1

Balance of Power and the Outbreak of WWI

Political Science Capstone

POLS 480
Dr. Stephen Hill
December 1, 2016

2
Abstract
This paper will examine how international relations theorists have argued as the main reason for
the outbreak of World War One. This conflict is one of the most studied conflicts, as it was a
devastating continental war that preceded a long-period of peace and historians and political
scientist have tried to understand how a war of this magnitude could occur. There are many
different international relations theories about how war broke out, and Im seeking to understand
the lessons that this was has on global conflict. This paper will be a debate of the views that
prominent international relations scholars have on WWI, concluding with my interpretation of
the outbreak of WWI based on these scholars.

Political scientists and historians study World War One, and the implications this massive
conflict has on international relations and peace. There are many theories that seek to explain
how conflict started, and each has merits and criticisms. The goal of this paper is a debate
between international relations scholars about the outbreak of WWI, and the lessons this case has
on the study of conflict. There is largely a consensus that Germany was a rising power in the late
19th to early 20th century, that to European powers, meant a shift in the balance of power. The
historian Donald Kagan described the balance-of-power system of the decades before WWI,
saying, that, The Old European order, resting on a balance among the five great powers of
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, had been established at Vienna in 1815 as a
way of preventing the domination of a single state over all of Europe, such as had almost been
achieved by Napoleon Bonaparte (Kagan, 1995, 83). Germanys growth was viewed as a
challenge to the old order, whether or not their intentions were aggressive, or to become a
hegemon. My research question is, was a change in the balance of power the principle cause of
WWI? My hypothesis is that WWI occurred because Great Britain, France, and Russia, in
thinking about the balance of power, formed the Triple Entente, which German leaders saw as
the opportunity to seek regional hegemony through a war fought with offensive military policies.

4
One of the most prominent theories of explaining the outbreak of WWI is known as the,
cult of the offensive, argued by scholars Stephen Van Evera and Jack Snyder. The cult of the
offensive phenomenon explains that European militaries glorified offensive doctrines, and
civilians and political leaders assumed the offensive solutions to security problems were the most
effective (Van Evera 1984, 58). In thinking of the balance of power, Van Evera explains that
many Germans believed that international alliances were formed by bandwagoning with a
powerful state rather than balancing against it. Opponents might be intimidated by a powerful
state, and neutrals would bandwagon with it. In this, German leaders hoped they might force
Great Britain to realize the balance of power principle was impracticable to real-life situations in
international relations and opt to make peace with Germany (Van Evera, 1984, 62). International
relations theorists who believe the cult of the offensive was a reason for the outbreak of the war,
emphasize the dangers when the offense is strong relative to the defense, in which case,
European nations believed that the side which mobilized and struck first would have the military
advantage (Van Evera, 1984, 65). Germany believed that its security required a wider empire,
and the only way this was possible, was by coercion or conquest. In addition, prewar statements
made by German leaders reflected the need that if Germany did not change the status quo, then
German independence would be threatened (Van Evera, 1984, 66). By 1914, German leaders
feared that German power was in decline, and that they needed to take drastic action, such as,
provoking and winning a crisis that would break the encircled Triple Entente. German officials
believed it needed to go to war in 1914 for fear of the threat that a strengthened Russian military
posed by 1917 (Van Evera, 1984, 80). The Berlin Post wrote in 1914 that, at the moment the
state of things is favorable for us. France is not yet ready for war. England has internal and

