Immaculada L. Garcia v.

Social Security Commission Legaland Collection & SSS

FACTS: Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita
Fernandez, and Consuelo Villanueva were directors of Impact Corporation.
Thecorporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum tube
containers and operated two factories. One was a "slug" foundry-factory located in
Cuyapo, NuevaEcija, while the other was an Extrusion Plant in Cainta, Metro Manila,
which processed the "slugs" into aluminum collapsible tubes and similar containers
for toothpaste and other related products. Records show that around 1978, Impact
Corporation started encountering financial problems. By 1980, arises a problem with
theemployees of the corporation due unremitted SSS contributions issues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the only surviving director of the corporation is liable for all
the workers whole collected and unremitted SSS contributions, with penalties.
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The surviving director of the
Impact Corporation is solely liable for the unremitted SSS premium contributions
and penalties therefor. The petitioner avers that under the social security law
provision, the liability does not includeliability for the unremitted SSS premium
contributions. But accordingly, the sections must be understood or interpreted as a
whole and not by parts. The liability imposed as contemplated under the provisions
of the social security law does not preclude the liability for theunremitted amount.
Republic v. Lacap
FACTS: Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where
Lacap and two other contractors were pre-qualified.Being the lowest bidder, Lacap
won the bid for concreting of a certain barangay, and thereafter undertook the
works and purchasedmaterials and labor. On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng
conducted final investigation of end product and fount it 100% completedaccording
to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH. DPWH withheld
payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due to
Lacaps license as contractor having expired. Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH
legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License Law (RA
4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of
license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such
a contract. DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Endorsement
on July 20 1994 recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such
recommendation,no payment was issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for
completed projects
HELD: A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed
projects, but does not exonerate him from correspondingfines thereof. Section 35 of
R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Penalties - Any contractor who, for a

price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or

contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisorycapacity
of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license
to engage in the business of contracting inthis country; or who shall present or file
the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or
any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or
use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guiltyof
misdemeanour, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less
than five hundred pesos but not more than fivethousand pesos.The "plain meaning
rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must begiven its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare,
expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license
had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine
prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed.
Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed
under the law
SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA SUGAR MILL
CORPORATION vs.
CA and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION (G.R. No. 180462 February 9, 2011)
FACTS:
In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric tons of sugar
due to the effects of El Nio and La Nia phenomena. To fill the expected shortage
and to ensure stable sugar prices, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued
Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999 (EO 87),facilitating sugar importation by the
private sector.
Section 2 of EO 87 created a Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction to determine
procedures for sugar importation as well as for collection and remittance of
conversion fee.
Under Section 3 of EO 87, sugar conversion is by auction and is subject to
conversion fee to be remitted by respondent Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA)
to the Bureau of Treasury.
On 3 May 1999, the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction issued the Bidding
Rules providing guidelines for sugar importation. Under the Bidding Rules, the
importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working days from receipt of
notice of the bid award and the 75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar.

The Bidding Rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or if
the imported sugar fails to arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the
conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the SRA.
The SRA forthwith authorized the importation of 300,000 metric tons of sugar, to be
made in three tranches.
The Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction caused the publication of the
invitation to bid. Several sugar importers submitted sealed bid tenders. Petitioners
Southeast Asia Sugar Mill Corporation (Sugar Mill) and South Pacific Sugar
Corporation (Pacific Sugar) emerged as winning bidders for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
tranches.
Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill paid 25% of the conversion fee amounting
to P14,340,000.00, while Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fee amounting to
P28,599,000.00.
As it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar (sugar corporations) delivered only
10% of their sugar import allocation. They requested the SRA to cancel the
remaining sugar import allocation blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. The sugar
corporations sought immediate reimbursement of the corresponding 25% of the
conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00.
The SRA informed the sugar corporations that the conversion fee would be forfeited
pursuant to paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules. The SRA also notified the sugar
corporations that the authority to reconsider their request for reimbursement was
vested with the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction.
The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages in the
Regional Trial Court.
In its notice of appearance, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty.
Raul Labay of the SRAs legal department to assist the OSG in this case.
The RTC ruled in favor of the sugar corporations and held that paragraph G.1 of the
Bidding Rules contemplated delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not cancellation
of sugar importation. It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to the
sugar corporations which merely cancelled the sugar importation.
On 5 January 2007, the OSG received its copy of the RTC Decision. On 24 January
2007, the deputized SRA counsel, Atty. Raul Labay, received his own copy of the
Decision and filed a notice of appeal on 7 February 2007.
The sugar corporations moved to expunge the notice of appeal on the ground that
only the OSG, as the principal counsel, can decide whether an appeal should be
made. The sugar corporations stressed that a lawyer deputized by the OSG has no
authority to decide whether an appeal should be made.

The OSG filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG
pointed out that in its notice of appearance; it authorized SRA counsel Atty. Labay to
assist the OSG in this case.
The RTC granted the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG then moved
for reconsideration however it was denied.
A motion for execution was granted by the RTC.
Aggrieved, the SRA filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 seeking to set aside the orders issued by the RTC as well as the writ of execution.
The Court of Appeals held that the deputized SRA counsel had authority to file a
notice of appeal. The appellate court thus directed the RTC to give due course to the
appeal that Atty. Labay timely filed.
ISSUES:
(1)

Whether a deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal;

(2)
Whether the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of
P38,637,000.00 in conversion fee.

RULING:
As to the first issue, the SC held that the deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of
appeal.
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 198717
authorizes the OSG to represent the SRA, a government agency established
pursuant to Executive Order No. 18, Series of 1986,18 in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
In National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation,19 this Court ruled
that the deputization by the OSG of NAPOCOR counsels in cases involving the
NAPOCOR included the authority to file a notice of appeal. The Court explained that
the OSG could have withdrawn the appeal if it believed that the appeal would not
advance the governments cause. The Court held that even if the deputized
NAPOCOR counsel had no authority to file a notice of appeal, the defect was cured
by the OSGs subsequent manifestation that the deputized NAPOCOR counsel had
authority to file a notice of appeal.
In the present case, records show that both the OSG and the deputized SRA counsel
were served copies of the RTC decision subject of the appeal. Thus, what applies is

