Deixis and distance

BASIC CONCEPTS I
The phenomenon of deixis ('pointing/indicating' via
language) constitutes the singlemost
obvious way in which the relationship between language
and context is reflected in the
structure of languages themselves
any linguistic form used to accomplish this pointing is called
a deictic expression (or
indexical sign)
- among the first forms to be used by very young children
- used in face-to-face spoken interaction, to be easily
understood by the people present (but
difficult for someone not right there and then or in
darkness).
I'll put this here.
Meet me here a week from now with a stick about this big
Listen, Im not disagreeing with you but with you, and not about this, but
about this
If the semantic content of a sentence is identified with its
truth conditions, then utterances
with deictic elements cannot be assessed (without context
information)
I am the mother of Napoleon
There is a man on Mars
How should indexicals be accomodated so that the notion of
logical consequence can be
applied to them?
a. John Henry McTavitty is six feet tall and weighs 200 pounds
b. John Henry McTavitty is six feet tall
c. I am six feet tall and weigh 200 pounds
d. I am six feet tall
while b. can be inferred from a., the only way for d. to be
a valid inference from c. is if
they were uttered by the same speaker (need for pragmatic
indices or reference points
THE DEICTIC CENTER
proximal vs.distal
there is a basic distinction between things 'near' or 'away
from' the speaker

proximal terms: this, here, now

distal terms: that, there, then
These terms are defined in relation to the deictic center:
- central person is the speaker
- central time is the time of utterance production
- central place is the speakers location at utterance time
- disourse center is the point which the speaker is currently
at in the production of his/her utterance
- social center is the speakers social status to which the
status of the adressee(s)/referent(s) is relative
the structural distinctions between direct and indirect
(reported) speech are reflected in the
switch from proximal to distal forms
other languages may have more distinctions than English:
e.g., in Japanese demonstrative pronouns (this / that) will
distinguish between 'that near the addressee'
(<sore>) and 'that distant from both speaker and
addressee' (<are>) with a third term being used for the
proximal 'this near the speaker' (<kore>)
DEICTIC USAGE
gestural: terms used in gestural deictic way can only be
interpreted with reference to an
audio-visual-tactile, and in general a physical, monitoring of
the speech event
This ones genuine, but this ones fake (with selecting gesture)
Hes not the Duke. He is. Hes the butler.
Voici! (Presentative in French)
symbolic: symbolic usages of deictic terms require for their
interpretation only knowledge
of the basic spatio-temporal parameters of the speech
event (and occasionally
participant role, discourse and social parameters)
This city is really beautiful (general location is sufficient)
You can all come with me if you like (set of potential addressees)
We cant afford a holiday this year (general time)
!! deictic expressions can be used in a non-deictic function !!
Oh, I did this and that
There we go
You can never tell what age they are nowadays
DEICTIC USAGE: EXERCISE

Identify whether the deictic expressions in the following

utterances are used gesturally,
symbolically or on-deictically
1 You, you, but not you are dismissed gestural
2 I met this weird guy the other day non-deictic
3 Lets go now rather than tomorrow symbolic
4 This city stinks symbolic
5 Now thats not what I said non-deictic
6 Move it from here to there gestural
7 This finger hurts gestural
8 What did you say? symbolic
9 Hello, is Harry there? symbolic
10 I did it ten years ago
PERSON DEIXIS I
each person in a conversation constantly shifts from being
'I' to being 'you'
Children may go through stages of acquisition where this
is problematic: Read you a story!
basic three-part division speaker, addressee, others (1.,
2., 3. person)
markers of relative social status, so-called honorifics, may
be used (see also social deixis)
T/V distinction: familiar vs. non-familiar addressees (tu vous, du - sie, tu- usted)
higher status, older, more powerful speakers tends to use
the familiar form toward a lower
status, younger, less powerful addressee.
on-familiar forms express distance, are often of 3rd person
origin
Would his highness like some coffee?
Somebody didn't clean up after himself.
PERSON DEIXIS II
Inclusion/exclusion distinction:
speaker and others without addressee vs. speaker and
addressee included 'we'
Lets go to the movies
?Lets go to see you tomorrow
some languages grammaticalize this distinction, e.g. Fijian
'keimami' we excl.
'keda' we incl.

Vocatives (special address forms for names, titles, kinship

terms) are noun phrases that refer
to an addressee, but are not syntactically or semantically
incorporated as the arguments of a
predicate (they are also set apart prosodically)
call/summons: Hey you, you just scratched my car with your frisbee!
address: The truth is, Madam, nothing is as good nowadays
summons: utterance/conversation-initial, independent speech
acts (gestural)
address: parentheticals that can occur anywhere in an
utterance (symbolic)
SPATIAL DEIXIS I
locations can be specified relative to other objects or fixed
reference points
The station is 200 yards from the cathedral
Kabul lies at latitude 34 degrees, longitude 70 degrees
locations can be deictically specified relative to the
location of participants at the time of
speaking
Its 200 yards away
Kabul is 400 miles west of here
basic distinction: here/there - additional older/dialectal
forms: yonder, hither, thence
(the latter two including the notion of motion toward or
away from the speaker)
other languages:
Tlingit has demonstratives for this one right here, this
one nearby, that one over there,
that one way over there
Malagasy even has a six-way contrast for this dimension
SPATIAL DEIXIS II
Yet other languages do not organize demonstratives in this
way (i.e., distance in concentric
circles from a fixed deictic center), but with respect to
contrasts between participant roles:
Latin: hic (close to speaker), iste (close to addressee),
ille (remote from speaker and
addressee)
Turkish: bu (close to speaker), u (close to addressee),
o (remote from speaker and
addressee)

