Alawi vs.

Alauya
268 SCRA 639
Facts:
Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on instalments by Alauya of one of the housing
units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was
vitiated
because
Alawi
had
resorted
to
gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President
of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an
administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds
was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellorsat-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or
the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself
a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar,
can use the title of

Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the
regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya's use of the title of
"Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law
before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to
the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction.

In Re Garcia
2 SCRA 985
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the
practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the required
bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among
others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of
filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain.
He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the
provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise
of profession between the republic of the phils.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission
to
the
phil.
bar.
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO
66 SCRA 245

Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision
of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of
the Philippines and Spanish state cannot be invoked by the
applicant. The said treaty was intended to govern Filipino
citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain. The
treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and
regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason the executive may not encroach
upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in
the Philippines. The power to repeal, alter or supplement
such rules being reserved only to the congress of the
Philippines.

Facts:
This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney
Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter
that speaks of the exam notebooks of a examinee named
Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated and re-corrected
such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the
Bar. Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking. The five
examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the

notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the

authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned
failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline
of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar
exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears
that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil,
Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial). Galang on the other hand,
denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on
Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU. The five examiners
were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees
regular activity that when an examinee has failed in one
subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that
subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties,
including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never
declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities.
Issue:
Whether or not
Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the
examiners such that Galang passed the Bar?
Held:
YES. It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception
that characterized respondent Lanuevos well-studied and
well-calculated
moves
in
successively
representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the
effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before
the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in
the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects
which under no circumstances or standard could it be

honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he

was on the borderline of passing.
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the
re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees
who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar
Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the
examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon
the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not
the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better
than the examiner.
AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an
attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the
fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to
practice law is well settled. The practice of the law is not
an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of the criminal law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar
examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he
passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the
surrender of his attorneys certificate and the striking out of
his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.

and, in case of their incapacity or death, to such persons as

they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to
them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are
brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews
of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the
then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in
favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into
between them that was embodied on a notarial document.
Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the
convenio or of his brothers assumption of the position.
Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to
his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over
to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this
case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUE
Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?
Cui v Cui
Facts:

HELD

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution

established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna
Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent
invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired
corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of
the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly

Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation.
However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed
gives preference to the one, among the legitimate

descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer

(titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the
one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not
a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations.
Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar
and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio.

also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the

office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his
moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for
his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions
and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were
wiped out.

The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of

the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in
the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the
practice of law. A Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law
school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By
itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance
with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations
has successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a
law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary
of Education.
The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all,
because in all of the works of an administrator, it is
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to
practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as
against defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is
made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred
(for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is

IN RE: CUNANAN
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of
unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et.
al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so

much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly

known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a
candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of
75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any
subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades
were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting
of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70%
1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as
those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that
they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages
lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for,
and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by
the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill
no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed
bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public
interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had
inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as
evidenced by their failure in the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on
the legal profession and the administration of justice, the
S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.

An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital

requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the
act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and
the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power
and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the
law seeks to cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C.
but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and
this power is not included in the power granted by the Const.
to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
Reasons for UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the
court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in
attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal,
alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the
profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the
bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is

void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said
law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and
effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid
and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates
who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the
candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN
Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any
subject are considered as having passed whether they have
filed petitions for admissions or not.)
16 07 2010
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar
of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN
Resolution March 18, 1954
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known
as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the
said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per
cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar

candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while other motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There
are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration
of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court
first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue:
WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NO
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit
to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency
of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from
which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in admitting an
attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an

attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such

right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it
seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always
has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the
power to determine the qualifications may reside.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between
the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of
the government.

examination papers were still pending also invoked the

aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There
are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration
of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court
first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue:

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant

license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely
to fix the minimum conditions for the licens

WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NO

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar

of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN
Resolution March 18, 1954

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from
which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known
as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the
said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per
cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while other motions for the revision of their

Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit
to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency
of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been

perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in admitting an
attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an
attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such
right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it
seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always

has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the

power to determine the qualifications may reside.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between
the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of
the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely
to fix the minimum conditions for the license
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
Facts:
-

The SC received a confidential letter stating the reevaluation of the exam booklets of a certain Ramon
Galang to be admitted to the Bar.
Lanuevo admitted to have brought said exam booklets
to the examiners for re-checking.

