13.

Meaning of residence for the purpose of venue

CARLOS BELL RAYMOND and AGUSTIN ALBA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80380 September 28, 1988
Facts
A complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo by
Santiago Bitera against Carlos Bell Raymond and Agustin Alba. The latter
moved to dismiss the action on the ground of improper venue. They argued
that although Bitera's complaint gives his address as 240-C Jalandoni Street,
Iloilo City, he is, and for many years has been actually residing at the socalled UPSUMCO Compound, Bais City. The Trial Court denied their motion to
dismiss. They then filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
the Court of Appeals. It dismissed their petition.
Issue
Whether the CA committed error in not dismissing petitioners motion to
dismiss.
Held
Yes, the Court of Appeals committed reversible legal error in not dismissing
Bitera's action despite the fact that its venue had clearly been improperly
laid.
According to Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, personal actions, such as
Bitera's, "may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff."
In the application of venue statutes and rules-Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature-residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is
construed as meaning residence and not "domicile" in the technical sense. In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile

requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile.

YOUNG AUTO SUPPLY CO. AND NEMESIO GARCIA v. COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. No. 104175

June 25, 1993

Facts:
Sometime on October 28, 1987, Young Auto Supply Co. Inc. (YASCO)
represented by Nemesio Garcia, its president, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy,
sold all of their shares of stock in Consolidated Marketing & Development
Corporation (CMDC) to Roxas. The purchase price was P8, 000,000.00.
The first check of P4, 000,000.00 representing the down-payment, was
honored by the drawee bank but the four other checks representing the
balance were dishonored.
On June 10, 1988, petitioners filed a complaint against Roxas in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, for the collection of the balance of P3,
400,000. 00 after selling one of the markets of P600, 000.00 to a third party
or the full control of the three markets be turned over to YASCO and Garcia.
Roxas filed motion for extension of time to submit his answer. On August 19,
1988, the trial court declared Roxas in default. The order of default was,
however, lifted upon motion of Roxas. Further, Roxas filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid.
The trial Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals ordered the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in holding that the venue was improperly laid in Cebu
City.
The Court of Appeal relied on the address of YASCO, as appearing in the
Deed of Sale which is "No. 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay City." This was the

same address written in YASCO's letters and several commercial documents

in the possession of Roxas.
Held
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the venue was improperly laid
in Cebu City.
There are two plaintiffs in the case, a natural person and a domestic
corporation. Plaintiff Young Auto Supply Co., Inc., ("YASCO") is a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal
place of business at M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. It also has a branch
office at 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay City, Metro Manila. Plaintiff Nemesio
Garcia has his business address at Young Auto Supply Co., Inc., M. J. Cuenco
Avenue, Cebu City.
The Court explained why actions cannot be filed against a corporation in any
place where the corporation maintains its branch offices. The Court ruled
that to allow an action to be instituted in any place where the corporation
has branch offices, would create confusion and work untold inconvenience to
said entity. By the same token, a corporation cannot be allowed to file
personal actions in a place other than its principal place of business unless
such a place is also the residence of a co-plaintiff or a defendant.
With the finding that the residence of YASCO for purposes of venue is in Cebu
City, where its principal place of business is located, it becomes unnecessary
to decide whether Garcia is also a resident of Cebu City.

14. Stipulation of venue by the parties; when stipulation is mandatory or

restrictive
UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS and
KUBOTA AGRI-MACHINERY PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 119657. February 7, 1997
Facts
Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. (KUBOTA) and Unimasters
Conglomeration, Inc. (UNIMASTERS) entered into a "Dealership Agreement
for Sales and Services" of the former's products in Samar and Leyte
Provinces. The contract contained, among others:
1) a stipulation reading: "All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in
the proper Courts of Quezon City," and
2) a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line
with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch in the amount of P2,000,000.00
to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA.

