Case Study 2: Challenger Launch Decision

Instructions
You will prepare a presentation based on the answers to the questions provided.
Make sure to apply leadership concepts discussed in class to the topic of the
case.
Time length of the presentation is approximately 15 minutes.
The assignment is due at the beginning of the class. Do not forget to bring a
printout of the presentation for me.

Assignment Questions
How would you characterize the broader context surrounding the January 1986
teleconference? What were the organizations in which they worked like? What was the
group against? What impact might that have on the groups decision-making process?
Put yourself in Roger Boisjolys shoes. The teleconference is scheduled for tonight.
What approach will you take with the group to get support for your perspective? What
will you actually say during this meeting?
What issues face Bob Lund (VP Engineering)? What might he be concerned about in the
teleconference meeting? What will you actually say during this meeting?
What issues face Larry Mulloy (Manager, SRB project)? What might he be concerned
about in the teleconference meeting? What will actually say during this meeeting?

Conclusion
Integrate in your answer:
What acctually happened? Why did it happen? What made it difficult for them to discuss
the issues more thoughtfully and analytically? What are the learnings for business
leaders from this analysis?

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REV: OCTOBER 21, 2002

AMY C. EDMONDSON

Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

At 8:45 p.m. EST on January 27, 1986, 32 individuals from three locationsHuntsville, Alabama;
Brigham City, Utah; and Merrit Island, Floridajoined in a teleconference 12 hours and 53 minutes
prior to scheduled launch of the Challenger Shuttle, known inside NASA as 51-L.1 (Exhibit 1 lists
attendees at each site). The three sites joined two organizationsNASA and Morton Thiokolthat
were intimately involved in the Shuttle program. Roger Boisjoly, an engineer with Morton Thiokol,
had instigated the telconference meeting upon hearing an Air Force weather forecast of 19 degrees
Farenheit for the next morning at Kennedy Space Center in Merrit Island. Boisjoly had been
increasingly vocal over the last few months about the performance of a component of the Shuttle
design, the O-Rings, at low temperatures (Exhibit 2 lists events from the year prior to launch). What
were the implications of this new weather forecast for the launch of the Challenger?

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958 by the U.S.
government one year after the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union. Although NASA was created
as a civilian space exploration program, in many ways the organization was the expression of a
military culture in which the goal was to establish U.S. dominance over the Soviet Union in space
exploration. To this end, NASA received abundant funding from Congress and by 1969 the crew of
the Apollo mission walked on the moon. Following Apollo, the goal of U.S. space exploration was to
establish a permanent, manned space station. A three-point plan was presented to a nation that had
become increasingly embroiled in the Vietnam War. Tight funding meant that plans for the space
program were scaled down; in March 1970, Nixon approved the Space Transportation System (STS),
the backbone of the three projects supporting NASAs long-term goal.

History of the Shuttle Program

The Space Transportation System, or Shuttle Program, was conceptualized as a fleet of reusable
spacecraft that would reduce the cost of putting objects into orbit and essentially service the yet-to-

1 For Space Shuttle flights one through nine, NASA used the designation STS (Space Transport System). After STS-9 NASA

changed the method on numbering missions: each flight was since designated by two numbers and a letter, e.g. 41-B. The first
digit indicated the fiscal year of the scheduled launch (4 for 1984), the second digit identified the launch site (1Kennedy
Space Center, Florida, 2Vandenberg Air Force Base, California), and the letter corresponded to the alphabetic sequence for
the fiscal year (Bthe second mission scheduled).
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Professor Amy C. Edmondson and Research Associate Laura R. Feldman prepared this case. This case was developed from published sources.
HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or
illustrations of effective or ineffective management.
Copyright 2002 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685,
write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any meanselectronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwisewithout the permission of Harvard Business School.

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Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

be-developed space station. Continued financial constraints prompted NASA to accept a proposal
from the Air Force to build the Shuttle to Air Force specifications (i.e. meet criteria for military use) in
exchange for additional funding from Congress and the White House. However, the Air Force was
unwilling to pay for some of the specifications that they required. A 1971 analysis by Mathematica,
Inc. (a Princeton, New Jersey-based think tank), found that even with the Air Force-induced increase
in development costs, the Shuttle Program could pay for itselfif it were launched very frequently
(over 30 times per year). Program survival was dependent on routine flights, recovering costs, and
making money on commercial payload.2
Funding for the STS program was scaled down to $5.1 billion; modifications to the Shuttle design
reflected the lower-cost operation. A new design replaced the costly all-liquid fuel system with a
mixed solid (Solid Rocket Booster, or SRB) and liquid (External Tank) system. The three components
of the Shuttle included a reusable Orbiter, an expendable External Fuel Tank, and two reusable SRBs,
shown in Exhibit 3.
NASA divided responsibility for the Shuttle among three of its field centers: the Johnson Space
Center in Houston dealt with the Orbiter; the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville,
Alabama was assigned the main engines, External Tank, and SRBs; and the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) in Merrit Island, Florida (the launch site), had to assemble the components.

