CRIM - Case Digest (Batch 6)

Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Article 89 113
PEOPLE vs. BAYOT
G.R. No. 200030
April 18, 2012
FACTS:
Appellant Nelson Bayot was charged with rape. The Information filed against him states
that on September 17, 1997, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with
[AAA], 44 years old, against her will.
RTC: In its July 31, 2000 Decision, convicted appellant of the crime of rape and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of P40,000.00 as indemnity with
costs.
CA: In its Decision dated May 9, 2006, affirmed appellants conviction with the modification
increasing the award of indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral
damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00.
However, in a letter dated May 29, 2006, the Penal Superintendent of the New Bilibid
Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital
on December 4, 2004.
Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the aforesaid
Court of Appeals Decision to this Court (Supreme Court) dated May 31, 2006, which was given due
course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution dated January 19, 2007. The Court of Appeals also
directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entire records of the case to this
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants death on December 4, 2004, during the pendency of his appeal
before the Court of Appeals, extinguished his criminal liability for the crime of rape and his civil
liability solely arising from or based on said crime (YES)
HELD:
YES, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides for the effect of death of the accused on his
criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads:
SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes.
Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
Case

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment; x x x
Applying the foregoing provision, People vs. Bayotas had laid down the following guidelines:
1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2) Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi contracts, and quasi delict.
3) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action subject to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The
rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Evidently, it is already unnecessary to rule on appellants appeal. Appellants appeal was
still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death.
Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become
irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex
delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death.
Case

PEOPLE vs. AMISTOSO
G.R. No. 201447
August 28, 2013
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, with the rape of his daughter, AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at
the time of the incident.
Crime charged: statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended
RTC: guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A
CA: affirmed Amistosos conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9346 and the latest jurisprudence on awards of damages
Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to the Supreme Court. In its Decision
dated January 9, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction
against Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded.
However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque, OIC, Inmate Documents
and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died
on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison. Roque attached to his letter a photocopy of the
Death Report stating that Amistoso, 62 years old, died at about 5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2012 of
cardio respiratory arrest. Roques letter was received by the Court on February 12, 2013.
Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan, Sr. (Lansangan), OIC, Maximum
Security Compound, NBP, wrote another letter, likewise informing the Court of Amistosos death.
PIS Lansangan appended to his letter a photocopy of Amistosos Death Certificate. The Court
received PIS Lansangans letter on February 18, 2013.
Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), which
represented Amistoso and which was apparently also unaware of its clients demise, still filed
a MR of the Courts Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants death on December 11, 2012, during the pendency of
his appeal before the Supreme Court, extinguished his criminal liability for the crime of qualified
rape and his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime notwithstanding the Courts
Decision affirming his conviction dated January 9, 2013 (YES)
Case

HELD:
YES, accused-appellants death on December 11, 2012, during the pendency of his
appeal before the Supreme Court, extinguished his criminal liability, as well as his civil
liability ex delicto.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
offender occurs before final judgment; x x x
Applying the foregoing provision, in People vs. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in
case the accused dies prior to final judgment:
1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2) Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi contracts, and quasi delict.
3) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action subject to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. Since the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Case

Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the
Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was
still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not
immediately informed of his death.
Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts Decision dated January
9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover,
said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
Case

PEOPLE vs. CONSORTE
G.R. No. 194068
November 26, 2014
FACTS:
Benjie Consorte y Franco (appellant) was a former conductor of Elizabeth Palmars jeepney.
Sometime in June 2000, Elizabeths residence was robbed and several personal belongings,
including cash, were taken. Appellant was the only one who had access to the house, aside
from Elizabeths family. So Elizabeths brother tailed appellant and found out that the latter pawned
her TV set to Frederic Francisco. She then sued appellant for robbery. A hearing was scheduled on
January 23, 2001, but on the night of January 22, 2001, Elizabeth was murdered.
On January 22, 2001, Jose Palmar, Elizabeths husband, instructed Rolando Visbe to haul
feeds from Morong, Rizal and deliver them to their piggery in Binangonan, Rizal. As he was driving
the jeepney, Rolando saw Elizabeth together with her 14-year old daughter Myrna and her 3-year
old nephew Big Boy. They went with him to deliver the feeds. On their way back to Morong,
Rolando noticed appellant, who was wearing a hat. When they got near him, Rolando slowed down
and asked appellant where he was going. Appellant did not reply. Rolando veered to the right to
avoid hitting appellant. In the process, the jeepney ran over a stone, lost its balance, and rolled into
a ditch. While struggling to release the vehicle, Rolando heard a gunshot. He looked around and saw
appellant standing near the jeepneys left rear, holding a handgun. Appellant immediately fled. He
(Rolando) then heard Myrna shouting Ninong, may dugo si Nanay! They rushed Elizabeth
to Angono District Hospital. But due to her fatal gunshot wound on the forehead, she died.
Aneline Mendoza, a resident of Greenpark, Cainta, Rizal, testified that on January 22, 2001,
around 8:45 pm while on her way home, a stranger greeted her magandang gabi po. He was
carrying something wrapped in a black cloth which looked like a gun. She was somewhat frightened
so she let him walk ahead of her. She saw him turn to a corner. Immediately after she entered her
house, she heard a gunshot. She opened her window and saw the stranger, standing by the side of
the jeepney. The stranger immediately ran toward the direction of Elizabeths house. She also heard
the driver saying Putang ina, sinong bumaril?
Crime charged: murder
RTC: found appellant guilty of murder, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and directed him to indemnify the heirs of Elizabeth Palmar the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P29,500.00 as actual damages
CA: affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification as to damages; in addition to
actual damages, appellant was further directed to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amounts
of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively
SC (July 9, 2014): affirmed the Decision of the CA with the following modifications:
1) the amount of civil indemnity is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; and
2) the amount of exemplary damages is increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Case