UNIMASTERS filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City

against KUBOTA for damages for breach of contract, and injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order.
KUBOTA filed two motions. One prayed for dismissal of the case on the
ground of improper venue and the other prayed for the transfer of the
injunction hearing due to unavailability of the counsel.
KUBOTA claims that notwithstanding that its motion to transfer hearing had
been granted, the Trial Court went ahead with the hearing on the injunction

incident. Kubota lawyer cross-examined with the express reservation that

KUBOTA was not waiving and/or abandoning its motion to dismiss.
The Trial Court handed down an Order authorizing the issuance of the
preliminary injunction but denying KUBOTA's motion to dismiss.
KUBOTA in a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition filed with the
Court of Appeals, contended that (1) the RTC had "no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of UNIMASTERS action considering that venue was improperly
laid," and (2) the RTC gravely erred "in denying the motion to dismiss." The
CA agreed with Kubota.
Issues
1) Whether the agreement on venue between petitioner (UNIMASTERS)
and private respondent (KUBOTA) limited to the proper courts of
Quezon City the venue of any complaint filed arising from the
dealership agreement between them.
Held
No, the agreement of venue is not limited to the courts in Quezon City since
stipulation in a contract is mere considered as agreement on additional
forum not as limiting venue.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the
venue of actions, whether real or personal, or involving persons who neither
reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements on venue
are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an
action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the
parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law. In other words, stipulations designating venues other
than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed to make it
more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation
to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the
venues indicated in said Rule 4.

15. Requisites of a compulsory and a permissive counter claim

SPOUSES LYDIA and VIRGILIO MELITON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 101883

December 11, 1992

Facts
Nelia Ziga, in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of Alex A. Ziga and
Emma A. Ziga-Siy (private respondent), filed a complaint at the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, Naga City, against herein Lydia Meliton (petitioner) for
rescission of a contract of lease over a parcel of land situated at Elias
Angeles Street, Naga City. Alleged as grounds therefor were said petitioner's
failure, as lessee, to deposit the one month rental and to pay the monthly
rentals due; her construction of a concrete wall and roof on the site of a
demolished house on the leased premises without the lessor's written
consent; and here unauthorized sublease of the leased property to a third
party.
Lydia Meliton filed an answer to the complaint denying the material
averments thereof and setting up three counterclaims for recovery of the
value of her kitchenette constructed on the leased parcel of land and which

was demolished by private respondent, moral damages, attorneys fees and

appearances and litigation expenses.
On motion of private respondent contending that her cause of action had
already become moot and academic by the expiration of the lease contract,
dismissed the complaint. The counterclaims of petitioner Lydia Meliton were
also dismissed for non-payment of the docket fees.
Lydia Meliton and Virgilio Meliton filed a complaint against private
respondent for recovery of the same amounts involved and alleged in their
counterclaims.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the cause of action therein was barred by prior judgment and denied by
the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed and referred to Court of
Appeals for proper determination and disposition of the case. The CA ruled
that the failure of the respondents to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal
of their counterclaim or to take an appeal therefrom rendered the dismissal
final.
Issues
(1)Whether the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature.
(2)Whether the petitioners, having failed to seek reconsideration of or to
take an appeal from the order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are
already barred from asserting the same in another action.
Held
1. Yes, the counterclaim is compulsory in nature. Considering Section 4 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises
out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim.
All the requisites of a compulsory counterclaim are present. Both the
claims therein of petitioners and private respondent arose from the same
contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as well as their
potential liability for damages, emanated from the same contractual
relation.

2. No, the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the failure of petitioners to
appeal or to move for reconsideration of the said order of dismissal bars
them from asserting their claims in another action cannot be upheld. The
dismissal was without prejudice, since a dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata. The dismissal of the case
without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and
leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action. The
trial court, in dismissing the complaint of private respondent, did not
intend to prejudice the claims of petitioners by barring the subsequent
judicial enforcement thereof. In dismissing private respondent's
complaint, the trial court could not but have reserved to petitioners, as a
condition for such dismissal, the right to maintain a separate action for
damages.

