People vs Estella

February 24, 2015

People vs Estella
G.R. Nos. 138539-40. January 21, 2003
Facts: According to the accused, the policemen
asked him as to where his house is located and
accused told them that his house is located
across the road. The police did not believe him
and insisted that accuseds house (according to
their asset) is that house located about 5-8
meters away from them.
Accused told the
policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain
Barnachea as to where his house is and heard the
latter telling the policemen that his house is
located near the Abokabar junk shop. After about
half an hour, the policemen went inside the house
nearby and when they came out, they had with
them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to the
accused.
Accused denied having surrendered to policeman
Buloron tin cans containing marijuana and
likewise having any firearm.
Issue:
Whether
the
search
and
undertaken in the hut where the
marijuana was seized was valid/legal.

seizure
subject

Held: No.
The only link that can be made between
appellant and the subject hut is that it was
bought by his brother Leonardo a.k.a. Narding
Estella. We cannot sustain the OSGs supposition
that since it was being rented by the alleged livein partner of appellant, it follows that he was also
occupying it or was in full control of it. In the first
place, other than SPO1 Bulorons uncorroborated
testimony, no other evidence was presented by
the prosecution to prove that the person renting
the hut was indeed the live-in partner of
appellant if he indeed had any.
At most, the testimony shows that the subject hut
was bought by Narding Estella and rented by
someone named Eva. The attempt to make it
appear that appellant occupied it, or that it was
under his full control, is merely conjectural and
speculative. We have often ruled that courts do
not rely on evidence that arouses mere suspicion
or conjecture. To lead to conviction, evidence
must do more than raise the mere possibility or
even probability of guilt. It must engender moral
certainty.
Neither do we find merit in the OSGs argument
that appellant cannot deny ownership or control
of the hut, since he was found in front of it, sitting
on a rocking chair and drinking coffee. Indeed, to
uphold this proposition would be to stretch our
imagination to the extreme.

The OSG maintains that when appellant was

shown the search warrant and asked about the
existence of prohibited drug in his possession,
appellant went inside the hut, took his stock of
marijuana and turned it [over] to the police
officers. This, according to the prosecution,
clearly showed that he was not only occupying
the hut, but was in fact using it to store the
prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, we believe that the trial court
erred in adopting the prosecutions dubious story.
It failed to see patent inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses testimonies about the
search undertaken.
It is undisputed that even before arriving at the
hut, the police officers were already being
assisted by Barangay Captain Barnachea. Thus,
it was highly improbable for him not to see
personally
appellants
alleged
voluntary
surrender of the prohibited drug to the
authorities. And yet, his testimony completely
contradicted the policemens version of the
events. He testified that appellant, after being
served the search warrant, remained outside the
hut and did nothing.
In fact, the former
categorically stated that when the police officers
had gone inside the hut to conduct the search,
appellant remained seated on a rocking chair
outside. Barnacheas statements sow doubts as
to the veracity of SPO1 Bulorons claim that, after
being apprised of the contents of the search
warrant, appellant voluntarily surrendered the
prohibited drug to the police.
Apart from the testimony of Barnachea which
contradicted rather than validated the story of
SPO1 Buloron no other evidence was presented
to corroborate the latters narration of the events.
Without any independent or corroborative proof,
it has little or no probative value at all.
In a criminal prosecution, the court is always
guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable,
and in harmony with the usual course of human
experience not by mere conjecture or
speculation. While the guilty should not escape,
the innocent should not suffer.
The OSG argues that [e]ven assuming that
appellant was not the occupant of the hut, the
fact remains that he voluntarily surrendered the
marijuana to the police officers. After appellant
had surrendered the prohibited stuff, the police
had a right to arrest him even without a warrant
and to conduct a search of the immediate vicinity
of the arrestee for weapons and other unlawful
objects as an incident to the lawful arrest.
The above argument assumes that the
prosecution was able to prove that appellant had
voluntarily surrendered the marijuana to the
police officers. As earlier adverted to, there is no
convincing proof that he indeed surrendered the
prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise.

In fact, the testimony of Prosecution Witness

Barnachea clouds rather than clarifies the
prosecutions story.

People vs Tangliben

Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot

claim that the search was incident to a lawful
arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or
valid arrest and can only be invoked through
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

Facts: At around 9:30 in the evening the

Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red
traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and
they confronted him; that the person was
requested by Patrolman Quevedo and Punzalan to
open the red traveling bag but the person
refused, only to accede later on when the
patrolmen identified themselves; that found
inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in
plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or
less.

