OBLIGATION AND CONTRACTS CASE DIGESTS 1

PEOPLE V. RITTER 194 SCRA 690

FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in
a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he
inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie
200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina.
Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from
her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling.
Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to
remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply
embedded and covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending
physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made
liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty of rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age.
As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also
testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different
from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the
object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her
vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to
the victims heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.

LEUNG BEN VS. OBRIEN

April 6, 1918

FACTS: On December 12, 1917, an action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila by P.J. OBrien to recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000, all alleged to have been
lost by the plaintiff to the defendant in a series of gambling, banking, and percentage
games conducted during the two or three months prior to the institution of the suit. The
plaintiff asked for an attachment against the property of the defendant, on the ground that
the latter was about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors. This
attachment was issued. The provision of law under which this attachment was issued
requires that there should be a cause of action arising upon contract, express or implied.
The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money lost at
gaming is not such an action as is contemplated in this provision, and he insists that the
original complaint shows on its face that the remedy of attachment is not available in aid
thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the
writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by
appeal or otherwise; and that consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate
remedy for this relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming is an
obligation arising from contract, express or implied.

RULING: Yes. In permitting the recovery money lost at play, Act No. 1757 has introduced
modifications in the application of Articles 1798, 1801, and 1305 of the Civil Code.
The first two of these articles relate to gambling contracts, while article 1305 treats of the
nullity of contracts proceeding from a vicious or illicit consideration. Taking all these
provisions together, it must be apparent that the obligation to return money lost at play
has a decided affinity to contractual obligation; and the Court believes that it could,
without violence to the doctrines of the civil law, be held that such obligations is an
innominate quasi-contract.
It is however, unnecessary to place the decision on this ground. In the opinion of the
Court, the cause of action stated in the complaint in the court below is based on a
contract, express or implied, and is therefore of such nature that the court had authority to
issue the writ of attachment. The application for the writ of certiorari must therefore be
denied and the proceedings dismissed.

PEOPLE V. PEDRO ABUNGAN

G.R. NO. 136843
Accused was convicted of murder. He died pending appeal.
HELD:
The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction
extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities (civil liability ex delicto) arising from the delict
or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed.
However, it must be added that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation
other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his
estate, as may be warranted by law or procedural rules.
BRINAS VS. PEOPLE
(125 SCRA 687)
Facts: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the
railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo. The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon.
They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about 2pm. Upon approaching
Barrio Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down and the conductor, accused-appellant,
Clemente Brinas, shouted Lusacan, Lusacan!
The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with one hand and holding
her baggage with the other. When they were near the door, the train suddenly picked up
speed. The old woman and the child stumbled from the train causing them to fall down the
tracks and were hit by an oncoming train, causing their instant death.
A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver, Hermogenes Buencamino,
the assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for Double Homicide thru Reckless
Imprudence. But the lower court acquitted Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA,
respondent CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the accused-appellant was negligent?
Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the
conclusion drawn from the findings.
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and
buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor
announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the
train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest
exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a
train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to
disembark; there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped. The appellant was
negligent because his announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full 3
minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. The premature
announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit.
Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective
seats when the train jerked and picked up speed. The proximate cause of the death of the
victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant.

PEOPLES CAR VS COMMANDO SECURITY G.R. L-36840 MAY 22, 1973

FACTS:
Peoples Car entered into a contract with Commando Security to safeguard and protect the
business premises of the plaintiff from theft, pilferage, robbery, vandalism, and all other
unlawful acts of any person/s prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiff.
On April 5, 1970, around 1:00am, defendants security guard on duty at plaintiffs
premises, without any authority, consent, approval, or orders of the plaintiff and/or
defendant brought out the compound of the plaintiff a car belonging to its customer and
drove said car to a place or places unknown, abandoning his post and while driving the car
lost control of it causing it to fall into a ditch.
As a result, the car of plaintiffs customer, which had been left with plaintiff for servicing
and maintenance, suffered extensive damage besides the car rental value for a car that
plaintiff had to rent and make available to its customer, Joseph Luy, to enable him to
pursue his business and occupation.
Plaintiff instituted a claim against defendant for the actual damages it incurred due to the
unlawful act of defendants personnel citing paragraph 5 of the contract wherein
defendant accepts sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch hours.
Defendant claimed that they may be liable but its liability is limited under paragraph 4 of
the contract which provides that its liability shall not exceed P1,000 per guard post for loss
or damage through the negligence of its guards during the watch hours provided that it is
reported within 24 hours of the incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is obliged to indemnify the plaintiff for the entire
costs as result of the incident