Accused-appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco thereafter filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned Decision dated July 9, 2014. He raises the
incredibility of his identification as the perpetrator of the crime.
Meanwhile, in a Letter dated September 21, 2014, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid
Prison (NBP) informed the Court that accused-appellant died on July 14, 2014.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant are
extinguished by his death prior to final judgment (YES)
HELD:
YES, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant Benjie Consorte y
Franco are extinguished by his death prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction
against him is therefore set aside.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
offender occurs before final judgment; x x x x
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for
reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore becomes necessary
for the Court to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have
been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.
Case

PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 168641
April 27, 2007
FACTS:
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida
Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but
no settlement was reached. The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action dated
August 11, 1999.
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP)
a Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution
dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an Information against herein respondent.
Such recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City
Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be found in the records.
The Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila,
Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the
Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the
crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed.
MeTC: ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari.
RTC: denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
CA: On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, the 60-day prescriptive
period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with the OCP of Manila on
August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by the time
the Information was filed with the MeTC, reasoning that even if the 10-day period for the CP or
ACP Sulla, to act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken
as late as the last day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June
20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To use once again the language of
Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him (the accused) for a time very much more than the prescriptive period of only two
(2) months. The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with the court
on June 20, 2000.
Case

Petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA
Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating
prosecutors recommendation to file the proper criminal information against respondent was
approved by the City Prosecutor (NO)
HELD:
The answer is in the negative.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the
running of the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical
injuries.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philipppine Archipelago.
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation for the filing of an Information against respondent, the period of prescription began
to run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint
with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
The proceedings against respondent were not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's
approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an Information be filed with the
court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by
the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the Information
but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the
offended party.
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the petitioner
in the present petition considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary
Case

investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information after the City Prosecutor had
approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the Information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in the filing
of the Information. The Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the
right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly inflicted on him by the mere
expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors apparent lack of a sense of urgency in fulfilling
their mandate. Under the circumstances, the more appropriate course of action should be the filing
of an administrative disciplinary action against the erring public officials.
The Petition is hereby granted and the Decision of the RTC is hereby reinstated.
10
Case

ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 174654
August 17, 2011
FACTS:
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto
(spouses Alonto), secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located at
Pardo, Cebu City. Subsequently, or in July 9, 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying said lots to him for a consideration of P130,000.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed
by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses
Alonto appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to
his name and sold the lots to third persons. On August 12, 1999, an Information was filed charging
petitioner with estafa through falsification of public document.
Crime charged: estafa through falsification of public document

RTC: guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual
Petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay
their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which spouses Alonto actually signed;
but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized without the spouses Alonto personally appearing
before the notary public. From these, the trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held
guilty of falsification of a Public Document by a private individual under Art. 172(1) in relation
to Art. 171(2) of the RPC and not estafa through falsification of public document as charged in
the Information. Petitioner is also directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to restore
ownership and possession of the real properties in question in favor of private complainants or to
pay them P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties in case of failure to restore the
properties.
CA: acquitted the petitioner but nonetheless affirmed the RTCs finding with respect to
petitioners civil liability (No criminal liability, only civil liability)
CA acquitted him of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual because the
Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa through falsification of a
public document.
Petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of
public document under Art. 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of falsification of public
document by a private individual under Art. 172(1) in relation to Art. 171(2). The falsification
committed in Art. 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric while
the falsification in Art. 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear in a document that a
person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such person did not so participate.
Thus, the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not
necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed
11
Case

