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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

SIMACO BELLOSILLO,
FERNANDO DIOPIDO, ARTURO PALACIO, CRISOSTOMO GONZALES and FEDERICO
FRANCISCO, Defendants-Appellees. [G.R. No. L-18512. December 27, 1963.]
Facts: An information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and docketed therein
as criminal case No. 7689, charging defendants herein Simaco Bellosillo, Fernando
Diopido, Arturo Palacio, Crisostomo Gonzales and Federico Francisco with the crime of
theft of coconuts, valued P300.00 and belonging to Pe Julian Lao,
Upon a reinvestigation conducted at the request of the accused, it turned out that the
property from which the coconuts were allegedly stolen was involved in a civil case between
the complainant on the one hand and the accused on the other, said criminal case was, on
motion of the prosecution, and "with the express conformity" of the accused, dismissed on
January 4, 1960.
On thereafter the prosecution filed against the accused an identical information in the same
court.
Before arraignment, the accused moved to quash the information upon the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense and res judicata. The lower court granted
this motio.
Issue: Whether or not res judicata applies.
Held: The order appealed from is untenable. The order of January 4, 1960, dismissing case
No. 7689, cannot be an obstacle to the institution of the present case for, not being a
decision on the merits, said order cannot bar the present case upon the principles of res
adjudicata, and the provision of Rule 30, section 3, of the Rules of Court, to the
effect that a "dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise provided by the Court," does not apply to criminal cases. Neither
does the present action place the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, not only because he had never been in jeopardy of punishment therefor in the
previous case, the same having been dismissed before arraignment and plea, but,
also, because its dismissal took place with the express consent of the accused
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings, with costs de oficio. It is so ordered.
SPOUSES ANTONIO MARTINEZ AND BENEDICTA BALATBAT MARTINEZ, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE EUFROCINIO S. DE LA MERCED, BIENVENIDO U. JUAN and
SACRED HEART SCHOOL MALABON, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 82039 June 20, 1989

Facts: Petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against private respondents Bienvenido
Juan and Sacred Heart School of Malabon, Inc., for the recovery of possession of the
premises being used by the latter as school building. For their causes of action, they
claimed that the contract of lease has expired, and the terms and conditions of the contract
of lease were violated.
Private respondents filed a motion to suspend proceedings because of the pendency of their
interpleader case, RTCt of Caloocan City, against the petitioners and their predecessors-ininterest, the estates of Ricardo and Soledad Balatbat, who were all claiming to be the
owners of the leased premises. This motion was granted.
Five years later, Petitioners filed a motion to lift the said order of suspension alleging that
the pendency of the interpleader case is not a bar to its trial. The motion was denied by the
court.
On the basis of petitioners' evidence, on May 26, 1986, the lower court rendered an ex parte
decision in favor of the petitioners.
On Petitioners Second Motion to Lift Order of Suspension invoking the same ground the
court, in an orderlifted the suspension in view of the absence of any opposition and that

there was no showing as to the progress of interpleader case. Motion for reconsideration was
denied and set the case for trial on the merits.
The Private Respondents evidence were ordered stricken off the record as they were clearly
filed out of time due to late submission of medical certificate of their lawyer.
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court presided by respondent Judge
Eufrocinio de la Merced. On August 13, 1986, said respondent judge rendered a decision
declaring the judgment of the inferior court "null and void" on the ground that a preliminary
conference under the Rules on Summary Procedure is a jurisdictional requirement, the nonobservance of which constitutes reversible error. 6
Issue: Whether or not the preliminary conference under the Rules of Summary Procedure
can be waived, albeit impliedly, by failing to object to its non-observance in the proceedings
had before the inferior court.
Held: While the Court of Appeals is correct in its view that Section 6 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure is made mandatory by the use of the auxiliary verbs "shall" and "must"
instead of the permissive "may," it does not, however, logically follow that the absence of a
preliminary conference would necessarily render nugatory the proceedings had in the court
below.
While termed a "preliminary conference," a closer look thereat would reveal that the
provision is akin and similar to the provision on "pre-trial" under Rule 20 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Both provisions are essentially designed to promote amicable settlement or to
avoid or simplify the trial.
An analysis of existing jurisprudence on the matter reveals that proceedings undertaken
without first conducting a pretrial or with a legally defective pre-trial is voided because
either of the parties thereto suffered substantial prejudice thereby or they were denied their
right to due process.
Thus, unless there is a showing of substantial prejudice caused to a party, the trial court's
inadvertent failure to calendar the case for a pre-trial or a preliminary conference cannot
render the proceedings illegal or void ab initio. A party's failure to object to the absence of a
pre-trial is deemed a waiver of his right thereto. This observation holds with more reason in
the case at hand where private respondents have already submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court.
Obviously, the failure of private respondent to raise the issue was occasioned by negligence
on their part, if not a belief that it was not vital for their cause, and not because filing a
motion for reconsideration invoking this ground was prohibited by the rules.
Nevertheless, while we hold in this case that the right to a preliminary conference under the
Rules on Summary Procedure is deemed waived by a party's failure to invoke the same
before the trial court, this is not in the least to suggest that the trial courts may dispense
with such a preliminary conference. Courts should make full use of the pre-trial proceedings
primarily so that all issues necessary to the early disposition of a cause are properly
determined and to explore all avenues towards a compromise or settlement of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE
and the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated May 26, 1986 in Civil Case No. 4526 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