5
colonial difficulties, and Russia recoils from the conflict because she fears revolution at home
(Van Evera, 1984, 82). But soon France would gain the strength necessary to fight a war,
England would likely join the Entente if France was attacked, even if they showed confusing
signs that made Germany think they would be neutral, and Russia would soon have a stronger
military, despite internal revolutionary problems. As such, Van Evera explains that the Central
powers launched a preventive war, in the belief that they were saving themselves from a worse
fate in a few years time, like having to defend against a superior offensive attacked by the
Entente (Van Evera, 1984, 84). In their offensive worldview, German leaders hoped that German
power would force Britain into neutrality, or Britain might hesitate before entering the war, and
then might abandon their effort once the French were swiftly beaten (Van Evera, 1984, 92). Van
Evera believes Germany preferred status quo to world power, but the reactions of each state from
their mobilization threatened the safety of others-forcing them to react or preempt, which forced
German to launch a world war which it preferred to avoid like that rest of Europe (Van Evera,
1984, 96). The offensive character of states, like Russias that forced full mobilization, rather
than just partial mobilization, explains why Russias allies were in an all or nothing situation,
and why Britain was faced with choosing between giving Russia their active support which
meant joining the Entente, or renouncing their friendship, and thus alliance (Van Evera, 1984,
97). The alliances themselves were unconditional, as allies supported one other regardless if their
behavior was defensive or provocative (Van Evera, 1984, 96). Van Evera concludes that when
historians and political scientists cast blame for 1914, it cannot just be on the statesmen at the
time or German expansionism, but the offensive nature of the times, and the severe demands it
placed which made peace diplomacy difficult (Van Evera, 1984, 103).

6
Jack Synder uses the cult of the offensive to explain how the role of civil-military
relations encouraged offensive strategies. He writes that, Military technology should have made
the European strategic balance in July 1914 a model of stability, but offensive military strategies
defied those technological realities, trapping European statesmen in a war-causing spiral of
insecurity and instability (Snyder, 1984, 108). The offensive doctrines and the war plans were a
decisive cause of the war, arguing that security, not conquest, was the reason for the design of the
plans (Snyder, 1984, 108). The cult of the offensive reflected the preference of militaries to use
offensive strategies, even though a defensive or even limited offensive strategy would have left
European states in a more favorable position, instead of an offensive full mobilization, all or
nothing strategy that attempted to annihilate the enemy. One of the reasons for the military
offensive strategies was the lack of civilian control over plans and doctrine, which provided no
check on the tendency of military organizations to institutionalize doctrines that support the goals
of prestige and autonomy (Snyder, 1984, 110). Cult of the offensive theory has implications that
spread across time, and Synder warns that war will occur if there is a belief among states that a
disarming, offensive flow is necessary to ensure the attackers security (Snyder, 1984, 112).
States that attempt to challenge the balance of power, and are labeled as revisionists, will view by
their offensive military characteristics, that using full mobilization to attack an enemy is the only
way to ensure their security. These were the arguments that German leaders used to support the
Schlieffen Plan. Russia held similar views as their incentive to strike first was a result of the
desire to close Germanys window of opportunity to attack France (Snyder, 1984, 114). The
Schlieffen Plan was enacted because it sought to capitalize on the slow mobilization of the
Russian Army at the time, and the plan reasoned it could alter the balance of forces in Germanys

7
favor. Snyder argues that Germany pursued an offensive war because of the endemic offensive
characteristics of military organizations, and Germany believed that Russia would eventually
become hostile, so disarming Germany seemed to be the only way to break of their future
attacks. Snyder quotes Kenneth Waltz by arguing that states are socialized to the implications of
international anarchy, so war was seen as more likely than it actually was, which increased the
likelihood of adopting offensive plans (Snyder, 1984, 119). As Russian military power was
increasing relative to Germanys, Russian war planners had the strong incentive to invade
German or Austria during the Schliefflen Plan, where the mobilization of the Germany army
would be focused on the French border (Snyder, 1984, 133). The question that scholars who
argue for the cult of the offensive about WWI must ask, is whether Germany adapted offensive
strategies to gain security against a future Russian attack, or seize the opportunity to establish
European hegemony.
Jack Snyder believes that Germany provoked a war with the goal of dominating Europe,
even if that war meant it would be long and cost many lives (Snyder, 2008, 174). Synder agrees
with Van Evera that the offensive assumption increased the chance of war by exaggerating
Germanys incentive for preventive war in response to Russias rising power, which created
incentives for unconditional alliances and time pressures on crisis diplomacy (Snyder, 2008,
175). Snyder also argues that Germany had a self-defeating over expansion which was caused by
civilian nationalist and imperialist myth making, believing that aggression was the best to
combat security threats that Russia may have posed. Synder ultimately believes that World War I
confirms defensive realisms theoretical arguments, and he believes that offensive realists tend to
believe that offensive action is more necessary for self-defense than defensive realists believe
(Snyder, 2008, 181). He argues that defensive realists and offensive realists do not differ as much

