University of Santo Tomas

Digested by: DC 2016

Members
Editors: Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Luigi Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier

TORTS and
DAMAGES
First Sem Cases

Torts and Damages

Table of Contents
1. Cang vs. Cullen, 605 SCRA
391.3
2. Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Ching, 543 SCRA
560...3
3. City Government of Tagaytay vs. Guerrero, 600 SCRA
33..4
4. Schmitz Transport vs. Transport Venture, Inc., 456 SCRA
557...5
5. Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges, 443 SCRA
56....6
6. Mercury Drug vs. Baking, 523 SCRA
184...6
7. Capili vs. Cardana, 506 SCRA
569...7
8. Cantre vs. Go, 522 SCRA
547..8
9. Bontilao vs. Gerona, 630 SCRA
561...9
10.RCPI vs. Verchez, 481 SCRA
384...10
11.Mindex Resources Development Corp. vs. Morillo, 379 SCRA
150.11
12.Manliclic vs. Calaunan, 512 SCRA
642..12
13.BPI vs. Reynald R. Suarez, G.R. No. 167750, March 15,
2010...13
14.Ocean Builders Construction Corp. Vs. Cubacub, 648 SCRA
605..14
15.Equitable PCI Bank vs. Ong, 502 SCRA
11915
16.Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA
356..16
17.Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation, 597 SCRA
52617
18.Universal Aquarius vs. Q.C. Human Resources, 533 SCRA
38.18
19.Mercury Drug vs. Huang, 525 SCRA
427..19
20.Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana, 513 SCRA
47820
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21.Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom, 388 SCRA
445..20
22.PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., 557
SCRA 141.21
23.OMC Carriers, Inc. vs. Nabua, 622 SCRA
624....22
24.Estacion vs. Bernardo, 483 SCRA
222...23
25.Mercury Drug vs. Huang, 525 SCRA 427..
...23
26.Heirs of Redentor Completo vs. Albayda, Jr. 624 SCRA
97..24
27.Pacis vs. Morales, 613 SCRA
607..24
28.Loadmasters vs. Glodel Brokerage, 639 SCRA
69..25
29.Manaloto vs. Veloso III, 632 SCRA
347.26
30.Titus B. Villanueva vs. Emma M. Rosqueta, G.R. No. 180764, Jan. 19,
201027
31.Republic vs. Lacap, 517 SCRA
255...28
32.Uy vs. Public Estate Authority, 589 SCRA
1...29
33.Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 596 SCRA
57.30
34.Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 599 SCRA
594..30
35.Vinsons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp., 525 SCRA
11..31
36.Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Janiola, 591 SCRA
466....32
37.Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA
12232
38.Po Chan vs. Pizarro, 467 SCRA
1..33
39.AC Enterprises vs. Frabelle Properties Corp., 506 SCRA
625.34
40.City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr., 455 SCRA
308..35
41.Smart Communications vs. Astorga, 542 SCRA
434.36

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Torts and Damages

42.People vs. Abes, 420 SCRA
259..36
43.Dio vs. Jardines, 481 SCRA
226..37
44.B.F. Metal (Corporation) vs. Lomotan, 551 SCRA
618.38
45.Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf, 7 Phil.
359..39
46.Mckee vs. IAC, 211 SCRA
517.40
47.Castilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vasquez, Jr., 321 SCRA
393....41
48.Optimum Motor Center Corporation vs. Tan, 558 SCRA
267..42

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Torts and Damages

TORTS AND DAMAGES

STEPHEN CANG AND GEORGE NARDO Y JOSOL v. HERMINIA CULLEN
G.R. No. 163078, 25 November 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.
Negligence is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that circumstances justly demand.
Facts:
Nardo was operating a taxi when Saycon, who was travelling on a motorcycle without
protective headgear, veered into his lane and bumped him. After the impact, Nardo drove
back to help Saycon, two traffic enforcers ordered Nardo to take Saycon to the hospital. No
sketch of the accident was done by the enforcers. Saycon claims that it was Nardo that
sideswept him and that Nardo tried to speed away until he was flagged down by peace
officers. Cullen, the employer of Saycon, shouldered the hospital expenses of Saycon and is
now claiming damages from Nardo and Cang, the owner of the taxi. The RTC dismissed the
case stating that Cullen is not entitled to damages. The CA reversed the RTC decision
claiming that the RTC did not give credit to a witness account of the accident.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages to respondent
Ruling:
YES. Saycon was operating the motor vehicle as a student-driver without being
accompanied by a duly licensed driver. Article 2185 provides that it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. Negligence is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to
others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that
circumstances justly demand.
To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, the Supreme Court laid
down this test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. Saycon was
negligent since he should not have been driving alone. The law requires that the holder of a
student-drivers permit should be accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating a
motor vehicle. Further, he was not wearing a helmet and he was speeding. All these prove
that he was negligent.
Neither can Cullen as Saycons employer be entitled to claim damages. Cullen was
negligent in the selection and supervision of her employee. When an employee causes
damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris
tantum presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance
of the diligence of a good father of a family. The fact that Saycon was driving alone is proof

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enough that Cullen was negligent. Either she did not know that he only had a students
permit or she allowed him to drive alone knowing this deficiency.
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC. vs. JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY FOREST, INC., et al.
G.R. No. 161803, February 4, 2008, J. Reyes, R.T.

The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in
a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

FACTS:
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by Dy Teban Trading, Inc. (DTT) along
the National Highway going to Surigao City while a Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising
on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked primer
mover with a trailer, owned by Liberty Frost, Inc. The night before, this primer suffered a tire
blowout and its driver, Cresilito Limbaga, parked the vehicle askew, occupying a substantial
portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. To avoid hitting the
primer, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching
Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus.
He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit
the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national
highway.
RULING:

YES. The test of negligence is objective. The SC measured the act or omission of the
tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as
applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same
situation. The Court found that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover
askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of
the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road
with its left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and
gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime
mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent
upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it. Limbaga
also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked prime
mover. He did not immediately inform his employer, private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc.,

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that the prime mover suffered two tire blowouts and that he could not have them fixed
because he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling for help, Limbaga took it upon himself
to simply place banana leaves on the front and rear of the prime mover to serve as warning
to oncoming motorists. Worse, Limbaga slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard
beside the vehicle. By his own account, Limbaga was sleeping on the prime mover at the
time of the collision and that he was only awakened by the impact of the Nissan van and the
passenger bus on the prime mover.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY vs. ELEUTERIO GUERRERO, et al.

G.R. No. 140743 & 140745, September 17, 2009, J. Nachura

Negligence is the failure to observe protection of the interests of another person,

that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Thus, negligence is the want of care required
under circumstances.

FACTS:
For failure of Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) to settle its
delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City Government of Tagaytay offered the two
parcels of land registered in the name of TTDC for sale at public auction. Being the only
bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of City of Tagaytay. Later on, Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera and Emilina Melencio-Fernando (Melencios) purchased the subject
properties from the City of Tagaytay. TTTDC filed a petition for the nullification of the public
auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the properties were not within
the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing authority. The Melencios
were not Impleaded despite the fact that they purchased the same. The RTC and the CA
decided in favor of TTTDC. Thus, the public auction over the subject properties was annulled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Tagaytay was negligent.
RULING:

YES. In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain
property for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its territorial
jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to know such basic principle of law. The failure of
the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying
taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence. Accordingly, the City of Tagaytay is liable to
return the full amount paid by the Melencios during the auction sale of the subject properties
by way of actual damages.

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Torts and Damages

The gross negligence of the City of Tagaytay in levying taxes and auctioning
properties to answer for real property tax deficiencies outside its territorial jurisdiction
amounts to bad faith that calls for the award of moral damages. Moral damages are meant
to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount
must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted.

SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION vs. TRANSPORT VENTURE,

INC., et al.
G.R. No. 150255, April 22, 2005, J. Carpio-Morales
The principle embodied in the Act of God Doctrine strictly requires that the act
must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded
from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in
part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect
or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God.
FACTS:
SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from Russia on board a vessel owned by
respondent Black Sea Shipping Corporation 545 hot rolled steel sheets in coil. The cargoes
which were to be discharged at the port of Manila in favor of consignee Little Giant Steel
Pipe Corp. were insured under a Marine Insurance Policy. Schmitz Transport & Brokerage
Corporation, whose services the consignee engaged to secure clearances, was to receive the
cargoes and deliver them to a warehouse in Rizal. In turn, Schmitz engaged the services of
Transport Venture, Inc. (TVI) to send a barge and tugboat at shipside. After unloading the
coils from the vessel unto the barge, no tugboat pulled the latter to the pier despite the
oncoming inclement weather. Due to strong waves, the crew of the barge abandoned the
same, and it later on capsized, washing the coils to sea.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the loss of the cargoes was due to a fortuitous event.
RULING:
NO. That no tugboat was towed back to the pier after the cargoes were completely
loaded by 12:30 in the morning is, however, a material fact which the appellate court failed
to properly consider and appreciatethe proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes. Had the
barge been towed back promptly to the pier, the deteriorating sea conditions
notwithstanding, the loss could have been avoided. But the barge was left floating in open
sea until big waves set in at 5:30 a.m., causing it to sink along with the cargoes. The loss
thus falls outside the "act of God doctrine." TVIs failure to promptly provide a tugboat did
not only increase the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside
operation, but was the proximate cause of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not
leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a considerable number of hours, at such a
precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing that the barge does not have any power of its
own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea. That it was nighttime and,

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therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be charging overtime pay did not
excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat.
KHRISTINE REGINO vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGESOF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, et
al.
G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004, J. Panganiban

When a contractual relation exists, the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties.

