TodayisThursday,November24,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC

G.R.No.81567October3,1991
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFROBERTOUMIL,ROLANDODURALand
RENATOVILLANUEVA,MANOLITAO.UMILandNICANORP.DURAL,FELICITASV.SESE,petitioners,
vs.
FIDELV.RAMOS,MAJ.GEN.RENATODEVILLA,BRIG.GEN.RAMONMONTANO,BRIG.GEN.ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE,respondents.
G.R.Nos.8458182October3,1991
AMELIAROQUEandWILFREDOBUENAOBRA,petitioners,
vs.
GEN.RENATODEVILLAandGEN,RAMONMONTANO,respondents.
G.R.Nos.8458384October3,1991
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFATTY.DOMINGOT.ANONUEVOandRAMON
CASIPLE:DOMINGOT.ANONUEVOandRAMONCASIPLE,petitioners,
vs.
HON.FIDELV.RAMOS,GEN.RENATOS.DEVILLA,COL.EVARISTOCARIO,LT.COL.REXD.PIAD,T/SGT.
CONRADODETORRES,S/SGT.ARNOLDDURIAN,andCommandingOfficer,PCINPDetentionCenter,
CampCrame,QuezonCity,respondents.
G.R.No.83162October3,1991
INTHEMATTEROFTHEAPPLICATIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFVICKYA.OCAYAANDDANNYRIVERA:
VIRGILIOA.OCAYA,petitioners,
vs.
BRIG.GEN.ALEXANDERAGUIRRE,COL.HERCULESCATALUNA,COL.NESTORMARIANO,respondents.
G.R.No.85727October3,1991
INTHEMATTEROFAPPLICATIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFDEOGRACIASESPIRITU,petitioner,
vs.
BRIG.GEN.ALFREDOS.LIM,COL.RICARDOREYES,respondents.
G.R.No.86332October3,1991
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFNARCISOB.NAZARENO:ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THESTATIONCOMMANDEROFTHEMUNTINGLUPAPOLICESTATION,Muntinglupa,MetroManila,P/SGT.
JACINTOMEDINA,P/SGT.ELADIOTAGLE,P/SGT.LEVISOLEDAD,andP/SGT.MALTROAROJADO,
respondents.
EfrenH.MercadoforpetitionersinG.R.No.81567andG.R.No.83162.
RicardoC.ValmonteforpetitionersinG.R.Nos.8458182
JosefinaG.CampbellCastilloforpetitionersinG.R.Nos.8458384.
PotencianoA.Flores,Jr.forpetitionerinG.R.No.85727.

TheSolicitorGeneralfortherespondents.
RESOLUTION

PERCURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the aboveentitled petitions, seeking
reconsiderationoftheCourt'sdecisionpromulgatedon9July1990(thedecision,forbrevity)whichdismissedthe
petitions,withthefollowingdispositivepart:
WHEREFORE,thepetitionsareherebyDISMISSED,exceptthatinG.R.No.85727(Espirituvs.Lim),
the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00.Nocosts.
TheCourtavailsofthisopportunitytoclarifyitsrulingabeginswiththestatementthatthedecisiondidnotrule
as many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army
memberisavalidgroundforhisarrestwithoutwarrant.Moreover,thedecisionmerelyappliedlongexistinglaws
tothefactualsituationsobtainingintheseveralpetitions.AmongtheselawsarethoutlawingtheCommunistParty
of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is
elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is
Congress as the elected representative of the people not the Court that should repeal, change or modify
them.
Intheirseparatemotionsforreconsideration,petitioners,insum,maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without
warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113
(Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons
arrested
2.ThatthedoctrinelaiddowninGarciavs.Enrile1andIlaganvs.Enrile2shouldbeabandoned
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of
the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the
timeofarrest,inasmuchasthoseconfessionsdonotcomplywiththerequirementsonadmissibilityof
extrajudicialadmissions
4.Thattheassaileddecisionisbasedonamisappreciationoffacts
5.ThatG.R.No.81567(theUmilcase)shouldnotbedeemedmootandacademic.
Wefindnomeritinthemotionsforreconsideration.
Itcannotbeoverlookedthatthesearepetitionsfortheissuanceofthewritofhabeascorpus,filedbypetitioners
under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4
Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the
detaineemaybeorderedforthwitreleased.

Inthepetitionsatbar,toascertainwhetherthedetentionpetitionerswasillegalornot,theCourtbeforerendering
decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in
accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention
resultingfromsucharrestsalsoinaccordancewithlaw.
Therecanbenodisputethat,asageneralrule,nopeaceofficerorpersonhasthepowerorauthoritytoarrest
anyowithoutawarrantofarrest,exceptinthosecasesexpressauthorizedbylaw.6Thelawexpresslyallowingarrestswitho
warrantisfoundinSection5,Rule113oftheRulesofCourtwhichstatesthegroundsuponwhichavalidarrest,withoutwarrant,canbeconducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113,
whichread:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrantwhen lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant,arrestaperson:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attemptingtocommitanoffense

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicatingthatthepersontobearresthascommitteditand
...(Emphasissupplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is
justifieditcanbesaidthat,withinthecontemplationofSection5Rule113,he(Dural)wascommittinganoffense,
when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a
continuingoffense,thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
andothercrimesandoffensescommittedinthefurtherance(sic)ontheoccasionthereof,orincident
thereto,orinconnectiontherewithunderPresidentialProclamationNo.2045,areallinthenatureof
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involvingamassiveconspiracyofnationwidemagnitude....
GiventheideologicalcontentofmembershipintheCPP/NPAwhichincludesarmedstrugglefortheoverthrowof
organizedgovernment,Duraldidnotceasetobe,orbecamelessofasubversive,FORPURPOSESOFARREST,
simplybecausehewas,atthetimeofarrest,confinedintheSt.AgnesHospital.Duralwasidentifiedasoneof
several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOMpolicemenintheirpatrolcar.ThatDuralhadshotthetwo(2)policemeninCaloocanCityaspartofhis
missionasa"sparrow"(NPAmember)didnotendthereandthen.Dural,givenanotheropportunity,wouldhave
shotorwouldshoototherpolicemenanywhereasagentsorrepresentativesoforganizedgovernment.Itisinthis
sensethatsubversionlikerebellion(orinsurrection)isperceivedhereasacontinuingoffense. Unlike other so
called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversionandrebellionareanchoredonanideologicalbase which compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessnessandviolenceuntiltheoverridingobjectiveofoverthrowingorganizedgovernmentisattained.
NorcanitbesaidthatDural'sarrestwasgroundedonmeresuspicionbythearrestingofficersofhismembership
in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown
hereafter.
Viewedfromanotherbutrelatedperspective,itmayalsobesaid,underthefactsoftheUmilcase,thatthearrest
ofDuralfallsunderSection5,paragraph(b),Rule113oftheRulesofCourt,whichrequirestwo(2)conditionsfor
avalidarresttwithoutwarrant:first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second,
thatthearrestingpeaceofficerorprivatepersonhaspersonalknowledgeoffactsindicatingthatthepersontobe
arrestedistheonewhocommittedtheoffense.Section5(b),Rule113,itwillbenoted,referstoarrestswithout
warrant,basedon"personalknowledgeoffacts"acquiredbythearrestingofficerorprivateperson.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause,whichmeansanactualbelieforreasonablegroundsofsuspicion9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicionthatthepersontobearrestedisprobablyguiltyofcommittingtheoffense,isbasedonactualfacts,i.e.,
supportedbycircumstancessufficientlystronginthemselvestocreatetheprobablecauseofguiltofthepersonto
bearrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
makingthearrest.11

TheserequisiteswerecompliedwithintheUmilcaseandintheothercasesatbar.
InG.R.No.81567(Umilcase),militaryagents,on1February1988,weredispatchedtotheSt.AgnesHospital,
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound that the
informationfurtherdisclosedthatthewoundedmaninthesaidhospitalwasamongthefive(5)male"sparrows"
who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City that based on the same
information,thewoundedman'snamewaslistedbythehospitalmanagementas"RonnieJavellon,"twentytwo
(22)yearsoldofBlock10,Lot4,SouthCityHomes,Bian,Laguna.12
Saidconfidentialinformationreceivedbythearrestingofficers,totheeffectthatanNPAmember("sparrowunit")
was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was
basedonactualfactsandsupportedbycircumstancessufficienttoengenderabeliefthatanNPAmemberwas
truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31
January1988,two(2)CAPCOMsoldierswereactuallykilledinBagongBario,CaloocanCitybyfive(5)"sparrows"
includingDuralsecondawoundedpersonlistedinthehospitalrecordsas"RonnieJavellon"wasactuallythen
being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound third as the records of this case disclosed later,

"Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in
realityRolandoDural.
Infine,theconfidentialinformationreceivedbythearrestingofficersmeritedtheirimmediateattentionandaction
and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13 believe that the
confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the
attendingdoctorandhospitalmanagementincompliancewiththedirectivesofthelaw,14and,therefore,camefromreliablesources.

Astotheconditionthat"probablecause"mustalsobecoupledwithactsdoneingoodfaithbytheofficerswho
makethearrest,theCourtnotesthatthepeaceofficerswnoarrestedDuralaredeemedtohaveconductedthe
same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The
recordsshowthatthearrestingofficersdidnotappeartohavebeenillmotivatedinarrestingDural. 15It is therefore
clearthatthearrest,withoutwarrant,ofDuralwasmadeincompliancewiththerequirementsofparagraphs(a)and(b)ofSection5,Rule113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information
chargingdoublemurderwithassaultagainstagentsofpersonsinauthoritywasfiledagainstDuralintheRegional
TrialCourtofCaloocanCity(CriminalCaseNo.C30112).Hewasthuspromptlyplacedunderjudicialcustody(as
distinguishedfrocustodyofthearrestingofficers).On31August1988,hewaconvictedofthecrimechargedand
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No.
84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 8458182), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
(G.R.Nos.8458384)andVickyOcaya(G.R.No.83162),theirarrests,withoutwarrant,arealsojustified.They
were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms,
explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified
their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said
petitioners,therebyplacingthemwithinjudicialcustodyanddisposition.Furthermore,Buenaobramootedhisown
petitionfohabeascorpusbyannouncingtothisCourtduringthehearingofthesepetitionsthathehadchosento
remainindetentioninthecustodyoftheauthorities.
Morespecifically,theantecedentfactsinthe"inflagrante"casesare:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the
operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato
Constantine,locatedintheVillaluzCompound,MolaveSt.,MarikinaHeights,Marikina,MetroManila
wasbeingusedastheirsafehousethatinviewofthisinformation,thesaidhousewasplacedunder
military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a
searchofthehousewasconductedthatwhenRenatoConstantinewasthenconfrontedhecouldnot
produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications
equipment,andheadmittedthathewasarankingmemberoftheCPP.16
2.InthecaseofWilfredoBuenaobra,hearrivedatthehouseofRenatoConstantinointheeveningof12August1988,andadmittedthat
hewasanNPAcourierandhehadwithhimletterstoRenatoConstantineandothermembersoftherebelgroup.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of AmeliaRoque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra
whohadinhispossessionpapersleadingtothewhereaboutsofRoque 17that,atthetimeofherarrest,the
militaryagentsfoundsubversivedocumentsandliveammunitions,andsheadmittedthenthatthedocumentsbelongedtoher.18