 Samal has a four-way distinction based on four kinds of

participant role: (i) close to
speaker, (ii) close to addressee, (iii) close to audience (other
members of the
conversational group), (iv) close to persons present but
outside the conversational group
In Australian and New Guinean languages there are also
systems that produce large
arrays of demonstratives (upriver/downriver from speaker,
visible/not visible to
speaker, above/below/at level with the speaker)
some verbs of motion, e.g., come/go, retain a deictic
sense when they are used to mark
movement toward ('Come to bed') or away from the
speaker ('Go to bed')
SPATIAL DEIXIS III
location from the speaker's perspective can be fixed
mentally as well as physically.
Speakers temporarily away from their home location will
often continue to use 'here' to
mean the physically distant home location.
Speakers are also able to project themselves into other
locations prior to actually being in
those locations, as when they say 'I'll come later' (=
movement to the addressee's location)
Deictic Projection
The phrase 'I am not here now' should be nonsensical. It is
of course possible to say this on
your answering machine, projecting that 'now' will apply to
any time somebody calls and not
to when the words are recorded (projecting one's presence
into the future and a different
location).
Similar effect of indirect speech ('here' is not the actual
location of the person telling the story)
I was looking at this little puppy in a cage with such a sad look on its face.
It was like
'Oh, I'm so unhappy here, will you set me free?
Psychological Distance as the pragmatic basis of spatial
deixis
physical and psychological distance often correlate with
each other, but deictic elements can

be used to express psychological distance (empathetic

deixis) only ('I don't like that smell')
TEMPORAL DEIXIS I
proximal 'now' indicates both the time coinciding with the
speaker's utterance and the
time of the speaker's voice being heard (the hearer's now)
distal 'then' applies to both past and future time relative
to the speaker's present time
November 22nd, 1963? I was in Scotland then.
Dinner at 8:30 on Saturday? Okay, I'll see you then
non-deictic temporal reference like calendar and clock
time islearned later than deictic
references such as tomorrow, today, tonight, this week
all deictic expressions depend on knowing the relevant
utterance time (Fillmore 1971).
time the utterance was made = coding time (CT)
time the utterance is heard/read = receiving time (RT)
Deictic Simultaneity: CT = RT (normal verbal utterance
situation)
complication in written messages and pre-recordings of
media programs
Back in an hour
Free beer tomorrow
In this case a decision has to be made about whether the
deictic center remains on the speaker
(and CT) or is projected on the addresse (and RT)
TEMPORAL DEIXIS II
the psychological basis of temporal deixis is similar to that
of spatial deixis. Temporal
events can be treated as objects that move toward or away
from us ('the coming week',
'the approaching year' --- 'in days gone by', 'the past week')
This program is being recorded today, Wednesday April 1st , to be relayed
next Thursday
This program was recorded last Wednesday April 1st, to be relayed today
I write this letter while chewing peyote
I wrote this letter while chewing peyote
choice of verb tense expresses temporal deixis
present tense is proximal: 'I live here now'
past/future are distal: 'I lived there then / I will be in
London by then'

 conditional/unlikely event also treated as deictically

distant
I could be in Hawaii (if I had a lot of money)
DISCOURSE DEIXIS
Discourse or text deixis (Fillmore 1975, Lyons 1977) deals with
expressions within an
utterance that refer to portions of the unfolding discourse in
which the utterance is located.
Pff, pff, pff: that is what it sounded like
This is what phoneticians call creaky voice
This sentence is not true
This subject will be addressed in the next chapter
I bet you havent heard this story
That was the funniest story Ive ever heard
Also included in disccourse deixis are expressions which
signal an utterances relation to
surrounding text (e.g., utterance-initial anyway)
CAUTION: a discourse-deictic expression refers to a
linguistic expression or chunk of
discourse itself, but not to the same entity as a prior
linguistic expression (see anaphor)
A: Thats a rhinoceros
B: Spell it for me
A: Thats a rhinoceros
B: I like it
Token Reflexivity
Discourse-deictic use of it
Anaphoric use of it
SOCIAL DEIXIS I
Social Deixis deals with the encoding of social distinctions
that are relative to participant roles,
particularly aspects of the social identities of and the
relationship between speaker and addressee(s) or
speaker and some referent
Relational Social Deixis
(i) speaker and referent (e.g. referent honorifics)
(ii) speaker and addressee (e.g. addressee honorifics)
(iii) speaker and bystander (e.g. audience honorifics)
(iv) speaker and setting (e.g. formality levels)
Honorifics: describing a relation concerninh relative rank or
respect (Comrie 1976)

- other grammaticalized relationships: kinship relations,

totemic relations, clan membership
Referent honorifics: respect conveyed by referring to the
target of respect
- T/V distinction (tu vous etc.)
Addressee honorifics: respect conveyed without
(necessarily) referring to the target
- Japanese/Korean: the soup is hot with choice of linguistic
alternates, e.g., for soup to
express respect for the addressee
complex speech levels (anything one says is
sociolinguistic)
Audience honorifics: respect conveyed for participants in
audience role or non-participating overhearers
- Dyirbal alternative vocabulary in the presence of taboo
relatives
Formality levels: different language use in particular formal
settings
- Japanese/Tamil: different style (vocabulary, syntax) /
diglossic variant (differences across
phonology, morphology, syntax, lexicon)
SOCIAL DEIXIS II
Absolute Social Deixis
authorized speakers: only certain typed of speakers may
use particular words/morphemes
- Thai: khrb politeness particle only used by men, kh
only by women
- Japanese first pronoun only used by the emperor
authorized recipients: only certain types of addresse may
be addressed with certain words/morphemes
titles of address (You Honor, Mr. President)
- Tunica: pronouns differing with sex of addressee, e.g. two
words for they
depending on whether one is speaking to a man or a
woman
socially deictic information can be encoded anywhere in the
linguistic system
lexicon (alternates/suppletives): e.g., Japanese (also weakly
in English elevated terms, e.g.
residence for home, dine for eat, lady for woman,
steed for
stallion

morphology (affixes, particles): Thai

phonology (segmental, prosody): Basque, Tzeltal (honorific
falsetto)
mixtures of all elements: Javanese, Tamil, Madurese

Reference and inference

BASIC CONCEPTS
reference: act in which a speaker/writer uses linguistic forms to enable a
listener/reader to
identify something (words don't refer, people do)
referring expressions
- proper nouns ('Shakespeare', 'Hawaii')
- definite noun phrases ('the author', 'the island')
- indefinite noun phrases ('a man', 'a woman', 'a beautiful place')
- pronouns ('he', 'she', 'them')
The choice of expression depends largely on what the speaker assumes the
listener already
knows (in shared visual contexts -> deictic expressions)
inference: as there is no direct relationship between entities and words, the
listener's task is
to infer correctly which entity the speaker intends to identify by using a
particular referring
expression.
- can use vague expressions ('the blue thing', 'that icky stuff', 'whatsisname')