National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation. Applying here the

doctrine laid down in the said case, deputized SRA counsel Atty. Labay is, without a
doubt, authorized to file a notice of appeal.
Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such defect was
cured when the OSG subsequently filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the
notice of appeal. As the OSG explained, its reservation to "approve the withdrawal
of the case, the non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the
interest of the government" was meant to protect the interest of the government in
case the deputized SRA counsel acted in any manner prejudicial to government.
Obviously, what required the approval of the OSG was the non-appeal, not the
appeal, of a decision adverse to government.
As to the second issue, the SC held that the sugar corporations are not entitled to
reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00.
Paragraph G.1 of the bidding rules provides that if the importer fails to make the
importation, 25% of the conversion fee shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA, thus:
G. Forfeiture of Conversion Fee
G.1 In case of failure of the importer to make the importation or for the imported
sugar to arrive in the Philippines on or before the Arrival Date, the 25% of
Conversion Fee Bid already paid shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA and the
imported sugar shall not be classified as "B" (domestic sugar) unless, upon
application with the SRA and without objection of the Committee, the SRA allows
such conversion after payment by the importer of 100% of the Conversion Fee
applicable to the shipment.
In joining the bid for sugar importation, the sugar corporations are deemed to have
assented to the Bidding Rules, including the forfeiture provision under paragraph
G.1. The Bidding Rules bind the sugar corporations. The latter cannot rely on the
lame excuse that they are not aware of the forfeiture provision.
There is nothing in the forfeiture provision of the Bidding Rules that is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. On the contrary, the
forfeiture provision fully supports government efforts to aid the countrys ailing
sugar industry. Conversion fees, including those that are forfeited under paragraph
G.1 of the Bidding Rules, are automatically remitted to the Bureau of Treasury and
go directly to the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund.
It is unrefuted that the sugar corporations failed in their contractual undertaking to
import the remaining 27,000 metric tons of sugar specified in their sugar import
allocation. Applying paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules, such failure is subject to
forfeiture of the 25% of the conversion fee the sugar corporations paid as part of
their contractual undertaking.

Plainly and expressly, paragraph G.1 identifies two situations which would bring
about the forfeiture of 25% of the conversion fee: (1) when the importer fails to
make the importation or (2) when the imported sugar fails to arrive in the
Philippines on or before the set arrival date. It is wrong for the RTC to interpret the
forfeiture provision in a way departing from its plain and express language.
Where the language of a rule is clear, it is the duty of the court to enforce it
according to the plain meaning of the word. There is no occasion to resort to other
means of interpretation.
City of Baguio, ET AL. vs. PIO R. MARCOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969
Sanchez, J.
FACTS:
On April 12, 1912, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of
cadastral proceedings (a land registration/ titling proceeding) Civil Case No.1. A decision on November 13, 1922
was rendered; the land involved (Baguio Townsite) was among those declared public lands.
On July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned cadastral court to reopen said civil case. He claims that the land (Baguio
Townsite) be registered in his name upon the grounds that 1.) he and his predecessors have been in continuous
possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times 2.) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus were not
able to file their claim to the land in question.
On the other hand, Francisco G. Joaquin Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and Teresita J. Buchholz, as tree farm lessees
of the land in question, opposed the reopening. Their contentions are as follows: 1.) The reopening petition was
filed outside the 40-year period provided by R.A. 931 2.) Petition to reopen the case was not published 3.) as
lessees of the land, they have a standing to appear in the reopening proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
Statcon issue here is whether the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided by R.A. 931
(enacted June 20, 1953). Joaquins group contests that the title of the said act is in conflict with section 1 of the
same act, thus invalidating the petition of Lutes to reopen the civil case.
Title of the act reads:
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF
CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY
VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE
APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
Section 1 of the act provides:
SECTION 1. in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to
be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted
HELD:
The court allowed the reopening of the case since the case was filed within the 40-year period imposed by the act.
Joaquins group believes that the difference between the title (BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
RENDERED and in section 1 (by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted), is material. If the title is to be followed,
the date November 13, 1922 should be the date used in reckoning the period (which is still within the 40-year
period; counted from the date of the enactment of R.A. 931 which is June 20, 1953). But if the wordings of the title
are to be followed, the date April 12, 1912, which is the date the Director of lands instituted the reopening of the
case, would render the petition invalid since it is already outside the 40-year period.
The rule on statutory construction provides that laws should be construed liberally (see page 12 of statcon book).
The spirit or the intent of the law should be looked upon and should prevail over its letter . In this case, R.A. 931
clearly gives an opportunity to any person who has any interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as
public land to present his claim within the time prescribed. This act is a piece of remedial legislation; its intent
provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the act had no legal means of perfecting titles. Therefore, the
court cannot see an inconsistency between the title and its section.

The title of the act is indisputably clear, as it expresses the very substance of the law itself. The constitutional
jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title, breathes the spirit of command because the
constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
Therefore, by the statute, the petition of Lutes to reopen the case, decision on which was rendered on Nov. 13, 1922,
comes within the 40-year period.
Case: People vs. Purisima, G.R. No. L-42050-66
Facts: This case actually involves 17 petitions, in which informations in each petition were filed against the
respective accused with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph
3. The accused in each petition filed a motion to quash, and the judge concur...red with the motions filed, filing an
order to quash or dismiss the said informations on the ground that that the information in each petition did not assert
facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9, paragraph 3 because it failed to state one essential
element of the crime. In one case, the information contended that the accused carried a carving knife 6 inches long,
which the accused carried outside of his residence, not being used as a tool or something for him to earn his
livelihood, nor being used in an activity that has connection therewith, which the information concluded as contrary
to law. The judge who handled the case, Amante Purisima, ruled that the information should have shown that the
possession of the bladed weapon was for the purpose of carrying out or worsening of criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder, etc. in accordance to what is being mentioned in Proclamation 1081. The information
filed didnt have the requirement, since the accused didnt have the motivation to carry out lawlessness as was in
Proclamation 1081, since the bladed weapon is concealed. Hence, it doesnt establish the facts to constitute an
offense against P.D. 9(3). The petitioner argues that P.D. 9(3) punishes mala prohibita acts, hence for public policy.
Furthermore, the presidential decree here doesnt only condemn carrying a bladed weapon in connection with the
commission of the crime, but in relation to criminality as a whole which characterized the pre-martial law era. The
petitioner further said that the preamble of a statute, usually introduced by the word whereas, is not an essential
part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute, and that the explanatory
note or enacting clause of the decree, if it provides limits to the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text
itself because the explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree.
Issue: Whether the informations filed by the prosecutors in each petition are sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly weapon punishable under P.D. No. 9(3).
Ruling: The Court disagreed with the contention of the petitioner. First, the Court said that the preamble or the
explanatory note of a statute contains the legislative intent and spirit of the decree if there will be problems as to
how we should construe a statute. The Court then stated that the results of implementing P.D. No. 9 (3) should be
within its legislative intent. The Court accorded with Judge Purisimas ruling, saying that it is only the act of
carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with an intention or motivation connected with or in relation with desired result
of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. No. 9(3), and nothing else. Furthermore, in construing this
presidential degree, there should be an inquiry concerning the consequences of a word-for-word implementation of
which, and it is a presumption that in any statute, maladaptive consequences where never intended by the legislator,
and this is a characteristic of P.D. No. 9(3), and the way the petitioner claimed the presidential decree is to provide
hardships for the citizens. The Court also found, as did Purisima, that the elements[1] to constitute the violation of
P.D. 9(3) were not mentioned in the informations, the second element being absent, hence upheld the decision of
Purisima. The petition therefore was denied.
Statutory Construction Issue: 1) pursuit of legislative intent; 2) preamble and explanatory note as construction aids;
3) construing vis--vis the consequences of the statute
[1] The first element is the carrying outside ones residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as
a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.

Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994

Facts:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate
informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting
to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and
Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor
filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This
motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were
considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor VillaIgnacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of
frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the
arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order
denying the motion to quash.
In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge
Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatementof the
original informations, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8,
1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent
Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos
which denied petitioners motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier
stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February
18, 1994, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the
ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners
had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and
granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice
and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the
dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of four new informations, three
of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new
informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant
petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in

the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93
does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.
Petitioners contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent
filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous
an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been
amended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be
deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with the subsequent
ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged
and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an
amended or a new information.
Contrary to petitioners submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a
trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held thatThe
order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing,
or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive
a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to
pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is
either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which
dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.
US vs. WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and SERVILIANO NATIVIDAD,
G.R. No. L-8848, November 21, 1913Trent,
J.:Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a charge of
vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and presented
evidence showing that each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade
or business sufficient enough to support themselves. However, the Attorney-General
defended his clients by arguing that in Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase no
visible means of support only applies to the clause tramping or straying through
the country and not the first clause which states that every person found loitering
about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, thus making the 3 appellants
guilty of vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for without visible
means of support to qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma after
gambling houses would have been omitted, or else a comma after country would
have been inserted.
Issue:
WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the Attorney-Generals
argument based on a mere grammatical criticism.

Held:
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive and the effect
intended by theLegislature should be the relevant determinant of the interpretation
of the law. When themeaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty
of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
construction of the statute which will give iteffect. Moreover, ascertaining the
consequences flowing from such a construction of the law isalso helpful in
determining the soundness of the reasoning.Considering that the argument of the
Attorney-General would suggest a lack of logicalclassification on the part of the
legislature of the various classes of vagrants and since it wasproven that all three of
the defendants were earning a living by legitimate means at a level of comfort
higher than usual, Hart, Miller and Natividad were acquitted, with the costs de
oficio.

Paras v. COMELECG.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996Ponente: Justice Francisco

Facts:Petitioner is the incumbent barangay captain of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the last regular barangayelection in 1994. A petition for his recall was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. A recall election was set,against
which petitioner filed a petition. Petitioner cites Section 74 (b) of LGC, which states
that
no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election
, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred
as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the
first Monday of May1996, and every three years thereafter. Petitioner maintains that
as the SK election is a regular local election, henceno recall election can be had for
barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do
notagree.
Issue:Whether or not an SK election is a regular election.
Held: No. A statutes provisions must be considered with the other parts and must
be kept subservient to the general intentof the whole enactment. Paragraph (b) with
(a) of LGC74 merely designates such a period, i.e. 2nd year of term.Considering the
SK election as regular will unduly circumscribe the LGC provision on recall. No recall
election can be conducted if that is the case (May 1996, every three years). It is
assumed that legislature intended to enact aneffective law, and interpretation
should give effec to the intent, with the whole statute. It is likewise a basic

preceptin statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony

with the Constitution.
[7]
Thus, theinterpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically
paragraph (b) thereof, should not be inconflict with the Constitutional mandate of
Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local governmentcode which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through asystem of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall ,
initiative, and referendum x x x. An interpretationtoo literal that the spirit is denied
will fall in former of the latter.

Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.

Case No. 290
G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955)
Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61
FACTS:
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved
in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who
issued a
patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by
his heirs,
represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the
homestead
to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce,
and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs
of the
deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to
recover
the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.
ISSUE:
W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel
of
land was valid.
HELD:
No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants
do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act
that the
Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that
he could
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the

conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the

Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of
Nicolas was
null and void.

SEVERINO UNABIA, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR,

CITY TREASURER, CITY AUDITOR and the CITY ENGINEER, RespondentsAppellants.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu
City, at P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the
service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E.
Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division, including personnel,
was transferred from the City Health Department to the Office of the City Engineer.
In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be reinstated but his petition was not heeded by
the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held
that Petitioner is a person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the
unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his
removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised Administrative
Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words Civil Service in section 1
and 4 of Article XII of the Constitution and the use of small letters for the same
words, civil service, in section 670, Revised Administrative Code, indicates that
only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the above-mentioned
sections of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the use of capital in the words "Civil Service" in the Constitution
and the use of small letters for the "civil service" in the Revised Administrative code
indicates that the protection only pertains to the classified service.
DECISION:
We see no validity in this argument. Capital C and S in the words Civil Service
were used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the
similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no difference between
the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in the latter. There is no reason
for excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those
belonging to the classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil
Service;
chan Hence,

Hence, the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the
unclassified service are so designated because the nature of their work and

qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed
to the classified service. This cannot be a valid reason for denying privileges to the
former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said
removal is null and void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position
from which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz. [4],
1778).
There is, however, an additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the
memorandum submitted by the attorneys for the Respondents in lieu of oral
argument. This is the fact that asPetitioner was removed on June 16, 1953 and only
filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15
days, Petitioner should no longer be allowed to claim the remedy, he being
considered as having abandoned his office.

aSSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, et al., petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
FACTS
The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of
retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7
hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their
respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by tenants who
re actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily
devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until
such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall
have been determined, they petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel
the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention.
ISSUE
Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP
is violative of the Constitution.
Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of
eminent domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual
payment to him in full of just compensation

HELD
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject.
However, objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is
claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness in the provision
as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only preliminary unless
accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the right to
review with finality the said determination.
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money
and no other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the
power and eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which
involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not
be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The invalidation of the
said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed
full owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just
compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962]

FACTS:
[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the
defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense
counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People
vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of expressio unius, est exclusion alterius. The
lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the
ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code.

