J L J 2B 2016-2017

TITLE

ISSUE

DOCTRINE

ATOK BIG-WEDGE COMPANY v. IAC

Whose right to the land should,

therefore, prevail: the mining
claimants or that of an
applicant
for
land
registration? Does the mere
recording or location of a
mining claim ipso facto and
irreversibly convert the land
into
mineral
land,
notwithstanding the fact that
the mining claimant failed to
comply with the strict work
requirement
under
the
Philippine Bill of 1902?

THE APPLICANT FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 contained provisions for, among many other things,
the open and free exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral deposits and the
land where they may be found. It declared all valuable mineral deposits in public lands
in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed x x x to be free and open to
exploration, occupation, and purchase, and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said Islands x x x.
The recording of a mining claim only operates to reserve to the registrant
exclusive rights to undertake mining activities upon the land subject of the claim. The
power to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been intended under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone who records a mining claim. In fact,
this strengthens our holding that the rights of a mining claimant are confined to
possessing the land for purposes of extracting therefrom minerals in exclusion of any
or all other persons whose claims are subsequent to the original mining locator. Thus,
if no minerals are extracted therefrom, notwithstanding the recording of the claim, the
land is not mineral land and registration thereof is not precluded by such recorded
claim. Thus, in the case at bench, the mining claimant, who had failed to comply with
the annual minimum labor requirement, could not, all the more, be expected to have
extracted minerals from the mining location. Utter lack of proof of even its potential
deposits on the part of the petitioner, thus, does not surprise us at all.
Thus, it can be said (1) that the rights under the Philippine Bill of 1902 of a
mining claim holder over his claim has been made subject by the said Bill itself to the
strict requirement that he actually performs work or undertakes improvements on the
mine every year and does not merely file his affidavit of annual assessment, which
requirement was correctly identified and declared in E.O. No. 141; and (2) that the
same rights have been terminated by P.D. No. 1214, a police power enactment, under
which non-application for mining lease amounts to waiver of all rights under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and application for mining lease amounts to waiver of the right
under said Bill to apply for patent. In the light of these substantial conditions upon the
rights of a mining claim holder under the Philippine Bill of 1902, there should remain
no doubt now that such rights were not, in the first place, absolute or in the nature of
ownership, and neither were they intended to be so.

DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS

MULTIPURPOSE ASSOC. v. DENR

(1) WHETHER OR NOT

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942
(PH MINING ACT) AND
THE CAMC FTAA ARE
VOID BECAUSE THEY
ALLOW THE UNJUST AND
UNLAWFUL TAKING OF
PROPERTY
WITHOUT

(1) NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the
foreign-owned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the
specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on
behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to
proceed to fully implement the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for at this

J L J 2B 2016-2017
PAYMENT
OF
JUST
COMPENSATION
,
IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 9,
ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE
STATE,
THROUGH
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942
AND THE CAMC FTAA,
ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE
FULL
CONTROL
AND
SUPERVISION
OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES.

stage since there are still various avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other
than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the
implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from violating the AntiDummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules
and regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private
properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide
for the payment of just compensation.
(2) RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining operations.
The following provisions thereof establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial
rights over mining operations and institute reportorial requirements.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a
passive regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the
government agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to
influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding
minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and
utilization phases of the mining enterprise.

PEOPLE v. QUE

Appellant argues that he

cannot be convicted for
violation of Section 68 of P.D.
705 because E.O. 277 which
amended Section 68 to
penalize the possession of
timber or other forest products
without the proper legal
documents did not indicate the
particular documents necessary
to make the possession
legal. Neither did the other
forest laws and regulations
existing at the time of its
enactment.

Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products
Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.
Appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those
laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O.
277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law
inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase

J L J 2B 2016-2017
should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession
of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993
specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products.
Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the
crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
4

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS v CA

Whether or not the mayor of a

town has a right to stop the
operations of Technology
Developers.

HENARES v LTFRB

Whether or not LTFRB can be

compelled by Mandamus to
order the motor vehicles to use
CNG.

