[No. L-5790.

April 17, 1953]

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs.

Pablo de la Cruz, defendant and appellant.
1.Criminal Law;
Evidence;
Decoy and EntrapmentThe prohibition against
decoy and entrapment can not be applied ta the case of a retailer who was selling
to the public, i. e., to anybody who would come to his store to buy his commo dities
and was not led or indiiced to sell them at more than the ceiling price.
2.Id.; Penalties; Cruel and Unusual Punishment.The penalty of six months
imprisonment and a fine of two thousand pesoa are not cruel and unusual for a
merchant who sold milk ten centavos over the ceiling price fixed by executive
order. People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil., 906, No. L-5790 April 17, 1953

People vs. Borja

No. L-22947. July 12, 1979.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO

BORJA, PEDRO FUSTIGO, INOCENCIO DEMEN, RUFINO
PAVIA, FELIPE BENAVIDES, DOMINADOR DE LOS SANTOS,
JOHN DOE, and RICHARD DOE, defendants-appellants.
Criminal Law; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Aggravating circumstance of
promise or reward although not alleged in the information but proven during the
trial can be considered generic aggravating circumstance.We reject the
contention of the five accused; for while it is true that the aggravating circumstance
promise or reward was not alleged in the information, nevertheless, it was proven
during the trial, and therefore can be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance, though not a qualifying circumstance. (People of the Philippines vs.
Navarro, et al., L-20860, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 530).
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Lack of Instruction; Extenuating
circumstances as lack of instruction must be proven postively; Lack of instruction
refers not only to illiteracy but also to lack of intelligence.The five accused
contended that there were three mitigating circumstances in their favor: lack of
instruction; fear of Pedro Borja; and lack of motive. We find no merit in this
contention. The argument of lack of instruction is based on the allegation that the
five accused did not finish primary education. But the defense adduced no proof to
establish the existence of this circumstance, leaving in full force the holding that
extenuating circumstances must be proven positively and cannot be based on mere
deduction or inference. (PP. vs. Sakam, et al., 41566, December 7, 1934, 61 Phil.
27). If by lack of instruction the defense refers to illiteracy, it is not sufficient to
constitute a mitigating circumstance, for there must also be lack of intelligence. (PP.
vs. Gorospe, L-10644-45, February 19, 1959, 105 Phil. 184; PP. vs. Ripas, L-6246,
May 26, 1954, 95 Phil. 63; PP vs. Semaada, L-11361, May 26, 1958, 103 Phil. 790;
PP. vs. Tengyao, L-14675, November 29, 1961, 113 Phil. 465).
Same; Same; Same; Fear not considered a mitigating circumstance; Reason.The
second mitigating circumstance advanced by the five accused is awe and fear of
Pedro Borja. But the element of fear is not one of those enumerated as a
mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, Article 13. If the defense
refers to the element of uncontrollable fear or duress which is an exempting
circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, Article 12, the argument is still invalid,
for it has been held that the element of duress should be based on real, imminent,
or reasonable fear for ones life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or
remote fear. (PP. vs. Quilloy, No. L-2313, January 10, 1951, 88 Phil. 53). We find no
evidence to support the claim that Borja threatened any or all of the other
accussed.
Same; Same; Flight; Flight is an admission of guilt; Conspiracy; When conspiracy
attaches, it is unnecessary to prove previous agreement to commit the crime.He

