm, chap. 2, 7j.80 Furthermore,
Karl Uiwith makes an important comriburion by highlighting the link
established by Heidegger in 1936 between the carcgory of"historiciry, "81
which has a central role in Sein tmd Zeit, and his own commitment to
Nazism. Nazism itself, thanks to some of its ideologists, makes large and
skill fol use of rhe category of "hisroricity"' (cf. supra, chap. 3, 1 ).
The goal is nor to reduce Heidegger's masterpiece to a mere ideology,
but rad1er to grasp the winding, problematic character of the line between
theory and ideology (cf. infra, chap. 7, 7). What Habeimas finds most
intriguing is the "overcoming of the subject," or the "detransc.endentalization of the world's cori_~titutive 'I.' " Jn this "new beginning," "the
most significant change of direction in German philosophy since Hegef"82
is found. This is the main theoretical point that cannot be reduced to the
next ideological discourse. And yet, just a quick look at the course of history mar be enough to make such a distinction / juxtaposition problematic. Many Nazi writers and ideologists have often referred to the philosophical theme so dear to Habermas in order to denounce any neutral
position or scientific objectivity as contradictory and unacceptable. This is
the case, for example, with Christoph Seeding who, with regards to this
matter, refers to the analysis of man as "being-in-thc-world"83 which is
formulated in Sein imd Zcit. Srcding, a fervent Nazi at this point, not only
rejects the category of "value neutrality" and criticizes "fieischwebend speculation," but tirelessly emphasizes the liberal implications of Weber's view,
which he repeatedly contrast-~ to Sein imd ?.eit.84
The category of bti1vrin-thc-1vorlti is also referred to by a major ideologist of the Third Reich, Franz Bt>hm, despite the fact that he does not
85
86
the name of the "seemingly supreme idea of scientific nature and objectivity, it elevues a-criticism to a principle, and spreads a fundamental
blindness." This prejudice is connected to that of the separation between
subject and object, and all this makes the understanding of"life in its facticiry [the Dasein] impossible. "92 These are cl earl~' the themes of Sein
und Zeit, which, from irs very beginning, aims ar refuting some fondamental philosophical propositions: among them, the separation betwe.en
subject and object, and the consequent creation of an object which can
be investigated in an objective and value-neutral way, transcending the
ineradicable plurality of values. These philosophical propositions will
later be denounced by Heidegger as typical of the modern world and
loaded with unacceptable liberal implications (cf. supra, chap. 2, 7 j. In
light of these considerations, we can perhaps interpret the meaning of an
enigmatic note included in rhe same course of lectures from the summer
of 1923: "Position free from conditioning = corrupted subjectivity"
(Freistiindiger Standpunkt = SubJcktsein w:rdorben).93 In Heidegger's
point of view, the Weberian man seems to personify the liberal, modern
man in his uprooting.
In contrast to Steding, Bohm and Schmitt, the categories of beingin-the-world and of "historicity" stir Mannheim's interest and, above all,
young Marcusc's appro\'al.94 Marcuse's enthusi<1sm seems to b~ directed
to the debate. between rwo opposed criticisms of the "abstract" subject:
on the one hand, a current rhat follows Burke, and on the other, a current started by Marx (who is in turn influenced by Hegel). Marx's criticism presupposes the developmc.nt of the universal concept of man and,
far from wanting to negate it, aims at forming it in the concreteness of
economic-social relationships as weJl.95 Even later on, Marcusc does not
seem to completely understand this debate. What is significant, however,
is the fact rhar, in reacting to Heidegger's rectrnial speech and ro his
increasing commitment to the Nazi regime, Marcusc feels the. need to
c1itically reexamine the category of historicity. Certainly, he does not
retract the appreciation he had expressed earlier:
The point of philosophical existenfialism was to re.gain the full males
cern:e of the historical subjc.cc, against the abstract "logical" mbject of
rational idealism. Thm, ir was to eliminate the dominion of the &JfO
cogir:o, which had lasted, undisputed, up rn Husserl. Heidegger's position up to Sein 1md Zcit represents the highest point reach.e.d by philosophy in this direction.
87
88
5.
....
~
.'.'
~:;:dii~:
As early as 1923, Heidegger criticizes phenomenology for its lack of historicity ( Geschichtslosi._qki:it) and for irs tendency to disregard the dimension of "being rooted in the soil" ( Bodenstiindigkeit) .97 Considering,
among other things, the important political implications it involves, this
seems to be the central point of Heidegger's break with Husserl.
Husserl's philosophy is imbued with universalistic motitS, and is focused
on the "development of humanity," of "all humanity," even throughout
the patriotic lectures delivered during the war.98 Nonetheless, during the
conflict, this universalism is spiritually guided by Germany, and in the
years between rhe wars, by the entire Western world. Ir. is above all after
1918 that Husserl focuses his attention on the theme of historicity. It
would seem that now his aim is to criticize one of the Kriegsideologie'~
cornerstones: rn fact, he describes the developing process of modernicy
under the. banner of the "struggle between newly awakened reason, and
the pmvers of historical reality [ Miichtc de1 historischen Wirklichkeit]."99
This struggle cominues with the efforr made by philosophy to build
"the first internationality starting from culture [ Bildung] rather tha11
from mere power"; 100 this "completely nen, internationality" is pre
sented as "a link created by the spirit of autonomy." 101 Internationalitii.t'. the term used by Husserl also aims at avoiding any confusion with
the existing Communist or Socialist Internationals. Yet, it is intercstine
to notice that, in order ro clarify his poinr of view, Husserl does not hes
itate to use the term "communist," even though only metaphorically.
The philosophical community, which constitutes the leitmotif of European history at its highest moments, freely and autonomously overcome~
social and national barriers without resorting to external constraints. Fo1
this reason, this philosophical community is, "'so to speak, communist,'
whereas the forced community that is formed during the Middle Agei
under the rule of"priests" is robe considered "imperialistic."102 For tht
present, too, what must be created is a "universal associatior
I Verbindu1t,1fJ of will which produces a unity of will with no impcrialisti'
organization of it." In other words, what must be chosen is a "corn mu
nist unity of will" against the "imperialistic" unity ofwiILl03
We need only briefly mention that the terms "imernational" am
"communism" were hared by borh Nazism and Heidegger, who saw ir
communism, and its atheism, the climax of the modern corruption o
89
90
.r
~::..
only the rerm "historiciry." We have. seen the reclaiming, on the part of
philosophy, of the righr to intervene in ''concrete historicity" in order to
profoundly change iu; DaJein. This rerm recurs very often: "Philosophy
is the organ of a new historical Dasi:in [ historisclJCS Dauin J of humanity,
of Dtisein founded upon the spirit of autonomy." This language is sim
ilar to that in Sein und Zeit. And when we finally read that even "the
problems of so .. called existence [ sogrnanntc E.~im:nz ], both individual
and national," arc included in "universal theory, that is, in philosophy," !OS every doubt seems to dissipate.. The Dasein that had be.en
emphasized by Heidegger, starting from that da which underlined it5
absolute uniqueness and immunity to general rules, can instead be,
according to Husserl, radically transformed by philosophical universality
This is the starting point of the contrast that Husserl, the founder oJ
phenomenology, establishes with Heidegger, the theoretician of a category that he finds not only philosophically debatable, but above all.
politically compromised. The historicity regarded as nontranscendable i!
instead, according to Husserl, an unduly naturalized hist0ricity. If\.re de
nor ascribe a "physiological meaning" to the rerm "life" and inste.ad con
sider it "a life able to produce spi1itual frJrmations ... , a life that creaw
culture in the. unity of a historicity," ic becomes dear that hisco1icit:y ca11
express itself within "very different comrnuniries, simple or articulated.
such as the family, the. nation, and overnacional formations" ( Uberna
tion).109 An overnational formation is not in and of itself the denial ol
historicity. Together with the "family" and the "people," rhe "commu
nity of the people" ( Viilktr;_ffemeinschaft) is also included, or can be
included, within the "essential structures of human historicity. "110
Human historicity must not be considered as motionless in time: "[A
revolutionizing [ Rnmltttionierim/il of historicity" is possible, and it doe:
occur. lt may consist in the "history of the disappear.mce of finit<
humanity within the becoming of a humanity with infinite rasks."ll
Husserl bestows an all hut negative meaning to the process of intemaliza
tion that he believes he observes, at lea.~t with regards to the West. "Th4
spiritual telos of Europeat1 humanity" ends up including "the individua
telos of single nations." This assertion-Husserl points our-is not a spec
ulative interpretation of our historicity, but the expression of a vivid pre
sentiment that emergc.s from a reflection free of any prejudice." Wha
Husserl think~ he can recognize is a reality in progre.ss. On the other hand
"actual historical humanity is not always shaped in rhc same way." lksidci
the extreme division between "familiarity and e.xrraneousness in relation t
91
geographical distance and historical development" is "a fundamemaJ category of any historicity. "'112 In parti.cular, in Europe (which for Husserl
basically coincides with the \Vest), "'extraneousness'' i1Kreasingly yields to
"familiarity." Heimatlichkeit. it is worth reflecting upon this term. In contrast to "har was claimed by ma.ny passionate representatives of a clearly
conservative or reactionary Kultttrkritik, che development of modernity
and of modern Europe is not the corruption that culminates in the
Heimatlosigkeit, that is, in the loss of roots and historicity. On the contrary,
it is the. passage from a narrower to a wider historicity.
On the other hand, the "revolutionizing of historicity" does not
only consist in the dislocation of geographical borders; there is a more
profound and significant revolution. A~ philosophy and the theoretical
spirit emerge and take root in consciousness, historicity's naturalistic fixation is questioned, regardle.ss of how big its borders are. If we move on
to "a universal consideration of the historicity of human Da.scin
[ Geschichtlichkeit des mensch/ichen Dasein l in all of its forms of communiry and in its historical degrees," we realize that there is "one first hisroricity" ( eitu ersr:e Histt1rizitat), intended here in a dearly negative
sense: "We are speaking of the natural, primitive [ urmtlcbsig] state of
mind which is typical of natural lifr. in a primitive way," and which is
characte1ized by stillness and immobilicy. ll 3 This criticism seems ro
target the theoreticians of an immobile historicity and, above all, the
enthusiasts of the blood and of the soil. Regardless of its possible racist
implications, this ideology is the expression of a naturalistic and "primitive" state of mind that-Husserl seems to highlight this point with reference to Germany--can manifest itself also in "superior culrnres." And
yet, this primitivism cannot resist history: "[I ]n the natural state of mind
of historically [hist01isch] factual humanities," sooner or later a situation
arises that makes the "revolution" inevirabJe. L14
Once this heavy and primitive naturalism has been shaken oft~ what
emerges is nor an "empirical hi.storicity" ( cmpiriscJJe Gcschichtlicbkcit), l I;;
but an "absolute historicity"' ( ab.1oltttc Gcschicbtlicbluit), typical of a
"transcendental community of subjects. "L Lti At this point rhe juxtaposition of this historicity to the ideology of blood and soil, as well as to Heidcggcrian histori(:ity, becomes clear. The latter two themes, of course,
must not be confused or blended together, but the fact is that in order
to confront Nazism, Husserl must also confront the ('.Cntral categories in
Heidegger's philosophy.
92
6.
.:n: ::
93
pra.is, pure theory establishes the norms and the values of a praxis base.d
upon a universal rationality~ Certainly, this transcendcncy of norms and
values with regard to historicity cannot be accepted by Heidegger.
Indeed, he retorts by saying that the Greeks did not aim "at conforming
praxis to theory, but that on the contrary, rheir goal was to conceive
theory it~elf as the highest achicvcmenr of an authentic praxis echtcr
Pra.1.."is'j."1 24 In this sense, far from being the pure contemplation of uni
versa! norms and values, theory-or philosophy-is rooted in a concrete
historicity where it function!; simultaneously as a frmnding and a deter
mining force. Husserl seems to be familiar with Heidegger's recto1ial
speech when he insists that the theoretical state of mind, which emerge.cl
for the first time in ancient Greece, "is totally unpracrical." It "is founded
upon a voluntary epocbt; from every natural praxis, and thus also from
every higher praxis whkh intends to serve the narnral dimension within
professional life." This, however, docs not mean that praxis is separated
from theory by an abyss. Theory, on the contrary, "becomes a new praxis,
a universal critique of any form and goal of life and of every cultural for
marion." Theory aims at "serving humanity" as a whole, "in a new
way, "125 and not only one specific state or people, as Heidegger t.b.ollght.
Heidegger, too, seems to be a target of Husserl's criticism of the
ruinous change that has occurred in the "spirit of the time" (Zcitpeist) in
Europe. This change has led to the reje.ction of the most precious heritage of rationalistic and Enlighrenment tradition:
This reference to rhe ideological crisis of the "youth" is all the more significant if we keep in mind that Heidegger himseJfI27 made reference to the
"young, the youngest force of the people," in his exaltation of Germany's
National Socialist chan.ge of direction. In aflirming that the m1e signifi
cance of Greek theory and science can certainly nor be grasped by turning
to "international organizations,"128 Heidegger seems to be targeting
Husserl, who, as we know, emphasized the important role of the world's
scientific community and of "internationality beginning with culture."
94
.........
,.
.r. ."
The insistence that science is an autonomous "cultural value" ( Kulturwcrtj tlppears to Heidegger as a "reactionary interpretation [ rcaktionifre Deutt11~] of science" itselt~ 129 not only in the sense that it draws
from a dulled cultural tendency, but perhaps also because it is in sharp
conrrast to the German National Socialist revolut.ion. We arc citing one
of Heidegger's first lectures of the 1935 summer semester. This con
demnation, cxpres.<>cd also in political terms, had perhaps already been
uttered, and Husserl may very well have kept it in mind during the conference he held in Vienna in May of the same year. There, he clarifies his
position \ith regard to rationalistic tradition which, he argues, should be
reformed and renovated, but certainly not rejected. He adds: "I believe
that I, the supposed reactionary [ dcr l>trrneintliche Reaktionifrl, am
much more radical and revolutionary than those who nowadays flaunt a
merely verbal radicalism. "130 If not a direct response to Heidegger's lecture, this statement undoubtedly takes its aim at the theoreticians of
what he considers an overly isolated and motionle.ss "historicity."
Husserl, therefore, feds the need to defend himself in advance from the
accusations that he professes "an intelkctualism lost in a theory
estranged from the world," and that he follows the ideal of a "humanity
superior to its destiny, and satisfied" with pure scientific contemplation.131 We know that "destiny" is a key word in the Kricgsideo/ogie and
in Sein 1md Zeit, and that it is, in fact, strictly linked to the category of
"historicity." "Destiny" also plays an important part in the rectorial
speech, which is imbued with the pathos of "German destiny"; faced
with this destiny, mere theoretical knowledge must give up and admit its
own "impotence" ( Unkraft).132 In the 1922-23 text, Husserl depicts
reason as struggling against "the powers of historical reality" (Miichtr.
dcr historischen Wfrklichkeit). In contrast to this, Heidegger's recrorial
speech repeatedly insists on the absolute "predominance [over theoretical knowledge] of all the powers which constitute the world [ Obc1'1nacht aller wdtbildendcn Machu] of human Da.rein": the "powers of
Dasein," which arc the powers of"historico-human Dasein," of"man's
being."133 Husserl regards all of this as the surrender of reason.
Rejecting the accusation of intellectualism and of indifference to "destiny," he declares that be does nor want to disregard historicity, but on
the contrary, his intention is to "revolutionize" it in a positive and
fruitful manner. In this sense, he believes chat he can consider himself far
more "revolutionary" than his critics, who are tied to <\ static, natural
istic vision of historicity.
7.
95
Toward the end of the First World War, a new element intervenes in contrast to the "ideas of 1914." It is the Bolshevik Revolution. On the same
day of his abdication, Wilhelm II declares that "faced with the danger that
threatens all of Europe, it would be absurd to continue the war. Hopefully, the enemy will eventually recognize the danger bound to strike
European civilization if Germany is abandoned to Bolshevism," or if she
is forced to accept peace agreements so harsh that Bolshevism's victory is
facilitated. The armistice ha.~ yet to be signed, and the emperor--0r exemperor-of the agonizing Second Reich already sees himself leading a
crusade against the Bolshevik and Eastern threat.134 A new theme
emerges, partly in contradiction to the preceding topoi: On the one hand
the shallow "rationalism" and the even shallower "empiricism" (Latin and
Anglo-Saxon, respectively) of the countries to the west of Germany 135 is
still denounced. On the other hand, however, there now emerges the
pathos of the unity of the West, regarded in its authenticity and defined
by its opposition to the threat from the East. There is sometimes an
attempt to solve this contradiction by distinguishing, on a linguistic level,
between the "liberal Western world [West]," that is, the "Roman/AngloSaxon"l36 world, and the Abend/and, the authentic West, which, far from
excluding Germany, sees her as its center and guide.
If there is any self-criticism regarding Germany's view of the outcome of the First World War, it is not constituted by the war itself, but
by the division and the crisis of the West. In 1931 Jaspers ob.serves:
Politics as a selfisl1 calculation of a territorial unit) of the state considers
everybody else, according to their configuration, as allies or enemies.
Against those who are closest to it as far as history and culrnre, a state
sides with those who are most distant .... England and France have
used Indian and Black troops on the front at the Rhine. Germany
would not refosc to side with Russia, if this alliance offered her some
possibility to regain her frcedom.l3i
96
...~~~-......ii
::;:---
Negroes for the cause of 'man's rights.' " But the "massive" use of colored people during the first world war brrngs about a radical shift in
power relationships, at rhe expense ofrhe West.138
The situation is all the more serious since, even after t.hc war, France
still sides with the colored populations of her African colonies; but the
fact that Negroes familiarize themselves with the Western art of war dangerously undermines whire pmver.139 Therefore, Spengler concludes, "it
was not Germany, but the West that lost the world war when it lost the
respect of the colored peoples. "140 It is above all the Western dcmocra
cies, Jlinger resumes, that now risk the loss oftheir colonies in exchange
for the. "war loans of blood and labor" they received from the colored
peoples from 19 l 4 to l 918 .141 If anyone can claim victory, complains
Spengler, it is Russia, a country that, with the Bolshevik Revolution, has
cast off her" \vhite' mask" and has become "again a great Asian power,
a 'Mongolian' power, burning with 'fiery har.c' for Europe." Russia's
appeals for revolt, addressed to the colonized counrries and peoples,
reveal her as an integral part of the "entire colored population of the
earth, which she has inspired with the concept of common resistance"
and the struggle against "white humanity."142 lt is truly disastrous that,
in order to weaken and dismember Germany, France docs not hcsit;lte to
support the revolutionary uprisings of German communists (who are, at
least objectively, in alliance with the Soviet Union), and to side with the
colored populations. In conclusion, "Eurc.H\fi-ican France"l43 contributes ro the mortal danger that threatens the Western world.
Jaspers contrasts ro the fatal division that rook place during the First
World War (and that persists even after the war), a "policy founded upon
a histmical consciousnm of the 111/JOle. This policy would be able to envision, beyond the inrcrests of any single Stace, the foture interests of existence at large, which arc vaguely foreshadowed in the contrast between
the Western and the Asiatic nature, between European freedom and
Russian fanaticism. Such a policy would not overlook the profound
human and spiritual tics that unite rhe German nature with that of the
Larin and Anglo-Saxon peoples, and they would be horrified by the
treason which has been perpetrated over and over against these affini
ties."1 44 Within this framework, again with reference to the tragic divi
sion of the West, Jaspers complains that war
is no longer a conflict between opposing faiths, but ben\'een opposing
imeresrs; not 3 struggle. between aurhemi<: civi!izacions, but between
administrative bodies .... vVe no longer reach a historical decision, as
97
with, for example, the vicrory of the Greeks over the Persians, which
still re.presenrs the foundation of the exi.~tencc of rhe Western man's
personality, or with rhe victory of the Romans over che Carthaginians,
which consolidated the conque.st. oftbc Grccks.14.'.\
The new Persia that threatens the Western world is clearly the Soviet
Union. Jaspers's argument rakes on apocalyptic tones: "Today bq,rins the last
campa.ign a,_qainst the nobility. ... In the past, revolutions could take place
without annihilating man; if this one succeeds, it will annihilate man. nJ 46
8.
The appeal to save the Western world is the Jcitmot~f that characterizes
Heidegger's support of Nazism and of his subsequent loyalry to the
regime. Continuously recurring are the patboi of the "Western man," of
"Western DaJcin" (abendliindisches Da.scin), and of the "Western spiritual force." 14 7 We must-Heidegger observes in 1937-confront "the
imminent uprooting of the West," foil the "'threat against the West," and
"save" it.1 4 8 After Germany's defeat, Heidegger himself will declare that
he embraced Nazism in consideration of the "historical situation of the
West," out of a sense of "\.Vestern responsibility,"149 with the hope that
Hitler, too, would meet his own "Western responsibility."150
Carl Schmitt's position is not very different from Heidegger's. In 1936,
he recalls the "great speech," delivered on March 7, at the Reichstag, in
which "the Fiihrer and Reidt5kanzler Adolf Hitler" spoke of the European
nations a..~ one single "family," and of Europe as the common "house" of this
family. Schmitt empha5izes "the national and viilkisc/J kinship among European peoples," in cona-ast to the peoples who are foreign to Europe and to
the West. "The latter include Abyssinia-in which Fascist Italy reftLses to
acknowledge a "homogeneity on the level of civilization"--and the USSR,
which Germany's enemies have unfrwmnately included among the "community of European States."151 Schmitt criticizes the treaty made by France and
the Soviet Union on May 2, 1935, after the latter becomes part of the League
of Narjons and its Council. In other words, he protests the unravelling of the
c1wd-On sanim.ire that is created immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution. It
is within this same context that we must interpret Heidegger's statement,
made during d1e summer semester of 1935, according to ..vhich Europe, ''in
her ruinous blindness, fis] always on the point of cutting her own throat. "152
98
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"ff"~~~
...
.. , .
._?;;:~::.
;-i;;r,;:::
99
100
WAR.
9.
I 01
by Jaspers,171 who certainly does not embrace the regime, but who,
nonetheless, in 1935 ends an essay on Kant by asserting that rhe great
philosophers' voices will be heard only "as long as Western people
live." l 72 And finally, Husserl himself speaks of "\Vestcrn humanity." 173
Far from being weakened by the massive presence of colonized and
colored populations on the front during rhe First World War, Euroceo
tric prejudice, which is the heritage of a long history, and colonial tradition in particular, becomes even stronger. Shortly after the outbreak of
the conflict, Thomas !viann criticizes the Entente powers for unleashing,
against Germany's presumed "barbarity," "Kirghizcs, }ltpanesc, Gurkhas,
and Hottentots."174 And later on, Weber exalts the German people as a
great people of culture and civilization ( ein grf!_fles Kulturvolk), in contrast to the "Negro from Senegal" (cf. su.pm, chap. 1, 3 ), who has been
called to fight for Germany's enemies. Germany's culture and political
press is not alone in insisting on this theme. As an ally of the countries
that have resorted to these populations, Italy shares the advantage thar
comes from their presence in the conflict. In order to demonstrate the
inevitable realistic unscrupulousness of the states' action, Bcnedctro
Croce writes in 1922: "We have seen France quiveringly solicit anyone's
help, and celebrate barbarian savages, the Senegalese and the Indian
Gurkhas who were trampling on her sweet land."li5
When speaking about the "Papuan," Husserl seems to h;we trouble
subsuming him under the concept of man:
The definirion of "reason" is very broad. According to the rraditionai
meaning, man is a rational being, and in this sense, the Papuan, too, is a
man and not an animal. ... Bm in the same way as man, including the
Papuan, represcms a new degree of animaliry wirh regards to animals, so
philosophical reason represents a new de.gree of humanity and reason.176
102
:.r::
.. I
.
Hegel), provisionally I would make him a slave; and this would be the pedagogy of rhe case, excepr that later I would have to see regarding his
grandchildren and great-grandchildren ... .' " Croce seems w agree with
Labriola for the most part, ar least judging from his assertion that it is necessary to "find a suitable and concrete way to spread culture. And this way
can sometimes even mean the odi profanum ru{qus, and violently pushing
people away from rhe doors of the temple of science, and forcing them to
stay our until they become worthy of it." 178 Gramsci's irony, then,
be.comes dear: we recognize that "primitive people'' are mature, or able to
quickly become mature, only when we are about to send them ro the
front, after training them to "use a rifle" rather than "a bow, a boomerang,
or a blowgun."1 79 And yet, despite expressing some sympathy for the regulating function attributed to Fascism, with his attitude toward the
Papuan, Croce places himself in line \\ith liberal tradition. Didn't John
Stuart Mill declare that "despotism is a legitimate form of government
when dealing with barbarians," though this statement is contained in an
essay dedicated, even in the tide, to the exaltation offi-eedom?l80
If Weber speaks of "civilized people" ( KulturPolk) and Husserl ol
"civilized humanity" ( KT-tltitrmcnschheit), Heidegger speaks, with a similar meaning, of "historical people" (geschichtliches Volk),181 that is, ol
"historical humankind" lwschichtliclm M.enschenrum), 182 with reference
to Germany in particular, and the Western world in general. In the. same
way in which We.her and Husserl present the "Negro from Senegal" and
.. the Papuan" as the antithesis of civilization, Heidegger presents the
"Hottenrots."183 Therefixe, what leads Husserl to this grave position is
not humanistic universalism, I 84 but rather the influence that the cult oJ
uniqueness, inherent in the category of "hisroriciry," continues to bear
upon him. With regard to this point, the most significant difference
between Husserl and Heidegger is their dissimilar conception of th(
Western world's geographical borders, and therefore their conception ol
"hisroricity" or "civilization," and of the form of this "historicity." The
latter is, for Husserl, less imbued with the cult of roots and with ties t(
the soil than it is for Heidegger. Whar follows from this is that Hci
degger sees even the Western world, in the strictest sense of the word, a.:
threatened by the risk of "historical death" and "the loss of historicity'
as a consequence of the ruinous leveling and uprooting process causec
by "democracy" and modernity (cf. infra, chap. 5, 2).
