Published as The Art of Living: Pierre Hadot's Rejection of Plotinian Mysticism, International

Philosophical Quarterly, 43:4 (December, 2003), 407-422.

THE ART OF LIVING:

PIERRE HADOTS REJECTION OF PLOTINIAN MYSTICISM

Abstract
This article examines Pierre Hadot's rejection of the "purely spiritual" and "transcendent"
philosophy of Plotinus as a viable philosophy of life. Hadot's initial attraction to the
Enneads eventually concluded that the mystical quest of Plotinus was unrealistic and
unacceptable because it required one to forsake the experience of the spiritual and
ineffable in the concrete and the practical. I argue that Hadot's critical assessment does
not adequately appreciate the "descent vector" that is integral to Plotinus conception of
the One. His mysticism requires reference not only to the efficacy of Intellect and the
One but also to embodiment and creative participation in the everyday affairs of worldly
existence. Plotinus cannot abandon the implications of the bi-directional dynamic of the
One which generates the richly diverse, beautiful cosmos. The profile of proper living
extends across the ontological spectrum, observing the demarcations and dynamic
affiliations, from the One to concrete materiality.

1.
Pierre Hadot is a highly qualified scholar of Plotinus. His work includes
translation, commentary, and exposition of the Enneads. His studies range from early
Greek to contemporary philosophical works, with a long-term focus on HellenisticRoman philosophies. His work is of particular interest because he approaches
philosophies not simply as worldviews, conceptual structures, or systems of thought but
as ways of living that involve self-transforming "spiritual discipline."1 He is, in effect,
eminently qualified to provide a broad based critical judgment on the work of Plotinus.
His appraisal of the Enneads as a conceptual structure and a form of discourse which
advocates a distinctive way of life deserves high regard and serious consideration.
In an interview with Arnold Davidson in 1992, Hadot (at the age of 70) sums up
what he refers to as his inner evolution over the years. In 1946 (at the age of 24) he says,

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"I naively believed that I, too, could relive the Plotinian mystical experience."2 In the
1960s, Hadot says,
my relationship with Plotinus began to become more complex. On the one hand, I
believe that this great author has yet to be explained in the detailed way he deserves,
and that's why I have undertaken the translation with commentary of the totality of
his works. Moreover, the phenomenon of mysticism, which is so striking in Plotinus,
continues to intrigue me. Yet as I grow older, Plotinus speaks to me less and less, if I
may say so.3
Of the earlier nave belief regarding Plotinian mysticism, he says,
I later realized that this was an illusion. The conclusion of my book Plotinus [or the
Simplicity of Vision] already hinted that the idea of the "purely spiritual" is
untenable.4
I have become considerably detached from him. From 1970 on, I have felt very
strongly that it was Epicureanism and Stoicism which could nourish the spiritual life
of men and women of our times, as well as my own.5
It is true that there is something ineffable in human existence, but this ineffable is
within our very perception of the world, in the mystery of our existence and that of
the cosmos. Still, it can lead to an experience which could be qualified as mystical.6
Hadot comes to reject the mysticism of Plotinus because of what he takes to be a
fundamental error. The goal of the spiritual life that Plotinus advocates is utterly
transcendent. Because it locates utmost value and reality in a realm so completely beyond
and other than the world of human affairs, Hadot judges it to be illusory. In effect, the
idea of such a "purely spiritual" life undermines the value that is to be fashioned and the

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mystery that is to be found in the immanent. The cultivation of practical virtue and the
perspective that could find the ineffable in the world, nature, embodiment, the social, and
the historical are discredited. As a consequence, Hadot concludes, the Plotinian mystical
perspective cannot "nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our times, as well as
my own." Plotinus mistakenly identifies the manifestation of the mystical, mislocates the
experiential resources of the mystical, and his therapeutic method leads astray from the
"mystery of our existence and that of the cosmos."
Even though this assessment by Hadot is not presented in a formal, direct, and
extensive writing, it is nevertheless significant because of his well-established standing as
a scholar of Plotinus. His responses are neither casual nor lacking in reflective
deliberation carried out over an extended period of time. In this paper I argue that his
disillusionment with and rejection of the Plotinian position is the result of an incomplete
and hence unfair assessment of the theoretical and existential implications of the
Enneads. Although Plotinus himself may be greatly responsible for providing a basis for
such criticism, there are clearly stated principles in the Enneads that call for a corrective
response to these objections. According to the Enneads, in contrast, proper living
necessitates a disciplined and rich spiritual life within the world as well as beyond it.
Mystical immanence and mystical transcendence both play a central role. Affirming the
importance of returning to the One (Good) must also affirm the equally important
opposite dynamic of the One to the many. In making this case as a response to Hadot's
appraisal, I must argue somewhat perilously by using the system of the Enneads not only
against Hadot but at times against the rhetoric of Plotinus as well.
2.