eluded his trackers for more than two months until his capture, To flee the fold of
the law is to admit that one has transgressed that law. (PP. vs. Wilson, et al., 3001215, March 7, 1929, 52 Phil. 907). Borjas uncontested actions would be gratuitous
and illogical, unless located within the frame of conspiracy, which is their only
reasonable context. The evidence shows that Borja acted in concert with the other
accused in pursuance of the same objective. Hence, conspiracy attaches and it is no
longer necessary to obtain proof as to the previous agreement or decision to
commit the crime. (PP. vs. Cadag, L-13830, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 388; PP. vs.
Peralta, L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP. vs. Alcantara, L-26867, June
30, 1970, 33 SCRA 812).
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Conspiracy; When there is
conspiracy, treachery is considered against all the offenders.Treachery was
present because Gancayco was killed while he was unarmed, and surrounded by
enemies with firearms, including two grease-guns. Thus, Gancayco was deprived of
any means of defense while his enemies were exposed to no risk arising from the
defense which the offended party might have made. True, Borja was inside the
bodega when the shooting took place; but his physical absence does not exonerate
him, for it was he who ordered the execution. Moreover, where there is conspiracy,
treachery is considered against all the offenders. (PP. vs. Carandang, et al., 32039,
February 26, 1930, 54 Phil. 503).
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Voluntary Surrender; Capture of accused,
after killing another and being a dangerous fugitive are not indicia of voluntary
surrender to entitle accused to a mitigating circumstance.Lastly, Borja contended
that, assuming he is criminally liable, the trial court erred in not according him the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. We do not view this
as error. It appears that Borja did not surrender but was captured on February 27,
1959. His own witness, Captain Eliseo Farol of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
testified that he received a report that Borja was holed up at Barrio Sumakap,
Cavinte, Laguna. Accordingly, he sent a ranger team which located the house and
called on Borja to come down. As the house was surrounded by soldiers, Borja
offered no resistance. Capt. Farol also testified that while Borja was at large, he
killed a PC soldier in an armed encounter at Catanuan, Quezon, as a result of which
he was in-dicted for murder in the court of first instance in that province. Capt.
Farol also declared that a prize of P2,000.00 was put on Borjas head for being a
dangerous fugitive. These are not indicia of the personality seeking voluntary
surrender.
Barredo, J., separate opinion:
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; The imposition of death penalty would amount to
a cruel one where for 19 years the appellants have been under detention prisoners
under deplorable conditions in the national penitentiary.As stated in the main
opinion, all the appellants have been under detention for more than twenty years.
More than that, they have been living under the shadow of a sentence of death
since September 8, 1960, almost nineteen years ago. In the light of these facts, I
hold that while unquestionably, appellants deserved the death penalty at the time

they were sentenced by the trial court, the passage of so many years of mental
torture under the deplorable conditions obtaining in the national penitentiary during
all those years has transformed that penalty into a curel one within the
contemplation of the human proscription of the Constitution against the inflicting of
cruel and unusual punishment. (Section 21, Bill of Rights.)
Same; Same; Same.It was certainly no fault of appellants that proceedings
leading to their final conviction by this Court now have been prolonged beyond the
reasonable period for the purpose. And it is hardly of any materiality at this
juncture, to inquire where the fault for such a happenstance actually lies, for it
cannot lessen the extreme agony they have already undergone. I do not believe it
can be denied that living under the shadow of a sentence of death for more than
ten years, what with the deplorable conditions in the death row and other parts of
our national penitentiary, is a life that can be worse than death itself. Indeed, such
as unusually long waiting amounts to cruelty, which should never be addedand
the law, I dare say, does not contemplate that it may be addedto the penalty of
death.
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Supreme Court has to hasten decision on appeals
involving capital offenses.It goes without saying that the Supreme Court can itself
prevent the occurrence of such situation as herein contemplatedby hastening the
disposition of the unusual number of appeals involving capital offenses pending
before it. That is easier said than done. Multiple compelling factors have contributed
to cause such a lamentable backlog, and while remedial measures being taken may
eventually minimize or altogether solve the problem, what is important at the
moment is that we cannot escape the reality that until the desired improvement
shall have materialized something has to be done for the poor innocent victims of
the situation, in the interest of humanity and justice. People vs. Borja, 91 SCRA 340,
No. L-22947 July 12, 1979

