LITERAL INTERPRETATION (VERBA LEGIS)

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONERINTERVENOR,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially
prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside
the April 1, 2013 and April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively.
(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared
the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of
private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estradas)
disqualification to run for and hold public office

FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime
of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy[7] for the position of President but was opposed by three
petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and
MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the
second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized
elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the
political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, [10] this time vying for a
local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former
President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estradas Conviction for
Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner

relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division,
dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitionerintervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and
seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of RisosVidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President
Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of
the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately
demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or were so patent and gross as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully

restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to
seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same
in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised

Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states
that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute

disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty

of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40
of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC
is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape
from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the
latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or
amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
Petition is dismissed.
[G.R. No. 182249. March 5, 2013.]
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

BRION, J p:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 of Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) seeking the reversal
of the decision2dated September 28, 2007 and the resolution 3 dated
March 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 81058. The
assailed CA rulings affirmed the resolutions, 4 dated January 31, 2003 and
October 7, 2003, of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), invalidating
Arsenio de Guzman's appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV
in TIDCORP. The CA subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration
that followed.
Factual Antecedents
On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as
Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1080. His appointment was included in TIDCORP's Report on Personnel
Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was submitted to the CSC
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office. 5
In a letter 6 dated September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong
disallowed De Guzman's appointment because the position of Financial
Management Specialist IV was not included in the DBM's Index of
Occupational Service. CAacTH
TIDCORP's Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed 7 the
invalidation of De Guzman's appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the

CSC-National Capital Region (NCR). According to Tambanillo, Republic Act

No. (RA) 8494, which amended TIDCORP's charter, empowers its Board of
Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern,
and to approve its own compensation and position classification system
and qualification standards. Specifically, Section 7 of RA 8494provides:
Section 7.The Board of Directors shall provide for an
organizational structure and staffing pattern for officers
and employees of the Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP)
and upon recommendation of its President, appoint and
fix their remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits:
Provided, That the Board shall have exclusive and final
authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and reassign personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of
existing law to the contrary notwithstanding.
All positions in TIDCORP shall be governed by a
compensation and position classification system and
qualification standards approved by TIDCORP's Board of
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and
audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and
shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more
than once every four (4) years without prejudice to
yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity
and profitability. TIDCORP shall be exempt from existing
laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. It shall,
however, endeavor to make the system to conform as
closely as possible to the principles and modes provided
in Republic Act No. 6758. ESHAIC
On the basis of Section 7 of RA 8494, Tambanillo argued that TIDCORP is
authorized to adopt an organizational structure different from that set and
prescribed by the CSC. Section 7 exempts TIDCORP from existing laws on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards, and is
thus not bound by the DBM's Index of Occupational Service. Pursuant to
this authority, TIDCORP's Board of Directors issued Resolution No. 1185, s.
1998 approving the corporation's re-organizational plan, under which De
Guzman was appointed Financial Management Specialist IV. De Guzman's
appointment was valid because the plan providing for his position followed
the letter of the law.
Tambanillo also noted that prior to De Guzman's appointment as Financial
Management Specialist IV, the position had earlier been occupied by Ma.
Loreto H. Mayor whose appointment was duly approved by Director
Bugtong. Thus, Director Bugtong's invalidation of De Guzman's
appointment is inconsistent with her earlier approval of Mayor's
appointment to the same position.

The CSC-NCR's Ruling

Director Padilla denied Tambanillo's appeal because De Guzman's
appointment failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which requires that the position title of an
appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved
Position Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational
Service. Since the position of Financial Management Specialist IV is not
included in the Index of Occupational Service, then De Guzman's
appointment to this position must be invalid. 8
Director Padilla pointed out that the CSC had already decided upon an
issue similar to De Guzman's case in CSC Resolution No.
011495 (Geronimo, Rolando S.C., Macapagal, Vivencio M. Tumangan,
Panser E., Villar, Victor G., Ong, Elizabeth P., Re: Invalidated Appointments;
Appeal) where it invalidated the appointments of several Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) employees because their position titles did
not conform with the Position Allocation List and with the Index of
Occupational Service. Like TIDCORP, the DBP's charter exempts the DBP
from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. It also has a similar duty to
"endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible to the
principles under [the] Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended)[.]" 9 THacES
Lastly, Padilla stressed that the 1987 Administrative
Code empowers 10 the CSC to formulate policies and regulations for the
administration, maintenance and implementation of position, classification
and compensation.
TIDCORP's appeal to the CSC-CO
In response to the CSC-NCR's ruling, TIDCORP's President and CEO Joel C.
Valdes sent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David a
letter 11 appealing Director Padilla's decision to the CSC-Central
Office (CO). Valdes reiterated TIDCORP's argument that RA 8494 authorized
its Board of Directors to determine its own organizational structure and
staffing pattern, and exempted TIDCORP from all existing laws on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
Citing Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, et al., 12 Valdes asserted that
the wisdom of Congress in granting TIDCORP this authority and exemption
is a political question that cannot be the subject of judicial review. Given
TIDCORP's functions as the government's export credit agency, its Board of
Directors has been provided flexibility in administering its personnel so
that it can hire qualified employees from the private sector, such as banks
and other financial institutions.
In addition, prior actions of the CSC show that it recognized TIDCORP's
exemption from all laws regarding compensation, position classification
and qualification standards of its employees. The CSC has approved prior
appointments of TIDCORP's officers under its July 1, 1998 re-organization
plan. It also approved Mayor's previous appointment as Financial
Management Specialist IV. Further, a memorandum dated October 29,