8
as other scholars would believe. One distinction he says is that offensive realism believes that
offensive action contributes to security, while defensive realism believes that it does not (Snyder,
2008, 182). Defensive realists believe that offense led Germany to adopt a risky war plan, which
exacerbated the security dilemma, and provoked Germany into launching an unwanted
preventive war. Thus, Germany and Russia pursued unnecessary offensive policies that
ultimately led to war, whereas defensive policies could of averted the attitudes to attack first and
fully mobilize.
Keir Lieber believes that historical evidence challenges defensive realism and their
interpretation of WWI. He believes that German leaders were driven by a desire to provoke a
hegemonic war, not by the fear of a future Russian attack, and that their ambitions would not
have been served from a defensive strategy (Lieber, 2008, 189). Germany was not compelled to
launch its war plan for fear of Russian mobilization, nor were they surprised by British nonneutrality, in fact, German officials desired rather than feared that its enemies would mobilize
first, so that the blame for the war could be cast on their enemies (Lieber, 2008, 190). As such,
Lieber says his argument undermines the idea that war could be averted if diplomatic options
were not constrained by offensive military mobilization attitudes. While defensive realists
believe states are primarily motivated to maintain the balance of power, offensive realists
believes states are primarily motivated to expand their power over other states, which the WWI
evidence shows to support offensive realism, and Germanys desire for hegemony. Lieber argues
that the possibility of achieving regional hegemony is attractive because of a hegemonys
security payoff. He believes that German leaders understood the European balance of power and
nature of warfare, and believed the potential costs of a world war were offset by the benefits of
potentially achieving continental hegemony (Lieber, 2008, 192). Germany sought to establish

9
regional hegemony, and he argues that defensive realists are incorrect, because Germanys
actions were not to defend itself against a change in the status quo (Lieber, 2008, 193).
Liber goes on to say that international security scholars are wrong in their assumption
that a blind blunder explains the origin of WWI, and that German leaders preferred a war in the
Balkans over a continental war involving France, Russia, and Great Britain (Lieber, 2007, 156).
His analysis runs counter to security dilemma theory and defensive realism. Instead he argues
that German leaders provoked a war to achieve their goal of European hegemony, and were fully
aware that the conflict would be long. The preventive war was initiated in 1914 because German
leaders foresaw that Germany would no longer be strong enough to pursue hegemonic goals in
the future. And although a continental war was inevitable and necessary for extending Germanys
power position in Europe, they believed a war was better fought in 1914 that had hope of victory,
instead of several years down the road, where the Entente would almost certainly annihilate
Germany. But Lieber says that Germany lost control of the aggressive military policies and
actually ushered a conflict it neither expected or wanted (Lieber, 2007, 183). Defensive realists
argue that German leaders tried to avert war at the last moment, but Lieber says historical
evidence shows that the goal of German leaders late in the July crisis was to have Russia and
France be blamed for the war. When news of Russias general mobilization reached German
officials on July 31st, he quotes a German official who said, Everywhere beaming faces, people
shaking hands in the corridors, congratulating one another on having cleared the hurdle (Lieber,
2007, 185). German leaders accomplished their goal for being able to be victims of the war
starting, and did so not to gain British neutrality, but to gain domestic support from members of
the German public who might resist Germanys bid for regional hegemony (Lieber, 2007, 186).

