Radha Jain

Should Britain have agreed to terms less favourable in Falkland Islands

War than it could justly claim?
Radha Jain
Ian Zuckerman
1.30 2.20pm T, Th
Prompt Number:
Word Count: 1800

Radha Jain

Should Britain have agreed to terms less favourable in Falkland Islands War than it could
justly claim?

When an act of aggression threatens the political sovereignty or the territorial

integrity of a state, Waltzers legalist paradigm indicates that initiating war is a just action1.
Just as individuals have the right to self-defence, international law decrees that states have the
right to unilaterally protect themselves, and call on the international community to condemn
the aggressor state. This can be diplomatic criticism and trade sanctions, but also extends to
military action. However, the right to invoke this military defence does not indicate its
necessity. States must also consider practical factors, such as the probability of success, the
potential gains from war and the costs of war. If the states decision to go to war is
disproportionate to any of these factors, it can be argued that the war is unjust, despite it
lying within the parameters for a just war. I will use the just-war framework to critically
analyse Britains decision to enter the Falklands War in 1982, particularly with respect to one
of these pragmatic limitations: the underlying cost of the war. Ultimately, although Britains
use of force was a permitted response to Argentinas aggression, it was disproportionately
excessive according to the just-war theory and therefore, unjust.
The Falklands War officially started in March 1982, with an Argentinian invasion of
the Islands. The UN deemed this an act of aggression, and authorised Britain to use armed
forces to defend their territory, thus initiating an intense military conflict between Britain and
Argentina. Britain, the islands post-colonial owner, and Argentina, the Falklands
neighboring state, had contested ownership of the Falkland Islands, an inaccessible and
inclement area of the South Atlantic2 since 1833. Hence, the conflict was born out of a

1Michael
2

Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations(New York: Basic Books, 2015), 51

Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 14

Radha Jain

confusion of who owned the territory in the first place, what was the initial act of aggression
and whether the islands were consequential enough to go to war over.
To establish whether Britains use of force was just, the political sovereignty of the
Falkland Islands at the time of the Argentinian aggression must be determined. If Argentina
had legitimate claim to the land, then her invasion was not an act of aggression. Conversely,
if Britain had rightful ownership of the Falklands when Argentina attacked, then Britain
would have been justified in some response. Britains claim to the Falklands was derived
through the sovereignty claim of its inhabitants and the length of time that they controlled the
islands. In 1980, the population was 95 percent British3 and, as reported by Lord
Shackleton in 1976, firm in its desire to remain British. In his definition of the legalist
paradigm, Waltzer establishes two key concepts that underlie every state: territorial integrity
and political sovereignty. He suggests that these rights depend only on the right of men and
women to build a common life4. By suggesting that the states rights stem from the
population, rather than from the land, Waltzer supports Britains claim to the Falklands due
to its British inhabitants. Although Argentina argues that the islanders are of British origin,
and so their preference is unsurprising5, John Stuart Mill contends that this fact is
unimportant and in his theory on self-determination, states:
We are to treat states as self-determining communities, whether or not their internal
political arrangements are free, whether or not the citizens chose their government
and openly debate the policies carried out in their name.6
Mill places importance on the fact that the locals are citizens, rather than how that became
the case, hence suggesting that the inhabitants right to self-determination is fully valid. In
addition, the length of time that Britain had sovereign control over the islands seems to lend

Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 16
Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 61
5 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 20
6 Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 87
3
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legitimacy to their ownership of the Falklands. The islands were formally established as a
crown colony in 18407 and remained under British control for the next 150 years. This is
supported by the legalist paradigm, the comparison of international to civil order8, as
Britains largely unchallenged occupancy of the Islands seems to draw a parallel with the
civil law of Adverse Possession, in which a trespasser can come onto land, occupy it and
gain legal ownership of it. Hence, even if Britains initial claim to the islands was dubious,
by virtue of its long-established British sovereignty9 it gained rightful ownership of the
land.
Conversely, Argentina disputed that Britains ownership of the islands was ever
legitimate, as they held the belief that the islands were Spains legacy10 and that British
occupation of 1833 was illegal and remains so11. Argentina asserts that any agreements of
sovereignty took place in confused circumstances12, and that British rule was a vestige
from past colonialism, and therefore cannot be valid or legal. This view was accepted in 1965
by the General Assembly Resolution 2065 which stated that the British position in the
Falklands represented a form of colonialism13. This negates Waltzers definition of
aggression that any use of force...by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial
integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.14 As Argentina contends
that the islands belong to her, their invasion cannot be defined as aggression. In the words of
Jeanne Kilpatrick, the US Ambassador the to the United Nations, If the [Argentinians] own
these islands, then moving troops into them is not armed aggression15.

Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 19

Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 58
9 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 22
10 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 17
11 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 19
12 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 20
13 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 23
14 Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 62
15 Kilpatrick qtd. in Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 40
7
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However, ultimately, Britains claim to the Falkland Islands, buttressed in Waltzers

argument of self-determination, is strongest. Waltzer explicitly states when discussing a
parallel case of Alsace Lorraine that the decision as to whose sovereignty was legitimate
(and therefore as to whose military presence constituted aggression) belonged by right to the
men and women who lived on the land in dispute. Not simply to those who owned the
land16. Since Britains argument is derived from the people, whereas Argentinas claim is
just an extension of Argentinas territory, I would be inclined to agree with Waltzer that the
land follows the people17. Moreover, sovereignty disputes should be enforced in a manner
that reduces the likelihood of future wars rather than increases their probability. With a local
population adamant that it wishe[d] to stay British and repeatedly showing a marked
antipathy to Argentina18, Argentinian sovereignty would seem to be sowing the seeds for
further future conflict rather than achieving a resolution.
After establishing that Argentinas actions in March 1982 violated the political
sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (and be extension, of Britain), the question remains as to
how much, if any, military force Britain was just in using. Britains recourse to force can be
justified both conceptually, in order to preserve the principle of international peace, and
practically, as their actions were approved by the international community. According to justwar theory, an act of aggression against one nation is a crime against society as a whole19.
Waltzer argues that states have a moral imperative to respond to acts of aggression, so that
rights can be maintained and future aggressors deterred20. Thus, Britains use necessary
force to condemn Argentinas aggression was not just legitimate, but essential. Moreover,
Britain obtained diplomatic approval from the UN, who condemned Argentinas actions
under Resolution 502, demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and an immediate

Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 55
Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 55
18 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 23
19 Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 59
20 Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 59
16
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Radha Jain

withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands 21. Britains decision had
international and domestic support22, and invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, allowing
for the inherent rights of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations (Charter of the UN). As Britains cause was
considered just, the international community did not place a limit on the proportionality of
response that Britain could take, and so, it can be argued that Britains military decisions
were both legitimate and proportional.
However, Britains extreme use of military force was disproportionate to the value of
the islands themselves. I question Freedmans assumption that since the international
community was able to demonstrate that Britain was the aggrieved party, it was therefore
justified now in taking drastic steps23. The unchecked limitations on the force used seems
debatable at best and reckless at worst, all in the effort to maintain islands 8000 miles24
away that was of little, if any, consequence to Britain. Moreover due to the distance between
Britain and the Falklands, Argentinas invasion of the islands posed no real threat to either
the territorial integrity or the political sovereignty of Britain. In addition, the force that
Britain employed was a major military response25. Not only was a large quantity of
wartime resources employed, but the operation was also high-risk and hazardouswithout
guarantee of success26. This degree of military force could be justified if the disputed
territory was of great importance or value to Britain. However, Britains desire to maintain
the islands was weak at best. There were few economic benefits, as its primary industry,
agriculture, was faced with farmers profits in decline27 . Regular maintenance of the islands
were not being upheld and any serious development depended on UK aid, an amount that

Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 40

Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 40
23 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 40
24 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 31
25 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 38
26 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 39
27 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 16
21
22

Radha Jain

totalled over one million pounds in 198128. The main motivation for reclaiming the islands
was to protect national-pride and popular cause, however one cannot help but question the
cost that a country should endure simply to maintain the ever-fluctuating morale of their
public. Consequently, Britains hard-line insistence that it could not acquiesce in any
infringement of British sovereignty29 was excessively inflexible and not responsive to the
situation at hand. Instead, giving sovereignty of the Falklands to Argentina in exchange for
improved diplomatic and potentially economic relations with Latin America may have
produced greater gains for Britain at the time. This echoes the Munich Principle in that it
may, however, be the [attacked nations] right, and even its duty, to try to persuade the victim
of aggression to terms less favourable than those which it can claim in justice. Coupled with
Waltzers acknowledgement that it is a states duty to avoid violence if one possibly can30,
an alternative moral imperative emerges: to avoid indiscriminatingly punishing every
instance of aggression if doing so would be a disproportionate response.
Therefore, although Britain was successful in maintaining their colony, the great
military cost involved challenges whether Britain really did win, or benefit, from the
Falklands War. Although Argentinas invasion was rightfully condemned as an act of
aggression by just-war theory, just because Britain had the right to invoke war, I dont
believe it was the correct decision given the practical constraints. This can be extrapolated to
a larger balance between the right to engage in war and pragmatic considerations. Thus,
although I acknowledge the importance and clarity of Waltzers just-war theory in principle, I
disagree that aggression is a greater evil than the ultimate evil of a general conflict31 in
reality, and feel that Britains decision to go to war over the Falkland Islands was a
disproportionate response and hence, was ultimately unjust.

Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 17

Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War, 36
30 Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 68
31 Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 68
28
29

Radha Jain

Works Cited
Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands War (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988)
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at:
http://www.unwebsite.com/charter [accessed 4 February 2016]
Michael Waltzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations
(New York: Basic Books, 2015)