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful A

peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Having ruled that the prosecution failed to prove
appellants ownership, control of or residence in
the subject hut, we hold that the presence of
appellant or of witnesses during the search now
becomes moot and academic.
Obviously, appellant need not have been present
during the search if he was neither the owner nor
the lawful occupant of the premises in question.
Besides, as we have noted, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses regarding these crucial
circumstances were contradictory. They erode
SPO1 Bulorons credibility as a prosecution
witness and raise serious doubts concerning the
prosecutions evidence.
This Court is thus
constrained to view his testimony with caution
and care.
With the failure of the prosecution to establish
the propriety of the search undertaken during
which the incriminating evidence was allegedly
recovered we hold that the search was illegal.
Without the badge of legality, any evidence
obtained
therein
becomes
ipso
facto
inadmissible.
CASE DIGESTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE
DIGESTCONSTITUTIONAL LAWG.R. NOS. 13853940PEOPLE VS ESTELLASEARCHES AND SEIZURES
0
People vs Tangliben
February 24, 2015

G.R. NO. 63630, April 06, 1990

The counsel for the accused stated that the

marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was
a product of an unlawful search without a warrant
and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
Issue: Whether the marijuana allegedly seized
from the accused was a product of an unlawful
search without a warrant and is therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
Held: No. The contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule
requiring a search warrant is a search incident to
a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
xxx A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was
carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This
case therefore falls squarely within the exception.
The warrantless search was incident to a lawful
arrest and is consequently valid.
CASE DIGESTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE
DIGESTCONSTITUTIONAL
LAWFLAGRANTE
DELICTOG.R. NO. 63630PEOPLE VS TANGLIBEN
0
Go vs CA
February 24, 2015
Go vs CA
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992
Facts:

Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on

a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguans
car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and
left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down petitioners car
plate number. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A
manhunt ensued.

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be

arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

Six days after, petitioner presented himself

before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police;
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to
the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner

who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the

case to the lower court, setting and commencing
trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor
reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted
and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under
Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of
The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully
arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been just
committed at the time that he was arrested.
Moreover, none of the police officers who
arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the
personal knowledge required for the lawfulness
of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no
lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception
to
the
right
to
preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had
been effected by the San Juan
Police in
respect of petitioner Go;
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his
right to preliminary investigation
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the
warrantless arrest or detention of petitioner in
the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5
of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been

committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)

hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after
the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly
shot Maguan. Neither could the arrest effected
six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected when [the shooting had] in
fact just been committed within the meaning of
Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the arresting
officers had any personal knowledge of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who
had shot Maguan. The information upon which
the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting one stated that petitioner was the
gunman; another was able to take down the
alleged gunmans cars plate number which
turned out to be registered in petitioners wifes
name. That information did not, however,
constitute personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court
does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner
had waived his right to preliminary investigation.
In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that
appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately
after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to
trial without previously claiming that they did
not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for
release on recognizance or on bail and for
preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion.
He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved
the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered
his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the
Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of

preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner.

In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in
court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized
that petitioners claim to preliminary investigation
was a legitimate one.
CASE DIGESTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE
DIGESTCONSTITUTIONAL LAWG.R. NO. 101837GO
VS CAWARRANTLESS ARRESTS
0
Padilla vs CA

Padilla vs CA
G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997

Facts:
High-powered
firearms
with
live
ammunitions were found in the possession of
petitioner Robin Padilla:
(1)
One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and
Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2)
One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP
131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with
clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
action

Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and

a black bag containing two additional long
magazines and one short magazine.
PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms
and Explosives Office issued a Certification which
stated that the three firearms confiscated from
appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP
131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and
Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SNA35720, were not registered in the name of Robin
C. Padilla. A second Certification stated that the
three firearms were not also registered in the
name of Robinhood C. Padilla.
Issue: Whether or not his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions
taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in
evidence under the exclusionary rule
Held: No. There is no dispute that no warrant was
issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se
did not make his apprehension at the Abacan
bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests
following instances:

are

sanctioned

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be

arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

February 24, 2015

(4)
Six additional live double
ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A

peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

in

the

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be

arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. Both elements
concurred here, as it has been established that
petitioners vehicle figured in a hit and run an
offense committed in the presence of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to
arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point
that presence does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when
he hears the disturbance created thereby AND
proceeds at once to the scene. As testified to by
Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim
(balut vendor), reported the incident to the police
and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero
vehicle using his motorcycle in order to
apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio
report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang
proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found
responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda already positioned near the bridge who
effected the actual arrest of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the
illegality of his arrest by arguing that the
policemen who actually arrested him were not at
the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree.
That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the
policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the
vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioners
arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of
the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent
action Manarang could have taken rather than
collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as
policemen are unquestionably better trained and
well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect
(like herein petitioner) who , in all probability,
could have put up a degree of resistance which
an untrained civilian may not be able to contain
without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is
a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more
success when law enforcers function in
collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely

through this cooperation, that the offense herein

involved fortunately did not become an additional
entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved
crimes.

1.
warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the
Rules
of
Court
and
by
prevailing
jurisprudence,

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a

suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the
arrest which has been set in motion in a public
place for want of a warrant as the police was
confronted by an urgent need to render aid or
take action. The exigent circumstances of hot
pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the
public place and the raining nighttime all
created a situation in which speed is essential
and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop since
they had more than mere reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the occupant of the
vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.
Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith &
Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine),
petitioners warrantless arrest was proper as he
was again actually committing another offense
(illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions)
and this time in the presence of a peace officer.

2.
Seizure of evidence in plain view, the
elements of which are:

Besides, the policemens warrantless arrest of

petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an
offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and
run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after
having stationed themselves at the Abacan
bridge in response to Manarangs report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling
plate number (PMA 777 as reported by
Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
thereof. These formed part of the arresting police
officers personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioners Pajero was indeed the
vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily
then, the arresting police officers acted upon
verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable
hearsay information.
Furthermore,
in
accordance
with
settled
jurisprudence,
any
objection,
defect
or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea. Petitioners
belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to
quash the information, his participation in the
trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him
in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.
Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently
waived such irregularities and defects.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions
seized from petitioner without a search warrant,
the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a
warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid, are as follows:

(a).
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b).
the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c).
the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and
(d).
plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
3.
search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicles
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes
a
highly
reasonable
suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity.
4.

consented warrantless search, and

5.

customs search.

In
conformity
with
respondent
courts
observation, it indeed appears that the
authorities stumbled upon petitioners firearms
and ammunitions without even undertaking any
active search which, as it is commonly
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that
which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was
justified for they came within plain view of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the
revolver and magazine tucked in petitioners
waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero.
The same justification applies to the confiscation
of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately
apparent to the policemen as they took a casual
glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the drivers seat. Thus it has
been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the
commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police
officers should happen to discover a criminal
offense being committed by any person, they are
not precluded from performing their duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
person and the taking of the corpus delicti.
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law
inadvertently found in plain view are subject to
seizure even without a warrant.

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag

containing
assorted
magazines,
petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This
latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and seizure,
and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported
defect.
Even assuming
that the firearms and
ammunitions were products of an active search
done by the authorities on the person and vehicle
of petitioner, their seizure without a search
warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a
search
incidental to a lawful arrest (first
instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected,
the police may undertake a protective search of
the passenger compartment and containers in
the vehicle which are within petitioners grabbing
distance regardless of the nature of the offense.
This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental
search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was
within the arrestees custody or area of
immediate control and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of
that search are admissible evidence not excluded
by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a
search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In
connection therewith, a warrantless search is
constitutionally permissible when, as in this case,
the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before
the search, that either the motorist is a lawoffender (like herein petitioner with respect to the
hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the
vehicle are or have been instruments or the
subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal
offense.
CASE DIGESTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DIGESTCONSTITUTIONAL
LAWG.R.
121917PADILLA
VS
CASEARCHES
SEIZURESWARRANTLESS ARRESTS

CASE
NO.
AND

0
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA
November 4, 2014
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426

February 16, 1959

FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and
injunction against respondent Agrava, the
Director of Philippines Patent Office due to a
circular the latter issued scheduling an
examination for determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed
the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines

and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to

practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and
that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and is
in violation of the law for requiring such
examination as condition precedent before
members of the bar may be allowed to represent
applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava
argued that that the prosecution of patent cases
does not involve entirely or purely the practice of
law and that the Rules of Court do not prohibit
the Patent Office from requiring further condition
or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office.
ISSUE:
Whether appearance before the Patent Office and
the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law
HELD:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and
the prosecution of their applications for patent,
their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of
their rights in patent cases. Although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office
involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such
business has to be rendered in accordance with
the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. All these
things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for
legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.
As stated in 5 Am. Jur,
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law corporation services,
assessment
and
condemnation
services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions.