YES.
No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining
whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition
of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it
must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.
NO.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law
as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC
to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by
E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates
of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results
of the DOTC surveys.
In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission
standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor
vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose
mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

MMDA v. JANCOM

Whether or not there was a

valid contract between the
government and JANCOM
despite lack of the Presidents
signature and non-compliance
w/ the conditions precedent

YES.
The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the Civil
Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only allege that
there was no valid notice of award; the contract does not bear the signature of the
President; the conditions precedent specified in the contract were not complied with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the governments fault; though the
President did not sign, his alter-ego did; and anyway his signature was only necessary
for the effectivity of the contract, not its perfection; and that the two-month period
within which Jancom should comply with the conditions had not yet started to run
because the contract had not yet taken effect, precisely because of the absence of the

J L J 2B 2016-2017
7

CALANZA v. PICOP

Do provincial governors have

the right to issue small scale
mining permits?

SOUTHEAST
MINDANAO
GOLD
MINING CORP. v. BALITE PORTAL
MINING COOP

Whether or not the "direct

state utilization scheme"
espoused in MO 9703 divested petitioner of its
vested right to the gold rush
area under its EP No. 133.

REPUBLIC v. MARCOPPER MINING

CORP.

The Court of Appeals erred in

ruling that Republic Act No.
7942 (otherwise known as the

Presidents signature.
NO.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of small-scale miners are processed
with the Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. Pursuant to Republic Act
No. 7076, which took effect on 18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining
permits and for mining contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
Board. Composed of the DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale
mining sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a representative
from an environmental group, this body is tasked to approve small-scale mining
permits and contracts.
In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their small-scale mining permits on 23
August 1991, making them bound by the procedures provided for under the applicable
and prevailing statute, Republic Act No. 7076. Instead of processing and obtaining
their permits from the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to
get the same from the governor of Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is
without legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and
void.
No. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy
in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that
what was directed hereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing
else. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or
profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but
simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility.
Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any
permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract
and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing
police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands
of
the general
welfare. Additionally, there can
be no valid opposition raised
against a mere study of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is
authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the
1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of
the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources,
by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified
entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of
the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the
constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded
from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in
sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush.
The applicable and governing law in this petition is Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise
known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Mining Act, approved on March 3,
1995). Chapter XI of the Mining Act contains a series of provisions relating to safety

J L J 2B 2016-2017
Philippine Mining Act of
1995) repealed the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3931, as
amended
by
Presidential
Decree No. 984, (otherwise
known as the National
Pollution Control Decree of
1976), with respect to the
power and function of
petitioner
Pollution
Adjudication Board to issue,
renew or deny permits for the
discharge of the mine tailings.

and environmental protection on mining and quarrying operations. More

specifically, Section 67 of the Mining Act in essence, grants the mines regional director
the power to issue orders or to take appropriate measures to remedy any practice
connected with mining or quarrying operations which is not in accordance with safety
and anti-pollution laws and regulations.
From a reading of that provision, it would appear therefore that prior to the passage of
the Mining Act, the Pollution Adjudication Board had jurisdiction to act on pollutionrelated matters in the mining business. With the effectivity of the Mining Act and in
congruence with its Sec. 115 (i.e., Repealing and Amending Clause), the power to
impose measures against violations of environmental policies by mining operators is
now vested on the mines regional director. Be that as it may, we are constrained to
enunciate that the PAB had no authority to issue the challenged Order dated 23 April
1997. More so, respondent PAB as petitioner argued and We note, had remained
perplexingly silent on the matter for almost six (6) years from July 1991 when MMC
ceased to make its deposits up to April 1997 when respondent PAB precipitately
issued the Order requiring MMC to pay its arrears in deposits to the ETF. And PAB,
apparently oblivious to MMCs economic quandary had issued said Order exparte without hearing or notice.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law, expressly or
impliedly, provides for another forum, as in the instant petition.
Thus under Republic Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, the
mines regional director, in consultation with the Environmental Management
Bureau (italics ours), is specifically mandated to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy that the State shall promote the rational exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of all mineral resources in public and private
lands within the territory and exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the
Philippines, through the combined efforts of government and the private sector in
order to enhance national growth and protect the rights of affected communities. (Sec.
2, R.A. 7942). It bears mention that the Pollution Adjudication Board has the power to
issue an ex-parte order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment
exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the
country. (Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., 195 SCRA
112). However, with the passage of R.A. 7942, insofar as the regulation, monitoring
and enforcement of anti-pollution laws are concerned with respect to mining
establishments, the Mines Regional Director has a broad grant of power and
authority. Clearly, pollution-related issues in mining operations are addressed to the
Mines Regional Director, not the Pollution Adjudication Board.

