The Clarion Brief

Supported by:

Two Steps Back, One Step Forward: The EU and

Abkhazia

by

Thomas Frear
Research Fellow, European Leadership Network

September 2016

About the Research

The research has been carried out Thomas Frear for The Clarion, with the financial
support of the Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Fund. It partially draws on the
authors previous work for the Caucasus Survey and the European Leadership
Network (ELN).

About the Organisation

The Clarion Brief is a part of the experimental media and research platform The
Clarion (www.theclarion.eu), where we look for ways to empower and engage
Georgia in an ongoing discussion about Europe. The Clarion is powered by Civil
Georgia (www.Civil.ge) a source of reference on Georgias current affairs since
2001.
The United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG - www.una.ge) is the institutional
parent for these media initiatives. A veteran of Georgias non-governmental scene,
UNAG works since 1995 to engage youth, protect the rights of the vulnerable, inform
the public about the world and strengthen countrys institutions.

Dolidze str. 2, Tbilisi 0183, Georgia

Tel.: +995 32 332 516
clarion@una.ge
http://www.theclarion.eu/

Executive Summary
The Ukrainian revolution of 2014, the

approach that in no way suggests de jure

subsequent Russian occupation of the

recognition of Abkhazia. They focus

Crimean peninsula, and the establishment

instead on improving the ability of

of separatist enclaves in the Donbass has

Abkhazian

given a new urgency to the study of the de

internationally,

facto statelets that dot Europes periphery.

Abkhazian economic prospects.

Combined with the recognition by Russia

The former centres on the introduction of

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, and

EU-sponsored, status neutral passports in

the subsequent signing of extensive

the same vein as those issued by the UN to

integrative agreements between these

residents of Kosovo between 2000 and

entities and Russia, it is now clear that

2008. This circumvents the criticism of the

Moscow will undertake what measures of

existing status neutral passports that are

integration with neighbouring territory it

sponsored explicitly by Georgia.

deems necessary to defend its interests.

residents
and

to
on

travel

diversifying

The latter focuses on EU support for key

In such an environment it is imperative to

infrastructure projects such as the Inguri

reassess past and current engagement

dam and hydroelectric plant, and regional

strategies with Europes de facto states.

rail links. Reconnecting Georgia and Russia

by rail through Abkhazia is arguably more

This paper examines the policies of the

plausible following the designation in the

European Union towards one such entity,

Georgia-Russia WTO agreement as an

Abkhazia. These proposals rest on a

independently monitored trade corridor.

controversial assessment, that it is not

plausible in the short to medium term that

The paper also calls for the EU to facilitate

Georgia will gain sovereign control of

greater Abkhazia-Turkey trade links as a

Abkhazia. It thus becomes necessary to

method

buttress

overwhelming reliance on Russia.

where

possible

Abkhazias

independence of action vis--vis Russia in

of

reducing

Sukhumis

It is testament to past failures that the EU

order to keep open the possibility of

must now act to improve the capacity of a

constructive engagement between Tbilisi

de facto entity as part of a wider effort to

and Sukhumi in the future.

uphold an existentially weakened regional

The underdeveloped policy of Engagement

security structure. Engagement without

without

Recognition must be made to work, or

Recognition

is

the

guiding

principle behind these policies, which must

be

understood

as

these failures will become permanent.

status-neutral

Background
The Ukrainian revolution of 2014, the

economic integration with the Russian

subsequent Russian occupation of the

Federation.

Crimean peninsula, and the establishment

This paper will focus on the evolution of EU

of separatist enclaves in the Donbass has

policy towards Abkhazia in the face of

given a new urgency to the study of the de

Sukhumis deepening relationship with

facto statelets that dot Europes periphery.