HELD: Yes. Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the
customers car, which had been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law
justified in making good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its
contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had been caused directly
by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendants security guard in breach of their
contract.
Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer that under the Guard Service Contract it was not
liable for the damage but the defendant since the customer could not hold defendant to
account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant.

SAGRADA ORDEN VS NACOCO G.R. NO. L-3756 JUNE 30, 1952

FACTS:
The land in question belongs to plaintiff Sagrada Orden in whose name the title was
registered before the war
On January 4, 1943, during the Japanese military occupation, the land was acquired by a
Japanese corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho
After liberation on April 4, 1946, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of
America took possession, control, and custody of the property pursuant to the Trading with
the Enemy Act
The property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under a custodian
agreement with US Alien Property Custodian. When it vacated the property, it was
occupied by defendant National Coconut Corporation
The plaintiff made claim to the said property before the Alien Property Custodian. Alien
Property Custodian denied such claim
It bought an action in court which resulted to the cancellation of the title issued in the
name of Taiwan Tekkosho which was executed under threats, duress, and intimidation;
reissuance of the title in favor of the plaintiff; cancellation of the claims, rights, title,
interest of the Alien property Custodian; and occupant National Coconut Corporations
ejection from the property. A right was also vested to the plaintiff to recover from the
defendants rentals for its occupation of the land from the date it vacated.
Defendant contests the rental claims on the defense that it occupied the property in good
faith and under no obligation to pay rentals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is obliged to pay rentals to the plaintiff

HELD: No. Nacoco is not liable to pay rentals prior the judgment. If defendant-appellant is
liable at all, its obligations, must arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namley,
law, contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Spanish Civil Code.)
Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises
and occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control and
administration thereof, the Allien Property Administration. Neither was there any
negligence on its part.

PELAYO VS LAURON
FACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child
delivery of the daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services
rendered by him was P500.00 which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any
good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as
against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs.
The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their
daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive,
she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house, that on the day she
gave birth she was in the house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and
due to fortuitous circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical
assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law.
HELD:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are
created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not
presumed. Those expressly determined in the Code or in special law, etc., are the only
demandable ones.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the
mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided
by the law or the Code. Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical
assistance rendered to the defendants daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.
In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is especially established by
the law and the compliance therewith is unavoidable.