Morton Thiokol
On November 20, 1973, NASA granted the contract to build the SRBs to the engineering firm
Morton Thiokol. Two factors contributed to Thiokol winning this contract: 1) their bid was $100
million lower than those of the other competitors (Aerojet Solid Propulsion Co., Lockheed Propulsion
Co., and United Technologies) and 2) they proposed an innovative modular design that would allow
them to build the SRB components in Utah and ship them to Florida for assembly. The modular
design relied upon O-Rings to seal its largeyet narrow enough to transport through highway
tunnelscomponent parts. When assembled, each SRB was 149 feet in length (by comparison, the
Statue of Liberty was 151 feet tall), 12.7 feet in diameter, and weighed 2 million pounds.
Thiokols segmented design was modeled after United Technologies 1950s Titan III solid fuel
rocket motor.3 Unlike Uniteds design, which relied on a single rubber O-ring, Thiokol used two Orings to seal the joint between each segment and prevent blow-by, or leakage of hot gases during
take-off (see Exhibit 4 for a drawing of the SRB and joint). Thiokol management assumed
redundancy in designthe similarity to Uniteds successful Titan III motor and the double layer of
O-ringswould translate to safety in use.

O-rings
Problems with Thiokols SRB design were uncovered as early as 1977. Analysis of a pre-flight
hydroburst test found joint rotation between the clevis and tang did not apply the required amount
of pressure to the O-rings for them to seal the joint properly. NASA and Thiokol officials continued

2 Payload is the load (including passengers or instruments) carried by a vehicle exclusive of what is necessary for its operation.
The participation of civilian Christa McAuliffe, Payload Specialist for the Teacher in Space Project, was widely publicized,
heightening media coverage of flight 51-L.
3 Thiokols and Uniteds SRBs differed in one significant way: Uniteds SRB was designed for a single use while Thiokols was

intended for repeated usage.

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Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

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to monitor two conditionserosion of the primary O-ring and blow-byboth of which reduced the
integrity of the joint seal. If the primary O-ring was eroded then the secondary O-ring, instead of
serving as a backup, could actually reduce the chances that the joint would seal.
Erosion of the primary O-ring on the November 1982 STS-5 flight prompted NASA to increase the
criticality rating of the primary O-ring.4 However, this change was not thoroughly communicated
within Thiokol. Boisjoly, an engineer of 27 years and an expert on booster seal joints, performed
post-flight analysis on SRBs recovered from the Atlantic Ocean.
Boisjoly learned of the
reclassification only in 1984. He became increasingly alarmed about seal failure following the April
29, 1985 launch of flight 51-B in which both O-rings in the nozzle joint eroded, the primary O-ring by
two-thirds of its diameter. Despite the higher criticality rating, NASA responded to the mounting
risk by waiving launch constraints on a case-by-case basis, rather than grounding the entire fleet of
Shuttles. One contributor to the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
observed the decision-making involved was
A kind of Russian roulette.... (The Shuttle) flies (with O-ring erosion) and nothing happens.
Then it is suggested, therefore, that the risk is no longer so high for the next flights. We can
lower our standards a little bit because we got away with it last time.... You got away with it,
but it shouldn't be done over and over again like that.5
In July 1985 Thiokol formed an unofficial seal task force to solve the O-ring problems. Along with
data from previous Shuttle launches, the task force focused attention on a test from March of that
year demonstrating O-ring rigidity and failure to seal at low temperatures. Dissatisfied by Thiokols
attitude towards the task force and the seal problem, Boisjoly wrote a memo to his boss, Bob Lund, in
which he warned of the catastrophic consequences of uncorrected O-rings (the memo is reproduced
in Exhibit 5). Following receipt of the memo, Boisjoly was accused of histrionics by Joe Kilminster,
VP for Space Booster Programs, in the Thiokol cafeteria.
In an October 4, 1985 SRM Seal Problem Task Team Status memo Boisjoly wrote:
The team generally has been experiencing trouble from the business-as-usual attitude from
supporting organizations. Part of this is due to lack of understanding of how important this
task team activity is and the rest is due to pure operating procedure inertia which prevents
timely results to a specific request6

January 27, 1986

A teleconference between several Thiokol and NASA officials convened at 5:45 p.m. EST to
discuss Thiokols concerns and recommendation against launch before noon due the effect of low
temperatures on SRB joints. The teleconference ended by scheduling a second conference for 8:45
that evening, allowing more personnel to be present and adequate time for Thiokol to prepare
materials for facsimile to KSC and MSFC. (Exhibit 6 shows the materials transmitted by fax from
Thiokol to NASA at the beginning of the 8:45 p.m. EST meeting).

4 Criticality ratings indicated the degree of uncertainty involved with the reliability of a component or system.

5 Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1986. Vol II, Appendix F. Available at http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51l/docs/rogers-commission/Chapter-6.txt (accessed October 10, 2002).
6 Source: Ibid, Appendix D. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1p254.htm (accessed October 10, 2002).