1998 issued by the CSC-NCR noted that "pursuant to Sec. 7 ofRA 8494[,]
TIDCORP is exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification
standards." 13 AIECSD
The CSC-CO's ruling
In its Resolution No. 030144, 14 the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR's
decision that De Guzman's appointment should have complied with CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 15, s. 1999. Rule III, Section 1 (c) is explicit in requiring that
the position title indicated in the appointment should conform with the
Position Allocation List and found in the Index of Occupational Service.
Otherwise, the appointment shall be disapproved. In disallowing De
Guzman's appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director Bugtong was simply
following the letter of the law.
According to the CSC-CO, TIDCORP misconstrued the provisions of Section
7 of RA 8494 in its attempt to bypass the requirements of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998. While RA 8494 gave TIDCORP
staffing prerogatives, it would still have to comply with civil service rules
because Section 7 did not expressly exempt TIDCORP from civil service
laws.
The CSC-CO also supported the CSC-NCR's invocation of CSC Resolution
No. 011495. Both the charters of the DBP and TIDCORP have similar
provisions in the recruitment and administration of their human resources.
Thus, the ruling in CSC Resolution No. 011495 has been correctly applied in
TIDCORP's appeal.
Lastly, the CSC-CO noted that the government is not bound by its public
officers' erroneous application and enforcement of the law. Granting that
the CSC-NCR had erroneously approved an appointment to the same
position as De Guzman's appointment, the CSC is not estopped from
correcting its officers' past mistakes. EHSAaD
TIDCORP moved to reconsider 15 the CSC-CO's decision, but this motion
was denied, 16 prompting TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari 17 with the CA. The petition asserted that the CSC-CO
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 030144 and
Resolution No. 031037.
The Appellate Court's Ruling
The CA denied 18 TIDCORP's petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO
in Resolution No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037. The CA noted that
filing a petition forcertiorari was an improper recourse; TIDCORP should
have instead filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. The CA, however, brushed aside the procedural defect,
ruling that the assailed resolutions should still stand as they are consistent
with law and jurisprudence.
Citing Central Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, 19 the
CA stood by the CSC-CO's ruling that it has authority to approve and

review De Guzman's appointment. The CSC has the power to ascertain

whether the appointing authority complied with the requirements of the
law; otherwise, it may revoke the appointment. As TIDCORP is a
government-owned corporation, it is covered by civil service laws and is
therefore bound by the CSC's jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to
personnel, including appointments.

Further, RA 8494 is a later expression of Congress' intent as it was enacted

nine years after RA 6758 was approved, and should therefore be construed
in this light in its relation with the latter. A new statute should be
interpreted in connection with those already existing in relation to the
same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand
together interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi.

Further, the CA cited the CSC's mandate under the 1987 Constitution to
approve or disapprove appointments and to determine whether an
appointee possesses civil service eligibility. As TIDCORP's charter does not
expressly or impliedly divest the CSC of administrative authority over
personnel concerns at TIDCORP, the latter is still covered by the existing
civil service laws on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. Its appointment of De Guzman as Financial Management
Specialist IV should have complied with these rules. SIaHTD

Under these principles, TIDCORP argued that Section 7 of RA 8494, the

provision of a special law, should be interpreted as an exemption to RA
6758. Thus, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which was issued
pursuant to RA 6758, should not have been applied to limit TIDCORP's
staffing prerogatives.

The CA thus concluded that the CSC was well-within its authority when it
invalidated De Guzman's appointment. It held that an appointee's title to
the office does not permanently vest until the appointee complies with the
legal requirements of his appointment. The requirements include the
submission of the appointment to the CSC for the determination of whether
the appointee qualifies to the position and whether the procedure for
appointment has been properly followed. Until these requirements are
complied with, his appointment may still be recalled or withdrawn by the
appointing authority. 20
TIDCORP moved for reconsideration 21 but the CA denied the motion in a
resolution 22 dated March 17, 2008.
The Present Petition
In its present petition for review on certiorari, 23 TIDCORP argued that the
CSC's interpretation of the last sentence of Section 7 of RA 8494 (which
mandates it to endeavor to make the system conform as closely as
possible with the principles provided in RA 6758) is misplaced. This
provision does not bar TIDCORP from adopting a position classification
system and qualification standards different from those prescribed by the
CSC. TIDCORP asserts that it is not also duty bound to comply with civil
service rules on compensation and position classification, as it is exempt
from all these rules. Instead, TIDCORP is only required to furnish the CSC
with its compensation and position classification system and qualification
standards so that the CSC can be properly guided in processing TIDCORP's
appointments, promotion and personnel action.
Insisting on its exemption from RA 6758 and CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 40, s. 1998, TIDCORP emphasizes that the provisions of RA 6758, which
the CSC applied to TIDCORP, is a general law, while TIDCORP's charter, RA
8494, is a special law. In interpreting conflicting provisions of a general law
and a special law, the provisions of the two laws should be harmonized to
give effect to both. But if these provisions cannot be reconciled, then the
special law should prevail because it is a qualification to the general
rule. HDaACI