10
Leiber believes that the two telegrams Bethmann Hollweg sent to Austria urging it to negotiate
with Russia may be evidence that German leaders did get cold feet and tried to avert war at the
last minute. But he contends that this was a cynical ploy to make it appear to the world that
Austria and Germany were seeking a negotiation even while Russia was mobilizing. He quotes
an officer who wrote in his diary on July 31: Brilliant mood. The government has succeeded
very well in making us appear as the attacked (Lieber, 2007, 186). Bethmann Hollweg sent
telegrams to embassies around the globe that Russian mobilization would mean war, but omitted
this sentence in his telegram to Russia. Lieber explains that German leaders softened their
warning to Russia so that the Russians wouldnt stop mobilization and possibly rob Germany of
the opportunity to fight a war which they would be seen as victims of Russian and French
aggression (Lieber, 2007, 187). As such, evidence shows that the history of WWI undermines
security dilemma and spiral models for the outbreak of the war. Lieber writes that German
behavior before the war was intentional, not driven by fears of encirclements, but motivated by a
desire to expand. In fact, he argues that Germany feared more that Russia would not mobilize
then that it would (Lieber, 2007, 190). Simply put, Leiber, an offensive realist, argues that the
main reason WWI occurred is because of the strategies that Germany undertook to achieve
regional hegemony.
Several scholars place the blame of the war on Great Britain, for its failure to deter
Germany from attacking the Entente. Paul Papayoanou argues that domestic political institutions
controlled foreign policy, which forced Britain to not take a hard stance against German
aggression. He writes that, Economic interdependence had a profound effect on British and
German strategies in balance-of-power politics in the period leading up to August 1914, but the

11
two pursued much different foreign policies because of the different ways their domestic political
institutions aggregated political and economic interests (Papayoanou, 1996, 43). He contends
that liberal theorists are wrong that economic interdependence is conductive to peace, and that
realists are not necessarily right. He argues that economic ties determine whether societal
economic interests will support or oppose a states security goals, and the economic ties also
determine whether strategists will balance against threats they perceive or if they will pursue
expansionism (Papayoanou, 1996, 43). He believes the reason Britain did not balance against
Germany in the pre-war stage was because of the strong economic ties it enjoyed with Germany.
Britain worried that confronting Germany could sever their economic ties, and Papayoanou
argues that states with strong economic ties with threatening powers are likely to be reluctant to
believe there is a danger to their security, and will oppose balancing. (Papayoanou, 1996, 49).
From Germanys perspective, they needed to avoid appearing as an aggressor so that they would
not threaten economic ties with a status quo power like Britain, in the hope that status quo power
would keep out of balance-of-power politics. But Germany knew that they could get away with
minimal expansionist policies because the economic interdependence would likely cause Britain
to not see German expansion as an overt threat to British security.
Papayoanou argues that weaker balancing by a status quo power will be signals to other
status quo powers that their ally is not committed to the alliance, and as such, aspiring revisionist
powers are optimistic that they can pursue aggression without meeting firm opposition
(Papayoanou, 1996, 50). This explains why Russia and France wanted a commitment by Britain
that it would come to their side if Germany attacked them, and why Germany could successfully
pursue aggression, at least not to the point that would force Britain to break off economic ties to
protect itself from a German threat. A stable balance-of-power system exists when status quo

12
powers balance against revisionist powers, and peace is maintained as revisionist powers are
deterred from aggression, but Britain did not balance against Germany, so there was not peace.
Papayoanou argues that economic links generated adjustment-cost concerns that British
strategies in a liberal democracy could not ignore, as such, Britain was constrained from
balancing firmly against the German threat. (Papayoanou, 1996, 53). Germany, on the other
hand, pursued an expansionist foreign policy because its pseudo-democratic political system
gave prominence to forces that saw expansionist policies being more beneficial than economic
interdependence. Germany recognized the constraints that the economic partnership had on
British strategists and noted the mixed signs Britain was sending, which made German leaders
confident that a rapid military offensive like the Schliefflen Plan could be successful
(Papayoanou, 1996, 53). Since Britain was a liberal democracy, societal economic concerns
would constrain British military strategies that hoped to balance against the German threat.
Britain and Germany enjoyed commercial trade with each other as British trade with Russia was
only half of what it was with Germany, and Britain was the leading market for German exports
(Papayoanou, 1996, 55). Though Britain did form an entente with Russia and France, domestic
economic constraints meant the entente would not be an alliance, but rather just a set of
agreements to consult in a crisis. Foreign secretary Grey did not pursue an alliance because
internationalist business and financial interests led a majority of the Cabinet to oppose an
alliance and seek a commitment to neutrality (Papayoanou, 1996, 59). British commercial and
financial interests influenced British policy, and they raised concerns of what the devastating
financial consequences of a war with Germany could be. Anglo-German war could lead to the
collapse of London banks that German industry had owed millions of pounds to, and Lloyds of
London had insured much of the German merchant marine, and had to pay out for losses in