16. Forum shopping; test to determine forum shopping

ALAN M. LOYOLA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117186

June 29, 1995

Facts
Private respondent Aniceto Fernandez III, the defeated candidate for Punong
Barangay, filed with the 4th MCTC of Macato-Tangalan an election protest
against the petitioner Alan Mayola. The protest was not accompanied by a
certification of non-forum shopping, however, the following day the private
respondent submitted to the MCTC his certification of non-forum shopping.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the protest for the private
respondent's failure to strictly comply with the requirements as mandated
under Administrative Circular No. 04-94.

The MCTC denied the motion invoking the following provisions of law:
Rule 1, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and
to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.
Rule 143 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases, not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.

Contesting the denial of his motion to dismiss, the petitioner filed with
Branch 6 of the RTC of Aklan a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
damages and attorney's fees, however denied the petition for lack of merit.
The petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review but
decision of the MCTC and RTC were upheld.
Issues
(1) Whether Administrative Circular No. 04-94 or certificate of forum
shopping is mandatory and jurisdictional.
(2) Whether it is applicable in election cases.

Held
1. Yes, the Circular is mandatory but not jurisdictional. Jurisdiction over the subject
or nature of the action is conferred by law. The fact that the Circular requires
that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that
it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it
does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances. Accordingly, although the certification was not filed
simultaneously with the initiatory pleading, its filing within the reglementary
period was a substantial compliance with Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
2. Yes, there is nothing in the Circular that indicates that it does not apply to
election cases. The court does not agree with the MCTC that Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 is not applicable to election cases because it is merely
amendatory of the Rules of Court and the latter, pursuant to Rule 143 thereof, is

not applicable to election cases. On the contrary, it expressly provides that the
requirements therein, which are in addition to those in pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court and existing circulars, "shall be strictly complied with in the filing
of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts
and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION v COURT OF APPEALS and AIDA

ALVARAN
G.R. No. 115858 June 28, 1996

Facts
The deceased, Sgt. Alaran was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station,
assigned at the Pasig Provincial Jail as 2nd Shift Jailer. The deceased was infront of
the Office of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong Police Station
and was talking with another policeman, PFC. Ruben Cruz, when another policeman,
Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who had just arrived, fired three successive shots which sent him
slumped to the ground. The deceased, however, although critically wounded, drew

his side firearm and fired back, twice hitting fatally Pat. Cesar Arcilla. Both fell,
fatally wounded, and were rushed to the Mandaluyong Medical Center, but Sgt.
Alvaran was pronounced dead upon arrival. Pat. Cesar Arcilla, died in the same
hospital, the day after.
The appellant, Aida Alvaran filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626,
as amended. GSIS denied the claim on the ground that at the time of the accident
the deceased was supposed to be at the Pasig Provincial Jail as 2nd Shift Jailer and
with a specific duty to perform, in a particular place. This is also affirmed by the
Employer Compensation Commission.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Hence the petitioner attacks the
appellate court's decision.
In the other hand, private respondent raises the issue of forum-shopping claiming
that this Court, in G.R. No. 115040, had already dismissed an earlier petition
questioning the very same Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28487.
Issue
Whether the petitioner engaged in "forum-shopping" in filing this petition?
Held
No, forum-shopping applies only when the two (or more) cases are still pending.
Private respondent should have alleged res judicata, and not forum-shopping, as
defense because the decision in G.R. No. 115040 had already become final and
executory. In fact, it has been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
The test therefore in determining the presence of forum-shopping is whether in the
two (or more cases) pending there is identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of
action and (c) reliefs sought. There is no question that there is identity of cause of
action and reliefs sought between this petition and the petition in G.R. No. 115040
against the argument of the Solicitor General that there is no identity of parties
inasmuch as the petitioner in G.R. No. 115040 is the Government Service Insurance
System as represented by the Government Corporate Counsel while the petitioner
now is the Employees' Compensation Commission. The Solicitor General missed the
point that forum-shopping does not require a literal identity of parties. It is sufficient
that there is identity of interests represented. Be that as it may, the case is not a
forum shopping.