J L J 2B 2016-2017
10

NARRA NICKEL MINING & DEVT

CORP.
ET
AL.
v.
REDMONT
CONSOLIDATED MINES

In mining disputes, the POA has jurisdiction to pass upon the nationality of
applications for MPSAs. Petitioners also scoffed at this Courts decision to uphold the
jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) since the POAs determination of petitioners nationalities
is supposedly beyond its limited jurisdiction. Indeed, as the POA has jurisdiction to
entertain "disputes involving rights to mining areas," it necessarily follows that the
POA likewise wields the authority to pass upon the nationality issue involving
petitioners, since the resolution of this issue is essential and indispensable in the
resolution of the main issue, i.e., the determination of the petitioners' right to the
mining areas through MPSAs.
Application of the Grandfather Rule. Based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion,
the Grandfather Rule or the second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40
Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture
corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino
stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either 6040% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40
Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply.
[P]etitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino since MBMI, a 100%
Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is
derived from grandfathering petitioners corporate owners. xxx Noticeably, the
ownership of the layered corporations boils down to xxx group wherein MBMI has
joint venture agreements with, practically exercising majority control over the
corporations mentioned. In effect, whether looking at the capital structure or the
underlying relationships between and among the corporations, petitioners are NOT
Filipino nationals and must be considered foreign since 60% or more of their capital
stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI.

11

PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY

Whether or not the permanent

closure of the San Mateo
Landfill is mandated by RA
9003.

YES.
San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed. Proclamation No. 635 is illegal.
A mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure. The court also
held that the records of this case indicate two self-evident facts. The San Mateo site
has adversely affected its environs, and sources of water should always be protected.
Adverse effects of the site were reported as early as of June 1989. MMA was also
informed that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsite srendered
the location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible
with Laguna Lake Development Authoritys (LLDA) program of upgrading the water
quality of the Laguna Lake. Investigation Reports regarding the respiratory illnesses
among pupils of a primary school located approximately 100 meters from the site, as
well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the schools
playground were also submitted. Leachate treatment plant eroded twice already,
contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the residents.
The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-boso

J L J 2B 2016-2017
River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now. Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert
the garbage crisis, Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act to adopt
urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which adversely
affects the health and well-being of the population, food production, and
industrialization process. One of the issues the law sought to address was the
protection and conservation of watersheds. Respondents actions in the face of such
grave environmental consequences defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted that
instead of providing solutions, they have,with unmitigated callousness, worsened the
problem.
The Reorganization Act of the DENR defines and limits its powers over the countrys
natural resources. The Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192
entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation and our other natural treasures. Although the DENR owns the Marikina
Reserve, it is but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the
law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular
reference to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority. With great power
comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that the public respondents have
vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San Mateo site, but have
deftly ignored their corresponding responsibility as guardians and protectors of this
tormented piece of land.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent
either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
12

CHAM v. PIZARRO

*misrepresentation of Atty.
Pizarro that a parcel of land is
A & D.

In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications from the
DENR that the property is part of the public domain and not disposable as it is within
the Bataan National Park. Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 24 issued
on December 1, 1945, all properties of the public domain therein designated as part of
the Bataan National Park were withdrawn from sale, settlement or other disposition,
subject to private rights.
On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim
of having irrevocable rights and interests over the property which he could have
conveyed to complainant. E.g., he could have presented any document issued by the
government conferring upon him and his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged
predecessors-in-interest, with any such right or interest, but he presented none. He

J L J 2B 2016-2017
merely presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by a certain Jose R.
Monzon in his, Banzons and Zabalas favor on July 25, 1995, a month shy of the
execution on August 21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of complainant.
The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help his cause any
as neither tax receipts nor realty tax declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of
possession over realty unless supported by other effective proof. The presentation of a
tax declaration must indeed have been a pretext, as observed by the PENR in its
earlier-quoted portion of its letter-directive to the Balanga Municipal Assessor that the
area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and disposable land.
13