First the outbreak of the war, which is interpreted and experienced a
the dash between opposed cultures, or even between civiliz.-ition and bar
l03
barism; then the terror and anguish caused by the Bolshevik Revolution
and by the call for the uprising of the colonized peoples, which incites the
impulse to rebel: all of this meshes with the consolidated Eurocentrism of
colonialistic tradition, and causes a pathos of the Western world and civilization. The latter two undergo countless re-definitions, but they always
remain in opposition to those who are excluded from the Western world
or from civilization. The Western world is firmly identified with civilization, and is called upon not only to defend itself from external threats, but
also to preserve its own purity. Unfortunately, Spengler observes, France
does not hesitate to regard the Negroes and the populations of her
colonies as fri;res de coulem, "in contrast to the Germanic sense of race, the
French one docs not rebel against the recognition of Negroes as equal,"
and does not even oppose "mL'{ed marriages." 185 In one of)aspers's texts
of 1931 we read: "Races intermingle. Historical civilizations and cultures
are uprooted and plunge into the rechnico-economic world, and into a
vacant inrellecrualism."186 And yet, in the same text, Jaspers, perhaps referring to anti-Semirism in particular, condemns the "theory of races" (cf~
infra, chap. 4, 4). In his vigorous defense of the Jews, Jaspers highlights
their great contribution to Western culture and history. Their subsumption
under the Western world seems to be the presupposition, if not of safety
and physical i.megrit:y, at least of full political and civil right~.
Nazism, instead, will end up considering the Jews foreign to the
Western world, and with them, not only the Gypsies and the Indios, but
also the populations of Eastern Europe. In this way, the nominalistic corruption of the concept of man reaches irs extreme conclusion. The least
refined of the ideologists, and Carl Schmitt himself during the least glorious moment of his career, no longer contrast the universal concept of
man to that of "Western man"; they now speak, even more curtly, of the
"German man."187 According to Hitler, if one must speak of man's
rights, it is dear that the only authentic and "most sacred r(1Jht ~{man"
consists in preserving purity and ensuring the dcvelopmcm of the "best
rype of man" ( bestes Menschcntu.ms). 188
10.
104
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I05
106
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the war the campaign against "merchants" continue.s. Their number had
increased with the arrival of the Bolsheviks. Aft.er all, one can speak ol
"'business" and mercantile "morals" ( Geschii.ftsmoral) also with regards
to Marx's theorie.s.205 The expression Gescha.ftsmoral comes from Spengler, for whom it is unquesrionable that in the USSR, as well as in the
United States, "life has a merely economical structure, with no d.e.pth
f.Tir:fe] to it." 206 It is within this framework that we can locate Heidegger's Einfii/Jrunlf in dfr Metaphysik: The true nature of the modern
world results from the repulsive spectacle offered by the United Stam
and the Soviet Union, and its "predominant dimensions'' are "extension," "'number," and "quantity"; it is an existence that. lacks "any
depth" (jede Tiefe).207
According to Heidegger, the German people, the "metaphysical
people" par excellence,208 rise against all of this. At this point-i11
1935--the term "'metaphysics" is not yet burdened with the negative
connotation that it will acquire later; it is precisel~r this discourse tha1
reveals its continuity with respect ro the topoi of the First World War
During the first conflict, Thomas Mann refers to the German people ~
the "people of metaphysics." He then contrasts Germany to the mechan
ical, "antimetaphysical" position of Western democracies and to theii
"mere culture of utility. "209 But in the Weimar years, Mann, by nmv ~
lucid critic of the turbid ideology that is circulating in his country, movei
drastically away from that which he now defines and condemns as the
"ideology of war" (Kriegsidcologie). He is dearly set to dismantle th<
very same topoi he had helped to spread during the war. He criticize!
those who insist on the incompatibility between their own "Germar
spirit" on the one band, and democracy and socialism, with their "eco
nomic materialism," on the other. To this, he objects that "de.mocrac1
can be something more German than the imperial pomp of operettas,'
and that, far from being synonymous with superficiality, democracy car
well "have depth [ Niveau], even the depth of German romanticism."2ll
While the persistent Kric,_f!sideologie continues to thunder against th1
mercantile spirit, Mann cites Novalis's passionate praise of the Handel.1
geist (business spirit) as the "spirit of culture" (Geist der Kultif.r).11
These quotations and references do not attempt to provide a rigorou
historical reconstruction, but they respond to a need for cultural policiei
We are in the presence of an effort that aims at restoring the right of cit
.izenship to everything that the Kriegsideologie had patriotically expellec
And yet, this effort is not very successful: After all, Mann is well awar
l 07
of going against the current. Immediately after the end of the war, Jaspers
defines the "liberalism" of Western countries as "a-metaphysical" (cf.
supra, chap. 2, l ). A few years later, Sombart declares that "the German
spirit is mctaph;vsical," in opposition to the deafness typical of the AngloSaxon and Latin peoples who are unable to perceive the dimension of
"transcendence" (referred co in a broad sensc).2l2 In the 1930s, the
increasing popularity of Nazi ideology in German universities is favored
bv the vision, widely spread among professors and students, of the
German people as a "metaphysical" people, in violent contrast to the
superficiality of the democratic, mechanistic Western world.2 l 3 Two years
afi:er the Nazis' rise to power, the same year in which Einftilmmg in die
Metaph_vsik is published, Heyse observes that "the Germanic people stand
as the bearers pa1 excellence of life's metaphysical values. "214
NOTES
1. Werner Sombart, Hib1dle1 und Heiden: Pt:i.triorischc Gcsinnungm
(Milnchen-1..epzig; Duncker & Humblot, J 915 ), p. 18.
2. Ernsr Troelrsch, "lJber einige Eigenti.imlichkeite.n der angclsachsichen Zivilisa.tion" (1916), in Deutscher Get.rt und Wcsteitropa. (Ti.ibingen,
1925), p. 115.
3. Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehrc des Thomas .Hobbes.
Sinn 1md Fel1lsch/ag cines politischen Symbals (1938), pp. 4 lff.
4. Arthur Moeller van der Bruck, Das D1ittc Reicb(Berlin, 1923), p. 87.
As for Georg Quabhe, cf. A. Mohler, Die konsen,11.tfre Rcvoltltion i11 Deutsch/and l918-1932: Ein Handb11ch (Darmstadt, 1989), p. 112.
5. Friedrich Meinecke., Die E11tsteh1111g des .Historismus (Milnchen,
1965 i, pp. 274-81.
6. Karl Mannheim, "Das konservative Denken. Soziologische Beitrage
zum Werden des politisch-hisrorischen Denkens in Deurschland" (1927), in
Wissensoziolq_nic: AumaJJZ aus dcm Werk, ed. Kurr H. Wolff (Berlin, 1964), pp.
408-508 (in particular, p. 466).
7. Oswald Spengler, ]ahre dcr Entscheidung (Miinchen, 1933), pp. 8,
85; and Der Untergan,q des Abmdlandes (Miinchen, 1980), p. I 063.
8. Spengler, Der Untei;11a11g des Abendlandcs, p. 28.
9. Ibid., pp. 32, 613.
IO. Sornbart, Handler und .Heiden, p. 141.
11. Werner Sombart, Der prolctarischc Sozialism.us ("Marxismus") vol. 1,
(Jena, 1924), p. 252.
12. Ernst }i.inge.r, Der Arbeiter (Stuttgart: Bibliothek der Moderne,
108
1982), pp. 14, 22ff ln 1951, Hinger will explicitly quote Burke (cf De
Waldgang," in Siimtlfrhc We1ke, vol. 7 [Snmgart, 1978), p. 297), bur Burke'
direct or indirecr influence is mosr.ly powerful hetween rhe wars.
13. Joseph de Maistre .. "Considerations sur la France" (1797), in Ouir1
c"mpletcs, vol. l (Lyon, 1884), p. 74.
14. Mannheim, "Das konservati1re De.nken," p. 467.
15. G. Anders, "Nihilismus und Existenz" (1946), in Guido Schnee
berger, Nachltst: z11 Hdde.!l!Jer: Doku111ent1' zu seinem Leben and Dmken (Ben
1962), p. 267.
16. About this, and on the considerations on Nietzsche made in thi
Domenico Losurdo, "Nietzsche, il moderno e la tradizione liberale,
chapter,
in Af1,t11morfasi d.d moderno, ed~. Gian .Mario Cazzaniga, Domenico Losurdc
and Livio Sichirollo (Urbino, 1988), pp. 115-40 (in panic.ular, pp. 126ff) Si@
niticantly enough, Heidegger's nomimtlism is highlighted, cxalced, and place1
on the same line with Burke and de Maistre by a major representative of th
French Nouvelle Droite: cf Alain de Benoist, "Fondements nominalistes d'un
auitude devant la vie," in Lcsideesa l'endroit(Paris, 1979), pp. 3lff. On the ca1
cgory of "anthropoiogical nominalism," ct: Domenico Losurdo, "Ri:J.lismu
und Nominalismus als politische Karegorien," in Philosophic als Verteidigung d1
Ganzen dcr Vt1'"1111r~ft, e.ds. Domenico Losurdo and Hans G. Sandkiihler (Kl:>lr
1988), pp. 170--96; and Domenico Losurdo, "II concetto di uomo tra Marx
ii liberalismo," in Mondopmiio, (August-September 1989): 123-32.
17. Alfred Baeumler, "Nierzsche" ( 1930), in Studien zur deutsc/Jcn Gei.
tt:{lft~schichte (Berlin, 1937 ), p. 247.
18. Hans Heyse, Idee1mdEdstrnz(Hamburg, 1935),pp. l40ff, 104, 14
19. Karl Lowith, "Mein Leben" in Deutschl1md i>or 1md nacb 1933: Ei:
Bericht (Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 36, 14ln. 15.
20. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zdt, 27 in Gesamtausgabc, vol.
(Frankfurt, 1980), p. 171; English translation, Being and Time, trans. Joh
Macquarrie. and Edward Robinson (Ne~' York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 166
21. Martin Heidegger, "Anmerkungcn zu Karl Jaspers 'Psychologie d(
Welransd1auungen,'" in Gesa.mta1'{11abc, vol. 9, p. 32.
22. Alfred Bacumler, Nic1zsc/1e, dcr l'hilosoph u11d Politiker (Leipzi1
J 931 ), p. l 30. The passage cited by Bacumler i5 containe.d in rhc. first version c
rhe preface ro Die Geburt diw Tra._Jfi.idic (1871 ). Ct~ Friedrich Nietzschi
Samtlic/1c WcYke: Kritischc Studiu1auwabc, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzin
Monrinari, vol. 7 (MiinchenBcrlin-New York), p. 355.)
23. S0ren Kierke.gaard, "Eine literarische. Anzeige" ( 1846 ), GermJ
translation trom the original Danish, in Gesammelte Werke, ed~. Emanuel Hirsc
and Hayo Gerdes (Gi.itersloh, 1983), vol. 17, pp. 89-97.
24. Thomas Mann, Betri1clmmger1 cines Unpolitischen, ed. Hanno He
bling (Frankfort a.M., 1988), pp. 242, 108, 163.
25. Carl Schmitt, Uber die drci Arten des reclmwissenschaj't!ichr.n Denki:
ct:
g. ,,..,
.. :
,.
;.;:
~::
109
(Hamburg, 1934) p. 44. In this essay, Schmitt seems to take a stand against
"nominalism" in the legal and political field, in rhe name. ofrhe concreteness of
the political community (pp. 8ft). In reality, this emphasis on concrete historicity
is developed precisely on the basis of the nominalistic disintegration of the. universal concept of man. Som ban falls into the same misunderstanding, as he criticizes at the s.m1e time Marx'.~ "nom.inalism" (cf. Der p1YJk.tarisd1c Sozialismus,
vol. 1, pp. 15 lft), and his patho.t of the unity of humankind (pp. 242-fl3 ).
26. Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bc11egtmg, llc1/k (Hamburg, 1933), p. 44.
27. Carl Schmitt, Nati-011.alsoz.ialismmund VolkC1Teclit{lkr\in, 19::\4), p. 7.
28. Carl Schmitt, "Faschistische. und nazionalsozialisrische Rcchtswis
se.nschafr.," Deutsche Juristcn-Zeitimg, ( 1936 ): 619,
29. Carl Schmitt, "Das Zeitalrer der Neurralisierungen und Empolirisieruogen" (1929), in l'ositionen 1md Bfgrif)I' im Kampf mit WcimarGenF
Versailles 1929-1939(Hamburg, 1940), p. 124.
30. Heyse, ldee und fa"istenz., p. 314.
31. Ibid., p. 121; and Franz Bohm, AntiCantsianismus: Dcutsd1c
Philosophic im Widcrstand (Leipzig, 1939 ), pp. 42, 53.
32. Franz Bohm, "Gegenwartigkeir und Transzendenz der Geschichte,"
Zcitschrift.fiir deutschc Kulturpbilosophie. Neue Fo{IJc des Logos l (19 35 ): 159-78
(in particular, p. 178).
33. R. Craemer, "Geschichrswissenschaft un<l politischer Geist,"
Zciischr~(tfar dczttsche Kult1trphilosophie. Ne1ie Folge des Logos l (1935}: 179201 (in particular pp. 179, l99ff.)
34. Otto F. Bollnow, "Zurn Bcgriff der Ganzheit bei Orhmar Spann,"
Finanzarchil'. Neuc Fo{.qe 6, no. 2 (1938): 271-315 (in panicular, p. 286).
35. Ibid., p. 304.
36. Ihid., p. 315.
37. Oswald Spengler, Der Mensch und die Technik: Bcitrag z11 dncr
Philvsophie du l.cbens(Mi.inchen, 1971 ), p. 9.
38. Bollnow, "'Zurn Begriff der Ganzbeit bei Orhmar Spann," p. 305.
39. Ernst Jiingcr, "Der Kampfals innere.s Erlebnis" (1922), in Siim.tliche
Werke, vol. 7, pp. 49ff
40. Ibid., pp. llff
41. ln a 1933 essay, Bollnow declares that his attcmpr is co investigate the
problems that arise "in the fie.Id of Heidegger's philosophy." Cf Otto F.
Bollnow, "Ober Heideggers Ve.rhaltnis zu Kant," Nmc Jahrbiicher fii.r Wisscnschaft und fugendbild1mg ( 1933 ): p. 222.
42. Heidegger, "Anmerkungm zu Karl Jaspers," p. 11.
43. Martin Heidegger, Die Sclbstbehaiiptimg dn drntscben U1ii'r'trsitii.t
(Frankfort, 1983), pp. l8ff, 15.
44. Heidegger's "letter ro Carl Schmitr," dared August 22, 19::\3, was
published in Telos 72 ( 1987): 132. [n Italy, right after the outhreak of the First
World War, Gimanni Gentik makes reference m Heraclitus as a supporr for his
,.,
..
'l
i'
110
S-~i1~
-~~1:::
r--
i:.... ~-
~::
.:::....~.
r
interventionist position: cf. "La filosofia della guerra,'"' in Opere, ed. Herve J
Ca\'allera (Firenze, 1989), p. 3.
45. Bohm, AntiCartesianismus, p. 113.
46. Baeumler, Nietzsche, der Philosoph und Politiker, p. 67.
47. }linger, "Der Kampfals inneres Erlcbnis," p. 49.
48. Cf. "Adolf Hitlers Geheinm:de vor dem "Militiirischen Fiihrernacl
wuchs" vom 30 Mai 1942," in Hitlers Tisch~qespriiche, ed. Henry Picker (Fran!
furt a.M.-Berlin, 1989), p. 491.
49. lbid., p. 492.
50. Alfred Rosen berg, Der M,vthus des 20. ]ahrhunderts (Mu nchen, 19 3?
pp. 22, 40, B6.
51. Mann, Betraclrtun...;ren eines Unpolitischm, pp. 456, 52ff, passim.
52. Ibid., p. 48.
53. Ibid., pp. 375, 51.
54. Ibid., pp. 50, 48.
55. Ibid., p. 51.
56. Ibid., p. 161.
57. Ibid., p. 575.
58. Ibid., p. 43.
59. Ibid., p. 5 l.
60. Jiinger, Der Arbeiter, p. 43.
61. Ludwig Klages, Der Geist als lVuimadn:r der Seele (Leipzig, 1929).
62. Th<imas Mann, .. Deursche Ansprache. Ein Appell an der Vernunfi
in "Essll.YS, ed. Hermann Kurzke {Franfurt a.M., 1986), p. 115.
63. Rosenberg, Der /l(vthus des 20. ]ahrhundens, pp. l 36ff
64. Ibid., p. 2.
65. Heyse, Idec und bcistenz, p. 293.
66. Cf. Lllwirh, Mein Leben, p. 50.
67. Hinger, Der Arbeiter, p. 43.
61!. Cf. Jacques Derrida, De /-'esprit: Heide.!l!ftr et I.a question (Paris, 198;
69. Jiingcr, De1 Arbeiter, p. 63.
70. Heidegger, Die &lbstbchauptimg, pp. 17, 11.
71. Ibid., pp. 15, l 3ff.
72. Ibid., pp. 14, 16, 12.
73. In Schneeberger, NaciJ/ese zu HeidC!l!fCI\ pp. 180ff
74. Manin Heidegger, "Einfuhrnng in die Mcraphysik," in Gemmta.1
gr:ibe, vol. 40, p. 42.
75. Ibid., p. 50. Ct'. also Heidegger, Die Selbstbehattptung, p. 14.
76. Heidegger, "Einfiihrung in die Mecaphysik," p. 50.
77. Martin Heidegger, "Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik," in Gem:
tausgabe, vol. 29-30, p. 259.
78. Manin Heidegger, ..Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung
abendllindischen Denken," in GesamtaUf_lfabe, \'OI. 44, p. 150.
l l I
Heidegger, Sein tmd Zcit, l 0, pp. 61-67; Bcin.,.111md Timi\ pp. 72, 74.
Heidegscr, "Nietzschcs metaphysische Grundsrc!lung," p. I 27.
LOwith, Mein Leben, p. 57.
Jurgen Habermas, "Heidegger: \Verk und \Veltanschauung, Vorwort," in
Heid'i!{IJl!I' und dcr Nn.tionalsozialimms, ed. Victor Farias (Frankfort, I 989), p. 13.
83. Chrisroph Sreding, Das R<'ich 1md die Knmkheit d1~/' mropiiischm
Kultul'(Hamburg, 1938), p. 129. Heidegger's influence on Stcding is emphasized in the introduction (p. }.'Vii) by Walter Frank, who was president of the
Reich's institute for the history of the ne.w Germany, and who was on very good
rerms with Rosenberg (cf Leon Poliakm and Joseph Wtilt~ Das Drirtc Reich
1md s1<inr DenktT [Miinchen, 19781, p. 51, passim).
84. Seeding, Das Reich und die Krankh1,it, pp. 71, 125, 14-3, 395, pas.rim.
85. Bi>hm, Ami-Ca.rtesumimms, pp. 96, 98, 144, 194.
86. Ibid., pp. l 58ff
87. Ibid., pp. 98ff.
88. Ibid., p. 144.
89. Ibid., pp. 32ff The fact that "'di~ ist~ is already in quotation marks in
Bohm's text could be an indirect citation.
90. Schmitt, Sta.at, Bervegtmg, Viilk, pp. 44ff. Schmitt does nor explicitly
quote .Mannheim, and yet, after the big debate stirred by ldcolo..r1ic 1md Utopie,
the category of Scint11ebm1dmhr.it was already a quotation in itse.lt: cf Karl
Mannheim, ldeologie tmd Utopic, 3rd ed. (Frankfurr, 1952 ), p. 71,
91. Carl Schmitt, "Neutralitat und Neutrnlisicrung ( 1939 ). Zu Christoph
Steding 'Das Re.ich und die Krankhe.it der europiiische.n Kultur,' ~ in Positionen
und &gnj'fe, pp. 271-95.
92. i\farrin Heidegger, "Omologie (Hcrmencurik der 'Faktizitat)"
( 1923 ), in Gesamtausgabc, vol. 63, pp. 81-83.
93. Ibid., p. 82.
94. With regard to Marcuse's enthusiasm for Sein tmd Zeit, cf. his
"Beitrage zu ciner l'hanomenologie des historischen lvlarerialismus," which
appeared in Philosophischc Ht;fte ( 1928 .. in a special issue of the journal entirely
dedicated ro Heidegger's masterpiece. As for rhe relation established hy Marcusc
between Sein und Zcit and Marxism, there is a somewhat amused mention of it
in a letter written hy Jaspers to Heidegger himself: the letter is dated July 8,
1928, in Marrin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, Br-icfnwhsd 1920-1963, eds.
Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt, 1990 ), p. 102.
95. With regard to this discourse, cf Losurdo, "Realismus und Nominalismus."
96. He.rherr Marcuse, "Der Kampf gegen den Liheralismus in der rotalitaren Sraatsauffassung," ZeitscJ,,ift fiir S11zialforsch1mg (19 34 ): 185-88.
97. Heidegger, "Ontologie," p. 75; and "Prolegomc.na z.ur Geschichte
des ZeitbegriftS" (1925), in (;muntausgabc, vol. 20, p. 119.
98. Edmund Husserl, "Fichtes Menschheitsidea!," in Aufsii.tzr und
79.
80.
81.
82.
l 12
,11
Viirtrt(qc (1912-1937), eds. Thomas Nenon and Hans R.. Se;-.pp, Hus.ccrlitma, vol.
27 (Den Haag, 1987 ), pp. 283, 292ff
99. Edmund Husserl, ["Zur ldee absoluter Rechttertigung"L in Aufsiiru
1md Vin-trt(IJt, (1922-1937) p. 106.
I 00. Edmund Husserl, ["Uher die gegenwartige Aufgabe der Philosophic"] (1934), in Au.fsiitzc mid Vortrtigc (1922-1937), p. 207.
101. Edmund Husserl, "i\n den Prasidenren des \i1Il lntcrnationalen
Philosophenkongresses Herrn Prof Dr. Rad! in Prag" ( 1934 ), in AufrtJ.rzt 1md
Vortr1(qe (1922-1937), p. 240.
I 02. Edmund Husserl, "Formak Typen dcr Kulrur in der Menschheirsentwicklung" (1922-23), in Aufsatzc zmd v0rtragc (1922-1937), p. 90. In this
context, one. can better llndersrand rhe criticism made in 1924 against the
"Catholic lmernarional" (cf supfa, chap. 2, l ), which was dearly considered
too hierarchic, and therefore not without "imperialistic" aspects.
103. Edmund Husserl, "Erneuerung und Wisscnschati:" ( 1922-23 ), in
Aufsiitu imd Viwm{qe (1912-1937), p. 53 and n.
104. Husserl, ["lrberdie gcgenwartige Aufgabe der Philosopbk"], p. 207.
105. Husserl, "An den Prasidemen," p. 24-2.
!06. [bid., p. 244.
I Oi. Ibid .. pp. 240-43, passim.
108. Ibid., pp. 240ff
109. Edmund Husserl, "Die Krisis der europaischen Menschentums und
die Philosophie" (l 935 ), in Dfr Krisis dcr mropli.ischm Wissenschaftrn und die
transundentalc Phanomrnolo._11ie, ed. W. Biemct, Husserliana, vol. 6 (Den Haag,
1954), pp. 314tI
110. Husserl, Die Krisis dtr mropiiisd1m Wissemfhaften, p. 262.
111. Husserl, "Die Krisis der europaischen Menschenmms," p. 325.
112. Ibid., pp. 320ff
113. Ibid., pp. 326ff
ll4. fbid., p. 327.
115. Husserl, "An den Prlisidcnren," p. 241.
l 16. Husserl, Dfr Krisis dn europii-ischen Wissensc.haften., p. 262.
117. Heidegger, Die Selbstbehaupttff(._/f, pp. l l ff.
118. Husserl, "Formate Typen," pp. 83-.
119. Heidegger, St'in und Zeit, note to 7 C, p. 52.
120. Husserl, "Die Krisis der europaischen Mensc.hentums," pp. 326-28.
121. Heidegger, Die Sdbstbehallptung, p. 12.
122. Husserl, "Formalc Typen," p. 85.
123. Ibid., p. 87.
124. Heidegger, Die Selhstbehm1ptmi,_q, p. 12.
125. Husse.rl, "Die Krisis der europaischen 1'.lenschenrums," pp. 328[
126. Husserl, ["Uher die gegenwartige Aufgabe der Philosophie"], p. 208
127. Heidegger, Die Sclbstbehauptunlf, p. 19.
ll3
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
[hid., p. 12.
Heidegger, "Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik," p. 52.
Husserl, "Die Krisis der e.uropaischen Menschentums," p. 337.
Ibid.
Heidegger, Die Sclbsrbdm11ptung, pp. 1(1, 11, 12, 15.
Ibid., pp. 15, 17, 13, 16.
Cf. Maurice Beaumont, La Faillite dda pai."<, vol. l (I'aris, 1967), p. 32.
135. Somban, Der proleta.1iscbe Sozialismus, vol. 1, p. 84.
136. Schmitt, "Neum.litat und Neutralisierung," p. 275; Sombart, De1
prolctariscln Sozia.lismus, vol. l , p. 84.
l 37. Karl Jaspers, Dicgcistigc Sit1tation dcr .?-cit (Berlin, l 947), p. 97.
138. Spengler, ]ahre dcr Entschcidun,IJ, p. 151.
139. Oswald Spengler, "Frankreich und Europa" (1924j, in Rcden 1md
Au.fsiitzc, ed. Ildegard Kornhardr (.Miinchen, 1937), p. 84.
140. Spengler, Jahre dc1 Enrscheidung, p. 151.
141. hinger, Der ,4rbeittw, p. 254.
142. Spengler, ]ahrc der Entschcidung, p. 150.
143. Spengler, "Frankreich und Europa," p. 88, passim.
144. Jaspers, Diegeistigc Situation dc1 Zdt; p. 97; English rranslarion, Man
in the Modern Age, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor
Books, 1957), p. 120 (modified).
l 45. Jaspers, Die geistigc Situation dcr Zeit, p. 82; Ma.n in the .Modern Age,
p. 101 (modified).
146. Jaspers, Die lf&isti,_qe Situation dtr Zeit, p. 174.
147. Heideg,_~er, Die Selbstbeh1rnptun,1J, pp. l l, l 9; "Wege. zur Aussprache"
(1937), in Gesamrnuwabc, vol. 13, p. 16.
148. Heidegger, "Wege zur Aus.~prache," pp. 20. 16.
149. Manin Heidegger, "Das Rektorat 1933-34: Tats~1chen und
Gedanken," published as an appendii; to Die Sclbstbehauptim//, pp. 24, 28.
150. Letter to C. von Dietze dated December 15, 1945, and publishe.d in
Hugo Ott, .~fa.rtin HeidtlI..JJer: UnterJl.'(lfS :w seiner Biogiaphit: (Frankfurt-New
114
ct:
..