FACTS:
Khristine Regino was a first year computer science student at Pangasinan Colleges of
Science and Technology. PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and
Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's
tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of
P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who
purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were
denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. As Regino is poor, she refused to pay
the tickets. During the scheduled dates of her final examinations in logic and statistics, her
teachers allegedly disallowed her from taking the same on the ground of Reginos nonpayment of the tickets. Regino, as a pauper litigant, filed a complaint for damages against
PCST and the respective teachers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSCT may be held liable for torts.
RULING:
YES. Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a
contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an
existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a
tort. The Court ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, A perusal of Article 2176 of the Civil Code shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso the
private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class
seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of
carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even
if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN M. BAKING
G.R. No. 156037, 25 May 2007, J. Sandoval-Gutierrez

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Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. It is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
Facts.
Respondent Sebastian Baking, after a medical checkup with Dr. Sy, was prescribed a
medicine called Diamicron for his blood sugar. Baking bought the prescribed medicines in
Mercury Drug Alabang Branch but the saleslady apparently misread the prescription for
Diamicron as Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware that what was given to him was
the wrong medicine, Baking took the medicine on three consecutive days. On the third day,
he figured in a vehicular accident because he fell asleep while driving. Baking filed a
complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
Issue.
Whether or not petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of respondents accident.
Held.
YES. Petitioners argument that the proximate cause of the accident was
respondents negligence in driving his car is untenable. Proximate cause is defined as any
cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause
is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common
sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had
petitioners employee been careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent
effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep
while driving his car, resulting in a collision.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages
caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the
employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such
selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee. Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI v. SPOUSES DOMINADOR and ROSALITA CARDANA
G.R. No. 157906, 2 November 2006, J. Quisumbing
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Facts.

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Torts and Damages

While Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of San Roque
Elementary School, a branch of caimito tree located within the schools premises fell on her,
causing her instantaneous death. Her parents filed a complaint for damages before the RTC,
alleging that a resident of the barangay had already reported on the possible danger the
tree posed to passersby. The resident even pointed to petitioner Joaquinita Capili, the school
principal, the tree that stood near the principals office. The Cardaas averred that
petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and belied the claim that she knew that the tree was dead
and rotting.
Issue.
Whether or not the petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of respondents
daughter.
Held.
YES, the probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm
someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was
tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the
school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling
branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her
position. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has
to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead
and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious
danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as
to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained
of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree
which caused the death of respondents daughter was a result of petitioners negligence,
being in charge of the school.
DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE v. SPS. JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. GO
G.R. No. 160889 April 27, 2007 QUISUMBING. J.
In any case, given the particular circumstances of this case, a ruling on the
negligence of petitioner may be made based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even in the
absence of such additional exhibits.
Facts:
Nora Go gave birth to her 4th child. Two hours later, she suffered profuse bleeding
inside her womb due to some placenta parts which were not completely expelled after
delivery. She then suffered hypovolemic shock, so her BP dropped to 40/0. Dr. Milagros
Cantre, an Ob-Gyne specialist and Noras attending physician, together with an assisting

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resident physician, performed various medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to
restore Noras BP. While Dr. Cantre was massaging Noras uterus for it to contract and stop
bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. At that time, she was
unconscious.
While in the recovery room, Noras husband John David noticed a fresh gaping wound
(2 1/2 x 3 1/2 in) in the inner portion of her left arm near the armpit. John David filed a
request for investigation. Dr. Cantre said that what caused the injury was the blood pressure
cuff. John David brought Nora to the NBI for a physical examination. The medico-legal said
that the injury appeared to be a burn and that a droplight when placed near the skin for
about 10 minutes could cause such burn. He dismissed the likelihood that the wound was
caused by a blood pressure cuff since the scar was not around the arm, but just on one side
of the arm. Noras injury was referred to a plastic surgeon for skin grafting. However, her
arm would never be the samethe surgery left an unsightly scar, her movements are
restricted, and the injured arm aches at the slightest touch.
Sps. Go filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Cantre, the medical director, and
the hospital. In the RTC, parties have rested their respective cases, but the court admitted
additional exhibits [consist mostly of medical records produced by the hospital during trial
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum] offered by Sps. Go, which were not testified to by any
witness. RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA affirmed RTC with modification (complaint
dismissed with respect to the medical director and the hospital; only moral damages
awarded).
Issues:
Whether or not Dr. Cantre is liable for the injury suffered by Nora Go.
Ruling:
YES. In medical negligence cases, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere
existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur:
1.)Accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur absent someones negligence. The
wound not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby; could not have happened
unless negligence set in somewhere; 2.) It is caused by an instrumentality
within defendants exclusive control. It doesnt matter whether the injury was caused by the
droplight or by the blood pressure cuff, since both are within the exclusive control of the
physician in charge [Dr. Cantre] under the captain of the ship doctrine (surgeon in charge of
an operation is held liable for his assistants negligence during the time when they are under
the surgeons control); 3.) Possibility of contributing conduct which would make plaintiff
responsible is eliminated. The wound could only be caused by something external to and
outside the control of Nora since she was unconscious while in hypervolemic shock.
SPS. ALFREDO BONTILAO AND SHERLINA BONTILAO v. DR. CARLOS GERONA
G.R. No. 176675 September 15, 2010 VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In other words, as held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the real question is whether
or not in the process of the operation, any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of
the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of professional activity
in such operations, and which, if unexplained, would themselves reasonably speak to the
average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.
Facts:

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Allen Key, 8-year old son of Alfredo and Sherlina, was treated by Dr. Carlos for a
fractured right wrist. He administered a U-splint on Allen Key then sent him home. Then,
Allen refracted the same wrist, where x-ray examination showed a complete fracture and
displacement of the bone. Dr. Carlos then performed a closed reduction procedure with Dr.
Vicente as anaesthesiologist. After the post-reduction x-ray showed that the bones were
properly aligned, Allen was sent home with instruction to bring him for re-tightening not
later than June 15, 1992. Because no retightening happened, a rotational deformity had
developed in Allens arm, caused by a re-displacement of the bone fragments, necessitating
an open reduction surgery by Dr. Carlos as surgeon and again Dr. Vicente as
anaesthesiologist. After five attempts, Dr. Vicente failed to intubate Allen Key, so
anaesthesia was administered through a gas mask. When Dr. Carlos asked if the operation
should continue with the failure to intubate, Dr. Vicente gave the go-ahead. Dr. Carlos
checked if Allen Key was breathing properly before proceeding with the surgery. Sherlina
went out temporarily to make a telephone call when she saw Dr. Carlos about to finish the
suturing, but was informed that her son died at the operating table due to asphyxia due to
congestion and edema of the epiglottis. Allen Keys parents then filed criminal and
administrative charges against Dr. Carlos and Dr. Vicente, as well as instituted a civil case
for damages against both doctors, alleging incompetence and negligence in the
performance of their duty.
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Carlos is negligent in the performance of his duty.
Ruling:
NO. The petitioners failed to present substantial evidence of any specific act of
negligence on respondents part or of the surrounding facts and circumstances which would
lead to the reasonable inference that the untoward consequence was caused by
respondents negligence. In fact, under the established facts, respondent appears to have
observed the proper amount of care required under the circumstances. Respondent verified
that Allen was still breathing by looking at his chest to check that there was excursion before
proceeding with the surgery. That respondent decided to continue with the surgery even
though there was a failure to intubate also does not tend to establish liability, contrary to the
trial courts ruling. Petitioners failed to present substantial proof that intubation was an
indispensable prerequisite for the operation and that it would be grave error for any surgeon
to continue with the operation under such circumstances. In fact, the testimony of the
expert witness presented by the prosecution in the criminal proceedings and admitted into
evidence at the RTC, was even to the effect that the anesthesia could be administered by
alternative means such as a mask and that the operation could proceed even without
intubation.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) v. ALFONSO VERCHEZ,

GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND
FORTUNATO CATIBOG
G.R. No. 164349, January 31, 2006, CARPIO MORALES, J.

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In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure
of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the
obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind
of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A
breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that
which may have been lost or suffered.

Facts:

Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) engaged the services Sorsogon Branch of the Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida
Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing Quezon City reading: "Send check money
Mommy hospital." because their mother, Editha, was confined in a hospital. Three days
after, no response was received from Zenaida. Grace sent another letter to Zenaida, thru JRS
Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending money. Zenaida said she did not received
any telegram. The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later. On April 17,
1992, Editha died. Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against
RCPI before RTC of Sorsogon for damages alleging that the delay in delivering the telegram
contributed to the early death of Editha. RCPI answered alleging that any delay in the
sending of the telegram was due to force majeure. The RTC rendered judgment against RCPI
ordering RCPI to pay moral damages plus attorneys fees. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC

Issue:

Whether or not award of damages was proper even if the RTC found that there was
no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts.

Ruling:

YES. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of
contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-respondents. Article 1170 of
the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.

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The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include
his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being
put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, or
his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance
on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract
not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. The effect of every infraction is to
create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the
failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence or of the attendance of fortuitous
event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.