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I agree that the dominant, overriding interest of Plotinus in the Enneads is to track
the details of the soul's journey to its source, from embodied soul to Soul to nous
(Intellect) and the One, and to convey in simple as well as elaborately and polemically
formulated ways the need for and value of engaging in such a conversion and return to
nous and the One. In order not to be confused and overcome by the world and in order
genuinely to discern beauty and goodness everywhere, one "must first become god-like
and all beautiful" (I.6.9).7 Realization of the soul's enduring affiliation with its source
requires specific cultivation which correctly orients the soul to that source. Plotinus
provides not only a philosophically and phenomenologically responsive exposition of this
process, the presentation is also, at times, an enactment of the distinctive experiential
transitions and structures.
That this focus should dominate the existential and educational interests of
Plotinus is understandable. But Plotinus the guide to the One is also Plotinus the
systematic metaphysician. His conception of reality has a bi-directional (ascent-descent)
dynamic. Whatever is generated by the One not only properly needs to realize its ultimate
dependence and completion in the One through the ascent, but it also is empowered by
the One to exercise these resources to the maximum extent by means of the descent. Both
of these functions constitute the bi-directional operation of reality. Nothing is exempt
from it; everything is, to whatever extent, affected by it.
Although the conceptual system set forth in the Enneads delineates this bidirectional process, Plotinus nevertheless appears most prominently in the role of an
advocate for the proper recognition of dependence upon the One as creative source,
preeminent reality, and ultimate telos. As a result, the role and significance of the effluence

4
or radiation from the One is under-appreciated and under-represented. This part of the
narrative not only suffers from a lack of attention, the value of the "decline" of the soul is
frequently put in a very negative light, nearly being thoroughly discredited in some
formulations.8 It is no accident that Plotinus must at times work to rectify characterizations
that closely resemble Gnostic type claims about fallen souls, the evil of matter, the
defective status of the cosmos, and embodiment as imprisonment. The thought that it might
very well be better for a soul to have remained "above" (with Soul/nous) leads Plotinus to
acknowledge that such a hostile disposition to the productive forces of good is
unacceptable. It is a violation of basic principles that he clearly advocates in the Enneads.
Individualized souls are the agents of good working upon matter, generating a kosmos.
3.
Plotinus provides a key to the educational strategy of his writings.
One must therefore speak in two waysOne shows how contemptible are the things
now honoured by the souland the other teaches and reminds the soul how high its
birth and value. (V.1.1.20 f.)
Read from this perspective, the evaluative appraisals emphasized by Plotinus function as
rhetorical (didactic, soteriological) tactics, i.e., a kind of trash-talk and pep-talk. He
employs a narrative of contempt and guilt as well as a narrative of purification and praise
to encourage the audience/reader to recognize and remedy their own false and alienated
identities.9 In this respect, going down the ontological scale into materiality is viewed as
a ruinous affair, while ascending out is salvific. Yet, positive "down-scale" talk, though
often absent from the presentation, is nevertheless required. The structural principles and

5
values of the Enneads clearly authenticate affirmative discourse regarding the outgoing
(downgoing) creative mission of nous/Soul/souls.
The famous passage in which Plotinus describes his experience of awakening to
his embodied condition from his previous participation in "immeasurable beauty," "united
with the divine life," he comments that "I wonder and do not understand how I could now
or could ever have descended, and how my soul could have entered and taken abode in the
body" (IV.8.1.1 f.). The temporary transition from embodiment to nous/One and back to
embodied sensory experience may very well produce a sense of wonderment, but the
drama in Plotinus' formulation is demystified later in the same treatise. There is an
impulse to ascend, but there is also a drive to descend. Both are an inherent part of soul.
The descent is ontologically and normatively necessitated by the dynamis of the One. It is,
for Plotinus, of value in itself as a vitalizing presence extending into every nook and
cranny, it benefits individual souls through their own development and functioning, and it
contributes to the organization or "government" of the cosmos. In effect, we, as individual
souls, complete our own nature and create good by taking our place in the cosmos,
utilizing our energies, as we are able, for the most extensive realization of the good. This
is a constitutive principle emphasized throughout the Enneads.
Despite Plotinus' strong penchant for achieving direct unity with the One, he is
obliged to engage at times in counteractive discourse in order to acknowledge the
praiseworthy status of the cosmos and human affairs within it. It is, after all, the best
possible, intricately organized, beautifully arrayed living ecosystem (material life form).
When Plotinus makes this shift in perspective and proceeds actually to engage in an