Russia in an effort to highlight past failures

These entities, each the result of differing

centrifugal

forces

catalysed

by

and to identify possible future areas of

the

action.1

dissolution of the Soviet Union and latterly

Yugoslavia, have, with the exception of

Deepening Dependence

those few resolved swiftly through the use

The signing in November 2014 of the

of overwhelming force, defied attempts at

Agreement on Alliance and Integration

conflict resolution aiming to reunite them

between Russia and Abkhazia is illustrative

with their de jure parent state. The

of the prevailing assessment of Abkhazia in

prolonged existence of these statelets has

the decision-making centres of the EU.

posed a considerable problem to the

European security structure, hindering the

This document includes provisions that call

state-building efforts of the parent state,

for the creation of a Russian-Abkhazian

and occasionally acting as violent flash-

joint group of forces to defend Abkhazia

points.

in the event of external aggression and a

pledge to bring Abkhazian customs

Russian recognition of two of these

legislation into line with that of the

entities, Abkhazia and South Ossetia,

Eurasian Economic Union within three

represented a significant failure of western

years.2 Such measures are taken as proof

policy towards the post Soviet de facto

of Russias gradual annexation of Abkhazia.

states. It is imperative that this failure is

understood. Limited western involvement

However, a more nuanced assessment of

in these entities has left institutions such

the Abkhazia-Russia relationship shows

as

that this process was far from inevitable.

the

European

Union

apparently

impotent in the face of their on-going

It is not the place of this article to discuss the Georgia-Abkhazia peace process at length, only to
comment on areas to which the EU has contributed and how its policy could be developed.
2
- : , , 24
November 2014, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/252874/ Accessed October 2016

It is often overlooked that Russia has not

stronger bargaining position with which to

always been a supporter of a secessionist

resist Russian political encroachment.

Abkhazia. On the contrary, the Russian

As Russia-Georgia relations deteriorated,

Federation spent the majority of the 1990s

Russian

imposing an economic blockade on

implementation

of

the

CIS

sanctions regime became increasingly lax,

Abkhazia and restricting the movement of

permitting the development of cross-

its residents at the behest of the Georgian

border trade and investment by regional

government.

Russian authorities in the economy of

That Abkhazia accepted closer relations

Abkhazia. In addition the distribution of

with the Russian Federation from the late

Russian passports to residents of Abkhazia,

1990s to the present is indicative of a

and the access to a Russian pension that

wider failure. The lack of a constructive

came with them, provided an additional

relationship between Sukhumi and Tbilisi

source of income dependency.

in the years preceding Russian recognition

The August 2008 war and Russias

served to ensure Abkhazian isolation.

Whilst

Georgian

efforts

to

subsequent recognition of Abkhazian

prohibit

statehood

substantially

altered

the

diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia were

relationship, followed closely as it was by

prudent,

the signing of a plethora of inter-

restricting

economic

development and reconstruction following

governmental

the 1992/3 Abkhaz-Georgian war has

provision

proved to be counterproductive. Far from

budgetary assistance to the Abkhaz

encouraging

authorities. Russian recognition has in

such

many ways served to further isolate

renewed

the

union

Abkhazians
with

into

Georgia

deprivation cemented local resentment,

of

agreements

and

considerable

the

Russian

Abkhazia.

and created the conditions whereby the

The Russian veto in the UN and OSCE made

Abkhazian political elite had little choice

agreement on the continued presence of

but to accept what assistance they were

their respective missions in the territory

offered, no matter who offered it.

untenable and they were subsequently

Had the Abkhazians had multiple sources

withdrawn, whilst the Georgian Laws on

of income with which to balance offers of

the Occupied Territories restricted the

trade with Russia and various Russian aid

work of international NGOs. It was in this

packages then they would have had a

environment that the EU assumed a more

leading role in engaging Abkhazia.

In the period before the establishment of

History of EU involvement in
Abkhazia

the

European

Neighbourhood

Policy

(1992-2005) the European Commission

In the early stages of de facto Abkhazian

allocated 505 million to Georgia, for

independence, roughly the period 1992-

utilisation

2008, the EU as a bloc was a minor player

as

technical

assistance

dedicated primarily to democratisation

in the conflict resolution process between

projects and the reform of the judicial

Tbilisi and Sukhumi.

system,

of which 30 million was

Engagement with Abkhazia was mainly

allocated to conflict resolution in Abkhazia

limited to the large-scale provision of aid at

and South Ossetia.

claimed to be the largest international

sub-governmental

level

and

the

By 2008 the EU

maintenance of the largely nominal Rapid

donor to reconstruction in Abkhazia.

