Professional Documents
Culture Documents
V CARLOS
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner
Francisco Muoz, Jr. (petitioner) to challenge the decision[2] and the resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57126.[4] The CA decision set aside the
decision[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 166, Pasig City, in Civil Case No.
63665. The CA resolution denied the petitioners subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized
below.
Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter
residential house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong City (subject
property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the Registry of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name of the petitioner.[6]
The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT
No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents).[7]
On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee,
mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with Erlindas consent, to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within
twenty (20) years, through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66.[8] The respondents
then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square meter, two-story residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by
Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration
ofP602,000.00.[9]
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC
for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but
only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioners
name were falsified.
Erlindas parents; it was the subject of Civil Case No. 50141, a complaint for annulment
of sale, before the RTC, Branch 158, Pasig City, filed by the surviving heirs of Pedro
ampagreement, Amado agreed to transfer to the other compulsory heirs of Pedro,
including Erlinda, their rightful shares of the land.[21]
THE RTC RULING
In a Decision dated January 23, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It
found that the subject property was Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property that was
inherited from her father. It also upheld the sale to the petitioner, even without Eliseos
consent as the deed of absolute sale bore the genuine signatures of Erlinda and the
petitioner as vendor and vendee, respectively. It concluded that the NBI finding that
Eliseos signatures in the special power of attorney and in the affidavit were forgeries
was immaterial because Eliseos consent to the sale was not necessary.[22]
The respondents elevated the case to the CA via an ordinary appeal
under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
THE CA RULING
The CA decided the appeal on June 25, 2002. Applying the second
paragraph of Article 158 [23] of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun,
[24]
the CA held that the subject property, originally Erlindas exclusive paraphernal
property, became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for a housing loan
that was paid through conjugal funds Eliseos monthly salary deductions; the subject
property, therefore, cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseos consent,
pursuant to Article 124[25] of the Family Code. Thus, the CA declared void the deed of
absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision.
When the CA denied[26] the subsequent motion for reconsideration,[27] the
petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them
a P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the petitioner
gave Erlinda a P200,000.00[10] advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, and made her
sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract; the petitioner promised to
give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS
mortgage cancelled, and submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives
all his rights to the subject property; with the P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid
GSIS P176,445.27[11] to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427;[12] in May 1992,
Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseos
affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseos affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give
the P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda
return the P200,000.00 advance; since Erlinda could not return theP200,000.00
advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title;
and in 1993, they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioners
name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their name.
During the pendency of the RTC case, or on March 29, 1995, the MeTC
decided the ejectment case. It ordered Erlinda and her family to vacate the subject
property, to surrender its possession to the petitioner, and to pay the overdue rentals.
[17]
THE ISSUE
The issues in the present case boil down to (1) whether the subject
property is paraphernal or conjugal; and, (2) whether the contract between the parties
was a sale or an equitable mortgage.
OUR RULING
We deny the present Petition but for reasons other than those
advanced by the CA.
This Court is not a trier of facts. However, if the inference, drawn by the
CA, from the facts is manifestly mistaken, as in the present case, we can review the
evidence to allow us to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record.[33]
First Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
Second Issue:
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.[34]
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot
from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.
[35]
Pursuant to Articles 92[36] and 109[37] of the Family Code, properties acquired by
gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. [38] The residential
lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.
The CA, however, held that the residential lot became conjugal when the
house was built thereon through conjugal funds, applying the second paragraph
of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.[39] Under the second paragraph
of Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land that originally belonged to one spouse becomes
conjugal upon the construction of improvements thereon at the expense of the
partnership. We applied this provision in Calimlim-Canullas,[40] where we held that
when the conjugal house is constructed on land belonging exclusively to the husband,
the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the husband is entitled to reimbursement of
the value of the land at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
The CA misapplied Article 158 of the
Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas
We cannot subscribe to the CAs misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the
Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.
As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code,
its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have
governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on
August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including
Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to
133). Article 105 of the Family Code states:
xxxx
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of
the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already
vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil
Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are
made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or
through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the
cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of
the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses
shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property
shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement
of the cost of the improvement.[41]
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS
loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989[42] to April 30, 1992,
[43]
Eliseo paid about P60,755.76,[44] not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan
plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27[45] paid by Erlinda to
cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS
housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is
considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary
deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of
Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to
the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseos signatures in the
special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.
Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real
nature of the contract between the parties.