PICHEL V. ALONZO
Facts:
Respondent Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of land in
Basilan City in accordance with Republic Act No. 477. The award was cancelled by the
Board of Liquidators on January 27, 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto, plaintiff
was proved to have alienated the land to another, in violation of law. In 1972, plaintiff's
rights to the land were reinstated.
On August 14, 1968, plaintiff and his wife sold to defendant Luis Pichel all the fruits of the
coconut trees which may be harvested in the land in question for the period, September
15, 1968 to January 1, 1976, in consideration of P4,200.00. Even as of the date of sale,
however, the land was still under lease to one, Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that
part of the consideration of the sale, in the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid by defendant
directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the clutches of the latter. Pending
said payment plaintiff refused to allow the defendant to make any harvest. In July 1972,
defendant for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale in his favor, caused the
harvest of the fruit of the coconut trees in the land.
Alonzo filed for the annulment of the contract on the ground that it violated the provisions
of R.A. 477, which states that lands awarded under the said law shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation, otherwise the awardee shall no longer be entitled to apply for
another piece of land. The lower court ruled that the contract, which it held as a contract
of lease, is null and void.
Issues:
(1) Whether the respondent had the right or authority to execute the "Deed of Sale" in
1968, his award having been cancelled previously by the Board of Liquidators on January
27, 1965
(2) Whether the contract is one for lease of the land, or for sale of coconut fruits
(3) Whether the contract is an encumbrance as contemplated by R.A. 477
Held:
(1) Until and unless an appropriate proceeding for reversion is instituted by the State, and
its reacquisition of the ownership and possession of the land decreed by a competent
court, the grantee cannot be said to have been divested of whatever right that he may
have over the same property. Herein respondent is not deemed to have lost any of his
rights as grantee during the period material to the case at bar, i.e., from the cancellation
of the award in 1965 to its reinstatement in 1972. Within said period, respondent could
exercise all the rights pertaining to a grantee.
(2) A perusal of the deed fails to disclose any ambiguity or obscurity in its provisions, nor
is there doubt as to the real intention of the contracting parties. The terms of the
agreement are clear and unequivocal, hence the literal and plain meaning thereof should
be observed. The document in question expresses a valid contract of sale. It has the
essential elements of a contract of sale. The subject matter of the contract of sale in
question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the land during the years from September
15, 1968 up to January 1, 1976, which subject matter is a determinate thing. Under Article
1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a potential existence may be the object of the
contract of sale. Pending crops which have potential existence may be the subject matter
of sale. The essential difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things is that

the delivery of the thing sold transfers ownership, while in lease no such transfer of
ownership results as the rights of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the
thing leased.
The contract was clearly a "sale of the coconut fruits." The vendor sold, transferred and
conveyed "by way of absolute sale, all the coconut fruits of his land," thereby divesting
himself of all ownership or dominion over the fruits during the seven-year period. The
possession and enjoyment of the coconut trees cannot be said to be the possession and
enjoyment of the land itself because these rights are distinct and separate from each
other, the first pertaining to the accessory or improvements (coconut trees) while the
second, to the principal (the land). A transfer of the accessory or improvement is not a
transfer of the principal. It is the other way around, the accessory follows the principal.
Hence, the sale of the nuts cannot be interpreted nor construed to be a lease of the trees,
much less extended further to include the lease of the land itself.
The grantee of a parcel of land under R.A. No. 477 is not prohibited from alienating or
disposing of the natural and/or industrial fruits of the land awarded to him. What the law
expressly disallows is the encumbrance or alienation of the land itself or any of the
permanent improvements thereon. Permanent improvements on a parcel of land are
things incorporated or attached to the property in a fixed manner, naturally or artificially.
They include whatever is built, planted or sown on the land which is characterized by
fixity, immutability or immovability. Houses, buildings, machinery, animal houses, trees
and plants would fall under the category of permanent improvements, the alienation or
encumbrance of which is prohibited. The purpose of the law is not violated when a grantee
sells the produce or fruits of his land. On the contrary, the aim of the law is thereby
achieved, for the grantee is encouraged and induced to be more industrious and
productive, thus making it possible for him and his family to be economically self-sufficient
and to lead a respectable life. At the same time, the Government is assured of payment on
the annual installments on the land. We agree with herein petitioner that it could not have
been the intention of the legislature to prohibit the grantee from selling the natural and
industrial fruits of his land, for otherwise, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein the
grantee would not be able to receive and enjoy the fruits of the property in the real and
complete sense.

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA
SALETTE, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990]

TOPIC: Concept of Quasi-Delict, Scope, Intentional Acts

NATURE: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS:
1. Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Silang, Cavite
a. Land is adjacent to the land of private respondent Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc.,(MOLLSI) a religious corporation.
2. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed,
a. This allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
i. caused a young man to drown,
ii. damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
iii. washed away costly fences,
iv. endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
3. Andamo spouses instituted a criminal action before the RTC of Cavite against Efren
Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code
4. Andamos filed another action against MOLLSI, this time a civil case for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
a. MOLLSI filed an answer and opposed to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
b. TC issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until
after judgment in the criminal case.
5. Andamo spouses appealed the order to the IAC
a. IAC affimed the order

b. MR denied

ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an
adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently
of the criminal case.