'!f
,
I 15
182. Marrin Hcide.ggcr, "Holdcrlins Hymne 'Der lster,' " in Gcsarmausgabe, vol. 53, p. 68; "Parmenidc~," in ibid., vol. 54, p. 250.
183. Heidegger, "Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik," p. 17.
] 84. A<. Derrida appears to believe in De !"'esprit.
185. Spengler, "Frankreich und Europa," p. 84.
] 86. Jaspers, Dielf&istige Situation der :?,cit, p. 68; Man in the Modem. A,irt,
p. 85 (modified).
187. In Wilhelm Stapel, printed in Poliakov and Wulf, eels., Das Drittc
Reich, p. 65.
188. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf(Miinchcn, 1939), p. 444.
189. Heidegger, Die Selbstbcl11:i11pt1mlJ, pp. 10, 15, and 16.
190. Martin Heidegger, "Holderlins .Hymnc 'Germanien' und 'Der
Rhein,'" in Gesamrauwa.bf, vol. 39, p. 134.
191. Martin Heidegger, ..Wege. zur Aussprache," p. 21.
192. Jacob Burkhardt, Griechische Kiilturgrschfrhtc, 5th ed., ed. Johann J.
Oeri, vol. l (BerlinSruttgart, 1898-1902), p. 322. The "B,tsel lectures, Greek
culrurc and the influence, hoth positive and negative, that it had on Nietzsche,
arc referred to in the 1936-37 and 1942-43 lectures; cf. Martin Heidegger,
"Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst," in Gc.ramm11.sga.bc, vol. 43, p. 122;
and "Parmenides," p. 134. During rhe last years of his lite, Heidegger will again
make reference to Burkhardt and to his criticism of democracy (analyzed and
denounce.ct alreadr from irs genesis in Greece); cf. Heinrich W. Petzer, Auf
einen Stern zugehcn: Bi:.11e..JJnungcn mit iUarti~i Heide._1l!ftl' 1929 bis 1976 <Frankfurt a.M., 1983 ), p. 232.
193. Heidegger, "Holderlins Hynme 'Gerrnanien' und 'Der Rhein,'" pp.
l72ff, 210.
194. Heidegger, "Einfiihrung in die Mernphysik," p. 42.
195. Heidegger, "Wege zur Aussprache," p. 16.
196. Heidegger, "Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik," pp. 40-43; English
translation, Introduction to Mrtaphysics. trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1959), p. 38 (modified).
197. Arisrotle, Politics, VU, 6; Burckhardt, Gi-iechischr Kultui:_11eschichtc,
vol. l, p. 319.
198. Georg Simmel, Der Krieg und die /Jdst(Jfen Entscheidimgm
(Miinchen-Leipzig, 1917), pp. 14ff
J.99. Max Weber, "Demokrarie undAristokratie im amerikaniscben Leben"
(1918}, in Zur Palitik im Wdtkrieg: Sclmftm und Reden 1914-1918, eds. Wolf.
gang J. Momsen and Gangolf Hiibinger (Tiibingen: J.C. B. .Mohr, 1981l), p.
355. It is m1e that, already in "Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapicalismus" ( 1904-05 ), Gcsammcltt Aufsatzc zui Rel(lfiDnssoziolo._qic, 6th ed. vol.
l (Tiibingen, 1972), pp. 35, 81, rdcrence is made, with regard ro the United
Stares, to a "romanticism of numbers" and to a people whose "imagination is
dire.cted merelr tr:m-'ards measurable quantities." And yet, in this ten, Weber's
r
t
116
value judgement is more ambiguous, since American "traders are in their own
way poets." In the 1918 text, instead, Weber adds (cf. supra, chap. 6, 5) that
the United States lack "hiscorical destiny." In "Die protesranrische Ethik" it is
still asserted that "appealing to the national character ... is ... generally equivalent co confessing one's ignorance." On the. contrary, immediately after the
First World \Var, the contrast "between the value. of German culrure and of
French culture" is regarded as an "antagonism berween differenr divinities" over
which "destiny" dominates (cf. supra, chap. 1, 6:. chap. 2, 7}.
200. In Luc.iano Canfora, Cultura classica c crisi tedcsca: Gli scritti politici
di WifamoJT1itz 1914-1931 (Bari, 1977), p. 77.
201. Fritz Fischer, Grijf nach der Weltmacht (Diisseldort~ 1961 ), p. 543.
202. Oswald Spengler, Preuflentum 1md Sozialismus (Mi.inchen, 1921),
p. 71.
203. Spengler,Jalm der Entscheidtmg, pp. lOlff.
204. Sombarr, Der prolttarische Sozialinnus, vol. 1, pp. 84-89.
205. Spengler, Pm~/lmtum umi SozialirmM, p. 75.
206. Spengler, ]aJm der Entschcidung, p. 48.
207. Heidegger, "Eintllhrung in die Metaphysik," p. 49.
208. Ihid., p. 41.
209. Mann, "Gedanken im Kriege," p. 30; Bctrachtungen tines Unpolitis
chm, pp. 484, 241.
210. Thomas Mann, 'Vim deutscher Re[mbli.k: Potitische Schriftcn und Rcden
in Drntsdiland (Berlin, 1984), vol. 17, pp. 73, 80.
211. !hid., p. 83.
212. Somhan, De:r prolerarischc Sozialism11s, vol. l, p. 84.
213. He.lmur Kuhn, "Die deursche Universitat am Vorabend der Machtcr
greifung," in Dfr de11tschc Universitiit im Dritten Reich (Mi.inchen, 1966}, p.
l 5: reprinted in Victor Farias, Hddeggcr 1md der Nationalsozialisnrns (Frank
fort, I989i, pp. 13lft~ 412.
214. Heyse, Idec 1md E-dstcnz, p. 345.
F 0
R.
WAR, REVOLUTION,
AND CONSPIRACY
1.
"JUDAIC-BOLSHEVIK" CONSPIRACY
117
118
2.
On the eve of the First World War, one of the key figures of the K~ie;..J!sitlc
ologit:, Sombart, begins to attach the same stereotypes to }c>A'S that wi!
1t9
eventually be applied to Germany's enemies. In 1911, according to Sombart, the Jews, more than anyone else, personif).' the characteristics of
those. "merchants" (Handler) against whom Ge.rman "heroes" prepare to
engage in mortal combat. And the. mercantile spirit becomes synonymous
with exclusive attention to quantity, "numbers," "utility," and "practical
rationalism, "2 qualities which arc ultimately interpreted as banausic,
antimetaphysical, and characteristic of calculati\'C thought.
That's not all: the Jew is the "born representative of a 'liberal' vision
of the world"; he has no sense of "community" ( G'c1ncinwe.rm}, something that comes with "mutually dependent personal relationships."
Instead, he aims for a" 'constitutional state,' where relationships are conducted in a legally and well-defined manner," and "tlesh and bone individuals with their unique differences" are superseded by "abstract citi
zcns, with their rights and duties. "3 Along \vith mere calculative thought,
the Jews represent the incarnation of the Gesellschaft, an extrinsic and
mechanical model of society. It couldn't be otherwise: What sense of
Gemeinschaft could they have as a people who, according to their history,
went directly from the desert to large ci.ties without ever involving themselves \\~th agrirnlture, even in the absence of legal obstacles. "The large
city is the immediate extension of the desert; borh are equally distant
from fertile soil, and both limit their inhabitants to a nomadic life. "4
Just before and during the course of the war, the stereotypes of the
Krie~11sideolq_qir tend to mesh with a mounting antiSemitic and antiJudaic sentiment, and becoming violent, especially after the riots in
Russia. One can understand why the many different forms of anti-Semitism, or even conspiracy theories, are more deeply rooted in Germany
than in other nations. For one, Germany had been defeated in a conflict
that saw her isolated by the coalition of her many enemies: "Historical
resean:h will make dear-writes Thomas Mann in l 918-the role played
by the international Illuminati [ intcniationales llluminatentum l, and
the worldwide lodge of Masons-with the exception of their naive
German members-, in touching off the war, the W;lr of Zivilisati.on
against Germany. "5 The disorder in Russia has tremendous repercussions
in Germany, not only because of her vicinity, but also due to the fact that
just a year after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Hohenzollern Dynasty is
toppled in a revolution in which Judaic intellectuals play, or seem to play,
a significant role.
These are the years in which Thomas Mann, who has by this point
parted with the Kriegsidco!-0gic, passionately encourages his frUow coun-
120
trymcn not to consider the republic born of the revolurion as "the work
of young Jewish hoodlums. "6 During these years, "the people are exasperated with revoimionaries and with their fi:>rcign, Judaic leaders
ffremdhindisc/J ], " leaders who are "foreign to the race and to the
country" (Stamm- und Landfremde) to use .Marianne Weber's vords.7
These very same years witness Max Weber, according to his \vifc's testimony, deploring the facr that there arc "so many fews among the revolutionary leaders." Weber's understanding of the historical genesis of
snch a phenomenon, however, immunizes him from racism, and in fact
he does not hide his distaste lbr anti-Semitism.8 Nonetheless, the reason
why Jews have a unique inclination to incite revolution remains to be
explained. Weber's Wirtschaft und Gcsellsclmft attempts to elucidate the
problem, emphasizing the role of resscntim.ent, or the "conscious or
unconscious thirst for revenge" in the "'Judaic religiousne.ss of ethical
redemption."' Weber vigorously insists upon this point:
....
Tht~
,,,.
.........
121
ures.' "1.3 However, his condemnation of modernity and rhe role Jews
play in ir certainly contributes to a funher development of the classic
themes surrounding the anti- Judaic debate. Nietzsche considers the Jews
the example "par excellence of rtssentmrnt," the ones with whom "the
.rlme.r' 1'ePalt in mom.ls begins. "14 Nor by chance, he makes reference ro
Judaism even \'."hen he comes across, or believes he has come across, plebeian resentment in philosophers such as Socrates and Plato. 15
In refere111:e to the political and cultural history of the recently fallen
Third Reich, Thoma_~ Mann will nor.e: "Although he is far from any
racial anti-Semitism, Nierzsche does see in Judaism the birth of Christianity, and in this he rightfully, but horrifyingly, recognizes the seeds of
democracy, the French Revolution and the loathsome 'modern ideas'
which he vehemently condemns as the morality of the herd."16 Anri}udaic motifs are clearly deduced from Nietzsche, and nourished during
these years (the. term anti-Semitic will be reserved for reference to biological racism). Just a~ we noted it in Sombart, we can also note it in
Spengler. A<. early as the beginning of the First World War, Spengler
alludes to the role played by "Jewish nihilists" in inciting pacifism in the
years preceding the conflict. It is a rok well worth remembering, despite
the. eventual, generalized patriotic zeal that ensucs.17 [mmediately after
Germany's defeat, the "Judaic press" is considered partially responsible
fur the events that are tearing the nation apart, 18 and kws arc held culpable for the revolutionary movement in the modern world, from the
Paris Conunune19 to the. Bolshevik fury demonstrated during the overthrow of the Czar.20 Even more interesring is Spengler's explanation for
the revolution in Russa: "Thr apaca(rpsr '.r prim.al hatred <!{ 1mcient wlwn, and something of the turbid exasperation which develops from the
time of the MacC.:abces and, much later, results in the insurrection which
led to the destruction of Jerusalem, are cerrainly the foundations of Bol-shevisrn."21 Nietzsche's influence is clearly present in the interpretation
of socialism and communism as expressions of 1-csscntiment; or "social
rcF1mche," and as Messianism which, rather than focusing upon the "last
judgement, aims at the ovenhroiv or "collapse of bourgeois society. "22
It would be inappropriate, however, to speak of anti-Semitism in a
strict scnse, that is, \\'ith regard to biology and race, because Spengler
considers "folly" the "slogan" that propagates the contrast between
"Aryans and Semit.es";23 he even prepares an outspoken argument
against it. This is even more significant, and unequivocal, given that it
coincides wirh the Nazis' rise to power:
122
\,\'hen one speaks here. of race-he observes in /aim: der Ent.scheidungit is nor. intended as according to the modern rrend followed by European and American anti-Semites, that is, in a Darwinistic and marcrialistic sense. Racial purity is a grotesque concept, given that for millennia
every family line and every lineage have im:errningkd, and warrior lines,
healthy, rich and promising, have. always gladly incorporated a foreigner,
provided that he was "noble," regardless of what race he pertained t11.24
c~;1:
!~i
1:::
;Z~.
..::.i11~:~
Wai~,
12 3
the
124
secuted, as the only population that can rruly call themselves a "community of blood." Instead,
the peoples ofche world are not content with the community of blood;
they thrust their roor.s into the black of rhe soil, soil which is dead, but
which gives lite and susrains it. Their will m eremiry is anc.hored ... to
the soil and its dominion, to territory. We were the only ones who
trusled blood and left the land. 33
..
:''
.. .
:, ..... ..
~!'
12 5
context is, once again, Friedrich Nietzsche.39 Buber even goes as far as
to condemn, referring explicitly to the Jews, '"'intelkctuaJity [Jntellektualititt] that is extraneous to life, unbalanced and, so to speak, incoherent. "40 That is, the Jews arc condemned as uprooted intellectuals
who are deaf or alien to the values of the GemcinschaftThis, however, is only one aspect. It is worth noting that the community theorized and exalted here not only lacks any warlike signification, bur it is con~idered diametrically opposed to the profane world that
provoked the atrocious massacre_ Subsequently, the same pacifistic tendencies manifested by more than just a few Jewish inrdlectuals during
the war are further accentuated.41 It is worth examining Franz Rosen
zweig in this regard. During the war years, that period of ubiquitous
patriotic enthusiasm, he too falls under the influence of the I<riegsideolo._11ic. He refuses, in fact, to consider war "more immoral I' or more 'irreligious'] than peace," and hails the warrior's "capacity to suffer
[heroism]," and his profound humanity: "Animals do not wage war, in
the same way that they do not pray, do not laugh, and are incapable of
poetry. "42 Eventually, the Kriegsideologie is overthrown by means of its
very own language..
It is worth noting that this overthrow will end up reinforcing the
conviction, evermore widespread in nationalistic or anti-Judaic and amiSemitic circles, that the Jews are extraneous to the authentic German
Gerneinschaft. The exaltation of a community without soil can never
avoid suspicion. To remrn to Rosenzweig:
All abom the motherland runs the blood of her sons; in fact, the)' de>
nor trust a living community of blood that is not firmly grounded to
the earth. Only we trusted the blood and Jcfr the land. In this way we
saved the precious juice oflifr which guaramee.d our etcrn.tl being and,
unlike the other peoples on Earth, we separated our vital elemenr from
any link to that which is dead. Indeed, the soil nurtures, hut: at the same
time ties .... And the. motherland, the place where a people rake up
residence and leave their mark on the. land, almost to the point of for
getting that to be a people means more than simply being seated in a
country, never becomes for the eternal people that which it is for
others. They are not permitted to stay at home and become corrupt;
rather they maintain the independence of rravelcrs.43
In turn, Buber observes that the Jew lacks all "the elements that constitute a nation and render it a reality: a country, a language, vital forms. "44
!26
4.
.:::.
:...........
11
At this point \Ve may examine the positions ofJaspers and Heidegger with
regards ro the "Jewish question." As far as Jaspers is concerned, it almost
seems superfluous to address the problem: A~xording to Lukacs, )aspen
refoscs to support the regime simply for "reasons of a private nature" ( i11
reference to the philosopher's Jewish wife).45 And yet, it is interesting tc
note how these "reasons of a private nature" seem to work their way intc
his philosophy. Jaspers explicitly criticizes the "theory of race. "46 He
insists that the origins of the Western World do not reside solely with the
"Greek philosophers,"_ but \7>'ith the "Jewish prophets" as well;47 and that
philosophy, authentic philosophy, must not only kt1ow how to inherit
"the disposition of the heroic nordic soul," but, togetherwith the "darit}
of Greek thought," it must inherit the "profrmndness of the Judaic
soul." 48 Quite clearly Jaspers condemns anti-Semitism, which is nonetheless infecting currents and realms even extraneous to Nazism.
Still, despite his insisrence on the existence of Judaic roots i11
Western culture, oddly enough, in 1938, Jaspe.rs seems to resonate some
anti-Judaic motifs. He cites various works in which Nietzsche declare!
that it is the Jews who are the perpetrators of the slaves' revolt, thOS(
who embody "'the instinct of ressentiment turned genius." It Is hard!)
just reported speech. Each of these citations, to include the one above
is followed by passionate commentary, which seems to reveal Taspers':
identification with Nietzsche as he describes in detail the role that thi
Jews have played in overturning uaditionaf aristocratic values. The nega
tion and defamation of the world, typical of Christianity, finds "its imme
diate origins in Judaism. In the concemration and inrcnsity of its fina
mori(~, Christianity is a thoroughly Judak phenomenon."'i9 ls thi
simply a detached comment? In reality, Jaspers seems to give Nietzsch
credit for the .. psychological discovery" of the devastating consequence
of rcs.rentimcnt, for disentangling rhe "complex web of the effects c
ressm.cimmt ... capable of misrepresenting all value judgments. "50
It is not paradoxical and conrradictory to try to find anti- Judai
motifs in rhe work of a philosopher who, if only because of his family,
12 7
inclined to see his own destiny as that of the Jews? Moreover, these are
the years in which he comes to know firsthand the immediate and painful
consequences of the regime's anti-Semitism. He is removed as the chair
of the university, and his wife-Marianne Weber says-chooses to com
pletely withdraw from lite, "so as not to endanger others."51 And yet, in
order to avoid the risk of schematism and over-simplification, let us
examine a different example, that of Bergson, an authentic Jew who, in
his spiriwal heritage, regrets the grave role played by his people in the
Bolshevik Revolution.52 The growing hostility, discrimination and
oppression to which the Jews are subject does not immunize them from
the anti-Judaic stereotypes that are born, more or less, from the uprisings in Russia and in central Europe. On the other hand, these very
events have the power to motivate some moderate or conservative Judaic
circles and authors to distance themselves from the small minority of
Jews active in the insurrections and revolutionary struggle that would
tear apart the regimes that were oppressing them. This position, and the
distinctions ir entails regarding the Jewish communiry's role, is at times
perceived or considered the most appropriate policy \\~th which to contrast the mounting anti-Semitism, or at least its most hateful expressions.
With regards to Jaspers, it should be noted that, before being published, the text of Nietzsche ttnd das Christentum is read in Marianne
Weber's parlor. She is anything but inclined to anti-Semitism-among
other reasons, she has a daughter-in-law who is "nor Aryan"5-'-and yet,
we have already mentioned some moods and expressions of an anti Judaic
nature on her part. Naturally, in the text that was examined above, Jaspers
continues ro be adamantly opposed ro antiSemitism. And his assertion,
that the Jews had become. the protagonists of the slaves' revolt only after
having denied "their hernic and warlike past,"54 cannot be welcomed by
the Nazis. The facr remains that the pe.rsistent denunciation of modernity
neces.5atily brings about an examination of Nietzsche, who, tracing the
slaves' revolt to its most remote origins, accounts for the presence of
resscntiment in Christianity and Judaism. Jaspers is concerned with dist.in
guishing between Jesus on the one hand and historical Christianity on the
other, and between original Judaism and "the falsification of Israel's history as carried out by the Judaic ptiests."55 It is through this distinction,
which he goes to great lengths to ascribe to Nietzsche as well, that Jaspers
in tum attempts to distinguish himself from Nazism, which has little inclination to preserve anything of Christianity, or worse, of Judaism. His
interpretation continues to be in line with Nietzsche's regarding the
128
compatible vvith his rejection of anti-Semitism, makes any clear demarcation with respect to anti-Semitism difficult.
We may now move forward with an analysis of Heidegger's position.
Debate regarding the philosopher's anti-Semitism is the most bitter of
all the aspects of his contentious relationship to Nazism. Rather than
engage in a battle fought through a series of citations from various contradictory sources and testimonies, the present analysis will proceed with
a preliminary clarification of the categories that are or should be incorporated in the debate. Without a doubt, biological racism would seem
w be completely extrinsic to Heidegger. At. the outbreak of the Second
Wi:>rld War, Heidegger, dearly rc&rring to the prevailing racism, condemns the fact that "blood and race become instruments of history,"57
and this condemnation is radicalized, as we shall see, in the years that
follow (cf. i>~fra, chap. 6, 5).
On the other hand, Heidegger, too, is of the opinion that "Bolshevism is in effect Judaic":58 a theory that is-as has been noted-similar
to Hitler's, and to those of his inspirers and ideologists.5 9 This is an
incontrovertible observation, qnd yet it requires two clarifications: first,
this theory is certainly not limited ro Nazi circles, and second, Hei-
12 9
}3()
is, therefore, in the final analysis, responsible for the naturalistic distortion
and impoverishment ofhisroricity.65 It is for this reason that we prefrr, in
Heidegger's case as well, ro speak of anti- Judaism, though it may assume
many forms: from Jaspers's topos of Judaic subversion, to the support
that Heidegger gives to hideous measures of discrimination. In a 1929
letter, Heidegger, though distancing himself from any "campaign of
hatred" (Hctzc), emphasizes the necessity to oppose the "growing
Judaization ( Vi:rjudtmg]" of"Gennan spirirnal life," which must instead
be strengthened once again and be rooted in authentic German forcr:s,66
Four years lat.er, in April, Heidegger's wife, on behalf of the acting rector
of the University of Freiburg, approves of the "new, harsh and rational
German h1w," though not without some personal difficulty. Under the
new law, Husserl's son, Gerhart, though disabled in the First World War,
loses his position as professor of civil law, because he is a Jew. 67
It is the pathos of unique German historicity-the adjective is highlighted in a letter dated 1929-that leads Heidegger to support the
Third Reich's initial measures enacted to deemancipate an ethnic group
considered fundamentally extraneous r.o Germany. And so, the process
initiated by the loathsome French Revolu[ion which had, in 1791,
emancipated the Jews, is now reversed.
5.
War, ReJ>olution,
tHid
Conspiracy
l3l
132
.... .,
; ~.:
Stahl's death his nephew "burned all of his uncle's letters," on the pretext
that they were "illegible."79 Ar. this point, Schmitt seems to have well
demonstrated the duplicitous and conspiratorial nature of Stahl-Jolson.
The entire history of modern culture appears to be traversed, if not
by a bona fide conspiracy, then by the mysterious and disturbing presence
of Judaic authors and circles. How else can one explain the liberal corruption that Spinoza, a "Jewish philosopher," perpetrates upon Hobbes's
the.ory? "A slight shifi:ing of concepts, an inversion derivative of Judaic
existence and, with the greatest of ease, in just a few years the decisive
turning point in the Leviathan's destiny is accomplished." On the other
hand, it is indeed a "Jewish scholar," Leo Strauss, who underscores the
fact that according to Hobbes, "rhe Je\>.'S are the true promoters of the
seditious and subversive distinction benveen religion and politics. "80
The principal victim of this conspiracy or sinister activity is, naturally,
Germany. With regard ro this, Schmitt cites the words of a noted Jewish
deputy, Eduard Simson, uttered in 1866, during the course of the constirutionai conflict in Prussia. Turning to Ono von Bismarck, still new as the
iron chancellor, the liberal opposition leader declares: "You are battling
the spiritual and ethical powers [ Miichtc l that be; sooner or later, you will
have ro yield to these powers, the importance and significance of which
you so underestimate." To this, Schmitt comments: "The. liberal Germans
who applauded with naive enthusiasm these obscure words, were deaf and
blind. And so the struggle of those 'spiritual and ethical pmvers' developed in an invisible and elusive manner, until Germany's defeat in 1918
seemed achicved."81 Scrn in this light, the fall of the Second Reich is perceived as the resulr ofa Judaic conspiracy that, incidentally, takes on inrernationa.I dimensions, and reveals itself even as one of the causes of the First
World War. With regard to the "Judaic interpretation of Leviathan and
Behemoth," Schmiu asserts that rhcse describe
rhc history of the world ... as the barc!e of pagan peoples againsr one
another. In particular, the hank centers upon the maritime powers of
Leviathan and the terrestrial powers of Behemoth: Behemoth tries to
slash Leviarhan with its horns, whik Leviathan wirh its fins clogs the
mouth and nostrils of Behemorh, killing it. 1t is, incidcnrally, a beautifol reprcsemation of the strangulation of a land power by means of a
naval bloekade.82
13 3
denounced by Schmitt as a violation of international Jaw, and an expression of total war (cf. infra, chap. 6, 6ff); this tragedy seems to find its
prefiguration in remote rexes that apparently lack reference to political
life, yet when closely examined, they reveaJ a truly sinister and surpris
ingly contemporary significance.
After the allusive description of the conflict between England and
Germany, Schmitt further expounds upon the "Judaic interprc.tations of
Leviathan and Behemoth," though all the while alluding to the present:
"But the Jews stand apart, looking on as the populations of the Earth kill
one another: For them, these reciprocal 'massacres and butchcrie$' are
legal and 'kosher.' They feed upon the meat of murdered peoples,
drawing life from them. "83 Similarly, the denunciation of the supposed
"battle" that the "spiritual and ethical P'"''ers,"-that is, Judaismunleasbed in opposition to the Second Reich from the nineteenth cen
tury up unril its annihilation in 1918, concludes as such: "Today, fol-
NOTES
1. For the ahove citarions, cf. Leon Poliakov, Histoirr de. l'amiscm.itisme:
L'Emope su.icidaii-i-, 1870-1933 (Paris, 1977), chaps. 3 and 4; Alex P. Schmid,
134
Clmrchills priTJJlter Kriq:r. lntervention und Kontern:voluti1m int mssischen Burgerkrieg 1918-1920(Ziirich, 1974), pp. 293, 312; Domenico Losurdo, "Marx e
la storia dcl totalitarismo," Storig e problemi ,,onumporanei 6 (1990): 41--61.
2. Werner Sornbarr, Die ]uden 1md das Wirtschaftsleben (Leipzig, 1911 ),
pp. 33lff.
3. Ibid., p. 318.
4. Ibid., pp. 414-ff.
5. Thomas Mann, Bttrachrunlfen cines Unpolitischen, ed. Hanno Helbling
(Frankfort a.M., 1988 ), p. 24.
6. Thomas Mann, Vim deutscher Rep11blik: Politische Schrijten und Rcden
i11 Deutscliiand (Berlin, 1984 ), vol. 17, p. 72.
7. Marianne Weber, Max Weber: Ein Lebmsbild (Ti.ibingen, 1926 ),
p.672.