Response Mechanism (RRM) aimed at

Economic rehabilitation and confidence

maintaining communication between the

building measures were selected for their

Georgian and Abkhaz authorities. 3 The

apolitical nature, and implementation was

appointment of the European Union

not linked to the Georgian/Abkhazian

Special Representative (EUSR) in 2003

negotiations in Geneva, at which the EU

served to provide a permanent presence

sat and continues to sit as a co-chair.9 The

and a secretariat through which regional

EU also provided significant financial

projects could be coordinated, 4 however

assistance for the restoration of the Inguri

the EUSR had little influence in Abkhazia.5

dam and hydroelectric plant, a critical

Nino Kereselidze (2015) The engagement policies of the European Union, Georgia and Russia
towards Abkhazia, Caucasus Survey, 3:3, 309-322. P. 312
4
European Scrutiny Committee, UK Parliament, committee assessment of the EU Special
Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, 2015,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-xxxi/21908.htm
Accessed November 2016
5 See Liana Kvarchelia (2012) Perceptions of the EU in Abkhazia and Prospects for the EU-Abkhazia
Engagement, Centre for Humanitarian Programmes, http://www.cr.org/downloads/PPP_2012analysis1_EN_0.pdf Accessed October 2016
6 European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Georgia: Country
Strategy Paper, 2007- 2013, https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf
Accessed October 2016
7 Nino Kereselidze (2015) The engagement policies of the European Union, Georgia and Russia
towards Abkhazia, Caucasus Survey, 3:3, 309-322. P. 312
8 Project specifics can be found here,
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/georgia/documents/projects/euprojects_2011_en.pdf
Accessed October 2016
9 Dominic Fean (2009, September) Making Good Use of the EU in Georgia: The Eastern Partnership
and Conflict Policy, Russie Nei Visions No. 44 p.9

infrastructure project that provides nearly

including the HALO Trusts work on mine

all of Abkhazias electricity and a significant

clearance. 12 An EUSR for the Conflict in

proportion of the Georgian requirement.10

Georgia was also established to monitor

the implementation of the six point

Following the August 2008 war and the

ceasefire plan, before being combined

dissolution of the UN mission in Abkhazia

with the office of the EUSR for the South

the EU became the primary peacekeeper

Caucasus in 2011.13

between Georgia and the separatist entity,

first through playing a key role in the

The main mechanisms through which the

negotiation of the ceasefire and later

EU funded its activities in the region were

through the deployment of the European

the

Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) on 15

Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 14 and the

September 2008. The EUMMs mandate

European Commissions Instrument for

consists of stabilisation, normalisation and

Stability (IfS) 15 that dispersed aid in the

confidence building, as well as reporting to

form

the EU in order to inform European policy-

international and local non-governmental

making in the region.

11

European

of

Neighbourhood

contracts

and

grants

and

to

However the

organisations. For the period of 2014-

EUMM is prohibited by the Abkhaz

2020, the ENPI was replaced by the

authority from operating within Abkhazian

European

territory. This more visible deployment has

(ENI), however ENI funding documents

Neighbourhood

Instrument

come at the expense of some aid projects,

as these remain hampered following
Georgias introduction of the Law on
Occupied Territories. However EU funding
continues to support several key projects,

10

EBRD (2006) Enguri Hydro-power Plant Rehabilitation Project

http://web.archive.org/web/20080527202746/http://www.ebrd.com/projects/psd/psd1998/4304.ht
m Accessed October 2016
11 European Union External Action Service, European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia,
https://www.eumm.eu/en/home Accessed October 2016
12 The HALO Trust, Georgia https://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/europe-andcaucasus/georgia/ Accessed November 2016
13 Emilia Jeppsson (2015) A Differentiated, Balanced and Patient Approach? The EUs Involvement
with Georgias Secessionist Conflicts beyond the August 2008 War, College of Europe, p.14
14 European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/european-neighbourhood-and-partnership-instrumentenpi_en Accessed October 2016
15 European Commission, International Cooperation and Development,
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/%C2%A0-ifs-ms-1_en Accessed October 2016

contain no specific reference to funding for

inevitably led to drift and inaction. This

projects in Abkhazia.16

prevarication was heavily criticised by the

Abkhazian leadership at the time, whilst

During the period 2009/2010 the EU

public opinion polls showed that the EU

developed a concept of Engagement

was increasingly viewed as a partisan

without Recognition towards Abkhazia,

actor.18

this doctrine, not referenced directly in

official EU documents, was more fully

Nevertheless the Russian annexation of

elucidated by a 2010 paper by Alexander

Crimea in March 2014 and the signing of

Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell.17

the Agreement on Alliance and Integration

between

This policy proposed moving away from

Russia

and

Abkhazia

has

appeared to galvanise a renewed focus on

the policy of total isolation that has forced

mechanisms by which to engage Abkhazia.