CELSO PAGTALUNAN and PAULINA P. PAGTALUNAN, petitioners, vs. HON. ROQUE A.


TAMAYO, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Bulacan, Branch VI, REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES and TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, MARLENE PACITA, MATTHEW


and ROSARY, all surnamed ALDABA, respondents. G.R. No. L-54281 March 19, 1990
Facts: Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the CFI of Bulacan for expropriation
of a parcel of land owned by private respondents. petitioners herein filed a supplemental
motion for leave to intervene, with complaint in intervention attached thereto, alleging that
petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been the bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of the
land. Petitioners asked the trial court to order payment to Celso Pagtalunan of just
compensation for his landholding or, in the alternative, to order payment of his disturbance
compensation as bona fide tenant.
Respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo denied the petitioners' supplemental motion, holding
that to admit petitioners' complaint in intervention would be tantamount to allowing a
person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for disturbance compensation is
a claim against the State. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, limiting the discussion on the issue of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the expropriation case. The SC granted the motion for
reconsideration and gave due course to the petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines a notice of
appeal.
Issue: The principal issue raised in the petition centers on the alleged right of petitioners to
intervene in the expropriation proceedings instituted by the State against private
respondents as registered owner of the subject property.
Held: Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention
[Gibson v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 219]. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of
the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. The Court has ruled
that such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant [Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939); Batama Farmer's Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 408; Gibson v.
Revilla, supra].
In the present case, petitioners claim that Celso Pagtalunan possesses legal interest in the
matter in litigation for he, not private respondents herein, is the party entitled to just
compensation for the subject property sought to be expropriated or, in the alternative,
disturbance compensation as a bona fide tenant based on Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No.
3844, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389.
The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to describe the
grantee of a certificate of land transfer. But the import of such phrase must be construed

within the policy framework of Pres. Decree No. 27, and interpreted with the other
stipulations of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree.
And under Pres. Decree No. 266 which specifies the procedure for the registration of title to
lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27, full compliance by the grantee with the
abovementioned undertakings is required for a grant of title under the Tenant Emancipation
Decree and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation patent in favor of the
farmer/grantee [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is the emancipation patent which
constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer, or a
Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee.
In the present case, the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain has
decided to expropriate the subject property for public use as a permanent site for the
Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and Highways. On the other hand,
petitioners have not been issued an emancipation patent. Furthermore, they do not dispute
private respondents' allegation that they have not complied with the conditions enumerated
in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a patent [See Private
Respondents' Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 34. And also Memorandum of Private Respondents, p.
6; Rollo, p. 109]. In fact, petitioners do not even claim that they had remitted to private
respondents, through the Land Bank of the Philippines, even a single amortization payment
for the purchase of the subject property.
Petitioners cannot hold private respondents liable for disturbance compensation. Section 36
(1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, is applicable only when it is the owner/lessor who
voluntarily opts for the conversion of his land into non-agricultural land. In the present case,
it is the State, not the private respondents, who disturbed petitioners' possession of the
subject property. The conversion of the property into a permanent site for the Bulacan Area
Shop of the Department of Public Works and Highways was undertaken by the government
independent of the will of private respondents herein.
On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that since their motion to intervene alleges
as justification therefor that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan is the bona fide tenant of the
subject property, the case should have been referred to the Court of Agrarian Relations
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings for public
purpose of all kinds of tenanted properties.
The Court finds no reason to dwell on this point. The issue of what court has jurisdiction over
the expropriation proceedings in this case has been rendered moot and academic by B.P.
Blg. 129. Under Paragraph 7, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, all civil actions and special
proceedings which were then under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations were placed under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts [formerly the Courts of First Instance].

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