PICOP RESOURCES v. BASE MINERAL

RESOURCES

(1) the 2,756 hectares subject

of Base Metals MPSA are
closed to mining operations
except upon PICOPs written
consent pursuant to existing
laws, rules and regulations and
by virtue of the Presidential
Warranty;
(2) Is allowing mining
operations over a forest reserve
tantamount to changing its
classification from forest to
mineral land?
*Please see the issue on
presidential warranty

(1) NO.
Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is a government
reservation, defined as proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than
mineral reservations, such does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the
area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened
for mining applications upon prior written clearance by the government agency having
jurisdiction over such reservation.
Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than
mineral reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations. It
provides:
Sec. 6. Other Reservations.Mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral
reservations may be undertaken by the Department, subject to limitations as herein
provided. In the event that the Department cannot undertake such activities, they may
be undertaken by a qualified person in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary. The right to develop and utilize the minerals found
therein shall be awarded by the President under such terms and conditions as
recommended by the Director and approved by the Secretary: Provided,That the party
who undertook the exploration of said reservations shall be given priority. The mineral
land so awarded shall be automatically excluded from the reservation during the term
of the agreement: Provided, further, That the right of the lessee of a valid mining
contract existing within the reservation at the time of its establishment shall not be
prejudiced or impaired.
(2) Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but
only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in this case
that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves. Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the AgusanDavao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area is
absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of our
decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral
agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established under Proclamation 369,
the Court in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385,

J L J 2B 2016-2017
one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-DavaoSurigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau
of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau
of Mines and Geosciences.
Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include
the public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations. It
states:
Sec. 47. Mining Operations.Mining operations in forest lands shall be regulated and
conducted with due regard to protection, development and utilization of other surface
resources. Location, prospecting, exploration, utilization or exploitation of mineral
resources in forest reservations shall be governed by mining laws, rules and
regulations. No location, prospecting, exploration, utilization, or exploitation of
mineral resources inside forest concessions shall be allowed unless proper notice has
been served upon the licensees thereof and the prior approval of the Director, secured.
* Significantly, the above-quoted provision does not require that the consent of
existing licensees be obtained but that they be notified before mining activities may be
commenced inside forest concessions.
14

15

SPECIAL
CANDA

PEOPLE

LLDA v. CA
BINANGONAN

&

FOUNDATION

RTC

JUDGE

v.

OF

WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER

PETITIONERS
DUE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS
MANDATED
BY
RESPONDENTS FOR THE
ISSUANCE
OF
THE
CERTIFICATE OF NONCOVERAGE
(CNC)
APPLIED
FOR
BY
PETITIONER, IT IS NOW
THE RIPENED DUTY OF
RESPONDENTS, THROUGH
RESPONDENT
EMB
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TO
ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER

NO.

(1) Which agency of the

Government the Laguna
Lake Development Authority

The LLDA.

Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC
application when he made his finding. It is clear that his finding referred to the
"procedural requirements for review" only. He had still to decide on the substantive
aspect of the application, that is, whether the project and the project area were
considered critical to the environment. In fact, this was the reason why RD Lipayon
required the petitioner to submit certifications from the various government agencies
concerned. Surely, the required certifications were not mere formalities, because they
would serve as the bases for his decision on whether to grant or deny the application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with
the requirement to submit the needed certifications. For one, it submitted no
certification to the effect that the project site was not within a critical slope. Also, the
PHIVOLCSs certification showed that the project site had experienced an Intensity
VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place the site in the category of "areas
frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed
to establish that it had the legal right to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting the
denial of its application.

Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act

J L J 2B 2016-2017
or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction
over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?