HELD: YES. IAC DECISION REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TC ordered to proceed with the
civil case independently of the criminal case.
1. the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
a. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
i. damages suffered by the plaintiff,
ii. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and
iii. the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
2. In the present case: the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of
a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
3. Samson vs. Dionisio:
a. the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code, ruling that:
"any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the
flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing
loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to
the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment
of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
b. Applying in the present case: the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa
aquiliana.
4. adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that
each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon
the rights and interests of others.

a. An owner may build structures in his own land but such must be all constructed
and maintained using all reasonable care
b. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third
person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
5. Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage
caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.
a. "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
b. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary.
6. The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
a. Report of the Code Commission: "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of
criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ...
7. Castillo vs. Court of Appeals: a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality
that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual.
a. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
b. The acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the
court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not

exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability.
8. Azucena vs. Potenciano: "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal
case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles
to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would
render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."

TAN VS. NITAFAN

G.R. No. 76965. March 11, 1994.*
Remedial Law; Prescription; Prescription may be pleaded in a motion to dismiss if
the complaint shows on its face that the action had already prescribed at the time it was
filed.This petition for certiorari must fail. For, prescription may be effectively pleaded in
a motion to dismiss only if the complaint shows on its face that the action had already
prescribed at the time it was filed. But this is not the situation here. On the contrary, the
applicable prescriptive period in this case is, at most, dubitable. While petitioners contend
that it is four (4) years hence the cause of action of private respondents already
prescribed, the trial court ruled that it was coterminous with the crime so that, in this case
where the accused were charged with murder, the prescriptive period for the offense
being twenty (20) years, the action had not yet prescribed it having been instituted less
than ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued.
Same; Same; The resolution in G.R. No. 69418 having already attained finality,
becomes the law of the case as to the issue of prescription.Be that as it may, in G.R. No.
69418 we already affirmed the ruling of the trial court that prescription had not yet set in,
albeit in a minute resolution. But, it is axiomatic that when a minute resolution denies or
dismisses a petition for lack of merit, the challenged decision or order, together with its
findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. Correspondingly, the
impression that no legal rule was enunciated in G.R. No. 69418, as espoused by
petitioners, is wrong and must be corrected. The resolution in G.R. No. 69418 having
already attained finality, it becomes the law of the case as to the issue of prescription,
which simply means that if an appellate court has passed upon a legal question and
remanded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus
determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent
appeal given the same case and substantially the same facts. The law of the case, as
applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the
courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is necessary to enable an
appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be
impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in
the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal. Thus, the matter on prescription in
the case before us is already a settled issue, now long dead to be revived. Corollary
thereto, the issue of whether a cause of action exists against petitioners who were
acquitted was already adjudicated in G.R. No. 67029, hence, is now the law of the case, at
least insofar as that issue is concerned.

Same; Same; Res Judicata; Conclusiveness of judgment; Res judicata as a rule on

conclusiveness of judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the
matters actually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein.Perforce,
the finality of our denial of Velez motion to dismiss, which relied heavily on prescription,
must also apply to petitioners who have joined cause with Velez on the same issue.
Consequently, they are now precluded from contesting the validity of that denial even on
the pretext that what is being questioned in the instant petition is the denial of their
motion to dismiss of 28 January 1986, and not the previous motion of Velez. After all,
petitioners are raising under the same factual backdrop the very issue of prescription as
Velez did in G.R. No. 69418. The less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res
judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the
judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually
determined therein or which were necessarily included therein. And prescription was one
of the grounds raised in G.R. No. 69418. Courts frown upon litigants reiterating identical
motions in the hope that they would entertain a possible change of opinion in the future.
Tan vs. Nitafan, 231 SCRA 129, G.R. No. 76965 March 11, 1994