Abkhazia so deeply into the Russian orbit

and onto a policy of economic, political,

On 3 February 2015, the EUs special

and cultural engagement whilst making

representative for the South Caucasus,

very

of

Herbert Salber, met with Abkhazias then

Abkhazian statehood was not an option.

de facto foreign minister, Viacheslav

Such a policy was designed to decrease

Chirikba, in Sukhumi to discuss the EUs

Abkhazian reliance on Russia in these

activities.

spheres and create an environment that

have yet to emerge from this initiative

was more responsive to productive

Salber suggested shortly afterwards that

Georgian-Abkhazian negotiations.

the establishment of an EU Information

clear

that

full

recognition

19

Whilst concrete proposals

Office. It is unclear, whether this remains a

However, whilst the EU remained clear and

possibility.20

consistent in its policy of non-recognition

the lack of a clear strategy for engagement

16

European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Georgia,

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/georgia/index_en.htm Accessed October
2016
17 Alexander Cooley & Lincoln A Mitchell (2010) Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy
Toward Abkhazia and Eurasias Unrecognised States The Washington Quarterly Vol.33 No.4 pp.59-73
18 Liana Kvarchelia (2012) Perceptions of the EU in Abkhazia and Prospects for the EU-Abkhazia
Engagement, Centre for Humanitarian Programmes, http://www.cr.org/downloads/PPP_2012analysis1_EN_0.pdf Accessed October 2016
19 What Is the EUs Game in the Caucasus Separatist Territories?, Eurasianet, 26 February 2015
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72301 Accessed October 2016
20 Envoy Says EU Expanding Presence In Abkhazia, RFE/RL, 05 February 2015,
http://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-abkhazia-salber/26831819.html Accessed October 2016

Policy Recommendations
The continued lack of clarity regarding

reliance of Abkhazian society on Russian

specific policy options risks repeating the

largess. Only by increasing Abkhazian

failure

without

exposure to the world at large can Georgia

section

hope to diminish, however marginally,

of

Recognition.

Engagement
The

following

analyses a number of options available to

Russian influence in the region.

the EU.

The principles of Engagement without

These proposals rest on a controversial

Recognition can be applied in two distinct

assessment, that it is not plausible in the

areas,

short to medium term that Georgia will

development of trade relations.

gain sovereign control of Abkhazia.21

international

travel

and

the

A primary issue is that Abkhazian officials

It thus becomes necessary to buttress

and civil society representatives need to be

where possible Abkhazias independence

granted permission to visit western

of action vis--vis Russia in order to keep

capitals on a regular basis in order to

open the possibility of constructive

participate in discussions relating to the

engagement between Tbilisi and Sukhumi

future of their region.

in the future.

In the past, Abkhazian NGOs have

The EU can play an important role in this

cooperated

process, but by necessity must coordinate

organisations such as the European

closely with the Georgian government.

Commission, UNDP and OSCE and have

and

international

free press and the creation of civil society

reconsideration of the Law on the

Territories

such

played an important role in supporting the

In the first instance EU efforts urging a

Occupied

with

within Abkhazia and must be supported in

the

the future.

accompanying State Strategy on Occupied

Territories through the Venice Commission

Similarly measures should be undertaken

of the Council of Europe must be

to enable Abkhazian students to study in

rekindled. The restrictions placed on the

the west and opportunities for tourist visas

activities of foreign organisations in

for

Abkhazia by these agreements have

examined. The policy of the United

proved counterproductive, increasing the

Kingdom is illustrative in this regard. The

21

the

wider

populous

should

be

Thomas De Waal (2015) Crimea, Russia and Options for Engagement in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Carnegie Europe, http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=62122 Accessed October 2016

Foreign

and

Commonwealth

Office-

neutral.

