Professional Documents
Culture Documents
TORTS and
DAMAGES
First Sem Cases
2 | Page
3 | Page
4 | Page
The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in
a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
FACTS:
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by Dy Teban Trading, Inc. (DTT) along
the National Highway going to Surigao City while a Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising
on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked primer
mover with a trailer, owned by Liberty Frost, Inc. The night before, this primer suffered a tire
blowout and its driver, Cresilito Limbaga, parked the vehicle askew, occupying a substantial
portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. To avoid hitting the
primer, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching
Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus.
He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit
the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national
highway.
RULING:
YES. The test of negligence is objective. The SC measured the act or omission of the
tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as
applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same
situation. The Court found that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover
askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of
the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road
with its left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and
gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime
mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent
upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it. Limbaga
also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked prime
mover. He did not immediately inform his employer, private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.,
5 | Page
FACTS:
For failure of Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) to settle its
delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City Government of Tagaytay offered the two
parcels of land registered in the name of TTDC for sale at public auction. Being the only
bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of City of Tagaytay. Later on, Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera and Emilina Melencio-Fernando (Melencios) purchased the subject
properties from the City of Tagaytay. TTTDC filed a petition for the nullification of the public
auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the properties were not within
the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing authority. The Melencios
were not Impleaded despite the fact that they purchased the same. The RTC and the CA
decided in favor of TTTDC. Thus, the public auction over the subject properties was annulled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Tagaytay was negligent.
RULING:
YES. In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain
property for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its territorial
jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to know such basic principle of law. The failure of
the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying
taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence. Accordingly, the City of Tagaytay is liable to
return the full amount paid by the Melencios during the auction sale of the subject properties
by way of actual damages.
6 | Page
7 | Page
When a contractual relation exists, the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties.
FACTS:
Khristine Regino was a first year computer science student at Pangasinan Colleges of
Science and Technology. PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and
Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's
tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of
P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who
purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were
denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. As Regino is poor, she refused to pay
the tickets. During the scheduled dates of her final examinations in logic and statistics, her
teachers allegedly disallowed her from taking the same on the ground of Reginos nonpayment of the tickets. Regino, as a pauper litigant, filed a complaint for damages against
PCST and the respective teachers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSCT may be held liable for torts.
RULING:
YES. Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a
contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an
existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a
tort. The Court ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, A perusal of Article 2176 of the Civil Code shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso the
private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class
seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of
carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even
if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN M. BAKING
G.R. No. 156037, 25 May 2007, J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
8 | Page
9 | Page
10 | P a g e
11 | P a g e
12 | P a g e
Facts:
Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) engaged the services Sorsogon Branch of the Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida
Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing Quezon City reading: "Send check money
Mommy hospital." because their mother, Editha, was confined in a hospital. Three days
after, no response was received from Zenaida. Grace sent another letter to Zenaida, thru JRS
Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending money. Zenaida said she did not received
any telegram. The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later. On April 17,
1992, Editha died. Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against
RCPI before RTC of Sorsogon for damages alleging that the delay in delivering the telegram
contributed to the early death of Editha. RCPI answered alleging that any delay in the
sending of the telegram was due to force majeure. The RTC rendered judgment against RCPI
ordering RCPI to pay moral damages plus attorneys fees. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC
Issue:
Whether or not award of damages was proper even if the RTC found that there was
no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts.
Ruling:
YES. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of
contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-respondents. Article 1170 of
the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.
13 | P a g e
The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include
his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being
put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, or
his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance
on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract
not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. The effect of every infraction is to
create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the
failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence or of the attendance of fortuitous
event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest
possible time. It took 25 days for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically,
the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or
reception of the telegraphic message. For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is
necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned
the loss. Ones negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and
injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a
fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other
words, there must be an exclusion of human intervention from the cause of injury or loss.
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the
telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the nontransmission and the non-delivery so that she could have taken steps to remedy the
situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
14 | P a g e
15 | P a g e
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from
a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an
action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
Facts:
Modesto Calaunan (Calaunan), together with his driver Marcelo Mendoza (Mendoza),
was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine
Rabbit Bus, owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) and driven by Mauricio
Manliclic (Manliclic), was also bound for Manila from Tarlac. The two vehicles collided in
Plaridel, Bulacan. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the
jeep. Calaunan suffered minor injuries while Mendoza was unhurt. During the trial of the civil
case for damages, Calaunan and Mendoza alleged the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60
to 70 kph when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking
the jeep hitting the rear of the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the
back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Manliclic explained that when the Philippine Rabbit
bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left.
PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically Manliclic.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Calaunan and against Manliclic and PRBLI.
On appeal, the CA, finding no reversible error in the decision of the RTC, affirmed it in all
respects.
Issue:
Whether or not Manlilic and PRBLI can be held solidarily liable for damages because
of the collision.
16 | P a g e
YES. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. In
other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However,
if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on
the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of,
civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any,
may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). It was
petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the
collision. Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash
up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only
by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. Under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection
or both.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. For failure to adduce
proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages
caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
17 | P a g e
18 | P a g e
19 | P a g e
20 | P a g e
FACTS:
Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by
the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle. The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck. RTC rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant
and absolved Calalas of liability. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490),
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 held Salva and
his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. CA reversed the
judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage.