HELD:
YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this
case was remanded for trial on the merits.
RATIO:
The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact
that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.
In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such
omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public
policy, defendant-appellees contention that justices of the peace are not covered
by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective
a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied
the rule of expressio unius, est exclusion alterius in arriving at the conclusion that
justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If
the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of
Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for
the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the
rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 111202-05 January 31, 2006
FACTS:
The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its cargo. On January 7, 1989, the vessel
M/V "Star Ace," coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port of San Fernando, La
Union (SFLU) for needed repairs. The vessel and the cargo had an appraised value, at that
time, of more or less Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000). When the Bureau of Customs
later became suspicious that the vessels real purpose in docking was to smuggle its cargo into
the country, seizure proceedings were instituted under S.I. Nos. 02-89 and 03-89 and,
subsequently, two Warrants of Seizure and Detention were issued for the vessel and its cargo.
Respondent Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel or any of its cargo but claimed a
preferred maritime lien under a Salvage Agreement dated June 8, 1989. To protect his claim,
Urbino initially filed two motions in the seizure and detention cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a
Motion to Lift Warrant of Seizure and Detention. Apparently not content with his administrative
remedies, Urbino sought relief with the regular courts by filing a case for Prohibition, Mandamus
and Damages before the RTC of SFLU, seeking to restrain the District Collector of Customs
from interfering with his salvage operation. The RTC of SFLU dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction because of the pending seizure and detention cases. Urbino then elevated the
matter to the CA. The Commissioner of Customs, in response, filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings, advising the CA that it intends to question the jurisdiction of the CA before this
Court. The motion was denied. Hence, in this petition the Commissioner of Customs assails the
Resolution "F" recited above and seeks to prohibit the CA from continuing to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether Urbino's claim is a preferred lien in this case.
HELD:
No.
xxx
First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel
M/V "Star Ace," to be void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel. In filing the case,
Urbino had impleaded the vessel as a defendant to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This
meant that he brought an action in rem under the Code of Commerce under which the vessel
may be attached and sold. However, the basic operative fact for the institution and perfection of
proceedings in rem is the actual or constructive possession of the res by the tribunal
empowered by law to conduct the proceedings. This means that to acquire jurisdiction over the
vessel, as a defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual or constructive
possession over it. Neither was accomplished by the RTC of Manila.
In his comment to the petition, Urbino plainly stated that "petitioner has actual[sic] physical
custody not only of the goods and/or cargo but the subject vessel, M/V Star Ace, as well." This
is clearly an admission that the RTC of Manila did not have jurisdiction over the res. While
Urbino contends that the Commissioner of Customs custody was illegal, such fact, even if true,
does not deprive the Commissioner of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. This is a question that
ought to be resolved in the seizure and forfeiture cases, which are now pending with the CTA,
and not by the regular courts as a collateral matter to enforce his lien. By simply filing a case in
rem against the vessel, despite its being in the custody of customs officials, Urbino has
circumvented the rule that regular trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs,
on his mere assertion that the administrative proceedings were a nullity.
On the other hand, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the res ahead and to
the exclusion of the RTC of Manila. The forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of
Customs are in the nature of proceedings in rem and jurisdiction was obtained from the moment
the vessel entered the SFLU port. Moreover, there is no question that forfeiture proceedings
were instituted and the vessel was seized even before the filing of the RTC of Manila case.
The Court is aware that Urbino seeks to enforce a maritime lien and, because of its nature, it is
equivalent to an attachment from the time of its existence. Nevertheless, despite his liens
constructive attachment, Urbino still cannot claim an advantage as his lien only came about
after the warrant of seizure and detention was issued and implemented. The Salvage
Agreement, upon which Urbino based his lien, was entered into on June 8, 1989. The warrants
of seizure and detention, on the other hand, were issued on January 19 and 20, 1989. And to
remove further doubts that the forfeiture case takes precedence over the RTC of Manila case, it
should be noted that forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of the offense, in this
case the day the vessel entered the country. A maritime lien, in contrast, relates back to the
period when it first attached, in this case the earliest retroactive date can only be the date of the
Salvage Agreement. Thus, when the vessel and its cargo are ordered forfeited, the effect will

retroact to the moment the vessel entered Philippine waters.

Accordingly, the RTC of Manila decision never attained finality as to the defendant vessel,
inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired over it, and the decision cannot be binding and the
writ of execution issued in connection therewith is null and void.

TOPACIO NUENO v. ANGELESJose Topacio Nueno, et al.,

petitioners
Gerardo Angeles, et al.,
respondents
FACTSJose Topacio Nueno, Manuel De La Fuente, Eustaquio Balagtas and Carmen
Planas were elected asmembers of the Municipal Board in the general election on
Dec 1940, and qualified on Jan. 1941. Nuenoand Planas subsequently resigned from
their office to run for the House of Representatives on Nov. 1941, but they were not
elected. The President of the Commonwealth then appointed Nueno to fill the
vacancyhe created because of his resignation, and Delia Dino to fill the vacancy
created by Carmen Planas, sincethey were both from the same political party, The
Young Philippines.On 1942, the Japanese Army invaded the country. The regular
election as provided in theElection Code could not be held because the Japanese
still occupied the country. The special electionlikewise could not be held after the
restoration of the Commonwealth due to physical impossibility.Therefore the
President of the Commonwealth appointed the six respondents to the Municipal
Board.The four petitioners instituted an action quo warranto against six
respondents, averring that their term of office of three years has not yet expired
since they have not served for such period due to theJapanese occupation. They
also assert their right to hold-over, or their right to continue in office until
asuccessor has been elected. Also, that their appointments are in contravention of
Sec. 16, Act 357 sincethe party of Dino has not been represented, and that such
appointments were not submitted to theCommission on Appointments.Respondents
contend that petitioners have no right to hold public office since their term
expiredon Dec 1943, and that term of office must be distinguished from tenure. Also
that the appointments arevalid under the emergency powers granted upon the
President.
ISSUES(1)Whether or not the petitioners have a right to hold-over of office
(2)Whether or not the appointments of the President are validRULING & RATIO(1)
NO.

The term of office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The
term meansthe time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right
and fixes the intervalafter the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The
tenure represents the term duringwhich the incumbent actually holds office. The
term of office is not affected by hold-over, andthe tenure may be shorter than the
term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.There is no principle,
law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reasonof
war.Sec. 27 and 2177 of the Revised Administrative Code provided for the right to
hold-over of a municipal and provincial officer: the incumbent shall hold-over until
a successor shall beduly qualified.
Such phrase was suppressed by a subsequent amendment (Act No. 2774), but was
provided by a different section in the act, so it was still in effect. However, the
foregoing provisions were all repealed by Sec. 184 of the Commonwealth Act No.
357. It provided: Theofficers elected shall assume office on the first day of January
next following.
(2)
YES.
Sec. 16 of the Commonwealth Act provides for the appointments to be done by
thePresident in case of vacancy in an elective or municipal office. The vacancies
enumerated thereof may be immediately filled in the manner provide, therefore
there will be no interregnum duringwhich the office may be temporarily without an
incumbent.The act provides for appointment during temporary vacancy of office
under subsection(a). Subsections (b),(c), (d ) and (e) provides for appointment to fill
in a vacancy. Subsection (a)cannot be applied in this case since no vacancy,
temporary or otherwise, exists in this case.
Temporary absence is not the same as vacancy since in vacancy, there is no
incumbent in public office.The petitioners were also not appointed under subsection
( f), which provides for the appointed officer to serve for the unexpired term of
office.Their terms, therefore, expired already on Dec. 1943, and the subsequent
appointments of the respondents are valid under Sec. 16 of Commonwealth Act
357.DISPOSITIVEAction quo arrant is dismissed.

Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division

Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary
Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the
retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the
implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition
holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasianos right to security of
tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same
attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity
from suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of
tenure.
Held:
1. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is
directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are
those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions
may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or
that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that
the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be
inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to
the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications
and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus
be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private
respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the
field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the
reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a
permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with
no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is
definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in
Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):

"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our

civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed
without cause but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to
illegal removals (Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals,
183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27
SCRA 138).
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without
the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary
step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent
position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation.
Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the
tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA
651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of
his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be
countenanced. (Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15,
2000)

LORENZO T. TANGGA-AN vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., UNIVERSE

TANKSHIP DELAWARE LLC, and CARLOS C. SALINAS G.R. No. 180636, 13 March 2013
FACTS:
Under the employment contract entered by Tangga-an with Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and in behalf of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship
Delaware, LLC., he was to be employed for a period of six months as chief engineer
of the vessel the S.S. Kure. He was to be paid a basic salary of US$5,000.00;
vacation leave pay equivalent to 15 days a month or US$2,500.00 per month and
tonnage bonus in the amount of US$700.00 a month. On February 2002, Tangga-an
was deployed but was dismissed on April 2002. Tangga-an filed a Complaint for
illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract, leave pay, exemplary and moral damages, attorneys fees and interest.
The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to be illegally dismissed. As regards petitioners
claim for back salaries, LA said he is entitled not to four months which is equivalent
to the unexpired portion of his contract, but only to three months, inclusive of
vacation leave pay and tonnage bonus (or US$8,200 x 3 months = US$24,600)
pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005.
ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegally dismissed overseas employee is only entitled to 3months

back salaries.
RULING:
No. As held in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, involving Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, that an illegally dismissed overseas employee is not entitled
to three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the
choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker,
i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less,
comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at
least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the wording for every year of the
unexpired term which follows the wording salaries x x x for three months. To
follow the thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary
only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook
some words used in the statute while giving effect to some.
Petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of
his six-month employment contract, or equivalent to four months. This includes all
his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are
expressly provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his
monthly salary and benefit package. Thus, petitioner is entitled to back salaries of
US$32,800 (or US$5,000 + US$2,500 + US$700 = US$8,200 x 4 months). Article
279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employees full backwages shall be
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. As we
have time and again held, it is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally
dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus all
other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to which he would have been
normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped working.

JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. No. 109835.
November 22, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as
amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as

amended. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that
the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of
the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond
of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has
placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in
compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily answer
for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or
money claims. The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond and commented
that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V,
Book VII of the POEA Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its
appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
HELD:
YES. Petitioners contention has no merit.
RATIO:
Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat that the
thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules
as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond
required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier
bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section
6 as a superfluity but there is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6
complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would
render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole

Sajonas v. CA
Doctrine:

The cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it

ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall
continue as a lien upon the property.

Facts:
Case is about the cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from
a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property
September 22, 1983 the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a
parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and
Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated
September 22, 1983.
The property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N79073
August 27, 1984 the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim
based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was
inscribed as Entry No. 116017.
Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale
involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4,
1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28,
1985.
A Domingo Pilares filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection of sum of money against
Ernesto Uychocde.
June 25, 1980 a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties. Uychocde
agreed to pay the same in two years from June 25, 1980. Uychocde failed to comply
with his undertaking in the compromise agreement so Pilares moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement,
which the court granted in its order dated August 3, 1982.
A writ of execution was issued. Pursuant to the order of execution dated August 3,
1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued.
February 12, 1985 Defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same
was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4 1984 was registered on August
28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was
issued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated
by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title.
October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of
Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as
scheduled.
The Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution
upon defendant-appellant Pilares. Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilares
refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation.
The Sajonases filed their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 71,
against Domingo Pilares, the judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. In their complaint,
they alleged that:
That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the defendant, the
Uychocde spouses, debtors of the defendant, have already transferred,
conveyed and assigned all their title, rights and interests to the plaintiffs and
there was no more title, rights or interests therein which the defendant could
levy upon;
That the annotation of the levy on execution which was carried over to the
title of said plaintiffs is illegal and invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in
view of the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by the plaintiffs on the
corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses;
Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim raising special and affirmative
defenses:
Assuming, without however admitting that they filed an adverse claim against
the property covered by TCT No. 79073 registered under the name of spouses

Ernesto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceases to have any legal
force and effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529;
The sale is the null and void (sic) and without any legal force and effect
because it was done in fraud of a judgment creditor,
TC: In favor of Sajonas and ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
CA: Reversed the lower courts decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy on
execution on the certificate of title.
Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27, 1984, it was effective
only until September 26, 1984. Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated
the notice of levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was
already ineffective. It cannot be said that actual or prior knowledge of the
existence of the adverse claim on the Uychocdes title is equivalent to
registration inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective when the
notice of levy on execution was annotated. Thus, the act of defendant sheriff
in annotating the notice of levy on execution was proper and justified.
Issue/s:
The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 still in force when private respondent caused the
notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said title,
considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated?
(NOTE: If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are charged with
knowledge of pre-existing interest over the subject property, and thus, petitioners are
entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the certificate of title.)
WON PETs are buyers in good faith?
Ratio:
1. YES.

Annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a

person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is
not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than
that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice is registered by filing a sworn
statement with the Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located,
setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other dates pertinent
thereto.

For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law itself. (Act 496 or the Land
Registration Act reads along with the changes introduced by P.D. 1529)

Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,
and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of title
of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimants residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him.
This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period,
the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of
a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however,

that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same

ground shall be registered by the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition
in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the
adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration
thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and
hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine
the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five
thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant
may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn
petition to that effect. (Italics ours)

The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse
claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription
will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if
the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said
period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of
cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase may be cancelled, which
obviously indicates, as inherent in its decision making power, that the court may or
may not order the cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision
limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of
registration. The court cannot be bound by such period as it would be inconsistent
with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of
effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim
which is the principal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore
depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine whether it
will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim
is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard,
providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or
revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance
on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line with the provision
immediately following:
It was held that validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by
the Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order
the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and
equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that
the registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting
the interest of the adverse claimant and giving notice and warning to third parties.
In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. N-79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon
City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on
execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the
property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an
interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof.
Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed
on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.

2. YES.

As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject property,
the same should be made to rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly
observed by the appellate court, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees were

not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at the time of the
sale of the property by the latter in their favor.
Dispositive: ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
October 17, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court dated February 15, 1989 finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution
from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby REINSTATED.