8. Ibid., p. 660.
9. Max Weber, WirtsclJajt 1md G.:scllscha.fl-, ed. Johannes Winckelmann
(Tiibingen, 1985 ), pp. 30lfl~ passim.
10. Werner Sombart, Der proletarische Sccialismus, vol. 2 (Jena, 1924),
p. 517.
l l. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 153; vol. l, p. 57.
12. Ibid., vol. I, p. 318.
13. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Der Wille zur Macht," af. 864 (1888), in
Siinitlicbc Werkc: Kritischc Studinumsgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Moncinari, vol. 13-(~-i.unchcn-Berlin-New York), p. 36!i.
14. Friedrich Nierzsche, ]erscits io11 Gut und Riise: Zur Gencalogie der
.Horal (Mfinchen, 1999.J, vol. l, pp. 7, 16.
15. Nietzsche, "Der Wille zur Macht, ~af 429 (1888), p. 331.
16. Thomas Mann, "Nietzsche's Philosophic im Lichr.e unserer
Erfahrung" ( 1947), in Essays, vol. 3, ed. Hermann Kurzke (Frankfurr a.M.,
1986), p. 252.
17. Letter to H. Klores dated October 25, 1914, in Oswald Spengler,
Rriefc 1913-1936, ed. Amon Kokranek and Manfred Schrt>ter !Mtinchen,
1963), pp. 29ff.
18. Letter ro H. Klores dated December 18, 1918, i.n Spengler, Brit:fe
1913-1936, p. 112.
19. Oswald Splengler, ]aim de,. Entscheid1mg (Miinchen, 1933), p. 83.
20. Oswald Spengler, Der UtiterganJ/ des Abend/an des ( Munchen, 1980 ).
pp. 995ffn.
21. Oswald Spengler, Pret~{.V:ntum 11nd Sozialismus(Milnchen, 1921}, p. 94.
22. Ibid., pp. 83, 73. The theme of the relationship betwe.en universal jus
tice and sodiJlisr revolution is well developed by Nietzsche in Thr Antichrist.
23. Spengler, Der Unrci:_qan.tf des Abend/and.es. p. 952.
24. Spenglc.r, Jahre dt:r Entsch1,idutlfJ, p. 157.
25. Ibid., pp. 82ff. ft re.mains to he seen, incidentally, whether the rccog
l 35
nition of the genesis of the Bolshevik revolution in the West is fully compatible
with the condemnation of the USSR, the instigator of the colonies' revolts, as a
'"Mongolian" and no longer a "white." power (cf. sitpra, chap. 3, 7).
136
13 7
P I V E
BETWEEN
''BLOOD AND SOIL''
AND REACTIONARY
MODERNISM
1.
.
::1
.. :
.::.: ..~.
1""""
~,
~
ii"".\!I'
he First World War, and the clash between Germany and the cc.mntrics in which liberal-democratic traditions have long been established, radicalize the tendency to criticize and to denounce modernity, a
tendency already largely presenr in German culture. Germany's communil)' of war is a result of the "ideas of 1914," ideas that openly oppose
the "i<kas of 1789." The Lurer arc regarded as synonymous with the
predominance of "politics"' and democracy, or rather with a "bourgeois" democracy, imbued \11;'ith the superstitious belief in idle and self:
satisfied "security." The target of this denunciation is not only the
French Revolnrion~ criticism of "modernity" ( Modcrnitiit), of the "present times" (fctztzcit), of the "spirit of rhe time" goes much further;
and, in line with Nietzsche, who is referred to by Mann, the "ideas of
the eighteent.h century," that is, "modern ideas," are also condmned. 2
In the introduction to one of his books, published at the st arr of the war,
Carl Schmitt declares that he imends to challenge the "self-defined
modern man," the "spirit of the. time" ( GeiJt der Zcit), "the era of the
machine, of organization, the mechanistic era" characte1ized by "the
most generalized calculability" (der al[qemeisten Bercchcnbarke.it).3
With regards to democracy, hideous modernity develops especially in
the homeland of the French Revolution, whereas its heavy burden of
banality and mechanism finds its home in the Anglo-Saxon world. Not
138
139
140
airplane. engine"; what is even worse is that they place "technical and economic issues outside of and on a lower le1cl than culture." 11
Ir is Ernst ]linger who makes the most structured attempt to reconcile technology and mechanization with the Kric._11sideologit, and wirh the
Kulturk1itik so deeply rooted in German culture. In reality, inasmuch as
the modern world of technology and industry is synonymous with standardization and plebeian vulgarization, it is still condemned and looked
upon suspiciously or scornt1.11ly. Not by chance, "the big cir.ies between
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries" are denounced as "the ideal
strongholds of security": "every victory of technology is thus a victory
of rnmfort" and everything is determined by "economics." 12 By now,
however, the siruarion has radically changed. For one, technology has
conquered reality: "The famous discinction between the city and the
country only endures in the romantic sphere; ic is just as invalid as the
distinction between the mechanical and the organic world. There is no
point, then, in trying lO create for oneself a sort of "natural park"
( Natttrsclmtzpark) within modernity, a bucolic island which only survives in the imagination of incurable romantics.13 However enticing "the
sound of medie\'al bells or the scent of exotic flowers" may be, ro lull
oneself inro these suggestions means to abandon oneself to the "diversions of the defeated." 14
No, the battle must be carried our starting from \Vithin the very
heart of modernity, and it can be engaged and won because technology
has starred to reveal a new, diverse meaning, even in contradiction to the
traditional one. Far from being synonymous with standardization, technology allows fix ne"v opportunities to halt and even reverse the ruinous
course that the modern world has taken. The war has demonstrated t.he
clear superiority of elite corps, well armed and well trained, and at the
same rime inspired by an irrepressible warlike spirit. Once and for all, the
era of the revolutionary Levie en massc, once able to determine the outcome of a conflict, has come. to an end: "the masses are no longer able
to attack or to defend themselves." "In this sense, the masses vanish
from the cities, just as they had v;mished from the battlefields where the)
had appeared at the time of the revolutionary wars." Yes, in the citie.
too, the masses have revealed their impotence. After the First World War
it becomes clear that the masses are. not able to gather autonomously ir
an assembly; they can only do so thanks to the formation of "securit;
units" ( Schurzsta:f.feln, Saalsclmtz) and other organizations of the sort
This is evidc.ntly an allusion to the SS (which, indeed, stands fo
141
142
.......
leads to new hierarchies, "21 that is, to that "warlike community" which
was exalted by hinger and by the Kric,_qsidcololfie.
The position held by Jiiogcr, Spengler, and others \Vith regard tc
technology has sometimes been called "reactionary modernism. "22 Thii
category is undoubtedly legitimate and even rather useful, but only on
two conditions: one, the adjective "reactionary" must subsume not onl)
the rejection of liberalism, de.mocracy, and socialism, but also the obsti
natdy archaizing themes of the Kricgsideologic; and two, one must 1101
lose sight of the contradictions that result from associating these rwc
terms, contradictions which make the balance between modernism anc
reaction to it ever more precarious and unstable. This is evident espe
cially in Spengler: removed from, and even opposed to, the "materialis1T
of Zil'ilisation," technology becomes an expression of "lite" and of tht
struggle which characte.rizcs it (perceived, "in the Nietzschean sense, ai
a struggle that starts from the will to power, cruel, inexorable and mer
dless"); ultimately, it becomes an expression ofwar.23 On the one hand
Spengler condemns the tendency to flee from the "machine" and frorr
the "big cities" as a symptom of decadence; on the other hand, in th<
same text which he dedicates to the reevaluation of technology, tht
machine and the "big cities" are condemned as an expression, and at th<
same time as an instrument, of a lite characreriz.cd by "panem ci
circcnses. "24 Even more bitter is Spengler's criticism of "urban, rootles:
intellectualism" Jnd of "the arrogance of the urban, uprooted spirit, om
that is no longer guided by a strong instinct, and which looks dowr
upon the tcrvcnt rblutrolll philosophy of the past and the wisdom 0
generations of farmers."25 The exaltation of the city as the privilege<
place for technology and for the industrial production canied out ir
preparation for war is in contradiction to the denouncement of the ci~
as a stronghold of the "masses" and ideological subversion (on the par
of "professional demagogues"). lt is thus in contrast to the admonish
ment of the revolutionary uprisings which have torn Europe apart, arn
which aim at establishing "the dictatorship of the proletariat in the b~
cities. "1 6 Germany's immediate needs in the struggle to regain hcge
mony in Europe force Spengler r.o rehabilitate technology (and urbar
civilization itself). At the same rime, from a historical and philosophica
point of view he cannot help but condemn the plebeian leveling proces
carried out by the city.
This contradiction appears irremediable, and it remains as such, eve
within Nazi ideology. On the one hand, on a political and cultural !eve
l43
rhcrc arc. currents that not only enthusiasticaliy exalt rcchnology, but
likewise reject any criticism of it as an expression of a sort of "left-wing
cultural Ludd ism," which is incompatible with the regime and with Germany's needs.27 On the other band, by insisting on the ideology of
"blo~Jd and soil," Nazism keeps alive the hope of a regeneration of
society, one that will be able to halt and reverse the processes of industrialization and urbanization. The desired outcome would be a return to
the !and and to the soil, and a limitation and marginalization of the dangerous, materialistic contamination identified with the big cities. This is
; theme that arouses nostalgia and inspires utopias of regression in more
than just a few social strata, and one that finds its expression in maga7,ines, manifestos, and even novels.
The idea of a regeneration of society and of a return to the soil
extends its influence upon some maj.or figures of the regime, and perhaps
even upon Heinrich Himmler.28 On the other hand, Hitler himself,
before the Nazi rise to power, formulates a program that seeks to remove
"industry and commerce" from their unsound leading position, thus
rebalancing the "relationship between the population of the country and
that of the city." According to the analysis in Mein Kampf, Germany's
catastrophe is to he imputed above all to her "unrestrained and harmful
industrialization," and to the resultant "weakening of the agricultural
class," which occurs to the advantage of the uprooted "'masses, the metropolitan proletariat." The result is not only "class division" and the disintegration of the old organic community, but also the ruinous "econo
mization of the nation," and widespread "degeneration": "IT]hc
economy becomes the absolute owner of the State, and money becomes
the God to whom everything is subordinate and he.fore whom everyone
mtL~t how down. !\lore and more, the heavenly gods, now out of date,
arc put aside, and in rhcir place the idol of Mammon is worshipped."29
Certainly, Hitler's dark description of the consequences of industrialization and urbanization also serves to justify his plan to expand eastward by presenting it as a necessary condition for Germany's desired
return to the soiL But the idea of the return to the soil is raken seriou.~ly
in many circles that identif}' \Vith Walter Dam'., the minister of agriculture and the author of a book dedicated to the exaltation of the Nm
Nobility of tbe Blood and Soil ( Neuadd aus Blut und B()dm.)_ In it, he
paints a black picture of the city: lt is a place of uprooting (it is impossible to feel "intimately linked" to a "sea of rocks"); it is a place of stan
dardizarion and of leveling (ir dishes up mass-produced "individuals");
144
2.
14 5
With regard to Hitler's rise to power, Heidegger exalts the accomplished liberation from the "idolatry of a rootless and powerless philosophy f boden-tmd machtlos]." It is not just one isolated passage. On the
conrrary, it has been noted that the rectorial speech "is fi.111 of expressions
and metaphors which relate to will and to power"; one might even say
that it is ... dominated by a metaphysics of the 'v,ill to power.' "37 At this
moment, roots and pO\ver seem as one; the criticism of the machine and
of calculative thought is not yet the criticism of the will to power, bur
rhe criticism of a world which is violently questioned by Nietzsche, and
by the very ideal of the will to power.
Above all, at this moment, Nietzsche is a pioneer in the struggle
against nihilism. In order to understand this point, however, we should
once again proceed with the First World War, during which the struggle
of the "metaphysical people" against Zi11i/isation is exalted in Germany
as the struggle "against Western nihilism." This expression is Thomas
Mann's, for whom "the enlightenment of Western Europe, that is, the
politics of reason and the progress of liberalism, [is] essentially
nihilistic."38 And this struggle against "decadence and nihilism" is also,
or above all, led by Nietzsche, who is credircd with contrasting the "idea
of lite" to democratic radicalism and to the ZiPilisa-ti1m of Germany's
encmies.39 These themes arc still present even after 1918. According to
Spengler, democracy is indissolubly tied to nihilism by virtue of its plebeian hatred and resentment for any superior culture, and through its
leveling and uprooting tendency, which aims at extirpating the "historical" forms of culture by means of internarionalistic keywords. And it is
precisely because of its intrinsic nihilism that democracy "i.~ already Bolshevism. "40 Nazism inherits this theme from the KrieJJsideologic, and
exalts its 0\\-11 rise to power as Germany's reawakening from the darkness
of nihilism.41
lt is within this same political and cultural framework that we can
locate Heidegger's position as expressed a few years after Hirler's rise to
power. The unity of Europe and of the West is reestablished by way of the
struggle against antimetaphysical superficiality and nihilism (in 1935 the
term "metaphysics" has a positive connotation). Nihilism is certainly
"Bolshevism," "mere socialism";42 but nihilism is also democracy:
"Europe-Heidegger continues-wan.ts, now and forever, to cling to
'democracy,' and cannot seem to accept the fact that this would constitute her historical death. In fact, as Nietzsche clearly saw, democracy is
merely a variation of nihilism." 4 3 In this period, far from being synony-
146
..
;.;-i.:.
~-~~-
14 7
148
.. -.,
'j'"-
,...,:: ::
~.. ~i ..
;ff:;
149
Dasein, the ambition for all that is possible only for a high-class man,
and every imbe.cilc and spiritless individual [Dtm1mkopf mid Geistfremde] must learn that which is due only ro a man endowed with originally vital ideas.63
3.
150
-~- l
. ;
-. 1'
-:.1-'"
: ;.
j,'=,j
;;.!:.,:;
in acrivities in which each person has only one thing to do," so that individuals lose their auronomy and end up becoming "one sinJJle
machine. "65 Perhaps as a comment on this aphorism, Jaspers observes,
in 1938, that Nietzsche had the merit ofpainring "the frightening pmtrair of the modern world," of exposing "the desolation and frantic
nature of work and profit [ En11c1b] ... , the significance of the machine
<tnd the mechanization of labor, and the coming of the masses. "66 in
rum, two years later, Heidegger cites Nietzsche's aphorism in its entirety
in order to draw auenrion to the close relationship between the "age of
the machine" and standardization, and to denounce, still in reference to
Nietzsche, "the accomplished plebeian character of science. "67
Jaspers gives credit to Nietzsche for conrrasting "the tragic truth of
the prc,Socratic Greeks' lite" to the modern Christian world. The latter
is characterized by <\ tremendous cultural impoverishment, by the "decay
ofculture" ( Kultur) ro the advantage of irs vile substitute: the "din of a
semblance of spirit." It is also characterized by a "knowledge" without a
center and without an authentic spiritual tension. This is the very same
contrast between Kultur and ZiPilisation that plays such an important
role in rhe Krie,_11sideolo._qic. Heidegger explicitly speaks of Zi1>ilisation as
the er-a of rhe "unlimited dominion of machination [ Machcnscha:ft]," of
"calculation," of "calculability." It is not the era of "disenchantment"
( Entzaube.run..JJ)-the crirkism against Weber, though only allusive, i.~
dear-on the contrary, it is a total "spell" ( Vcrzaube.nmg) or "bewitchment [ Bchexun~q l carried our by technology. "<>8
Such radical criticism of the modern world of technology and calculative thought cannot help but srir up rcnsions within the regime.
Already in Augusc of 1933, Heidegger expresses concern that the new
Germany might overemphasize "organization. "69 His preoccupation
becomes more and more serious, but never read1es a breaking point.
Some critics, who use Heidegger's assertions in order to depict him as a
rcpresentat.ive of the opposition, seem to ignore altogether the contra
dinions and the strnggles, sometimes biuer ones, \Vithin the Nazi movement and the Third Reich.
We should therefore investigate the problem more thoroughly and
focus upon the apocalyptic denunciations of urban aiHi industrial civili7.ation that flourish in those years and that portray the contemporary
metropolis as the place of a repulsive dystopil. In a novel from 1932, the
white rncc becomes the master of the earth, bur irs dominion entails the
abandonmem of the country and of the soil, and the transformation of
l5l
152
it is only inasmuch as, despite the new regime and the promising start, it
docs not succeed in winning the st.ruggle against the modern world. And
this is why, in such a catastrophic evaluation of modernity and technology,
there seems co be no room for the denunciation of the terroristic bombings carried out by the Nazi air force during the Spanish Civil War, for
example (which is, nonetheless, discussed by Heidegger).
The fact is that the Third Reich, despite its limitations and inconsistencies, continues to exen for Heidegger a useful control over the
threats that loom over the West: "The bank against destruction and
uprooting is only the first step in the preparation, a step that leads closer
to the authentic space of decision. "73 Heidegger dispelc; any possible
doubts as to his loyalty to the regime:
..-::
The dominion of rhe masses whi.::h have become free (and therefore
rootless and selfish i must [ m1~/.i1 be esr.ablished and maintained by
means of the tetrcrs of "organization" I no criticism or reservation is
expressed about che terror which is rai:,ring in Nazi Germany]. But is it
possible. for what is "organized" in this way to grow b:ick
[ z11riickwad1sen] to its primal foundations [ Grunde] and nor only
block, but trtmsf0rm the nature of the masses [das Massenhaffr}i ...
Nobody should undcresrimarc the opposirion and resistance w the
inexorable uprooring [ EntrPurzelrmgJ; on the comrary, it is the first
thing that one. must resort co [and again support for dictatorship
reemerges]. But can this opposirion and its measures also guarante.e the '
transformation of the uprooting into a rooting [ Vc1wandlung di'r
I53
that, in regulating the acrive forces of human Dastin, one. inust const.antly subordinate the spirit, thar is, intellectualism, ro physi(al indust:riousncss and ro character: this is the way to resist that nduction.
154
."
.,
Hi
. ~
,.
.;if
reactionary modernism) according to which "metaphysics did not contl'ibute to prepaiing the revolution [that is, the N;lzi rise to power], and
is therefore to be rejected": In reality-Heidegger observes-even
though "never directly," but always "mediated," metaphysics plays an
important role in the configuration of a people's historico-spiritual
world.79 Thus, there is criticism, bur only with regard to the common
appeal r.o "revolmion." It would be thoroughly misleading to identify
the entire ideology of the Third Reich with reactionary modernism.
Even in Hitler himself, it is possible to detect some fluctuations and contradictions. On the one. hand, the total mobilizar.ion in view of the war
and of a brutal policy of imperialistic expansion demands a break with
the great, classical tradition of German culture. And so, shortly after his
rise to power, the Fiihrer comments ironically, not unlike Spengler, upon
the representation of Germany as a "people of singers, poets and
thinkers," unable to carry our a realistic policy or ro contend with neighboring countries for hegemony.so Inasmuch as he is involved in the
immediate needs of the conflict, Hitler cannot help but identif)r with
reactionary modernism: "We were once a vigorous people. Little by little
we became a people of thinkers and poets. Poets, l can accept-because
nobody takes them seriously-bur the world is foll of 'thinkers.' "81
The target of this criticism is above all the universalism of the classic
tradition, rhe tendency to theorize the "right over the stars," that is, in
terms of universal validity. Consequently, one is deprived of"foundation
[Boden] in the earth," and loses sight of the "affirmation of one's lite. "82
What is rejected is a "spirit" with no Boden and Bodi:nstiind(qkcit, and
therefore uprooted and subversive (cf. supra, chap. 3, 3). Though in
fact, on other occasions, a very different point of view is affirmed. This
is how Hitler expresses himself in a speech addressed to some officers
who were about to leave for the Russian front: "The true national heritage is constituted by the manifold inven.ton and thinku-.r, by the poets,
as well as by the great statesmen and leadcrs."83 On the one hand, the
technkai and productive needs of the war lean toward reactionary modernism. On the other hand, the need to propel an ideological mobilization and to excite nationalistic passion drives in t.he opposite direction:
It encourages the celebration of Germany as a "population of thinkers,"
and presents German as "the most precious and beautiful [language] for
thinkers," the only language. that can really "go beyond generally
accepted facts and representations. "84
This theme is dearly reminiscent of Heidegger who, despite some
15 5
contradictions with the regime, certainly does not break with it. All the
more so since a branch of the Third Reich, diametrically opposed to that
of reactionary modc.rnism, exalts Germany as the "people. actually
formed by philosophers and thinkers." These are the words of Darn:,
who, it seems, even met Heidegger on one occasion. We do not know
whether this information, which is given without further details by the
politician's biographer,85 is reliable. And, perhaps, it is not even panicu
larly relevant. The important thing is not to lose sight of the contradictions within the regime when we analyze Heidegger's relationship to it.
With regard to th.is, we might posit the following conclusion: the
denunciarion of modernity is at the same time a point in common with
Nazism, and a possible critical confrontation with it. The first aspect is
immediately evident: the condemnation of modernity is also the condemnation of liberalism, democracy, socialism, standardization, and the.
political world against which Nazism has waged war. Hitler denounces
Marxism as a "theory of the masses," and singles out the "value principle
of the majority" and "the masses number" as the cause of the dissolution
and ruin of the ''commm1ity of people. "8(; This position is not opposed
by Heidegger who, instead, continues along the same lines, as is evident
from this note in Bcitrage zur Philosophic: "The invasion of the masses
fde1 Aujliruch des Massenhafun ]. This term does not only refer to the
'masses' in a 'social' sense; the masses prevail because what is valuable is
the number and that which can be quantified, that is, what is equally
accessible to everyonc."8 7 Thus, the real and permanent solution to the
problem is the eventual battle against calculative thought and modernity.
And here begins the critic.al confrontation with Nazism.
4.
156
.....
of fighting.SS This criticism of the "total vision of the world" has been
imerpretcd as a condemnation of rhe "totalitarianism of the Nazi
Srate. "8 9 But if we choose not to indulge in this game of associat.ion of
ideas, or worse., assonances of ideas, and proceed instead with a concrcre
historical an.ilysis, then we come ro a very different conclusion. The
terms "totalitarian" or "totalitarianism" are not welcomed by the repre~
sent:uives and ideologists of the Third Reich who, if at all, use them
polemically in reference w the Soviet Union.9
The idea of a "total State," is also looked upon with suspicion;
indeed, according to Goebbels, it would be a "serious mistake" to want
to applr ir to the Nazi regime.91 Such an association-another ideologist
conrinues-\vould facilitate the propaganda spread by Germany's enemies, those who presume to arbitrarily assimilate "the new Reich with
other total States." Moreover, it would create a problem-Rosenberg
points out-because the center of attention would be the state as a
"mechanistic apparatus" (that is, as an expression of the objectivity of
juridical order) rather than the "people," organized by the Nazi "movement" and led by a Fuhrer who is himself a source of rights. Thus, it
would be more appropriate to speak of the "totality [ Ganzhcit, or Totalitat} of National Socialist world vision. 92 It is very likely, then, chat
Heidegger's criticism of the "total vision of the world" is aimed at
15 7
dition. "Total" had been the indelible mark with which Burke bad
branded the French Rcvolution,94 constantly referred to by the regime as
one of the main stages of the catastrophe of the West. And besides,
\Vasn 't the category of tOtality tied to that of universality, which had been
unanimously attacked by the Kricgsidcologie? It is in this sense that, in
contrast to the ideology of the regime, Husserl exalts, in 1934, "the total
idea [ Totalidee] of an autonomous link embracing all of humanity. " 95 On
the other hand, even though in a completely different context and with
a different political significance, in [ra.ly, Croce himself speaks of liberalism and of the religion ofliberty as "a total conception of the world and
realiry. "96 According to Schmitt, it was the French Revolution (and then
the Bolshevik Revolution) that brought about the "pan-intcrventional
worldwide ideology" (pan-interi>c:ntionisti.1che Wdr-JdcolttfJir),97 against
which Germany had been fighting since ar least the First World War. The
definition of "total vi~ion of the world," when applied to Nazism, runs
the risk of dangerously resembling the definition of pan-ideology, which
referred to the ideas born of the French Revolution (or the Bolshevik
Revolution). Schmitt solves this problem by pointing out that the "the
premise for Piilkisch totality is ... the pluralistic character of the political
world and of the objective spirit"; and thus, the "ambition for totality"
present in Nazism, and in Polkisch ideology, does not desire the possesion
of a "universalistic character. "98 Bollnow proceeds along these same lines
whe.n, referring to Heidegger, he exalts concrete totality, that is, a determined community or historicity, as opposed to the Ganzhcit so dear to
Othmar Sp<mn. This Ga.nzhcit, or totality, reeks of "Catholicism," "not
in a confessional sense," but to the extent that it is analogous to universalism. This universal totality presupposes a "harmonious image of the
world" (hannonischcs Weltbild), >vherc there is no place for unique "his
toricity," "struggle," or the agonistic spirit and tragic vision of life. 9 9
Already before the Nazi rise to power, Schmitt criticizes the ambition w
juxtapose "to the concrete reality of these plural structures, totalities
[ Ganzheiten] which encompass the world."100 Inasmuch as totality is
synonymous with universality, both the KrielJsideofogic and Nazism
accuse the Western demoaacies and the Soviet Union of a totalitarian
universalism that is somehow totalitarianism. It is within this framework
that one must situate Heidegger's criticism, which in Einfiihr1m;1r in die
Mrtaphysilt is directed against uni.versa.I totalities, the Ganzhitcn; while in
Be.itri.ige ztn- Phi!-Osop/Jic, it is aimed at the "total vision of the world." On
the other hand, we arc already familiar ~ith Heidegger's criticism of
158
::.
-::
::
,.
~;;.;~~
~+
\!.