4.AsregardsDomingoAnonuevoandRamonCasiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the
said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded
gunswerefoundinthelatter'spossessionbutfailingtoshowapermittopossessthem.19
5.WithregardtoVickyOcaya,shewasarrested,withoutwarrantwhenshearrived(on12May1988)atthepremisesofthehouseofone
BenitoTiamzonwhowasbelievedtobetheheadoftheCPP/NPA,andwhosehousewassubjectofasearchwarrantdulyissuedbythe
court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PCIntelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive
documentsinthecarofOcaya.20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which
compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military
authoritiesthattwo(2)safehouses(oneoccupiedbyRenatoConstantineandtheotherbyBenitoTiamzon)were
being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of
RenatoConstantineandBenitoTiamzonasresidentsoroccupantsthereof.
Andatthetimeoftheactualarrests,thefollowingcircumstancessurroundedsaidarrests(ofRoque,Buenaobra,
AnonuevoandCasiple),whichconfirmedthebeliefofthemilitaryagentsthattheinformationtheyhadreceived
was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes:first: search
warrantwasdulyissuedtoeffectthesearchoftheConstantinesafehousesecond:foundinthesafehousewasa
person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership

thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively
identifiedbytheirformercomradesintheorganizationasCPP/NPAmembers.Inviewofthesecircumstances,the
corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in
thecaseofDural,thearrestswithoutwarrantmadebythemilitaryagentsintheConstantinosafehouseandlater
intheAmeliaRoquehouse,donotappeartohavebeenillmotivatedorirregularlyperformed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons
(Dural,Buenaobra,Roque,Anonuevo,CasipleandOcaya),noprudentancansaythatitwouldhavebeenbetter
for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglectofofficialdutyandacausefordisciplinaryactionagainstthepeaceofficersinvolved.
For,oneofthedutiesoflawenforcersistoarrestlawbreakersinordertoplacetheminthehandsofexecutive
and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of
lawandtoprosecuteandsecurethepunishmenttherefor.21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The
powertoarrestwithoutwarrantiswithoutlimitationaslongastherequirementsofSection5,Rule113aremet.Thisruleisfoundedonanoverwhelming
publicinterestinpeaceandorderinourcommunities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in
Section5,Rule113,thisCourtdeterminesnotwhetherthepersonsarrestedareindeedguiltyofcommittingthe
crimeforwhichtheywerearrested. 22Notevidenceofguilt,but"probablecause"isthereasonthatcanvalidlycompelthepeaceofficers,in
theperformanceoftheirdutiesandintheinterestofpublicorder,toconductanarrestwithoutwarrant.23

Thecourtsshouldnotexpectoflawenforcersmorethanwhatthelawrequiresofthem.Undertheconditionsset
forthinSection5,Rule113,particularlyparagraph(b)thereof,evenifthearrestedpersonsarelaterfoundtobe
innocentandacquitted,thearrestingofficersarenotliable. 24Butiftheydonotstrictlycomplywiththesaidconditions,thearresting
officerscanbeheldliableforthecrimeofarbitrarydetention,25fordamagesunderArticle32oftheCivilCode26and/orforotheradministrativesanctions.

InG.R.No.85727,Espiritu,on23November1988,wasarrestedwithoutwarrant,onthebasisoftheattestation
ofcertainwitnesses:thatabout5:00o'clockintheafternoonof22November1988,atthecornerofMagsaysay
BoulevardandVelenciaSt.,Sta.Mesa,Manila,Espirituspokeatagatheringofdriversandsympathizers,where
hesaid,amongotherthings:
Bukastuloyangwelganatin...hanggangsamagkagulona.27(Emphasissupplied)
andthatthepoliceauthoritieswerepresentduringthepressconferenceheldattheNationalPressClub(NPC)on
22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November
1988.28Espirituwasarrestedwithoutwarrant,notforsubversionorany"continuingoffense,"butforutteringtheabovequotedlanguagewhich,inthe
perceptionofthearrestingofficers,wasincitingtosedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free
speechguaranteedbytheConstitution.But,then,Espirituhadnotlosttherighttoinsist,duringthepretrialortrial
onthemerits,thathewasjustexercisinghisrighttofreespeechregardlessofthechargedatmosphereinwhichit
was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words
wereuttered,orsoonthereafter,isstillanotherthing.Inthebalancingofauthorityandfreedom,whichobviously
becomesdifficultattimes,theCourthas,inthiscase,tiltedthescaleinfavorofauthoritybutonlyforpurposesof
thearrest(notconviction).LetitbenotedthattheCourthasorderedthebailforEspiritu'sreleasetobereduced
fromP60,000.00toP10,000.00.
LetitalsobenotedthatsuperveningeventshavemadetheEspiritucasemootandacademic.ForEspirituhad
beforearraignmentaskedthecourtaquoforreinvestigation,thepeaceofficersdidnotappear.Becauseofthis
development, the defense asked the court aquo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case
againstEspiritu(CriminalCaseNo.8868385)hasbeenprovisionallydismissedandhisbailbondcancelled.
InG.R.No.86332(Nazareno),therecordsshowthatinthemorningof14December1988,RomuloBunyeIIwas
killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28
December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
NazarenoasoneofhiscompanionsduringthekillingofBunyeIIthatat7:20ofthesamemorning(28December
1988),thepoliceagentsarrestedNazareno,withoutwarrant,forinvestigation.29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was
madeonlyon28December1988,or14dayslater,thearrestfansunderSection5(b)ofRule113,sinceitwas
only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guiltyinthekillingofBunyeIIandthearresthadtobemadepromptly,evenwithoutwarrant,(afterthepolicewere
alerted)anddespitethelapseoffourteen(14)daystopreventpossibleflight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno
notedseveralfactsandeventssurroundinghisarrestanddetention,asfollows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging
NarcisoNazareno,RamilRegalaandtwo(2)others,withthekillingofRomuloBunyeIIwasfiledwit
theRegionalTrialCourtofMakati,MetroManila.ThecaseisdocketedthereinasCriminalCaseNo.
731.
On7January1989,NarcisoNazarenofiledamotiontopostbailbutthemotionwasdeniedbythe
trialcourtinanorderdated10January1989,evenasthemotiontopostbail,earlierfiledbyhisco
accused,ManuelLaureaga,wasgrantedbythesametrialcourt.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso
Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the
PresidingJudgeoftheRegionalTrialCourtofBifian,Laguna,Branch24,orderingsaidcourttohear
thecaseon30January1989andthereafterresolvethepetition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
CourtofBian,Lagunaissuedaresolutiondenyingthepetitionforhabeascorpus,itappearingthat
the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed
againsthimwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofMakati,MetroManilawhichliadtakencognizanceofsaid
caseandhad,infact,deniedthemotionforbailfiledbysaidNarcisoNazareno(presumablybecause
ofthestrengthoftheevidenceagainsthim).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations
against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and
supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They
werenotarbitraryorwhimsicalarrests.
Parenthetically,itshouldbeherestatedthatNazarenohassincebeenconvictedbythecourtaquo for murder
andsentencedtoreclusionperpetua.HehasappealedthejudgmentofconvictiontotheCourtofAppealswhere
itispendingasofthisdate(CAG.R.No.stillundocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an
extrajudicialadmission.
InthecaseofBuenaobra(G.R.Nos.8458182),headmitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of

AmeliaRoque,sheadmitted31thattheunlicensedfirearms,ammunitionandsubversivedocumentsfoundinherpossessionduringherarrest,belongedto
her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the
CPP/NPA,aswellastheirownershipoftheunlicensedfirearms,ammunitionsanddocumentsintheirpossession.
Butagain,theseadmissions,asrevealedbytherecords,strengthentheCourt'sperceptionthattrulythegrounds
uponwhichthearrestingofficersbasedtheirarrestswithoutwarrant,aresupportedbyprobablecause,i.e.that
the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons
arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of
determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas
corpus.Itpertainstothetrialofthecaseonthemerits.
AstotheargumentthatthedoctrinesinGarciavs.Enrile,andIlaganvs.Enrileshouldbeabandoned,thisCourt
findsnocompellingreasonatthistimetodisturbthesame,particularlylnthelightofprevailingconditionswhere
national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels.
Whatisimportantisthatevervarrestwithoutwarrantbetestedastoitslegalityviahabeascorpus proceeding.
ThisCourt.willpromptlylookintoandallotherappropriatecourtsareenjoinedtodothesamethelegalityof
thearrestwithoutwarrantsothatiftheconditionsunderSec.5ofRule113,RulesofCourt,aselucidatedinthis
Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released but if such conditions are met,
thenthedetaineeshallnotbemadetolanguishinhisdetentionbutmustbepromptlytriedtotheendthathemay
beeitheracquittedorconvicted,withtheleastdelay,aswarrantedbytheevidence.
AFinalWord
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a
subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the
validityofthequestionedarrestswithoutwarrantinthesepetitions,notonmereunsubstantiatedsuspicion,buton
compliancewiththeconditionssetforthinSection5,Rule113,RulesofCourt,alongexistinglaw,andwhich,for
stress,are probable cause and goodfaith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the
records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or
palatabilitytosomegroups,whatisimportantisthattheCourtberight.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is
FINAL.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,MelencioHerrera,Paras,Padilla,Bidin,GrioAquino,MedialdeaandDavide,Jr.,JJ.,concur.