6
observation of the material world, his sensitivity and attention to the detailed arrangement
of nature are especially noteworthy.
the universal order is forever...[it] extends to everything, even to the smallest, and
the art (techne) is wonderful which appears, not only in the divine beings [i.e., the
stars] but also in the things which one might have supposed providence would have
despised for their smallness, for example the workmanship which produces wonders
in rich variety in ordinary animals, and the beauty of appearances which extends to
the fruits and even the leaves of plants, and their beauty of flower which comes so
effortlessly, and their delicacy and variety, and that all this has not been made once
and come to an end but is always being made as the powers above move in different
ways over this world. ...it brings together beauty and justice in its workings.
(III.2.23.18 ff.)
The "rich variety," " manifold life," "ceaselessly making beautiful and shapely living
creatures" is the work of souls. Nature is an ever-ongoing productive field of activity, with
a drive for diversity (differentiation) and richness (abundance) as well as unity (III.2.17).
From this perspective one can see that the intentional participation of a person in
this material world, in a properly disposed way, is part of the realization of a good life.
The cosmos involves "divine providence" that calls for fundamental care which "extends
to this world and to anything and everything" (II.9.16). Following Plato's Phaedrus,
Plotinus finds that it is the nature of soul to care not just for "higher realities" but also for
the ongoing affairs of the world. The two "directions" are in dynamic interplay.
It is also to be noted here that within the larger context of the cosmos, humans,
although they are special, are not given preferential treatment because "providential care

7
is much more of wholes than of parts."10 An anthropocentric attitude of either superiority
or hostility or indifference to the world would be based upon a false valuation of the
world. The affairs of the world need and are deserving of care. It is care that most
positively engages in the production of increased value. This view of soul and matter
reveals, says Plotinus, a state of affairs that calls for sympathetic responsiveness (IV.3)
and proper reverence (piety) (II.9.16). The world is not to be despised; souls are not
degraded by their materialization. The proper bearing of soul is bi-directional and the
proper orientation to its mission is holistic (see, e.g., IV.4.2.3).
4.
Tolma is, in this context, a noteworthy term for Plotinus. It can be translated
variously as 'bold,' 'adventurous,', 'daring,' or more negatively as 'audacious,' 'arrogant,'
'reckless.' There are some twenty variants of the word that occur in the Enneads.11 The
most pertinent uses are of two kinds, each with a negative and positive meaning. The first
has a negative characterization applied to persons/souls who arrogantly assume personal
self sufficiency. The second use has a negative characterization applied to the
ontological levels (hypostases) that are generated from the One. Plotinus refers to the
audacity of souls who come to birth and suppose that they belong to themselves alone
(V.1.1.4) or the audacious and stupid part of the soul that becomes a plant (V.2.2.5) or
the fact that souls would never bring themselves (dare) to enter the mud of body and dirty
themselves (VI.7.31.24).
it [soul] is always searching and in its wish to be borne away to that Good has a
contempt for the things here, and when it sees the beauties of this world it distrusts

8
them, because it sees that they are in bodies of flesh and polluted by their present
dwelling and disintegrated by magnitudes. (IV.7.31.21 f.)
The intent of these judgments is clear: what everyone really needs are the "higher
realities." Any kind of decline is undesirable and bad. Yet, there is a significant shift in
such negative appraisals when Plotinus confronts Gnostic accounts of the generation of
the (evil) material world and their presumption of spiritual superiority. He ridicules these
judgments as reckless, arrogant, and rash. He then proceeds to highlight the positive
aspects of the ontological production from the One and the resulting material order of the
natural world. The rhetoric employed to cultivate "purification" of self changes to a
language of apologetic cosmology emphasizing the goodness the world and the
importance of the formative work of Soul/souls.
In effect, tolma is represented at every major level of ontological progress. Nous
dares to stand away from the One; Soul assertively extends itself to materiality (e.g.,
VI.9.5.29; V.2.2; III.4.2). This positive usage is significant because it shows how the
descent dynamic operates so as to constitute the material world--which is itself an
extension of the constitutive empowerment provided by the Good/One. This tolma is, in
effect, justified in the most fundamental way. Soul must be audacious in this manner in
order for the power of the One to be expressed to the fullest extent possible. This
formative kind of "self-assertion" is definitely good (a) insofar as it does not leave behind
(become alienated from) its grounding in the higher good and (b) inasmuch as it extends
the influence of good (beautiful, just, etc.) to the opportunities available to it.
The "soul shaping" task is, in effect, twofold. It is directed upon itself in order to
participate in formative powers of good and beauty and it is directed beyond itself to