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Exhibit 1

Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Teleconference Attendees

Present at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)

Huntsville, Alabama
1. George B. Handy, Deputy Director, Science
and Engineering
2. Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy Manager,
Shuttle Projects Office
3. Leslie F. Adams, Deputy Manager, SRB
Project
4. Lawrence O. Wear, Manager, SRM Project
Office
5. John Q. Miller, Technical Assistant, SRM
Project
6. J. Wayne Littles, Associate Director for
Engineering
7. Robert J. Schwinghamer, Director, Material
and Processes Laboratory
8. Wilbur A. Riehl, Chief, Nonmetallic
Materials Division
9. John P. McCarty, Deputy Director,
Structures and Propulsion Laboratory
10. Ben Powers, Engineering Structures and
Propulsion Laboratory
11. James Smith, Chief Engineer, SRB
Program
12. Keith E. Coates, Chief Engineer, Special
Projects Office
13. John Schell, Retired Engineer, Material
Laboratory
14. Boyd C. Brinton, Morton Thiokol
Manager, Space Booster Project
15. Kyle Speas, Morton Thiokol Ballistics
Engineer
14. Cecil Houston, MSCF Resident Manager,
at KSC
15. Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, Shuttle
Projects Office
16. Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, SRB
Project

Present at Morton Thiokol Wasatch Division

Brigham City, Utah
1. Jerald Mason, Senior Vice President, Wasatch
Operations
2. Calvin Wiggins, Vice President and General
Manager, Space Division
3. Joe C. Kilminster, Vice President, Space Booster
Programs
4. Robert K. Lund, Vice President, Engineering
5. Larry H. Sayer, Director, Engineering and
Design
6. William Macbeth, Manager, Case Projects,
Space Booster Project
7. Donald M. Ketner, Supervisor, Gas Dynamics
Section and Head Seal Task Force
8. Roger Boisjoly, Member, Seal Task Force
9. Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, Rocket
Motor Cases
10. Jack R. Kapp, Manager, Applied Mechanics
Department
11. Jerry Burn, Associate Engineer, Applied
Mechanics
12. Joel Maw, Associate Scientist, Heat Transfer
Section
13. Brian Russell, Manager, Special Projects, SRM
Project
14. Robert Ebeling, Manager, Ignition System and
Final Assembly, SRB Project

Present at Kennedy Space Center (KSC)

Merrit Island Florida
1. Allan J. McDonald, Morton Thiokol Director,
SRM Project
2. Jack Buchanan, Morton Thiokol Manager, KSC
Operations

Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Volume 1, Chapter 5. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm (accessed October 15, 2002).

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Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Exhibit 2

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The year leading up to the launch

Challenger Flight 51-L was originally scheduled for July 1985, but by the time the crew was assigned
in January 1985, launch had been postponed to late November to accommodate changes in payloads.
The launch was subsequently delayed further and finally rescheduled for January 22, 1986.

January 1985 - Boisjoly discovers serious erosion of the O-rings from the Discovery (51-C).

March 1985 - Preliminary tests at Thiokol suggest that O-rings do not work as well in low
temperatures.

April 1985 - O-ring failure in nozzle joint occurs at launch temperature of 70 degrees. NASA
requests full review of rocket joints.

August 1985 - Thiokol management briefs NASA on all joint seal problems. NASA concludes it is
not an issue worth grounding the entire fleet and tells Thiokol to fix it as they go along.

January 12, 1986 - Columbia (61-C) lifts off after a record-setting seven delays over 25 days.

January 21, 1986 - NASA announces it is seeking bids for a second source (besides Thiokol) to
supply SRBs.

Late January, 1986 - Several delays to the Challenger mission because of weather.

January 27, 1986 - Dan Rather stated on the CBS evening news, Yet another costly, red-faces-allaround space-shuttle-launch-delay. This time a bad bolt on a hatch and a bad weather bolt from
the blue are being blamed. Launch rescheduled for 9:38 a.m., January 28, 1986.

Sources: Adapted by casewriter from Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture,
and Deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996; and from materials used by Action Design
Associates in conjunction with video to teach interpersonal skills for organizational learning.

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Exhibit 3

Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Space Shuttle Systems

Artists drawing depicts the Shuttle stacked for launch in view from dorsal side of Orbiter (left) and
from the left side of stack.

Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Volume 1, Chapter 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch1.htm (accessed October 10, 2002).

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Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Exhibit 4

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Thiokols Solid Rocket Booster

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Exhibit 4 continued

Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Thiokols SRB joint

Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident,
Volume 1, Chapter 4. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at
http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch4.htm (accessed October 10, 2002).

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Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Exhibit 5

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Boisjolys memo to Bob Lund

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Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Exhibit 5 continued

Source: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Appendix D. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1appd.htm (accessed October 10, 2002).

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Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Exhibit 6

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Facsimile from Thiokol to NASA officials

Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter
5. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm (accessed
October 10, 2002).

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Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (A)

Exhibit 6, continued

Source: Report to the President By the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 4, Hearings
of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident: February 14, 1986. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1986. Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v4part6.htm#6 (accessed October 10, 2002).

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-13-

Exhibit 6, continued
Plot of Flights with O-Ring Incidents versus Weather-Induced Joint Temperature

Source: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, Chapter 6, p 146. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986.
Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch6.htm#6.3 (accessed October 11, 2002).

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