In its comment, 24 the CSC noted that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
series of 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999,
was issued in accordance with its authority to prescribe rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of civil service laws and other
pertinent laws (Administrative Code), and not pursuant to RA 6758.
The CSC maintained that Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the
Constitution includes government and controlled corporations as part of
the civil service. TIDCORP, a GOCC, is therefore covered by the civil service
rules and by the CSC. It should submit its Position Allocation List to the
DBM, regardless of its exemption under RA 6758.
Lastly, the CSC argued that RA 8494 should not prevail over RA
6758 because the latter also applies to GOCCs like TIDCORP; RA 8494 even
makes a reference to RA 6758.
Issues
The parties' arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:
1) Whether the Constitution empowers the CSC to
prescribe and enforce civil service rules and
regulations contrary to laws passed by Congress;
2) Whether the requirement in Section 1 (c), Rule III of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, as
amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15,
s. 1999, applies to appointments in TIDCORP;
and
3) Whether De Guzman's appointment as Financial
Management Specialist IV in TIDCORP is valid.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
Directly at issue is the application of Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, to appointments in TIDCORP.
TIDCORP claims that its exemption, embodied in Section 7 of its charter,
precludes the application of this requirement. The CSC, on the other hand,
maintains its stance that appointments in a GOCC should follow the civil

service laws on appointments, regardless of its exemption from the civil

service rules on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. aIHCSA
While the CSC has authority over
personnel actions in GOCCs, the
rules it formulates pursuant to this
mandate should not contradict or
amend the civil service laws it
implements.
At the outset, we clarify that the CSC's authority over personnel actions in
TIDCORP is uncontested. Both parties acknowledge this relationship in the
pleadings they filed before the Supreme Court. 25 But while TIDCORP
asserts that its charter exempts it from rules on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards, the CSC argues that this
exemption is irrelevant to the denial of De Guzman's appointment because
the CSC's authority over TIDCORP's personnel actions requires it to comply
with the CSC's rules on appointments.

Commissioner Aquino kindly indicate to us the

corresponding provisions and her proposed
amendment which would encompass the powers
to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel
actions?
MS. AQUINO.
It is my submission that the same functions are already
subsumed under the concept of a central
personnel agency.
MR. REGALADO.
In other words, all those functions enumerated from line
35 on page 2 to line 1 of page 3, inclusive, are
understood to be encompassed in the phrase
"central personnel agency of the government."
MS. AQUINO.

The parties' arguments reveal an apparent clash between TIDCORP's

charter, enacted by Congress, and the CSC rules, issued pursuant to the
CSC's rule-making power. Does the CSC's constitutional authority over the
civil service divest the Legislature of the power to enact laws providing
exemptions to civil service rules?

Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, except that on line 40 of page 2

and line 1 of the subsequent page, it was only
subjected to a little modification.

We answer in the negative. The CSC's rule-making

power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still limited to the implementation
and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce.

May we, therefore, make it of record that the phrase ". . .

promulgate and enforce policies on personnel
actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of
employment except as to compensation and
other monetary benefits which shall be provided
by law" is understood to be subsumed under and
included in the concept of a central personnel
agency.

The 1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of
the government mandated to establish a career service and promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service. 26 It is a constitutionally created
administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and quasilegislative or rule-making powers.
While not explicitly stated, the CSC's rule-making power is subsumed
under its designation as the government's "central personnel agency" in
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. The original draft of Section
3 empowered the CSC to "promulgate and enforce policies on personnel
actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to
compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by
law." This, however, was deleted during the constitutional commission's
deliberations because it was redundant to the CSC's nature as an
administrative agency: 27 SEDIaH
MR. REGALADO.
This is more for clarification. The original Section 3
states, among others, the functions of the Civil
Service Commission to promulgate and
enforce policies on personnel actions. Will

MR. REGALADO.

MS. AQUINO.
I would have no objection to that. 28 DTAIaH
The 1987 Administrative Code then spelled out the CSC's rule-making
power in concrete terms in Section 12, Book V, Title I-A, which empowered
the CSC to implement the civil service law and other pertinent laws, and to
promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the civil service. 29
The CSC's rule-making power as a constitutional grant is an aspect of its
independence as a constitutional commission. It places the grant of this
power outside the reach of Congress, which cannot withdraw the power at
any time. As we said in Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr., 30 a case which upheld the
validity of a resolution issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
another constitutional commission:
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a
constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority
to grant the Commission broader and more flexible

powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate

it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its
rule-making power is made to depend on statutes,
Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed,
the present Constitution envisions a truly independent
Commission on Elections committed to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to
serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of
suffrage the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a
peaceful change of government and in achieving and
promoting political stability. [citation omitted]
But while the grant of the CSC's rule-making power is untouchable by
Congress, the laws that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the
prerogative of Congress. As an administrative agency, the CSC's quasilegislative power is subject to the same limitations applicable to other
administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must not
override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and
implement. 31 IHCacT
For example, in Grego v. Commission on Elections, 32 we held that it was
improper for the COMELEC, a constitutional body bestowed with rulemaking power by the Constitution, to use the word "shall" in the rules it
formulated, when the law it sought to implement uses the word "may."
While rules issued by administrative bodies are entitled to great respect,
"[t]he conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. [T]he
function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into
effect. . . . [A]dministrative regulations cannot extend the law [nor] amend
a legislative enactment; . . . administrative regulations must be in harmony
with the provisions of the law[,]" and in a conflict between the basic law
and an implementing rule or regulation, the former must prevail. 33
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
s. 1998, and CSC Resolution No. 15,
s. 1999, which were issued pursuant
to the CSC 's rule-making power,
involve rules on position
classification
Two questions logically follow our conclusion on the extent of the CSC's
rule-making power. The first is whether Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, was issued pursuant to the CSC's
rule-making power; the second is whether this provision involves
compensation, position classification and/or qualification standards that
TIDCORP claims to be exempt from. We answer both questions in the
affirmative. EaTCSA
We agree with the CSC's position that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s.
1998, and CSC Resolution No. 15, s. 1999, were all issued pursuant to its
rule-making power. No less than the introductory clause of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, confirms this:

Pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 3, Section 12, Book V

of Administrative Code of 1987 otherwise known
as Executive Order No. 292,the Civil Service Commission
hereby prescribes the following rules to govern the
preparation, submission of, and actions to be taken on
appointments and other personnel actions. 34
Both these memoranda govern appointments and personnel actions in the
civil service. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, or the "Revised
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions," updated
and consolidated the various issuances on appointments and other
personnel actions and simplified their processing. This was subsequently
amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999.
The assailed provisions in those memorandum circulars, however, involve
position classification. Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 40, 35 s. 1998, requires, as a condition sine qua non for the approval
of an appointment, that the position title indicated therein conform with
the approved Position Allocation List. The position title should also be found
in the Index of Occupational Service. According to National Compensation
Circular No. 58, the Position Allocation List is a list prepared by the DBM
which reflects the allocation of existing positions to the new position titles
in accordance with the Index of Occupational Service, Position Titles and
Salary Grades issued under National Compensation Circular No.
57. 36 Both circulars were published by the DBM pursuant to its mandate
from RA 6758 to establish a position classification system in the
government. 37 SaITHC
Further, the CSC admitted in its comment that RA 6758 was the basis for
the issuance of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, as amended
by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999. The CSC said:
The abovecited Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. No. 6758 are the
bases for respondent's issuance of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1999. To
reiterate, the Circulars mandate that appointments
should conform [to] the approved Position Allocation List
(PAL) and at the same time be listed in the Index of
Occupational Service (IOS). 38 ITEcAD
Section 7 of TIDCORP's charter
exempts it from rules involving
position classification
To comply with Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
s. 1998, TIDCORP must conform with the circulars on position classification
issued by the DBM. Section 7 of its charter, however, expressly exempts
TIDCORP from existing laws on position classification, among others.
In its comment, the CSC would want us to disregard TIDCORP's exemption
from laws involving position classification because RA 6758 applies to all
GOCCs. It also noted that Section 7 of RA 8494, the provision TIDCORP

invokes as the source of its exemption, also directs its Board of Directors to
"endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the
principles [and modes provided in] Republic Act No. 6758[.]" 39 This
reference of RA 6758 in Section 7 means that TIDCORP cannot simply
disregard RA 6758 but must take its principles into account in providing for
its own position classifications. This requirement, to be sure, does not run
counter to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides that
"the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters." The CSC shall still enforce
position classifications at TIDCORP, but must do this under the terms that
TIDCORP has itself established, based on the principles of RA 6758.
To further expound on these points, the CSC's authority over TIDCORP is
undisputed. The rules that the CSC formulates should implement and be in
harmony with the law it seeks to enforce. In TIDCORP's case, the CSC
should also consider TIDCORP's charter in addition to other civil service
laws. Having said this, there remains the issue of how the CSC should
apply the civil service law to TIDCORP, given the exemptions provided in
the latter's charter. Does the wording of Section 7 of RA 8494command
TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant to RA 6758 despite its
exemption from laws involving position classification?
We answer in the negative. "Under the principles of statutory construction,
if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plainmeaning rule or verba legis is derived from the maxim index animi sermo
est (speech is the index of intention) and rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express
its intent and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure." 40 ISCTcH
The phrase "to endeavor" means to "to devote serious and sustained
effort" and "to make an effort to do." It is synonymous with the words to
strive, to struggle and to seek. 41 The use of "to endeavor" in the context
of Section 7 of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORP's exemption from
laws involving compensation, position classification and qualification
standards, it should still strive to conform as closely as possible with the
principles and modes provided in RA 6758. The phrase "as closely as
possible," which qualifies TIDCORP's duty "to endeavor to conform,"
recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA 6758, but it
should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent
of Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply
with RA 6758, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the
mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavor to conform to the principles
and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.
These inter-relationships render it clear, as a plain reading of Section 7
of RA 8494 itself would confirm, that TIDCORP is exempt from existing laws