9
shape the material and social world into the best operation possible. Plotinus'
characterization of soul involves this bi-directional mission.
For Plotinus, as for Plato, this worldly or material-historical exercise of virtue
(cosmos forming) is not and cannot be ideal (perfect, complete). Plotinus typically
characterizes it as, at best, an image or weaker representation of the ideal. Comparatively
it is deficient because incomplete and subject to conditions of the changing world. As
such, it has utility (educational) value for progressing to the unchanging noetic realities.
But this does not take away from the specific values inherent in the cosmos or in its place
within the ontological continuum. The encouragement to abandon the descent is not the
complete message provided by Plotinus. It may not be uncommon for mystical thinkers to
see their genuine destination and ultimate identity as located in the One (God, Brahman,
Dao, et al.), but this perspective turns out to be only part of the story of the Enneads.
From the standpoint of the whole operation of reality, i.e., from the bi-directional
dynamic of the One, a persistently impassioned and exclusive prioritizing of the
transcendent One would itself be audacious, indulgent, and an offense to the very
magnificence of that One.
Since the ontological dynamic of reality is bi-directional, Plotinus should also be
advocating the full development of soul/character that is itself bi-directional. The best of
souls will extend across the ontological spectrum, finding itself with specific fields and
kinds of action in each hypostasis.12 Any talk about "unity" of soul must include
reference to its functioning across the spectrum. Its range is from embodied, empathic
actions (via sympatheia) in the natural world, to mixed perceptual and calculative
(aisthesis and logos) consciousness, to pure noetic activity (eidos), to the One. The

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resourcefulness resulting from the One operates throughout the spectrum, so that its
transformation and application in worldly affairs is an inherently legitimate and worthy
endeavor. Humans are enjoined to participate as explicitly and extensively as possible in
this ontological continuum. Unification is thus multi-dimensional.13
The profile of a self, in being bi-directional ("amphibious," IV.8) is itself multidimensional.14 The properly cultivated soul learns to locate its identity in each of the
ontological levels of reality, transitively, and with a sense of expanded (or holistic) as
well as centered unity. The particular site (or field) of operation will determine the kind
of activity that is appropriate for excellence of functioning. The point here is that
embodiment for humans offers a distinctive range of good-making possibilities, and these
commitments need not deny legitimacy to other ontological commitments as well.
In this way, the negative rhetoric applied to descent, embodiment, and material
things in the Enneads must be rectified by the metaphysical principles that Plotinus
advances. It is clear that the "descent" has a co-constitutive significance with the
"ascent." A human is an embodied instance of creative vitality whose natural ("downscale") goal is a well formed, orderly, beautiful individual life, communal life, and world.
5.
As tolma is a term of signal importance in the Enneads that has a Janus-like
profile, so is eros. Plotinus emphasizes an ascent as well as a descent identity for love.
Although he has his own distinctive take on Platonic eros, it is still for Plotinus as for
Plato bi-directional in operation. One vector characterizes the erotic soul as aiming to
shape its own identity by ascending to the Good/Beautiful. This is not just selfgratification by encountering the higher realities, however. For both Plato and Plotinus,

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everything that reaches fruition functions so as to exert its formative force on something
else (see IV.8.6.7; V.1.6.37 f; V.4.1.27 f.; II.9.3.7 f.). In this respect, the counsel to return
to the One by turning away from embodiment and affairs of the world is advice that goes
against the very productive-formative dynamic at work everywhere, from the One on
down the ontological scale. This other work of eros must be included otherwise it would
be forsaking the way that goodness and beauty get realized in the world.
Again, the message of disaffection and withdrawal must be remedied and
supplemented by the complementary message of the value and merit of being seriously
engaged in the affairs of the world. Eros in Plato's Symposium is the daimonic
hermeneutical agent who operates between (metazu) the heavens (gods) and the earth
(humans), both empowered (poros) by and depleted (penia) by this bi-directional
predicament. In this respect, Eros occupies a location where virtue is exercised and
imparted into otherness as well as received, formed, and fueled from the source. The two
directions are not mutually exclusive or necessarily competitive but, according to the
Enneads, naturally and (at best) mutually beneficial.15
If the philosophical system itself is a holistic therapeutic enterprise, the more
complete story of unity results in a vision of reality that is empowered with productive
efficacy at every level. Every site is an ontological location of value-realization that
contributes to the increased accomplishment of good (justice, beauty) of and for the
whole. The One is the primal prototype for the operation of the individual self. As it
generates spontaneously, effortlessly, in ungrudging giving, without losing anything of
itself, so the individual self should engage itself in a like performance with the resources
available to it. When the soul "looks to what comes before it [and] exercises its