SeparateOpinions

FERNAN,C.J.,concurringanddissenting:
After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive evaluation of the
motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with the, majority's resolution on said
motionsforreconsiderationexceptforthelegalityofthewarrantlessarrestsofpetitionerDeograciasEspiritufor
thecrimeofincitingtoseditionandpetitionerAlfredoNazarenoforthecrimeofmurder.
In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any 'continuing
offense,'butforuttering"thefollowing:"Bukastuloyangwelganatin...hanggangsamagkagulona."Apparently,
suchstatementwas,intheperceptionofthearrestingofficers,incitingtosedition.Whilenotconcedingthevalidity
ofsuchperception,realizingthatitisindeedpossiblethatEspirituwasmerelyexercisinghisrighttofreespeech,
theresolutionnonethelesssupportstheauthorityofpeaceofficers"onlyforpurposesofthearrest."
I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions warrantless arrests
providedtheyaremadeinaccordancewithlaw.Inthefirstplace,Espiritumavnotbeconsideredashaving"just
committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious remarks at the National Press Club in the
afternoonofNovember12,1988.Thesecondallegedlyseditiousremarkaforequotedwasmadeataround5:00
o'clockinthesameafternoon(Decision,pp.2324).Underthesecircumstances,thelawenforcementagentshad
time,shortthoughitmightseem,tosecureawarrantforhisarrest.Espiritu'sapprehensionmaynotthereforebe
consideredascoveredbySection5(b)ofRule113whichallowswarrantlessarrests"whenanoffensehasinfact
justbeencommitted."
The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who was arrested 14 days after the
commissionofthecrimeimputedtohim.
Secondly,warrantlessarrestsmaynotbeallowedifthearrestingofficerarenotsurewhatparticularprovisionof
lawhadbeeriviolatedbythepersonarrested.Trueitisthatlawen.orcementagentsandevenprosecutorsare
not all adept at the However, errneous perception, not to mention ineptitude among their ranks, especially if it
wouldresultintheviolationofanyrightofaperson,maynotbetolerated.Thatthearrestedpersonhasthe"right
to insist during the pretrial or trial on the merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he was exercising a right which the
arrestingofficerconsideredascontrarytolaw,isbesidethepoint.Nopersonshouldbesubjectedtotheordealof
atrialjustbecausethelawenforcerswronglyperceivedhisaction.
Thirdly,incitingtoseditionisnotacontinuouscrimeforwhichtheoffendermaybearrestedwithoutawarrantduly
issuedbytheproperauthority.Byitsnature,asingleactofurgingotherstocommitanyoftheactsenumeratedin
Article142oftheRevisedPenalCodemaysufficetoholdanyoneliableforincitingtosedition.Whilethecrimeis
aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a question of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524
[1951]),itshouldberememberedthatanyoftheprohibitedactsinArticle142mayinfringeuponthefundamental
freedoms of speech and expression. There arises, therefore, the necessity of balancing interests those of the
State as against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is
made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the determination of what may incite other people to sedition. Hence,
while the police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in view of the jeopardy it may
causethegovernment,speedyactionshouldconsistnotinwarrantlessarrestsbutinsecuringwarrantsforsuch
arrests.
On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the AntiSubversion Law, it should be underscored that
anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator is knowing member of a subversive
organizationasdistinguishedfromanominalone(Peoplevs.Ferrer,L3261314,December27,1972,48SCRA
382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government
such as bombing of government offices trie assassination of government officials provided there is probable
causetobelievethatheisintherollofmembersofasubversiveorganization.Itdevolvesupontheaccusedto

provemembershipbyforceorciorcion.Certainly,onemaynotbeinsucharollwithoutundergoingtheconcious
actofenlistment.
Itbearsrepeatingtheatwarrantlessarrestsaregovernedbylawandsubjecttostringentapplication.Section5,
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed.
"connotesimmediacyinpointoftimeandexcludescasesundertheoldrulewhereanoffense'hasinfactbeen
committed'nohowlongago.Similarly,thearrestormusthave'personalknowledgeofthefactsindicatingthatthe
[arrestee]hascommittedit'(insteadofjust'reasonablegroundbelievethatthe[arrestee]hascommittedit'under
theoldrule)."(DissentingopinioninIlaganvs.Enrile,G.R.No.70748,October21,1985,139SCRA349,408).
IdeemitapthereintorecallotherCourtrulingsprovideguidelinesineffectingarrestswithoutwarrants.InPeople
vs.Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court considered as illegal the warrantless
arrestofasubversivenotbasedonthearrestingofficer'spersonalknowledgesuchsubversionandheldthatany
ruleonarrestswithowarrantsmustbestrictlyconstrued.Wecategoricallystatethereinthatwarrantlessarrests
should "clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary was
providedbytheRules"(144SCRAat14).Moreover."itisnotenoughthatthereisreasonablegroundtobelieve
thatthepersontobearrestedhascommittedacrime.Acrimemustinfactoractually(hasjust)beencommitted
first.Thatcrimehasactuallybeencommittedisanessentialprecondition.Itisnotenoughtosuspectthatacrime
mayhavebeencommitted.Thefactofthecommissionoftheoffensemustbeundisputed.Thetestofreasonable
groundappliesonlytotheidentityoftheperpetrator.(Supra,atp.15).
Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538), the Court laid out the
proceduretobeobservedthemomentapersonisarrested:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to imform him of the
reasonforthearrestandhemustbeshownthewarrantofarrest,ifany.Heshallbeinformedofhis
constitutionalrightstoremainsilentandtocounsel,andthatanystatementhemightmakecouldbe
used against him. The person shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger.Itshallbetheresponsibilityofthearrestingofficertoseetoitthatthisisaccomplished.
Nocustodialinvestigationshallbeconductedunlessitbeinthepresenceofcounselengagedbythe
personarressted,byanypersononhisbehalf,orappointedbythecourtuponpetitiononhisbehalf,
or appointed the court upon the petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
Therighttocounselmaybewaivedbutthewaivershallnotbevalidunlessmadewiththeassistance
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatoryorinculpatory,inwholeorinpartshallbeinadmissibleevidence.(121SCRAat554).
Thesejudicialpronouncementsmustbeobservedbyeveryoneconcerned:themilitaryandciviliancomponentsof
the government tasked with law enforcement as well as the ordinary citizen who faces a situation wherein civic
dutydemandshisinterventiontopreservepeaceinthecommunity.
I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of offenders of crimes with a political or
ideologicalelement.Suchabusesaremoreoftenthannot,triggeredbythedifficultyinfindingevidencethatcould
standjudicialscrutinytopinpointasubversive,policeofficersusuallyhavetomakelongpersistentsurveillance.
However, for the orderly administration of government and the maintenance of peace and order in the country,
goodfaithshouldbereposedontheofficialsimplementingthelaw.Afterall,wearenotwantinginlawstohold
any offending peace officer liable both administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance of their
duties.Victimsofabusesshouldresorttolegalremediestoredresstheirgrievances.
Ifexistinglawsareinadequate,thepolicydeterminingbranchesofthegovernmentmaybeexhortedpeacefully
bythecitizenrytoeffectpositivechanges.ThisCourt,mandatedbtheConstitutiontoupholdthelaw,canonlygo
as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit behind them. Otherwise, we hail be entering the dangerous
groundofjudiciallegislation.
GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.,concurringanddissenting:
The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential condition for order, It is disturbing
whenevertheCourtleansinthedirectionoforderinsteadoflibertyinharcasescomingbeforeus.
People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society encourages freedom and permits
dissent can it have lasting security and real progress, the theory that enhancing order through constraints on
freedomisdeceptivebecauserestrictionsonlibertycorrodetheveryvaluesGovenmentpretendstopromote.I
believeweshouldmovewiththepeopleoftheworldwhoarefastliberatingthemselves.
I,therefore,voteforthestrictapplicationofSection5(a)and(b)ofRule113onarrestswithoutwarrant,towit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant,arrestaperson:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attemptingtocommitanoffense
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicatingthatthepersontobearrestedhascommittedit.
xxxxxxxxx
Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt, the tendency
shouldbetodeclarethewarrantlessarrestillegal.
Insofar as G.R. Nos, 8458182, G.R. Nos. 8458384 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia Roque, Wilfredo
Buenaobra,DomingoAnonuevo,RamonCasiple,andVickyOcayaareconcerned,thepetitionerswerearrested
after having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and ammunitions. They were actually
committingacrimewhenarrested.Iconcurinthedenialoftheirmotionsforreconsideration.
I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was arrested while
urgingjeepnevandbusdriverstojoinastrikeoftransportworkersonthegroundthatthatwasincitingtosedition.
This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of speech. "Inciting to
sedition"isatermoverwhichthemostlearnedwritersandjuristswilldifferwhenappliedtoactualcases.Idoubtif
therearemorethanahandfulofpolicemeninthewholecountrywhowouldknowthefulldimensionsofthefine
distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national
importance on one hand and the application of the clear and present danger rule as the test when claims of
nationalsecurityandpublicsafetyareasserted,ontheother.Infact,thepercentageofknowledgeabilitywouldgo
downfurtherifweconsiderthat"incitingtosedition"requirestheabilitytodefine,amongother(1)whatkindsof
speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly andtumultously (3,) when
doesacertaineffortamounttoforce,intimidation.orillegalmethod(4)whatconstitutethefiveobjectsorendsof
sedition and (5) what is a scurrilous libel against the Philippines. If we allow public speakers to be picked up
simply because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace officer or critical of government
policy and action, we will undermine all pronouncements of this Court on the need to protect that matrix of all
freedoms,whichisfreedomofexpression.Attheveryleast,awarrantofarrestafterapreliminaryexaminationby
aJudgeisessentialinthistypeofoffense.
Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations regarding
"continuingoftenses."Tobasewarrantlessarrestsonthedoctrineofcontinuingoffenseistogivealicenseforthe
illegaldetentionofpersonsonpuresuspicion.Rebellion,insurrection,orseditionarepoliticaloffenseswherethe
linebetweenovertactsandsimpleadvocacyoradherencetoabeliefisextremelythin.Ifacourthasconvictedan
accusedofrebellionandheisfoundroamingaround,hemaybearrested.Butuntilapersonisprovedguilty,Ifail
toseehowanybodycanjumptoapersonalconclusionthatthesuspectisindeedarebelandmustbepickedup
onsightwheneverseen.Thegrantofauthorityinthemajorityopinionistoobroad.Ifwarrantlesssearchesareto
bevalidated,itshouldbeCongressandnotthisCourtwhichshoulddrawstrictandnarrowstandards.Otherwise,
thenonrebelswhoarecritical,noisy,orobnoxiouswillbeindiscriminatelylumpedupwiththoseactuallytakingup
armsagainsttheGovernment.
Thebeliefoflawenforcementauthorities,nomatterhowwellgroundedonpastevents,thatthepetitionerwould
probablyshoototherpolicemenwhomhemaymeetdoesnotvalidatewarrantlessarrests.Icannotunderstand
whytheauthoritiespreferredtobidetheirtime,awaitthepetitioner'ssurfacingfromunderground,andpounceon
himwithnolegalauthorityinsteadofsecuringwarrantsofarrestforhisapprehension.Thesubsequentconviction
ofapersonarrestedillegallydoesnotthewarrantlessarrest.
InG.R.No.86332,RomuloBunyewaskilledonDecember14,1988.TheinformationthatNarcisoNazarenowas
oneofthekillerscametotheattentionofpeaceofficersonlyonDecember28,1988orfourteen(14)dayslater.
Tosaythattheoffense"hasinfactjustbeencommitted"evenif14dayshavelapsedistostretchRule113on
warrantlessarrestsintoridiculouslimits.Awarrantofarrestisessentialinthiscase.Ivotetograntthemotionfor
reconsideration.
Thesubsequentconvictionofapersonarrestedillegallydoesnotreachbackintothepastandrenderlegalwhat
wasillegal.Theviolationoftheconstitutionalrightagainstillegalseizuresisnotcuredbythefactthatthearrested
person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized. A government of laws must abide by its own
Constitution.
CONSIDERINGTHEFOREGOING,IVOTETO:

(1)DENYthemotionsforreconsiderationinG.R.Nos.8458182G.R.No.8458384andG.R.No.83162
(2)GRANTthemotionforreconsiderationinG.R.No.85727
(3)GRANTthemotionforreconsiderationinG.R.No.86332and
(4)GRANTthemotionforreconsiderationinG.R.No.81567.
CRUZ,J.,SeparateOpinion:
Ireiteratemyconcurrencewiththeponenciainsofarasitdismissedthepetitionsofthosewhowerearrestedin
flagrante,orsubsequentlypostedbailorchosetoremaininthecustodyofthemilitary,orvoluntarilypermittedthe
search of the house without warrant. I do not think that under the applicable circumstances the petitioners can
validlycomplainthattheyarebeingunlawfullydetained.
ButImustagainexpressmaydissenttothecontinuedobservanceofGarciaPadillavs.Enrile,121SCRA472,to
justifythewarrantlessarrestanddetentionoftheotherpetitionersonthegroundthattheywereapprehendedfor
thecontinuingoffensesofrebellionandotheralliedcrimes.
Wefindinthesaiddecisionthispartltularlydisturbingobservation,whichwasquotedwithapprovalintheoriginal
ponencia:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committingnonviolentactsbutinfurtheranceoftherebellion,ismoreanactofcapturingtheminthe
courseofanarmedconflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting
themincourtforastatutoryoffense.Thearrest,therefore,neednotfollowtheusualprocedureinthe
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable
causebeforetheissuanceofarrestandthegrantingofbailoftheoffenseisbailable.Obviously,the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overtactsofviolenceagainstgovenmentforces,oranyothermilderactsbutequallyinpursuanceof
therebelliousmovement.(Emphasissupplied.)
Thetreatmentsuggestedenvisionsanactualstateofwarandisjustifiedonlywhenarecognitionofbeuigerency
is accorded by the legitimate government to the rebels, resulting in the application of the laws of war in the
regulationoftheirrelations.Therebelsarethenconsideredalienenemiestobetreatedasprisonersofwarwhen
capturedand cannot invoke the municipal law of the legitimate government they have disowned. It is in such a
situationthattheprocessesofthelocalcourtsarenotobservedandtherebelscannotdemandtheprotectionof
theBillofRightsthattheyaredeemedtohaverenouncedbytheirdefianceofthegovernment.
Butaslongasthatrecognitionhasnotyetbeenextended,thelegitimategovenmentmusttreattherebelsasits
citizens, subject to its municipal law and entitled to all the rights provided thereunder, including and especially
thoseguaranteedbytheConstitution.PrincipalamongtheseinourcountryarewhoseembodiedintheBill
ofRights,particularlythoseguaranteeingdueprocess,prohibitingunreasonablesearchesandseizures,allowing
bail,andpresumingtheinnocenceoftheaccused.Thelegitimategovernmentcannotexcusethesuppressionof
these rights by the "exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an intemal matter governed
exclusivelybythelawsoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
Treatmentoftherebelsasiftheywereforeigninvadersorcombatantsisnotjustifiedinthepresentsituation
asourgovernmentcontinuestoprosecutethemasviolatorsofourownlaws.Underthedoctrineannouncedin
GarciaPadilla,however,allpersonssuspectedasrebelsarebysuchsuspicionalonemadesubjecttosummary
arrest no different from the unceremonious capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The decision
itselfsaysthatthearrest"neednotfollowtheusualprocedureintheprosecutionofoffenses"and"theabsenceof
a judicial warrant is no impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities of the
"continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes. International law is thus substituted for
municipallawinregulatingtherelationsoftheRepublicwithitsowncitizensinapurelydomesticmatter.
Asforthedurationoftheoffenses,thedecisioncontainedthefollowingpronouncementwhichthisCourthasalso
adoptedasitsown:
. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance on the occasion thereof, or
incidentthereto,orinconnectiontherewithunderPresidentialProclamationNo.2045,areallinthe
nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside front their
essentiallyinvolvingamassiveconspiracyofnationwidemanitude.(Emphasissupplied.)

Thebeginningofthe"continuingoffense"maybearbitrarilyfixedbytheauthorities,usuallybysimplyplacingthe
suspect"undersurveillance,"tolaythebasisforhiseventualapprehension.Oncesoplaced,hemayatanytime
be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the process of committing the "continuing
offense,"nomatterthatwhathemaybeactualllydoingatthetimeisaperfectlyinnocentact.
InthecaseofDural.thearrestwasmadewhilehewasengagedinthepassiveandinnocuousactofundergoing
medicaltreatment.Thefictionwasindulgedthathewaseventhen,ashelaysupineinhissickbed,engagedin
the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification, the Court says that the arresting
officersactedon"confidentialinformation"thathewasinthehospital,whichinformation"wasfoundtobetrue."
Thisissupposedtohavevalidatedthedeterminationoftheofficersthattherewas"probablecause"thatexcused
theabsenceofawarrant.
Myownimpressionisthatprobablecausemustbeestablishedpreciselytojustifytheissuanceofawarrant,not
to dispense with it moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing the warrant, not the
arrestingofficerwhosaysitisnotnecessary.
InthecaseofEspiritu,thearrestwasmadewhilehewasactuallysleeping, and for allegedly seditious remarks
madebyhimthedaybefore.TheCourtsayshiscaseisnotcoveredbytheGarciaPadilladoctrinebutapproves
thearrestjustthesamebecausetheremarksweresupposedtocontinuetheireffectseventothefollowingday.
Theoffensewasconsideredashavingbeenjustcommitted(tomakeitcomeunderRule113,Section5,ofthe
RulesofCourt)despitetheconsiderabletimelapse.
It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less than fourteen days
afterthekilling.Insustainingthisact,theCourtsaysthatitwasonlyonthedayofhisarrestthathewasidentified
as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned not from the
timeofthecommissionofanoffensebutfromthetimeoftheIdentificationofthesuspect.
Section5ofRule113saysthatapeaceofficermayarrestapersonwithoutawarrantifthelatter"hascommitted,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense "has in fact just been
committed."Therequirementofimmediacyisobviousfromtheword"just,"which,accordingtoWebster,means
"averyshorttimeago."Thearrestmustbemadealmostimmediatelyorsoon after these acts, not at any time
afterthesuspicionofthearrestingofficerbegins,nomatterhowlongagotheoffensewascommitted.
I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution which I hope will not be the start of
anotherdangerousdoctrine:
TheCourt,itistrue,tookintoaccounttheadmissionsofthearrestedpersonsoftheirmembershipin
theCPP/NPA,aswellastheirownershipoftheunlicensedfirearms,ammunitionsanddocumentsin
their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon wmch the arresting officers based their arrests without
warrant,aresupportedbyprobablecause,i.e.,thatthepersonsarrestedwereprobablyguiltyofthe
commissionofcertainoffenses,incompliancewithSection5,Rule113oftheRulesofCourt.
I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case of People vs. Malmstedt, G.R. No.
91107,June19,1991,whereInoted:"Theconclusionthattherewasprobablecausemayhavebeeninfluenced
by the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the
soldier'ssuspicion.Inotherwords,itwasthefactofillegalpossessionthatretroactivelyestablishedtheprobable
cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree that washed clean the
treeitself."
I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the GarciaPadilla decision to justify the illegal arrests made in the
cases before us is a step back to that shameful past when individual rights were wantonly and systematically
violatedbytheMarcosdictatorship.Itseemssomeofushaveshortmemoriesofthatrepressiveregime,butIfor
oneamnotonetoforgetsosoon.AstheultimatedefenderoftheConstitution,thisCourtshouldnotglossover
the abuses of those who, out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual liberty in the dubious name of national
security.Whatevertheirideologyandevenifitbehostiletoours,thepetitionersareentitledtotheprotectionof
theBillofRights,nomoreandnolessthananyotherpersoninthiscountry.Thatiswhatdemocracyisallabout.
FELICIANO,J.,concurringanddissenting:
IconcurintheresultreachedbythemajorityintheResolutiondisposingoftheMotionforReconsideration.
Atthesametime,however,Ifeelcompelledtodissentfromcertainstatementsmadebythemajorityprincipally
concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests without warrants. It
seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta, since they are quite unnecessary for sustaining the
actual results reached in the majority Resolution. This was summarily pointed out in my very brief statement

concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990. The subsequent
developments in several of the cases here consolidated, which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution,
makethisevenclearer.Nonetheless,themajorityResolutionhastakenthetimeandtroubleexpresslytoreiterate
the "continuing crimes" doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. Although the above statements
areobiter,theyhavebeenmadeand,Ibelieve,needtobeaddressedtosomeextentandtheinterrelationofthe
"continuingcrimes"doctrinewithconstitutionalrightsexplored.
1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons.
ArticleIIISection2oftheConstitutionreads:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforanypurposeshallbeinviolable,and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesseshemayproduce,andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsor
thingstobeseized.(Emphaissupplied)
Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual members of
society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest, the rendition of which
complieswiththeconstitutionalprocedurespecifiedinArticleIIISection2.Arrestsmadewithoutawarrantissued
by a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure, are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons
withinthemeaningofArticleIIISection2.
2.Thereare,however,certainwellrecognizedexceptionstothenormthatwarrantlessarrestsareunreasonable
seizuresofpersons.Thoseexceptionsare,inourday,essentiallyfoundinSection5(a)and(b)ofRule113ofthe
RulesofCourt.Section5(a)and(b)markoutthesituationswhereanofficerofthelaw,oraprivatepersonfor
thatmatter,maylawfullyarrestapersonwithoutpreviouslysecuringawarrantofarrest.ThefulltextofSection5,
Rule113follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant,arrestaperson:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attemptingtocommitanoffense
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicatingthatthepersontobearrestedhascommitteditand
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escapedwhilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.
Incasesfallingunderparagraphs(a)and(b)hereof,thepersonarrestedwithoutawarrantshallbe
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordancewithRule112,Section7.
3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall that judicial
interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for what they are: they are
exceptionstoavitalconstitutionalnormenshrinedintheBillofRights.Exceptionstosuchanormmustbestrictly
construedsoasnottorenderfutileandmeaninglesstheconstitutionalrulerequiringwarrantsofarrestsbefore
the persons of individuals may be lawfully constrained and seized. The ordinary rule generally applicable to
statutory provisions is that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in
whichtheyarecastfairlywarrants,andalldoubtsshouldberesolvedinfavorofthegeneralprovision,ratherthan
the exception. 1 This rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we deal, not with an ordinary statutory provision, but with a
constitutionalguarantee.2Exceptionstosuchaguaranteemustbereadwithespecialcareandsensitivityandkeptwithinthelimitsoftheirlanguagesoto
keepvitalandsignificantthegeneralconstitutionalnormswarrantlessarrests.InAlvarezvs.CourtofFirstInstance,3thisCourt,stressingthat:

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal
constructionorastrictconstructioninfavoroftheindividual,topreventstealthyencroachmentupon,
orgradualdepreciationof,therightssecuredbythem(Statevs.CusterCounty,198Pac.,362State
vs.McDaniel,231Pac.,965237Pac.,373).Sincetheproceedingisadrasticone,itisthegeneral
rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly construed
(Rosevs.St.Clair,28Fed.[2d],189Leonardvs.U.S.,6Fed.[2d],353Perryvs.U.S.,14Fed.[2d],
88Cofervs.State,118So.,613.(emphasissupplied)

heldthat:
...Allillegalsearchesandseizuresareunreasonablewhithlawfulonesarereasonable.4
InPeoplevs.Burgos,5thisCourtreiteratedtheaboveruleinthefollowingterms:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
locationofthefirearmwasgivenbytheappellant'swife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document.Neitherwashecommittinganyactwhichcouldbedescribedassubversive.He was, in
factplowinghisfieldatthetimeofthearrest.
Therightofapersontobesecureagainstanyunreasonableseizureofhisbodyandanydeprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situationswhensecuringawarrantwouldbeabsurdorismanifestlyunnecessaryasprovidedbythe
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyondthecasesspecificallyprovidedbylaw.Todosowouldinfringeuponpersonallibertyandset
backabasicrightsooftenvilatedandsodeservingoffullprotection.6(emphasissupplied)
4.Section5(a)relatestosituationswhereacrimeiscommittedorattemptedtobecommittedinthepresenceof
the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the attempt to commit an offense, in the
presenceofthearrestingofficer,maybeseentobethesubstitute,underthecircumstances,forthesecuringofa
warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the
partofthearrestingofficertosuppressthebreachofpublicorderandtopreventfurtherbreachesthenandthere.
Section5(a)may,moreover,beseentorefertoovertactsconstitutiveofacrimetakingplaceinthepresenceof
thearrestingofficer.Theterm"presence"inthisconnectionisproperlyandrestrictivelyconstruedtorelatetoacts
takingplacewithintheopticalorperhapsauditoryperceptionofthearrestingofficer.7Ifnoovert,recognizablycriminal,acts
occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer, such officer could not, of course, become aware at all that a crime is being
committed or attempted to be committed in his presence. 8 It is elementary that purely mental or psychological phenomena, not externalized in overt
physical acts of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be
shown there must also be an actusreus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in the presence or within the sensor perception of the arresting
officer, there would, in principle, be ample time to go to a magistrate and ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that imperious
necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the crime being committed, or to capture the doer of the perceive criminal act, the
necessitywhichservesasthejustificationinlawofwarrantlessarrestsunderSection5(a).

5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may be sustained
under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting officer arrived in the
sceneand2)theofficermusthave"personalknowledge"of facts indicating tha the person to be arrested has
committedtheoffense.Insomewhatdifferentterms,thefirstrequirementimportsthattheffectsorcorpusofthe
offense which has just been committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled on the ground, dead of gunshot
wound or a person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may not ha
seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not be said to have been
committed"in[his]presence."Therequirementof"personalknowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a
requirementthatsuchknowledgemusthavebeenobtaineddirectly from sense perception the arresting officer.
Thatrequirementwouldexcludeinformtionconveyedbyanotherperson,nomatterwhathisreputationfor,truth
andreliabilitymightbe.9Thus,wherethearrestingofficercomesuponapersondeadonthestreetandseesapersonrunningawaywithaknife
fromwherethevictimissprawledtheground,hehaspersonalknowledgeoffactswhichrenderithighlyprobablethatthepersonfleeingwasthedoerof
thecriminaldeed.Thearrestingofficermust,inotherwords,perceivethroughhisownsensessomeactwhichdirectlyconnectsthepersontobearrested
withthevisibleeffectsorcorpusofacrimewhichhas"justbeencommitted."

6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the time interval
between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief indeed. In the
firstplace,theword"just"wasfairlyrecentlyinsertedinSection5(b)bythe1985RulesonCriminalProcedures,
no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made. In the second place, a latitudinarian view of the
phrase"hasinfactjustbeencommitted"wouldobviouslyrenderpointlesstherequirementinSection5(a)thatthe
crimemusthavebeencommitted"[in]thepresence"ofthearrestingofficer.InG.R.No.86332,thewarrantless
arrestofAlfredoNazareno14daysaftertheoccurrenceofthekillingwithwhichhewaschargedalongwithother
persons,cannotbyanystandardbejustifiedunderSection5(b).InG.R.No.81567,Duralwasarrestedwithout
warrantwhilebeingtreatedinahospitalthedayaftertheshootingofthepolicemeninwhichhewassuspectedto
havebeenaparticipant.While1daymaybesubstantiallydifferentfrom14days,stillitmustbepointedoutthat
atthetimeDuralwasarrestedinthehospital,thekillingofthetwo(2)policemeninCaloocanCityfarawayfrom
theSt.AgnesHospitalinQuezonCitycouldnotreasonablybesaidtohavebeenjustcommitted.Therewasno
showing,nordidtheCourtrequireit,thatthearrestingofficershadbeenin"hotpursuit"ofDuralbeginningatthe
sceneofthekillingandendingthenextdayinthehospital.
7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer who is
determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more exacting than the standard

imposedbytheConstitutionuponthejudgewho,intheseclusionofhischambers,ascertains"probablecause"by
examiningtheevidencesubmittedbeforehim.Thearrestingofficermusthimselfhave"personalknowledge"the
magistratemayrelyuponthepersonalknowledgeofthewitnessesexaminedbyorforhiminissuingawarrantof
arrest. In the present Resolution, the majority begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge" in
Section5(b),butwindsupinthenextpagewithaverydilutedstandardof"reasonablebeliefand"goodfaith"on
the part of the arresting officers. The stricter standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a person
withoutawarrantofarrest,fortheyareactinginderogationofaconstitutionalright. That the person unlawfully
arrestedwithoutawarrantmaylaterturnouttobeguiltyoftheoffensehewassuspectedofinthefirstplaceis,
course, quite beside the point. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is constitutionally entitled to be
secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has in fact committed physically observable criminal acts in the
presenceofthearrestingofficerorhadjustcommittedsuchactswhenthearrestingofficerburstuponthescene.
8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes," shows that
doctrineisherebeingusedasasubstitutefortherequirementunderSection5(a)thattheoffense"hasinfactjust
been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the person to be arrested is suspected of
havingcommittedacrimeinthefuture.ThepertinentportionofthemajorityResolutionreads:
...Duraldidnotceasetobe,orbecauselessofasubversive,FORPURPOSEOFARREST,simply
becausehewas,atthetimeofarrest,confinedintheSt.AgnesHospital....ThatDuralhadshotthe
two(2)policemeninCaloocanCityaspartofhismissionasa"sparrow"(NPAmember)didnotend
there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen
anywhereasagentsorrepresentativesoforganizedgovernment.Itisinthissensethatsubversion
like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other socalled
"common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversionandrebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objectives of overthrowing organized
governmentisattained.(Emphasissupplied)
9.Irespectfullysubmitthatanexaminationofthe"continuingcrimes"doctrineasactuallyfoundinourcaselaw
offersnoreasonablebasisforsuchuseofthedotrine.Morespecifically,thatdoctrine,inmysubmission,doesnot
dispencewiththerequirementthatovertactsrecognizablycriminalincharactermusttakeplaceinthepresence
of the arresting officer, or must have just been committed when the arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless
arrestittobelawful.The"continuingcrimes"doctrineinourcaselaw(beforerenditionofGarciaPadillavs.Enrile
10doesnotsustainwarrantlessarrestsofpersontobearrestedis,asitwere,merelyrestinginbetweenspecificlawlessandcommitthemomenthegetsan
opportunitytodoso.

Ourcaselawshowsthatthe"continuingcrimes"doctrinehasbeenusedbasicallyinrelationtotwo(2)problems:
thefirstproblemisthatofdeterminationofwhetherornotaparticularoffensewascommittedwithintheterritorial
jurisdictionofthetrialcourtthesecondproblemisthatofdeterminingwhetherasinglecrimeormultiplecrimes
werecommittedwherethedefenseofdoublejeopardyisraised.
10.Inrespectofthefirstproblem,thegistofourcaselawisthatwheresomeoftheingredientsorelementsofan
offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some other ingredients or elements of the
sameoffenseoccurintheterritoryofanothercourt,(e.g.,estafaormalversation)eitheroneofthetwocourtshas
jurisdictiontotrytheoffense.Wherealloftheessentialelementsofacrimetakeplacewithintheterritoryofone
court but "by reason of he very nature of the offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be
"continuing," then the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has
jurisdictiontotryapersonchargedwithsuchoffense.Inthelattercase,theoffenseisdeemedtobecontinuing
becausesomeoralloftheelementsconstitutingtheoffenseoccurredwithinjurisdictionofthesecondcourt(e.g.,
kidnapping and illegal detention libel evasion of service of sentence). The criminal acts are regarded as
repeatedorascontinuingwithintheprovinceorcitywherethedefendantwasfoundandarrested.11Clearly,overtacts

oftheaccussedconstitutingelementsofthecrimechargedmustbeshowntohavebeencommittedwithintheterritorialjurisdictionofthecourtwhereheis
charged.

11.Turningtothesecondtypeofproblem,thequestionisnormallypresentedintermsofwhetheronecrimeor
multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of acts actually alleged and proven to have
been committed by the accused constituted only one and the same crime, the defense of double jeopardy
becomes available where a second information is filed covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand,
wheretheactsoftheaccusedconstituteddiscrete,multipleoffenses,eachactcomprisingadistinctandseparate
offense,thedoublejeopardydefenseisnonavailable. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing upon the issue relating to the
unityormultiplicityofoffensecommitted,theovertactsoftheaccusedconstitutiveeitherofthesingleoffenseorofthepluraloffenses,mustbeshown.

12.Myfinalsubmission,isthat,thedoctrineof"continuingcrimes,"whichhasitsownlegitimatefunctiontoserve
in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee
against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of the offense charged
areshowntohavebeencommittedbythepersonarrestedwithoutwarrant,the"continuingcrime"doctrineshould
notbeusedtodressupthepretensethatacrime,begunorcommittedelsewhere,continuedtobecommittedby
thepersonarrestedinthepresenceofthearrestingofficer.Thecapacityformischiefofsuchautilizationofthe

"continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of unambiguous
criminalactswithadefinitebeginningandendintimeandspace(suchasthekillingorwoundingofapersonor
kidnappingandillegaldententionorarson)butratherofsuchproblematicoffensesasmembershipinoraffiliation
withorbecomingamemberof,asubversiveassociationororganization.Forinsuchcases,theovertconstitutive
actsmaybemorallyneutralinthemselves,andtheunlawfulnessoftheactsafunctionoftheaimsorobjectivesof
the organization involved. Note, for instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of
"membershipinanysubversiveassociation:"13
a)Allowinghimselftobelistedasamemberinanybookoranyofthelists,records,correspondence,
oranyotherdocumentoftheorganization
b)Subjectinghimselftothedisciplineofsuchassociationororganizationinanyformwhatsoever
c)Givingfinancialcontributiontosuchassociationororganizationindues,assessments,loansorin
anyotherforms
xxxxxxxxx
f)Conferringwithofficersorothermembersofsuchassociationororganizationinfurtheranceofany
planorenterprisethereof
xxxxxxxxx
h)Preparingdocuments,pamphlets,leaflets,books,oranyothertypeofpublicationtopromotethe
objectivesandpurposesofsuchassociationororganization
xxxxxxxxx
k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such
associationororganization
xxxxxxxxx
Itmaywellbe,asthemajorityimplies,thattheconstitutionalruleagainstwarrantlessarrestsandseizuresmakes
thelawenforcementworkofpoliceagenciesmoredifficulttocarryout.ItisnotourCourt'sfunction,however,and
theBillofRightswasnotdesigned,tomakelifeeasyforpoliceforcesbutrathertoprotectthelibertiesofprivate
individuals.OurpoliceforcesmustsimplylearntolivewiththerequirementsoftheBillofRights,toenforcethe
law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy,
whetherthroughsheerineptnessorexcessofzeal,theveryfreedomswhichmakeourpolityworthprotectingand
saving.
REGALADO,J.:SeparateOpinion:
WhileIhaveheretoforeconcurredintheponenciaintheaboveentitledcasesandIreiteratesuchconcurrence,I
wishtounburdenmyselfofsomereservationsontherationaleadoptedinG.R.No.86332.
It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while
Nazareno'sarrestwithoutwarrantwasmadeonlyon28December1988,or14dayslater,thearrestfallsunder
Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
NazarenowasprobablyoneofthoseguiltyinthekillingofBunyeII."
I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing a peace
officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest, specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the
situation"(w)henanoffensehasinfactjustbeencommitted,andhehaspersonalknowledgeoffactsindicating
thatthepersontobearrestedhascommittedit."
It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in
imposingtherequirementsthatthepersonmakingthearresthaspersonalknowledgeofthefactsindicatingthat
thearresteeisresponsibleforanoffensewhichhasjustbeencommitted.
Now,accordingtotheresolution,"therecordsshowthatinthemorningof14December1988,RomuloBunyeII
waskilledbyagroupofmeninAlabang,Muntinlupa,MetroManilathatatabout5o'clockinthemorningof28
December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
NazarenoasoneofhiscompanionsduringthekillingofBunyeIIthatat7:20ofthesamemorning(28December
1988),thepoliceagentsarrestedNazareno,withoutwarrant,forinvestigation."

Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the suspects,
RamilRegala,theresolutionhasemasculatedtherequirementinSection5(b)thatthepersonmakingthearrest
musthavehadpersonalknowledgeoffactualindicationsregardingthecomplicityorliabilityofthearresteeforthe
crime.Yet,thatamendmentrequiringsuchpersonalknowledgemusthavebeendesignedtoobviatethepractice
inthepastofwarrantlessarrestsbeingeffectedonthebasisoforsupposedrelianceuponinformationobtained
fromthirdpersonswhomerelyprofessedsuchknowledgeor,worse,concoctedsuchreportsforvariantreasons
notnecessarilyfoundedontruth.
Further,andobviouslyasanaddeddeterrenttothepossibilitythatsucharrestwithoutawarrantmayresultfrom
imputations based on dubious motives, it is now required that the crime must have just been committed. The
recencycontemplatedhere,inrelationtothemakingofthewarrantlessarrest,isthetimewhenthecrimewasin
factcommitted,andnotthetimewhenthecrimewasinfactcommitted,andnotthetimewhenthepersonmaking
the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to reductio ad
absurdum,suchwarrantlessarrestscouldbevalidlymadeevenforacrimecommitted,say,morethanayearago
butofwhichthearrestingofficerreceivedinformationonlytoday.
Thebrevityintheintervaloftimebetweenthecommissionofthecrimeandthearrest,asnowrequiredbySection
5(b),musthavebeendictatedbytheconsideration,amongothers,thatbyreasonofsuchrecencyofthecriminal
occurrence,theprobabilityofthearrestingofficeracquiringpersonaland/orreliableknowledgeofsuchfactand
theidentityoftheoffenderisnecessarilyenhanced,ifnotassured.Thelongertheinterval,themoreattenuated
are the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the obtention of
informationofacrimecommittedfourteen(14)daysearliernecessarilyunderminesthecapacityofthearresting
officertoascertainthereliabilityoftheinformationheisactinguponandtoacquirepersonalknowledgethereof
aftersuchverification.
Itmaybegranted,asanadhocproposition,thatthearrestofNazarenowasbasedonprobablecauseanditwas
notwhimsical,atleast,inthisinstance.Itiscorrecttosaythatprevailingconditionsaffectingnationalsecurityand
stability must also be taken into account. However, for the reasons above elucidated, I take exception to the
conclusionthattheconditionsinSection5(b)ofRule113hadbeencompliedwithinthiscase.Itistruethatthe
correspondinginformationwasfiledagainstNazarenoshortlyafterhisarrestbutthat,precisely,isanothercause
forcontroversy.Definitely,iftherulesonarrestarescrupulouslyobserved,therewouldbenoneedfortheusual
invocationofIlaganasacurativebalmforunwarrantedincursionsintocivilliberties.
SARMIENTO,J.:dissenting:
I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1 the majority has not shown why the arrests in
questionshouldafterallbesustained.

According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a warrant and that his
arrestwassufficientcompliancewiththeprovisionsofSection5,paragraph(b),Rule113,oftheRulesofCourt.
According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all committing an offense (subversion being supposedly a
continuing offense) and that the military did have personal knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal
knowledge," according to the majority, is supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable grounds . . . of
suspicion,"andsuspicionissupposedlyreasonable:
...when,intheabsenceofactualbeliefofthearrestingofficers,thesuspicionthatthepersontobe
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstancessufficientlystronginthemselvestocreatetheprobablecauseofguiltyofthepersonto
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
goodfaithonthepartofthepeaceofficersmakingthearrest.2
AsIsaid,Idissent.
First,andasIheld,subversion,asanoffensepunishedbyExecutiveOrderNo.167,asamendedbyExecutive
OrderNo.276,inrelationtoRepublicActNo.1700,3ismadeupof"overtacts."4InPeoplevs.Ferrer5this Court defined "overt acts"
asfollows:

...Indeed,weretheAntiSubversionActabillofattainder,itwouldbetotallyunnecessarytocharge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would suffice to secure their punishment. But
theundeniablefactisthattheirguiltstillhastobejudiciallyestablished.TheGovernmenthasyetto
proveatthetrialthattheaccusedjoinedthePartyknowingly,willfullyandbyovertacts,andthatthey
joinedtheParty,knowingitssubversivecharacterandwithspecificintenttofurtheritsbasicobjective,
i.e., to overthrow the existing government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the
countryunderthecontrolanddominationofaforeignpower.
AsFerrerheld,thatabove"overtacts"constitutetheessenceof"subversion,"andasFerrerhastakenpainsto
explain,thelawrequiresmorethanmeremembershipinasubversiveorganizationtomaketheaccusedliable.I
respectfullysubmitthatforpurposesofarrestwithoutawarrant,thatabove"overtacts"shouldbevisibletothe

eyesofthepoliceofficers(ifthatispossible),otherwisetheaccusedcannotbesaidtobecommittinganyoffense
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court, to justify police action, and otherwise, we would have made
"subversion" to mean mere "membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that mere
membership.
Ifindstrainedthatmajority'sinterpretationof"personalknowledge,"asthemajoritywouldinterpretit,asnomore
than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based on actualfacts . . . [and] founded on
probablecause,coupledwithgoodfaith..." 6Isubmitthatpersonalknowledgemeansexactlywhatitsaysthatthepeaceofficeris
awarethattheaccusedhascommittedanoffense,inthiscase,membershipinasubversiveorganizationwithintenttofurthertheobjectivesthereof.Itisto
be noted that prior to their amendment, the Rules (then Section 6) spoke of simple "reasonable ground" which would have arguably encompassed
"actualbelieforsuspicion...coupledwithgoodfaith"referredtobythemajority.Section5(b)asamended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge" I
respectfullysubmitthattogiveto"personalknowledge"thesamemeaningas"reasonableground"istomaketheamendmentasuselessexercise.

What,furthermore,wehaveherewasamere"confidentialinformation"thata"sparrowman"hadbeenwounded
andwasrecuperatinginthehospital,andthatthatpersonwasRolandoDural.Clearly,whatwehaveissecond
hand,indeed,hearsay,information,andneedlesstosay,notpersonalknowledge.
I would like to point out that in the case of Peoplevs.Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar arrest because of lack of personal
knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by
[another]..."8IdonotseehowWecanactdifferentlyhere.

Idonotfindthemajority'srelianceonthecaseofUnitedStatesvs.Santos9tobewelltaken.Santosinvolvedaprosecutionfor
coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant). Santos, however, did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the
peaceofficerongroundsofgoodfaith.Santosdidnotsaythatsolongashe,thepeaceofficer,wasactingingoodfaith,asthemajorityheresaysthatthe
militarywasactingingoodfaith,thearrestisvalid.Quitetothecontrary,Santossuggestedthatnotwithstandinggoodfaithonthepartofthepolice,the
arrestisneverthelesssubjecttoquestion.

AsfarastheinformationleadingtothearrestofDuralisconcerned,themajoritywouldquiteevidentlyswallowthe
versionofthemilitaryasifinthefirstplace,theretrulywasaninformation,andthatitwasreliable,andthat"itwas
foundtobetrue" 10 and as if, in the second place, the hospital authorities (the alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under
existinglaws.Wehave,itshouldbenoted,previouslyrejectedsuchaspeciesofinformationbecauseofthelackof"compulsionfor[theinformant]tostate
truthfullyhischargesunderpainofcriminalprosecution."11Here,itisworse,becausewedonotevenknowwhothatinformantwas.

ThemajorityisapparentlyunawarethatunderExecutiveOrderNo.212,amendingPresidentialDecreeNo.169,
hospitalestablishmentsarerequiredtoreportcasesofactsofviolenceto"governmenthealthauthorities"not
tothemilitary.
Iamconcernedthatifthemilitaryweretrulyarmedwithreliableinformationandifitdidhavepersonalknowledge
tobelievethatDuralhadcommittedanoffense,therewasnoreasonforthemilitarytoignorethecourts,towhich
theConstitutionafterall,givestheauthoritytoissuewarrants.AsPeoplevs.Burgosheld:
Moreimportant,wefindnocompellingreasonforthehastewithwhichthearrestingofficerssoughtto
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committedacrime.Thereisnoshowingthattherewasarealapprehensionthattheaccusedwason
thevergeofflightorescape.Likewise,thereisnoshowingthatthewhereaboutsoftheaccusedwere
unknown.12
I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon
Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 8458182 83162) could have been lawfully picked up under similar
circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tipthe military had no
personalknowledge(asIelaboratedwhatpersonalknowledgemeans).Second,Idonotthinkthatthemajority
can say that since Amelia Roque, etal. "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque, et al. allegedly admitted), immediate
arrestswere"prudent"andnecessary.AsIsaid, that Roque, etal. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question
before the trial court and precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this Court to pass
judgmentontheguiltofthepetitionerssinceafterall,andasthemajoritypointsout,wearetalkingsimplyofthe
legalityofthepetitioner'sarrests.
Moreimportant,thatRoque,etal."wereNPA'sanyway"isevidently,ameresaysoofthemilitary,andevidently,
theCourtisnotboundbybaresayso's.Evidently,wecannotapproveanarrestsimplybecausethemilitarysays
it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway") that would be abdication of judicial duty and when,
moreover,theverybasisoftheclaimrestsondubious"confidentialinformation."
According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.Icertainlyhopenot,afterthemajorityreferredtoRolandoDuralasa"sparrowman"andhavingAmelia
Roque,etal.admittobeingNPA's."
Itistoglossoveratanyrate,thenatureofarrestasarestrainingonliberty.Itistomeimmaterialthattheguiltof
theaccusedstillhastobeestablished,sincemeanwhile,theaccusedareinfactbeingdeprivedofliberty.Arrest
to me, is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the majority, it is nothing to crow about (a mere
"administrativemeasure").