None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired by each
over the properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the accusedspouse may properly be charged against the community as heretofore discussed.15
The RTC applied the same reasoning as above.16 Efren and Melecias property
relation was admittedly conjugal under the Civil Code but, since the transitory
provision of the Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or
acquired rights are impaired, that property relation between the couple was changed
when the Family Code took effect in 1988. The latter code now prescribes in Article 75
absolute community of property for all marriages unless the parties entered into a
prenuptial agreement. As it happens, Efren and Melecia had no prenuptial agreement.
The CA agreed with this position.17
Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal
stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be
said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of
the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute
community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before
1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be
modified except prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must
be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles
66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage
between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except
before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the
absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a
decree of legal separation;18 (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled
and agreed to revive their former property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of property
had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or
fails to comply with his obligations to the family;20 (d) there was judicial separation of
property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary
dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.21 None of
these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the
Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property
and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in
a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership
over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage
settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community
of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired
or vested rights to such separate properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses loose admission that absolute
community of property governed their property relation since the record shows that
they had been insistent that their property regime is one of conjugal partnership of
gains.22 No evidence of a prenuptial agreement between them has been presented.
What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the
operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is
that they were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article
119 of the Civil Code thus provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains
that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code states:
"x x x x
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply
to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256." 23
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether
or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil
liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to
the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the
marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient;
but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property
of her own,24 the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder
case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been
covered.25Those responsibilities are as follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate
children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children
shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent
of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to
the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of
their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing
or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for selfimprovement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to
be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.1wphi1
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal
indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against
the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article
have been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not
altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the
partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned."
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198 dated January 29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The
Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing
the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for
the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in
Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
Family Code have been covered.
SO ORDERED.
AGUETE V PNB
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Issues
Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not giving
weight to the findings and conclusions of the trial
court, and in reversing and setting aside such findings
and conclusions without stating specific contrary
evidence;
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring
the real estate mortgage valid;
III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring,
without basis, that the loan contracted by husband
Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine National Bank
Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family, aside
from the fact that such had not been raised by
respondent in its appeal.14]
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari of
the Decision[2] dated
September 7, 2000 and Resolution[3] dated
December 29, 2000, both of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
54896. The CA Decision reversed and set
aside the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 92),
which ruled in favor of herein petitioners in
the action for reconveyance filed by the
latter in said court against the
respondents. The CA Resolution denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
respondents
subsequent
motion
for
reconsideration was simply noted by the CA
in its Resolution of July 7, 1995. On the
basis of a technicality, this Court, in a
Resolution dated September 27, 1995,
dismissed respondents' appeal which was
docketed as G.R. No. 121020. Per Entry of
Judgment,[16] said Resolution became final
and executory on January 2, 1996.
Meanwhile, respondents filed their
Answer[17] in the main case therein denying
the allegations of the complaint and averring
as defenses the same grounds upon which
they anchored their earlier motion to
dismiss.
The parties having failed to amicably
settle during the scheduled pre-trial
conference, the case proceeded to trial.
The evidence respectively presented
by the parties is summarized as follows:[18]
x x x [It] appears that in
the early part of 1958, Domingo
Hernandez, Sr. (who was then a
Central Bank employee) and his
spouse Sergia V. Hernandez
were awarded a piece of real
property by the Philippine
Homesite
and
Housing
Corporation (PHHC) by way of
salary deduction. On October
18, 1963, the [petitioners] then
having paid in full the entire
amount of P6,888.96, a Deed of
Absolute Sale of the property
was executed by the PHHC in
their favor. TCT No. 107534,
covering the property was issued
to the [petitioners] on May 23,
1966.It bears an annotation of
the retention period of the
surmise
and
conjectures; (2) the
inference made is
manifestly
mistaken; (3) there
is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the
judgment is based
on misapprehension
of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) the
Court of Appeals
went beyond the
issues of the case
and its findings are
contrary to the
admissions of both
appellant
and
appellees; (7) the
findings of fact of
the
Court
of
Appeals
are
contrary to those
of the trial court;
(8) said findings of
fact are conclusions
without citation of
specific evidence
on which they are
based; (9) the facts
set forth in the
decision as well as
in the petitioners
main and reply
briefs
are
not
disputed by the
respondents; (10)
the finding of fact
of the Court of
Appeals is premised
on the supposed
absence of evidence
and is contradicted
by evidence on
record. (emphasis
ours)
provisions
regarding
the
certification
of
non-forum
shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether
dispensed
with
or
its
requirements
completely
disregarded. Thus,
under
justifiable circumstances, the
Court has relaxed the rule
requiring the submission of such
certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not
jurisdictional.