- can use expressions focusing on one feature ('Mister Aftershave is late

today)
reference needs to use objectively correct naming, but can work with
locally successful
REFERENTIAL AND ATTRIBUTIVE USE
Not all referring expressions have identifiable physical referents
indefinite noun phrases can refer to
a physically present entity: 'There's a man waiting for you'
an unknown entity assumed to exist: 'He wants to marry a woman with
lots of money'
an entity that does not exist: 'We'd like to sign a nine-foot-tall basketball
player'
use in b. (entity only known in terms of descriptive properties) is an
attributive use
meaning 'who/whatever fits the description'
referential use has one specific entity in mind (Donnellan 1966)
attributive use is also possible with definite NPs: 'There was no sign of the
killer'
(when talking about a mysterious death, referential use when a particular
person had been
identified, chased into a building, but escaped)
expressions themselves do not have reference but are invested with
referential function in
a context by a speaker/writer
NAMES AND REFERENTS
convention between all members of a cultural/language community:
collaboration of the
intention to identify and the recognition of intention
'Shakespeare' does not refer only to a specific person:
Can I borrow your Shakespeare?
Yeah it's over there on the table
conventional set of entities (e.g. things the writer produced)
Shakespeare takes up the whole bottom shelf
We're going to see Shakespeare in London
I hated Shakespeare at school
'the cheese sandwich' can refer to a person
Where's the cheese sandwich sitting?
He's over there by the window
pragmatic connection between proper names and objects
conventionally associated
within a socio-culturally defined community

THE ROLE OF CO-TEXT

The ability to identify intended referents does not just depend on the
understanding of the
referring expression, but is aided by the linguistic material, or co-text,
accompanying it
Brazil wins World Cup
('wins World Cup' limits the range of possible interpretations)
the referring expression provides a range of reference, a number of
possible referents
The cheese sandwich is made with white bread
The cheese sandwich left without paying
co-text: linguistic part of the environment in which a referring expression
is used
context: physical environment and (speech) conventions, e.g., a restaurant
The heart-attack mustn't be moved (hospital)
Your ten-thirty just cancelled (dentist)
A couple of rooms have complained about the heat (hotel)
conventions may differ from one social group to another
reference is a social act in which the speaker assumes that the
word/phrase chosen to
identify an object/person will be interpreted as the speaker intended (not
simply a
relationship between the meaning of a word/phrase and an object/person in
the world)
Reference and inference
ANAPHORIC REFERENCE I
In talking and writing we have to keep track of who or what we are talking
about for more
than one sentence at a time
In the film, a man and a woman were trying to wash a cat.
The man was holding the cat while the woman poured water on it.
He said something to her and they started laughing.
initial/introductory reference is often indefinite ('a man', 'a woman', 'a cat')
subsequent reference with definite NPs ('the man, 'the cat', 'the woman')
or with pronouns
('it', 'he', 'she')
Reference to already introduced referents is called anaphoric reference
(initial expression:
antecedent - subsequent expression: anaphor)
- anaphoric reference need not be exactly identical to antecedent:
Peel and slice six potatoes. Put them in cold salted water.
('them' now refers to 'the six peeled and sliced potatoes')

- sometimes reversal of antecedent-anaphor order.

I turned the corner and almost stepped on it.
There was a large snake in the middle of the path.
cataphoric pattern ('it' is a cataphor)
ANAPHORIC REFERENCE II
While definite nouns and pronouns can act as anaphors, ellipsis can as well
(zero anaphor)
Peel an onion and slice it.
Drop the slices into hot oil.
Cook for three minutes.
The last utterance 'Cook for three minutes' works with the expectation that
the listener will be able to
infer that the speaker intends to identify the peeled onion slices
It is possible to make inferences when anaphoric expressions are not
linguistically connected
to their antecedents.
I just rented a house. The kitchen is really big
We had Chardonnay with dinner. The wine was the best part.
The bus came on time, but he didn't stop
I just rented a house. The kitchen is really big requires the inference that
if x is a house, then x has a
kitchen to make an anaphoric connection
knowledge in the listener is assumed (can be specific, e.g. one must
know that Chardonnay is a
wine, can lead to lack of grammatical agreement (bus - he))
the social dimension of reference is tied to the effect of collaboration conversation partners must
have something in common/share something (social closeness)
Successful reference means that an intention was recognized, via inference,
indicating a kind
of shared knowledge and hence social connection.
ANALYSIS EXERCISE
The following text was found on the back wall of an airline toilet (in an
American Airlines plane):
PLEASE USE THE TRASH CONTAINER FOR ANYTHING OTHER
THAN TOILET PAPER
What are possible interpretations of this?
What is the most likely interpretation and what is necessary to arrive at it?
The following notice was found on the back wall of the mens toilet in the
Universidade
Federal de Brasilia

SEA EDUCADO, JOGUE O PAPEL NO LIXO

(Be educated, throw the paper in the waste basket)
What is the most likely interpretation here? Is the note ambiguous?
How is understanding of these contradictory messages dependent on the
context?
What does anything other in the American notice refer to?
What is the paper referred to in the Brazilian notice?

Speech acts and events

BASIC CONCEPTS
Speakers can perform actions while making utterances
Situation: At work, boss has great deal of power
You're fired

more than just a statement, actually ends your

employment
Other examples:
You're so fantastic (compliment)
You're welcome (acknowledgement of thanks)
You're crazy! (expression of surprise)

Actions performed via utterances are called speech acts

(e.g., apology, complaint,
compliment, invitation, promise, request)
The speaker normally expects that his or her communicative
intention will be recognized by the hearer -

both speaker and hearer are helped by the circumstances

surrounding the utterance.
These circumstances (including other utterances) are called the
speech event
The tea is really cold!
Situation A: On a wintry day, the speaker reaches for a cup of tea,
believing that it has been freshly
made, takes a sip, and produces the utterance complaint
Situation B: On a really hot summer's day the speaker is being
given a glass of iced tea, takes a sip,
and produces the utterance praise
No simple utterance-to-action correspondence is possible!!!

PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
1930s: - logical positivism (unless a sentence can be tested
for its truth or falsity,
it is strictly speaking meaningless)
vs.
- Wittgenstein: Meaning is use
Austin 1962: - theory of Speech Acts
- series of lectures (posthumously published as How to do
things with words)
truth conditions are not central to language
understanding
- performatives vs. constatives
I christen this ship the Imperial Flagship Mao

- speech act goes wrong if

+ ship already has another name
+ I am not authorized to name it
+ there are no witnesses, slipways, bottles of champagne
felicity conditions (conditions performatives must meet
to succeed)
Searle 1969: - systematization of Austins work, creating
speech act theorys impact
on linguistics

- felicity conditions constitute various speech acts

(illocutionary acts)
- typology of speech acts

and events
SPEECH ACTS
An action performed by producing an utterance consists of
three related acts
locutionary act: basic act of utterance, producing a
meaningful linguistic expression
Aha mokofa ( not a locutionary act)
I've just made some coffee ( locutionary act)
illocutionary act:function/communicative force of the
utterance (also called illocutionary
force), can be a statement, offer, explanation etc.
perlocutionary act:intended effect of the action (also
called perlocutionary effect)
- speecht acts are often interpreted narrowly as just the
illocutionary force of an utterance
- the same locutionary act can count as different
illocutionary forces
I'll see you later
can be a prediction, promise or warning
How can speakers be sure that the intended illocutionary
force will be recognized by the
hearer? IFIDs and felicity conditions

IFIDS
An IFID (Illocutionary Force Indicating Device) is an
expression with a slot for a verb
that explicitly names the illocutionary act being
performed.
- such verbs are called performative verbs

I promise/warn you that ...

- they are not always made this explicit in conversation

A: Can I talk to Mary?
B: No, she's not here.
A: I'm asking you - can I talk to her?
B: And I'm telling you - She is not here!!!!

- most of the time there is no performative verb mentioned

Other IFIDs beside performative verbs: word order, stress,
intonation, voice quality
(lowered for warnings/threats)
You're going! [I tell you X]
You're going? [I request confirmation about X]
Are you going? [I ask you if X]

acts and events

FELICITY CONDITIONS
Felicity conditions: expected or appropriate
circumstances for a speech act to be recognized
as intended
I sentence you to six months in prison
- performance will be infelicitous if the speaker is not a judge in a
courtroom
general conditions: language is understood, no play-acting,
nonsense
content conditions: e.g. for promises/warnings the content of
the utterance must be
about a future event (promise: the event will be an act by the
speaker)
preparatory conditions: pre-existing conditions about the
event, e.g.,
promise: event will not happen by itself, event will be beneficial
warning: it's not clear if the hearer knows that the event will
occur,
the event will not have a beneficial effect
sincerity conditions: attitude of the speaker, e.g.,

promise: speaker genuinely intends to carry out the future action

warning: speaker genuinely believes the future event will not have
a beneficial effect
essential conditions: change of state in the speaker, e.g.,
promise: change of state from non-obligation to obligation to
carry
out action
warning: change of state from non-information of bad future
event
to information

THE PERFORMATIVE
HYPOTHESIS I
Performative Hypothesis:
One way to think about the speech acts being performed
via utterances is to assume that
underlying every utterance (U) there is a clause containing
a performative verb (Vp) which
makes the illocutionary force explicit
I (hereby) Vp you that U

- the subject must be first person

- the adverb 'hereby' indicates that utterance counts as an
action
- Vp in the present tense
- indirect object in second person singular
Clean up this mess I hereby order you to clean up this mess
The work was done by Elaine and myself I hereby tell you that the
work was done
by Elaine and myself

implicit performatives explicit performatives

(primary perormatives)

THE PERFORMATIVE
HYPOTHESIS II

This type of analysis makes clear what elements are

involved in the production and
interpretation of utterances:
in syntax a reflexive pronoun (like 'myself') requires an
antecedent ('I') within the same
sentence structure (it can be found in the explicit
performative!!)
it can be shown that some adverbs naturally attach to the
explicit performative clause
rather than the implicit version:
Honestly, he's a scoundrel (I hereby honestly tell you that he is a
scoundrel)
What time is it, because I may be late? (I hereby ask you because
I may be late ...)

problem: explicit utterance may change interpretation

(versions are not equivalent)
I hereby order you to clean up this mess You're dumber than a
rock

has a more serious impact than does not really work as an

insult as
Clean up this mess ? I hereby insult you that you're dumber than
a rock

('insult' may not be a performative verb)

We don't how many performative verbs there are in any
language!!

SPEECH ACT CLASSIFICATION I

declarations: - speech acts that change the world via their
utterance
- the speaker has to have a special institutional role, in a specific
situation
Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife
Referee: You're out
Jury Foreman: We find the defendant guilty

the speaker changes the world via words

representatives:- speech acts that state what the speaker

believes to be the case or not
- statements of fact, assertions, conclusions and descriptions are
all
examples of the speaker representing the world as he/she believes
it is
The earth is flat
Chomsky didn't write about peanuts
It was a warm sunny day

the speaker makes words fit the world (of belief)

expressives: - speech acts that state what the speaker feels
- they express psychological states and can be statements of
pleasure, pain,
likes, dislikes, joy, sorrow ...
I'm really sorry
Congratulations!
Oh yes, great, mmmmm!!

the speaker makes words fit the world (of feeling)

SPEECH ACT CLASSIFICATION II

directives: - speech acts that speakers use to get someone else to
do something
- they express what the speaker wants, they are commands,
orders, requests,
suggestions and can be positive or negative
Gimme a cup of coffe. Make it black
Could you lend me a pen, please?
Don't touch that
the speaker attempts to make the world fit the words via the
hearer
commissives: - speech acts that speaker use to commit
themselves to some future action
- they express what the speaker intends, they are promises,
threats, refusals, pledges
- they can be performed by the speaker alone, or by as a member
of a group

I'll be back
I'm going to get it right next time
We will not do that
the speaker undertakes to make the world fit the words via the
speaker

Summary
Speech Act Type Direction of fit Form (S = speaker, X = situation)
Declarations words change the world S causes X
Representatives make words fit the world S believes X
Expressives make words fit the world S feels X
Directives make the world fit words S wants X
Commissives make the world fit words S intends X

EXERCISE
Classify the following speech acts
1 Ill make him an offer he cant refuse (Mario Puzo)
commissive
2 I baptize this baby John
declarative
3 Better remain silent and be thought a fool, than open
your
mouth and remove all possible doubt (Chinese proverb)
directive
4 Ifd known I was gonna live that long, Id have taken
better care of myelf (Eubie Blake)
expressive
5 I came, I saw, I conquered (Julius Caesar)