No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On
the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish
corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone
of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting
the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local
Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically
expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no
intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority
constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
is a general law. We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake
Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has
its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the eight (8) major
river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km
basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater
portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute
one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of
policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This
is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious
management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological
integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy
geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable
development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources
by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have
foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to
govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management
policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over
specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the

J L J 2B 2016-2017
lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain
area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The
implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy,
therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." 5

16

ZAMORA v. CABALLERO

Whether or not the trial court

may issue a temporary
restraining order and
preliminary injunction to
enjoin the construction and
operation of the 29 decagonshaped steel poles or towers by
the NAPOCOR,
notwithstanding Presidential
Decree No. 1818.

The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted
for revenue purposes.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against
government infrastructure projects. In Garcia v. Burgos, Presidential Decree No. 1818
was held to prohibit courts from issuing an injunction against any infrastructure project
in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential government projects or
frustrate the economic development effort of the nation.
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are
actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application. In a
spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits
any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the
prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of
law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power
to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the
ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in
Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
consciousness among them.
To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondents failure to conduct prior
consultation with them, as the community affected by the project, in stark violation of
Section 27 of the Local Government Code which provides: "no project or program
shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned
are complied with, and prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned is observed."
From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners constitutionally
protected right to health and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated the
Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the affected communities
are veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a
TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law
divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal support
in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may

J L J 2B 2016-2017
be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual. (3a)
The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act
complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment
ineffectual.
Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of
NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify
the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction.
17

BUENDIA v. CITY OF ILIGAN

(1) Who has jurisdiction in the

dismissal of the respondents
Opposition and Appeal?
(2) Whether the court a quo
correctly ruled that since
respondent
had
already
acquired
by
acquisitive
prescription the right to
appropriate water from the
Ditucalan spring then the
NWRB no longer had any
jurisdiction to issue any water
right over the same water
source

(1) Time and again, this Court has upheld the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
deference to the specialized expertise of administrative agencies to act on certain
matters. As held by the Court in the case of Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:
. . . [I]f the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though
the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
Therefore, the question of as to who between the City of Iligan and Carlos Buendia has
the better right to the water source should have been left to the determination of the
NWRB via a timely protest filed during the pendency of the water permit applications.
However, said issue could not have been adjudicated upon by the NWRB since the
application was never properly contested. Hence, in the absence of a timely protest
filed before the NWRB, no water rights controversy arose wherein the NWRB can
properly discuss the substantial issues raised by respondent.
Furthermore, Articles 16 and 17 of the Water Code of the Philippines provide:
Art. 16. Any person who desires to obtain a water permit shall file an application with
the Council [now Board] who shall make known said application to the public for any
protests.
In determining whether to grant or deny an application, the Council [now Board] shall
consider the following: protests filed, if any; prior permits granted; the availability of
water; the water supply needed for beneficial use; possible adverse effects; land-use

J L J 2B 2016-2017
economics; and other relevant factors.
Upon approval of an application, a water permit shall be issued and recorded.
Art. 17. The right to the use of water is deemed acquired as of the date of filing of the
application for a water permit in case of approved permits, or as of the date of actual
use in a case where no permit is required. [Emphases ours]
From a reading of the above provisions, it is evident that after an application to obtain
a water permit has been made known to the public, any interested party must file his
protest thereto, in order that the application may be properly evaluated. Otherwise,
after the application for a water permit has been approved, the grantee of the permit
now acquires an exclusive right to use the water source, reckoned from the date of the
filing of the applications. Thus, after petitioners right to the water permit has been
properly adjudicated, respondent may no longer belatedly question said
(2) As to the issue of acquisitive prescription, the Court cannot now accept hook, line,
and sinker the lower courts findings on the issue based on two reasons. First, said
determination was not passed upon by the agency that exercises original jurisdiction to
settle said question of fact, which brings us to the conclusion that the court a
quo should have declined to decide on the matter. Second, such determination is
contradicted by the allegations made by the City of Iligan in a previous case that has
become final involving the same parties. It has been established in the decision] of the
RTC of Lanao del Norte, Branch 1, entitled, Buendia v. City of Iligan, and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that respondent entered petitioners property only in 1974 and
constructed an in-take dam thereon for purposes of appropriating water from the spring
only in 1978. According to the said decision:
On the other hand, the defendant City of Iligans allegations that its entry and clearing
over the area in1974 was acted upon in good faith as allowed by the administratrix of
the estate of plaintiffs father in the person of Aurea Buendia is right. But its failure
later on to obtain the consent and knowledge of the true owner when it constructed the
in-take dam over the land in 1978 constitute bad faith
Therefore, based on respondents previous allegations, the ICWSS cannot be said to
have acquired a right to the use of the water source by acquisitive prescription, since it
only entered the premises two (2) years before the enactment of the Water Code of the
Philippines and only eighteen (18) years before petitioner applied with the NWRB for
water permits. Furthermore, respondents alleged exercise of its right to appropriate the
water source since 1927 is negated by its belated application with the NWRB for water
permits. If indeed the City of Iligan has the right to appropriate water from the spring
located inside petitioners property, then respondent would not have filed said
application after the water permits over said water source have already been issued to
petitioner.