In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest
possible time. It took 25 days for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically,
the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or
reception of the telegraphic message. For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is
necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned
the loss. Ones negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and
injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a
fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other
words, there must be an exclusion of human intervention from the cause of injury or loss.
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the
telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the nontransmission and the non-delivery so that she could have taken steps to remedy the
situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.

MINDEX RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT v. EPHRAIM MORILLO

G.R. No. 138123, March 12, 2002, PANGANIBAN, J.
In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one
has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. Ones
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or
injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found
to be partly the result of a persons participation -whether by active intervention, neglect or
failure to act- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to
acts of God.
Facts:

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Ephraim Morillo (Morillo) leased his ten-wheeler cargo truck to Mindex Resources
Corporation (Mindex) for its mining operations. The truck was burned by unidentified
persons while it was parked unattended at Sitio Aras, Bigaan, San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro,
due to mechanical trouble. Upon learning of the burning incident, Morillo offered to sell the
truck to Mindex but the latter refused. Instead, it replaced the vehicles burned tires and had
it towed to a shop for repair and overhauling. The parties had since remained
uncompromising, Morillo pulled out the truck from the repair shop of Mindex and had it
repaired elsewhere. Morillo filed a complaint for damages against Mindex. The RTC found
Mindex responsible for the destruction or loss of the truck and ordered it to pay damages
plus interest. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that the burning of the subject
truck was impossible to foresee, but not impossible to avoid.
Issues:
Whether or not Mindex is liable to Morillo because of its negligence.
Ruling:
YES. Mindex was negligent and thus liable for the loss or destruction of the leased
truck. True, both parties may have suffered from the burning of the truck; however, as found
by both lower courts, the negligence of Mindex makes it responsible for the loss. Article
1667 of the Civil Code holds lessees responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing
leased, unless they prove that it took place without their fault. This often-invoked doctrine
of "fortuitous event" or "caso fortuito" has become a convenient and easy defense to
exculpate an obligor from liability. To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements
must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be
impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from
any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. Article 1174 of the Civil Code states
that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or,
though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an exclusion of human
intervention from the cause of injury or loss.
A review of the records clearly shows that Mindex failed to exercise reasonable care
and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation.
Mindex failed to employ reasonable foresight, diligence and care that would have exempted
it from liability resulting from the burning of the truck. Negligence, as commonly
understood, is that conduct that naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to
others. It may be a failure to observe that degree of care, precaution or vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand; or to do any other act that would be done by a prudent and
reasonable person, who is guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs.

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. v. MODESTO

CALAUNAN
G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

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A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from
a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an
action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.

Facts:

Modesto Calaunan (Calaunan), together with his driver Marcelo Mendoza (Mendoza),
was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine
Rabbit Bus, owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) and driven by Mauricio
Manliclic (Manliclic), was also bound for Manila from Tarlac. The two vehicles collided in
Plaridel, Bulacan. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the
jeep. Calaunan suffered minor injuries while Mendoza was unhurt. During the trial of the civil
case for damages, Calaunan and Mendoza alleged the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60
to 70 kph when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking
the jeep hitting the rear of the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the
back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Manliclic explained that when the Philippine Rabbit
bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left.
PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically Manliclic.

The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Calaunan and against Manliclic and PRBLI.
On appeal, the CA, finding no reversible error in the decision of the RTC, affirmed it in all
respects.

Issue:

Whether or not Manlilic and PRBLI can be held solidarily liable for damages because
of the collision.

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Ruling:

YES. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. In
other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However,
if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on
the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of,
civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any,
may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). It was
petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the
collision. Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash
up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only
by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. Under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection
or both.

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. For failure to adduce
proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages
caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. REYNALD R. SUAREZ

G.R. No. 167750, March 15, 2010, CARPIO, J.

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The following are the conditions for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an
injury whether physical, mental or psychological clearly sustained by the claimant; (2)
the culpable act or omission is factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Reynald Suarez (Suarez) had savings and current accounts with
petitioner BPI Ermita Branch from 1988 to 1997. Suarez client purchased several parcels of
land in Tagaytay City. Suarezs client deposited a RCBC check worth P19, 129,100,
representing the total consideration of the sales, in BPI Pasong Tamo Branch to be credited
to Suarezs current account in BPI Ermita Branch. Suarez instructed his secretary,
(Garaygay), to confirm from BPI whether the RCBC check was already credited to his account
that same day. According to Garaygay, BPI allegedly confirmed the same-day crediting of the
RCBC check. Then, Suarez issued on the same day five checks for the payment of the
Tagaytay properties. The BPI dishonored the five checks Suarez issued due to insufficiency of
funds and his current account had been debited a total of P57, 200 as penalty for the
dishonor. Suarez sent a letter to BPI demanding an apology and the reversal of the charges
debited from his account. BPI offered to reverse the penalty charges but denied Suarezs
claim for damages. Suarez rejected BPIs offer.
Suarez filed with the RTC a complaint for damages claiming that BPI mishandled his
account through negligence. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Suarez. The CA affirmed
in toto the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Suarez is entitled for actual and moral damages for the negligence of
BPI.
Ruling:
NO. Negligence is defined as "the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent man and reasonable man could
not do." The question concerning BPI's negligence, however, depends on whether BPI indeed
confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC checks face value to Suarezs BPI account.
Based on the records, there is no sufficient evidence to show that BPI conclusively confirmed
the same-day crediting of the RCBC check which Suarezs client deposited late on 16 June
1997. Garaygay failed to (1) identify and name the alleged BPI employee, and (2) establish
that this particular male employee was authorized by BPI either to disclose any information
regarding a depositors bank account to a person other than the depositor over the
telephone, or to assure Garaygay that Suarez could issue checks totaling the face value of
the RCBC check. Accordingly, BPI was not estopped from dishonoring the checks for
inadequacy of available funds in Suarezs account since the RCBC check remained uncleared
at that time.
In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury was proximately
caused by the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks. Proximate cause has been
defined as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have
occurred." There is nothing in Suarezs testimony which convincingly shows that the
erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or
social injuries.

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On the award of actual damages, the Court found the same without any basis.
Considering that BPI legally dishonored the checks for being drawn against uncollected
deposit, BPI was justified in debiting the penalty charges against Suarezs account.
OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., and/or DENNIS HAO v. SPOUSES
ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB
G.R. No. 150898 April 13, 2011 CARPIO MORALES, J.
To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz:
(1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation.
FACTS:
Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by Ocean Builders
Construction Corp. (OBCC) in Caloocan City. Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was
thus advised by Dennis Hao, the companys general manager, to rest for three days which
he did. Three days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores. Later in the afternoon,
however, he asked a co-worker to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could
rest. Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered the co-worker to instead bring Bladimir to the
nearest hospital. Bladimirs parents- Spouses Cubacub arrived at the hospital and
transferred Bladimir to another hospital where he was placed in the intensive care unit and
died the following day. Spouses Cubacub filed before RTC at Capas a complaint for damages
against OBCC and Hao alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the
deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his death. RTC dismissed the complaint.
However, it was reversed by the CA on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Dennis Hao was negligent.
RULING:
NO. The present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee
relationship being merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts,
three elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation.
The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to
provide adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code,
failing which a breach is committed. As found by the trial court and borne by the records,
petitioner Haos advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him
brought to the nearest hospital constituted adequate and immediate medical attendance
that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency. AT ALL
EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the
death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result
would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to
act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the
injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act
or omission. Thus, the petition was granted.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK (the Banking Entity into which Philippine Commercial
International Bank was merged) v. ROWENA ONG
September 15, 2006 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

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The highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and
performance are even required of it (bank).
FACTS:
Warliza Sarande deposited in her account at Philippine Commercial International (PCI)
Bank Magsaysay Avenue, Santa Ana District, Davao City Branch a PCI Bank General Santos
City Branch, TCBT Check No. 0249188 in the amount of P225,000.00. Upon inquiry by
Serande at PCI Bank on whether the check had been cleared, she received an affirmative
answer. Relying on this assurance, she issued check drawn against the proceeds of the
check in favor of Rowena Ong. Ong presented to PCI Bank Magsaysay Avenue Branch said
check and requested PCI Bank to convert the proceeds thereof into a managers check,
which the PCI Bank obliged. The next day, Ong deposited PCI Bank Managers check in her
account with Equitable Banking Corporation Davao City Branch. Later, she received a check
return-slip informing her that PCI Bank had stopped the payment of the said check on the
ground of irregular issuance. Ong made several demands to PCI Bank but was refused. Thus,
she filed a Complaint for sum of money, damages and attorneys fees against PCI Bank. RTC
ruled in her favor. On appeal, CA denied the appeal of PCI Bank.
ISSUE:
Whether Ong is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
RULING:
YES. In the first place, by refusing to make good the managers check it has issued,
Ong suffered embarrassment and humiliation arising from the dishonor of the said check.
Secondly, the culpable act of PCI Bank in having cleared the check of Serande and issuing
the managers check to Ong is undeniable. Thirdly, the proximate cause of the loss is
attributable to PCI Bank. Proximate cause is defined as that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. In this case, the proximate cause of the
loss is the act of PCI Bank in having cleared the check of Serande and its failure to exercise
that degree of diligence required of it under the law which resulted in the loss to Ong.
The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public
good. The banking system has become an indispensable institution in the modern world and
plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized society. Whether as mere passive
entities for the safe-keeping and saving of money or as active instruments of business and
commerce, banks have attained an ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come
to regard them with respect and even gratitude and most of all, confidence. For this reason,
banks should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. Without
a doubt, it has been repeatedly emphasized that since the banking business is impressed
with public interest, of paramount importance thereto is the trust and confidence of the
public in general. Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high
standards of integrity and performance are even required of it. Having failed in this respect,
the award of exemplary damages is warranted. Hence, petition was granted.
VICENTE CALALAS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA
G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000 MENDOZA, J.