The

sponsored Chevening scholarship is now

however,

open to Abkhazians via a status neutral

sponsored,

South Caucasus nationality option, an

documents.

innovation that should be imitated across

for

precedent
the

does

issuance

politically

neutral

exist,
of

UN
travel

The UNMIK Travel Document, in use in

the EU.

Kosovo by those residents unable to obtain

The primary difficulty in implementing this

a Yugoslavian (Serbian) passport between

outreach initiative is that Abkhazian

the years 2000-2008, provided the option

passports are not recognised outside of

of international travel to those states that

Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru;

recognised the document.24

and that EU member states do not issue

Russian recognition of Abkhazia makes a

visas to Abkhazian residents issued with

direct replication of this process unlikely to

Russian passports.

pass via UN processes; it is however

Whilst the Georgian government has

possible to consider such a document

discussed issuing passports to residents of

sponsored by the EU.

Abkhazia, 22 complete with their recently

The replacement of the Georgian country

validated visa free travel to the EU, it

code so criticised on the previous status-

remains highly unlikely that Abkhazians

neutral document would be a necessity, as

outside of the ethnic-Georgian Gali district

would a system of application and

will avail themselves of this offer.23

distribution outside of the onus of Tbilisi.

In 2011 a solution was presented in the

The lack of permanent EU representation

form of neutral travel documents, to be

in Abkhazia would make this difficult. In

issued by the Georgian government to the

order to avoid accusations of subversion it

residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

may be necessary to approach the Abkhaz

Not surprisingly these documents were

authorities with regard to the validity of

rejected by the Sukhumi authorities, who

this document and to discuss the means of

condemned them as Georgian rather than

22

Georgia to Issue Abkhaz and Ossetians Passports, Granting Visa Free Travel to EU, Georgia Today,
21 March 2016, http://georgiatoday.ge/news/3323/Georgia-to-Issue-Abkhaz-and-OssetiansPassports,-Granting-Visa-Free-Travel-to-EU Accessed October 2016
23
Under Abkhazian law it is illegal to hold dual citizenship with any state other than Russia, whilst an
Abkhazian passport is necessary for participation in civic life. Ethnic-Georgian residents of Gali already
rely on Georgian passports due to the revocation of their Abkhazian documents in 2014.
24 Thomas Frear (2015) Abkhazia and the west: Rehabilitating engagement without recognition,
European Leadership Network, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/abkhazia-and-the-westrehabilitating-engagement-without-recognition_2370.html Accessed October 2016

10

dissemination. The issuance of such a

attitude towards the AA among the

document to residents of Abkhazia, in

governing political and economic elite in

combination

Tiraspol. This is not the case in Abkhazia.

with

coordinated

recognition of it by the EU member states

The Abkhaz leadership have remained

and other western actors, would provide a

consistent in their rejection of any

valid option of travel to Abkhazians.

cooperation with the EU, economic or

Reducing travel restrictions on Abkhazia

otherwise, conducted through Georgia.

would also open up the possibility of

This intransigence is to some degree

greater trade with the region, lessening its

total

reliance

on

Russia.

reflected in the text of the AA itself, stating

Western

as it does that the agreement will only

diplomatic efforts should focus on creating

become applicable in Abkhazia once the

a tacit framework whereby Turkish vessels

region is under sovereign Georgian

can routinely visit Abkhazian ports, and on

control.

the restoration of a ferry link between

Even a limited application of the DCFTA to

Abkhazia and Trabzon.

Abkhazia, on a sectoral basis short of full

The role of the EU in facilitating, or indeed

trade liberalisation, designed to give

participating in, trade with Abkhazia is

access to the EU as a market would face

complicated by the recently activated

Association

Agreement

(AA)

similar resistance due to the necessity of

and

certifying exported goods as of Georgian

accompanying Deep and Comprehensive

origin.

Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with

In any case the nature of the Abkhazian

Georgia.

economy limits the possibility of export to

Whilst the EUs AA/DCFTA with Moldova is

the EU. The destruction or atrophy of most

deemed to play a broadly positive role in

the

Transnistria/Moldova

of Abkhazias Soviet-era industry leaves

conflict

the economy (excluding direct Russian

resolution process the parallels with

budgetary support) reliant on tourism,

Abkhazia are incomplete, challenging the

agriculture,

assumption that increased trade will act as

With

the

hazelnuts exported to the EU from Georgia

conflicts.
Transnistrian

logging.

exception of hazelnuts (in 2014 10% of

a catalyst for dialogue on Europes frozen

The

and

were of Abkhazian origin) it is unlikely that

economy

remains

these products would be able to secure

closely linked to that of Moldova and the

market share in the EU.

EU, a position fostering a pragmatic

11

It is thus prudent for the EU to instead act

accession to the Russian sanctions regime

as a facilitator for trade between Abkhazia

on Turkey following the shooting down of

and third parties, Turkey in particular.

a Russian aircraft on the Turkish-Syrian

border in November 2015.26

Whilst Abkhazian trade is overwhelmingly

dominated by Russia (the Abkhazian State

The position of Abkhazia as a transit

Customs Committee acknowledged Russia

corridor for Georgia-Russia trade may also

accounted for 69% of foreign trade

provide a role for the EU as facilitator.

turnover in the first two quarters of

The Georgia-Russia agreement on the

201625), the majority of which consists of

latters accession to the WTO conferred on

imports, trade with Turkey remains

Abkhazia the status of trade corridor, an

considerable.

area through which goods can be moved in

Turkish trade accounted for 24% of

accordance with a neutral monitoring

Abkhazian turnover in the first two

regime. This monitoring regime entails the

quarters of 2016, but perhaps more

administration of customs issues at either

significantly this consisted of a substantial

end of the corridor by a private Swiss

trade surplus (1.74 billion roubles export

company (SGS) that will in turn coordinate

to 0.43 billion roubles import).

with the WTO.27

The development of this trade link,

This status-neutral approach will not

through such measures as the transport

involve the stationing of monitors on

link suggested above, would provide

Abkhazian territory. Whilst this agreement

Abkhazia an important source of income

is not designed to facilitate Georgian-

with which to balance reliance on Russia.

Abkhazian trade, 28 it is conceivable that

this form of moderation may increase the

Without external support this tenuous link

plausibility of restoring the Russian-

remains hostage to Russian pressure, as

was

evident

following

Georgian rail link through Abkhazia

Abkhazias

25

18%, , 1 August 2016,

http://www.apsnypress.info/news/vneshnetorgovyy-oborot-abkhazii-vyros-na-18/ Accessed October
2016
26 Valery Dzutsati (2016), Putin Aide Surkov Pressures Abkhazia Into Joining Russian Sanctions Against
Turkey, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 13, https://jamestown.org/program/putin-aidesurkov-pressures-abkhazia-into-joining-russian-sanctions-against-turkey-2/ Accessed October 2016
27 Lavrov: 2011 Georgia-Russia WTO Deal Does Not Cover Abkhazia, S.Ossetia, Civil Georgia, 11
March 2015, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28119 Accessed October 2016
28 Natalia Mirimanova (2015), Abkhazia: Regulations for Trade with Disputed
Statehood, Politorbis Nr. 60 2 / 2015 p.14

12

30

The possibility of restoring the Sukhumi-

Whilst a 2013 study

Tbilisi section of the Transcaucasus

negative impact that the costs of the

railway, the only such link between Russia

restoration of the Abkhazian section of the

and Georgia, was broached in 2012 by the

railway would have on the profitability of

new GDDG government as part of its

freight traffic, Russian investment since

reassessment

then has increased operational capacity.31

of

the

previous

administrations approach to Abkhazia.

highlighted the

Added to this is the increase in possible

However this proposal received criticism

Georgian-Russian freight following the

from the opposition centred on the

lifting of restrictions on key products, such

possible use of the rail link as method for

as Georgian wine, at the end of 2013.

