1.

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS & REALTY

DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
v
FORMARAN
FACTS: Ruby Shelter obtained a loan in the
total amount of P95,700,620.00 from Tan &
Obiedo, secure by a real estate mortgage
over 5 parcels of land. When the loan
became due & Ruby Shelter failed to pay,
the parties entered into a MOA, granting an
extension to pay & it was agreed that Ruby
Shelter is to execute a DOS over the same
parcels of land in favor of Tan & Obiedo w/c
shall be nullified in case of payment and
failure to pay on the expiration of the
extension, Tan & Obiedo can acquired their
properties as dacion en pago.
Ruby Shelter failed to pay and so Tan &
Obiedo registered the properties in their
name. Ruby Shelter filed before the RTC an
action for annulment of Deed of Sale
asserting that the execution of the same
constituted pactum commisorium and was
null & void.
Upon filing, Ruby Shelters paid the sum of
P13,644.25 for docket fee as assessed by
the OCC. The COC initially considered the
action
as
incapable
of
pecuniary
estimation& computed the docket feee
according to Sec 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court w/c imposes a fixed flat rate
of docket fee.
Tan contends that the docket fee should be
computed based on Sec 7(a) of Rule 141 as
amended by AM-04-2-04-SC, since the case
involves real properties and that due to the
failure of Ruby Shelter to pay the proper
docket fee, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction. RTC did not out rightly
dismissed the case and granted Ruby
Shelter to pay the additional docket fee,
however Ruby Shelter refused believing it
already paid the correct amount.
ISSUE: What provision is applicable to the
case at bar, Sec 7(a) or 7(b) of Rule 141?
RULING: Sec 7(a) is applicable
The action is a real action, involving the
recovery of the title and possession of the
5 parcels of land and thus the docket fee
for which must be computed in accordance
with 7(a) of Rule 141 which though
dominated as an action for annulment of
DOS, provides that in cases involving real
property, the fair market value of the
real property in litigation stated in the

current tax declaration or zonal

valuation of the BIR whichever is
higher or if there is none, the stated
value of the property in litigation
instead of the assessed or estimated
market value.
SC affirmed the order requiring
Shelter to pay additional docket fee.

Ruby

2. YAP v PDCP
FACTS: Sammy Yap obtained a P2 million
loan from PDCP Development Bank, Inc.
(PDCP). As security, Sammys parents,
petitioners Simon Yap and Milagros
Guevarra, executed a third-party mortgage
on their land and warehouse standing on it.
The mortgage agreement provided that
PDCP may extrajudicially foreclose the
property in case Sammy failed to pay the
loan.
Sammy issued a promissory note and six
postdated checks in favor of PDCP as
additional securities for the loan. Sammy
defaulted on the payment of his loan, PDCP
presented the six checks to the drawee
bank but the said checks were dishonored.
This prompted PDCP to file a complaint
against Sammy for six counts of violation of
BP 22, which were provisionally dismissed
upon the motion of Sammy.
This prompted to file an application for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on
the property of petitioners which served as
principal security for Sammys loan.
ISSUE: WON PDCP is guilty of splitting of
cause of action?
RULING: No. The causes of action for the
filing of BP 22 and extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage are different.
Under BP 22, the cause of action is
issuance of bum checks and in filing
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage,
cause of action is the failure to pay for
loan secured by mortgaged property.

the
for
the
the

3. LAPANDAY AGRI & DEV CORP v

ESTITA
FACTS:
The heirs of Orval filed for a Sales
Application over a 719 ha tract of
agricultural land and this was opposed by
Malalag Land Petitioners Association