DIRECT AND INDIRECT SPEECH

ACTS I
Whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a
function
Direct Speech Act
You wear a seat belt. (declarative)
Do you wear a seat belt? (interrogative)

Wear a seat belt! (imperative)

If the relationship between structure and function is indirect
Indirect Speech Act
Example: A declarative used to make a statement is a direct
speech act, a declarative used to
make a request is an indirect speech act.
It's cold outside
I hereby tell you about the weather (direct speech act)
I hereby request that you close the door (indirect speech act)
Example: Speaker wants hearer not to stand in front of the TV
Move out of the way! (Imperative -> direct speech act)
Do you have to stand in front of the TV? (Interrogative ->
indirect speech act)
You're standing in front of the TV (Declarative -> indirect speech
act)
You'd make a better door than a window (Declarative -> indirect
speech act)

DIRECT AND INDIRECT SPEECH

ACTS II
There is a typical pattern in English whereby asking
a question about the hearer's
assumed ability ('can you', 'could you') or future
likelihood with regard to doing
something ('will you', 'would you') normally counts
as a request to actually do that
something.
Could you pass the salt?
Would you open this?
Indirect speech acts are generally associated with
greater politeness than direct
speech acts.

SPEECH EVENTS I
An indirect request can be interpreted as question whether
the necessary conditions for a
request are in place, i.e., a preparatory condition would
be that the speaker assumes that
the hearer is able ('CAN') to perform the action. A content
condition concerns the future
action that the hearer WILL perform the action.
Content condition Future act of hearer 'WILL you do X?'
(= hearer will do X)
Preparatory condition Hearer is able to perform act 'CAN you do
X?'
(= hearer CAN do X)

Questioning a hearer-based condition for making a

request results in an indirect request.
- there is a definite difference between asking someone to
do X and asking someone if the
preconditions for doing X are in place.
- asking about preconditions technically doesn't count as
making a request, but allows the
hearer to react as if the request had been made (= less of
an imposition on the hearer, smaller
risk of refusal)
An utterance is part of a larger social situation
involving people with some kind of social
relationship and particular goals
Speech Event = the set of utterances produced in such a
situation

SPEECH EVENTS II
A speech event is an activity in which participants interact
via language in some
conventional way to arrive at some outcome.

- may include one obvious central speech act

- may include other utterances leading up to and subsequently
reacting to that central action
A: Oh, Mary, I'm glad you're here.
B: What's up?
A: I can't get my computer to work. the request is the whole
speech event,
B: Is it broken? not a single speech act.
A: I don't think so.
B: What's it doing? no actual request is made
A: I don't know. I'm useless with computers.
B: What kind is it?
A: It's a Mac. Do you use them?
B: Yeah.
A: Do you have a minute?
B: Sure.
A: Oh, great
- the question 'Do you have a minute?' could be characterized as a
pre-request, allowing the hearer to
say that she's busy or that she has to be somewhere else.
- the response 'Sure' is taken to be an acknowledgement not only
of having time available, but a
willingness to perform the unstated action.

Presupposition and entailment

BASIC CONCEPTS
Presupposition and entailment describe two different
aspects of information that need not
be stated as speakers assume it is already known by
listeners
[these concepts used to be much more central to pragmatics than they are
now, but they are still important to
understand the relationship between pragmatics and semantics]

presupposition: something the speaker assumes to be the case

before making an utterance
Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions

!! not the same meaning as in ordinary usage (John wrote Harry a letter,
presupposing he
could read)!!

entailment: something that logically follows from what is

asserted in the utterance
Sentences, not speakers, have entailments

Example analysis: Mary's brother bought three horses.

presuppositions: Mary exists, Mary has a brother, Mary has only one
brother, Mary's brother is rich
speaker's subjective presuppositions, all can be wrong
entailments: Mary's brother bought something, bought three animals, two
horses, one horse etc.
entailments follow from the sentence regardless of whether the speaker's
beliefs are right
or wrong
[Because of its logical nature, entailment is not generally discussed as
much in contemporary pragmatics as the
more speaker-dependent notion of presupposition]

esupposition and entailment

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND I
Concern with this topic originates with debates in
philosophy, specifically debates about the
nature or reference and referring expressions
Frege (1892): If anything is asserted there is always an
obvious presupposition
(Voraussetzung in the original) that the simple or
compound proper names used have a
reference. If one therefore asserts Kepler died in misery,
there is a presupposition that the
name Kepler designates something (Kepler designates
something is not part of the
meaning of Kepler died in misery)
(i) referring phrases carry presuppositions to the effect that
they do indeed refer

(ii) a sentence and its negative counterpart share the same

set of presuppositions
(iii) in order for assertion to be either true or false, its
presuppositions must be true
or satisfied

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND II
Russell (1905): Sentences that lack proper referents are
meaningful (vs. (iiii) in Frege)
The King of France is wise
The sentence is meaningful because it is simply false
The King of France is not wise
can be taken in two ways:
a. there is a King of France and he is not wise (narrow
scope of negation)
b. there is no King of France and he is not wise (wide
scope of negation)
(The King of France is not wise because there is no such
person)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND III

Strawson (1950): Sentences must distinguished from uses
of sentences. Russells
conflation of the distinction led him to think that because
The King of
France is wise is meaningful, it must be either true are
false.
Sentences arent true or false, only statements are
The statement of The King of France is wise may have
been true in
1670 and false in 1770, but in 1970 it cannot sensibly be
said to be

either true or false, due to the non-existence of a King of

France the
question of its truth or falsity does not even arise.
there is a precondition for The King of France is wise
to be true or
false and that is There is a present King of France. This
is a
presupposition

PRESUPPOSITION
Presupposition is treated as a relationship between two
propositions
Mary's dog is cute (= proposition p)
Mary has a dog (= proposition q)
p >> q (p presupposes q)

Negation does not change the relationship of

presupposition
Mary's dog isn't cute (= NOT p)
Mary has a dog (= q)
NOT p >> q (NOT p presupposes q)

constancy under negation = the presupposition of

statement remains constant (i.e., true)
even when that statement is negated
Everybody knows that John is gay (= p)
Everybody doesn't know that John is gay (= NOT p)
John is gay (= q)
p >> q & NOT p >> q

speakers disagree about validity of p, but not of q

TYPES OF PRESUPPOSITION I
Linguistic forms (words, phrases, structures) are indicators
(or triggers) of potential
presuppositions which can only become actual
presuppositions in contexts with speakers.