J L J 2B 2016-2017
18

REMMAN ENTERPRISES v. CA

Issue on damages

The factual findings of the court a quo rightly support its conclusions on this respect Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's allegations not well-taken.
Appellant contends that actual and compensatory damages require evidentiary proof,
and there being no evidence presented as to the necessity of the award for damages, it
was erroneous for the lower court to have made such award. It must be remembered
that after the ocular inspection, the court a quo rendered an inventory of dead and
rotten trees and plants found in appellee's property. Appellee also testified on the
approximate annual harvest and fair market value thereof. Significantly, no opposition
or controverting evidence was presented by appellant on the matter. Hence, appellant
is bound thereby and cannot now be heard to complain. As correctly held by the court
a quo:
An ocular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The inventory of the trees
damaged and the itemized valuation placed therein by private respondent after the
ocular inspection which is not rebutted by the petitioner, is the more accurate indicator
of the said amount prayed for as damages. If the valuation is indeed unreasonable,
petitioner should present controverting evidence of the fair market value of the crops
involved. The trial court held that the private respondent himself had been subjected to
extensive cross and re-cross examination by the counsel for the petitioner on the
amount of damages.

REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event.
Again cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opinions
expressed by the lower courts Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by
reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized,
rendering appellants liable for the ensuing damages. In National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 649 (1993), the
Supreme Court held: ella
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private
respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event
then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a
human factor - negligence or imprudence - had intervened. The effect then of
the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly,
resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was
thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts
of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property

J L J 2B 2016-2017
of appellee, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is
imperative. Under the Civil Code, it is provided:
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and
without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as
the stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will
increase the burden.
A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines
(P.D. No.1067), which provides:
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and
without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the
stone or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither
can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this
natural flow. marinella
As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural
easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally
and without the intervention of man descend from higher states.
However, where the waters which flow from a higher state are those
which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage
occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate
to compensation.[9]
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is directly
accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The negligence of REMMAN in
maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons has been satisfactorily established.
The extent of damages suffered by Lat remains unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.

19

LOVINA v. MORENO

Whether or not RA 2056 is

unconstitutional because it
invests the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications
with sweeping, unrestrained,

NO.
It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove
unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no
private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is

J L J 2B 2016-2017
final and unappealable
authority to pass upon the
issues of whether a river or
stream is public and navigable,
whether a dam encroaches
upon such waters and is
constitutive as a public
nuisance, and whether the law
applies to the state of facts,
thereby Constituting an alleged
unlawful delegation of judicial
power to the Secretary of
Public Works and
Communications

public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession

(Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves
the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its
previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial,
are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable
streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that
they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is
given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056,
section 2.
It thus appears that the delegation by Congress to executive or administrative
agencies of functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is
incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative
powers, is not in violation of the Separation of Powers so far as that principle
is recognized by the Federal Constitution nor is it in violation of due process
of law. (3 Willoughby on the Const. of the U.S., pp. 1654-1655)
The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private, rights
do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may
give to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence of facts which
call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners
and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate
facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws. (11 Am.
Jur., Const. Law, p. 950, sec. 235)
s. 237. Powers to determine cases within Statute. One important class of
cases in which discretion may properly be vested in administrative officers,
which class is almost an operation of the general rule relating to the
ascertainment of facts, consists of those cases in which a general rule or
prohibition is laid down and power is vested in an executive officer to
determine when particular cases do or do not fall within such rule or
prohibition. Power exercised under such statutes, calling for the exercise of
judgment in the execution of a ministerial act, is never judicial in nature
within the sense prohibited by the Constitution. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law,
sec. 237, p. 952)

20
21

TANJAY
WATER
GABOTON
FELICIANO v. GISON

DISTRICT

v.