of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial
courts finding with respect to petitioners civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable
notwithstanding his acquittal (NO)
HELD:
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the
exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action.
In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it
must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. However, based on
the records of the case, the Court finds that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did
not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the
spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer
of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties respective
evidence, the RTC found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed
the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary
public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or
render void ab initio the parties transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. The defective
notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said
properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said
Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alontos title and the issuance of
new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to
the spouses Alonto.
Moreover, the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the
petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay
them actual and other kinds of damages. First, it has absolutely no basis in view of the trial courts
finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are genuine and not
12
Case

forged. Second, sentences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law which
permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative. While a judge has the discretion of imposing
one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative. He must fix positively and with
certainty the particular penalty.
There is absolutely no basis for the RTC and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to
restore ownership and possession of the subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them
P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties and damages. (SC affirmed the judgment
of acquittal, however, it deleted the civil liabilities for lack of factual and legal basis)
13
Case

PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662
June 13, 2012
FACTS:
On September 16, 1997, private complainant Virginia Malolos filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan alleging that respondent issued 9 checks in favor of private complainant
which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant with
the RTC, followed by "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" before
the Office of the City Prosecutor. The City Prosecutor approved the petition for suspension.
Private complainant raised the matter before the Secretary of Justice who reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of Informations for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of 2 checks. The 7 other checks included in
the affidavit-complaint filed on September 16, 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, were filed against respondent
Pangilinan on February 3, 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, MeTC.
Respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest" alleging that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription.
MeTC: granted the motion in an order

Private complainant filed a notice of appeal.
RTC: reversed the order of MeTC ruling that inasmuch as the Informations were filed on February
3, 2000 although received by the Court itself only on June 7, 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it
was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo
considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office
of the Prosecutor on September 16, 1997 yet. RTC in reversing the said decision, directed to proceed
with the hearing of the criminal cases.
CA: reversed the decision of RTC, thereby dismissing the criminal cases for the reason that the
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had already prescribed. It held that it reckons the
commencement of the period of prescription for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to
respondent sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the she was notified
by the private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the 5-day grace period
granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act
14
Case

3326, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information
against the petitioner before the proper court. The Informations against the petitioner having
been filed on February 3, 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
It was held in the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes that the proceedings referred to in Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which means the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall
be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which
is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended. While the aforesaid case involved a
violation of a municipal ordinance, the SC, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended,
governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that
the ruling likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The OSG sought relief to the Supreme Court in the instant petition for review contending
that, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No.
3763, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of
criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts
the period of prescription of the offense charged. It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit
by private complainant on September 16, 1997 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
of the subject B.P. Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down
by this Court in the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription,
contending that in a catena of cases, the SC ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscals
Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the Informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on February 3, 2000 was
still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City
Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the
offense charged is a violation of a special law, thus, claiming that the cases relied upon by petitioner
involved felonies punishable under the RPC and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the RPC and
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Respondent pointed out that the
crime imputed against her is for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as
such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made
between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses
covered by the RPC.
15
Case

ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor on September 16, 1997 interrupted the
period of prescription of such offense (YES)
HELD:
The Court finds that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by
respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin," as amended, is the law applicable to B.P. Blg. 22 cases. The law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four
years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since B.P. Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than
30 days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in
four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. The running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
It has been held in a previous case that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. Moreover, another case
broadened such rule that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the
running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription.
The ruling in Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws. It has been held in a
number of cases involving special laws that the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. The Court has even ruled
that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the
Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription
period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
16
Case

cases. In a case which is in all fours with the present case, the Court ruled that commencement of
the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under
B.P. Blg. 22. In the same case it was held that aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep
on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or
the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
The Court follows the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is
the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, such being
the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of
dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on September 16,
1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on February 13, 2000 because in the
meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City
Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was
raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the Informations for the
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in jurisprudence, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the
offended party must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.
Therefore, DOJ is ordered to re-file the Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the
respondent.
17
Case

LUMANTAS vs. CALAPIZ
G.R. No. 163753
January 15, 2014
FACTS:
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-yearold son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an
emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the petitioner, who suggested to the parents
that Hanz also undergo circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the parents
consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy.
On the following day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His testicles
were swollen. The parents noticed that the child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly
removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal.
On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his parents protestations,
and was directed to continue taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the abscess formation
between the base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought about by
Hanzs appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the
boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated on
three times to repair his damaged urethra. When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired
and reconstructed, Hanzs parents brought a criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.
Crime charged: serious physical injuries originally in the MTC but was transferred to the RTC
pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99
Prosecution
They presented Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the physician who had
operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been
diagnosed to have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to trauma that had
necessitated the conduct of two operations to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although
satisfactorily explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr. Agudera
could not determine the kind of trauma that had caused the injury.
Defense
Petitioner denied the charge. He contended that at the time of his examination of Hanz on
January 16, 1995, he had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix two to three
inches from the penis that had required immediate surgical operation; that after performing the
appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his parents consent by using a congo instrument,
thereby debunking the parents claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had then cleared
Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found no complications when
18
Case