Veniegas vs. People

No. L-57601-06. July 30, 1982.*

LAZARO VENIEGAS, petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF

PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

THE

Anti-Graft Law; Criminal Law; A public officer who misappropriated funds in his
possession and who resorted to falsification unnecessarily can be convicted of both
crimes.He claims that he was deprived of due process of law for having been
convicted without evidence of his guilt. This is belied by the decision of the
Sandiganbayan which states and analyzes the evidence against him. Further on due
process, petitioner claims that having been convicted of malversation, he should
not have been convicted anymore of falsification. But as the Sandiganbayan states
in its decision, the public funds were already in petitioners possession and he could
have misappropriated them without having to resort to falsification but which he did
anyway. His other claim that he was made to answer several times for a single
offense is baseless for the misappropriations and falsifications were committed by
him separately.
Same; Same; The imposition by the Sandiganbayan of a penalty of 92 years
imprisonment for several crimes committed by accused is not cruel and unusual.
Lastly, it is claimed that the decision imposed cruel and unusual punishment
because for the twelve (12) convictions, he would be made to serve ninety two (92)
years of imprisonment which is shocking to the moral sense x x x an offense to the
constitution. This is nonsense. Obviously, petitioners counsel has forgotten the

provisions of Art. 70, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Veniegas vs. People, 115
SCRA 790, No. L-57601-06 July 30, 1982

People vs. Dacuycuy

G.R. No. 45127. May 5, 1989. *

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE
AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO,
SEGUNDINO
A.
CAVAL
and
CIRILO
M.
ZANORIA,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Enactments; Presumption of Constitutionality;
Presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure
is thereby created. In every case where a question is raised as to the
constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms
of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental
rule that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative
enactment.
Same; Cruel and Unusual Punishments; A punisment is not cruel or unusual or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is barbarous, one unknown to

the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community. We note with approval the holding of respondent
judge that The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized
by statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense
unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. Based on this
principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense
that the punishment of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is
cruel and unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386;
People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua, 96
Phil 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language of our Supreme Court in
the first of the cases it decided after the last world war is appropriate here: The
Constitution directs that Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted. The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity
in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which never existed in
America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jr., p.
172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning
at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra,
Note. 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition. (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906).
Same; Same; Same; The fact that punishment authorized by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel or unusual. ___ That the penalty is grossly disproportionate
to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the
ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In addition, what degree of
disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to
await appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative
bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being cruel and unusual
or excessive.
Same; Separation of Powers; Undue Delegation of Legislative Powers; It is not for
the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
made by the legislature. ___ In the case under consideration, the respondent judge
erroneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for
by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or
period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts
to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by
the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of
discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of
which designated limits will constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not
an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; RA 4670; Criminal Law; Penalties; Sec.32 of RA 4670
which provides for an indeterminate period of imprisonment, unconstitutional.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of

imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by
the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to
fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard,
such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from
one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It
vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as
applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as
the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of
constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the
separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared
unconstitutional.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Fine; A fine is as much a principal penalty as imprisonment;
it should not and cannot be reduced to a prison term. It follows, therefore, that a
ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment, as may have
been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth
mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of
parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of
imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a
single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted
into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and independent penalty
consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. It is likewise declared a
discrete principal penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said
Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of
imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when
imposed in conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In
sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate
to the other.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Criminal jurisdiction of the
court determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of
said law should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than
P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which court may properly
exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the complaint against private respondents
was
filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as amended
by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not more than
P3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts.
Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein private respondents falls within
the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte. People vs.
Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 45127 May 5, 1989

36662-63, People vs. Camano

Nos. L-36662-63. July 30, 1982.*

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Qualifying Circumstances; Evident premeditation, proof of.There is
evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender, when he
prepared beforehand the means which he deemed suitable for carrying it into execution, and
when he had sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences, and
when there has been a concerted plan. It has also been held that evident premeditation
requires proof of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evident premeditation, not present when killing was not a
preconceived plan and not proof of planning or preparation in the killing and persistence to
accomplish the plan.In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the killing of Pascua and
Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when the plan to kill
Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time had elapsed before the plan was carried
out.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery; Attack from behind by the accused upon the victim is
treachery.Amado Payago categorically declared that Filomeno Camano attacked Godofredo
Pascua from behind, a method which has ensured the accomplishment of the criminal act
without any risk to the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may put up.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of superior strength, absorbed in treachery.
The rule is already settled that abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery.
Same; Same; Alternative Circumstances; Intoxication; When drunkenness or intoxication
mitigating and when aggravating.Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental,
not habitual nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is
aggravating if habitual or intentional. To be mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. A
habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The
habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily
occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power
making its victim a potential evildoer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intoxication considered mitigating as intoxication was not
habitual and accused was in a state of intoxication at the time of commission of felony.The
intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and considering that the said appellant was
in a state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the alternative
circumstance of intoxication should be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Death penalty, not cruel, unjust or excessive punishment.
The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive.
People vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688, Nos. L-36662-63 July 30, 1982