Icannot,again,acceptthevalidityofthearrestsofDeograciaEspirituorNarcisoNazareno(G.R.Nos.85727
86332).Espirituwassupposedlypickedupforincitingtosedition,inutteringsupposedly,onNovember22,1988,
thefollowing:
Bukastuloyandwelganatin...hanggangsamagkagulona.13
Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day laterand in no way is "inciting to sedition" a
continuingoffense.Obviously,themajorityisnotsayingthatitiseither,butthat:
...Manypersonsmaydifferastothevalidityofsuchperceptionandregardthelanguageasfalling
withinfreespeechguaranteedbytheConstitution.But,then,Espirituhasnotlosttherighttoinsist,
during the trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the
charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the
arrest,withoutwarrant,atthetimethewordswereuttered,orsoonthereafter,isstillanotherthing.In
thebalancingofauthorityandfreedom,whichobviouslybecomesdifficultattimes,theCourthas,in
thiscase,titledthescaleinfavorofauthoritybutonlyforpurposesofthearrest(notconviction).Letit
benotedthattheCourthasorderedthebailforEspiritu'sreleasetobereducedfromP60,000.00to
P10,000.00.14
Andobviously,themajorityisconcernedaboutwhetherornotEspiritu'sspeechwasafterall,protectedspeech,
butapparently,thatisalsoofnomoment,since:(1)thatisamatterofdefense(2)wearetalkingofmerearrests,
andasfarasarrestsareconcerned,"theCourthas,inthiscase,titledinfavorofauthority,"15and(3)wehave,anyway,
givenareducedbailtotheaccused.

First,thattheaccused'sstatementisinthecategoryoffreespeechisnotonlyplaintomymind,itisaquestionI
donotthinkthemajoritycanrightlyevadeinthesepetitionswithoutshirkingtheCourt'sconstitutionalduty.Itisto
mymindplain,becauseitdoesnotcontainenough"fightingwords"recognizedtobeseditious. 16 Secondly, it is the

veryquestionbeforetheCourtwhetherornotthestatementinquestionconstitutesanoffenseforpurposesofawarrantlessarrest.Itisaperfectlylegal
questiontomymindandIamwonderingwhywecannotanswerit.

Whatthemajorityhasnotanswered,asIindicated,isthatincitingtoseditionisinnowayacontinuingoffense,
andasIsaid,themajorityisnotapparentlyconvictedthatitis,either.Ofcourse,themajoritywouldanywayforce
theissue:"Buttheauthorityofthepeaceofficerstomakethearrest,withoutwarrant,atthetimethewordswere
uttered,orsoonthereafter,isstillanotherthing." 17First,Espirituwaspickedupthefollowingday,andinnowayis"thefollowingday"

"soonthereafter".Second,wewouldhavestretchedtheauthorityofpeaceofficerstomakewarrantlessarrestsforactsdonedaysbefore.Idonotthinkthis
isthecontemplationoftheRulesofCourt.

AsinthecaseofBurgosinPeoplevs.Burgos,18Espirituwasneither"onthevergeofflightorescape"19andtherewasnoimpediment
forthemilitarytogothroughthejudicialprocesses,astherewasnoneinthecaseofBurgos.

InthecaseofPeoplevs.Aminnudin,20this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed,"
andunlessthereexistedanurgencyaswhereamovingvehicleisinvolved,instantpoliceactioncannotbejustified.

"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor of
authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)." 21 It is a strange declaration, first, because it is supported by no
authority(whytheCourtshould"tilt"onthesideofGovernment),andsecond,becausethisCourthasleaned,bytradition,onthesideoflibertyasthe
custodianoftheBillofRightsevenifweweretalkingof"simple"arrests.

IdonotunderstandwhythisCourtshould"tilt"...thescaleinfavorofauthority...inthiscase," 22as if to say that

normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do not understand why these cases are apparently, special cases, and apparently, the
majorityisnottellingusneither.Iamwonderingwhy,apartfromthefactthatthesecasesinvolved,incidentally,peoplewhothinkdifferentlyfromtherestof
us.

Themajoritygoeson:
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrantwasmadeonlyon28December1988,or14dayslater,thearrestfallsunderSection5(b)of
Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
NazarenowasprobablyoneofthoseguiltyinthekillingofBunyeII.23
Withallduerespect,Idonotthinkthatthemajorityisawareoftheseriousimplicationsofitspronouncementon
individual rights (and statutory construction in general), and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a
member of the Court, I am coresponsible for the acts of my colleagues and I am afraid that I may, rightly or
wrongly,beintimemadetodefendsuchanindefensiblepronouncement.
Section5(b)ofRule113isclearandcategorical:theoffensemusthavebeen"justcommitted"andtheauthorities
musthave"personalknowledge."
In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly)
committed.Innowaycantheauthoritiesbesaidtohave"personalknowledge"twoweeksthereafterwhatever
"personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a crime that had "just been

committed"whatever"personalknowledge"theyhaveisnecessarily"personalknowledge"ofacrimecommitted
twoweeksbefore.
InnowaycanNazareno'sarrestbesaidtobeanarrestsanctionedbytheexceptionalprovisionsoftheRules.
Iamnotsayingthatthemilitarycannotactinallcases,anditissheerignorancetosupposethatIamsayingit,
(or worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected criminal, if he can not be arrested
without a warrant, can not be arrested at all but that the military should first procure a warrant from a judge
beforeeffectinganarrest.Itisnottoomuchtoaskofsocalledlawenforcers.
Asitis,themajorityhasenlargedtheauthorityofpeaceofficerstoact,whentheRuleshavepurposelylimitedit
bywayofanexception,precisely,tothegeneralrule,mandatedbytheConstitutionnoless,thatarrestsmaybe
doneonlythroughajudicialwarrant.Asitis,themajorityhasinfactgiventhemilitarythebroadestdiscretionto
act,adiscretionthelawdeniesevenjudges24todayitisfourteendays,tomorrow,oneyear,andsooner,adecade.Isubmitthatayear,
adecade,wouldnotbeinfactunreasonable,followingthetheoryofthemajority,sincethemilitarycanclaimanytimethatit"foundoutonlylater,"asthe
majoritydidnotfinditunreasonablefortheCapitalCommandtoclaimthatit"cametoknowthatNazarenowasprobablyoneofthoseguiltyinthekillingof
BunyeII"25andnoneofuscanpossiblydisputeit.

Iwouldliketostressstronglythatwearenottalkingofasimple"administrativemeasure"alonewearetalkingof
arrests,ofdeprivingpeopleoflibertyevenifwearenotyettalkingofwhetherornotpeopleareguilty.Thatwe
are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point, I respectfully submit, and it will not minimize the
significanceofthepetitioners'predicament.
With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia Roque, et al.,
ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled confession) was precisely, the
basisforBuenaobra'sarrest.Itistobegthequestion,Irespectfullysubmit,toapprovethemilitary'sactionforthe
reason that Buenaobra confessed, because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely,
pounced on him. I am not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although it is supposed to be
presumed)butIcannotimaginethatBuenaobrawouldhavevoluntarilyproclaimedtothemilitarythathewasan
NPAcouriersothatthemilitarycouldpounceonhim.
IrespectfullysubmitthatthecasesGarciavs.Padilla26andIlaganvs.Enrile27havebeenbetterdays.Idonotseehowthiscourtcan

continuouslysustainthem"wherenationalsecurityandstabilityarestilldirectlychallengedperhapswithgreatervigorfromthecommunistrebels."28 First
and foremost, and as the majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing with "Communists." The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one,
hardly involves subversion. Second, "Communism" and "national security" are old hat the dictator's own excuses to perpetuate tyranny, and I am
genuinelydisappointedthatwewouldstillfallforoldexcuses.Third,GarciaandIlaganrestedonsupposedgroundsthatcannotbepossiblyjustifiedina
regime that respects the rule of law that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the filing of an
information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). Fourth and finally, it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for
warrantlessarrestsunderSection5(b)ofRule113.

ImostrespectfullysubmitthatGarciaandIlaganhavenotonlybeendilutedbysubsequentjurisprudence(e.g.,
Peoplevs.Burgos,supra),theyarerelicsofauthoritarianrulethatcannolongerbedefended,iftheycouldhave
beendefended,inPlazaMirandaorbeforeourownpeersinthebar.
"Whatisimportant,"saysthemajority,"isthateveryarrestwithoutwarrantbetestedastoitslegality,viahabeas
corpusproceedings." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also to patronize the petitioners and simply, to offer a small consolation,
whenafterall,thisCourtisvalidatingtheircontinueddetention.30Withallduerespect,Isubmitthatitisnothingforwhichthepublicshouldbeelated.

AFinalWord
As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be reconsidered, I reiterate one principle:
TheStatehasnorighttobothercitizenswithoutinfringingtheirrightagainstarbitraryStateaction."Therightof
the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The

State,"theCharterlikewisestates,"valuesthedignityofeveryhumanpersonandguaranteesfullrespectforhumanrights."32TheConstitutionstatesthe
general rule the majority would make the exception the rule, and the rule the exception. With all due respect, this is not what constitutionalism is all
about.

Isubmitthatthe"actualfactsandcircumstances"themajorityreferstoare,inthefirstplace,doubtful,the"actual
facts and circumstances" being no more than "confidential information" (manufactured or genuine, we have no
wayoftelling)andinthesecondplace,anyinformationwithwhichthemilitary(orpolice)werearmedcouldno
morethanbehearsay,notpersonal,information.Isubmitthatthe"actualfactsandcircumstances"themajority
insistsoncannotjustifythearrestsinquestionunderSection5(b)ofRule113,therulethemajorityinsistsisthe
applicablerule.
Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias Espiritu and Narciso Nazareno are
concernedcertainly,itisnottheSection5(b)Iknow.AsIindicated,Espirituwasarrestedonedayaftertheact,
allegedly,incitingtoseditionNazarenowaspickedupfourteendaysafterit(allegedly,murder).Yet,themajority
wouldapprovethepolice'sactionsnonethelessbecausethepolicesupposedly"foundoutonlylater."Isubmitthat
themajorityhasreadintoSection5(b)aprovisionthathasnotbeenwrittenthere.