13
wartime, even if it involved the Royal Navy (Papayoanou, 1996, 61). It was only after August
2nd, that the German occupation of the Belgian and French coasts posed a threat to British
security, more so than what the collapse of world trade would.
Papayoanou argues that his theory means that states with pseudo-democratic political
structures like Germany, were not constrained by societal economic factors that might be hesitant
to support expansionist policies that could disrupt established economic ties. As such, despite
being dependent on the international economy, Germany would be able to pursue aggressive
policies. In part, Germany would pursue these policies because the land-owning elites, called the
Junkers, were promised agricultural tariffs if they favored expansionists policies, and the German
political structure gave the Kaiser and Chancellor veto power against the Reichstag and
Bundesrat. In pursuit of Weltpolitik, Germany would gain access to overseas markets that would
lead to self-sufficiency, that especially attracted the Junkers, and higher levels of industrialization
(Papayoanou, 1996, 69). Papayoanou argues that any state whose rise to become part of the
international economy without transition to full democracy may have a negative effect on the
balance of power, as they would not be tied down by economic societal interests to fulfill their
potentially aggressive militaristic policies.
Sean M. Lynn-Jones argues that WWI occurred because statesmen lost control over a
minor crisis, and dangerous military plans created pressures for conflict (Jones, 1986, 123). He
believes that Anglo-German relations improved after 1911, and this contributed to the outbreak
of war, because Britain falsely believed that the Anglo-German dtente could resolve the 1914
crisis. This enabled Britain to fail to deter Germany from taking aggressive actions, and the
Germans, for their part, believed the dtente meant Britain would be neutral in a continental war
(Jones, 1986, 124). British colonial secretary Harcourt believed that granting minor concessions

14
to Germany would persuade them to reduce hostility and put an end to the policies that sought to
achieve economic and political domination on the continent. Harcourt writes, the Anglo-German
relations could be permanently improved if we had conversations leading to an exchange of
territory which might give Germany a place in the sun without injury to our colonial or Imperial
interests (Jones, 1986, 131). In this way, Britain understood that Germany was seeking to alter
the balance of power, but hoped concessions would deter them from doing so. Once Germany
figured it could not win the naval race against Britain, German leaders hoped that slowing the
naval construction could improve Anglo-German relations and increase the possibility of British
neutrality in a continental war (Jones, 1986, 134). Jones argues that the dtente explains why
Germany believed Britain would remain neutral, since British Foreign Secretary Grey sought to
reach a diplomatic solution with Germany, while failing to warn Germany that Britain would
support France if it was attacked (Jones, 1986, 141). So important was British neutrality, that
Bethmann Hollweg attempted to restrain Austria-Hungry from taking decisive action against
Serbia when he learned that Britain might side with France, that he sent six telegrams to Vienna
overnight on July 29th for an attempted halt in Belgrade (Jones, 1986, 144). Jones, concludes
that the dtente created confusion over the predictions that each side believed the other would
undertake, and combines this with offensive military strategies and mobilization schedules, that
led to WWI.
Political Scientist William Brian Moul writes that a country would be in a poor position if
it had neighbors to the east and west that formed a coalition (Moul, 1988, 253). This created an
insecurity in Germany, and historians and political scientist have argued that the French-Russian
alliance forced Germany to take aggressive actions to protect German security. Whether or not