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999.*

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET

AL., respondents.
Courts; Judgments; The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgmentthe finality of a
judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers over the case.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment
cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same
judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as follows: x x x the finality of a judgment does not
mean that the Court has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to
execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The
former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final.
x x x For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may
transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Death Penalty; Notwithstanding the order of execution
and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death.In truth, the argument of
the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by
the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of
Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, viz.: This Supreme Court has
repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the
subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the
period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review
the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment
has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it
does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with
reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having
then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself,
which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in
any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for
carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. Getting down to the solution of the
question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must
be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested.
There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the
date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in

sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in
three ways: (1) by command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court;
and (3) by mandate of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to control the execution of its decision is an
essential aspect of jurisdictionsupervening events may change the circumstance
of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness.The power to control the execution of its decision is an
essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction
for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the most important part
of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is
because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
to make them conformable to law and justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; What the Supreme Court temporarily restrained is the
execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light
of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitionerit did not restrain the
effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that
when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the
spirit of said law or rules. It bears repeating that what the Court restrained
temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check
its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The
Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law
enacted by Congress.
Same; Same; Rule-Making Powers; Pleadings and Practice; It should be stressed
that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted
by the Constitution to the Supreme Court to enhance its independence.The more
disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court
has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the
independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our
courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord
with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on
execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that
courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise
the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction
and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal
cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its

independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz without independence and
integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their
vigor as champions of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter,
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987
Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge,
as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process
of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised
since time immemorial.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; President; Pardoning Power; Separation of Powers;
The constitutional provision which is the source of the pardoning power of the
President cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality; An accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts.The text and tone of this provision will not yield
to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply
the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides
the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority
of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted
as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after
their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate
courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right
than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even
been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts
and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon
the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore
to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after
his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of
the three branches of our government. Same; Same; Death Penalty; Mob Mentality;
When the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound,

when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the special duty of
the Supreme Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority
fully hold.In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that x x x the question
of capital punishment has been the subject of endless discussion and will probably
never be settled so long as men believe in punishment. In our clime and time when
heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral
predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism
because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and
righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than
an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate
deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger
threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to
assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice
Brennan reminds us x x x it is the very purpose of the Constitutionand
particularly the Bill of Rightsto declare certain values transcendent, beyond the
reach of temporary political majorities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of Law; Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of
justice than the courts, a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can
prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of ragethe flame of
the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is
the mother of unfairness.Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than
the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the
roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law
cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of
unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can
pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the
most hated by society.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Criminal Law; Penalties; Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution.Let me state at
the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the
Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have
consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences
imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
Courts; Judgments; The rule of immutability of final and execu-tory judgments
admits of settled exceptionsconcededly, the Court may suspend the execution of
a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.The doctrine has almost invariably been that
after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further done except to
see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end
to litigations. The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until
the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal

processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it
the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any
event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and executory
judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance,
suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station,
whose right to life is the issue at stake.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:

Criminal Law; Penalties; Republic Act 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as some parts
thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of
heinousness and compelling reasons prescribed by the Constitution.I maintain
my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some
parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of
heinousness and compelling reasons prescribed by the Constitution of the
Philippines. This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinions in various
death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Courts deliberation on this
matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent
promulgated on February 7, 1997. Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift the TRO,
because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of a law (or the
relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional
and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA
8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it merely
prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is to be
implemented.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999