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intelligence, when it [then] looks to itself it sets in order what comes after it and directs
and rules it" (IV.8.3).
This last statement is an expression of a principle that reveals a fundamental
element in Plotinus' conception of the cosmos (earth, nature, environment). The
generative power (productivity, fruition, creativity) of the One is the determinative
component, to the extent possible, in the operation of everything. The Enneads contains
many different formulations of this. Plotinus says, for example,
[it] is in every nature to produce what comes after it and to unfold itself as a seed...
[this] had to go on forever, until all things have reached the ultimate possible limit
[impelled] by the power itself, which sends them out and cannot leave anything
without a share of itself. (IV.8.6.7)
Now when anything else comes to perfection we see that it produces, and does not
endure to remain by itself, but makes something else. This is true not only of things
which have choice, but of things which grow and produce without choosing to do so,
and even lifeless things, which impart themselves to others as far as they can: as fire
warms, snow cools, and drugs act on something else in a way corresponding to their
own nature--all imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to
everlastingness and generosity. (V.4.1.27)
All things complete themselves by generating (transmitting) representative instances. The
dynamism of the One flows out (radiates, unfolds, disseminates) to result in the noeticeidetic realm (hypostasis), and this in turn generates Soul which empowers the material
realm into a well-formed world. The analogies Plotinus frequently relies upon to
demonstrate the function of the One include an ever-flowing spring, a growing plant or

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tree, or the sun radiating light. But however helpful or problematic these models may be,
Plotinus is very clear about the generative results. Of this cosmos so conceived, he says,
it is not proper for anyone to speak ill of even this universe as not being beautiful or
the best of all things which have body...[it is] a whole, all beautiful and self-sufficient
and friends with itself and with its parts, both the more important and the lesser,
which are all equally well adapted to it...one must consider the parts in relation to the
whole, to see if they are harmonious and in accord with it.... (III.2.3.1 ff.)
When Plotinus allows the universe to speak from its own perspective, it says such things
as the following:
Everything in me seeks after the Good, but each attains it in proportion to its own
power...some things appear to participate only in being [existence], others in life,
others...have sense-perception, others...reason, and others the fullness of life. One
must not demand equal gifts in things which are not equal. (III.2.3.32 f.)
6.
Turning to Hadot, his analysis uses terms such as 'mysterious,' 'inexpressible,' and
'transcendent' as well as 'immanence' and 'mysticism,' but since his primary aim is
exposition of the texts rather than a critical analysis of the terms he uses in his exposition,
exact meanings and explanations of these crucial terms are often not obvious. If the term
'mysticism' refers at least to the breakdown of the distinction between self and other
where the identity of self becomes (at least temporarily and in part) unified with the
other, then the term has more than one application in the Enneads. The parameters of
self-identity can shift and be transformed to correspond to each dimension of the
ontological spectrum (each hypostasis) as well as across the spectrum. Plotinus cannot

14
simply advocate a monistic (introvertive) type of mystical unity or one whose structure is
only "vertical." The achievable unities must include unity with the One, but unity must
also be transportable, mobile, and as expansive as reality itself. From material and living
forms that comprise worldly affairs (sympatheia, aisthesis) to noetic forms (logoi, eide)
in reasoning and contemplation to the One surpassing all forms, none of the options for
unity should be discredited.
Plotinus recognizes this in a number of ways, most notably when he extends the
reference range of the term 'contemplation' (theoria) to include everything (III.8.7). This
understanding of the material-natural world places it in intimate continuity with itself and
with everything else. Nature is a living being that operates in sympathetic (sympatheia)
communication with itself, as its operation is fueled and shaped by the formative powers
of psyche and nous.
Plotinian mysticism must be the kind where a self can have its "moment" of unitywithout-difference with the One, nous, and psyche as well as its holistic "moment" of
unity-with-difference, joined with but differentiated from psyche-nous-One. Such a
mysticism can perhaps best be described as a kind of dialectical mysticism which shifts in
identity (or composition) depending upon the focal activity of the self.16 A kind of unity
can occur at each level, from material embodiment on "up." Each level is a field of
operation where the (horizontal) structure of participation in the field (of experience) can
transform from subject-object duality to holistic unification. Each level will have its
distinctive "knowledge" or epistemic profile--from the All of the "universebound
together in shared experiencelike one living creature" (IV.4.32) to the One without
distinction. The parameters of self-identity will shift according to the determinants of each