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The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract.

FACTS:
Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by
the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle. The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck. RTC rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant
and absolved Calalas of liability. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490),
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 held Salva and
his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. CA reversed the
judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage.
RULING:
YES. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490,
finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be
binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common
carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in
cases of death or injury to passengers.Thus, the decision of the CA was affirmed with
modification.
LAMBERT S. RAMOS v. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

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Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
FACTS:
Along Katipunan (Avenue), corner Rajah Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular
accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and
driven by Aquilino Larin, and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos and driven by
Rodel Ilustrisimo. A passenger of the sedan, Estela Maliwat sustained injuries. C.O.L. Realty
filed a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against Ramos before the MeTC. Said
court exculpated Ramos from liability. RTC affirmed MeTCs decision. MR met the same fate
as it was denied. C.O.L. Realty appealed to the CA which affirmed the view that Aquilino was
negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since such act is
prohibited. It likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos vehicle was moving at
high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction. It therefore
found the driver Rodel guilty of contributory negligence for driving the Ford Expedition at
high speed along a busy intersection. Ramos filed MR but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the CAs decision is contrary to law and jurisprudence, and the evidence to
support and justify the same is insufficient.
RULING:
YES. Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
x x x Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing
Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by
law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery
for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident. Proximate cause is defined as
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from
Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is
exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person
who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground
to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan
Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the
thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was
manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article
2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. Hence, the petition was granted.

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UNIVERSAL AQUARIUS, INC. and CONCHITA TAN v. Q.C. HUMAN RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 155990 September 12, 2007 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the
employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment.
FACTS:
The chemical plant of Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is adjacent to the depot of
Marman Trading (Marman) owned by Conchita Tan. Q.C. Human Resources Management
Corporation (Resources) supplied Universal with manpower. Rodolfo Capocyan, claiming to
be the general counsel/national president of Obrero Pilipino - Universal Aquarius Chapter,
sent a Notice of Strike to Universal. They picketed, barricaded and obstructed the entry and
exit of Universal's chemical plant and intercepted Universal's delivery trucks. Marman's
depot, which adjoined Universal's plant, suffered a similar fate. Universal and Tan filed a
Complaint against the strikers and Resources before the RTC for breach of contract and
damages suffered due to the disruption of their respective business operations. Universal
forged an Agreement (To End Labor Dispute) with Obrero Pilipino. Universal and Tan then
filed a Notice of Dismissal as against the strikers. Resources filed a motion to dismiss but
was denied by the RTC. The MR was likewise denied. On appeal, CA dismissed the complaint
for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether Tan has cause of action against Resources.
RULING:
NO. Tan has no cause of action against Resources. A thorough reading of the
allegations of the Complaint reveals that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the
strike effected by the employees of Resources. It is settled that an employer's liability for
acts of its employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or
is in the course of, his employment. The question then is whether, at the time of the damage
or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or,
independently, in that of his own. An employer incurs no liability when an employees
conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of employment. Unquestionably, when
Resources' employees staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the range of
their employment. Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike
staged by its employees.Hence, the petition was partially granted.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO v. SPOUSES
RICHARD HUANG and CARMEN HUANG, and STEPHEN HUANG
G.R. No. 172122 June 22, 2007 PUNO, C.J.
To be relieved of liability, (employer) should show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties.
FACTS:
Mercury Drug Corporation is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi
Truck. It has in its employ Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Spouses Richard and Carmen
Huang are the parents of Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan.

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These two vehicles figured in a road accident. At the time of the accident, Del Rosario only
had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His drivers license had been confiscated because he
had been previously apprehended for reckless driving. Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life
from his chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. The
Huangs fault Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence while
driving, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its driver. RTC found Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly
and severally liable. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision with modification as to the
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether Mercury Drug is liable as the employer of del Rosario.
RULING:
YES. To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective
employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience,
and service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its
hiring procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of
petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests,
and psychological examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic
admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for
the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. Mrs.
Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle,
instead of a truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor
skills development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were
also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars on June
30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before
the accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner
Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He
testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was
not suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against
petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed
to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario. Thus, the petition was denied.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. v. NATIVIDAD AND ENRIQUE AGANA
G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
For res ipsa loquitur to apply, the thing which caused the injury should be under the
management and control of the defendant. Under the captain of the ship doctrine, the
lead surgeon is the person who has control over the thing which caused the injury since the lead

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surgeon is the one in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation.
Facts:
Dr. Miguel Ampil ordered the operation of Natividad Agana, a patient who was rushed
to the Medical City General Hospital and diagnosed with cancer of the sigmoid. During the
operation, Dr. Agana requested for Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on Mrs. Agana.
After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes left and Dr. Ampil took over and completed the
operation. Months later, Natividad complained of excruciating pains. After another surgery, it
was discovered that the pains were caused by two (2) pieces of gauze left inside her during
her first operation. No investigation was ever conducted by Professional Services, Inc. (PSI),
owner of Medical City Hospital, regarding Natividads first surgery. This prompted Sps. Agana
to file a complaint for damages against Dr. Ampil, Dr. Fuentes, and PSI.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Dr. Fuentes is liable, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
2. Whether or not PSI is liable.
Ruling:
1. NO. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the thing which caused the injury should
be under the management and control of the defendant. Following the captain of the
ship doctrine, the operating surgeon (lead surgeon) is the person who has complete
control over the operation (including the thing which caused the injury) since he is in
complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. In this
case, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon: he was the one who directed the operation and called
on Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy. Consequently, it was Dr. Ampil and not Dr.
Fuentes who had complete control over the gauzes which caused injury to Natividad. In that
case, res ipsa loquitur does not apply, and no presumption of negligence can be had as
against Dr. Fuentes.
2. YES. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, as found in Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
employers shall be responsible for damages caused by their employees x x x Although
physicians are not employees of the hospital due to the latters lack of control
over the manner of the physicians work, developments in medical care prompted
the ruling that an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and
their attending physicians for purposes of allocating responsibility in medical
negligence cases. PSI is also liable under the doctrine of corporate negligence. Since
PSI operates a hospital, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect all its patients
from harm. Here, not only did PSI fail to provide quality medical services to Natividad, it also
failed to take active steps in fixing the negligence committed.
EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION v. LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA
ENANO, MYRNA TAMAYO AND FELIX OLEDAN
G.R. No. 143360 September 5, 2002, Panganiban, J.
In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily
liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the driver, even if the vehicle was already
sold by virtue of an unregistered deed of sale. In contemplation of law, the registered owner is
the lawful operator of the vehicle and employer of the driver. The real operator is treated only as
an agent of the registered owner.

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Facts:
In 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house of Myrna
Tamayo. The RTC convicted Tutor of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and
multiple physical injuries, but Tamayo et al. failed to recover anything from the criminal
case. Tamayo et al. decided to file a separate civil action for damages under Art. 2176
against Equitable Leasing Corporation, the registered owner of the motor vehcile. In its
defense, Equitable argued that it was no longer the owner and/or operator of the vehicle at
the time of the accident since Equitable had validly sold it to another person since 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not Equitable Leasing Corp. is liable even if it is no longer the actual
owner of the vehicle.
Ruling:
YES. In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor
vehicle is solidarily liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the driver.
This is true even if the vehicle was already sold by the owner to a buyer by virtue of an
unregistered deed of sale, and even if the registered owner does not use the vehicle for
public service. The sale of motor vehicles is not binding upon third persons,
especially upon the victims of an accident, unless the same is registered with the
Land Transportation Office. In contemplation of law and insofar as third persons are
concerned, the registered owner is the lawful operator of the vehicle and is the employer of
the driver. The real and actual operator and employer is treated only as an agent of the
registered owner. Here, Equitable Leasing Corp. is the registered owner and is thus liable for
the injuries sustained by Tamayo, et al. To be sure, even if the certificate of registration of
the motor vehicle contained an annotation that the tractor was leased to the same buyer,
the fact of registration of the lease agreement is immaterial because the lease was already
superseded by the unregistered deed of sale.
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC. v. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 162267 July 4, 2008, Austria-Martinez, J.
A sale, lease (or financial lease) that is not registered with the Land Transportation Office
does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents. The victims need only to
rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership for
purposes of recovering damages.
Facts:
A tanker truck registered under the name of PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI)
bumped a car insured by UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. After subrogation, the insurer
immediately demanded payment from PCI for damages caused by the tanker truck, but PCI
refused. Instead, PCI denies liability based on an unregistered financial lease agreement,
whereby PCI leased the tanker truck to Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO), and
that the driver of the said truck was SUGECOs employee.
Issue:
Whether or not PCI should be held liable for the damages caused by the tanker truck.
Ruling:

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YES. A sale, lease (or financial lease) that is not registered with the Land
Transportation Office does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious
incidents. The victims need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as
conclusive evidence of ownership for purposes of recovering damages. A lease is an
encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs to be registered in order for it to bind
third parties. Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is the exacerbation of the
suffering of victims of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty party. A
contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer
or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent
victims. Surely, Sec. 12 of RA 8556 provides that Financing companies shall not be liable for
loss, damage, or injury caused by a motor vehicle x x x leased to a third person x x x. But
this exculpatory clause will not benefit financing companies such as PCI unless it first
registers its lease agreement with the Land Transportation Office first.
OMC CARRIERS, INC. AND JERRY AALUCAS Y PITALINO v.
SPOUSES ROBERTO C. NABUA AND ROSARIO T. NABUA
G.R. No. 148974 July 2, 2010, Peralta, J.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee
or in the supervision over him after such selection. However, the presumption may be overcome
by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
Facts:
A private tanker driven by Jerry Aalucas y Pitalino hit a car and mortally injured its
driver, a college freshman. The parents of the deceased driver (Sps. Roberto and Rosario
Nabua) sued Aalucas and OMC Carriers, Inc., the employer of Aalucas and the registered
owner of the private tanker before the RTC. The trial court ruled for the Sps. Nabua and
awarded compensatory damages, among others.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not OMC Carriers, Inc. is liable for the damage caused by its tanker.
(2) Whether or not payment of compensatory damages is due.
Ruling:
(1) YES. The employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises
a presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of
his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. However, the
presumption may be overcome by a clear showing on the part of the employer that
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee. Here, since OMC Carriers, Inc. failed to
satisfactorily prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision over its driver Aalucas, then the presumption of negligence still attaches to
OMC Carriers as employer of Aalucas.
(2) NO. Art. 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition to the indemnity for death caused
by a crime or quasi delict, the "defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased x x x" Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for
loss of capacity to earn money. But evidence must show that the victim, if not yet employed

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at the time of death, was reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession.
Here, no compensatory damages is due absent proof that the deceased, a college freshman,
would eventually be employed or will complete training for a specific profession.
LARRY ESTACION v. NOE BERNARDO, THRU HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM ARLIE
BERNARDO, CECILIA BANDOQUILLO AND GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA
G.R. No. 144723 February 27, 2006, Austria-Martinez, J.
A plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
Facts:
Noe Bernardo was standing on the left rear portion of an overloaded Ford Fiera
passenger jeepney on his way home to Dumaguete. While the jeepney stopped at the
shoulder of the road to pick up passengers, an Isuzu cargo truck travelling in the same
direction at a very fast speed hit the rear end portion of the jeepney where Bernardo was
standing. The tremendous force crushed Bernardos legs. Bernardos guardian ad litem sued
Larry Estacion, the registered owner of the cargo truck, and his truck driver for damages.
Estacion and his driver argued that even if they were to be found negligent, the award of
damages to Bernardo should be mitigated because of the negligence of (1) the driver of the
jeepney; (2) the registered owner of the jeepney; and (3) Bernardo himself.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages to Bernardo should be mitigated, and if so, by
how much.
Ruling:
YES. Article 2179 of the Civil Code, which deals with contributory negligence,
provides that if the plaintiffs negligence was only contributory, the proximate cause of the
injury still being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This is because a plaintiff who is
partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
Here, the proximate cause of the injury is still the cargo truck. But it is also true that
at the time of the accident, the driver committed violations of traffic regulations. This
created a presumption of negligence on the part of the jeepney driver, and consequently, his
employer (the registered owner of the jeepney). Likewise, Bernardos act of standing at the
rear end of the jeepney exposed him to bodily injury and is negligence on his part. Pursuant
to jurisprudence, Bernardo should bear 20% of the award of damages. Estacion and his truck
driver, as well as the owner and driver of the jeepney should jointly and severally bear 80%
of the award of damages. Solidarity is the rule where the damage was caused both by the
drivers of a common carrier and a private vehicle, even if the sources of liability are
different, i.e. contract and quasi-delict, respectively.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION AND ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO v. SPOUSES
RICHARD HUANG AND CARMEN HUANG, AND STEPHEN HUANG
G.R. No. 144723 February 27, 2006, Austria-Martinez, J.

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To be relieved of liability, an employer should show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties.
Facts:
Stephen Huang was driving a car along C-5 Highway. While he was on the innermost
left shoulder of the road, the truck on his right, which was driven by Mercury Drug Corp.
employee Rolando J. Del Rosario, suddenly swerved to its left and bumped the car. The
collision hurled the car to the opposite lane and was a total wreck. Stephen sustained
massive injuries and was paralyzed for life from his chest down because of the injury.
Records show that at the time of the accident, Del Rosario was driving without a license
because his license was confiscated due to reckless driving. Del Rosario was also driving for
more than thirteen (13) hours straight without a back-up driver prior to the accident.
Issue:
Whether or not Mercury Drug is liable for damages.
Ruling:
YES. Since Del Rosarios negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, Mercury
Drug as the employer is likewise presumed negligent under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. To be
relieved of liability, Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance
of his duties. In this case, Mercury Drug failed to prove that it exercised due care in
supervising Del Rosario. In fact, at the time of the accident, Del Rosario was out on the road
for more than thirteen (13) hours straight without any alternate. Likewise, Del Rosario did
not have a license when he drove the truck. Finally, while Del Rosario reported the accident
to Mercury Drug, the latter did not suspend or even reprimand Del Rosario.
THE HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO AND ELPIDIO
ABIAD v. SGT. AMANDO C. ALBAYDA, JR.
G.R. No. 172200 July 6, 2010, Nachura, J.
Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Facts:
Sgt. Amando C. Albayda, Jr. was riding a bicycle on his way to the office. He stopped
and moved to the side of the street when he saw the taxi driven by Redentor Completo was
moving fast towards him. In spite of Sgt. Albayda, Jr.s precautions, the taxi still bumped and
sideswiped him, causing serious physical injuries. Sgt. Albayda, Jr. was admitted to the
hospital for six (6) months. Thereafter, Sgt. Albayda, Jr. sued Completo and his employer,
Elpidio Abiad, for damages. No receipts were presented during trial. Afterwards, the trial
court awarded actual and moral damages to Sgt. Albayda, Jr.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is correct.
Ruling:

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NO. The award of actual damages is not proper because Sgt. Albayda, Jr. failed to
present documentary evidence to establish with certainty the amount that he incurred
during his hospitalization and treatment for the injuries he suffered. In the absence of
stipulation, actual damages are awarded only for such pecuniary loss suffered that was duly
proved. But while the amount of actual damages was not duly established with certainty,
Sgt. Albayda, Jr. incurred a considerable amount for his medical expenses, as well as loss of
capacity to earn wages. Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. However, the award of moral damages is proper, since moral damages are
awarded in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.
ALFREDO P. PACIS AND CLEOPATRA D. PACIS v. JEROME JOVANNE MORALES
G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010, Carpio, J.
Employers are expected to exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good
father of a family, and must show proof of the same in order to free them from liability.
Facts:
Alfred Dennis Pacis was inside a gun store in Baguio City owned and operated by
Jerome Jovanne Morales, together with the gun stores sales agents. On that day, the sales
agents brought out a gun sent to their store for repair, and placed it on top of a table. Alfred
was attracted to the sight of the gun and got hold of the same. One of the sales agents
asked Alfred to return the gun, to which Alfred complied. The gun accidentally went off as
Alfred was handing it to the sales agent. A bullet struck Alfred in the head and killed him
instantly.
Issue:
Whether or not Morales is liable for the death of Alfred.
Ruling:
YES. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code,
the liability of the employer for quasi-delicts is primary and direct. Employers are
expected to exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family,
and must show proof of the same in order to free them from liability. In fact, a higher degree
of care is required of someone who has in his possession or control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.
In this case, a gun store owner such as Morales is presumed to know about firearms
safety. Hence, he should have known never to keep a loaded weapon inside his store to
avoid risk of harm. This applies with more reason to defective guns sent to the store for
repair, precisely because these are defective and may cause accidental discharge, such as
what happened in this case. The negligence of the sales agents of Morales in not insuring
that the defective gun was not loaded militate against Morales himself and made him liable
for damages.
LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., v. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION
and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 179446 January 10, 2011, Mendoza, J.