I 59
Moderne)I06 and "rational titanism" which is "the ethos of this philosophy and of modernity in general. ... Man has become 'free' and sees
the guarantee of his freedom in the opposition to any reality. Decision,
which has the power to intensify any moment, has been superseded by a
faith in infinite planning, which unconditionally places the future in the
hand.s of man."107 Descartes's theories lead to Auguste Comte's positivism, which has the ambition of transforming men into "masters and
owners of nature [ maftrt.r et po.rsessrnrs de la nature)" and inaugurating
that "positive" era which, since Nietzsche, had been revealed as the era
of the "'last man."108 For Bc:>hm, too, the history of calculative thought
is, in the final analysis, the history of "nihilism."109
The influence of the Kriegsid1:owgir. on Bohm is already evident in
the subtitle of his work, which exalts the "resistance" of "German philosophy" to Cartesianism and to modernity as well as "to the empty
mechanism of the seventeenth century and the enlightened rarefaction
of the world's conrents into mere intellectualism and mere utility; in
other word<>, resistance to the philosophically embellished chaos of world
visions in contemporary Europe. "110 All of this, to include "logical-sys
tematic philosophy," is put in contrast-this theme, too, is reminiscent
of Heidegger--to the "disclosing philosophy [erschlic_t;mdc.c Dcnktn)
which opens up reality," and which is not traversed by the logic of
dominion, but is, on the contrary, "liberating" (fn:ilcgcnd). This philosophy is characteristic of the German people and appears, instead,
"incomprehensible and mysterious to the Western sense of order."l l 1
Bohm, too, seems to reject the positions of reactionary modernism.
Ir should be clear by now that neither the criticism of the category of
totality nor the criticism of calculative thought represent, in and of themselves, a break with the regime. They arc instead, if anything, expressions
of the permanent ideological contradictions \vithin the Third Reich.
NOTES
I. Thomas Mann, "Gedanken im Kriege," in famys, ed. Herman Kurzke
(Frankfurt a.M., 1986 ), vol. 2, p. 26.
2. Thomas Mann, Betrachtitn/fen eines Unpolitisclm1, ed. l1anno Helbling (Frankfurt a.M., 1988), pp. 484, 575; "Einkehr" ( 1917), in Essays, vol. 3,
p. 38.
3. Carl Schmitt, Der U-crt dc1 Staates imd die BcdcururtlJ dts Einzdnen
(Ttibingcn, 19l4), pp. l-5.
..
~i.
) 60
4. Max Schclcr, ''Der Genius des Krieges und dcr demsche Krieg," in
(,,1
~. :-~:.~
:...-..r
'!"
~:
!'.:i:.
.....:s.
::
1982), p. 49.
13. Ibid., p. 167.
14. Ibid., p. 54.
15. Ibid., pp. 115-17.
16. Ibid., pp. l64ff
17. Ibid., p. 78.
18. ]bid., pp. 29-31, 66.
19. Ibid., pp. 266, 55, 37.
20. Ibid., pp. 44, 38, 228, 168.
.
21. Ibid., p. 169.
\
I
22. Jeffrey Herf, Reactiona1-y .Modernism. TeclmoJo..qy, C#lrure and Politic;
in cimar Mld tbe 111ird Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), p. 162.
23. Spengler, Der J.fmsch und die Teclmik, pp. 3-9.
24. Ibid., pp. 57, 3.
25. Spengler, /aim der Entscheidun~q, pp. 5ff.
26. Ibid., pp. 77, 26, 79.
27. In Hcrf, Reacti1mar_v Modernism p. 162; cf. also chaps. 7, 8.
28. Cf Jost Hermand, Der a/tr Tmum 1>om neucn Reich: Viilkischc
Utopicn und Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt a.M., 1988), p. 266.
29. Adolf Hitler, Mein Ka111pf(Miinchen, 1939) pp. 15lt'f, 255ff.
30. Walter Darre, Neuadel aus Blut und Boden (Miinche.n, 1939), pp. 87,
91; on Darre's figure, c[ Anna Bramwell, Blood and SoU ( 1985 ).
31. et: Hermand, De1 altt: 1raum, pp. 259-66.
32. Karl Jaspers, "lvl.ax Weber: Politiker, Forschcr, Philosoph," in Anc(.q-
mmg 1md Polcmik: Gesamn1elte Redcn und Aufsittzc zttr Geschichte der Philosophic, ed. Hans Saner (Mi.inchen, 1968), p. 483.
33. Ibid., p. 430.
34. Ibid., p. 432; in Philosopbische Autobiographie ([Mlinchen-Zlirich,
1984 J, p. 67), Jaspers will favoringly recall Weber's condemnation of the
16 l
"banausic political pettiness of the social democracy, of the trade unions, and of
the workers' leaders."
35. Jaspers, "Max Weber: Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph," p. 475.
36. Ibid., p. 464.
37. Silvio Vierra, Heidcggers Kritik a.m Nationalsozia./ismus und Ml der
Ii:dmik (Tiibingen, 1989), pp. 12, 17.
38. Mann, Bttrachrungen tines Unpolitischcn, pp. 166, 571.
39. Ibid., p. 193; and Mann, "Einkehr,~ pp. 38ff.
40. Spengler, ]ahrc der Entsc/Ji:idung, pp. 69, I 03.
41. Cf. Karl Lo\\.ith, Mein Leben in Drntsc/Jland vm und m1c/J 1933: Ein
Bmcht(Snmgart, 1986), p. 50.
42. Manin Heidegger, "Nietzsche: Der Wille z.ur Macht als Kunst," in
Gesa.mta.usgabe (Frankfurt, 1980), p. 31.
43. Ibid., p. 193. Significantly enough, this passage from Heidegger's
1936-37 lecture is lefi: out of the 1961 edition; cf .Martin Heidegger, Nfrtzsd1f
(Frankfurt a.M., 1961 ), vol. l, pp. 182ff.
44. This is a passage from a lecture on Schelling (summer l 936) which
was not include.d in the edit.ion that followed: Martin Heidegger Schelling:
Abbandltm.g iiber das Wesm det mmrchlichen Freibeit (Tubingen, 1971 ). Cf.
Carl Ulmer's letter to Dn- Spie_.qel dated May 2, 1977; and Otto Pi:lgg.eler, "Heideggers politisches Selbstverstandnis," in Hi::id.c..1J1Jer und dt'e p1aktische Philosophic, eds. Annemarie Gehtmann-Siefert and Otto Poggcler (Frankfort a ..M.,
1988 ), pp. 37, 59 n. 11; cf. also l\farrin Heidegger, "Schelling: vom Wesen der
menschlichen Freiheit" (1936), in Gesamtausgabc, vol. 42, pp. 40ff. In these
years Nieczsche's thought is so far from heing synonymous with nihilism that
Jaspers, in his warm praise (cf supra, chap. 2, 2) of Heidegger's rectorial
speech, compliments Heidegger himself by comparing him ro Nietzsche (and
very likely, this compliment is greatly appreciated by its recipiem ;. :
45. Martin Heidegger, "Nietzsches metaphysische Gnmdstellung irn
ahend landischen Denken," in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 44, pp. 200, 188.
46. Marrin Heidegger, "Beitrage zur Philosophic (Vom Ercignis)," in
Ge.s1JmtaU{1Jabe, vol. 65, p. 139.
47. Heidegger, "Nietzsche: Der Wille zur J\.facht als Kunst," p ..31.
48. Heidegger, "Bcitragc zur Philosophie," p. 41; this passage was
already discusse.d by Vietta in Heideggus Kritik, p. 74.
49. Heidegger, "Beitragc zur Philosophic," pp. l39tl
50. Heidegger, "Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung," p. 192.
5 l. Ibid., p. 187.
52. Heidegger, "Nite.zsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunsr," p. 191.
5.3. Ibid., p. 274.
54. Ibid., pp. 278, 283.
55. Ibid., p. 278.
56. Ibid., p. 281.
162
;; .1 ~
.. "'i.
-. :r
57. Jn a letter dared March 30, 1933, in lvia.rtin Heidegger and Elisabeth
Blochmann, B1-iefwed1stf 1918-1969, ed. Joachim W. Srorck (Marbach, 1990 ), p. 60.
58. Marrin Heidegger, Die Sclbstbehti.uptung dcr deutschen UniPersitiit
(Frankfurt, 1983 ), pp. 13, l 8.
59. Martin Heidegger, "Das Rektorar 1933-34-: Tatsachen und
Gedanken," published as an appendix to Die Selbstbehauptung, p. 23.
60. The problematic interprc.ration of Nietzsche made by Jaspers, who is
careful ro liighlighr even rhe contradictory and aporetk aspects of the philosopher, is condemned by Heidegger as a form of psychologistic reductionism, and
defined as "the lfn:aust faisijication": cf Heidegger, "Nietzsche: Der Wille zur
Macht als Kunst," p. 278; the text ro which this condemnation mostly refrrs is
Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche. Ein.fuhrung in das Verstandnis seines Philosophierms
(Berlin- Leipzig, 1936 ). This criticism, however, is guilty of completely overlooking the points in c.ornmon between the rwo interpretations of Nietzsche.
61. Karl Jaspers, Vi:rnin~ft und Ev:istenz (Bremen, 1947), pp. 23, 101.
62. Karl Jaspers, Psychologfr der Pv'eltanscha.mm,1Jcn, 4th ed. (Basel, 1954 ),
son:
l 63
printed in Georg Usadel, 'Z..eii~ireschichu in Wort und Bild. Vom Altrn Zum Ncuen
Rcid1 (Oldenhurg-Berlin, 1942 ), vol. 4, p. 38.
81. See BormanVermerke (audio recording), vol. 2, p. 304 (Hirlcr's talk on
August 29, 1942).
82. Again, in Hitler's speech delivered in Potsdam and primed in Usadd,
z~it!JeschiclJte in Wort tmd Bild, vol. 4, p. 38.
83. "Adolf Hiders Gcheimrcde vor dcm 'Militarischen Fiihrcrnachwuchs'
vom 30 Mai 1942," in Hitlers Tischgetprai:he, ed. Henry Pick.er !Frankfurt
a ..M.-Berlin, l 989), p. 496.
84. Ibid., pp. 121 (dialogue of.March 7, 1942), 364 (dialogue of June 7,
1942).
85. Dam~, Neuade/ a11s Blut und Boden, p. 86. A.~ for the presumed
meering between Heidegger and Darre, cf Bramwell, Blood and Soil, p. 117.
86. Hider, Mein Ka.mP.f; pp. 498ff.
87. Heidegger, "Beirrage z.ur Philosophie," p. 121.
164
..
... ~ I
S I
1. CRITICISM OF THE
IDEAL OF PERPETUAL PEACE
165
166
Peace is a desire, war is a fact, and the history of man has never given consideration to human desires and ideals. Lifr is struggle .... The fact that
entire populations be.come pacifistic is a ~ymprom of senile weakness:
gone are the. young, srrong races. 111e ideal of pacifism signifies the ulrimate contradiction ro the facts of!ife, Ir b a renunciation of t:he forure.
:,
'i
:.j
: :
_5,
a:.
~I
s:;; .,
16 7
168
.,. ~, . . :t'
\\le are perhaps already on the eve of the second world war-alliances
arc uncertain, and no one foresees the means and tactks: military, economi..: and revolutionary.... The. first world war was nothing more
rhan the. thunder and lightning of those dark clouds which traverse our
cenmry laden wirh <iesriny. The world will again be re-shaped in the
At this time, war in the West is anything but excluded, though three
years later, Spengler, rejecting the ideal of perpetual peace as a symprom
of vital decadence, observes: "Contemporary communism names its \Vars
revolts." The difference is strictly verbal: to profess revolutionary faith is
nonetheless a bellicose declaration. "It is a dangerous fact-Spengler
continues-that today only white populations speak of world peace, not
the colored ones, which arc numerically much more powerful." The
West is in mortal danger (keep in mind that for Spengler, communist
Russia is among the colored populations): "Pacifism will remain an ideal,
war will remain a fact, and if the white populations have decided not to
take charge of the war, the colored ones will, and they will come to dom
inatc the world." 16 The West is called upon to recover its warlike spirit,
above all with regard w the. East.
2.
l 69
But the war, perhaps expeae.d more in the East, erupts instead in the
West (against France and Britain, the allies of a quickly defeated Poland).
It is not the "historical" war foreseen by Jaspers in 1931. In 1953, he
will describe the atmosphere at the start of the cont1ict as such: "!\part
from some inconspicuous exceptions, Germans, even old fiicnds, were
hoping for a German victory; while I, in the midst of this exultation,
searched desperately for a sign that things would change." 17 It is impossible to say whether or not, here too, Jaspers backdates, if not hi$ semiment~, then at least their clarity. What is certain is that, among his "old
friends" unhesitantly supporting Germany, Heidegger is undoubtedly
included. One might venture to ask, however, whether or not Heidegger
was embarrassed by the unforeseen manner of the conflict. The First
World War-he states during the course of his 1936-37 lectures-had
demonstrated the validity of Nietzsche's thesis regarding rhe death of
God, the moral God of the Christian tradition: both sides of the
opposing "Christian,, powers "called upon the same 'good God' ro fight
for them, even up ro the very end."18 Did the ne\\.' conflict not confirm
the decisive victory of Nihilism in the West~ Nazi Germany, rising to
defend the West, allies itself with Japan and signs a nonaggression pact
with Bolshevik RL1.Ssia: it is a point that Thomas Mann does not fail to
ironically comment upon in one of his radio transmissions before a hypothetical, or at least very small, German audiencc.19 And didn't Heidegger himself, i.n l 935, warn Europe, locked between the United States
and the USSR, not to stab itself in the back?
According to Heidegger, what sparks the conflict is the will to power
that traverses Western hisrory, while a secondary role is played br economic factors, to include the "increase in population." Not even the
search for Lcbmsraum, to which official German propaganda makes reference, provides an adequate explanation. Not that Heidegger supports
the accusatiom made against the Third Reich and its expansionist policies; to the contrary, he is quick to reject them: "When the execution of
this metaphysical will rto power] is interpreted as a 'product, of egoism
or of the \.Viii of'dictators' and 'authoritarian stares,' what is being voiced
is nothing more than political calculation and propaganda, or the metaphysical ignorance of a philosophy which for ccmuries has been trapped
in a blind alley, or both of these things. " 20 Indeed, "securing 'vital space'
170
( ~
'
i.
;;."
for the living is never the end goal, hut rather the means to increase
power; and with this augmented power comes the increased need fi:>r
space." The insati.able nature of Nazi expansionism is very precisely
described, and its aggressive: character is readily perceptible; bnt this
assertion is by no means critical, which again confirms that it is "a fundamental metaphysical l:iw of power it~elf," and therefore appointed
governments and poliricosocial regimes cannot be held responsiblc.21
Yes, this relentless \Viii to power is nihilism, but, as we shall soon see, any
attempt to c1iridze it on moral or juridical ground~ is incomplete
nihilism, and frir that reason, even worse.
It is in this same period that Thomas Mann juxtaposes the ~rman
"policy of power" to the "humanity," that is, to the "values and 1goods
of the souf," that he sees embodied in Britain.22 Faced with the new
international situation, and wirh the terrible threat that Nazi Germany
holds over Europe and the world, Mann now wholeheartedly supports
the very ascertainment that he had previously dismissed, in his Bctrachtungen eincs Unpolitischen, as the. Entente powers' hypocritical propaganda. Heidegger, instead, perceives Germany's enemies in the Second
"World War as driven by the same will ro power that they insist on
ascribing solely to rhe Third Reich. In order to demonstrate his point,
he provides a significant example. Immediately after France's defeat and
the signing of the armistice, Britain proceeds to destroy her former ally's
fleet in an attempt to prevent it from falling into German hands. Instead,
this strengthens Germany's military and maritime power. Heidegger's
comment is as follows:
When, for example, the British recently bombed and sank French navy
vessels docked ar Oran, it was thoroughly "justified" from their point
171
In this sense, nihilism "is not just collapse [ Einst111-z ], but annihilation
l Wi;_q(all] in the form oflibcration, and thus a new besrinning [Bi;_qinn ]. "26
Active nihilism, with which Heidegger clearly identifies at this time,
is represented by Nazism, and Nazism is driven by a lucid will to power,
and by the dazzling victories through which it is realizing the "new
order." Again and again the call for a Neur Ordmm,IJ is repeated in the
course of the second lecture in 1940. And there is no possible ambiguity:
the reterence is to what Thomas Mann, during the course of the war,
defines as "Hitler's infamous 'new order.' "27 Naturally, Heidegger is
convinced otherwise. The unscrupulous brutality with which the Third
Reich is acrnalizing the Nette Ordnung is philosophically described and
transfigured as absolute and active nihilism; it has nothing to do with
decadence since it accdcrates the. dccre.pitation of values rhar have
already become moldy and lack credihility. "The double negation of that
172
..
which exists and that which must be," of every normative horizon, is in
fact the presupposition of the "new order. Only an fabsolute l nihilist is
able to actualize it."28 In short, "Nietzsche demands that the. coming of
nihilism he looked upon as r.hc introduction of an absolute return and a
new beginning, unhindered by half measures, rather than as the means
of spreading the beliefin the 'decline of the West.' " 29 The "beginning"
(Anfang) docs not exactly presuppose the r.ranscendence of the\ metaphysics of the will to power; rather, only the 1ieucr Beginn exreifis the
"unconditional dominion of nihilism. "W But it is this extension that in
turn renders the "new beginning" possible.
The denunciation of nihilism, which traverses the hisr.ory of the
West, is not at all indifferent: "fA]n awareness [BesinnrmoJ of nihilism
cannot mean a mere historiographic consideration of rhe present era and
irs hisrorica! presuppositions; rather, it is, in and of itself, necessarily, a
decision regarding what must constitute Earth's humanity [Menschmtmn] in the furure. "3 1 .. Nihilism and nihilism are nor the same
thing. "32 Thus Heidegger follows the events of the war, attempting to
interpret the Third Reich's dazzling victories philosophically. They represent the victory of absolute and active nihilism over incompkte
nihilism. There is nothing arbitrary about France's terrible defeat;
instead, it answers to some "mysterious law of history": the country that
gave birth tO Descartes is defeated by a country that, thanks to the triumph of absolute nihilism, excels in the organization of an "economy of
the machine." Springing to victor~' is "a new humanity ( neucs Men
schentuml ... which transcends the modern man." In fact, "only the
overman is commensurate to the absolute 'economy of che machine,'
and vice versa: they depend upon each other in order to establish
absolute dominion over the Earth. ".33
At this time, Heidegger's position docs not stray far from Jiinger's
in Der .Arheita, the work in which, in this \'try same time period, Heidegger comments upon and discusses with a "small circle of university
professors. ".H According to Jlinge.r, "a new world order !is] rhe result of
world domination," which in turn will be the result of an enormous
armed conflict marked by the will to power:
The lcgitimare version of rhc many manifestations of the will ro power
which desire to ru.le 11eeds to be made delr. Qualiticarion of its legitimaq'
consists in the nile over the predominant elements, in knowing how co
dominarc ahsolme. movement, and this can only be the work of a new
humanity-. We believe that such a humanity alre.uly exists at this moment..->5
l 73
174
'
riors. "39 But the virrory of Germany's enemies is nor destined to last: for
long: the war questions the ideology of progress upon which the Entente
powers arc founded. It triggers the "dismantling of rhe people's Cjhurch
of the nineteenth cenrnrr"; the central powers, ;rnd the traditional/Values
that they stand for, are swept away hy the Bih;ge1-, "mobilized" 'in the
name of democracy. But this Bu"lJer, tied to the ivorld of "security," is
itself destined to be swept away by the Arbeim-Soldat, the worker-soldier
who, unhindered by false ideals and lies, easily navigates the rediscovered
world of danger, the "elementary," and the will w power. The forces that
the war set in motion are destined to put an end to the "deceptive victory" ( Scheinsi(lf} of the "bourgeoisie" and democratic civilizarion, as well
as che "deceptive [ Schcinkultus] faith in progress. "40
The Third Reich's dazzling victories at the beginning of the war
seem w clearly confirm Jilnger's theory, and according to Heidegger,
the period from 1939 to 1940 marks the irreversible defeat of incomplete nihilism. This schema is reiterated in the summer of 1941, during
the course of which Heidegger makes a direct reference to Hinger when
he states that the new "humanity" enlisr.ed to realize the Nieczschean
will w power is represented by "the 'workers' and the 'soldiers.' " It is
they "who have now determined the face of reality. "H
....~;
~.
3.
17 5
ning. But by themselves, active nihilism and the will to power, and thus
Nietzsche, are not the new beginning per sc. lnsread-Hddegger
declares at the apex of Nazi military might-"the metaphysics of the will
to power goes hand in hand with that which is Romanic and with l\fachiavdli's 111c Prinn:. " 41 To steadfastly support this point of view is to preclude any new Greco-German beginning. When the United States enters
the war, Heidegger states that Romanic nature continues to live on in
Americanism: the two share a "monumentality" that is extraneous to
German authenticity ( undeutscl1cs Momnnentaits).43
The decision to reject Nietzsche's '"Romaniry" is emphasized later in
the course of the war. Instead, the representative of authentic Hellenism
and thus the possible Oheni>ind1mg of modern metaphysics, is
HC>lderlin, who is under no circumstances ro be confused with Nietzsche.; t.he two arc worlds apart.44 In an introduction to his lecture on
Aristotle in 1931, Heidegger cires a passage from Di:r Wille z.ui- Macht
in which Nietzsche exalts "German p1ide in having re-established a link
which had long seemed broken: the link with the Greeks, rhc greatest
'men' to have ever appeared. "45 Ir is the same text that, some years later,
Baeumler cites in order t0 demonstrate the tie.~ between Hellas and Germany.46 But for the Heidegger who expounds the victories of the Third
Reich, the Hellenism that Nietzsche claims to have discovered is in
reality "absolutely Roman, and at the same time modern, and thus not
Greek": "Roman" here is synonymous with "impcriaJ."47 In the final
analysis, Nietzsche's will to power is criticized as imperial and Roman.
We might ask ourselves if Heidegger hasn't distanced himself from
the Nazi regime. Didn't Hitler love to play the role, at least privately, of
the reborn Roman emperor? 4 8 And wasn't d1e very same Nietzsche
whom Heidegger condemns as Roman and imperial presented by a large
political press as the precursor to the Third Reich? Regarding rhis last
point, it is worth noting that the representation of Nazi ideologists as
unequivocal follm.,ers of Nietzsche is erroneous. Even in this circle there
are differences of opinion, even some conrradiccions. 49 ff, on the one
hand, Heidegger is in disagreement with the Nierzschc-BnPCJJU11;_ff (rhe
Third Reich's predominant movement) and, in panicu!ar, with
Baeumler, who sees in Nietzsche the symbol of Hellenism struggling
against the modern world's Romanity; on the other hand, thcv both ha\'e
a negative opinion of all that is Roman and modern. For Bacumler, what
is Roman is analogous to an international order that eliminates national
peculia1itics. lt is not only synonymous with cosmopolitanism and impc-
li6
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..
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rialism, but also with a philistine vision of the world as opposed to the
agonistic spirit of the Greeks: pax romana and imperium romanum are
clearly perceived in a negative way. so These themes, despite notablC\ differences, can be found in other Nazi ideologists as well, such as He~se5l
and Bohm. Bohm conrrasts "two thousand years of 'univers.ilism' " in
the West ro what is exalted as "original Hellenism" with a Volkisch rein
terprcration; that is, w the "Greek stateliness with its popular foundation" that is lost with the coming ofAristotk, and even more so with the
coming of the "RomaJ1 empire" and the modern world.52
lt would be rash ro a~scrt that Heidegger's criticism of Nietzsche's
will to power as being "Roman"' and "imperial," is in fact a subtle criti
dsm of German imperialism. Carl Schmitt, who denounces the "imperialism of Versailles, "53 contrasts the Reich to lmperiu.tn as such: rhe latter,
beginning with the Romans, is said to have a tendentially universalistic
meaning, and so does anything but. respecr the uniqueness of distinct
peoples ( lmperiznn is the rerm most suitable then for "Western democratic empires" and the "Eastern universalism of the Bolsheviks, iment
upon world revolution"); on die other hand, the German Reich has an
"ethnic" ( l'Olkbaft) frmnd;uion, and implies "a juridical order essentially
non-universalistic in nature, one which respects every population. "54 lt
is l 939, right afrer the Ansch'1~/l and the subse.quent dismemberment of
Czechoslovaki1: "The cenrer of Europe f die Mitte] has gone from being
weak and imporent to strong and invulnerable." It is capable of
spreading its "great political policy," which "'respects each unique population according to its lineage (Art), origin, blood and soil,"
"throughout Central and Southern Europe," and of defending it from
any external aggressor.55 rn effect, the Third Reich's expansionism is carried out 1mder the banner of slogans such as "great space" and "viral
space," the. reordering and unification of "Mitteleuropa," even expressions such as "antiimperialistic"--all of which reclaim "Europe for
Europeanr.." It is a sorr of European Monroe Doctrine, but with Ger
many obviously playing the role of the guide. 56 When Heidegge.r speaks
of imperialism, he either refers explicitly ro England, 57 or indirectly to
America, which is identified with Romanity, and thus bnperium. Rr:icl1,
on the ocher hand, has a positive connotation.58
Once again, the influence of the Kric.._qsideolo._qic is evident. Not by
chance docs it recall the BifreiunJJJkric:..111'~9 against Napoleon's France,
which Fichte and the cultural and political press of the rime denounce as
expansionist Rome.60 This anti-Roman topos is very much pre.sent in
177
178
.. i
'
..
Mose "rese;ln:h results" seem ro indicate that the Greeks were National
Socialists. Thi_~ erudite zeal docs nor seem to realize that such condu
sic.ms do no service to National So.:ialism or its hisrorical uniqueness;
indeed, National Srn.:i.1lism has no need of such sc.rvicc.74
.
~.~
..
~::,
4.
Despite: appearances, Spengler and Heidegger are not so fur apart. Even
more interesting than Spengler's ide.ntifrcar.ion of Prussia and Germany
with imperial Rome, is his charactcrizacion of the latter: "Let's not forget
that the lmpcrium Romanum was no more than a ruthless business affair,
and that the great Romans were none other than investors"; "Roman
expansionism was merely a financial takeover, just slightly disguised in
militaristic terms." On the other hand, contemporary Germany, in her
l 79
180
It was by pure chance rhar the Germanic people-~, under pressure from
the Huns, came to occupy the Romanic land.scape, thus interrupting
the devclpment of [he final "Chinese " stage of classical antiquicy....
As such, dassical antiquity is the only example of a Zii>ilisarion interrupted at the apogee of its maruriry.80
..
'.;
~:: -~
~-.
. .:
..
l 81
J82
r:
...
5.