Russia to militarily reinforce Armenia, in

A final but crucial project is the full

turn damaging Georgian relations with

restoration of the Inguri dam and

Azerbaijan, a key Georgian trading partner.

hydroelectric plant. Following its repair,

If this railway could be confirmed as a

with EU support, in the 1990s and

purely commercial matter, linked to the

subsequent work on the hydro-mechanical

WTO trade corridor regime and with

equipment in between January 2011 and

verification

January 2016

on

the

Georgian

side

32

it is rapidly becoming

conducted by the EUMM, it has the

necessary to reconstruct the dam in order

potential

to keep it functioning. 33 This will involve

to

become

an

important

economic boost to the region.29

suspending operations for several months.

29

A potential complication arises from Abkhazias handing over control of its railway system to
Russian management for a ten-year period in May 2009, under this agreement Abkhazia was set to
receive a 2 million-rouble credit from Moscow for reconstruction of the railway that has since
resulted in a considerable increase in traffic.
30 Natalia Mirimanova (2013) Rehabilitation of the Railways in the South Caucasus: Assessment of the
Potential Economic Benefits, International Alert, http://www.internationalalert.org/sites/default/files/Caucasus_RailwaysRehabilitationPt1_EN_2013.pdf Accessed October
2016
31 14%, , 4 October 2016,
http://www.apsnypress.info/news/passazhiropotok-v-abkhaziyu-uvelichilsya-na-14/ Accessed
October 2016
32 GE-01 Enguri/Vardnili HPP Rehabilitation grant, Delegation of the European Union to Georgia,
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/6950/ge-01-engurivardnili-hpp-rehabilitation---grant_en
Accessed November 2016
33 Izida Chanya & Regina Jegorova-Askerova (2016), Abkhazia, Georgia's Energy Security at Risk,
Institute for War & Peace Reporting, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/abkhazia-georgias-energysecurity-risk Accessed October 2016

13

The Inguri dam is vital for the economies of

the duration of the repairs.34 This initiative

both Georgia and Abkhazia and represents

is fully in-keeping with the principle of

the single functional cooperative project

Engagement without Recognition and

between

should be strongly considered for EU

Tbilisi

and

authorities recognise

Sukhumi.
this,

Both

with the

financial

and

technical

Georgian government quick to confirm

coordinated

that it will supply Abkhazia with power for

Neighbourhood Instrument.

34

through

the

support
European

Georgia to supply Abkhazia with power as Inguri Dam closes for maintenance, Democracy &
Freedom Watch, 12 March 2015, http://dfwatch.net/georgia-to-supply-abkhazia-with-power-asinguri-dam-closes-for-maintenance-34259 Accessed October 2016

14

Conclusion
The Russian recognition of Abkhazia in

Providing more financial and technical

2008 marked a paradigm shift in the

support to status-neutral projects would

Georgian-Abkhazian conflict resolution

permit

process, providing the Abkhaz polity a

independent of the perceived slight of

hitherto unprecedented level of security. It

acting through Georgian officialdom.

is now clear that in the foreseeable future

development

in

Abkhazia

The EU cannot and should not compete

the conflict will not be resolved by force.

with overt Russian financial support for the

Nevertheless the Russian annexation of

Abkhaz authorities, however expanding

Crimea has provided an added impetus to

low-level economic engagement, the

policy relating to the de facto states of the

activities of international NGOs, and travel

South Caucasus.

options would be welcomed by an Abkhaz

population wary of Russian dominance.

This is not to say that Russia intends to

annex Abkhazia, a move that would in all

It is testament to past failures that the EU

likelihood be fiercely resisted by the

must now act to improve the capacity of a

Abkhazians themselves, but does highlight

de facto entity as part of a wider effort to

that

uphold an existentially weakened regional

Moscow

will

undertake

what

measures of integration with neighbouring

security structure.

territory it deems necessary to defend its

Continued economic integration between

interests.

Abkhazia and Russia will eventually render

In this new reality a pragmatic Georgian

EU

approach would centre on strengthening

integrity irrelevant, support for the

Abkhazia to such a degree as it can resist

Helsinki principles on which this support is

Russian overtures of further integration, as

based must be sustained with action.

only so doing would keep alive the hope of

Engagement without Recognition must be

any constructive dialogue between Tbilisi

made to work, or these failures will

and Sukhumi in the future.

become permanent.

The practical development of the EUs

policy of Engagement without Recognition
will have an important role to play.

15

support

for

Georgian

territorial

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17