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In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract.
Facts:
Columbia insured its shipment of electric copper cathodes with R&B Insurance. The
shipment then arrived at Manila. Columbia engaged Glodel for the withdrawal/release of the
cargoes and their delivery to Columbias warehouses. In turn, Glodel engaged the services of
Loadmasters to transport the cargoes. 12 trucks owned by Loadmasters driven by its
employed drivers with its employed truck helpers were tasked with the delivery. However,
one truck failed to make the delivery. Later, the truck was recovered but without the copper
cathodes. Columbia claimed from its insurance with R&B. The insurance company then filed
damages against both Glodel and Loadmasters. The RTC found Glodel liable. On appeal, the
CA held that as agent of Glodel, Loadmasters was likewise liable with Glodel, hence the
petition to the SC. Loadmaster argued that it should not be held liable as agent of Glodel.
Issue:
Whether or not Loadmasters is liable with Glodel
Ruling:
YES, it is liable although not as an agent but a tortfeasor. Loadmasters claim that it
was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B
Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation
with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. This Court has previously held that a tort may arise despite
the absence of a contractual relationship. The act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. In connection, Art 2180 provides that employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. It is not
disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose
employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the
shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused
by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods
safely to the warehouse.
Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where
there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability,
even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without
which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the
negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both
of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine
in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the
whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party,

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they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article
2194 of the Civil Code.
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J.
CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR.
and JOEL JONGCO v. ISMAEL VELOSO III
G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010, Leonardo-De Castro, J.
As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
Facts:
Manaloto et al. filed an unlawful detainer case against Veloso before the MeTC for
failure to pay rentals. The MeTC decided in favor of Manaloto. The RTC QC Branch 88,
however, reversed the decision. CA and SC subsequently affirmed the RTC decision. While
Velosos appeal for the unlawful detainer case was pending before RTC Branch 88, he filed a
Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages against Manaloto et al. The first cause of
action was an action for damages because of his embarrassment and humiliation when
Manaloto et al distributed copies of the MeTC decision to the homeowners of Horseshoe
Village while his appeal was pending; second was for breach of contract for failure to make
continuing repairs on the property. Manaloto et al. argue that Veloso had no cause of action
because the MeTC decision was a matter of public record and its disclosure to the public
violated no law or legal right. RTC branch 227 dismissed Velosos case for lack of cause of
action. While the CA dismissed the second cause of action, it found Manaloto et al liable for
exemplary and moral damages as the distribution of copies of decision was made in bad
faith to embarrass and humiliate Veloso. Hence, the petition before the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not Veloso had a cause of action for damages
Ruling:
YES, Veloso had a cause of action for damages. The RTC should not have dismissed
the case. First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and
reputation. Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name. This
right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs,
whether as criminal offenses or tortuous conduct. Second, petitioners are obliged to respect
respondent's good name even though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer
case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of rights,
a tortuous conduct. Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent's "dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind" under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private
life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. And third, respondent alleged
that the distribution by petitioners to Horseshoe Village homeowners of copies of the MeTC

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decision in the unlawful detainer case, which was adverse to respondent and still on appeal
before the RTC-Branch 88, had no apparent lawful or just purpose except to humiliate
respondent or assault his character. As a result, respondent suffered damages - becoming
the talk of the town and being deprived of his political career.1avvphi1
Nevertheless, the SC further declared that the Court of Appeals erred in already
awarding moral and exemplary damages in respondent's favor when the parties have not
yet had the chance to present any evidence before the RTC-Branch 227. In civil cases, he
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is
incumbent upon the party claiming affirmative relief from the court to convincingly prove its
claim. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof under our
Rules. In short, mere allegations are not evidence. At this point, the finding of the Court of
Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis.
TITUS B. VILLANUEVA v. EMMA M. ROSQUETA
G.R. No. 180764, January 19, 2010, ABAD, J.
A partys refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise
lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right
Facts:
Rosqueta was formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs tendered her
resignation but five months later, she withdrew her resignation claiming that she enjoyed
security of tenure and she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior. President
Arroyo then appointed Valera to her position. Rosqueta then filed petition for prohibition, quo
warranto, and injunction against Villanueva and Valera with the RTC. It then issued a TRO
enjoining Valeras appointment. RTC then issued preliminary injunction in the quo warranto
case against Villanueva. During the Bureaus celebration of its centennial anniversary, a
special magazine edition was issued featuring all customs deputy commissioners except
Rosqueta. She then filed damages in the RTC against Villanueva but it was denied due to
lack of cause of action. It was then elevated to the CA which reversed the decision of RTC on
the ground of abuse of right under Article 19 of the CC
Issue:
Whether or not Villanueva shall be liable for damages due to abuse of rights
Ruling:
YES. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person
must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he
instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers
because of such abuse of right or duty.
Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) when he allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since
respondent Rosqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked
the Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job. But Villanueva cannot seek
shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official of his rank
must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed,
especially since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet
been properly resolved.

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Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who
remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he
withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As the Court
ruled, a partys refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise
lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL TREASURER v.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and style CARWIN
CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY,
G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him. This article is part of the chapter of the Civil
Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as "basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order, designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience, guides human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the
end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."
The rules thereon apply equally well to the Government.
Facts:
Carwin Construction was awarded for the construction of Sitio 5 Bahat Pare. However,
upon completion, it was discovered that the license to operate by Carwin has already
expired. Thus, the Republic did not pay Carwin despite repeated demands which then
prompted Carwin in filing a case for specific performance against the Republic
Issue:
Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for
completed project.
Ruling:
YES. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides that any contractor who, for a
price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or
contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in
the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate
of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining
a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or
license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to
pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as
void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless,
such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should
be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the
payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

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Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius
incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of anothers injury) states
that Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions
of which were formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order, designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, guides human conduct [that] should
run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal
which is the sway and dominance of justice." The rules thereon apply equally well to the
Government. Since respondent had rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance
by petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to
acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for
the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law
ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name and style EDISON DEVELOPMENT &
CONSTRUCTION, v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS,
G.R. Nos. 147925-26, June 8, 2009, NACHURA, J.
Principle of unjust enrichment cannot be validly invoked by the respondent who,
through his own act or omission, took the risk of being denied payment for additional costs
by not giving the petitioners prior notice of such costs and/or by not securing their written
consent thereto, as required by law and their contract
Facts:
Public Estates Authority (PEA) was designated as project manager by the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), primarily tasked to develop its 105-hectare
demilitarized lot in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City into a first-class memorial park to be known as
Heritage Park. PEA then engaged the services Uy, doing business under the name and style
Edison Development and Construction (EDC), to do the landscaping. During the project PEA
continuously incurred delay in turnover of work areas despite demands of Uy. Thus, Uy also
incurred delay for landscaping project. He then demanded for payment of additional
expenses but PEA did not hid to such demand then BCDA terminated the services of Uy. Uy
then claimed that it incurred additional expense for generator sets but it was not approved
by PEA as damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Uy shall be paid for generator sets invoking the principle of unjust
enrichment as damages.
Ruling:
NO. His claim for additional cost of generator set, such additional expenses were
incurred without prior written approval of PEAs general manager. Thus, he cannot claim
payment for such cost from PEA as damages. Neither did the SC held PEA liable based on
solutio indebiti, the legal maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense of another.
As the Court explained in Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, the principle of unjust

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enrichment cannot be validly invoked by the respondent who, through his own act or
omission, took the risk of being denied payment for additional costs by not giving the
petitioners prior notice of such costs and/or by not securing their written consent thereto, as
required by law and their contract. Uy cannot, therefore, claim from PEA the costs of
generator expenses.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND
HIGHWAYS, v. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSARIO RODRIGUEZ REYES
G.R. No. 160379, August 14, 2009, CARPIO, J.
Attorneys fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect ones interest by reason of an
unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought
Facts:
DPWH requested its permission to enter a portion of Reyes lot consisting of 663
square meters and construct the extension of Osmea Street Road. However despite repeated
demands of Reyes for just compensation, DPWH did not hid to such demands which
prompted Reyes in filing a complaint against the former. When the case reached to the CA, it
ordered payment of attorneys fees in favor of Reyes which was opposed by DPWH.
Issue:
Whether or not Attorneys fees shall be awarded in favor of Reyes.
Ruling:
YES, Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code provides that attorneys fees may be
awarded: (2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Attorneys fees may be awarded by
a court if one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect ones interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from
whom it is sought. In this case, DPWH took possession of Reyes real property without
initiating expropriation proceedings, and over the latters objection. As a result, private
respondent was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests over her
property. Thus, the appellate courts award of attorneys fees is proper.
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO v. COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and
EMMA J. DATUIN
G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009, NACHURA, J.
In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and
established that petitioner was impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating
an action against respondent, knowing that the charges were false and groundless,
intending to vex and humiliate her.
Facts:
Gregorio was charged with violation of BP 22. She contended that the same was
baseless and that she does not even own a checkbook to begin with. She was then acquitted
with the offense and later on filed a civil case against Sansio who filed the criminal case

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against her. It was then opposed by Sansio on the ground of malicious prosecution by the
RTC did not grant such. CA then affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the charge against Sansio is based on malicious prosecution
Ruling:
NO. A perusal of the allegations of Gregorios complaint for damages readily shows
that she filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for filing against her criminal charges for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the
true identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as payment
for the various appliances purchased; and that respondents never gave her the opportunity
to controvert the charges against her, because they stated an incorrect address in the
criminal complaint. Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and humiliation she
suffered when she was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting
her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay. Gregorio
anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26, 2176, and 2180 of the Civil Code. Noticeably,
despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never
imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Undeniably, Gregorios
civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176,
in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. Sansio and
Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorios complaint is based on malicious
prosecution. In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged
and established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in
deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and
groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her. Which is absent in this case
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO v. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
When a person sues under Article 32, it is not necessary that there should be malice or bad
faith to make a public officer or employee, or any private individual liable for damages. It is
enough that there is a violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 to make the one
accountable for damages. The clear intention of the legislature under this Article was to
create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights,
irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.
Facts:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different
brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. These
cigarette brands were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of
20-45%. However, two days before RA 7654 took effect, Petitioner Chato, in his capacity as
Commissioner, issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem. This
resulted in the assessment for ad valorem tax deficiency against the Fortune Tobacco.
However, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable. This ruling
was affirmed by the CA and finally by the SC.

