Scots Philosophical Association

University of St. Andrews

Review
Reviewed Work(s): Scepticism, Rules and Language. by G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker
Review by: Edward Craig
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 35, No. 139 (Apr., 1985), pp. 212-214
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and
the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219352
Accessed: 06-12-2016 01:35 UTC
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212 BOOK REVIEWS

Scepticism, Rules and Language. BY G. P

Blackwell, 1984. Pp. xiii + 140. Pr

This book consists of three essays. T

obvious advantages in having them
attack on what might be called the K

following a rule, aiming to show that i

philosophy. Roughly speaking, the fi

which Kripke made, of course, only w

purely philosophical criticism: the s

trivial, and the "sceptical solution" of

essay Baker and Hacker take up what

but still, the piece is not quite so depe

imply. In it, the authors try to explain

in the plan of the Philosophical Investi

"internal relation" between rules and th

a trivial muddle should have engaged

On the exegetical point Baker and H

the manuscript sources of the Investig

account of paragraphs 201-2. Here the

It appears unlikely, after what they say

the relation to the private language ar

they were meant as a reference to th

problem.
There are problems, to be sure, about the exact location of Baker and Hacker's
target. They certainly write as if it were primarily Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and

Private Language, though in the second essay they also have certain remarks by
Wright and Peacocke in their sights. But that makes it mysterious that they should
concentrate their attention on a form of the problem which is sceptical in the
epistemological sense, one that finds the trouble in our alleged inability to know what
rule is being followed. Kripke went out of his way to say that this is not how he sees
the matter; for him the problem is ontological: what sort of fact could it be that makes

it true that I am following one rule rather than another? Only if their opponents
inferred the latter from the former by a verificationist move would it be right to
proceed as Baker and Hacker (mostly) do. And Kripke, at least, does not; he takes the
ontological point to be basic:
... it is clear that the sceptical challenge is not really an epistemological
one. It purports to show that nothing in my mental history or past behaviour
- not even what an omniscient God would know - could establish whether I

meant plus or quus. But then it appears to follow that there was no fact
about me that constituted my having meant plus rather than quus. (Kripke

p. 21)
This raises two queries. First, it makes one doubt the force of one of Baker and
Hacker's arguments on the exegetical line. Wittgenstein, so it runs, was manifestly no

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BOOK REVIEWS 213

friend of scepticism, and it is therefore a

new sceptical point at the heart of his tho

are dealing with the sceptic of the "we c

who tells us that the fact that p can't be t
doesn't sound very un-Wittgensteinian at

Baker and Hacker leave the interpretatio

of rule-scepticism per se, the suspicion ar

Their insistence on the epistemological

shots pass straight over Kripke's posit

Kripke, in setting up the rule-following

will license a derivative cognitive claim".
leave, would indeed have been a howler; bu

not of cognitive claims, but of the condition

meaning. So it is not surprising that he

nothing at all to do with the thought tha

have to adduce evidence which entails w

Other features of their case also sugges
touch with Kripke's thought. They quot
with the sceptic, that there is no fact as
they reply, is quite wrong; Wittgenstein

admit". But reference to the context of

Kripke was well aware of the objection,
warning the reader of its dangers. All
ignore.

One final example. Baker and Hacker make play with the notion that the explanation I give of what rule I am applying decisively identifies it:

... it is a conceptual truth that I am entitled to judge someone to mean W

by "W" ... on the grounds of the explanation of W he gives. (p. 36)
There is no indication that Kripke has been over this ground (Kripke pp. 15-16), and
they make no attempt to respond to his response. It is possible, of course, that this
apparent omission reflects their choice of epistemological scepticism as being the
central issue. If so, their feeling that Kripke has not answered the claim just quoted
may well be right - but that does not strengthen their case against him.
The fact is that Baker and Hacker do not address themselves to the ontological
question, so there is no discussion of the arguments given by Kripke to show that no

conceivable fact about the individual will suffice to constitute his having meant
addition by "plus". It is possible that they feel free to ignore this question; they do
after all insist that there is no need for such a fact - the correspondence between
language and reality does not work in that way. But then the "sceptical solution" takes
that line as well, so that can hardly be the point at issue between them and Kripke.

The disagreement seems rather to lie in something much stronger which Baker and
Hacker also hold, namely that the question what someone means by something calls
for no grounds or assertibility conditions at all. This claim is more easily made in the
first person case than the third:

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214 BOOK REVIEWS

... there are no more grounds for my s

are grounds, assertibility conditions,
tomorrow" or "I want a drink". (p. 3

Possibly. But if "I mean W by 'W"' is to imp

or that he means the same as he previo

something more to it than just his sincer

about that, I am not clear why; and if they ag

be involved, or why they think they hav

than whole-hearted "sceptical solution".
Right or wrong, Kripke's book put the de
and clarity. Regretfully, I can only concl
again. It is somewhat disconcerting to find
pair of authors writing so near to their are
To me, Baker and Hacker seem like a man
the street empty, berates his neighbour
already round the first corner, or even t
especially concerning the alleged commun
believe. If so, they come not from missin
from seeing that and more, and so getting
map.

Churchill College, Cambridge EDWARD CRAIG

Personal Identity. BY SYDNEY SHOEMAKER AND RICHARD SWIN

Blackwell, 1984. Pp. 158. Price ?15, Pb. ?5.50.)

This book is the first issue in Blackwell's new series, Great D

which aims to provide introductions to a number of importa
philosophy in the form of a debate. Richard Swinburne argu

personal identity through time is strict and unanalysable, thoug

logical continuity, especially the continuity of memory, provid

identity, while Sydney Shoemaker argues that personal identity

tuted by psychological continuity, a view which he sees as entai

ist theory of mental states. The book concludes with a reply b

the contribution of the other.

Both philosophers write with great clarity, and there is m

book as an introduction to the issue. Nevertheless, in two fun
book is unsatisfactory. The first is that far too much of the d

the mind/body problem rather than to the issue of perso

Swinburne claims that the view that personal identity is strict

"simple" view) "amounts to the same as Cartesian dualism

consequently devotes considerable space to argument for dua

obliged to consider this argument, even though he wonder

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