on compensation, position classification and qualification standards,

including compliance with Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, s. 1998.
De Guzman's appointment as
Financial Management Specialist IV
is valid
With TIDCORP exempt from Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, s. 1998, there remains the issue of whether De Guzman's
appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV is valid. Since Section
1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, is the only
requirement that De Guzman failed to follow, his appointment actually
complied with all the requisites for a valid appointment. The CSC,
therefore, should have given due course to De Guzman's appointment.
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition,
and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated September 28, 2007
and the resolution dated March 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 81058, as well as Resolution No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037
of the Civil Service Commission that the Court of Appeals rulings affirmed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. DTSaIc
[G.R. No. 170589. April 16, 2009.]
OLYMPIO REVALDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review by petitioner Olympio
Revaldo (petitioner) seeking to reverse the Decision 1 dated 23 August
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22031 affirming the
Decision 2 dated 5 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
25, Maasin, Southern Leyte (RTC-Branch 25), in Criminal Case No.
1652, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of lumber in violation of Section 68 3 of the Revised
Forestry Code(Forestry Code). 4 CHEIcS
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of
premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry
Code, in an Information 5which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of June 1992, in the
(M)unicipality of Maasin, (P)rovince of Southern Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, did

then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess 96.14 board ft. of the following species of flat
lumber:
1. Six (6) pcs. 1x10x7 Molave;
2. One (1) pc. 2x6x6 Molave;
3. Two (2) pcs. 2x4x6 Molave;
4. Two (2) pcs. 1x10x6 Narra;
5. Two (2) pcs. 2x8x7 Bajong;
6. One (1) pc. 1x6x6 Bajong;
7. Four (4) pcs. 1x6x6 Magkalipay; and
8. Three (3) pcs. 1x6x5 Magkalipay;
with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency,
without any legal document as required under existing
forest laws and regulations from proper government
authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented SPO4 Constantino Maceda
(Maceda), Sulpicio Saguing (Saguing), and SPO4 Daniel Paloma Lasala
(Lasala) as witnesses.
Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified
that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with
Chief Alejandro Rojas (Rojas), SPO3 Melquiades Talisic (Talisic) and
SPO3 Nicasio Sunit (Sunit) to the house of petitioner to verify the
report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the
necessary documents. They were not armed with a search warrant on
that day. They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties
lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner. Maceda asked
petitioner who the owner of the lumber was and petitioner replied that
he owned the lumber. Petitioner stated that he would use the lumber to
repair his house and to make furniture for sale. Maceda also testified
that the lumber were freshly cut. Maceda loaded the lumber on the
patrol jeep and brought them to the police station. For coordination
purposes, Maceda informed the office of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) of the confiscated lumber.
The DENR entrusted to the police custody of the lumber. 6 IASTDE
Saguing, Forester II, CENRO-DENR, Maasin, Southern Leyte,
testified that he went to the office of the PNP in Maasin, Leyte to scale
the confiscated lumber which were of different varieties. The total

volume was 96.14 board feet belonging to the first group of hardwood
lumber. 7
Lasala, Responsible Supply Sergeant, Finance Sergeant and
Evidence Custodian, PNP, Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified that he
received the 20 pieces of assorted sizes and varieties of lumber from
the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, but only ten pieces
remained because some were damaged due to lack of storage space. 8
For the defense, petitioner presented Dionisio Candole
(Candole), Apolonio Caalim (Caalim), and himself as witnesses.
Petitioner testified that he is a carpenter specializing in
furniture making. He was in his house working on an ordered divider
for a customer in the morning of 18 June 1992 when policemen arrived
and inspected his lumber. Maceda, Sunit and Rojas entered his house
while Talisic stayed outside. Petitioner admitted to the policemen that
he had no permit to possess the lumber because those were only given
to him by his uncle Felixberto Bug-os (Bug-os), his aunt Gliceria Bolo
(Bolo), his mother-in-law Cecilia Tenio (Tenio). The seven pieces of
"magkalipay" lumber were left over from a divider he made for his
cousin Jose Epiz. He explained further that the lumber were intended
for the repair of his dilapidated house. 9 The defense presented Caalim
to corroborate the testimony of petitioner. 10
Defense witness Candole testified that it was Bug-os who hired
him to cut a "tugas" tree on his land, sawed it into lumber and
delivered the same to petitioner who paid for the labor transporting the
sawn lumber. Candole further testified that while they were on their
way to Barangay Combado, Sunit stopped them but allowed the
lumber to be brought to the house of petitioner. 11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court stated that petitioner failed to present Bug-os,
Bolo, and Tenio to attest to the fact that they sought prior DENR
permission before cutting the trees and sawing them into lumber. The
trial court further stated that the Forestry Code is a special law where
criminal intent is not necessary. The Secretary of the DENR may issue a
Special Private Land Timber Permit to landowners to cut, gather, collect
or remove narra or other premium hardwood species found in private
lands. Transportation of timber or other forest products without
authority or without the legal documents required under forest rules
and regulations is punishable under Section 68 of the Forestry Code.
Petitioner did not present any document as required by law.
The RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment on 5 September 1997
convicting petitioner of the offense charged and sentencing him as
follows: ETDHSa
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused
OLYMPIO REVALDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged and, crediting him with one
mitigating circumstance before applying the

Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby SENTENCES him to

an indeterminate imprisonment term of FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
The 21 pieces of flat lumber of different varieties, scaled
at 96.14 board feet and valued at P1,730.52 are hereby
ordered CONFISCATED and FORFEITED in favor of the
government particularly the CENRO, Maasin, Southern
Leyte which shall sell the same at public auction and the
proceeds turned over to the National Treasury. 12
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that motive or
intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the
lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability.
Hence, the present petition.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the items seized
should not have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner
argues that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant
when they went to his house to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner
had in his possession lumber without the corresponding license. The
police officers who conducted the search in the premises of petitioner
acted on the basis only on the verbal order of the Chief of Police. Sunit
had already informed the team of the name of petitioner and the
location the day before they conducted the search. Petitioner argues
that, with that information on hand, the police officers could have
easily convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the
issuance of a search warrant, but they did not. Because the search was
illegal, all items recovered from petitioner during the illegal search
were prohibited from being used as evidence against him. Petitioner
therefore prays for his acquittal.
In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines
(respondent) contends that even without a search warrant, the
personnel of the PNP can seize the forest products cut, gathered or
taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 13 of the Forestry
Code. TcHCDE
There is no question that the police officers went to the house
of petitioner because of the information relayed by Sunit that petitioner
had in his possession illegally cut lumber. When the police officers
arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around the
vicinity of petitioner's house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the

plain view doctrine, objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. This Court had the opportunity to
summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the case
of People v. Doria, 14 to wit:
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. 15
When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the
lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that
the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house
and for his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police
officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity for
a search warrant.
The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not have the
required permit to possess the forest products cut is sanctioned by
Section 68 of the Forestry Code which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or
Other Forest Products Without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered
the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be
liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. acCTIS
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor
of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or

possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,

implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
(Emphasis supplied)
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section
68 of the Forestry Code, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without
the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations. 16
As the Court held in People v. Que, 17 in the first offense, one can raise
as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is
immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of
the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not
the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because
the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper documentation
as malum prohibitum.
On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest
petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry
Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any
personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who
has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses
defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products
gathered or taken by the offender. Section 80 reads:
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. A forest
officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of
the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National
Police shall arrest even without warrant any person
who has committed or is committing in his presence any
of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize
and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense, and the
forest products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in
the process of committing the offense. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary
documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court,
petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the

confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal
documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for
the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex
sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law. HTAEIS
On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we deem it
necessary to discuss the matter. Violation of Section 68 of the Forestry
Code is punished as Qualified Theft with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, 18 thus:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos;
but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the
one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as
the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is
more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200
pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5
pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if
the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article
and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5
pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions
of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not

exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted
under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of
earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his
family. aIcDCT

SO ORDERED.

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of qualified theft

shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding articles, . . . .

DEL CASTILLO, J p:

The trial court applied Article 309 (3), in relation to Article 310
of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the amount involved was
P1,730.52. However, except for the amount stated in the Information,
the prosecution did not present any proof as to the value of the lumber.
What the prosecution presented were the Seizure Receipt 19 and
Confiscation Receipt 20 stating the number of pieces of lumber, their
species, dimensions and volumes, with "no pertinent supporting
document." These do not suffice.
As we have held in Merida v. People, 21 to prove the amount of
the property taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the
accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution
must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such
fact. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such
estimate, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty under
Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.
Accordingly, the prescribed penalty under Article 309 (6) of the
Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. However, considering that violation of Section 68 of
the Forestry Code is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code pursuant to the Forestry Code, the prescribed
penalty shall be increased by two degrees, 22 that is, to prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods or two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Taking into account the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken from
anywhere within the range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two
(2) years and four (4) months of arresto mayor, which is the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty. We find it proper to impose upon
petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining here, the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed Decision convicting
petitioner for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry
Code, as amended, with MODIFICATION as regards the penalty in that
petitioner Olympio Revaldo is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day ofarresto mayor, as

minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.

||| ARNEL SAGANA, petitioner, vs. RICHARD A.

FRANCISCO, respondent. **

It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law with its
spirit. Thus, it is not altogether surprising that two competing values
are usually discernable in every controversy the principle of dura lex
sed lex versus the notion that technicalities should yield to broader
interests of justice. In our rules of procedure, for instance, judges often
struggle to find a balance between due process considerations and a
liberal construction to secure a just disposition of every action. In such
cases, where a measure of discretion is permitted, courts must tread
carefully, with due consideration of the factual milieu and legal
principles involved. In so doing, we take steps sometimes tentative,
sometimes bold to apply prior experience and precedent towards an
eventual just resolution. It is these principles that animate our decision
in the instant case.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is the 13 August 2003 Decision 2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66412 which reversed and set aside the
20 September 1999 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 99 in Civil Case No. Q-94-22445 and held that there was
no valid service of summons to respondent Richard A. Francisco.
On 13 December 1994, petitioner Arnel Sagana filed a
Complaint 4 for Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-22445 and raffled to Branch 99.
Petitioner alleged that on 20 November 1992, respondent Richard A.
Francisco, with intent to kill and without justifiable reason, shot him
with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. As a result, petitioner incurred
medical expenses and suffered wounded feelings, and was compelled
to engage the services of a lawyer, due to respondent's refusal to pay
said expenses. Petitioner thus demanded payment of P300,000.00 as
actual damages, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00,
exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On 31 January 1995, process server Manuel S. Panlasigui
attempted to serve summons at respondent's address at No. 36
Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was unsuccessful. In his
Server's Return, 5 Panlasigui stated that he tried to personally serve
the summons to respondent at his given address at No. 36 Sampaguita
St., Baesa, Quezon City. However, the occupant of that house, who
refused to give his identity, told him that respondent is unknown at
said address. Panlasigui also declared that diligent efforts were exerted
to serve the summons but these proved to be futile. 6 Subsequently,