A. Existential Presupposition
speaker is committed to the existence of the entities named
the King of Sweden
the cat
the girl next door
the Counting Crows
your car

B. Factive Presupposition
certain verbs/construction indicate that something is a fact
Everybody KNOWS that John is gay (>> John is gay)
She didn't REALIZE he was ill (>> He was ill)
We REGRET telling him (>> We told him)
I WASN'T AWARE that she was married (>> She was married)
It ISN'T ODD that he left early (>> He left early)
I'M GLAD that it's over (>> It's over)

TYPES OF PRESUPPOSITION II
C. Lexical Presupposition
The use of a form with its asserted meaning is conventionally
interpreted with the presupposition that
another, non-asserted, meaning is understood
He MANAGED to repair the clock (>> he tried to repair the
clock)
Asserted meaning: he suceeded
He didn't MANAGE to repair the clock (>> he tried to repair the
clock)
Asserted meaning: he failed
He STOPPED smoking (>> he used to smoke)
They STARTED complained (>> they weren't complaining
before)
You're late AGAIN (>> You were late before)

D. Structural Presupposition
certain sentence structures conventionally and regularly
presuppose that part of the structure is already
assumed to be true
Wh-questions: When did he leave? (>> he left)

Where did you buy the bike? (>> You bought the bike)
This type of presupposition can lead listeners to believe that the
information presented is necessarily
true, rather than just the presupposition of the person asking the
question
How fast was the car going when it ran the red light? (>> the car
ran the red light)
If the question is answered with some estimate of the speed the
speaker would appear to be accepting
the truth of the presupposition (very popular with lawyers)

TYPES OF PRESUPPOSITION III

E Non-factive Presupposition
certain verbs/constructions indicate that something is not a
fact / not true
I DREAMED that I was rich (>> I was not rich)
We IMAGINED we were in Hawaii (>> We were not in Hawaii)
He PRETENDS to be ill (>> He is not ill)

F. Counterfactual Presupposition
structures mean that what is presupposed is not only not
true, but is the opposite of what is
true, i.e. contrary to facts
If you were my friend, you would have helped me (>> You are not
my friend)

SUMMARY
Type Example Presupposition
existential the X >> X exists
factive I regret leaving >> I left
non-factive He pretended to be happy >> He wasn't happy
lexical He managed to escape >> He tried to escape
structural When did she die? >> She died
counterfactual If I weren't ill >> I am ill

TYPES OF PRESUPPOSITION III

Identify the respective presuppositions and classify them
according to type

1 John didnt realize that he was in debt

>> John was in debt factive
2 Before Strawson was even born, Frege noticed presuppositions
>> Strawson was born structural
3 If Hannibal had only had twelve more elephants, the Romance
languages wouldnt exist now
>> Hannibal didnt have 12 more elephants counterfactual
4 John didnt see the man with two heads
>> there exists a man with two heads existential
5 Carter returned to power
>> Carter was in power before lexical
6 It wasnt Henry that kissed Rosie
>> someone kissed Rosie structural
7 Fred hallucinated that he had won a billion Dollars
>> Fred didnt win a billion Dollars non-factive
8 Agatha accused Ian of plagiarism
>> Agatha thinks plagiarism is bad

Presupposition and entailment

THE PROJECTION PROBLEM I
There is a basic expectation that the presupposition of a
simple sentence will continue to be
true when that simple sentence becomes part of a more
complex sentence
Projection Problem: the meaning of some
presuppositions (as 'parts') doesn't survive to
become the meaning of some complex sentences (as
'wholes')
EXAMPLE ANALYSIS 1:
I imagined that Kelly was ill and nobody realized that she was ill
a. Nobody realized that Kelly was ill (= p)
b. Kelly was ill (= q)
c. p >> q => Speaker uttering a. presupposed b.
d. I imagined that Kelly was ill (= r)
e. Kelly was not ill (= NOT q)

f. r >> NOT q => speaker uttering d. presupposed e. (which is the

opposite of b.)
g. I imagined that Kelly was ill and nobody realized that she was
ill (= r & p)
h. r & p >> NOT q => q can no longer be assumed to be true

THE PROJECTION PROBLEM II

EXAMPLE ANALYSIS 2
Dialog in a TV soap opera:
Shirley: It's so sad. George regrets getting Mary pregnant.
Jean: But he didn't get her pregnant. We know that now.
'George regrets getting Mary pregnant; but he didn't get her
pregnant
a. George regrets getting Mary pregnant (= p)
b. George got Mary pregnant (= q)
c. p >> q
d. He didn't get her pregnant (= r)
e. George regrets getting Mary pregnant; but he didn't get her
pregnant (= p & r)
f. p & r >> NOT q

The presupposition does not project because it is overruled

by an entailment: 'He didn't get
her pregnant' entails 'George didn't get Mary pregnant' as a
logical consequence.
Therefore 'George regrets getting Mary pregnant; but he
didn't get her pregnant' includes the
presupposition q in the first half and the entailment NOT q
in the second half
the entailment is more powerful

THE PROJECTION PROBLEM III

Entailments can also cancel existential presuppositions
a. The King of England visited us
b. The King of England does not exist

 the speaker uttering b. does not simultaneously believe

that there is a King of England
(presupposition) and that there is no King of England
(entailment)
Presuppositions should be thought of as potentials (they
are defeasible), they only become
actual presuppositions when intended by the speaker to be
recognized as such
At least John wont have to regret that he did a PhD

Despite the use of regret only the context/knowledge can

decide whether John did a PhD
or not.
Speakers can indicate that a potential presupposition is not
presented as a strong assumption
What's that guy doing in the parking lot?
He's looking for his car or something.