In HLC
Construction
and
Development Corporation v.
Emily
Homes
Subdivision
Homeowners Association, it was
held that the signature of only
one of the petitioners in the
certification
against
forum
shopping substantially complied
with rules because all the
petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense.
The same leniency was applied
by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of
Cavile,
because
the
lone
petitioner who executed the
certification
of
non-forum
shopping was a relative and coowner of the other petitioners
with whom he shares a common
interest. x x x
xxx
In the instant case, petitioners
share a common interest and
defense inasmuch as they
collectively claim a right not to
be dispossessed of the subject lot
by virtue of their and their
deceased parents construction of
a family home and occupation
thereof for more than 10 years.
[32]
action
for
annulment must be
brought during the
marriage
and
within ten years
from the questioned
transaction by the
wife. Where
the
law speaks in clear
and
categorical
language, there is
no
room
for
interpretation there
is room only for
application.
x x x (Emphasis ours.)
Here, the husbands first act of disposition of
the subject property occurred in 1963 when
he executed the SPA and the Deed of
Transfer of Rights in favor of Dolores
Camisura. Thus, the right of action of the
petitioners accrued in 1963, as Article 173 of
the Civil Code provides that the wife may
file for annulment of a contract entered into
by the husband without her consent within
ten (10) years from the transaction
questioned. Petitioners filed the action for
reconveyance in 1995. Even if we were to
consider that their right of action arose when
they learned of the cancellation of TCT No.
107534 and the issuance of TCT No. 290121
in Melanie Mingoas name in 1993, still,
twelve (12) years have lapsed since such
discovery, and they filed the petition beyond
the period allowed by law. Moreover, when
Sergia Hernandez, together with her
children, filed the action for reconveyance,
the conjugal partnership of property with
Hernandez, Sr. had already been terminated
by virtue of the latter's death on April 16,
xxx
The time-honored rule anchored
on public policy is that relief
will be denied to a litigant whose
claim or demand has become
stale, or who has acquiesced for
an unreasonable length of time,
or who has not been vigilant or
who has slept on his rights either
by
negligence,
folly
or
inattention. In other words,
public policy requires, for peace
of society, the discouragement of
claims grown stale for nonassertion; thus laches is an
impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right which has
become,
under
the
circumstances, inequitable or
unfair to permit.
Pertinently, in De la Calzada-Cierras
v. CA,[47] we ruled that a complaint to
recover the title and possession of the lot
filed 12 years after the registration of the
sale is considered neglect for an
unreasonably long time to assert a right to
the property.
Here, petitioners' unreasonably long period
of inaction in asserting their purported rights
over the subject property weighs heavily
against them. We quote with approval the
findings of the CA that:[48]
It was earlier shown that there
existed a period of 17 years
during which time Hernandez,
Sr. xxx never even questioned
the
defendants-appellants
possession of the property; also
there was another interval of 12
years after discovering that the
TCT of the property in the name
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[8]
[9]
[11]
[12]
[15]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
award
of P50,000.00
as
damages
and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The Court of Appeals explained that
the properties subject of the contracts
were conjugal properties and as such, the
consent of both spouses is necessary to
give effect to the sale. Since private
respondent Norma Camaisa refused to
sign the contracts, the sale was never
perfected. In fact, the downpayment was
returned by respondent spouses and was
accepted by petitioner. The Court of
Appeals also stressed that the authority of
the court to allow sale or encumbrance of
a conjugal property without the consent of
the other spouse is applicable only in
cases where the said spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the
conjugal property.
Hence,
the
present
assigning the following errors:
recourse
NEVER OBJECTED TO
STIPULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS OF
PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO
SELL ALREADY SIGNED BY THE
PETITIONER, RESPONDENT MR.
CAMAISA AND WITNESSES
MARKED AS ANNEX G IN THE
COMPLAINT EXCEPT, FOR MINOR
PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY
LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF
TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE
AND RESCISSION IN CASE OF
NONPAYMENT, WHICH PETITIONER
READILY AGREED AND ACCEDED
TO THEIR INCLUSION;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT CONTRACT OF SALE IS
CONSENSUAL AND IT IS
PERFECTED BY THE MERE
CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND THE
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS ARE
ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358,
1403, 1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
GOVERNED BY THE STATUTE OF
FRAUD.[23]
The Court does not find error in the
decisions of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court
erred when it entered a summary
judgment in favor of respondent
spouses there being a genuine issue of
fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of
whether the contracts to sell between
petitioner and respondent spouses was
perfected is a question of
necessitating a trial on the merits.
fact
SO ORDERED.