15
level. Who "we" are, as Plotinus sometimes formulates this, will be reflective of the
contracted or expanded character of our life along the spectrum. Even though he prefers to
emphasize unity with the One, this should be seen as an incomplete expression of the very
system, range of experiences, and modes of self-identity that he advances. There is more
to the mysticism of the Enneads than the one-directional fusion into the One without
difference. Although establishing unity with the One is crucial and foundational, the other
parts of the story are indispensable for an adequate understanding of the One, the resulting
otherness, and the self.
This complex profile of mysticism also affects what will count as 'ineffable.' Even
if unity (non-duality) with the One is the exemplar, each level also has features of
ineffability by virtue of its (horizontal) modes of unity or holistic unification. Each level
also exemplifies participation with its higher (vertical) level(s). So, sympatheia on a low
level of sensation also involves unity with (and of) Soul and Soul with (and of) nous, and
nous with (and of) the One. The identities achievable are also identities that overlap;
there is continuity, inclusion, and difference at each level. Insofar as linguistic
communication or discursiveness (effability) depends upon differentiation, each kind of
unity will have its own ineffability--including embodied existence in the material world.
It is also noteworthy that the description of Plotinus provided by Porphyry
includes reference to the importance of both directions of unity in the life of Plotinus. On
the basis of a familiarity with the Enneads, it is difficult to envision that its author would
have a life-style which was dedicated to the welfare of others, from the Emperor, his
wife, and other political figures, to anyone with serious interests in learning. Women
were associates of Plotinus, he assumed intimate responsibility for orphaned children,

16
and he had an interest in establishing a city to be called Platonopolis. Even with this
active and wide range of social relations and responsibilities, Porphyry observes that
Plotinus was present at once to himself and to others while never relaxing his
contemplative turn to nous.17
This characterization of Plotinus' orientation of self fits with the type of
mysticism previously indicated and belies the more limited (narrow, exclusivist) profile
of mystical union with the One emphasized by Plotinus. If this constricted description of
Plotinus' self-orientation is primary evidence for his conception of "philosophy as a
spiritual exercise," we have what appears to be something of a conflict between Plotinus'
enthusiastic emphasis upon pursuit of the One and Porphyry's portrayal of a resolutely
disciplined, fully present person, caring for and responsive to the welfare of others, with a
menu and medical prescriptions that are strictly vegetarian. Since there is a clear basis in
the Enneads which accounts for this positive "descent" behavior on the part of Plotinus,
Porphyry's biographical description can be viewed as independent evidence that confirms
and balances the lopsided view that is typical of the "mystical Plotinus" whose individual
oneness (aloneness) would happily disappear into the ultimate One (Alone). The climax
of his position is without doubt more complex and dialectical than it is often taken to be.
7.
In Hadot's more recent writings on Plotinus, the focus is exclusively on the
conversion and journey of the soul to the One.18 In his most recent work, he says
At all levels of reality, Plotinus philosophical discourse leads solely to an inner
askesis and experiencewhich enable the philosopher to rise toward the supreme

17
reality by progressively attaining levels of self-consciousness that are ever higher and
more inward.19
No mention is made of the significance of incarnation and material involvement of soul
as an inherent, natural, productive expression of the good. Hadot has, in effect, lets the
limited rhetoric of ascent by Plotinus determine the range of his major, distinctive
contribution. The genuine identity of Plotinus' position, however, includes more. It is
clear that Hadot is familiar with the sources in the Enneads that support a positive
appreciation of the descent. In his earlier writing, Hadot is sensitive to this issue from the
beginning of his book.20 In his next to last chapter, he feels compelled to clarify the
matter.
One might think that this contemplation absorbs the soul and prevents her from
paying attention to external things. But Plotinus's life is testimony to the fact that
once a specific degree of inner purity is attained, when contemplation has become
continuousattention paid to the Spirit [nous] does not exclude attention to other
people, to the world, and to the body itself. It is by means of the same availability, the
same loving attendance, that we can be present at the same time to the Spirit and to
other people.21
The continuity of contemplation identified here is inclusive or expansive; attention ranges
from specific individuals to nous. The profile of the development of proper and authentic
self-identity clearly includes learning to function as immanent within embodiment,
community, nature, and history. Notice, however, that Hadot makes this point on the basis
of Porphyry's description of Plotinus.22 Plotinus gets redeemed, but not directly on the
basis of material in the Enneads. This, however, is a misleading appraisal because it does