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Fortune Tobacco then filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner
Chato in her private capacity. It contends that the latter should be held liable for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right
to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner Chato filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that there
is lack of cause of action on the ground that the complaint of Fortune Tobacco failed to
allege malice in the issuance of such RMC. The RTC and the CA denied the motion to dismiss
filed by Chato. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed by Chato,
notwithstanding the failure of the complaint of Fortune Tobacco to allege the existence of
malice.
Ruling:
NO. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority,
are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. As an exception to
the exception, when a person suing under Article 32, it is not necessary that there should
be malice or bad faith to make a public officer or employee, or any private individual liable
for damages. It is enough that there is a violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 to
make the one accountable for damages. The clear intention of the legislature under this
Article was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of
constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of
the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a
cause of action and therefore the courts correctly denied the motion to dismiss.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A.
FAMINI
G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.
No prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific performance,
overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil
action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
Facts:
Pursuant to the complaint filed by Dreamwork Construction, a criminal information
was filed against private respondent Cleofe Janiola for violation of BP 22. However, Janiola
instituted a civil complaint against Dreamworks, by filing a Complaint for the rescission of an
alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Notably, the
checks, subject of the criminal case, were issued in consideration of the construction
agreement. Thereafter, Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings of the criminal case on
the ground that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. The
MTC issued its Order granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings. This was affirmed by the
RTC, and hence this petition.

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Issue:
Whether or not the court is correct in granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings.
Ruling:
NO. No prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as
the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
The fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of
the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the
elements of the crime. Thus, the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks
is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. It must be emphasized that the
gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which
the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere
act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and
the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
A person cannot claim damages where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her
act. In this case, the Court ruled that Consuelo Tan, in contracting a marriage with a married
man, should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth would
come out. Therefore, if there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her
own willful making.
Facts:
This case involves the two marriages contracted by Dr. Vincent Mercado. Dr. Mercado
was first married with Ma. Thelma Oliva, to whom he has two children. However, without
having his first marriage dissolved, Dr. Mercado married the herein complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan, to whom he sired a child. Thus, complainant Tan filed a complaint for bigamy
against Dr. Mercado, with a prayer for damages. The RTC ruled that Dr. Mercado was guilty
for the crime of bigamy. The conviction of Dr. Mercado was affirmed by the CA, but the
appellate court denied the claim of Tan for damages and attorneys fee. The CA argues that
Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be. The evidence on record
revealed that she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she
contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. Hence, in her Memorandum, Consuelo Tan prays
that the Court set aside the ruling of the CA insofar as to her claim of damages and
attorneys fees.
Issue:
Whether or not Consuelo Tan can claim damages.
Ruling:

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NO. Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her,
hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court
upheld the ruling of the CA that Consuelo Tan is not an innocent party. Therefore, she not
claim damages where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should
have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth would come out, as it
did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages
caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.
WILSON PO CHAM v. ATTY. EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO
A.C. No. 5499, August 16, 2005, CARPIO MORALES, J.
In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is not blameless or is in
pari delicto as this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge
the law profession of unworthy members to protect the public and the courts.
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Po Cham against
Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro for commission of falsehood and misrepresentations in violation of a
lawyers oath. This is in connection with the sale of a parcel of land made by Atty. Pizarro,
where he categorically represented to Po Cham that the property being offered for sale was
alienable and disposable. However, after Po Cham took posssession of the land, he
discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land susceptible of private
ownership as the said lands fall within the Bataan Natural Park.
Atty. Pizarro denied having employed deceit or having pretended to co-own rights
over the property or having represented that it was alienable and disposable. He claimed
that complainant, being engaged in speculation in the purchase of property, knew exactly
the character and nature of the object of his purchase. The IBP ruled that Atty. Pizarro is
indeed guilty of violating the lawyers oath and shall be suspended from the practice of law
for three months.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pizarro is guilty of violating the lawyers oath.
Ruling:
The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal proficiency but of
honesty and fair dealing. Thus, a member should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession. The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension. Hence, in this case,
Atty. Pizarro must be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase a nonexistent "irrevocable rights, interest and participation" over an inalienable property.
Although, Po Cham is not entirely blameless due to the fact that he failed to exercise
prudence before entering into the transaction with respondent. Nevertheless, in a
disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is not blameless or
is in pari delicto as this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but
one to purge the law profession of unworthy members to protect the public and
the courts.

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AC ENTERPRISES, INC. v. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORP.
G.R.166744. NOVEMBER 2, 2006, LABITORIA, J.
Whether or not the noise is a nuisance is an issue to be resolved by the courts.
Facts:
AC Enterprises, is a corporation that owns a 10-storey building in Makati City. On the
other hand, Frabelle, is a condominium corporation developing a condominium which is
located behind AC enterprises. Frabelle filed a complaint before the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of the noise emanating from the blower of the air-conditioning units of AC
enterprises and the Sanggunian declared that the noise is a nuisance per se. AC enterprises
countered that although under the Local Government Code, the Sanggunian is empowered
to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance, it
bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It further ruled that those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.
Issue:
Whether the nuisance is to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of
proceedings or a nuisance per se?
Ruling:
It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings. Noise
becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the
conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury to
a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not
render the house an actionable nuisance in the conditions, of present living, noise seems
inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations. The test is whether rights of
property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the
sufferer is subjected to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical Discomfort]which goes beyond the
reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a
particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although
ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of
another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights
of those affected by it.
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila v. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR.,
as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, TINGA, J.
A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention.
Facts:
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses, filed a Petition for

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Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order with the lower court impleading City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, Hon.
Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila. MTDC prayed that
the ordinance prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area insofar
as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments be declared invalid
and unconstitutional. MTDC contend that they did not use women as tools for entertainment,
and neither did they disturb the community nor adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community. Further, MTDC maintains that the City Council has no power to find as a
fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially
destroy it.
Issue:
Whether or not business of motels and inns are nuisance per se which would allow
the City Council to prohibit these establishments.
Ruling:
NO. City Council cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per
se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It cannot be said that motels are
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate
business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., v. REGINA M. ASTORGA,
G.R. No. 148132, January 28, 2008, NACHURA, J.
If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer
failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the
dismissal process was initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative.
Facts:
Regina M. Astorga was employed by respondent Smart Communications,
Incorporated as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed
Services Division. Thereafter, SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve
more efficient operations and abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorgas division on ground of
redundancy. The termination of Astorgas employment prompted her to file a Complaint for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits with prayer for moral and
exemplary damages against SMART for it violated her right to security of tenure . SMART
responded that Astorga was dismissed by reason of redundancy, which is an authorized
cause for termination of employment, and the dismissal was valid and effected in
accordance with the requirements of the Labor Code. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Astorga
and ordered to reinstate the latter with payment of full backwages, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. However, NLRC reversed the ruling and the termination was
valid organizational action. CA affirmed the decision of NLRC but awarded indemnity for
SMARTs failure to give the one-month mandatory notice.
Issue:

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Whether or not Astorga is entitled to indemnity for the violation of her statutory right
to due process.
Ruling:
YES. The indemnity of P50,000.00 is a sanction on SMART for non-compliance with
the one-month mandatory notice requirement, in light of the ruling in Jaka Food Processing
Corporation v. Pacot, which held that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article
282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be
imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect,
initiated by an act imputable to the employee, and if the dismissal is based on an
authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the
notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process
was initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative. In this
case, the dismissal is based on an authorized cause so higher indemnity must be awarded.
As provided in Article 283 of the Labor Code, Astorga is, likewise, entitled to separation pay
equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to at least one (1) months pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. The records show that Astorgas length of service is less than
a year. Astorga therefore is, also entitled to separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v.ANTONIO ABES y YAMBOT "TONY" (deceased),

SALDO YBAEZ y ACEBES, ROBERTO BONTO y MENDOZA "BERT," RICARTE
BUMAGAT y ORDONA, RAUL YBAEZ y ACEBES and SIMEON SILVANO, JR., y
GUTIERREZ "JHUN,"
G.R. No. 138937, January 20, 2004, QUISUMBING, J.
To be entitled to an award of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of the loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, which usually means official or
valid receipts.
Facts:

Abes, Ybanez , Bonto, Bumagat, and Silvano were charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide for the death of Antonio Calaycay. Abes et al. denied the
allegation but the trial court disbelieved the defense, but found them guilty. Trial court also
awarded Civil indemnity, P320,300.00 for actual damages, temperate damages and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. CA affirmed the decision but modified the amount
of actual damages because of the unavailability of receipts to support the claim.

Issue:
Whether or not the modification of award of actual damages is proper.
Ruling:
YES.
The amount of P320,300.00 was awarded by the trial court as actual damages, which
include: the hospital bill from the De La Salle University Medical Center for P1,300.00, the

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funeral service for the victim in the amount ofP40,000.00, a memorial lot for the victim
at P180,000.00, and expenses for the wake in the sum of P8,000.00. However, the record
discloses that only the amount of P40,000.00 for the funeral services of the deceased is
supported by a receipt. To be entitled to an award of actual damages, it is necessary
to prove the actual amount of the loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party, which usually means official or valid receipts. Hence, the Supreme
Court agreed that the award of actual damages here should be reduced to P131,000.00 only,
consisting of the P91,000.00 cash lost during the robbery and the P40,000.00 incurred for
funeral services.
In addition, however, the Court found it proper that temperate damages be awarded.
Where the Court finds that some pecuniary loss has been incurred but the amount cannot be
proved with certainty, such as for medical services and the wake, temperate damages are
appropriately given. Thus, the computation in People v. Abrazaldo, fixing temperate
damages at P25,000.00, which is half the amount of the indemnity ex delicto, was affirmed.
The award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise justified, to stress the need for
deterrence against the use of firearms, particularly unlicensed ones. Finally, it follows that
the award of attorneys fees must also be affirmed.
LEONIDES C. DIO, v. LINA JARDINES
G.R. No. 145871, January 31, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Award of actual damages must be duly substantiated by receipts.