the trial court attempted to serve summons to respondent's office

through registered mail on 9 February 1995. However, despite three
notices, respondent failed to pick up the summons. ISaCTE
On 30 June 1995, the trial court dismissed the case on account
of petitioner's lack of interest to prosecute. 7 It noted that since the
filing of the Server's Return on 8 February 1995, petitioner did not take
any action thus indicating lack of interest to prosecute the case.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 8 stating that after
the Server's Return was filed, he exerted efforts to locate the
respondent, and it was confirmed that respondent indeed lived at No.
36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. On 4 August 1995, the trial
court granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, conditioned upon
the service of summons on the respondent within 10 days from receipt
of the Order. 9
Thus, on 25 August 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar again
tried to serve the summons at the address of the respondent but no
avail. According to Iconar's handwritten notation on the
summons, 10 he was informed by Michael Francisco, respondent's
brother, that respondent no longer lived at said address. However, he
left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco. 11
On 10 November 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default, 12 alleging that despite service of summons,
respondent still failed to file an Answer. On 16 February 1996, the trial
court issued an Order 13 finding that the summons was validly served
to respondent through his brother, Michael. It thus declared respondent
in default and allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex
parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court documents were
furnished to respondent at No. 36 Sampaguita St.
In the meantime, on 1 March 1996, Michael Francisco, through
his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and
Motion 14 denying that he received the summons or that he was
authorized to receive summons on behalf of his brother, respondent
Richard Francisco. He alleged that the substituted service did not
comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons
was not served at defendant's residence or left with any person who
was authorized to receive it on behalf of the defendant. Michael
Francisco also prayed that his name be stricken off the records as
having received a copy of the summons.
In the Affidavit of Merit 15 submitted together with the
Manifestation and Motion, Michael Francisco asserted that he was 19
years of age; that his brother, herein respondent Richard Francisco,
had left their residence in March 1993; and that respondent would just
write his family without informing them of his address, or would just
call by phone.
Thereafter, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco submitted
their respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his Rejoinder,
petitioner attached a copy of an Affidavit 16 prepared by respondent

Richard A. Francisco dated 23 December 1992, where he declared

himself a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. Interestingly, the lawyer
who notarized the affidavit for the respondent, Atty. Bernardo Q.
Cuaresma, was the same lawyer who represented respondent's brother
before the trial court. SDTaHc
On 4 October 1996, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying
Michael Francisco's Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, holding
thus:
It should be considered that earlier, plaintiff had already
sent numerous pleadings to defendant at his last known
address. As also pointed out by [petitioner] in his
Opposition, movant has not adduced evidence, except
his affidavit of merit, to impugn the service of summons
thru him. Movant herein also admits that defendant
communicates with him through telephone. Movant,
therefore, being a person of sufficient age and discretion,
would be able, more likely than not, to inform defendant
of the fact that summons was sent to him by the
court. 18
Having failed to file an answer or any responsive pleading,
respondent was declared in default and petitioner was allowed to
present evidence ex parte. On 20 September 1999, the trial court
rendered its Decision, 19 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff and hereby orders defendant
to pay plaintiff the amount of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP35,000.00) as and for actual damages, the
amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (PhP15,000.00) as
and for moral damages, the amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP10,000.00) for exemplary damages and the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (PhP20,000.00) as
attorney's fees.
No further costs.
SO ORDERED. 20
On 23 November 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of
Appeal, claiming that he received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 9
November 1999; that the same was contrary to the law, facts, and
evidence, and praying that his appeal be given due course. 21
On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their
respective briefs, a copy of which was sent to respondent by registered
mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. 22 In his Appellant's
brief, respondent argued that:
I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION

OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE IRREGULARITY OF THE SUBSTITUTED
SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY THE COURT PROCESS SERVER.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY FIVE-THOUSAND
PESOS (P35,000.00) TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
ALTHOUGH ONLY SEVENTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P17,000.00) WAS DULY SUPPORTED BY
RECEIPTS. DaAIHC
III
THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN AWARDING
UNREASONABLE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00); EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00); AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THERE IS NO FACTUAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
BASIS FOR ALL THESE. 23
On 15 August 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution 24 ordering the parties to personally appear for the conduct
of preliminary conference to consider amicably settling the appeal,
pursuant to Sec. 1 (a), Rule 7 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals and the Court's Resolution A.M. No. 02-2-17-SC dated 16
April 2002 regarding the Pilot Testing of Mediation in the Court of
Appeals. Respondent was furnished 25 a copy of this Resolution at his
address at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Baesa, Quezon City. Per Delivery
Receipt of the Court of Appeals, the same was personally received by
respondent on 23 August 2002. 26
On 3 September 2002, respondent attended the preliminary
conference; however the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. 27 Thus, on 13 August 2003, the Court of Appeals
rendered the herein assailed Decision granting the appeal and setting
aside the Decision of the trial court. The appellate court held that the
service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the
proceedings before the trial court. Since it did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent, the trial court's decision was void.
In brief, the Court of Appeals found that there was no valid
service of summons for the following reasons:
1. Except for the notation made by the process server on
the summons, no proof of service by way of a
Process Server's Return was prepared;
2. The process server failed to state the specific facts
and circumstances that would justify valid