Hanz returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that the abscess formation
between the base and the shaft of the penis had been brought about by Hanzs burst appendicitis.
RTC: acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence. Nonetheless,
the RTC ruled that the petitioner was liable for moral damages and and was ordered to pay P50,000
because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious
trauma from his circumcision by the petitioner.
CA: affirmed the RTC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming petitioners civil liability despite his acquittal of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries (NO)
HELD:
NO, CA is correct in affirming petitioners civil liability despite his acquittal of the
crime of charged.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found
to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained
of.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent
a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case
19
Case

unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.
Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his
civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere preponderance of evidence. In this
connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require
that the complainants recovery of civil liability should be through the institution of a separate civil
action for that purpose.
The petitioners contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no
proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his
criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was
preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable. With the RTC and the CA
both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the
occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the
Court must concur with their uniform findings.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although the Court has long
advocated the view that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of
ones body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation,
civil damages should be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an
imperfect estimation of the true value of ones body. The usual practice is to award moral damages
for the physical injuries sustained. In Hanzs case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision
performed by the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis in
order to repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly warranted
the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest of 6% per annum should
then be imposed on the award as a sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that
is not only reasonable but just and commensurate.
20
Case

DALURAYA vs. OLIVA
G.R. No. 210148
December 08, 2014
FACTS:
One afternoon, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate
number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her
over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually
died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.
The prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness to the
incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading towards the island
near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages
sustained by her family as a result of her mothers death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who
presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police
Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident
and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not
witness the incident.
However, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer) asserting that he was not
positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the
victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence of how the incident transpired.
Crime charged: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

MeTC: granted Dalurayas demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It
found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in material details and that
they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him.
As to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same, holding that no civil
liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that Daluraya was the person responsible for
Marina Olivas demise.
RTC: dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTCs ruling, declaring that the act from which the
criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist
CA: reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of P152,547.00 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. It also held that
the MeTCs Order showed that Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil
liability.
Hence, this petition.
21
Case

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Olivas death
despite his acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (NO)
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of
the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
In Manantan vs. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our
law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found
to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained
of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the
civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability where:
1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required;
2) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
3) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding
on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when the
accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.
22
Case

In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Dalurayas acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that
he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when
the MeTC declared that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details
and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against
him. Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTCs Order acquitting Daluraya,
said court reiterated and firmly clarified that the prosecution was not able to establish that the
accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva and that there is no
competent evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of
Marina Oliva.
Hence, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that
Dalurayas acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand
of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Dalurayas evidence on the civil aspect. Records
disclose that Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that
he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be
deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
23
Case

SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192123
March 10, 2014
FACTS:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two
days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the
large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag
attached to the side of his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a
pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr.
Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr.
Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the
operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks,
but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged
a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutors Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
Crime charged: reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries

RTC: guilty as charged; also held the Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with the
petitioner
CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein (NO);
2) Whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence (NO)
3) Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr.
Solidum (NO)
HELD:
RES IPSA LOQUITOR NOT APPLICABLE
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must
first be satisfied, to wit:
24
Case

1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged; and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
of the person injured.
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate.
Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present,
considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr.
Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been
guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting.
Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through
operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of
his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss
of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the
brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not
ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of
anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his
attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the
anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen
could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the
patient.
NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude the probability that other
factors related to Geralds major operation, which could or could not necessarily be
attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led
Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that
"although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still
hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered
in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums guilt, and moves us to acquit
him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.
The Court has to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him
from civil liability. But it cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the
circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for
validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm
and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the
manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the
hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum
25
Case

civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. The Court is not allowed to do
so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
LIABILITY OF OSPITAL NG MAYNILA
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address
the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly
liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling,
therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally
liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an
artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby
acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila
void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng
Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry."
The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one
that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a
public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for
profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but
a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr.
Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him must have been
unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
Petition granted.
26

CRIM - Case Digest (Batch 6)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRIM - Case Digest (Batch 6)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Crime charged: estafa through falsification of public document

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

MeTC: granted the motion in an order

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Crime charged: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Crime charged: reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

You might also like