RULING:
YES. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490,
finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be
binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in
cases of death or injury to passengers.Thus, the decision of the CA was affirmed with
modification.
LAMBERT S. RAMOS v. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
21 | P a g e
22 | P a g e
23 | P a g e
24 | P a g e
25 | P a g e
26 | P a g e
27 | P a g e
28 | P a g e
29 | P a g e
30 | P a g e
31 | P a g e
32 | P a g e
33 | P a g e
34 | P a g e
35 | P a g e
36 | P a g e
37 | P a g e
38 | P a g e
39 | P a g e
40 | P a g e
41 | P a g e
42 | P a g e
Abes, Ybanez , Bonto, Bumagat, and Silvano were charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide for the death of Antonio Calaycay. Abes et al. denied the
allegation but the trial court disbelieved the defense, but found them guilty. Trial court also
awarded Civil indemnity, P320,300.00 for actual damages, temperate damages and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. CA affirmed the decision but modified the amount
of actual damages because of the unavailability of receipts to support the claim.
Issue:
Whether or not the modification of award of actual damages is proper.
Ruling:
YES.
The amount of P320,300.00 was awarded by the trial court as actual damages, which
include: the hospital bill from the De La Salle University Medical Center for P1,300.00, the
43 | P a g e
Leonides C. Dio alleged in her complaint that Lina Jardines executed in her favor a
Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro over a parcel of land but the transaction actually entered
into by the parties was one of simple loan and the Deed of Sale with Pacto de
Retro executed just as a security for the loan. Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended
Complaint adding prayer for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation. RTC, among others, ordered Jardines to pay actual and/or compensatory damages
to the plaintiff. However, CA reversed and deleted the award of damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Dio is entitled to actual and/or compensatory damages
Ruling:
NO. In the present case, the RTCs award for actual damages is a plain error because
a reading of said trial courts Decision readily discloses that there is no sufficient evidence
on record to prove that Dio is entitled to the same. Dios only evidence to prove her claim
for actual damages is her testimony that she has spent P3,000.00 in going to and from
respondents place to try to collect payment and that she spent P1,000.00 every time she
travels from Bulacan, where she resides, to Baguio in order to attend the hearings. In People
44 | P a g e
45 | P a g e
The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
Facts:
Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of Atlantic Gulf, was
at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard. The men
were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. Some of them were also in front, hauling by
a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car
either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught Rakes, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee. In two particulars, Rakes is charged with
carelessness: First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work;
and Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along
the boards, either before or behind it.
Issue:
Whether or not Rakes contributory negligence bars him from recovering.
Ruling:
46 | P a g e
Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the
last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.
Facts:
47 | P a g e
48 | P a g e
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use
outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer
contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for
personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer.
Facts:
Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle and Benjamin Abad manager of
Castilex Industrial, registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. They collided with each
other causing severe injuries because the latter overlapped the formers path. Vasquez died.
Sps Vasquez, parents of the deceased filed a suit. RTC ruled in favor of the spouses and
ordered Abad and Castilex Industrial to pay damages. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Castilex is vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by Abad of a company-issued vehicle outside working hours.
Ruling:
NO. Article 2180, par. 4 and 5, applies to employers. Par. 4, to owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise and Par. 5, to employers in general, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry. Par. 4 covers negligent acts of employees committed
either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the Par. 5
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
AMJUR principles: xxx (3)Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours: An
employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of
regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the
vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the
employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started
the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has
not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime and thereafter went
to Goldie's Restaurant, which is about seven km away from the place of business. At the
Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD
was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. To the mind of this Court,
ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line
with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2am, way
beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended and his overtime work
had already been completed. His being at a place which was known as a "haven for
49 | P a g e
The concept of a mechanics lien is articulated in Article 1731: He who has executed
work upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid. The
mechanics lien is akin to a contractors or warehousemans lien in that by way of pledge,
the repairman has the right to retain possession of the movable until he is paid. However,
the right of retention is conditioned upon the execution of work upon the movable. The
creation of a mechanic's lien does not depend upon the owner's nonpayment. Rather, the
contractor "creates" his or her own lien by performing the work or furnishing the materials.
Facts:
Tan brought the subject truck to Optimum for body repair and painting. Pea
introduced himself as the owner and manager of Optimum. Tan verbally contracted with
Pea for the repair of the damaged portions of the truck, repainting and upholstery
replacement. Then she discovered that Optimum had already vacated its shop in Del Monte
and that her truck was nowhere to be found. Later, she learned that Optimum had
transferred to a new location but her still unrepaired truck was found in Valenzuela City. RTC
ordered the seizure of the said vehicle. RTC rendered a decision in favour of Tan and held
Optimum liable for damages for its failure to execute its part of the contract on time,
pursuant to Article 1170 of the Civil Code. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Optimum is liable for damages.
Ruling:
YES. The concept of a mechanics lien is articulated in Article 1731: He who has
executed work upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid. The
mechanics lien is akin to a contractors or warehousemans lien in that by way of pledge,
the repairman has the right to retain possession of the movable until he is paid. However,
the right of retention is conditioned upon the execution of work upon the movable. The
creation of a mechanic's lien does not depend upon the owner's nonpayment. Rather, the
contractor "creates" his or her own lien by performing the work or furnishing the materials.
As a result of the failure to accomplish the repairs on the truck, the right to retain the
truck in accordance with Article 1731 did not arise. Optimums continuous possession or
50 | P a g e
51 | P a g e