ORDERED ENTAILMENTS
Generally speaking, entailment is not a pragmatic (i.e.
having to do with speaker meaning),
but a purely logical concept.
Rover chased three squirrels (= p)
a. Something chased three squirrels (= q)
b. Rover did something to three squirrels (= r)
c. Rover chased three of something (= s)
d. Something happened (= t)

Relationsship of entailment between p and q: p ||- q

a.-d. are examples of background entailments (there are
more)
the speaker can communicate - usually by means of stress
the order of importance of the
entailments
Rover chased THREE squirrels
ROVER chased three squirrels

 foreground entailment
Cleft-constructions can fulfil the same purpose
It was ROVER that chased the squirrels

Cooperation and implicature

BASIC CONCEPTS
We assume that speakers and listeners involved in
conversation are generally cooperating
with each other
- for reference to be successful it was proposed that collaboration
is a necessary factor
- in accepting speakers' presuppositions, listeners normally have
to assume that a speaker who says
'my car' does have a car and is not trying to mislead the listener

People having a conversation are not normally assumed to

be trying to confuse, trick, or
withhold relevant information from each other sense of
cooperation
In the middle of their lunch hour, one woman asks another how
she likes the hamburger she is eating,
and receives the answer:
A hamburger is a hamburger

Tautology: statement that is always true, but has no

communicative value
In a conversation the speaker using a tautology intends to
communicate more than is said.
The additional conveyed meaning is an implicature
(here: the hamburger tastes as usual, she has no opinion
whether it's good or bad)
Implicature stands as a paradigmatic example of the nature
and power of pragmatic
explanations of linguistic phenomena
It is intended to contrast with terms like (logical)
implication, entailment or consequence

THE COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE

Scenario:
There is a woman sitting on a park bench and a large dog
lying on the ground in front of the
bench. A man comes along and sits down on the bench
Man: Does your dog bite?
Woman: No.
(The man reaches down to pet the dog. The dog bites the man's
hand.)
Man: Ouch! Hey! You said your dog doesn't bite.
Woman: He doesn't. But that's not my dog.

The man erroneously assumed that more was

communicated than what was said.
- this is not a problem involving presuppositions because the
assumption that the woman has a
dog is true for both speakers.
- From the man's perspective the woman's answer provided less
information than expected

giving sufficient information is an example for the

cooperative principle of conversation
There are four sub-principles, called conversational
maxims according to Grice (1975)
(key ideas delivered in the William James lectures at
Harvard in 1967).
Cooperative Principle: Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which
you are engaged.

MAXIMS
A. Quantity
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange)

2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is

required
B. Quality (Try to make your contribution one that is true)
1. Do not say what you believe to be false
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
C. Relation
1. Be relevant
D. Manner (Be perspicuous)
1. Avoid obscurity of expression
2. Avoid ambiguity
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
4. Be orderly
Summary: We assume that people are normally going to provide
an appropriate amount of information,
tell the truth, be relevant and try to be as clear as they can.
Speakers rarely mention these principles, except when they may
be in danger of not fully adhering to
them hedges

HEDGES I
hedges: cautious notes to indicate that a speaker is aware
of maxims, but fears not to adhere
to them completely. Speakers are aware of the maxims and
show that they are trying to
observe them.
Examples Quality
As far as I know, they're married
I may be mistaken, but I thought I saw a wedding ring on her
finger
I'm not sure if this is right, but I heard it was a secret ceremony in
Hawaii
He couldn't live without her, I guess

Examples Quantity
As you probably know, I am terrified of bugs
So, to cut a long story short, we grabbed our stuff and ran
I won't bore you with all the details, but it was an exciting trip

Examples Relation
Oh by the way, his nephew is a member of parliament
Anyway, that's also part of the program
I don't know if this is important, but some of the files are missing
This may sound like a dumb question, but whose handwriting is
this?
Not to change the subject, but is this related to the budget?

and implicature
HEDGES II
Examples Manner
This may be a bit confused, but I remember being in a car
I'm not sure if this makes sense, but the car had no lights
I don't know if this is clear at all, but I think the other car was
reversing

Situations where speakers may not follow the expectations

of the cooperative principle:
- in courtrooms and classrooms, witnesses and students are
often called upon to tell people
things which are already well-known to those people
(violation of the quantity maxim)
specialized institutional talk is different from
conversation
Examples for speakers not following the maxims on
purpose
No comment
My lips are sealed

(these statements are not as informative as required, but

interpreted as communicating more
than is said, i.e., the speaker knows the answer)
APPARENT VIOLATION OF THE MAXIMS IS THE
KEY TO THE NOTION OF
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE!!!

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
Basic assumption in conversation:
Unless otherwise indicated, the participants are adhering
to the cooperative principle and the
maxims
Charlene: I hope you brought the bread and the cheese
Dexter: Ah, I brought the bread

Charlene assumes the Dexter is cooperating and aware of

the quantity maxim. If he did not
mention the cheese, he must have done so on purpose. She
infers that what is not mentioned,
was not brought
Dexter has conveyed more than he said via a
conversational implicature
Charlene: b & c?
Dexter: b (+> NOT c)

Speakers communicate meaning via implicatures listeners recognize the communicated

meanings via inference

GENERALIZED
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
Doobie: Did you invite Bella and Cathy? (b & c?)
Mary: I invited Bella (b +> NOT c)

When no special background knowledge of the context of

the utterance is required to make
the necessary inferences, it is called a generalized
conversational implicature
Example: indefinite articles are typically interpreted as an
X +> not speaker's X
I was sitting in a garden one day. A child looked over the fence.

not my garden, my child

Quantity maxim: If the speaker were capable of being

more specific/informative he/she
would have said 'my garden' and 'my child'
John has two PhDs

Quality maxim: A speaker believes what she/he asserts to

be true
Therefore sentences like
??John has two PhDs but I dont believe he has

are anomalous (so-called Moores Paradox)

SCALAR IMPLICATURES
Words of a certain type can be classified as expressing one
value from a scale of values,
e.g., terms for expressing quantity
<all, most, many, some, few> <always, often, sometimes>
<must, should, may> <n, , 5,4,3,2,1>

When producing an utterance, a speaker selects the one

word from the scale which is the
most informative and truthful (quantity and quality).
I'm studying linguistics and I've completed some of the required
courses.

'some' creates the implicature +> not all

scalar implicature: when any form in a scale is asserted,
the negative of all forms higher on
the scale is implicated
The linguistic courses are sometimes really interesting
'sometimes' creates the implicatures +> not often, +> not
always
It's possible that they were delayed
implicates +> not certain (as a higher value on the scale of
likelihood)
This should be stored in a cool place
implicates +> not must (on a scale of obligation)
implicates +> not frozen (on a scale of coldness)

Speakers may correct themselves on the use of scalar

implicatures:
I got some of this jewelry in Hong Kong - um actually I think I got
most of it there.