With the exrcnsion of the conflict beyond the "West" (as it is circum
scribed by Heidegger), inrerpretarion of the war once again takes on the
pathos of European and Western "historicity" characrcristic of his tcxrs
from 1933 through to the outbreak of the conflict. The United States,
18 3
184
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('
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German "overman," the only one truly up to par with te.chnology and
modern metaphysics. The battle of Stalingrad marks, perhaps, not only
a turning poinr in the Second World War, but also a crncill point in the
evolution of Heidegger's thought. After all, official propaganda itself is
now forced co cease exalting the cffic:iency of the Third Reich's war
machine and ro speak dismayingly of the "divisions of motorized robots"
set into motion by the Soviet Union. This is according to Goebbels, who
contrasts "Eastern Bolshevism" and "historical dangers" co "Western
humanity" and Germany's "historical mission" ro save Europc.103
Again, this is not to amalgamate the ideas of a great intellectual wirh
those of the rci:,rime 's propaganda minister; the contradictions continue
to be relevant and ever present (with regard, for example, to the fiery
anti-Semitism that Goebbels demonstrates on this occasion when
addressing the "Judaic-Bolshevik" threat.}. The fact remains that, beginning with the campaign against the Soviet Union, and even more so after
the defeat ar. Stalingrad, certain current5 rbat were not always in support
of Nazism and that at times even contradicted it, cal! now more than
ever for unity in the name of saving rhe West. This is the case with Franz
Joseph Rarkowski, the military Catholic archbishop who, in an appeal
made on June 29, 1941, immediately after rhe start of the "great and
decisive offensive to the east,'"' defines Germany as "the 'heart-population' of Europe," 104 an expression coined by Holderlin, and one dear to
Heidegger, who refers to it repeatedly. The Reich's propaganda presents
the war to the cast as a mortal clash between the West and "Central
Asia "-Thomas Mann notes shortly afi:cr the defeat at Stalingrad-in an
attempt ro shatter the anti- Nazi alliance by way of a rallying call to arms
against both the A5ian and the "red mcnace."105 Perhaps such a motif is
present in Heidegger, as well.
One thing is certain: the interpretation of the war has radically
changed since the initial campaign to the west: No longer is the will to
power juxtaposed to the will to power (even rhough the expression
"absolute nihilism" i~ preferred). What is now at stake to the cast is the
very soul of Germany," 'the sacred heart' of Western popularions." 106
This too must he a widespread theme107 it~ in criticizing the propaganda
of the Third Rei.ch, Thomas Mann continues to insist that the. " 'sacred'
... German soil" has ''for a long time. been de&ccrated and tarnished by
lies and crime."108 According to Heidegger, what is most at stake now,
in addition ro Germany and the West, is being, or rather, Being:
I85
186
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f;:
1,
6.
I 87
Marx's denunciation of ideological "false consciousness" as a technique for legitimizing unconfessed and unconfcssable interests, and his
pathos of science and of the objenivity of knowledge, are portrayed as
the exaltation of an overwhe.Jming will to power that leaves no room for
the autonomy and objectivity of knmvledge. l 19 Heidegger boasts of
having argued against this theory, allegedly common to both the Nazis
and the Marxists, in his rectorial speech in 1933.120
In reality, if his speech argues against the reduction of the "spiritual
world of a people" to the "superstructun:. of a culture," it is only in order
to affirm the fact that "the Jpiritual world of a people ... is the protective power of the forces of earth and blood."121 In 1935, referring
directly to his speech delivered two years earlier, Heidegger goes as far
as to accuse the new "propagandistic strategy" of "Russian communism"
of trying to reduce spirituality and culture to a mixture of "ornamental
objects and furniture." that are unrelated ro the "historical mission of our
people, the center of the West."122 The target of his argument is cer
tainly the anti-Nazi congress Pmw /a. D~fensc de la C11/t11ri:, v,.foch takes
place in Paris in June of 1935 (with the participation of Germans such
as Ernst Bloch, Bertolt Brecht, and Heinrich Mann, among others). The
conference, even ar its preparatory stage, promotes the slogan: "For a lit
erature of truth, peace, and liberty." This appeal to the "truth" is
repeated continuously during the congress, always in bitter opposition to
Nazism, which is accused of reducing, or attempting to reduce, culture
to an instrument frir the legitimization of power. Not by chance, one of
the participants of the next congress, held in 1937, is Julien Benda, the
:.:
188
.,
one who had bitterly denounced the "bccrayal of the clergy" and intellectuals, above all during the course of the First World War, accusing
them of giving in to the nationalistic passions and to the ideology of war.
Here, however, he dedicarcs himself to battling Nazi-fascism in the name
of the autonomy of culturc.123 lnsread, Heidegger, in condemning the
new "propagandistic strategy of Russian communism," rejects "the position of the litterateur and esthere" (alles Lirerate.n- tend Asthetenthmn).124 The one who is diffident \\ith regard to the slogans that focus
upon the- autonomy of culture, is Heidegger himself, in his 1935 Einji"il1run..1J in die Mctaph_vsik. It is hardly by chance that, even as early as
19 30, he had targeted "self-exhausting .freisch111ebe.nd speculation," and
thus the .frcisclnPcbcnd intellectual theorized by Mannheim (cf. mpra,
chap. 2, 6 ).
This is not, however, the essential point: If, during the course of 1940
and the first phase of the war, the incomplete nihilism of democracy,
socialism and Marxism is favorably compared to the absolute nihilism of
Nietzsche (and of Nazism); now, on the other hand, Hitler's defeat and
the assimilation of Marx and Nietzsche, and of communism and Nazism,
in the name of the will to power, allmvs for Marx and the revolutionary
tradition to also be blamed for the resultant catastrophe in the West (of
which the two world war.s and Nazism are an integral part). In fact, it is
now Marx himself who comes to represent ""the position of extreme
nihilism" 125 rather than incomplete nihilism. On the one hand, absolute
nihilism (Nietzsche and Nazism) plays a positive role in l 940 because, by
putting an end to hypocrisy and "half-measures" (democracy, socialism,
and so on), it also paves the way for a "new beginning." On the other
hand, absolute or extreme nihilism now has an unequivocally negative
meaning given that it serves to indic.ue rhe lowest point to which the
West and the entire planet have been led to by the oblivion of being.
According to Heidegger's assessment, there is no room for "moral
indignation" with regard to Fiihrers (note that the term is now used only
in the plural); such indignation is misleading and ridiculous since it fails
to recognize chem as "necessary conse.quences" of the oblivion of
being.12 6 This theme had already been deployed in 1940-4 l in order to
provide an indirect, "metaphysical" justification for Nazi Germany'~
policy of expansion, a justification that is now replaced by a condemna
tion that overshadows everyone and everything. In 1940-41 there wa..
room for distinction: unlike her enemies, Germany was able to demon
smne absolute nihilism, free of hypocrisy and half-measures; now, in tht
189
190
i::.
again made acute by the fall, or the impending fall, of the Third Reich.
Just months before the regime's collapse, Thomas Mann insists that the
German people be "aware of the inexpiable'' nature of the damage that
Germany has inflicted upon humaniry. There is one precondition to rcconcili:.uion, and this is the ""foll and unimpeded awareness of the horren
dous crimes," the burden and gravity of which the German people, per
haps even then, continue to ignore. With political clarity, and at the same
time deep psychological penetration, Mann informs his radio listeners of
the reason.~ for this ignorance: it is due "in part to rhe fact that. you were
isobred and violently confined ro stupidity and narrow-mindedness, in
part to the fact that you instinctively decided to save yourselves by
refusing to consciously accept the knowledge of these horrors." The
repression must end and the "production of death" which is still taking
place with the Russians in the East, must be looked square in the face.134
A frw monrhs after the war, Jaspers publishes the product of his own
deeply felt self-criticism, Dfr Schuldfrage. It is translated into Italian,
with the author's consent, as La colpa delta Germania.135 With respect
to the end of the First World War, a significant development has occured.
At that rime, Jaspers was in complete agreement with Weber, \Vhom he
credited with having condemned the victors' ambition of humiliating
Germany to the point of extracting a "confrssion of guilt." 136 Weber was
also credited with having denounced in his own country "the political
masochism of a pacifism withour dignity, which voluntarily wallows in
guilt."13 7 On a more philosophical level, after World War I, Jaspers
ascribes "guilt" to each individual and ro every human assemblage.
Given "rhc limitation of resources" L38 and therefore the inevitable
struggle for "the extension of Dasein's space fDascinsraum],"13 9 the fact
thar one exists is the cause of our guilt: "My Dasdn reduces r.he space of
others, in the same way thar the others reduce my space. Every bit that
I obtain eliminates the possibility of the other to reclaim a portion of the
space available. My gain is the other's loss. My lite is conringent upon
the victory of my forefathers."1 4 0 And so the blame is unmistakable: "If
by my Dastin l a/foij' .f01 rnndition.r which, though indispensable to m:'Y
existence, exact struggle and suffering from others, then I am guilty of
the exploitation by which I live." 141 So it makes no sense to ascribe guilt
solely to Germany: Together and in competition with the other powers,
she was forced to take part in the su-uggle for the vital space tJut is indispensable to human existence.
Gui.It that is neither juridical, nor political, nor even moral in a strict
191
192
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:-;...
..,.,:
~'.
i ....
~: :h
icism. It is true that in his reply Heidegger cites Jaspers ("The fuct that
\Ve are alive, that is our guilt"), but this is only to underscore the great
risk which any open opposition to the regime would have entailed, even
co "family members," and for which he is now being reproached.146
Given the equivalence between one Fuhrer and another, any expected
self-criticism from the author of the rectorial speech would be inappropriate. Before being solicited by Marcuse, Heidegger counterattacks,
even on a personal levc.l: lf one's position with regard to Nazism must
be refr.rred to as "guilt," "then isn't this essentially guilt by default
[ 1Puentlichcs Vt~rsdtmmis]?" Wouldn't it have been better "'if around
1933 all of those who were able to had worked m purif) and moderate,
slowly and secretively, the movement which came to power"?l47 This is
the same idea posited in 1936. To ll>with, who insists on outlining the
most despicable aspects of the Third Reich to his teacher, or former
teacher (who is facing him wearing the Nazi insignia), Heidegger
responds with a vehemem denunciation of those intellectuals who had
distanced themsdves: "If these gentlemen hadn't deemed themselves
too refined to get involved, things would have gone differently; but
instead I was completely alone. "148 Here, 1933 would appear to be not
so much t.he beginning of a catastrophe, bur rather a missed opportunity: and this assessment remains essentially unchanged even nine years
later, despite the resultant tragedy.
7.
19 3
194
:. -~
the thirties, his condemnarion of total, discriminatory war does not seem
to have any universal value, rather it presupposes the "homogeneity" of
European peoples "on the basis of civilizarion," a homogeneity that
cannot be ascribed to Africa or co the Soviet Union (cf. sup1a, chap. 3,
8). Then, in 1939, Schmitt \Hites that, in terms ofimemational law,
war should be considered "equally just by both contenders," but only to
the extent that they are aurhenric states: "International law pre.supposes
in e.ach Stace a minimal amount of organization on the domestic from,
and a foreign policy characterized by a strong military defense."158 A.s a
resulr, "'any population incapable" of statehood, or rather, incapable of
statehood at the level of modern warfare, should not be considered "the
subjecr of international law." 159 This "discriminatory" clause is not limited to colonies, even though it is made with specific reference to
Abyssinia. In the meantime, Czechoslovakia has bee.n dismembered, and
Poland's fate is likewise sealed, ro the Reich's advantage. Ir is within this
framework that Schmitt's theory must be contemplated; finally, the
Reich would substitute the state, above all the small state, as the subject
of international law. lbO
At the very least, the condemnation of total, discriminatory war has
many loopholes. After rhe Second World War, on the other hand,
Schmitt insists char it was primarily Marxism and Bolshevism that created
"absolute hostility," an elemenr previously unknown to the jtts public.inn
mropaeum, and the true origin of the atrocities and the catastrophe in
the Wcst.161 And yet, the assessments of both Schmitt and Jiinger can be
traced according to a clear cominuum with respect to their previous
assessmenrs of the First World War.
Jn his argument againsr Versailles, Schmitr denounces not only the
intrinsic, intervenrional nature of democratic universalism ("In internation<ll law, the general, universal c.oncepts that embrace the world are the
typical weapons of inrervcm.ionalism"),1(;2 bur above all he attributes to
demonacy the ideological, "total," and "discriminatory" war that has
sadly resurfaced in European hismry.Hi.'I In turn, Hinger, pointing a finger
at the Western democracies, asserts that the "political war" that they
despise is infinitely preferable co "the people's war": the difference being
that the former "is sheltered by morality, and so the excitement of lower
instincts and of hatred is not needed to spur the masses ro combat." tM
The hope or pretense of banishing war and suffering instead serves only
ro produce rhe unfortunate "confusion between war and murder,"
making vain any attempt to respect the traditional limits of war.165
l 95
196
.:."
/:
;
~
...
bilit.y of having been the first (after the Crusades) to banish "the traditional deli mi ration of war between European states." 169 And so, the
merit for having been the first to denounce the horrors of "absolute hostility" is ascribed to "an outstanding and courageous thinker of the
Ancien. Ri._qimc" who, on the one hand, was able to make the most of
the experience of the French Revolution, and on the other hand,
prophetically directed attention to .Russia, and to her new and disturbing
revolm.ionary turmoil. l70 It is, paradoxically, Joseph de Maistre who surfaces as an enemy of "total war." While it is true that de Maistre accuses
French revolutionaries of having made what were once limited and
chivalrous wars barbaric and ruthless, at the same time he exalts the
"enthusiasm of slattghter," not to mention the fact that here and there
he seems to even justify the genocide carried out by the Spanish against
the Indians.171 Interestingly enough, respects are paid to Joseph de
Maistre at a conference in Franco's Spain, in 1962. There, the civil war
that took place twenty-five years earlier is recalled, not with the aim of
condemning total war, perhaps by citing examples such as Guernica (the
bombing of which certainly did not distinguish between military and
civilian targers), but rather to pay respect to Francisco Franco's regime:
"In the years between 19 36 and 19 38 ... Spain managed to defend herself; by means of a war of national liberation, from the danger of falling
inro the clutches of international communism." I i2
Heidegger, hinger, and Schmitt-these three great German intellectuals of the twentieth ce.nrury, so different from one another, have at
least this much in common: They are content, at least in the beginning,
with the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism; likewise, around 1933 they p<lrticiparc in the bitter condemnation of
democracy, socialism, and the revolutionary political rradition; and then,
after the war, though each in a different manne.r, they finally incorporate
the criticism of Nazism into a vast hisrorical assessment. that ascribes
responsibility also, and above all, to the revolutionary political rradition.
It is within this context that the "revisionist" historiography of roday
must be situated: It is not by chance that it is one of Heidegger's disciples, the historian Ernst Nolte, who, more openly than any other, places
the blame for the holocaust and genocide upon the "Asian" barbarians,
whom Hitler imitates, with the Bolshevik Revolution in mind.173 Suddenly, it all becomes clear: The West, the authentic \Nest, uncontaminated by "Asian" influence, is again assured of a clear conscience. The
theme of the decline of the West first makes its appearance and gains
197
notoriety toward the end of the First World War; now, it is overturned
in its final, blinding transfiguration.
NOTES
I. Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitisc.hen, ed. Hanno He!
bling (Frankfurt a.M., 1988), p. 455.
2. Oswald Spengler, "lsr We.ltfriede m<'.iglich! Tekgraphischc Amwort
auf eine amerikanische Rundfi'age" ( 1936), in Redm 1md A1~fatze, ed. rldegard
Komhardt (Miinchenm 1937), pp. 292ff.
3. Oswald Spengler, Di-r Untcrlftm..IJ des Abendlandes (Miinchen, 1980),
p. 781.
4. Karl Jaspers, Vernimft1md Exi.11cnz(Bremen, 1947), p. 78.
5. Ibid., p. 79.
6. Max We.ber, "Die Wissenschafi: als Beruf, .~in Gt'Sammdte A1~fsiitze ziw
Wissenschajrs/ehrc, 6th ed., ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tiibingcn, I 985 ), p. 604.
7. Karl Jaspers, Notizen. zit Martin Heidegger, ed. Hans Saner
(Mi.inchen, 1978), pp. 180ff.
8. Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche. Ei1~fiihrung in das Verstiindnis seiner Phi/osophierem (Berlin-Leipzig, 1936), pp. 228ff.
9. Otto F. Bollnow, "Zum Begriff der Ganzheit bci Othmar Spann,"
Fimrnzarchfr: Ncuc Folge 6, no. 2 ( 1938): 30il-305, 315.
10. Cf. Guido Schneeberger, Na.cblese z11 Heidcggc1: Dokrunentz zu
seinem Lcb1:n und Denken (Bern, 1962 j, p. 4n.
11. Cf Hugo Ott, Martin Hcide;11.qer: Unrerwegs z11 .cdner Biographic
(Frankfun-New York, 1988), pp. 210....13.
12. So stares Julius Evola, L' "Operaio-~ ne/ pcnsicro di Em.11 fii11g1,1
fRoma, 1974), p. 7.
13. Marrin Heidegger, "Nietzsche: Der europaische Nihilismus," in
Gcsamtau.f!Jabe(Frankfurt, 1980), vol. 48, p. 56.
14. Johann Huizinga, Im Schattcn Pon moi:11m: Einr DinJrnosc des kit!turel/en Lcidem 1mse1~:r Zcit. (Bern-Leipzig, 1935 ), pp. 92-103.
15. Osw:ild Spengler, Jahre dcr Ermcheidung{Miinchen, 1933), pp.xi and ii.
16. Spengler, "lst Wcltfriede mt:iglich?" pp. 292ff
17. Karl jaspers, Philosophisch1: Autobio,qmphic (Miinchen-Zurich, 1984),
p. 76.
18 ..Martin Hcidegge.r, "'Nietzsche: Der Wille wr Machr als Kunst," in
Gesmnta.uwabe, vol. 43, p. 191.
19. Thomas Mann, "Deutsche Horer!" (April 1941 ), in Essays, ed. Hermann Kurzke <Frankfurt a.M., 1986), vol. 2, p. 265.
20. Marrin Heidegger, "Grundhegriffe," in Gesa1nt1.111.r1Ja.be, vol. 5L p. 18.
198
..
.'
-;t.
~-
~-. -~--.
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I 99
200
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201
83. Arthur Zwcininger, SpenJrfrr iin Drittm Rdch. Ei11c A11tivon ai~(
Om>a/d Spcnglen 'Jahri: der Entsd1cidmVJ' (Oldenburg, I 933 ), pp. 88fl~ 77.
84. Spengler, Jahrt der Entschddutl!J, p. 3; Zweininger, a Nazi, makes chis
one of his prime targets in Spengler im Drirten Reich, p. 57.
85. Oswald Spengle.r, "Pessimismus?" ( 1921 ), in Rcrfen und Au;friitzc, p. 79.
86. Spengler, Der U11tt1:11a-n;..tr des llbrndlandcs, p. 684.
87. Spengler, "Pcssimismus?" p. 79.
88. Ibid., p. 63.
89. Oswald Spengler, "Nietzsche und sein Tahrhundert" (1924 ), m
202
20 3
'nihilistic' in the usual sense of nihilism, we can never folly understand the Nietzschean concept of nihilism" (ibid., p. 77j. In reality, however, it is Hannah
A.n:ndt's reconstruction of r.hc complex relationship between Heidegger and
Niet7-~che which is inaccuracc: she asserts that in "Sein tmd Zcit, Nietzsche's
name is never mentioned," when instead Nierzsche's presence in Heidegger's
masterpiece is known to everybody, and it is Heidegger himself who cites him
(cf. 76).
113. Cf Ott, Martin Hcidt._f{lfer, p. 154.
114. Heidegger, "Nachwort zu: 'Was isr Mctaphysik?' ~ p. 3 ll.
115. Horkhcimer and Adorno, Dialektik de.r Aujklarim/f, pp. 65ff
J 16. Heidegger, "Parmcnides," p. 250.
117. Heidegger, "Heraklit," p. 181.
118. In Ott, ."Martin Heidegger, p. 188.
119. With regard to che radically diverse meaning of the criticism of ideology in Marx and Nietzsche, refer ro Domenico Losurdo, "Le catenc e. i fiori.
La cririca dell'ide.ologia era Marx e Nierzsche," Hr.rmene1ttfra.6 (1986): 81-143.
120. Ort, Martin Heid.e._fJ!fer, p. 188.
121. Heidegger, Dir SdbrtbehauptunJf, pp. 14, 13.
122. Heidegger, "Einfuhrung in die: Metaphysik," pp. 52ff.
123. Ct: rhc. passages of Johannes R. Becher, H. Mann and B. Brecht in
Zm Tradition der deutschen sozialistischen Literatiir (Berlin, 1979), vol. 1, p.
826; vol. 2, pp. 25H; and vol. 4, pp. 117, 1520: As for Benda, cf. Domenic()
Losurdo, "L'engagcment e i suoi problemi. Forruna e tramomo di una caregoria
nella culrura italiana," in Prn.ssi: Come orientarsi ne/ mimdo, eds. Gian Mario
Cazzaniga, Domenico Losurdo, and Livio Sichirol!o (Urbino, 1991).
124. Heidegge.r, "Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik," p. 50; English translarion, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1959i, p. 124 (modified).
125. Martin Heidegger, "Seminar in Zahringen 1973," in Gcsanitauwabr,
vol. 15, p. 393.
126. Martin Heidegger, "l'rberwindung der Metaphysik,'' in Vonr1(1Je und
At~fstitZt (l'iibingen, 1954 ), p. 93. '!11ese are nores that Heidegger claims to
have jotted down himself; with no ulterior explanations, bccween 1936 and
1946; they are published, however, only after 1945, and so for the mosc part are
considered part of his postwar repertoire.
127. Heidegger, "Das Rektorat 1933-34," p. 25.
128. Heidegger, "0berwindung der Metaphysik," pp. 96ff
129. Cf. the lerrers of Herbert Marcuse and Marrin Heidegger dared
August 28, 1947, and January 20, 1948 . in Farias, Hridc.,IJ/ffr und d,,,. Na.tionalsozialisittus, pp. 372-75.
130. From a public conference in 1949, according to the testimony of
Wolfgang Schirmache.r, Teclmik und Gel,wmheir: Zeitk,.itik 121ub Hcidc!liflT
( Freiburg, 198 3 ), p. 25.
204
Positionm und B(11rijfe im Kmnpfmit Weima1-Genf Vi:rsaillcs 1929-1939(Hamhurg, 1940), p. 238; and "Staar als ein konkretcr, an eine geschichtliche Epoche
gehundener Begriff" (l 94 l ), in Verjammgsrechtlicht AujSiitzt, 3rd ed. (Berlin
1985 ), pp. 382ff
133_ Carl Schmitt, De1 N111nos der Erd,~ im Vii!.kerruht des ]us P1tblic111n
btropr:umn (KOln, 1950), p. 294.
134. Thomas Mann, "Deutsche Horer!" (January 14, 1945), in EssaJs, vol.
2, pp. 276ff.
}35. Karl Jaspers, Die SrhuldfraJJt': fiir Vo/kermord JJibt es h-ine Vcrjiihl'un._1.1
(Mi.inchen: Piper, 1979). In Italian, l..a 1:olp1i delu1 Gcrm1mia, trans. R.. De Rosa
(Naples, 1947). [A literal translation of the Italian would he "Germany's Guilt."
Jaspers's hook has been rranslared from German into English as The Q!testion of
Gennan Guilt, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Capricorn Books, 1961 ).-Trans. J
136. Karl Jaspers, "Max Weber: Politiker, Forschcr, Philosoph," in AnrtiJ
nu1J_1J und Pokmik: Gcsammdu Rcden 1md Aujsiitzc z14r Geschichtc dcr Philosophit, ed. H.im Saner (Miinchen, 1968i, p. 444.
137. Ibid., p. 436; this is ;1 more or less rextual citation of Weher; cf.
Weber, M11.x Wchei, p. 649.
I :rn. Rarl faspers, PhilosopJJii: (Berlin-Heidelbc.rg, 1948), p. 500.
139. Ihid.,p. 495.
140. Ibid., p. 496.
141. Ihi~i., pp. 506.
142. Karl Jaspers, "Die Sdmldfragc" (1946), in Hoffnun.IJ und Sorge:
Schrifrm zur dcutsd1m Politik ( Miinchen, 1965 ), p. 77.
143. Karl Jaspers, ~Erncucrung der Universit.3t" (1945 ), in Ho.ffimng und
S01:.lfc, p. 32.
144. Thomas Mann, "Deutsche Horcr!" (Januar~' 16, 1945), in Essa.vs, vol.
2, p. 279.
145. Lener dared April 8, 1950, in Martin Heidegger and K;.,r] Jaspers,
Briefweclm:l 1910-1963, eds. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankforr, 1990),
p. 202.
146. In Farias, Hdde/J!}Cr 1md det Na.tionalsozitilismm, p. 374.
147. Heidegger, "Das Rekmrat 1933-34," pp. 25tl
148. Cf. Karl Lowith, ,"f,,-Jcin Lebu1 fo Detmchland vor tmd nac/J 1933: Ein
Bericbt (Snmgart, 1986 ), p. 58.
149.
Tulien Hervier, Ennetims fH'l'C frnst J1ttigcr (Paris, 1986), p. 88.
150. Ernst jlinger, "Der Kampf als inneres Erlchnis" ( 1922} and "ln
Stahlgewicrern" (1920), in Silmtlichi: H-1!1-kc, vol. 7, p. 17; and vol. 1, p. 11,
CJ:
n:~penive.ly.
205
S E
V E
HEIDEGGER,
THE SECOND THIRTY
YEARS' WAR,
AND THE ClUTICISM
OF MODERNITY
1. AN APOLITICAL PHILOSOPHER?
~: ...
.. ;.
..
the historian of philosophy rrics to single out the interlocutors and the
concrete targets of a certain position, and then tries to reconstruct the
real histori.rnl framework, even for propositions that have the ambition
of being valid sub specie 1uternitatis. He docs this not for the sake of histo1icist reductionism; on the contrary, his starting point is the awareness
that even the excess of one theory with respect to its time cannot be
grasped and evaluated without a preliminary attempt at historiral cla1ifi
c.ation. in the case of this debate, however, many interpreters of Heidegger seem dominated by the opposite preoccupation: that of relegating all of his texts, even those in which the political dimension is
explicit and declared, to a rarefied, politically aseptic sphere. In this way
Heidegger, who not only in his letters and occasional specd1es, but also
in his thcorerical writings, tirelessly comments upon the events of his
time, is subjected to a purifying process that is supposed to cleanse him
of any worldly contamination.