"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes the majority, "what is important is
thattheCourtberight."33
Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability. Umil is a
question,onthecontrary,ofwhetherornotthemilitary(orpolice),ineffectingthearrestsassailed,hadcomplied
withtherequirementsoflawonwarrantlessarrests.UmilisaquestionofwhetherornotthisCourt,inapproving
themilitary'sactions,isright.
Inspiteof"EDSA",aclimateoffearpersistsinthecountry,asincidencesofdisappearances,torture,hamletting,
bombings, saturation drives, and various human rights violations increase in alarming rates. In its update for
October,1990,theTaskForceDetaineesofthePhilippinesfound:
Anaverageof209arrestedforpoliticalreasonsmonthlysince1988,94%ofthemillegally
Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to September, 1990, 4,419,
illegally
Ofthosearrested,535showedsignsoftorture280wereeventuallysalvaged,40,offrustratedsalvage,and109
remainedmissingaftertheirarrest
Forty(40)casesofmassacres,with218killed54casesoffrustratedmassacre,inwhich157werewounded
Thevictimsbelongedtoneighborhoodandunionorganizations
SinceFebruary,1986,532ofthoseillegallyarrestedwerewomen
FromJanuarytoJune1990,361childrenweredetainedfornoapparentreason
One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence of bombing,
shellings,andfoodblockadesundertakenbythemilitarysince1988.34
Itisableakpicture,andIamdisturbedthatthisCourtshouldexpressverylittleconcern.Iamalsodisappointed
thatitistheportraitoftheCourtIamsoonleaving.Nonetheless,Iamhopefulthatdespitemydeparture,itwillnot
betoolate.
Motionsdenied.
#Footnotes
1G.R.No.61388,April20,1983,121SCRA472.
2G.R.No.70748,October21,1985,139SCRA349.
3Section1,Rule102:"Towhathabeascorpusextends.Exceptotherwiseexpresslyprovidedby
law,thewritofhabeascorpusshallextendtoallcasesofillegalconfinementordetentionbywhich
anypersonisdeprivedofhisliberty,orbywhichtherightfulcustodyofanypersoniswithheldfrom
thepersonentitledthereto.
4Villavicenciovs.Lukban,39Phil.778.
5Ilaganvs.Enrile,G.R.No.70748,October21,1985,139SCRA349.
6Sayovs.ChiefofPolice,80Phil.859(1948).
7RepublicActNo.1700knownasthe"AntiSubversionAct"titled"AnActtooutlawtheCPPand
similarassociations,penalizemembershipthereinandforotherpurposes."(1957)andthe
subsequentrelateddecreessuchasPresidentialDecreeNo.885,entitled"Outlawingsubversive
organizations,penalizingmembershiptherein,andforotherpurposes."(1976)andPresidential
DecreeNo.1835entitled"Codifyingthevariouslawsonantisubversionandincreasingthepenalties
formembershipinsubversiveorganizations."
8G.R.No.61388.April20,1983,121SCRA472.
9USvs.Santos,36Phil.851(1917).
10Ibid.
11Ibid.

12RecordsofG.R.No.81567,affidavitdated4February1988.
13Rollo,pp.311312(G.R.No.81567).
14PresidentialDecreeNo.169requiresattendingphysiciansand/orpersonstreatinginjuriesfrom
anyformofviolence,toreportsuchfacttothePhilippineConstabularyandprescribingpenaltiesfor
anyviolationthereof.
15Decisiondated9July1990,pp.1920.
16Decision,pp.1011.
17Ibid.,p.12.
18Ibid.,pp.1213.
19Ibid.,pp.1415.
20Decision,p.18.
21UnitedStatesvs.Sanchez,No.9294,March30,1914,27Phil,442.
22Ibid:"Thelegalityofthedetentiondoesnotdependuponthefactofthecrime,but...uponthe
natureofthedeed,wherefromsuchcharacterizationmayreasonablybeinferredbytheofficeror
functionarytowhomthelawatthatmomentleavesthedecisionfortheurgentpurposeof
suspendingthelibertyofthecitizen.
"InPeoplevs.Ancheta,itwasheldthat"thelegalityofdetentionmadebyapersoninauthorityoran
agentthereof...doesnotdependuponthejuridicalandmuchlessthejudicialfactofcrimewhich,at
thetimeofitscommission,isnotandcannotdefinitivelybedeterminedforthelackofnecessarydata
andforjurisdictionbutuponthenatureofthedeed....."
23UnitedStatesvs.Santos,supra.
24Ibid.
25Article124oftheRevisedPenalCodeprovides:
"ART.124.Arbitrarydetention.Anypublicofficeroremployeewho,withoutlegalgrounds.detains
aperson,shallsuffer:
1.Thepenaltyofarrestomayorinitsmaximumperiodtoprisioncorreccionalinitsmaximumperiod,
ifthedetentionhasnotexceededthree
days....
26Damagesfortheimpairmentofrightsandlibertiesofanotherperson.
27AffidavitofAvelinoFaustinodated23November1988ReturnoftheWritdated25November
1988Decisiondated9July1990,pp.2324.
28JointAffidavitof5policeagents,dated23November1988Decision,supra.
29Affidavitofpoliceagents,dated28December1988,markedExhibit"A"attheRTC,Bian,Branch
24.
30Decisionof9July1990,pp.9and12.
31Decisionof9July1990.p.13.
FELICIANO,J.,concurringanddissenting:
1Salaysayvs.Castro,98Phil.364(1956).
2RealtyInvestmentsInc.vs.Pastrana.84Phil.842(1949)lSayovs.ChiefofPoliceofManila,80
Phil.859(1948)
364Phil.33(1937).
464Phil.at44.

5144SCRA1(1986).
6144SCRAat14.
7Seee.g.,U.S.vs.Samonte,16Phil.516(1910).
8InPeoplevs.Aminnudin,163SCRA402(1988),theCourt,innullifyingawarrantlessarrest,said,
throughMr.JusticeCruz:
"InthemanycaseswheretillsCourthassustainedthewarrantlessarrestofviolatorsonthe
DangerousDrugsAct,ithasalwaysbeenshownthattheywerecaughtredhanded,asaresultof
whatarepopularlycalled"buybust"operationsofthenarcoticsagents.Rule113wasclearly
applicablebecauseattheprecisetimeofarresttheaccusedwasintheactofsellingtheprohibited
drug.
Inthecaseatbar,theaccusedappellantwasnot,atthemomentofhisarrest,committingacrime
norwasitshownthathewasabouttodosoorthathehadjustdoneso.Whathewasdoingwas
descendingthegangplankoftheM/VWilcon9andtherewasnooutwardindicationthatcalledforhis
arrest.Toallappearances,hewaslikeanyoftheotherpassengersinnocentlydisembarkingfromthe
vessel.Itwasonlywhentheinformerpointedtohimasthecarrierofthemarijuanathathesuddenly
becamesuspectandsosubjecttoapprehension.Itwasthefurtivefingerthattriggeredhisarrest.
TheIdentificationbytheinformerwastheprobablecauseasdeterminedbytheofficers(andnota
judge)thatauthorizedthemtopounceuponAminnudinandimmediatelyarresthim."(163SCRAat
409410)(emphasissupplied)
9Peoplevs.Burgos,114SCRA1(1986).
10121SCRA472(1983).
11Parulanvs.DirectorofPrisons,22SCRA638(1968)U.S.vs.Cunanan,26Phil.376(1913)U.S.
vs.Santiago,27Phil.408(1914)U.S.vs.Laureaga,2Phil.71(1903).
12E.g.Peoplevs.ZapantaandBondoc,88Phil.688(1951)wheretheCourtheldthateachinstance
ofsexualintercourseconstituteaseparatecrimeofadultery,thoughthesamepersonsandthesame
offendedspouseareinvolved,andthatasecondinformationmaybefiledagainstthesameaccused
forlateractsofsexualintercourse.
13Section6,P.D.1835,16January1981.
Sarmiento,J.:dissenting:
1Resolution,1.
2Supraemphasisintheoriginal.
3ThemajoritycitesPresidentialDecreesNos.885and1835and"relateddecrees"bothPresidential
DecreesNos.885and1835havebeenrepealedbyExecutiveOrderNo.167,asamendedby
ExecutiveOrderNo.267.
4PleasenotethatunderSection6ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1835,"[t]thefollowingactsshall
constituteprimafacieevidenceofmembershipinanysubversiveorganization:(a)Allowinghimselfto
belistedasamemberinanybookoranyofthelists,records,correspondence,oranyother
documentoftheorganization(b)Subjectinghimselftothedisciplineofsuchassociationor
organizationinanyformwhatsoever(c)Givingfinancialcontributiontosuchassociationor
organizationindues,assessments,loansorinanyotherforms(d)Executingorders,plans,or
directivesofanykindofsuchassociationororganization(e)Actingasanagent,courier,messenger,
correspondent,organizer,orinanyothercapacity,onbehalfofsuchassociationororganization(f)
Conferringwithofficersorothermembersofsuchassociationororganizationinfurtheranceofany
planorenterprisethereof(g)Transmittingorders,directives,orplansofsuchassociationor
organizationorallyorinwritingoranyothermeansofcommunicationsuchasbysignal,semaphore,
signorcode(h)Preparingdocuments,pamphlets,leaflets,books,oranyothertypeofpublicationto
promotetheobjectivesandpurposesofsuchassociationororganization(i)Mailing,shipping,
circulating,distributing,ordeliveringtootherpersonsanymaterialorpropagandaofanykindon
behalfofsuchassociationororganization(j)Advising,counselling,orinotherwaygivinginstruction,
information,suggestions,orrecommendationstoofficers,ormembersortoanyotherpersonto
furthertheobjectivesofsuchassociationororganizationand(k)Participatinginanywayinthe
activities,planningaction,objectives,orpurposesofsuchassociationororganization."Pleasenote
thatnoneoftheseareallegedbythemilitaryinthiscase,assumingthattheDecreestillexists.

5Nos.L3261314,December27,1972,48SCRA382emphasissupplied.InTarucvs.Ericta(No.
L34856,Nov.29,1989,168SCRA63,6667),IheldthatPeoplevs.Ferrerisnolongeragood
basisforsustainingtheAntiSubversionAct.IamnothereinvokingFerrertosustainit,buttodiscuss
itselaborationoftheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.1700.
6Resolution,supra.
7G.R.No.68955,September4,1986,144SCRA1.
8Supra,14.
936Phil.853(1917).
10Resolution,supra,10.
11Peoplevs.Burgos,supra,15.
12Supra.
13Resolution,supra,15.
14Supra,16.
15Supra.
16SeeUnitedStatesvs.Apurado,7Phil.422(1907).
17Resolution,supraemphasissupplied.
18Supra.
19At15.
20G.R.No.74869,July6,1988,163SCRA402.
21Resolution,supra.
22Supra,17.
23Supra.
24SeeRULESOFCOURT,supra,Rule112,sec.5,onthenumberofdaysajudgemayact.
25Resolution,supra.
26G.R.No.61388,April20,1983,121SCRA472.
27G.R.No.70748,October21,1985,139SCRA349.
28Resolution,supra,1819.
29Resolution,supra,19.
30ExceptforRolandoDural,therestofthepetitionershavebeenacquittedbythelowercourts
tryingtheircases.
31CONST.,art.III,sec.2.
32Supra,art.II,sec.11.
33Resolution,supra,19.
34ManilaChronicle,October,1990.
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