In consideration of the thought that Galang is in the

borderline of passing that he presented the 5 test
notebooks of the same to the examiners.

In view of such, he was able to pass the bar exam but

it was reflected that he failed in his 5 subjects.
(Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).

Lanuevo explained to the bar examiners that if an

examinee failed in 1 subject only and passed all the
rest; the examiner in the subject in which he failed will
review the exam notebook

Issue: Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty of defrauding the

bar examiners
Held:
This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney
Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar
Examinations.
Supreme Court received a confidential letter that speaks of
the exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon
Galang who has been re-evaluated and re-corrected such
that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective
examiners for re-evalution or re-checking.
The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or rechecked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating
that he has the authority to do the same and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and
was on the borderline of passing.
Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because
of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed
in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal &
Remedial).

Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight

Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.
The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is
the Bar Committees regular activity that when an examinee
has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the
examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his
exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties,
including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never
declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities.
Issue:
WON Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such
that Galang passed the Bar? YES
Held:
The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing
upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is
not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better
than the examiner.
-

Atty. Lanuevo was disbarred.

Galang was stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that

characterized respondent Lanuevos well-studied and wellcalculated moves in successively representing separately to
each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the

examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on

the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the
five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which
under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on
the borderline of passing.
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the reevaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who
fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks
are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has
no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and
cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner.
AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an
attorney in his application to take the Bar
examinations of the fact that he had been charged
with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law is well
settled. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be
granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the
criminal law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar
examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he
passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to

order the surrender of his attorneys certificate and

the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys

ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened

with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal
of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required
to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are
rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

Ratio:

G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of

their office are Judges, or other officials or employees of the
superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section
32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved
not being among them, remained as counsel of record since
he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants
counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was
substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new
counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams
CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the
case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to
act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The
right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by
counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance,
and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law
unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and
given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809,
March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to
provide the accused with a counsel de officio for such action
as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz
Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)

Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an
accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent
judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election
Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He
commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to
withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The
respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6,
Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel
de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service
which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this
certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying
the motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?
Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack
of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He

Facts:
Complainant Felipe E. Abella filed a complaint for violation

of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and

Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees against respondent Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra. In
his affidavit-complaint, complainant charged respondent with
engaging in private practice of law while employed in the
government
service.
Respondent was appointed at the Register of Deeds
of General Santos City. During her term of office, she applied
for a notarial commission and notarized 3, 000 documents.
These acts were performed by respondent, without obtaining
a permission from the Secretary of Justice.
Respondent invoke good faith as her defense. Respondent
insists that she cannot be punish because she was given
permission by her senior officer to notarize. In fact, one of the
agreement in her appointment letter was that she will not
imposed charges on papers from their office that needs
notarization. Moreover, respondent argued that she is new in
the legal profession and she does know the intricacies
thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent's act merits disciplinary action.
Ruling:
Yes, as per Civil Service rules, the authority to grant
permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the
head of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides:
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in
any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head
of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at

the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an

employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should
be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way
influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not
take part in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer
or
member
of
the
board
of
directors",
Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the
office deems necessary in each particular case in the interest
of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the
Civil
Service
Commission.
It is clear in this case that when respondent filed her
petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain
a written permission from the Secretary of the DOJ.
Respondents superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue
any authorization because he is not the head of the
Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds
authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that
written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or
good faith because respondent filed her petition for
commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular
No.
17
was
issued
in
1986.
Thus, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, engaging in the private practice of
profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense
punishable
by
reprimand.
Wherefore, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of
engaging in notarial practice without the written authority
from the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and

accordingly we REPRIMAND her. She is warned that a

repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a
more severe sanction.