PARTICULARIZED
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE I
Most conversations take place in very specific contexts in
which locally recognized
inferences are assumed
particularized conversational implicatures
- by far the most common type of implicature, therefore
usually just called implicatures
Rick: Hey, coming to the party tonight?
Tom: My parents are visiting
- seems to violate maxim of relevance. In order to make Tom's
response relevant, Rick has to draw on
assumed knowledge that one college student expects another to
have (Tom will be spending the evening
with his parents, who are unlikely to come to the party,
consequently +> Tom not at party)
Lloyd: What if the USSR blockades the Gulf and all the oil?
Winston: Oh come now, Britain rules the seas!
- any reasonably informed participant in the 1970s (and today)
would know that Bs utterance is
blatantly false. That being so, Winston cannot be trying to deceive
Lloyd. His seeming violation of the
maxim of quality must be intended to mean something different,
namely the opposite ( irony)
Possibilities: hyperbole (Im starving), metaphor (She devoured
this book), irony (friendly way of
being offensive: I just love being woken up at 4 a.m. by a fire
alarm), sarcasm (less friendly form of
irony: Why dont you leave all your dirty clothes on the floor?),
banter (offensive way of being

friendly, can have a flirtatious element: Youre nasty, mean and

stingy. How can you only give me one
kiss?)

PARTICULARIZED
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE II
Ann: Where are you going with the dog?
Sam: To the V - E - T

Sam 'flouts' (i.e. does not adhere to) the maxim of manner.
The dog is known to recognize
the word 'vet' and to hate being taken there, therefore Sam
produces a more elaborate, i.e.
less brief, version
Jane: John still has not said if hell come
Beth: Hell either come or he wont

Beth flouts the maxim of quantity by saying nothing

informative. Her true informative
inference must be something like calm down, theres no
point in worrying, we cant do
anything about it anyway
Leila has just walked into Mary's office and noticed all the
work on her desk.
Leila: Whoa! Has you boss gone crazy?
Mary: Let's go get some coffee.

Mary flouts the maxim of relevance. Leila has to infer

some local reason (e.g., the boss is
nearby) for why Mary makes a non-relevant remark
Standardized flouting of relevance:
Bert: Do you like ice cream?
Ernie: Is the Pope Catholic?

n and implicature
EXERCISE

Which Gricean maxims have been flouted in the following

example?
1 A: Lets get the kids something
B: Okay, but I veto I C E C R E A M
2 A: Wheres Bill?
B: Theres a yellow VW outside Sues house
3 A: Teherans in Turkey, isnt it?
B: Yes, and Londons in Armenia
4 War is war Quantity
5 Miss Singer produced a series of sounds corresponding
closely Manner
to the score of an aria from Rigoletto

PROPERTIES OF
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES
I
conversational implicatures are defeasible
Because implicatures are part of what is communicated
and not said, speakers can always
deny that they intended the communicate such meanings.
You have won five dollars! (+> ONLY five) standard implicature:
only five dollars won

It is easy to suspend the implicature +> only five by

adding 'at least'.
You have won at least five dollars!
You have won five dollars, in fact, you've won ten!
You have won five dollars, that's four more than one!

EXCURSION: LOGICAL REASONING

Deductive inferences are not defeasible Inductive inferences are
defeasible
i. If Socrates is a man, he is mortal i. I have dug up 1001 carrots
ii. Socrates is a man ii. Every one of the 1001 carrots is orange
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Therefore, Socrates is mortal iii. Therefore, all carrots are

orange
if premises i. and ii. are true, BUT:
then whatever else is true or false, iii. is true iv. The 1002nd
carrot is green
implicatures are more like inductive inferences than deductive
ones

PROPERTIES OF
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES
II
conversational implicatures are non-detachable
(except those due to the maxim of manner)
An implicature is attached to the semantic content of what
is said, not to linguistic form, and
therefore implicatures cannot be detached from an
utterance simply by changing the words
of the utterance for synonyms
If for example an ironic interpretation of Johns a genius
(i.e., Johns an idiot) is forced
by flouting, then it does not matter, if it is worded
differently
Johns a mental prodigy
Johns a big brain
Johns an enormous intellect

PROPERTIES OF CONVERSATIONAL
IMPLICATURES III
conversational implicatures are calculable
For every putative implicature it should be possible to
construct an argument showing how
from the literal meaning or the sense of the utterance on
the one hand, and the co-operative

principle and the maxims on the other hand, it follows that

an addressee would make the
inference in question to preserve the assumption of cooperation
conversational implicatures are non-conventional
Conversational implicatures are not part of the
conventional meaning of linguistic
expressions
Since you need to know the literal meaning/sense of a
sentence before you can calculate its
implicatures in a context, the implicatures cannot be part
of the meaning
An utterance can be true, while its implicature is false:
Herb hit Sally

By the quantity maxim this would implicate

Herb hit Sally but didnt kill her

but a speaker might say Herb hit Sally nevertheless,

attempting to mislead

CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURES I
Conventional implicatures are not based on the
cooperative principle or the maxims. They
don't have to occur in conversation and depend on special
contexts for interpretation. They
are associated with specific words and result in additional
conveyed meanings when those
words are used.
'but'
p but q will be based on the conjunction p & q plus an
implicature of contrast between the
information in p and the information in q
Mary suggested black, but I chose white
p & q (+> p is in contrast to q)

'even'

implicature of 'contrary to expectation'

Even John came to the party
He even helped tidy up afterwards

CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURES
II
'yet'
the present situation is expected to be different, perhaps
the opposite, at a later time
Dennis isn't here yet (= NOT p)
NOT p is true (+> p expected to be true later)

'and'
the so-called different meanings of 'and' in English can be
explained as instances of
conventional implicature in different structures.
Yesterday, Mary was happy and ready to work (p & q, +> p plus
q)
She put on her clothes and left the house (p & q, +> q after p)

- when two statements containing static information are

joined by 'and' the implicature is
simply 'in addition' or 'plus'
- when the two statements contain dynamic, action-related
information, the implicature of
'and' is 'and then, indicating sequence.
- in the second case the order of the two parts cannot be
reversed without a change in
meaning