18
not give credit to the distinctive view of reality and self delineated in the Enneads.
Although Porphyry's biography should not be approached uncritically, there is no reason
to think that he was intending to contrast the faulty Enneads with the real Plotinus. Unless
there is contrary evidence, the true model of spirituality, if present in the person of
Plotinus, is best explicated by means of the basic principles and norms presented in the
Enneads.
If this is correct, Hadot's claims regarding the untenability of the idea of the
"purely [Plotinian] spiritual" life appear in part to be based upon his judgment that the
mystical for Plotinus is simply a transcendent phenomenon. But it is wrong to say that,
for Plotinus, "something ineffable" is not in human existence and within our very
perception of the world. "The ineffable" is there all the time, in more than one way, even
though we may be unaware of it. The nexus of immanence and transcendence occurs
everywhere for Plotinus.
When Hadot says that "the mystery of our existence and that of the cosmos" and
"the phenomenon of mysticism" is to be located not beyond the world but within it, the
phenomenon of mysticism in the Enneads is properly located across the ontological
spectrum (continuum), i.e., not exclusively in the One and not excluded from the
immanent details of embodiment, nature, the social, and history. Hadot recognizes that
Plotinus says that soul can adapt to its levels of operation, coordinate, and become
harmonious with these various levels, but he chooses to emphasize the discontinuity
between the levels and to observe how the soul looses itself at each level.23 This "loss,"
however, is a transformation in the operation of soul where a different unification is
constituted. Such occasions comprise conditions for a self that are ineffable and edifying

19
whenever there is a dissolution or suspension of the subject-object structure within these
levels.
In the final section of his 1963 [1993] book, Hadot takes leave of Plotinus by
emphasizing what amounts to a critically ambivalent position.
Our generation is afraid of being "mystified"; whether Marxist, positivist,
Nietzschean, or Christian, we refuse the mirage of the "purely spiritual." We have
discovered the power of matter, of that whole lower world that Plotinus considered
weak, impotent, and close to nothingness.24
Despite what we moderns have learned about the various mechanizations of
mystification revealed by recent philosophers and psychotherapies, Hadot nevertheless
says on the same page that Plotinus's "mysticism, in the form in which he lived it, does
not appear to have been an escape mechanism."25 Is one to presume that the Enneads
promote escaping but not Plotinus himself? It seems more reasonable to assume that
Plotinus was living thoughtfully by means of the metaphysical vision set forth in the
Enneads.26 And Hadot has himself, throughout his book, pointed to passages in the
Enneads that support such a life. A few pages before, Hadot observes,
If even lifeless objects have a trace of the Good, how good must life itself be! Life is
a Good, whether it be the life of the soul or life of the Spirit [nous]. In particular, life
on earth, even though mixed with evil, is a good thing.27
"Terrestrial man," he says elsewhere, transforms the world through acts of detailed
gentleness, does not exclude, is available, and exemplifies loving attendance.28 Value
residing in immanence is to be affirmed, and yet the rhetorical Plotinus ("weak, impotent,

20
and close to nothingness") reemerges to skew an accurate appraisal of his position. The
final two sentences of the text are of interest.
There can be no question of slavishly imitating the spiritual itinerary of Plotinus here
in the late twentieth century; that would be impossible or illusory. Rather, we must
consent, with as much courage as Plotinus did, to every dimension of human
experience and to everything within it that is mysterious, inexpressible, and
transcendent.29
Since this formulation remained in the 3rd (1993) edition, Hadot presumably continues to
affirm the legitimacy of this "consenting" as well as the value of the courage to consent to
these dimensions of human experience. But to do justice to the mysticism of Plotinus,
Hadot needs to provide a more direct critical analysis of precisely how Plotinus goes
wrong and how, for example, the Stoics (according to Hadots later writings) do better.
Plotinus, after all, mobilized his own thinking in response to these Stoic and other
alternatives, utilizing some points while rejecting many others.
Analysts of mysticism have proposed a variety of categorical schemas to do
justice to mystical writings. It is of interest to note that the differences between Plotinus
and Marcus Aurelius, in Hadot's presentation, would seem to align roughly with W.T.
Stace's distinction between introvertive and extrovertive mysticism.30 Hadot finds that the
range of the transformation of self for the Stoics, i.e., Marcus Aurelius, goes
from its limited situation and partial, restricted, and individualistic point of view
to a universal and cosmic perspective. At this point, self-consciousness becomes
consciousness of the world, and consciousness of the divine Reason which guides the