Heidegger's philosophical commentaries on the historical situation
in which he lived include topics such as: the First World War; the crisis
of the Weimar Republic and the last desperate attempts to save it; the
Nazi rise ro power, or at least the first acts carried ont by the new regime
with regard to domestic and f<Jrcign policy; the Spanish C.ivil War; the
206
20 7
outbreak and development of the Second World War, followed, interpreted, and reinterpreted, step-by-step, from Germany's initial dazzling
victories, through to the difficulties that later emerge (the intervention
of the United States, the war that gets held up in Eastern Europe and
the change of direction afrer Stalingradj, and Germany's eventual defeat.
After 1945, Heidegger discusses the expulsion of the Germans from the
Eastern rerrirories, the coming of the aromic bomb, the Berlin Blockade,
and the Cold War. Throughout his career, he repeatedly and explicitly
manifests his \iews on liberalism, democracy, socialism, Bolshevism,
communism, and, of course, Nazism. He quotes Mussolini, Hitler, and
Stalin. He makes reference to authors whose political interests are undeniably dear: Weber, Schmitt, Spengler, }iingcr. And during the years of
the Third Reich, he is involved in debates with various ideologists of the
regime, he is attacked, praised, and even exalted by them.
In this light, the cleansing process that aims at purif),ing Heidegger
of any political content becomes rather problematic, though evidently
this is not considered a good enough reason to give up the attempt.
Subtle linguistic devices come into play: Heidegger continually uses the
term volki.rch. We have chosen to leave the term in the original German,
after pointing our the complexity of its meanings. Others proceed in a different manner: The.y translate it as "populain" or "nazional-popolarc."l
Thus far, rhere is little or nothing to contest. After all, it is a difficult, even
impossible, term to translate. One would expect, however, at least an
explanatory note to draVI' the reader's attention to the fact that the term
1olkisch constitutes, at that historical moment, a leitmotif of National
Socialism that, not by chance, entitles its otlicial newspaper Viilkischer
Bcobacbtn. Many interpreters blatantly disregard this detail, and thus
contemplate the Heidegger of the rectorial period from a "popular" or
"national-popular" point of \~cw, tl1at is, from a more or less Gramscian
perspective. In this way, they create a barrier that separates Heidegger
from the party and the regime that he solemnly supports. Yet, it is not difficult to realize the concret.e political significance of this term: Volkisrh is
the term Hitler uses ro define his vision of the world, and one needs only
to skim through the analytical index of the standard edition of Mei.n
Kampf to note that the expression iolkischc \X/eltamchauung is indicative
of the philosophy of the party; not by chance it refers back to another
emry, that of "National Socialism. "2 Even outside of the parry, there are
no doubts as to the political significance of the term we are discussing.
When the generals who are fighting on the Russian front must explain w
208
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their troops the peculiar characteristics of the ideological war and of the
extermination to be carried our against Bolshevism, they limit themselves
to declaring that all this has been dictated by the "votkisch ideal." 3 One
can understand, then, why the German-ltalian dictionaries of the time
translate. viililfrch as "racist. "4 This is an imprecise translation, at least as far
as Heidegger is concerned, but it should pm an end to any attempt to
purify a term that has been so dearly compromised on the political level.
There is no equivalence between the term Piilkisch on the one hand, and
"populairi:"' or "nazional-popolan:" on the other. It would be preferable,
and much kss arbitrary, ro translate it as "National Socialist."
In order to be complete, the purifying process promor.ed by the
hermeneurists of innocence must act not only upon certain key terms,
bm also upon authors who exercise some kind of influence upon Heidegger. Heidegger himself~ in an interview for "Der Spiegel," declares
that, at the time of the Nazi rise to power, he assumed "a national, and
above all, social position, similar to Friedrich Naumann's." 5 It is a credible assertion. The politician whom Heidegger mentions leaves a legacy
that is discussed and claimed by opposing currents, and referred to at
times in order ro justify support for Nazism.<> This is quite understandable: Naumann is deeply involved at the end of the nineteenth century
in the anri-S.emitic or anti Judaic movcme.nr,7 and thus he reveals some
similarities with the "unforgettable Lueger" whom a young Heidegger
speaks abom.8 Naumann's ambition is to create a "National-German
Socialism, "9 in contrast both to Marxism and ro the "individualisric peoples" of the West, a socialism that is synonymous with "popular order,"
and within which the "new German man" feds at one with the community. The Germans have already demonstrared their unique ability to
work "according ro a common plan and with a common rhythm," the
ability to fi.ise "their single egos into the ego of the community."' 10 But
this does not mean that the individual allows himself to be absorbed into
the amorphous mass. On the contrary: "individualism is folly devel
oped," bur at the same time it is raised and transformed imo a "communal way of being" (._qemeinscbaftlichc DascinsiPcisc).11 This ability to
reconcile a respect for individuals in their uniqueness with the overpersonal comnmnity is one of the topoi of the Kriegsideotogic, and we have
encountered it in Heidegger as well.
Naumann is a notable represe.ntative of this "ideology of war," particularly with regard to the goals of Germany's foreign policy. After
mocking, as usual, the ideal of perpetual peace, he theorizes, through the
209
war-or rather, through wars that he secs as continuing well after the
First World War (and for this reason, a strong increase in the b.irr.hrare is
absolutdy necessary)--the creation of a Jfitte/.europa under German
hegemony, "the core of which shall be German." This Afittdeuropa, this
"central European soul," which is alreadr forming, will embody t.hc best
part of culture and civilization, in contrast to other developed countries
and, above all, to the colonies;l2 with respect to the latter, Naumann recommends a policy free of moral scruples. To rhe German contingent of
the international expedition sent to repress the. Boxer Rebellion in
China, Wilhelm II orders that no barbarian be raken prisoner, stating
that Germany will teach them a lesson they will not forget for at least a
thousand years. This arouses some dissent and preoccupation, but Naumann contributes to silencing these protests by pointing our the fact that
one should not abandon oneself to an excessive "fastidiousness." 13
To Naumann, a National-Liberal politician with strong l'iilki.rch ten
dencies, imperialistic expansion appe.ars absolutely necessary in order to
unite the national community. There is no sense, then, in talking about
rights that belong "to man as man" ("rights emerge in the course of history"); the "internationalism of the old democracy," \\1th it~ theory of
the equality of all peoples and al! individuals, is comp!etdy abstract and
unrealistic: "trying to be more liberal than history itself is difficult." This
teaches us that the essenr.ial thing to keep in mind is the distinction
between "free peoples and non-free peoples." Freedom, therefore,
means first of all "consanguineous government." (bluts1,erwandt),
"dircc.tion given by the members of one's blood, one's lineage, or one's
people" (FiihrtmlJ durch Blttts- Sta1mnes odi:r Volks.qcnossc).14
It is not necessary to insist on the turbid nature. of this ideology, one
rhat brought about such tragic consequences. It suffices to note that
Naumann is introduced by the editor of the Italian edition of Heidegger's interview, Nttr noch i:in Gott kann 1ms 1ctten, as such: "In 1894
he founded the journal 'Die Hilfe' in order to oppose the Kaiser's un liberal measures. In 1895 he shared Max Weber's position, which
asserr.ed the need for 'socialism' to bear national responsibility. He estab
lished a dose link between the defense of civil right.~ on rhe domestic
front, and expansionism abroad."!~ Subsequently, the significance of
Heidegger's reference to Naumann's ""national, but above all, social
position" (nor his liberal ideas, whether they a.re true or only presumed)
is lost. Yet, what has been eliminated might certainly prove useful to
under.standing the viilkisd; and organic 1notifs as well as rhc anti Judaic
210
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and anti-Semitic ones; ir might darify the theme, which \Ve have defined
as nominalistic, of "historicity" and the consequent negation of the unive1sal concept of man; and finally-, it might throw some light upon the
exaltation of Germany as the "sacred heart" of the West and the "cenrer"
{Mittc) of Europe, or rather, to use Naumann 's term, of Afitteleuropa.
i\11 of this precluded. In order to reinterpret Heidegger in nonpolitical
terms, Naumann, whom Heidegger declares he somehow felt dose to,
musr be ingenious!~ transfigured imo a brave detender of man's rights!
One last characteristic of this cleansing process needs to be examined. With regard to texts with an explicit political content, such as the
rectorial speech, many admir that Heidegger expresses support for
Nazism, bm then go on to claim that he docs so on the basis of a misunderstanding, that is, without being fully conscious of his actions, and
with Plato and classical Greece in mind rather than mundane contingencies. Accordingly, it is asserted that Heidegger uses the term 110lkisch, but
that he ignores the fact that it has become a keyword of Nazism. Likewise, he is said to insist upon the theme of "struggle," but only in a
purely philosophical sense, and in ignorance of the fact that all around
him the same term is being used in an explicitly political context.
According to this point of view, Heidegger never ceases to condemn the
loss of Bodenstii-ndi..JJk.cit as a capital sin of modernity and of modern
urban life, but he is completely blind co the fact that the exaltation of the
Boden is a constitutive eleme.nt of the Reich's ideology, or at least. of one
of its major currents. It is difficult to imagine a more severe and unjust
argument than that which is presemcd by these would-be defense attor
neys: One does noc defend a great thinker by denying him the foll possession of his faculties within the political realm, or by attributing a very
limited consciousness to him. This is not the way to treat a philosopher
whom one claims to revere.
In reality, the mission th.1t they arc trying to carry out is desperate
and useless. For rhe most part, Heidegger's defenders arc t()rced to confront Heidegger himself, whom they rry to shield under the cover of pure
theory, but who on many occa.'iions underscores the political dimension
of his rheorerkal categories, e.vcn those that are central co his philosophy.
Heidegger, we noted above, establishes a link between the category of
''historiciry," which plays such an important part in Sein imd Zcit, and the
ideology of National Socialism. Bur even the category of nihilism is analyzed, discussed, and tied, throughout Heidegger's development, t.o
democracy and Bolshevism, to world war, and eventually to Nazism itself
2 LL
Habermas recently attempted to isolate a period or a chapter in Heidegger's intellectual biography, in which at last it would be possible to
consider him a theoretician with no significant polirical or ideological
implications. His attempt, however, lays itself open to objections similar
to those we have il!usrrated so far. We noted the massive presence of rhe
Kri'.~1Jsideolq_1Jie in Sein 11nd Zeit, and even hefore 1929, the year that
Habermas indicates as the date of Heidegger's fatal change of direction.
Arc we. then trying ro reduce Heidegger's masterpiece to a mere ideologyr This is not our goal. Even Lukics's Die ZnstiinmlJ da Vcnum.fi:,
though heavily influenced by the bitterness of the political and ideological clash of its lime period, does nor fail to give praise, though perhaps
involuntarily, to Sein 1md Zcit.1 6 Thus, nor even Luk.ks reduces it to a
mere ideology. The line that separates theory from ideology, however, is
not as dear as Habermas suggests. There is no sense in superficially di.smis.<>ing Heidegger\ works writ.ten after 1929 (or 1933) as mere ideology !there are undoubtedly many philosophically fascinating pages
even in those lectures which carry out a justification ~ind a "metaphysical" transfiguration of the blitzkrieg and the "new order" imposed upon
Europe by Hitler). Hy the same token, there is no sense in immersing
St:in 1md Zeit in a sphere of purity. The line between theory and ideology
is, so to speak, not ho1izontal but verrirnl, in the sense that ir traverses
the whole of Heidegger's work. And this criterion does not apply only
to him.
2. Two
212
During the struggle against this world which is perceived as, and has
acmally become, inrolcrablc, some, like Lukacs and, in a different way, Bloch,
place their hopes in the ex;lmple set by the Bolshevik Revolution. Nonetheless, this political choice is accompanied by a utopian drive that is a product
of the traumatic experience brought on by the First World War. Others,
instead, resort to religious rra.n.'>Cendcnce, or teel a stronger motivation to
follow their vocation, and thus leave for Israel, where they seek an aJremative
to a world that is not only intolerable, but which has started to consider them
more and more inrolerable (this is Gershom Scholem's casc). 20
There is, however, another large group of these critics of modernity
that consists of those who, despite all appearances, proceed in a direction
that: is diametrically opposed to the one examined above. For them, the
era of fulfilled sinfulness is the very same one that the war is credited wit!::
having put an end to. It is an era characterized by "bourgeois securiry, ,.
the lad:. of "destiny," md the immersion into an opaque, mechanistk
21 3
214
3.
21 5
216
ideology. In this sense, Dialchik de1 Ai~fkli:fruitg i1; the dialectic of the criticism of ideology and the disenchanrment characteristic of the modern
world. This disenchantment is absolutely necessary, but in and of itself it is
not enough to guarantee emancipation. One case in point is Nazism
which, a distant follower of the traditional school of law that Marx condemns, takes on some "'enlightened" tones and positions. A'S a result,
Nazism condemns universal value.s as prejudices or mystifications, and it
submits not only Christianity, but also its secularized versions, that is, lib
eralism, democracy and socialism, to a sort of criticism of ideology.
In this sense, "today's archaics" (among whom Horkheimer and
Adorno might have included Heidegger himself) "bring about" that
Az~fklarunJ1 which they "meant to crush. ".H And what they bring a.bout
are the worst aspects of the At~fkliirun,_q, thus depriving it of the possibility for emancipation. The authors who are being examined here
express opposing positions not only with regard ro political modernity,
but also 1,.vith respect to the denunciation of the unforrunate. consequences that are the result of the predominance of calculative thought.
According ro Horkheimer and Adorno, this domination makes "pleasure" impossible, and it condemns numerous people robe "mutilated by
dominion. "32 Ir is hard to imagine a sharper contrast to Heidegger who,
in line with Nietzsche, perceives the ideal of happiness for the greatest
number as the most extreme example of the modern world's degradation
and standardization, a sign of the repulsive "last man's" coming.
The theme of happiness or pleasure leads us iinmediately ro the
theme of the French Revolution. In Dialektik de1 Ai~fkliirttng,
Horkheimcr and Adorno arc fully aware of this:
Liberalism gram.ed the Jews the right ro own property, but nor the
authority to command. It was the aim of man's rights to promise happiness even where there. is no power. Hut since the betrayed masses sense
that this universal promi5e remains a lie a.~ long as social classes c.xist,
they grow fi.uious, and fed as though they have been made fools of.33
Here. the subject. is liberalism, but what is really meant is the French
Revolution (and its mode rare conclusion), now the object of the same
criticism that had previously been expressed by Marx: man's rights
remain an abstraction, and they will not ti.ti fill r.he promise of happiness
and freedom for <t class "nmrilared by domination" until they directly
influence economic powe.r relationships. A few years earlier, Horkheimer, after having passionately discussed the "great illumination" that
2l7
permits Saint-Just to ex.alt "happiness" as a "new idea in Europe," comments upon the Jacobin leader's fall as such: "Aft.er Therrnidor, the order
of the day was no longer happiness, but rather a lawless terror which
knew no bounds."34 Thus, even though Horkhcimer and Adorno criticize the French Revolution, they still regard it as a milestone in history,
and declare its highest moment to be the formulation ofrhc idea of happiness. This same idea of happiness is, instead, despised first by the
Kric._11sideohigit's theoreticians, and then by Heidegger as well.
Certainly, some aspects of the criticism are diverse, sometimes even
in contrast to what we have examined thus fur: one major example is the
denunciation of the Enlightenment, not only as "totalitarian," bur even
as "more. totalitarian than any other system. " 35 Such a drastic condemnation cannot help but to implicate the French Revolution, and thus cast
a shadow upon modernity as a whole. Therefore, it would be legitimate
to make an analogy to Heidegger, an analogy that should not be under"
estimated, since even some liberal authors warn of the alleged totalitarianism evident in the Enlighcenmenr and some of its supportcrs.36
Horkheimer and Adorno's criticism of ideology is marred by the
ambiguity that envelops the statute that they ascribe to the category of
universality. Is the criticism of ideology the denunciation of the illegitimate and surreptitious transfiguration of the singlular in terms of uni
versality, or is it the rejection of universality in and of itsdt? And how
must the catastrophe that culminated in Auschwitz be assessed? Adorno,
in particular, docs not seem to be fully aware of the fact that this catastrophe is, as has been shown in this text and elscwhere;>7 the result of
the progressive destruction of the universal concept of man. In reality,
even an illusory, false, and deceitfol universal has some control over violence in its most brutal form. The most reactionary ideology is that
which destroys, to use Marx's terms, the illusory flowers so as to
strenghten the chains, chains that may then be used openly, \Vithout any
tricks and limitations, at least to some extent, even by those imaginary
and deceitful flowers. This is the reason why Nazism had to reject the
category of univcrsaliry. The fact is that Adorno himself see.ms sometimes
to indulge in that "ultra-nominalistic" rhetoric for which, elsewhere, he
reproaches Vilfredo Pareto (who, not by chance, is l\fossolini's ptimary
influence, or at least one of his primary influences )..38 And certainly, the
more he indulges the temptation to reject thi::. caregory of universality,
rhe closer he gets, with regard to his conceptual apparatus, to the author
whom, in another respect, he bitterly criticizes: Hcidegger.3 9
218
;.-.
.g~
::.:
219
4.
HUSSERL, MODERNITY,
AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT
Husserl\ case is diffrrent: he, too, L-; influenced by the Kric._qsidcol'1gic, but
a far lesser degree than his disciple. The condemnation of the "ideas of
1789" does not seem to act upon this impassioned reader of Descartes,
not even during the conflict, when nationalistic sentiment is most forvent.
This theme is completely absent after the war as well. It may be useful to
refer ro a passage from Die Krisis du mropiiischen Wissen.~cha.fien, in which
Hu$serl regards "the long-defamed age of the Enlightenment" as "worthy
ofreverence."45 As one can see, the condemnation of modern objectivism
does not entail a condemnation of political modernity or that current of
thought "so defamed, during the First World War and especially during
the years of Nazism, for having been an integral part of the ideological
preparation for the French Revolur.ion." Husserl vigorously underscores
the Enlightenment's progressive political implicar.ions as the apex in the
evolution of modernity. This development originates from that "great
movement for freedom" constituted by rhe Ren.aissance (which, in turn,
explicitly intends to recover the "ancient spirit of humanity's free culture"
typical of the Greeks); 4 6 it continues with the srrug;gk against "traditionalism"' carried our by Protestantism;47 and, thanks to Descartes, it finally
results in the "epoch in which humanity wakes up to autonomy," that is,
the present.48 With modernity, what ari.o;es and asserts irsdf is the "new
cultural principle of freedom, in particular, a freedom which begins v.ith
scientific reason"; with the Enlightenment, "a new era of humanity"
begins,49 an era "'dominated' by the spirit of autonomous reason."50
Husserl dearly moves away from the "trendy Kultttrllritik of the present"
and unhesitatingly condemns "irrationalism, so popular these days."51 Not
by chance, he circs the most critical point in the history of modernity as
the nineteenth century, a century that witnesses the rise of a.n intolerant
and aggressive nationalism. 52
The conr.rast between Husserl and Heidegger is sh.up, even in rcterence
to
220
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r.::..
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.o ~ ~' '
:~
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c.
221
5.
HEIDEGGER, CROCE,
GENTILE, AND LIBERALISM
222
/\s for Gentile, his exaltarion of the community goes well beyond the
patriotic mobilization indispensable ro the war and to the struggle
against socialism and communism. The tone that characterizes his celebration is all-encompassing: He calls for the respect of religion, tradition,
and native cusroms. Not by chance, his criticism of modernity attacks
not only the French Revolution, but the Protestant Reformation itself,
which, with its appeal to the freedom of conscience, is guilty of making
"religion a private bm;iness," thus corroding and dissolving, in a ruinous
way, the community's unity.61 It is for this reason, too, that Gentile
n:mains faithful, up to his tragic death, to fascism, despite the fact that
he had initially embraced it by explicitly profrssing himself a liberal:
.t.:.
Once he makes it ckar that it is time to pur. an end to the "democratic liberalism of today's liberals" and m purify classic liberalism of its
democratic contamination, Gentile may affirm-this time to a friend of
his-that "calling oneself a liberal ... is to me the same thing as calling
oneself a fascist. "<>2
Heidegger's point of departure is very differcm. On the one hand,
Gentile dcfend5 fascism by calling it liberal according to what he regards
as the most amhentic and profound meaning of the r.crm. Croce, on the
other hand, after expressing an initial sympathy for this political move"
mem, later criticizes it for failing to fulfill the hope for a restoration of
the old liberal state. Heidegger, instead, expects a far more radical regeneration from Nazism, a regeneration that presupposes the questioning of
millennia of history. And he soon begins m criticize it, though within a
permanently loyalist position, because the. party, the regime and its ideologists, and Rosenberg above all, cannot manage to rid themselves of
rhe remnants of '"liberalism."
6.
22 3
Harsh criticism and the complete rejection of modernity arc rife in the
German culture of the twentieth century, and they belong ro an esr.ablished tradition. Yet, one must avoid the widespread tendency to
schematically juxtapose Germany w the liberaldemocraric West. The
224
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~~.
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~
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2~
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c
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:.<
nership," che "community lthat] binds rogether not only the living, bur
the living, the dead and the unborn." This partnership "deals \Vit.h very
differenr needs than those pertaining to the animal inrerests of an
ephemeral and corruptible narnre." This partnership "'eternally ties
society ro its origins; ir links the lowest natures to the highest ones; it
connects the. visible world to the invisible, according to an immutable
pacr sanctioned by the inviolable commitment which binds together all
physical and moral natures, each in its appointed place. "65
There is no doubt: it is rhc very same Goneinschaft thar will later be
so dear to the theoreticians of anrimodern Kulturkritik. The first thcorizarion of"community,"' bathed in a sacred aura, is formulated in England, in contrast ro the society that was made a guinea pig fr:ir the experiments and innovative restlessness of French revolutionaries. Not by
chance, Burke exalts not only the bond of tradition, bur the "wisdom of
our ancesrors, "60 and the "wise prejudice" through which the sociopo~
litical institutions and rhe community one lives in come to be regarded
as something "consecrated" and worthy of"revercnce," an organic body
where one's forefathers and ancestors are still living. One must therefore
tlee in '"horror" from those hasty revolutionaries and reformers who are
"too eager w chop the body of their old father into pieces and put it in
the >A'izard\ cauldron in the hope that poisonous herbs and str~mge spells
might restore his health and vigor." This is the first coherent and wdlaniculated exaltation of organicism, and a condemnation of individualism: One must prevent hasty changes and ruinous doctrines from "pulverizing" the community "into the dust and crushed stone of individuality, \Vhich fall easy prey to all winds. "67
Burke also introduces another important mot~{ that can be paired up
with that of the "community": the exalrarion, in contrast to the city, of
the countryside and the "agriculrural class, the class least disposed to
rebellion."68 Th.i5 theme will later become very popular in the liberal tradition (one only needs to recall Conscant's condemnation of the "artisans crowded in the cities," or George W<lshington's desire that hii
tellow citizens remain attached to the soil, instead of becoming a "manufacturing people"). 69 From the liberal tradition, this theme will evolvf
into the conservative and reactionary Ku,/rurkritik.
One more theme presented by Burke is the nostalgic idolization o
the gc>od old times, the age of"ancient chivalry." Judging by the Frend
Revolution, this age is unfi.>rmnarely ""over, dethroned by the era of th(
225
sophists, economists and calculat.ors; and with it, the glory of Europe has
passed away for good."70 The.se words are somehow reminiscent of what
will later be the criticism of calculative thought.
A few years later, Friedrich Schlegel \Vil! denounce the prosaicness of
his time, the politics and lite of which are "mechanical and founded upon
charts and statistics."71 And Schlegel is a fervent admirer of the "great
Englishman, Burke," whom he credits with reevaluating that which "is
historical and divinely positive." Schlegel also praises him for unmasking
the "empty theories" and "revolutionary errors" that reduce the state to
a leveling and oppressive "legislative machine," and that install "mechax1ical" relationships everywhere, thus trampling upon all that is "personal,"
"living," and "organic. "72 The political world that stems from the French
Revolution, that is, the modern world, begins to be perceived as mechanical. This term is beloved by Burke, a bitter enemy of that "mechanical
philosophy" which was the origin of the carastrophe that occurred in
France., a catastrophe that threatened all of Europe.73 Burke's condemnation of his own epoch is at times so radical that, inflamed by the events
that take place in France during the revolution, he does not hesitate to
define it as "the least enlightened age of all, the least qualified to lay down
the law since civilized society was fast formed. "74
Ir is only by taking Burke's enormous influence into account that the
history of Kultttrkritik in Germany can be fully understood. There is
nothing strange about this: Burke comes from a country engaged in a
mortal srruggk against revolutionary and Napoleonic France, and at the
same time he fears the possibility of uprisings even within England. In
"his immortal book on the French Revolution,"--this definition refers
back, and not by chance, to anorher central figure in German conservatism75~hc provides the first model for criticism of the Revolution,
and prepares the weapons and theoretical arsenal that will later be utilized by other countries as well, during the struggles againsc other revolutions. Thus, besides introducing the above-mentioned motifr, Edmund
Burke condemns the abstractness of man's universal rights (to which he
juxtaposes the concreteness of England's unique tradition or, one could
say, historicity). In addition to that, he denounces uprooted intellecmals,
and presents the revolution as a conspiracy, a conspiracy that is for the
most part Judaic.76
The starring point of German ant.imodernisrn is personified by the
British \Vhig who, at the same time, continues to be exahed and largely
admired by authors who support nco-!aissez-fai.re.7 7 And these authors are
226
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~.'
.,.
(:'
p,:
:;:.
likewise critical of modi:rniry, not only political modernity, but also certain
aspects of scientific modernity. This is the case with Friedrich August von
Hayek, who dates the beginning of Europe'~ or the West's political decline
as starting from at least rhe middle of the Ja_~t century. 78 He ascribes this
decline tu the "ab1Li;e of reason," "modern hubris," and "intellectual
hubris" that is the disease of "rationalism, or better, intdlectualism,"79
"constructivist rationalism," or "construction" toitt cottrt.80 Heidegger
denounces the hubris of which modern man is guilty with respect to
reality, both histoiical and natural. Hayek, instead, denounces it only with
reference to its first aspect: What he finds intolerable is the ambition, typical of the Enlightenment and its fr>llowers, of revolutionaries and of radical reformers, to reduce society to an object that can be manipulated at
will. Among the main figures responsible for this, Hayek includes "Francis
Bacon, the Lord Chancellor, who will forever remain the prototype of the
'demagogue of science,' as he has justly been caUed,"81 but above ail
Descartes. At a certain point, Hayek wonders whether it would be appropriate to add "Plato" himself to the list,82 since he is suspected ofintellecmalistic arrogance and the. worship of reason that is so ruinously triumphant in the modern era. Not by chance, Plato constitutes the starting
point of Heidegger's merciless questioning of Western history as a whole.