Facts:

Leonides C. Dio alleged in her complaint that Lina Jardines executed in her favor a
Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro over a parcel of land but the transaction actually entered
into by the parties was one of simple loan and the Deed of Sale with Pacto de
Retro executed just as a security for the loan. Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended
Complaint adding prayer for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation. RTC, among others, ordered Jardines to pay actual and/or compensatory damages
to the plaintiff. However, CA reversed and deleted the award of damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Dio is entitled to actual and/or compensatory damages
Ruling:
NO. In the present case, the RTCs award for actual damages is a plain error because
a reading of said trial courts Decision readily discloses that there is no sufficient evidence
on record to prove that Dio is entitled to the same. Dios only evidence to prove her claim
for actual damages is her testimony that she has spent P3,000.00 in going to and from
respondents place to try to collect payment and that she spent P1,000.00 every time she
travels from Bulacan, where she resides, to Baguio in order to attend the hearings. In People

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vs. Sara, the Court held that a witness testimony cannot be considered as
competent proof and cannot replace the probative value of official receipts to
justify the award of actual damages, for jurisprudence instructs that the same
must be duly substantiated by receipts. Hence, there being no official receipts
whatsoever to support petitioners claim for actual or compensatory damages, said claim
must be denied.

B.F. METAL (CORPORATION), v. SPS. ROLANDO M. LOMOTAN and LINAFLOR

LOMOTAN and RICO UMUYON
G.R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008, TINGA, J.
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Facts:
Rico Umuyon was driving the owner-type jeep owned by Spouses Rolando and
Linaflor Lomotan when suddenly, at the opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck
driven by Onofre Rivera overtook a car by invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and
rammed into the jeep. The jeep was a total wreck while Umuyon suffered injuries which
entailed his hospitalization for 19 days. Also in view of the injuries he sustained, Umuyon
could no longer drive, reducing his daily income fromP150.00 to P100.00. This prompted him
to institute a separate and independent civil action for damages against petitioner BF Metal
Corporation and Rivera before the RTC. The complaint prayed for the award of actual,
exemplary and moral damages and attorneys fees. The trial court awarded P161,700.00 for
actual damages, P 100,000.00 for moral damages, P100,000 for exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees. However, the appellate court lowered the amount of actual damages
awarded to P 143,672.
Issues:
1. Whether the amount of actual damages based only on a job estimate should be
lowered.
2. Whether Spouses Lomotan are also entitled to moral damages; and
3. Whether the award of exemplary damages and attorneys is warranted.
Ruling:
1. YES. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof
of the actual amount of loss. In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to
show the amount actually spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep.
Spouses Lomotan presented two different cost estimates to prove the alleged actual
damage of the wrecked jeep, a job estimate by Pagawaan Motors, Inc., which pegged
the repair cost of the jeep at P96,000.00, and another estimated the cost of repair
at P130,655.00. Following Viron, neither estimate is competent to prove actual
damages. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages.
2. NO. An award of moral damages would require, a), evidence of besmirched
reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;
b), a culpable act or omission factually established; c), proof that the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the

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claimant; and d), that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. However, there is no
legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan whether arising from the
criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of B.F. Metal
under Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages where there is injury to
property, but the injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such
damages are justly due. There being no proof that the accident was willful, Article
2220 does not apply.
3. YES. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, Spouses Lomotan have shown that they are entitled to compensatory
damages while. Umuyon can recover both compensatory and moral damages. To
serve as an example for the public good, the Court affirms the award of exemplary
damages in the amount ofP100,000.00 to Umoyon et. al. Because exemplary
damages are awarded, attorneys fees may also be awarded in consonance with
Article 2208 (1).

M. H., RAKES v. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY

G.R. No. 1719, January 23, 1907, TRACEY, J.

The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
Facts:
Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of Atlantic Gulf, was
at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard. The men
were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. Some of them were also in front, hauling by
a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car
either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught Rakes, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee. In two particulars, Rakes is charged with
carelessness: First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work;
and Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along
the boards, either before or behind it.
Issue:
Whether or not Rakes contributory negligence bars him from recovering.
Ruling:

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NO. In Fance, the carelessness of the victim did not civilly relieve the person
without whose fault the accident could not have happened, but that the
contributory negligence of the injured man had the effect only of reducing the
damages. In the Canadian Province of Quebee, if in the case of damage there was fault or
negligence on the part of the person injured or in the part of someone else, the
indemnification shall be reduced in the first case, and in the second case it shall be
appropriated in proportion to such fault or negligence as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
section 2372. Article 1304 of the Austrian Code, the victim who is partly changeable with the
accident shall stand his damages in proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is
incapable of ascertainment, he shall share the liability equally with the person principally
responsible. The principle of proportional damages appears to be also adopted in article 51
of the Swiss Code. The Court found the theory of damages laid down in the judgment the
most consistent with the history and the principals of our law in these Islands and with its
logical development.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall
be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages, that is, the sinking of the
track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of Rakes in walking by the side of
the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself.
Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty,
the last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which
he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of
its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE v. IAC, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA
MANALO
G.R. No. L-68102, July 16, 1992, DAVIDE, JR., J.

Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the
last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.
Facts:

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A head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar and a
Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. When the northbound car was about 10m away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road
and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to
cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the
left and entered the lane of the truck, he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied
the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. RTC convicted Galang.
CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable.
Ruling:
YES. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person
who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for
the consequences thereof.
In Ong v. Metropolitan Water District(104 Phil. 397, 1958): The doctrine applies only
in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is
made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of
the plaintiff. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care
to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which
intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus
making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is
invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert
ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As
employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, are
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are
negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is
only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO
VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC.
G.R. No. 132266, December 21, 1999, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

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An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use
outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer
contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for
personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer.
Facts:
Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle and Benjamin Abad manager of
Castilex Industrial, registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. They collided with each
other causing severe injuries because the latter overlapped the formers path. Vasquez died.
Sps Vasquez, parents of the deceased filed a suit. RTC ruled in favor of the spouses and
ordered Abad and Castilex Industrial to pay damages. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Castilex is vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by Abad of a company-issued vehicle outside working hours.
Ruling:
NO. Article 2180, par. 4 and 5, applies to employers. Par. 4, to owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise and Par. 5, to employers in general, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry. Par. 4 covers negligent acts of employees committed
either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the Par. 5
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
AMJUR principles: xxx (3)Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours: An
employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of
regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the
vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the
employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started
the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has
not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime and thereafter went
to Goldie's Restaurant, which is about seven km away from the place of business. At the
Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD
was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. To the mind of this Court,
ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line
with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2am, way
beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended and his overtime work
had already been completed. His being at a place which was known as a "haven for

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prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to Castilexs business;
neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even
for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his
position.
OPTIMUM MOTOR CENTER CORPORATION v. ANNIE TAN or "AJ & T Trading"
G.R. No. 170202, July 14, 2008, TINGA, J.

The concept of a mechanics lien is articulated in Article 1731: He who has executed
work upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid. The
mechanics lien is akin to a contractors or warehousemans lien in that by way of pledge,
the repairman has the right to retain possession of the movable until he is paid. However,
the right of retention is conditioned upon the execution of work upon the movable. The
creation of a mechanic's lien does not depend upon the owner's nonpayment. Rather, the
contractor "creates" his or her own lien by performing the work or furnishing the materials.
Facts:
Tan brought the subject truck to Optimum for body repair and painting. Pea
introduced himself as the owner and manager of Optimum. Tan verbally contracted with
Pea for the repair of the damaged portions of the truck, repainting and upholstery
replacement. Then she discovered that Optimum had already vacated its shop in Del Monte
and that her truck was nowhere to be found. Later, she learned that Optimum had
transferred to a new location but her still unrepaired truck was found in Valenzuela City. RTC
ordered the seizure of the said vehicle. RTC rendered a decision in favour of Tan and held
Optimum liable for damages for its failure to execute its part of the contract on time,
pursuant to Article 1170 of the Civil Code. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Optimum is liable for damages.
Ruling:
YES. The concept of a mechanics lien is articulated in Article 1731: He who has
executed work upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid. The
mechanics lien is akin to a contractors or warehousemans lien in that by way of pledge,
the repairman has the right to retain possession of the movable until he is paid. However,
the right of retention is conditioned upon the execution of work upon the movable. The
creation of a mechanic's lien does not depend upon the owner's nonpayment. Rather, the
contractor "creates" his or her own lien by performing the work or furnishing the materials.
As a result of the failure to accomplish the repairs on the truck, the right to retain the
truck in accordance with Article 1731 did not arise. Optimums continuous possession or

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detention of the truck turned to be that of a deforciant and so respondent has every right to
recover possession of it. From another perspective, Optimum is obliged to take care of the
truck with the proper diligence of a good father to a family while the same is in its
possession. Records show that the subject truck had already deteriorated while in the
possession of Optimum. Taking into consideration the last known condition of the truck in
tandem with the fact that the court proceedings have spanned almost a decade, it can be
readily inferred that the truck has become wholly useless. Since restitution is no longer
feasible, Optimum is bound to pay the value of the truck.

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