*included in the report

Whether water districts are, by
law, GOCCs with original

YES.

J L J 2B 2016-2017
charter.

We find no merit in the petition and the petition in intervention, particularly in their
core position that water districts are private corporations, not GOCCs. The question is
a long-settled matter that LMWD and the Coalition seek to revive and to re-litigate in
their respective petitions.
In Feliciano, LMWD likewise claimed that it is a private corporation and therefore,
should not be subject to the audit jurisdiction of the COA. LMWD then argued that
P.D. No. 198 is not an "original charter" that would place the water districts within the
audit jurisdiction of the COA as defined in Section 2 (1), Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.[23] Neither did P.D. No. 198 expressly direct the creation of the water
districts. LMWD posited that the decree merely provided for their formation on an
optional or voluntary basis and what actually created the water districts is the approval
of the Sanggunian Resolution.[24] Significantly, these are the very same positions that
the LMWD and the Coalition (as petitioner-intervenor) submit in the present petition.
Our ruling in Feliciano squarely addressed the difference between a private
corporation created under general law and a GOCC created by a special charter, and
we need only to quote what Feliciano said:
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The
Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by
a general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is
to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain
individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special
charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist
only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a
general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can
qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, that general law is the
Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of
cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled
corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special
charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if

J L J 2B 2016-2017
such

corporations

are

government-owned

or

controlled.

Obviously, LWDs [referring to local water districts] are not private corporations
because they are not created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code
states that "[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x." LWDs have no articles of
incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no
stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all
corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The local
mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of
office. This Court has ruled that LWDs are not created under the Corporation Code,
thus:
From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been excluded from the
coverage of the CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation
Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said code, but on the
contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily
by its provision. (Emphasis supplied)" (Citations Omitted)[25]
Feliciano further categorically held that P.D. No. 198 constitutes the special charter by
virtue of which local water districts exist. Unlike private corporations that derive their
legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, water districts derive their legal
existence and power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6 of the decree in fact provides that
water districts "shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private
corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in, and subject to
such restrictions imposed under this Act." Therefore, water districts would not have
corporate powers without P.D. No. 198.

22

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. v. LLDA

Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies

As already mentioned above, the Court reiterated this ruling - i.e. that a water district is
a government-owned and controlled corporation with a special charter since it is
created pursuant to a special law, PD 198 - albeit with respect to the authority of the
COA to audit water districts, in De Jesus v. COA.[26]
xecutive Order No. 192 (EO 192) was issued on June 10, 1987 for the salutary purpose
of reorganizing the DENR, charging it with the task of promulgating rules and
regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution as well as of promulgating
ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels
of other pollutants and radiations. EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication
Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which took over the powers and
functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to the
adjudication of pollution cases, including the latters role as arbitrator for determining
reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR
Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would
be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best,

J L J 2B 2016-2017
speculative and presumptuous.
In fine, the assailed LLDA orders of January 21, 2008 and July 11, 2008 correctly
reckoned the two periods within which petitioner was found to have continued
discharging pollutive wastewater and applied the penalty as provided for under Article
VI, Section 32 of LLDA Resolution No. 33, Series of 1996. LLDAs explanation that
behind its inclusion of certain days in its computation of the imposable penalties that it
had already deducted not just the period during which the LLDA Laboratory
underwent rehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212
days) but had also excluded from the computation the period during which no
inspections or compliance monitorings were conducted (a period covering two years
and four months) is well-taken.
It is noted that during the hearing on June 19, 2007, the LLDA gave petitioner the
opportunity to submit within fifteen (15) days.any valid documents to show proof of its
non-operating dates that would be necessary for the possible reduction of the
accumulated daily penalties, but petitioner failed to comply therewith.
As earlier noted, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to which it attached Daily
Operation Reports and Certifications, which voluminous documents were,
however, unverified in derogation of Rule X, Section 2 of the 2004 Revised Rules,
Regulations and Procedures Implementing Republic Act No. 4850. Absent such
verification, the LLDA may not be faulted for treating such evidence to be purely selfserving.
23

LLDA v. CA & HON. ASISTIO JR.