15
Germany used this as a justification to pursue aggressive military policies to protect German
security, or policies to force a hegemonic war, is debated.
Scott Sagan argues that WWI occurred because of a dangerous mix of miscalculations
and escalations that resulted in a war that states were willing to risk but no one actually desired
(Sagan, 1986, 151). He goes on to say that it was a miscalculation that the great powers sought
offensive military doctrines when the military technologies of the time, like barbed wire, and
machine guns, should of favored the defense (Sagan, 1986, 152). He disagrees with the cult of
the offensive analysis, and that it misrepresents the causes of offensive doctrines and the
underlying causes of the war by overlooking the political objectives and alliance commitments of
the great powers (Sagan, 1986, 153). He distinguishes between preventive and preemptive war,
and the likely scenarios that might cause each one to take place. He believes that incentives to
launch preventive wars are increased when the balance of power shifts in the favor of a adversary
power, and when war is considered likely, preemptive incentives promote that it is better to strike
first, rather than wait be the victim of an offensive attack (Sagan, 1986, 155). Though he agrees
about the nature of the offensive military campaigns in 1914, he argues that the cult of the
offensive focuses on narrow issues of military planning, and it does not take into account the role
of political objectives in determining military doctrines. He believes that the root cause of the
offensive war plans by the major powers were to protect the minor allies. For example, Russia
needed an offensive capability against Austria-Hungry to protect the Serbians, and likewise,
Germany needed an offense capability to protect Austria-Hungry if Russia launched an attack
(Sagan, 1986, 163). The great powers had strategic interests in maintaining their alliances, which
led to offensive doctrines, and also conditions that led to rapid mobilization. As such, Sagan
argues that it is significant that the cult of the offense fails to relate the influence of strategic

16
alliances on military doctrines (Sagan, 1986, 166). He contends that an accurate analysis of WWI
must include that offensive biases produced offensive military doctrines and how strategic
interests, like the protection of allies, requires offensive military doctrine (Sagan, 1986, 172).
Stephen Walt develops a theory called the balance of threat theory, in which case states
seek to ally to balance against threats rather than just power. He argues that level of threat is
affected by geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intentions, all of which
were involved in the case of WWI (Walt, 1987, 5). He explains that states like France and Russia
ally because they put their survival at risk if they dont stop a state like Germany from achieving
regional hegemony. His balance of threat theory predicts that when a state like Germany appears
dangerous, states will form alliances and increase military policies to safeguard their security
against the threatening state (Walt, 1987, 263). Walt recognizes the importance of power, but his
theory explains that states tend to ally with or against the state that poses the greatest threat, not
power. For instance, German admiral Tirpitz risk theory rested on the logic that if Germany built
a naval fleet that posed a threat to Britains maritime supremacy, Britain could bandwagon with
Germany (Walt, 1987, 19). British foreign secretary Grey believed Germany possessed a level of
aggregate power that was a threat that Britain needed to respond to. Grey justified intervention
against Germany and Austria-Hungry by saying: To stand aside would mean the domination of
Germany; the subordination of France and Russia; the isolation of Britainand ultimately
Germany would wield the whole power of the continent (Walt, 1987, 22). In the balance of
threat theory, offensive power is influential in determining the level of threat a state possesses.
Britain viewed the German fleet as having an offensive threat, and strengthened both its naval
efforts as well their ties with France and Russia (Walt, 1987, 25). Whereas the balance of power

