DAVID VS MACAPAGAL-AAROYO

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent
or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care"
power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP
and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial
law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed
by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual
basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the
President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend
the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State
of National Emergency.
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the
Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal
significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state
of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,

a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise
of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national
emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the
President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second,
manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23
(2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

There must be a war or other emergency.

The delegation must be for a limited period only.
The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it refers
to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable
terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017,
this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business

affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence
of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have
not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It
is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said
PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in
part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the
following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo DDay, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations,
the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and
do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
AMPATUAN VS PUNO
Facts:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO
273-A, which amended the former AO (the term transfer used in AO 273 was amended to
delegate, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy
Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the Presidents proclamation and orders encroached on
the ARMMs autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs
operations and to seize the regional governments powers. They also claimed that the President had
no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and
the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops
and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers.
Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:
1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under
the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions
Held:
1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the
powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into
custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner
Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec.
12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional
Assembly, petitioner SahaliGenerale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did
not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.
2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
3. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the
power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution
entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without
factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several
factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that
the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also
prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might

decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the
state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and
decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling
out power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were
placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG
Secretary had no basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too
grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places
mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both highpowered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears
and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed
forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the
subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there
have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents actions.
BAYAN VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
I.

THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total
membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must

be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For
as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.

FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To
further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in
the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification,
the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations,
citizens and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents
grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may
be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a

treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by
the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
Ruling:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops
or facilities should apply in the instant case.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the
Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senate by the other contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a
wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the
Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence
of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military
bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common
ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that
Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.