In Hayck's opinion, the main culprit remains Descartes, who was
"simply disastrous. "83 Above all, he is guilty of laying the foundation for
the rationalistic traclit'ion that culminates in the Enlightenment and in
the French Revolution, and for spreading "contempt for tradition,
custom and history in general. "84 Once again, what comes to mind is the
cult of "historicity," which is so popular in twentieth-century Germany.
Through several transformations and mediations, this cult continues to
manifest itself even today, in Hans-Georg Gadamer's speech: in it, Heidegger's disciple attempts to reevaluate. "tradition," "authority" and
"prejudice," which arc unjustly discredited by "modern Enlightenment." In developing his reevaluation, Gadamer refers back to Burke,8 5
an author admired also by Hayek. And Hayek, in turn, insists on the
enormous "benefits" that derive from the "usages of our society," and
vigorously reevaluates the ''much derided ide.a of the '\visdom of our
ancestors' embodied in inherited institutions. "86 The expression in quotation marks makes immediate reference to Burke who, in defending tradition from enlightened and revolutionary attacks, mentions the superior "practkal politics of Ancient Times" and, in particular, Aristotle.87
The latter is one of Gadamer's constant reference points:
227
The superiority of ancient: ethics over modern moral philosophy i.~ also
cha,acterized by the facr that, for the former, it is predsclr rhc un.woidabi!ity of tradition which marks the passage from ethics to "politics,"
the arr of making good laws. Modern Enlightenment, instead, holds an
abstract and revolutionary position with regards to this.BS
228
7.
RADICAL ANTIMODERNISM
AND NONACTUALITY:
NIETZSCHE AND HEIDEGGER
229
r
.
230
.}.
;-:;:;;.'
i
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~i
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way that one consider& Heidegger, denying him the full possession of his
faculties within the political realm. One only needs ro cover up or eliminate the reference to slavery (the strictest and harshest division oflaborj,
and the philosopher who explicitly affirms the unavoidability of the division oflabor miraculously rises ro become a critic of chat very same division oflabor, and of the intellectual mutilation that it entails. In the final
analysis, Nietzsche becomes a theoretician of emancipation.
Another possibiliry: Nietzsche declares that he does not want to have
anything to do with modern individualism and its egalitarian implications. To all this he prefers "hierarchy" (Rangordnung), because it is
only through hierarchy that the foll deployment of individual capabilities
within the restricted ruling class is made possible. Even in this case it is
not difficult to transform rhe philosopher, by means of suirable cuts and
silences, inro a prophet of individualism. 1\.11 analogous operation may be
performed witl1 regard ro his criticism of religion and above all Christianity, which Nietzsche denounces as the main cause of the slaves'
democratic and socialist revolt. Nietzsche intends to carry out this criticism ro the very end, but not to the point of jeopardizing the cornforring, sedative efficacy that religion can and must have on those masses
condemned to slavery. Not to the point of upsening the sleepy tran
quiliry of those who, through their sacrifice, promote the development
of society. Even this theme can be assimilated only partially, and it is not
difficult to imagine which parts must be discarded in order to rum Nietzsche into a sorr of modern follower of the Enlightenment. Finally, one
only needs to forget about the pathos of the "lite of the species," the
"great economy of the Whole," the civilization that demands the sacrifice of innumerable slaves and condemns "compassion" as useless and
harmful. One only needs to forget about all this, and Nietzsche is once
and for all transformed into a relentless critic of false universals and suf
focating toralitics, a demystifier of every philosophy of history and, in the
final lmalysis, a prophet of postmodernisrn. The amimodernism characterized by "aristocratic radicalism" has been turne.d into a tolerant, even
liberal, postmodernism.
Something analogous happens to Heidegger. Follo\'\ing Nietzsche's
trail, he develops what could be defined as a radical amimodernism.
which is inevitably displaced from the actual political development. On
the one hand, Nietzsche can never fully recognize himself in tbe Seconc
Reich, which is tainted from the beginning with democracy and moder
nity because of Bismarck's ckmagogical recourse to plebiscitary approva
2 31
uniqueness i~ \ynonvmous with 'struggle," antagonism, and the rcfutacion of the idc,ti or nwth of'' reconciled hum.miry.
These considcracions arc not intended w dcnv the rhcorttical prC\'a
len.:c of Htidq_i;gcr'., thought mer rhe policic:tl positions ht expresses
throughout hi' lite. ft i~; ncccss,1ry, hm1eva, w break fn:c from this dogmarir prejudice, a prejudice that appears to be 1urtic11brl\ rooted in the
mosr fcrvem promoter~ of the impossible cleansing process we discussed
earlier. In order 10 d-iritV this mcthodologic.il problem it might be useful
10 starr by illusrrntin~ tlic cultural .ind political climarc th<ll is rn.rnifesrtd
in !uh ahrr 1945 ( rhou~h .malop:ou~ consiJcr;ltions may be valid <\lso
riir l-\-ann: ;md mher countrirsJ. bA[H.'.llio G;lrin dc:.scribes it ~1s surh: The
asMHTlflfion is ch<tt
the n1ltur<: \\'hich accompanied fascislli W;\' nm itself fa>dsr. ... Thcrekire, fas.:ism n:mained J n<m-cuhun:; :ind . .:ttlrnrc W<\s anri-fa,.::ism,
witl1 rhc: t'xce.ptinn uf c:rtain rhinkns <lnd arrrsts .who were, ,\tier ;ill_
1:1~..:ist~ ,,, wdL bur only ,\s in,iividual~, 11or in their do..:n:ines or [heir
poems. sculprures or p.1imingsJ.'1~
Thi~ a<;surnprion is, of course . ..:ompkrd\' groundless, and yet ir. still
.:ominm:s ro he profoundly intlucntial. One significant example: tho<;c
who <Krnsc Hcidcgg:cr of compromising. himsdf with the Third R.cichnhsrrYcs .m imporrnm participam in dw dcb.uc rq_i;arding the phifosopher--ilo nor rc.1li1.c thar l'\,1zi~m "was not, in <ll1Y wa~' or ar any time, ;l
current of thought. ... In fact, one must choose between thinking or
kill in~." And sin.:.c "in order to kill one musl above ,11! not think," tili~
seems ro 1:-rr th..: proof of 1-kideg;gc.r's complete cnr,rncomncss from 'l
llH.>WlllClll, ''tht' CXtcrmi1uting power of" whicb lil~S prccisd~ in the
rdusal !II think. "''9 The rhinkcr, the philosopher, the intdkctua! .ire, b~
ddinirion, cxmmcou; to fascism and Nazism. Suspicion is rcm<we.d frorn
Hcidq;~cr by contininir his rehlrionship to Nazism to an episode in hi.<
private lifr. The private dimeno;ion j, rc;,mkd as eomplctcly remon'.<'
from thcorcrical d.1horarion. and cxparn:kd w the point of absorbing thl
sociopoliticll >phac ilsdf. The C<H1wlob'Y upon which the hermcnemi.:!
of innoccncL' are founded is hy now clear: Since culttuT <lnd fascism an
oppming: term.~, ,1 philo~ophcr c.111 ne\'er he a fasci~t.
i\ ditkrent l"<lri.Hion upon the hcrmcnc11tit"' thar exalt rhe imma..:11
brc p1trirv of thoug:hr insi.~ts on the hd( of a "ncccssaq" connectior
hcnvecn Hcidq~ger's philosophy Jnd his support of Nazism. Thi~ for
muLuion of the problem is parti.:11larly in<lppropriuc, .t~ ic cornplctd:
Second
Thin:~
23 3
m (kmonstrnte.
Undoubtedly, Heidegger's thcorie; still prevail over his rnncrt'.tc
anions, and thi.~ i~ parrkularl~ common in rhc c1sc of ~rear intdlccrnals.
However, this focr dncs not need to be pro\'tn on th<: ba~is of a rnisrci>rcscntat1on of the historiographical assessment. Onlv those who still
ding m the naive and dogmatic as~umption criticized h\' Garin fed the
need to give an ;mtifascist or profrrcssivc character to the g:rcat tlf!urcs of
comcr\'arivc or rcactionan rnltun, be ir Hddcgcr, Schmitt, or, before
r.hcm, Nietzsche.
8.
234
manifrsr itself in l'ery ditfrrcnc fonm than those discussed thus far. Jc lmV
emerge, for cXtntpk_ as moral r.cal, which in irsclfis worthv of praise, but
which 011 .1 historiogr<lphiil kvcl is guilry of removing Heidegger\ experience from rhe cxpcrien~c of a whole.: gcncrarion of intclkccu,lls. And
mor<.mcr. it extirpates some complex cultural phenomena from their
intcrnarion;d context: for cx.,unpk:, Euroccmrism, thr dismay when faced
with the chrc.\t rcprcsenrcd hy barbariam, ;uni- Jucfaism, <lnti-Scmitism,
and so on. If the prescJH .uttmpr were to be summ.trized, one could say
rim rhc ~0.11 hl.:'rc hJ!- been to hi'>toridl.c without rclarivizing or trifling.
The ~c.1r 1914 \\';t,.\ cho1.cn .ls our point of dcp.irturc. Thi..~ might appe;ir
odd, but hv now it should bl.:' rnnsidcred as an inevitable starting poim: the
thesi!. that perceive!. the t\\IO world wars as two different stages of a gigantic
and renewed Thirty Yc;m;' \Var has practically bt:crnne an 11pin.u1 n:ci:f>tR. loo
Choosing l 9 l 4 a1. a point of departure, r.hc present analysis has tcx:uscd on
what Thom'~ Mann de.tines as the '/\;icJrsidmiw~ic During the conflict and
in ditkrcnt, even opposed manners, this justification, exaltation, and trans
fi~urarjon of rhc war rages throughom Europe, hnr io Germany it has a
unique imp:icr. Thae, in facr, ii imoues a large parr of German ndture ;md
phiJo.<;ophy, .md it continues to exert ir~ denstaring;, embittered, and radi
rnlized influence wdl after the milirary defeat in 1918.
The initial L-;sue addressed in rhe present analysi!i, therefore, docs not
deal only with the relationship hctwecn ;t singk Hlthor and the Third
R.l.:'ich or the ~.uioml Socialist' Parry and mowmcnt. Rather, it nece.ssarily
dc.1ls with the rdarionship between an entire generation of imdlecrnais
and the Kiitpsidr.o~m, a rdarionship that later results in Nazism, and
one th.it N;1zism irself c\'cnn1.1lly mana~cs ro fl'.claim and incorpor;tte. h
i~ only b~ rnnfronring: this latter issue that a correct fom1ul.uion of Hcidegg:er's rdationship with Nazism mar be provided, al> well ,1s a suitable
expl.marion for it. Thi~ ha~ been 011r firm belie!~ and the rca~on for m1r
decision t.o proceed in thii. manner. Of the intdlcctuals who 111a~sivd~
support the Krie._mid1:0Jo._qfr, onlv some mam1gc to break :l\\'~lY from it, at
diffl:rcnt rimes, and more or ks~ r.\dically or strenuously. Only rarely do
they mana~e ro formuhuc a lucid criridsm of rhc ideology they had supporrcd tthis i.'> Thom.:is J\.fann\ casci. Othl.:'rs, likl Jasper~, continue r.o be
inspirt:d hy the Krit:..1.rsidt>ol({lfif \\.cll after 19 JI{, hut nc\'er go so far as to
embrace N.izi~rn. This i~ not F-kideg.,cr'~ ..:J~c: Nor only docs he cros~ tht:
fatJI thrcslipld, hut he continue~ ro remain. w the \'cry end, bound to
N~1zi Germany, dc-spitt his ((llltradictorv rdatiomhip with ir, <Uld despite
hh m\ce.,sin!_!. .md mrmentcd reinterpretation of that rd.nionship.
2 3:;
NOTES
l.
er
F. hdicr\ rramlarion
of
1-kidq\[<Ci'\ poliri<:;J)
(0111!\1<.'.!1l:lri<~ of
72-101.
236
237
89ff
47. Edmund Husserl, I "Kirche und christlichc Wissenschati"J (] 92223), in Aufsi:i.tzc und Vortrligc 0922-1937), p. 104.
48. Edmund Husserl, "Phanomenologie und Anthropologie" ( 1931 }, in
Aufsiitzc tmd Vortriigc (]922-1937), p. 169.
49. Edmund Husserl, ["Die neuzeitliche Kulmr J(s Kultur aus prnktischer
Verfimfi:") (]922--23), in Aufsiitze ttnd Vortriige (1922-1937), pp. l08II
50. Edmund Husserl, ["Zurn Versagen der neuzeirlichen Kultur und
Wissenschafrsenrv.'ic.klung, das Telos der europaischen Menschheit zu vetwirk
lichen"] (1922-23), in AufsMze und Viwtrd._rrc (1912-1937}, p. 121.
51. Edmund Husserl, "Zur Unterschrifi unrer Kastors Bild" (193!i), in
Aujsiitzc und Vortrii.tJr (1922-1937), p. 239.
52. Husse.rl, ["Znm Versagen"}, pp. 12lff.
53. Edmund Hussc.rl, ["Zur Idee absoluter Rechrtenigung") ( 192223), in Aufsiitu und Vortrk_J,rc (1922-1937), p. lO:i.
54. Edmund Husserl, "An den Priisidenten des VIII Internationalen
Philosophcnkongresse$ Herrn Pro!~ Dr. IUdl in Prag," in At~fsiitzt 1md Viwtragc
(1922-1937), p. 243.
55. Cf. above all Edmund Husserl, "Erneuerung, Ihr Problem und ihre
Methode," in Aufsatu und Fortriige (1922-1937), p. 3.
56. Husserl, Die Krisis dcr L'uropiiischen WisunschnftL'n, p. 4.
57. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialektik dr1 Az~fklii.ru'tfJ, pp. 38ff.
58. Edmund Husserl, ["Der neuzeitlkhe Rationalismus erfi.illt nicht den
Ursprungssinn der Rarionalitat"J ( 1934 ), in Aufsiitu tmd Viwtl'i(qc
(1922-1937), p. 237.
59. Benedetto Croce, "Farri politici e inte.rpretazioni storichc" (1924 i, in
Cttltura e ritn- m01alc, 2d ed. (Bari, l 926), p. 270.
60. Cf Henri Guillemin, Benjamin Constant 11111.rcadin, 179.",-J 799
(Paris, 1958), pp. 275-79.
61 . With regard ro this, cf. Losurdo, La ca.tastr~fc dclla Genna.11i11. c l'im
mi?ginc di Ht;11cl, pp. 115-21.
62. Printed in Jader Iacobelli, Cl'oct!Gentilc: Dal sodalizio a.l dmmma
(Milano, 1989), pp. l40ff
63. This is the direction followed o~' Friedrich A. von Harck, 171e R.ond
to Serfdom (London, 1986 ), p. 16. The same path is foll(lwed hv Lucio Colletti,
"L'equivoco di Lukah," Mondopernio (i;muary 1986): 99-103. It should be
added, however, that Hayek himself later echoes some theme.s dear to German
Kultitrkritik, as will be discussed later in r.his paragraph.
64. Adam Miiller, "Deutsche Wissenschaft und Lltcrntur" (1806), in
K1itischc, asthrtisi:hc un.d philnsophische .'ichriftc11, eds. Walte.r Schroeder and
Werner Siehert (Neuwie.d Berlin, 1967 ), vol. J, pp. 10 J ff.
65. Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France" ( 1790j, in
238
.:-
11Je Works: A New Edition (London, 1826), vol. 5, p. 184. (As for the German
translation, see Edmund Burke, Betm.cht1m;._qcn uber die franziJsischt: Rnoltttion.
In der deutscbe11 Ubcrserzung ''on Friedrich Gentz [Frankfurt a.M., 19671, p.
160). This aspecr of the hisrory of the term Gemeinschaft was already highlighted by Eugene Len:h, " 'Gesellschaft' und 'Gemeinschafr,' " Viert:elJabr
schrift fiit Litemrnrwim:nschaft tmd Geistq_rrcschic.Jm 22 ( 1944 ): l 14ff Lerch,
who sees Burke as the point of departure for the hisrory of the term Gemein
schaj't, docs not hesirare to e.~tahiish a line of continuity which reaches the "com
nrnnity of the front" ( Fro1it11emeinscbaft) of the "First World War" and
~NarionalSocialism" (ibid., p. 117). It is interesting to nore rhat also the gene.sis of another fonda mental category of German conscrva ti\e or reactionary tra
dirion seems ro refer back, if not to British sources, to England's political model:
In I 860, Rudolf Haym contrasts France's "bloody and destructive" revolution
to ""the peacefu I, conservative revolution" (die .fh.cdlict1e, die konscrl'Mivc Rei>olution ); cf. Rudolf Haym, "Thomas Babington Macaulay," in l'reu.flische
jahrbiiclur 6 ( l 860 ): As for the constant reference to England made by German
conservatism, from the years of the srruggle against the French Revolution up
to the decades following the failure of the 1848 Revolution, cf. Domenico
Losurdo, He,,11el und das dc1itschc Erbe: Philosophic und national& Frage Zwisd1en
Rel'oiuti!m und Rt~aktio11 (Killn: lstituto Italiano per gli Srudi Filosofici, 1989 ),
chap. 5, 3ff.; Tra Hegel c Bismarck. La Rivol11zionc de/ 1848 c la crisi della
c11lwra tedesu1. (Roma, 1983), pp. 71-86; La catasrroft delta Germania e l'imma,qine di Hegd, pp. 17-28.
66. Edmund Burke., "Speech on Moving his Resolutions for Conciliation
with America" 11775 ), in The Works, vol. 3, p. 81.
67. Burke, "Reflections," pp. I 83ff.
68. Edmund Burke, "Letters on a Re.gicide Peace, Ill" ( 1797}, in I7;i
Works, vol. 8, p. 400.
69. Cf. Benjamin Constanr, "Principes de politique," in Oeuvru, ed. A.
Roulin (Paris, 1%7), p. ll5t; Ge.orge Washington, "Fragments of the Dis
carded First Inaugural Address" (1789), in A Collection, ed. William B. Allen
(Indianapolis, l988i, p. 455.
70. Burke, "Reflections," pp. 149tl
71. Friedrich Schlegel, "Zur ostem:ichischen Geschichte" (1807), in
Schriftm und Fra~11mentc, ed. Ernsr Behler (Stuttgart, 1956), p. 321.
72. Friedrich Schkgel, "Signatur des Zeitalters" (1823), in Concordia,
ed. Ernsr Behler (Darmstadt, 1967), pp. 354, 180, 64.
73. Burke, "Reflections," p. 152.
74. A lerre.r to an unknown addressee dated January 1790, in Alfred
Cobban <Uld Robert A. Smith, eds., T/Je Correspondence of Edmu11d Burke (Cam
bridge, 1967), \'Ol. 6, p. 80.
75. Friedric.h J. Srahl, Die l'hdosophic dt.1 Rechts, 5th ed. (Darmstadt.
2 39
pp.257,261-69.
86. Hayek, Nc1r Studies, pp. 4, IO.
87. Burke, "Letrers on a Regicide Peace, TII,~ p. 400.
88. Gadamer, Waihcit und Methodc, p. 265.
89. Ha~1ek, La.no, 1-t~qislation and Liberty, pp. 104, 105.
90. Hayek, nn: Consritution of Uberty, p. 5.
91. Leo Strauss, Whin is Political Philo.1ophy? and Other Studies (Glencoe,
1959); wirh regard to this, cf. Pier Franco Tahoni, "Leo Strauss c ii govcrno dei
migliori," in Hermenmtica, (1986): 145-92.
92. Heidegger, "Abraham a Sancra Clara," pp. 2ff.
93. Martin Heidegger, Dir SelbstbefJaupi:imJf det dcutschcn [Ini.1crsitii.t
(fomkfurr, 1983 ), pp. 12ff
94. Martin Heidegger, "Die Karegorien- nnd Bcdeutungslehre des Duns
i fiori. La. critica dell'ideologia tra Marx e Nietzsche" and "Nietzsche, ii moderno e !a rradizione liberalc."
96. In a letter to his friend Georg Brandes, who defines Nicr.zsche's posi
20-27.
97. hiedrich Nietzsche, "Die Gehurt der 'fo1gi.'>die. Vcrsuch einer Seib-
240
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INDEX
251
252
INDEX
Ittdex
Helbling, lfanno, 32, 6::i, 108, 133,
159, 197
Heraclirus, 78, 79, 104, I 09
Herf, Jetfrey, 160
He.rmand, Jost, l60, 162
Hervier, Julien, 137, 204
Heyse, Hans, 33, 50, 74, 81, 99, 10710, 114, 116, 167, 176, 178,
199-201
Himmler, Heinrich, 143
Hirsch, Emanuel, I 08
Hitler, AdoH: 26, 40, 42, 45, 79, 81,
97, 98, 100, 103, 115, 128, 131,
LB, 135, 136, 143, 145--47,
154, lf\5, 160, 162, 163, 167,
171, 175, 178, 188, 193, 196,
199,200,207,211,235
Hobbes, Thomas, 131, 132
Hohenzollern dynasty, 73, 119
Hfilderlin, Friedrich, 47, 104, 175,
184, 201, 202
Horkheimer, Max, 178, 186, 200,
203,214-18,220,223,236,237
Huber, Ernst Rudolf~ 163
Hiibingc.r, GangolC 31, l I 5, 201
Huizinga, Johan, 168, 197
Husserl, Edmund, 11, 13, 20, 23, 3133, 38, 47, 57, 86-94, 99, 100102, 1ll-14,129-31, 136, 157,
163,219-21,223,236,237
Jacobelli, Jader, 237
Jacobs, Wilhelm G., 31
Jaspers, Karl, 36-46, 52, 61-64, 67,
25 3
66
Kuhn, Helmut, 116
Kurzke, Hermann, 31, 110, 134, 159,
197
254
INDEX
216,228,231,233,239
Noire, Ernst, 33, 63, 196, 199, 200,
205
Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich
Leopold von Hardenberg), 106
Oeri, Johann Jakob, l 15
Opitz, Reinhard, 199, 235
Ort, Hugo, 62-64, 113, 136, 197,
203
Pareto, Vilfredo, 217
Parmenides, 212
Penzo, Giorgio, 199
Pe.rzet, Heinrich Wiegand, 115
Petzold, Joachim, 235
Picker, Henry, 110, 163
Plato, 66, 121, 210, 214, 226
Plenge, Johann, 16, 32
Pi:iggcler, Otro, 33, 68, 69, 136, 161,
201
Poliakm', Leon, 34, 66, 111, 115,
133, 137, 162
Praxiteles, I 83
Quabbe, Georg, 71, 107
Ranchetti, Mid1ek, 33
Rarkowski, Franz Joseph, 184
Reichenau, Walter von, 235
Remarque, Erich Maria, 168
Rembrandt (Harmensz van Rijn), 183
Rosenberg, Alfred, 53, 66, 80, 81,
110, 111, 128, 135, 156, 158,
163, 177,200,222,231
Rosenzweig, Edith, 135
Rosenzweig, Franz, 123-25, 135,
212-14, 236
Index
Rothschield, Anschel !\feyer ''on, 131
Rousseau, Jean- Jacques, 85
Rovarri, Pier Aldo, 66
Ruge, Wolfgang, 163, 201
Ruggiero, Amerigo, 164
Saccrdote, Gustavo, 235
Saint-Just, Louis de, 217
Salomon, A., 236
Salvucci, Pasquale, 235
Sandkiihlcr, Hans Jorg-. 108
Saner, Hans, 62, 63, 111, 136, 160,
197,204
Scarponi, Alherco, 33
Schadenwa!dt, Wolfgang, 43, 64
Scheler, Max, 13, 14, 20, 21, 24, 31,
32,59,60,66,69,87, 135, 139,
160
ScheUing, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph,
161
Schirmacher, Wolfgang, 203
Schlageter, Albert Leo, 49, 61
Schlegel, Friedrich, 225, 238
Schmid, Alex !'., ] 33
Schmitt, Carl, 28, 34, 71, 72, 76, 78,
255
131, 132,238
Stalin, Josif, 19, 207
Stapel, Wilhelm, 66, 115
Steding, Christoph, 84-86. 111, 199
Stehr, Nic.o, 66
Storck, Joachim W., 64, l.i6, Hi2
Srrauss, Leo, B2, 227, 228, 239
204,205,207,233
Schneeherge.r, Guido, 35, 62-66, 70,
108, 110, 114, 197
Scholem, Gershom. 212, 236
Schroe.der, Walrer, 237
Schrorer, Manfred, 34, 134, 200
Schumann, Woltgang, l 63, 20 l
Scpp, Hans Rainer, 31, 112
Sichirollo, Livio, J 08, 203, 235
Sieben, Werner, 237
Sieg, Ulrich, 136
Sieycs, Emmanuel-Joseph, 221
Simmel, Georg, 20, 23, 32, :13, 38,
) }5
256
INDEX
Valent, ltalo, 33
Vico, Giamhacrista, 101
Vierra, Sil\'io, 161, 163
Volrairt" (Fran~ois-Marie Arouct), 29,
147, 148, 199
Vossler, Karl, 43
Washington, George, 224, 238
Weber, Alfred, 65
Wd1er, Ma1ianne, 12-14, 19, 24, 25,
31, 32, 57, 63, 64, 69, 120, 127,
I:H, 200
Wehcr, l\hx, 12, 18, 19, 24, 25, 29,H, 33, 35, 38, 40-42, 51-54,
59, 6il, 64, 67, 78, 84, 101, 105,
115, 116, 120, 144, 150, 160,
166, 183, 189, 190, 197, 200,
201,204,207,209,22(}
Wharton, Edith, 13
Wiki.moVl~tz-.Moellendorf
Ulrich. l 05,
l 77, 178
Wilhelm IJ, 26, 95, l05, 207
Winckc:lmann, Johannes, 35, M, 67,
134, 197,204
Wismann, Heinz, 114
W'ittgensrein, Hermine, 33
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 22-24, 32
Wolff~ Kurr H., 66, 107
Wurt: Joseph, 34, 66, 111, 115, 162
Xenophon, 193
Zweig, Stefan, 11
Zweininger, Arthur, 201