substituted service of summons, to wit: (a) the

impossibility of service of summons within a
reasonable time, (b) the efforts exerted to locate
the respondent, and (c) it was served on a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing
therein.
3. Petitioner failed to prove that, at the time summons
was served, respondent actually lived in No. 36
Sampaguita St.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 where he
alleged that respondent did, in fact, reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. To
prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the original copy of the
envelope containing respondent's Notice of Appeal, which indicated
respondent's return address to be No. 36 Sampaguita
St. 29Nonetheless, on 29 January 2004, the Court of Appeals denied
the Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the sole issue
of whether there was valid service of summons upon the respondent.
The petition is meritorious. Under the circumstances obtaining
in this case, we find there was proper substituted service of summons
upon the respondent. ASDTEa
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court, the rules of
procedure then in force at the time summons was served, provided:
Section 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section [personal service on defendant],
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
Jurisprudence has long established that for substituted service
of summons to be valid, the following must be demonstrated: (a) that
personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;
(b) that efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) that the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the party's residence or upon a competent person in charge
of the party's office or regular place of business. 30 It is likewise
required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated
in the proof of service or in the officer's return. 31
In this case, personal service of summons was twice attempted
by the trial court, although unsuccessfully. In the first attempt, the
resident of the house refused to receive the summons; worse, he would
not even give his name. In the second attempt, respondent's own

brother refused to sign for receipt of the summons, and then later
claimed that he never received a copy, despite his participation in the
proceedings. The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the
respondent through his place of work, but to no avail. These diligent
efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's return,
the process server's notation, as well as the records of the
case. AEIHaS
Clearly, personal service of summons was made impossible by
the acts of the respondent in refusing to reveal his whereabouts, and
by the act of his brother in claiming that respondent no longer lived at
No. 36 Sampaguita St., yet failing to disclose his brother's location. We
also note that it was the trial court which directed that the second
service of summons be made within seven days; thus, the reasonable
time was prescribed by the trial court itself.
Undeniably, no Sheriff's Return was prepared by process server
Jarvis Iconar; the only record of the second service of summons was Mr.
Iconar's handwritten notation in the summons itself. However, the
information required by law and prevailing jurisprudence, that is, that
personal service was impossible because of the claim that respondent
no longer lived at the stated address, that efforts were exerted to
locate the respondent through the multiple attempts to serve
summons, and that summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion, were already in the records of the trial court.
Moreover, we find the claim that respondent moved out of their
residence in March 1993 without informing his brother or parents his
whereabouts, despite regular calls and letters, simply incredulous.
What makes this version of events even more implausible is
respondent's admission that he received a copy of the trial court's
Decision of 20 September 1999 that was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita
Street. Respondent even filed a Notice of Appeal coincidentally
indicating that his address was No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon
City. He also received a copy of the appellate court's order for
preliminary conference that was sent to said address. These were
never denied by respondent, despite being given every opportunity to
do so.
Respondent also wishes us to believe that it was pure chance
that he and his brother were assisted by the same lawyer, Atty.
Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, and yet it never occurred to respondent's own
brother or lawyer to inform him about the receipt of summons. All
these militate against respondent's self-serving declaration that he did
not reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. Indeed, there was no proof
presented as to when respondent left and then returned to his original
home, if he actually did leave his home.

In view of the foregoing, we find that substituted service of

summons was validly made upon respondent through his brother.
We do not intend this ruling to overturn jurisprudence to the
effect that statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully, and fully, and that any substituted service
other than that authorized by the Rules is considered
ineffective. 32 However, an overly strict application of the Rules is not
warranted in this case, as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of the law
as well as do injustice to the parties, who have been waiting for almost
15 years for a resolution of this case. We are not heedless of the
widespread and flagrant practice whereby defendants actively attempt
to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give their
names, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents, or eluding
officers of the court. Of course it is to be expected that defendants try
to avoid service of summons, prompting this Court to declare that, "the
sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving
the process on the defendant". 33 However, sheriffs are not expected
to be sleuths, and cannot be faulted where the defendants themselves
engage in deception to thwart the orderly administration of
justice. aDTSHc
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an
action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to
be heard on the claim against him. Under the circumstances of this
case, we find that respondent was duly apprised of the action against
him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the
petitioner. However, since respondent refused to disclose his true
address, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him.
Considering that respondent could not have received summons
because of his own pretenses, and has failed to provide an explanation
of his purported "new" residence, he must now bear the
consequences. 34
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is GRANTED. The 13 August 2003 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66412 and its 29 January 2004 Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, dated 20 September 1999 in Civil
Case No. Q-94-22445 holding that there was valid service of summons,
and ordering respondent to pay petitioner the amounts of P35,000.00
as actual damages, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees,
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.