LALICAN v. HON. VERGARA, et al.

FACTS
Lalican was charged with violating Section 68 of PD 705 for possessing without
lawful authority of permit, 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of
LUMBER on 2 passenger jeeps with a value of P14,000. Lalican claimed that the law
is vague and standardless as it does not specify the authority or the legal
documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, the information
should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the law.
ISSUE
whether a charge of illegal possession of lumber is excluded from the crime of
illegal possession of timber as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 to
warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a nonexistent
crime.
RULING
No, to exclude possession of lumber from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would
certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the
doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an
opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or
contravene the plain words of the law. The phrase forest products is broad enough
to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber.

KING vs HERNAEZMACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. PEDRO S.

HERNAEZ, ETC., ETAL.,respondents-appellants.
FACTS

Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizenImport Meat andProduce"Philippine Cold

Stores, Inc permission from the President of the Philippines(Secretary of Commerce
and Industry)DENIED petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus(Court
of First Instance of Manila) writ of preliminary appeal __ (RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section
1, Republic Act No. 1180No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no
association, partnership,or corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned by
citizens of the Philippines, shallengagedirectly or indirectly in the retail business: . ."
mphasis supplied)(x) merely to ban them from itsownership and not from its
management control or operation.(Anti-Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108,
as amended by Republic Act No.134)which seeks "to punish acts of evasion of the
laws of nationalization of certainrights,franchises or privileges." Read in connection
with the Retail TradeLaw, the Anti-Dummy Law would punish acts intended to
circumvent the provisions of theformer lawwhich nationalize the retail
business.Itchong Case
ISSUE
Is the employment of aliens in non-control position in a retail establishment or trade
prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law?
RULING
Yes, it is prohibited.Against retail trade law and Anti-dummylaw(X)unconsti-right of
employer to chooseThe nationalization of an economic measurewhen founded on
grounds of public policycannot be branded as unjust, arbitraryor oppressive or
contrary to the Constitutionbecause its aim is merely to further the material
progress and welfare of the citizens of acountry.Indeed, in nationalizing employment
in retail trade the right of choice of anemployer isnot impaired but its sphere is
merely limited to the citizens to theexclusion of those of other nationalities.falls
within the scope of police power, thruwhich and by which the State insures
itsexistence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizensWHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is reversed. Thispreliminary injunctionissued by the trial
court on December 6, 1958 is hereby lifted. Thepetition for mandamusis dismissed,
with costs against appellees

Solid Homes v Teresita Payawal

Facts:

On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc.,
before the Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to sell her subdivision
lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975. Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a deed of
sale but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate title despite of repeated
demands by Payawal because defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to
a financing company. Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction this being rested in the National
Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The motion was denied, hence, the petition to
reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court was submitted by Solid Homes Inc. to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims,
refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers
against the project owner,developer,dealer,broker or salesman?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National
Housing Authority has the jurisdiction.
As amended by PD No 1344 entitled Empowering the National Housing Authority to
issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under Presidential
Decree No 957 Section 1 provides, in the exercise of its function to regulate the
real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in PD No
957 that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature: a) unsound real estate business practices, b)
claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot owners or
condo unit buyers against project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman
and, c) cases involving specific performance of contractual statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman. The challenged decision of the respondent court was
reversed and the decision of RTC is Set Aside without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate complaint before the HLURB

Fiestan vs. Court of Appeals, and Developmentt Bank of the Philippines

FACTS:
For failure of petitioner spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada (spouses
Fiestan) to pay their mortgage indebtedness to respondent Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), the latter was able to acquire at a public auction sale on
August 6, 1979 the parcel of land (Lot No. 2-B covered by TCT No. T-13218) that the
spouses Fiestan owned in Ilocos Sur after extrajudicial foreclosure of said property.
The Provincial Sheriff issued a certificate of sale that same day which was registered

on September 28 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. Earlier, or on

September 26, spouses Fiestan also executed a Deed of Sale in favor of DBP which
was likewise registered on September 28, 1979. When spouses Fiestan failed to
redeem their parcel of land within the 1 year period which expired on September
28, 1980, the Register of Deeds cancelled their title over the subject property and
issued TCT No. T-19077 to DBP upon the latters duly executed affidavit of
consolidation of ownership.
On April 13, 1982, the DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria, so the Register of Deeds
of Ilocos Sur cancelled DBPs title over said property and issued TCT No. T-19229 to
Perias name, who later secured a tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid
the taxes due thereon. He thereafter mortgaged said lot to the PNB-Vigan Branch as
security for his loan of P115,000.00. Since the spouses Fiestan were still in
possession of the property, the Provincial Sheriff ordered them to vacate the
premises, but instead of leaving, they filed a complaint in the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur for annulment of sale, mortgage and cancellation of transfer certificates of title
against the DBP-Laoag City, PNB-Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur, Francisco Peria and the
Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur.
The lower court dismissed said complaint, declaring valid the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in favor of the DBP and its subsequent
sale to Francisco Peria as well as the real estate mortgage constituted in favor of
PNB-Vigan. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision. The spouses
Fiestan herein seek to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
property on the ground that the Provincial Sheriff conducted the foreclosure without
first effecting a levy on said property before selling the same at the public auction
sale.
ISSUE:
Who has the right to acquire by purchase the subject property?
COURT RULING:
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court reiterated that the formalities of a levy,
which the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur allegedly failed to comply with, are not
basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at
public auction. The spouses Fiestan insisted that what prevails over the case are
par. (2) of Article 1491 and par. (7) of Article 1409 of the Civil Code which prohibits
agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction either in
person or through the mediation of another, the property whose administration or
sale may have been entrusted to them unless the consent of the principal has been
given. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the power to foreclose is not an
ordinary agency that contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by
the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's
own protection, as provided under Section 5 of Act No 3135, as amended, which is a

special law that must prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law. Even in the
absence of statutory provision, there is authority to hold that a mortgagee, and in
this case the DBP, may purchase at a sale under his mortgage to protect his own
interest or to avoid a loss to himself by a sale to a third person at a price below the
mortgage debt.

Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several
cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4,
1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances
before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court
of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are
in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should
not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4.
On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a homemade revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that
he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a
secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In
his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must
acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to
municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated that the law is
explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are
in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list
therefore the accused is not exempted.

