Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Supported by:
David Batashvili
October 2016
1
Executive Summary
In late October-early November 2016 a
coalition
groups
of Georgia:
of
Ukrainian
hacker
Tskhinvali.
in
strengthening
proxy
into
daily
business
of
undermining
space
imposed
administration
Russia,
regulatory
by
and
the
Abstract
This policy brief looks at the revelations from the hacked and leaked e-mail accounts of Vladislav
Surkov close adviser of Vladimir Putin on the Russian policy in Ukraine and the two regions of
Georgia under the Russian occupation. The brief mostly draws upon primary sources in the form
of the materials from one of Surkovs hacked e-mail accounts. It focuses on the parts of these
materials that are dedicated to the occupied regions of Georgia Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. The
Surkov leaks provide useful glimpse on the extent of direct engagement from Moscow to manage
the legislative, regulatory and administrative routines of these entities, as well as some specific
details of the routine of the Russian control over the two regions.
Background
After the Western recognition of Kosovos
Moscow
then
proceeded
to
established
significant
and
permanent
that
elected through
process.
this
is
done
by
local
contested
proxy
political
with
correspondence
control.
Abkhazia
and
reveals
Tskhinvali,
a
picture
the
of
The
account - pochta_mg@mail.ru4.
Atlantic
Councils
analysis
was
. SBU -
Hunta is an alternate spelling of the word junta, included in the groups name in mockery of the message used
by the Russian propaganda that Ukrainian government after the revolution of 2014 is an illegitimate junta
2
Kiberhunta Peredaet Privet Surkovu CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian),
http://cyberhunta.com/news/kiberhunta-peredaet-privet-surkovu/
3
Den Surka, CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian), http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
4
SurkovLeaks (part 2), CyberHunta, last accessed 21 November 2016 (in Russian),
http://cyberhunta.com/news/surkovleaks2/
5
Andrew E. Kramer, Ukrainian Hackers Release Emails Tying Top Russian Official to Uprising, The New York
Times,
27
October
2016,
last
accessed
21
November
2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-emails.html?_r=1
6
Simon Shuster, Hacked Kremlin Emails Could Signal a Turn in the U.S.-Russia Cyberwar, Time, 7 November
2016, last accessed 21 November 2016, http://time.com/4558167/cyberwar-us-russia-vladislav-surkov/
7
Reid Standish, Hacked: Putin Aides Emails Detail Alleged Plot to Destabilize Ukraine, Foreign Policy, 25
October 2016, last accessed 21 November 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/25/hacked-putin-aides-emailsdetail-alleged-plot-to-destabilize-kiev-surkov-ukraine-leaks/
8
Robert Windrem, Payback? Russia Gets Hacked, Revealing Putin Aides Secrets, NBC News, 27 October 2016,
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/payback-russia-gets-hackedrevealing-putin-aide-s-secrets-n673956
1
While
Ukrainian
understandably
hackers
interested
mostly
were
in
of
these
entities
from
Valery Dzutsev, Vladislav Surkov to Oversee Russian Policies Toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia, The
Jamestown Foundation, 26 September 2013, last accessed 21 November 2016, https://jamestown.org/vladislavsurkov-to-oversee-russian-policies-toward-abkhazia-and-south-ossetia/
10
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-10-21 (in Russian),
last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
11
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, - 16 10 13,
2013-10-21 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
prm_surkova@gov.ru, e-mail message to mamonov_mv@gov.ru,
(), 2013-10-23 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
9
commission
that
includes
Russian
government
timetable
for
process
by
the
Russian
timely manner12.
contain
timetable
with
01.11.13,
2013-11-04
(in
Russian),
last
accessed
21
November
2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, ,
01.11.13, 2013-11-04 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/densurka/
16
Prm_Govoruna@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, ,
01.11.13, 2013-11-04 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/densurka/
prm_surkova@gov.ru, e-mail message to mamonov_mv@gov.ru,
(), 2013-10-23 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
12
laws,
to
several
Russian
Russian
officials
and
agencies
cabinet
in
administration
and
regime employees20.
governance
Meanwhile, Russian Ministry of Finance is
tasked with creation of Tskhinvali regimes
Treasury21.
This
intergovernmental
responsible
for
the
commission
management
of
financing
of
Tskhinvali
regimes
by
Sukhumi
the
and
Russian
purposes
the
two
occupied
and
infrastructure
Stanislav.Panchenko@minregion.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, : .. , 201403-21 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
23
There are numerous letters in Surkovs inbox with lists of participants of such meetings in 2013 and 2014. See
examples:
07.31, 2014-07-28 (in Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016,
http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
mamonov_mv@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, , 2013-10-22 (in Russian), last accessed
21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
24
Avdeenko_VN@gov.ru, e-mail message to prm_surkova@gov.ru, __6, 2013-12-16 (in
Russian), last accessed 21 November 2016, http://cyberhunta.com/news/den-surka/
22
10
of
deputy prime-minister.26
reveal
that
Russian
systematically
uses
government
inducements
Abkhazia
and
Tskhinvali.
Russian
and
in Abkhazia.28
designated
for
involvement
needed
for
as
an
splitting
Coordinating Council27.
instrument
the
oppositions
existence
in
of
Georgia
Kremlins
was
often
aggressive
11
Surkov leaks.
Tskhinvali regions.
Surkovs
e-mails
constitute
vivid
12
its instructions.
The
matters.
occupied
territories
are
casually
Donbass,
deeper
into
Ukrainian
territory.
Tskhinvali region borders the main Georgian
highway that connects the nations two
halves. At one geographic point the
occupation line runs less than 500 meters
from the highway, while, as mentioned
above, the capital Tbilisi is situated just 40
To
summarize,
Surkovs
revealed
13
Georgias foreign friends and partners should unambiguously recognize the reality, depth and
breadth of the direct Russian control over the occupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
Tbilisi and its partners shall engage in cooperative effort to identify the realistic means for
reducing such dependence, which would be by definition rather limited. At the same time,
a sustainable and concerted strategy for monitoring and protecting the rights of
Georgian-speakers and other minorities is required.
Georgias partners and aid agencies should take note of the fact that a potential investment in
strengthening the proxy administration in Abkhazia through financial aid, training, etc. will
effectively be conducted within the framework of the administrative and regulatory space
imposed by Russia. Such engagement would have implications for the neutrality and
impartiality of these agencies. The European Union shall engage in strategic dialogue with
Georgian authorities to adapt its policies and engagement accordingly.
should be consistently and vocally confronted by the Western nations diplomacy. Russia
attempts to present creeping occupation as a local and technical issue should be rebuffed.
14