The Supreme Court ruled that under the present

law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by
the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, since much of the business in said
office
involves
the
interpretation
and
determination of the scope and application of the
Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as
the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent
director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so
that appeals from his orders and decisions are,
taken to the Supreme Court.
CASE DIGESTS LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTG.R.
NO. L-12426LEGAL ETHICSPHILIPPINE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA
0

against one not made party respondent. Neither

may the petition for prohibition prosper against
Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military
Commission is not made party respondent in this
case, and although it may be acting, as alleged,
without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in
these case proceedings requiring it to refrain
from trying the petitioner.
The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction
to entertain the petition even if the commission
be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza
vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), . . . an attempt of
our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the
United States Army before such period (state of
war) expires, would be considered as a violation
of this countrys faith, which this Court should not
be the last to keep and uphold.
2. Under the laws of war, a military commander
has an implied power to appoint and convene a
military commission. This is upon the theory that
since the power to create a military commission
is an aspect of waging war, military commanders
have that power unless expressly withdrawn from
them.

Yamashita vs Styer
November 4, 2014
Yamashita vs Styer
G.R. No. L-129 December 19, 1945
Facts:
Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding
general of the 14th army group of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his
surrender became a prisoner of war of the United
States of America but was later removed from
such status and placed in confinement as an
accused war criminal charged before an American
Military Commission constituted by respondent
Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding General
of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15,

the Congress of the United States has explicitly
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so,
that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the laws of war in
appropriate cases.
CASE DIGESTS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASE
DIGESTG.R. NO. L-129PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAWYAMASHITA VS STYER
0

Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against

respondent, he asks that he be reinstated to his
former status as prisoner of war, and that the
Military Commission be prohibited from further
trying him. He questions, among others, the
jurisdiction of said Military Commission.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion and Mark Jimenez

(private respondent)

Issue/s:

G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000

1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and

prohibition be granted in this case?

Facts:

2. Was the Military Commission

constituted by respondent, therefore
jurisdiction over the war crimes?

validly
having

Ruling: 1. NO. 2. YES.

1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when
release of petitioner is not sought. It seeks no
discharge of petitioner from confinement but
merely his restoration to his former status as a
prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The
relative difference as to the degree of
confinement in such cases is a matter of military
measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the
jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue

November 4, 2014
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion and Mark Jimenez
(private respondent)

On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to

furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and
to grant the latter reasonable period within which
to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Private respondent states that he must be
afforded the right to notice and hearing as
required by our Constitution. He likens an
extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding
and the evaluation stage to a preliminary
investigation.
Petitioner
filed
an
Urgent
Motion
for
Reconsideration assailing the mentioned decision.
Issue:

Whether or not the private respondent is entitled

to the due process right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process
Ruling:
No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation
all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not
involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where
he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by
one whose extradition papers are still undergoing
evaluation.
P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient
opportunity to meet the evidence against him
once the petition is filed in court. The time for the
extraditee to know the basis of the request for his
extradition is merely moved to the filing in court
of the formal petition for extradition. The
extraditees right to know is momentarily
withheld during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process to accommodate the more
compelling interest of the State to prevent
escape of potential extraditees which can be
precipitated by premature information of the
basis of the request for his extradition. No less

compelling at that stage of the extradition

proceedings is the need to be more deferential to
the judgment of a co-equal branch of the
government, the Executive, which has been
endowed by our Constitution with greater power
over matters involving our foreign relations.
All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition
Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their
intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is
a signatory provides that a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its object
and purpose.
It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition
Treaty calls for an interpretation that will
minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees
from the long arm of the law and expedite their
trial. The submission of the private respondent,
that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy
of the US government request for his extradition
and its supporting documents even while they are
still under evaluation by petitioner Secretary of
Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear
of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the
demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee
must be deeply rooted on the experience of the
executive branch of our government. As it comes
from the branch of our government in charge of
the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the
careful consideration of this Court. In addition, it
cannot be gainsaid that private respondents
demand for advance notice can delay the
summary process of executive evaluation of the
extradition request and its accompanying papers.