LAPID vs. COURT OF APPEALS

facts
A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M.Lapid
and 5 other government officials with alleged dishonesty, grave misconductand
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly havingconspired
between and among themselves in demanding and collecting fromvarious quarrying
operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoringfee of P120 per
truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a dulyenacted provincial

ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuingreceipts for its
collection. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding guilty the petitioner
formisconduct for which they are meted out the penalty of 1 year suspension
withoutpay pursuant to section 25 (2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989).Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented
theassailed decision of the Ombudsman.Proceeding from the premise that the
decision of Ombudsman had not yetbeen become final, the petitioner argued that
the writs of prohibition andmandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG
for prematurelyimplementing the assailed decision.
ISSUE:Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman findingpetitioner
administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him apenalty of 1 year
suspension without pay is immediately executorypending appeal.
HELD:NO. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive
ordecision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure
orreprimand, or suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final
andunappealable. It is clear from the above provision that the punishment
imposedupon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one month, is not among
thoselisted as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. The clear
import of these statements taken together is impose penalties that are not
enumerated in thesaid section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately
executory. An appealtimely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay
the immediateimplementation of the decision.

MARCELINO C. LIBANAN vs. HRET

G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997
Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the
candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the
canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern
Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly elected Representative of the District.
Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the
absence of the BEI Chairmans signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the
ballots were not those issued to the voters during the elections thus, indicating that they were
spurious and invalid. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate
or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.
Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid.
Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it
bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in
those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of
red and blue fibers in the ballots. What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid

down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of
these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or
thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is
only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and
subject to rejection

cebu Portland Cement Company, vs. Mun. of Naga, Cebu, et. al.
Facts:
1.The Treasurer of the Mun. of Naga, Cebu collected from Cebu Portland
CementCompany (CPCC) municipal license tax imposed by the Amended Ordinance
No. 21 oncement factories located in the same municipality.
2.The demands made by the Treasurer were not entirely successful and resulted to
theremedies provided under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code.
TheTreasurer gave CPCC 10 days to settle the account.
3.The Treasurer also notified the Plant Manager of CPCC that he was distraining
100,000bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of their municipal license tax in the total
amount of Php 204,300.00. At first the Plant Manager did not agree with the letter
butacknowledged the distraint in the afternoon of the same day he was notified.
4.The Treasurer signed the receipt of the goods under the authority of 2304 of the
RevisedAdministrative Code & shall sell the same at a public auction to the highest
bidder. Theproceeds thereof shall be utilized in part of the satisfaction of the
municipal license tax &penalties CPCC owes to the municipality of Naga, Cebu.
5.The Notice of Sale was posted by the Treasurer & stated that the public sale shall
be onJuly 27, 1962. However, no sale was held on the date specified & in the
appealeddecision, that there was a stipulation by the parties where the auction took
place onJanuary 30, 1962.

Cebu PortlandCement Company - Petition (2 separateactions: Validity of thedistraint

& the sale ata public auction of thebags of cement RTC denied
Motion for reconsideration SC - denied
Issue1.Whether the distraint was valid.
2.Whether the auction sale was valid

Decision
Decision of the lower court was affirmed in toto. With costs against the plaintiffappellant.
1.CPCC alleged that the 10-day grace period in the letter of the Municipal Treasurer
did not lapse and therefore, the distrain is invalid. This is not true. According to
theRevised Administrative Code, the municipal treasurer may seize & distrain
anypersonal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax
lien, insufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question xxx. With this, the
lawgives an authority to the municipal treasurer to seize & distrain properties
regardlessof the provisions or conditions stated in the letter. There is only room for
applicationand not for interpretation and what is stated in the letter cannot amend
the law.
2.The auction sale is also valid. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the
salecannot take place less than 20 days after notice to the owner or possessor of
theproperty xxx. Since the first notification for distrait was in July 6, 1961 & the
sale wason January 30, 1962, the requisite for the notification was more than
complied with.The sale was only delayed due to the deferment made by the CPCC.
Even if the salewas made only in January 1962, the Treasurer informed the CPCCs
acting officer that he would again advertise for the public sale of the said bags of
cement. Withthis, the validity of the date of the said auction sale cannot be
contested

Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Phil.FACTS:

Appellants' applied for an urban real estate loan which was approved by appellee
bank on April80, 1953. they executed the mortgage contract on March 23, 1954,
and that the release of theamount of the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be made in
instalments subject to certainconditions. That the loan obtained from DBP is to be
received in several releases and to be paidlater in instalments, under the terms and
conditions specified in the loan agreement. That thefirst release of P4,200 was
made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases were madesubsequent thereafter,
then the balance of the loan were all availed of and received by him later than June,
1953. Rodriguez paid the instalments as they fell due. When a balance of
aboutP14,000.00 remained unpaid, quijano offered to pay for the said outstanding
balance with hisback pay certificate pursuant to Republic Act. No. 897, The
Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953.The Bank refused to accept the said tender of
payment in certificate on the ground that the loanwas not incurred before on June
20, 1953.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the
approval of Republic Act No. 897, the Amendatory Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic
Act 304.Whether or not there is a room for interpretation or construction.
HELD:
Thus even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law limited the
applicabilityof back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the
approval of this Act," thisCourt has ruled that obligations contracted after its
enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot comewithin its purview.WHEREFORE, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs.
Stat. Con.:
Clear and unambiguous provisions of law offer no room for interpretation or
construction. TheSupreme Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first
and fundamental duty is theapplication of the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called for only whensuch literal application is impossible. No
process of interpretation or construction need beresorted to where a provision of
law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in
explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary.

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC. VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE
COURTOF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No. L-28463, May 31, 1971FACTS:
From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills (petitioner) exported
Pollardand/or bran which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in
foreign trade whileanchored near the breakwater. The Commissioner of Customs
and The Court of Tax Appeals(respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of
wharfage dues on the said exportations in thesum of P7,948.00, which assessment
was paid by petitioner under protestIn this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would
want the Court to interpret the wordsproducts of the Philippines found in Section
2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code,as excludingbran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on
the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which isimported in the
Philippines, they are merely waste from the production of flour. Another
mainargument of the petitioner is that no government or private wharves or
government facilitieswere utilized in exporting such products. In that way, it would
not be liable at all for the wharfagedues assessed under such section by respondent
Commission of Customs.On the other hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner
of Customs was thatpetitioner was liable for wharfage dues upon receipt or
discharge of the exported goods by avessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of

the non-use of government-owned or privatewharves. Respondent Court of Tax

Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the
appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law
RULING/HELD:
As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, "There shall be
levied,collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and
on products of thePhilippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos
per gross metric ton as a feefor wharfage." appears to be quite precise. Section
2802 refers to what is imported andexported.The objective of this act must be
carried out. Even if there is doubt to the meaning of thelanguage employed, the
interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. If petitioner
were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded
fromthe operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to
sympatheticconsideration. It was desirable then that the gates to such efforts at
unjustified restriction of thecoverage of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end
result would be not respect for, butdefiance of, a clear legislative mandate The
decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed
withcosts against petitioner