17
theory will say that status quo powers need to check the growing power of a potential hegemon,
balance of threat theories argue that the intention, not the power, of a state is important in
understanding whether states should balance against the threat. Walt makes it clear that the more
expansionists a state appears to be, the more likely an opposing coalition will be formed as a
result (Walt, 1987, 26).
Much of what has been debated between scholars revolves around the idea that WWI
occurred because Germanys actions threatening a shift in the balance of power system, and
European leaders failed to diplomatically stop a crisis from unfolding. Some blame Germany for
launching a war that caused Great Britain, France, and Russia to form defensive alliances, which
served to cause Germany to make plans to remove itself from an unfavorable position of being
encircled by enemies soon planning to launch a preemptive war. There are several scholars who
believe that Germany was dragged into a Balkan conflict between Austria-Hungry and Serbia. I
agree with Sean Lynn-Jones analysis that although Austria-Hungry had its reasons for attacking
Serbia, like the problem of nationalism, Germany was not forced into the war by its weaker ally,
and Germany highly encouraged Austria to take decisive action against the murder of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand. This is little historical evidence to support the claim that Germany was forced
into the war, other than Bethmann Hollweg sending telegrams for a halt in Belgrade. Several
scholars contend that Britain should bear some of the responsibility for the blame of the war
because they failed to communicate to Germany that they would defend France in case Germany
attacked it. Sean Lynn-Jones argues that if Britain had been more clearer, it would likely have
deterred Germany (Sagan, 1986, 144). The offensive realist, Keir Leiber argues that Germany
did not have fears of encirclement, and British neutrality did not much matter to them, because
they knew that their last chance for hegemony was to allow a continental war to commence . I

18
agree with his analysis, as he uses historical evidence to show that Germany did not act in a way
that would allow one to sufficiently claim that Germany tried to prevent war. Leiber writes that
German officials were motivated by a desire to expand and this undermines defensive realist
interpretations that WWI was the result of offensive military plans and conditions that created
security competition, expansion, and war (Leiber, 2007, 189). Similarly the cult of the offensive
theory does not have as much historical evidence to claim that Germany believed that war would
be short and successful. While German desires for hegemony accelerated the belief in militaristic
offensive plans and the Shliefflen Plan was created to succeed, the evidence shows that Germany
encouraged Austria-Hungry action against Serbia, knowing that Russia would mobilize, and
Germany could use the opportunity to aspire to hegemony in a war. Explaining the situation well,
John Mearsheimer, wrote in the The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, that, Given the difficulty
of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that
the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any
possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an
opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to
survive. (Mearsheimer, 2001). So did the shift in balance of power make WWI inevitable? I do
not believe so, and this should give international relations scholars relief, because there are many
historical cases, where there has been a shift in the power that did not result in war. In summary,
I agree with the offensive realists, that WWI occurred because Germany, in seeking to put their
interest first, sought to become a regional hegemon, and European states responded with
offensive military strategies that undermined attempts at diplomatic mediation, and caused war to
break out.

19

Bibliography
Berghahn, V.R. 1973. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914. New York: St. Martins Press.
Craig, Gordon A. 2008. Tact and Intelligence: Essays on Diplomatic History and International
Relations. Palo Alto, CA: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship.
Evera Van, Stephen. 1984. The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War.
International Security 9(1): 58-107.
Kagan, Donald. 1995. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Anchor
Books.
Kennedy, Paul M. 1984. The First World War and the International Power System.
International Security 9(1): 7-40.
Kennedy, Paul M. 1973. German World Policy and the Alliance Negotiations with England,
1897-1900. The Journal of Modern History 45(4): 605-625.

20
Leiber, Keir A. 2007. The New History of World War I and What It Means for International
Relations Theory. International Security 32(2): 155-191.
Lynn-Jones, Sean M. 1986. Dtente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations, 1911-1914.
International Security 11(2): 121-150.
Midlawsky, Manus I. 1981. Equilibria in the Nineteenth-Century Balance-of-Power System.
American Journal of Political Science 25(2): 270-296.
Moul, William Brian. 1988. Balances of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes
among the European Great Powers, 1815-1939: Some Evidence. American Journal of Political
Science 32(2): 241-275.
Papayoanou, Paul M. 1996. Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain,
Germany, and World War I. International Security 20(4): 42-76.
Synder, Jack and Keir A. Leiber, 2008. Defensive Realism and the New History of World War
I. International Security 33(1): 174-194.
Synder, Jack. 1984. Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984.
International Security 9(1): 108-146.
Sagan, Scott D. 1986. 1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability. International Security
11(2): 151-175.
Snyder, Jack. 1984. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters
of 1914. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Turner, L.C.F. 1970. Origins of the First World War. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.
Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.