The power and authority of the

LLDA to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the
dumping of garbage in the
Barangay Camarin over which
the City Government of
Caloocan
has
territorial
jurisdiction.

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another
forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration
and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue
of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned
declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or
enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the

J L J 2B 2016-2017
LLDA for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady
of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before
the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by
complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City
Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance
from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an
allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary
jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting
among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of
Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the
LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and
other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by
the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the
LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA
to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and exparte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of
Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in
P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to
draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in
question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance
of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon
the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section
4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall
commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program
within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

J L J 2B 2016-2017
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad
powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by
the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is
concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions
or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed,
resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then
the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to
issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
24

*LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. v.

RAMOS

*Lam niyo na yan

*GREEN PEACE SEA v. EMB DENR

25

SR METALS v. CA

Two questions are posed

before us. The first deals with
the constitutionality of Section
1, PD 1899 which, according
to the mining corporations
violates the equal protection
clause. They argue that there is
no substantial distinction
between the miners covered
under RA 7076, who can
extract as much ore as they
can, and those covered under
PD1899 who were imposed an
extraction limit.

Small-scale mining refers to any single unit mining operation having an annual
production of not more than 50,000 metric tons of ore and satisfying the following
requisites:

Another issue concerns the

correct interpretation of the
50,000-MT limit. The mining
corporations insist on their
version of how to compute the
extraction.

On the other hand, under Section 3(b) of RA 7076, small-scale mining refers to
mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and
methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment. Significantly, this
definition does not provide for an annual extraction limit unlike in PD 1899.

1. The working is artisanal, whether open cast or shallow underground

mining, without the use of sophisticated mining equipment;
2. Minimal investment on infrastructures and processing plant;
3. Heavy reliance on manual labor; and
4. Owned, managed or controlled by an individual or entity qualified under
existing mining laws, rules and regulations.

DOJ Opinion No. 74, Series of 2006 concluded that as nothing from RA 7076 speaks
of an annual production limit, Section 1 of PD 1899 should be considered impliedly
repealed by RA 7076, the later law. However, while these two laws tackle the
definition of what small-scale mining is, both have different objects upon which the
laws shall be applied to. PD 1899 applies to individuals, partnerships and corporations
while RA 7076 applies to cooperatives.24 There are other differences between the two
laws, but we cannot hastily conclude that there is an implied repeal because of the
omission. Both laws may stand.

Significantly, the DENR in the exercise of such power had just recently resolved the

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question on the production limit in small-scale mining.1wphi1 On July 5, 2007, it
issued DMC 2007-07 or "Clarificatory Guidelines in the Implementation of the SmallScale Mining Laws". By imposing the annual production limit of 50,000 DMT to both
SSMPs issued under PD 1899 and Small-Scale Mining Contracts (SSMCs) under RA
7076, the DENR harmonized the two laws, viz:
V. Maximum Annual Production
For metallic minerals, the maximum annual production under an SSMP/SSMC shall be
50,000 dry metric tons (DMT[s]) of ore, while for nonmetallic minerals, the maximum
annual production shall be 50,000 DMT[s] of the material itself, e.g., 50,000 DMT[s]
of limestone, 50,000 DMT[s] of silica, or 50,000 DMT[s] of perlite.
The maximum annual production above shall include low-grade and/or marginal ore,
and/or minerals or rocks that are intended for sampling and/or metallurgical testing
purpose/s."
With the 50,000-MT limit likewise imposed on small-scale miners under RA 7076, the
issue raised on the violation of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is, the
DENR treats all small-scale miners equally as the production limit applies to all of
them. There is therefore no more reason for the mining corporations to not recognize
and comply with the said limitation. It must be stressed that the DENR is the
government agency tasked with the duty of managing and conserving the countrys
resources; it is also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations for the implementation of mining laws.