(Association). The Office of the President

gave due course to the applications to
cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectare
x
s per heir but awarded 399 hectares to 133
protesters.
The Association through its president Mr.
Mangubat,
sent
a
letter
to
the
management of Lapanday Group of
Companies, Inc. manifesting that they
were
no
longer
interested
in
the
government
grant
and
offered
to
transfer and waive whatever interest
they have over the subject land for a
monetary consideration.
It therefore came as a surprise when,
Estital et. Al.
filed against Lapanday
and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., the Heirs of
Orval Hughes, the DENR/COSLAP and
Cecilio Mangubat, Sr.] the following cases:
forcible
entry,
reinstatement,
nullification of any
documents on
disposition of lands.
They averred that LAPANDAY, Orval heirs
and Mangubat Sr., misled them to receive
P54,000.00 each as rentals on their
respective landholdings and deceived to
sign receipts in English which turned out
to be affidavits of quitclaims in favor
of LAPANDAY.
Lapanday Agricultural & Development
Corporation opposed said actions for there
being no entity by the name of
Lapanday and L.S. Ventures Inc. which
has agricultural operation in Davao del Sur.
The fact is that said company had
already
merged
with
Lapanday
Agricultural
and
Development
Corporation
The DARAB ordered Lapanday and/or L.S.
Ventures and Orval heirs to restore Estita,
et al., to their respective farmlots and
declared the nullity of the quitclaims
allegedly executed by petitioners. **This
prompted Lapanday to elevate the
case, now under the name of
LAPANDAY AGRI DEV CORP.**
LAPANDAY AGRI DEV CORP argued before
the SC that the DARAB decision has no
valid force and effect against it
because it is not a real party-ininterest, pointing out that Lapanday
and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., are separate
and
distinct
from
petitioners
corporate personality.

ISSUE: WON LAPANDAY AGRI DEV CORP is

precluded from questioning its inclusion as
a party in the case at bar.
RULING: YES. Lapanday Agri failed to raise
it at the earliest opportunity. It is basic in
the law of procedure that misjoinder of
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action, as parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of
any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the proceedings and on such
terms as are just. Here, aside from
unsubstantiated denials that it is not
the party referred to in the complaint
for forcible entry,
LAPANDAY AGRI
DEV CORP did not even file a motion
to strike its name in all the
proceedings.
It is a rule that objections to defects in
parties should be made at the earliest
opportunity, that is, at the moment
such defect becomes apparent, by a
motion to strike the names of the
parties
wrongly
impleaded.
For
objections to misjoinder cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.
In fact, their Answer, bears the name
LAPANDAY AND/OR L.S. VENTURES, INC.,
signed by its representative. This alone
negates their stance that there is no entity
by the name of Lapanday and that L.S.
Ventures, Inc. is separate and distinct from
any company.
But even assuming, in gratia argumenti,
that Lapanday does not have a juridical
personality, it may nonetheless be sued
under such a name considering that
Estita et.al. commonly know Lapanday
Agri Dev Corp by the name Lapanday
Group of Companies, and under Section
15, Rule 3 they may be sued under the
name by which they are generally or
commonly known
4. PILTELCOM v TECSON
FACTS: Tecson applied for six (6) cellular
phone subscriptions with petitioner Pilipino
Telephone Corporation (PILTEL) which
applications were each approved and
covered, respectively, by six mobiline
service agreements.
Tecsob filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte, a complaint
against petitioner for a Sum of Money and
Damages. PILTELCOM moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of

improper venue, citing a common provision

in the mobiline service agreements to the
effect that Venue of all suits arising from this
Agreement or any other suit
directly or indirectly arising from
the relationship between PILTEL
and subscriber shall be in the
proper courts of Makati, Metro
Manila.
Subscriber
hereby
expressly waives any other venues.
ISSUE: WON the filing of the complaint in
the RTC of Iligan was proper
RULING: No. The complaint should have
been filed in the courts of Makati pursuant
to the mobiline service agreement.
Section 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure allows the parties to agree
and stipulate in writing, before the filing of
an action, on the exclusive venue of any
litigation
between
them.
Such
an
agreement would be valid and binding
provided that the stipulation on the chosen
venue is exclusive in nature or in intent,
that it is expressed in writing by the parties

thereto, and that it is entered into before

the filing of the suit.
The provision contained in paragraph 22 of
the Mobile Service Agreement, a standard
contract made out by petitioner PILTEL to
its subscribers, apparently accepted and
signed by Tecson, states that the venue of
all suits arising from the agreement, or any
other suit directly or indirectly arising from
the relationship between PILTEL and
subscriber, shall be in the proper courts of
Makati, Metro Manila. The added stipulation
that the
subscriber expressly waives any other
venue should indicate, clearly enough, the
intent of the parties to consider the venue
stipulation as being preclusive in character.