FERRER V FERRER
[25]
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal
by Certiorari which assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 16 August
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78525, reversing
and setting aside the Order [2] dated 16
December 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 in
Civil Case No. MC02-1780. The Court of
Appeals ordered the dismissal of the
Complaint[3] filed by petitioner Josefa
Bautista Ferrer against respondents Sps.
Manuel M. Ferrer and Virginia Ferrer, and
Sps. Ismael M. Ferrer and Flora Ferrer in the
aforesaid Civil Case No. MC02-1780.
In her Complaint for payment of
conjugal improvements, sum of money, and
accounting with prayer for injunction and
damages, petitioner alleged that she is the
widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a halfbrother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer
(Manuel)
and
Ismael
M.
Ferrer
(Ismael). Before her marriage to Alfredo, the
latter acquired a piece of lot, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
67927.[4] He applied for a loan with the
Social Security System (SSS) to build
improvements
thereon,
including
a
residential house and a two-door apartment
building. However, it was during their
marriage that payment of the loan was made
using the couples conjugal funds. From their
REIMBURSEMENT MUST BE
DIRECTED TO.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT,
HON.
RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION
IN
DENYING
THE
[RESPONDENTS]
MOTION
TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION.[15]
MULLER V MULLER
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the
February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification
the August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between petitioner and
respondent, as well as the Resolution 4 dated August
13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent
Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany
at a house owned by respondents parents but
decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents
which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the
cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property
was registered in the name of petitioner under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. On September 26, 1994,
respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a
decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and
respondent. It also decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using
paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it
ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the
following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF
THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS
WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT
INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH
OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x
DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN
ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN
THE PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION
WHICH IS ACTUALLY A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO
OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT IN
QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF
CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is
disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines;
that respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition but circumvented the same; and that
respondents purpose for filing an action for
separation of property is to obtain exclusive
possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo
property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer
of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely
reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said
property were in consideration of his marriage to
BEUMER V BEUMER
11
12
SO ORDERED.
21
BUENAVENTURA V CA
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
[2]
Petitioner
appealed
the
above
decision to the Court of Appeals. While
the case was pending in the appellate
court, respondent filed a motion to
increase
the P15,000
monthly
support pendente lite of their son Javy
Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an
opposition thereto, praying that it be
denied or that such incident be set for oral
argument.
[3]
[5]
[9]
[10]
In
the
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari petitioner claims that the
Court of Appeals decided the case not in
accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
[12]
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
DINO V DINO
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
WHEREFORE, in view
foregoing,
judgment
is
rendered:
of the
hereby
A
DECREE
OF
ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only
be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, in view
foregoing,
judgment
is
rendered:
of the
hereby
10
The
delivery
of
the
presumptive legitimes herein
prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the
children accruing upon the death of
either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received
under the decree of annulment or
absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime.
16
11
13
14
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated August 11, 2010 and Resolution2 dated
October 5, 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318, which denied the
petitioner's appeal and motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
LawlibraryofCRAlaw
re darclaw
cralawla wlibrary
CARINO V CARINO
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death
benefits is now the subject of the controversy
between the two Susans whom he married.
1wphi1.nt
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN
THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS
TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND
EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT
OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
SO ORDERED.
SAGUID V CA
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
[3]
[4]
[5]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[15]
[17]
[21]
[22]
A.
[23]
[25]
[26]
[31]
[32]
[34]
[36]
[39]
[40]
contribution
in
the
construction
thereof. Anent the personal properties,
her participation therein should be limited
only to the amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial courts award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court
of Appeals correctly deleted the same for
lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private
respondent Gina S. Rey is declared coowner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the
controverted house to the extent of
P11,413.00 and personal properties to the
extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner
is
ordered to reimburse the amount of
P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing
which the house shall be sold at public
auction to satisfy private respondents
claim.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as
follows:
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
LAVADIA V HEIRS OF LUNA
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan
Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity,
Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the
condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage), having been acquired from the sole
funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna
while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was
still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no
right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of
the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to
the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married
to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the
owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
11
13
Issues
15
16
17
19
20
24
25
26
28
29
xxxx
SO ORDERED.