Enrile vs Salazar
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a
panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State
Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil,
Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29
to December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information
and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he
was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition
filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising
from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred
to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist
in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that
rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the
context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a
crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the
Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the
logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before
conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas

corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the
normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending
trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing
a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even
then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion
only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter
of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by
said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with
this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at
Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in
the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant
to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation
Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for
additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on
the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives
of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be
sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for
remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing
themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing
in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and

exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the

employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under
the Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an
action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only
after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission
which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not
an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid
before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor

Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs CA

January 31, 1989Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations, that which
better servesthe purpose of the law should prevail.Facts:The parents of Elena
Salenillas, one of the petitioners, were grantees of free patent. The subject property
was later sold to Elena Salenillas and herhusband, petitioners in the instant case.
On December 4, 1973, the property of petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine
National bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the
property was foreclose by PNB and wasbought at a public auction by private
respondent. Petitioner maintains that theyhave a right to repurchase the property
under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act.Respondent states that the sale of the
property disqualified petitioner from beinglegal heirs vis-a-vis the said property.
Issue:W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of
thePublic Land Act.
Held: Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance of land
acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject
torepurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within a period of five
yearsfrom the date or conveyance." The provision makes no distinction between
thelegal heirs. The distinction made by respondent contravenes the very purpose of

the act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves thepurpose
of the law should prevail.

Rolando Canet v. Julieta Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004
I. The Facts:
Petitioner Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while Respondent Julieta Decena was
the Mayor. Canet was allowed to operate and maintain a Cockpit in Bula as per Resolution No. 049. In 1999,
the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No. 001, regulating the operation of cockpits and other related
game-fowl activities in Bula and providing penalties for any violation to its provisions which was denied by
Decena because it does not contain rules and regulations on cockfighting and other related game-fowl
activities and a separability clause. The Sangguniang Bayan resolved to shelf the Ordinance indefinitely.
Meanwhile, Canet filed an application for mayor's permit but was was denied by Decena on the ground that
under the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licenses for the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan.
Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan authorizing the same. Citing Resolution No. 049, allowing him to operate a cockpit, and local municipal
tax ordinances, which generally provides for the issuance of a mayor's permit for the operation of businesses,
Canet sued Decena and sought to be given permit.
The Issue:
Whether or not Decena, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to issue the necessary business
permit to petitioner without a municipal ordinance that would empower her to do so.
The Ruling:
No. To compel Decena to issue the mayor's permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of
Sec. 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on respondents
administrative prerogatives. Hence, there being in effect no ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit,
Resolution No. 049, authorizing Canet to establish, operate and maintain a cockpit in Bula, Camarines Sur
cannot be implemented. Also, the municipal tax ordinances relied upon by Canet contain general provisions for
the issuance of business permits but do not contain specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to be
pain in the operation of cockpits and other game fowl activities. Even on the assumption that there is in fact a
legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details
thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by a judicial fiat.

Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Facts:
Conrado Macabenta was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal
Company ate Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in
Davao City. Although quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at
the sawmill many of them preferred to commute and the deceased went home
about thrice a week, to which the respondent furnished the transportation. On the
day following the accident, Conrado and Leonora were lawfully wedded in a
marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, where the
deceased was hospitalized up to his death. Leonora gave birth to the posthumous
daughter at the deceased named Raquel.
Issue:
Whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after
the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents
within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Held:
Yes, they are dependents whiting that of expressed in the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with
the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her
daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and
unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased are considered
dependents.
It is also supported in the fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of
the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by judiciary. Even if
honest doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of statutory
provisions, still respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of
DSTC.
Assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best
conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail. In US v.
Toribio, SC held that no construction is to be adopted that would tend "to defeat the
purpose and object of the legislator."
Therefore, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of awarding
the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the compensation
and attorney's fees is affirmed.

People vs. Jabinal

Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a
revolverwithout the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because,although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as
Secret Agent from theProvincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent
from the PC ProvincialCommander, and the said appointments expressly carried
with them the authority topossess and carry the said firearm. The accused further
contended that in view of hisappointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis
of the Supreme Courts decisions inPeople vs. Macarandang and in People vs.
Lucero. The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of
firearm andammunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in
Lucero* were reversedand abandoned in People vs. Mapa**. The case was elevated
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme
Courtsrulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.

Ruling:
The appellant was acquitted.Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in
themselves not laws, are neverthelessevidence of what the law means; this is the
reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Codeprovides that, Judicial decisions applying
and interpreting the laws or the constitution shallform part of the legal system. The
interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Courtconstitutes in a way a part of the
law as of the date the law was originally passed, since thecourts construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the lawthus
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities
isa restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet the
interpretationplaced upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The doctrine laiddown in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law of theland, at the time appellant was found in possession of the
firearm and when he wasarraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, thenew doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had reliedon the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof.Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm
pursuant to the prevailingdoctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under

which no criminal liability wouldattach to his possession of said firearm, the

appellant should be absolved. The appellantmay not be punished for an act which at
the time it was done was held not to be punishable

QUIMPO v. MENDOZA (CITY TREASURER)

FACTS
The case is about the basis for computing the penalty for real estate taxes. Quimpo
is the owner of a parcel of land in City of Cagayan De Oro (CDO) City valued at
20,000 P in 1969. The realty tax for this property is 400.00 pesos annually payable
in 4 equal instalments. He paid on time for the first 3 installments amounting to
300.00 but he defaulted with the last payment and it was only on the 27th of
August the next year that he settled the last instalment. He tried paying to the City
Treasurer of CDO for 124.00 inclusive of the penalty however the Treasurer declined
payment saying that he ought to pay 196.00 (100 pesos for the unpaid tax and 96
pesos representing the penalty). As such, Quimpo filed action for mandamus with
damages against the City Treasurer and consigned 124.00 pesos before the Court of
First Instance. He asserts that he suffered mental anguish caused by the Treasurer
thereby praying for 12,000 Peso worth of Moral, Actual and Exemplary damages.
ISSUE/S & HELD
1. The basis of computing the penalty of unpaid instalment. The SC ruled in favor of
the petitioner and held that the provision of the Charter of CDO being invoked by
the City Treasurer is not applicable in the case at bar. It was repealed impliedly by
RA 5447. Since petitioner is allowed by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal
instalments due and payable on four specified due dates and having paid the three
instalments religiously and faithfully, it is manifest injustice, sheer arbitrariness and
abuse of power to penalize him for doing so when he fails to pay the fourth and last
instalment. Accordingly, petitioners total liability as of August 27 when he tendered
payment to City Treasurer is computed as follows: 100.00 (the fourth and last
instalment) plus 16.00 penalty (8 months of delinquency from January to August, at
two percentum on the amount of the delinquent tax of (100.00) which totals 116.00
pesos.
2. Whether damages can be obtained by Quimpo against the City Treasurer. NO. The
city treasurers actuations and decisions were not tainted with bad faith. As held in
one case an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of an
ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an
aggrieved party to an award of damages.