21
world. Finally, we may say that the self, by means of this process of realization,
discovers both its limitation and its transcendence.31
Hadot refers to this fully realized consciousness as "cosmic consciousness." Elsewhere he
points to this as a dilation of our self throughout the infinity of universal nature;32 the
transcendent self becomes part of universal reason;33 "one identifies oneself with an
"Other:" nature, or universal reason, as it is present within each individual."34 If Hadot
assesses Plotinus on the basis of these contrasting features, the judgment of Plotinus as an
introvertive type of mysticism does not do justice to the more complex and extensive
range of his dialectical position.
Finally, regarding Hadot's assessment that the philosophy of Plotinus could not
"nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our times, as well as my own," it is of
interest to note the numerous books and articles that have been produced in the last 25
years which address some aspect of his work. In the postface to the third edition of his
text, Hadot says, "I have given up the idea of providing a complete bibliography, since
the number of important works devoted to Plotinus has increased considerably in the past
few years."35 Although references might also be found in various contemporary "new
age" writings, one suspects that Plotinus would respond with the sort of critical caution
that he exercised toward similar positions in his own times. It is true that being the object
of numerous studies does not equate to "nourishing the spiritual life," but the continuing
interest in his mysticism must be sustained by some existential value, even if no one
actually intends simply to "relive the Plotinian mystical experience" for themselves. The
benefit certainly need not require "slavishly imitating the spiritual itinerary of Plotinus."

22
One can be "nourished" by the Enneads in a variety of ways. But if Hadot's
standard of genuine philosophy is taken as that which can be determinative of one's
personal existence, i.e., put into practice as a way of life, of particular interest is a quite
different appraisal made of Plotinus in Margaret Miles' recent book, Plotinus on Body and
Beauty.36 While focusing on the themes of body and beauty, she notes the
commonsensical, empirical, practical, and realistic features of his position.37 The
perspective she finds supported in the Enneads helps, I think, provide a more balanced
appreciation of Plotinus. While Miles is far from giving any wholesale endorsement of the
Enneads as a spiritual remedy for our times, it is noteworthy that the final chapter of her
text is titled "Plotinus for the Present." I cannot here do justice to her assessment of
Plotinus as a contributor to contemporary issues related to interdependency, diversity,
enchantment, fragmentation of self, the body, and worldviews as religious (themes
specified in the final chapter), but her overall perspective is clear and succinct.
I have argued throughout these chapters that Plotinus did not urge flight from
everyday existence. His philosophy sought not to escape but to manage everyday
existence most fruitfully. Rather his philosophy is addressed to enabling flight from
deadness, lethargy, and constriction of vision.38
Hadot himself expresses surprise at the positive reception his text on Plotinus has
received over the years. He states in the preface to the third edition that despite the
distance separating Plotinus' Platonism and the end of the twentieth century, his "message
has conserved all it power of suffusing light."39
8.

23
Although Hadot is certainly aware of the evidence in the Enneads that is counter
to his overall judgment of Plotinus, he lets the rhetoric of ascent employed by Plotinus
have the day. As a result, he fails to give weight to the very items that he sets forth in his
earlier work on Plotinus. That his own interest in mysticism could be satisfied with the
dimensions of the mystical to be found in the works of Seneca, Epictetus, or Marcus
Aurelius is itself problematical, especially when compared with the multifaceted
mysticism that is advocated in the Enneads.40 But the Stoics do, to be sure, have a variety
of recommendations about how to engage in practices that will aid in focusing attention
and help to exercise ways of assessing and judging so as to develop dispositions to live in
more sage-like ways.41 Martha Nussbaum and others have also more recently delineated
the details of this therapeutic aspect of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy.42 References to
mysticism in these other studies are, however, rare. Yet, Hadot's special interest in
mysticism has shifted to the Stoics in some measure because of the deficiencies of
Plotinus.
I will not venture to predict what any future "present age" will find to be a
preferable form of mysticism. The competitive field includes not only non-Western
versions in the Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Buddhist, Neo-Confucian, and Daoist traditions, there
will likely be a variety of post modern and technology related versions of such spiritual
disciplines in the future.43 Plotinus will presumably continue to be explored not only for
the rhetorical (traditional, caricatured) version of his mysticism but for the more complex
dialectical mystical position delineated in the Enneads. His attempts to find the proper
depictions of immanence and transcendence are impressive and provocative.

24
One imagines that Plotinus saw the "spiritual materialism" of the Stoics as lacking
in the very courage that Hadot finds admirable in Plotinus. In effect, the mysticism of
Stoic cosmic consciousness based on the core concepts of physis, theos/Zeus, and logos
needs to explore further the foundations of consciousness. For Plotinus, the Stoic art of
living has settled for an account of reality and the spiritual life that results in a distorted
because less than complete depiction of immanence and transcendence. Even with this
"more" of Plotinus, however, the art of the "purely spiritual life" is not located in the
purely transcendent because this source is never solely transcendent. The spiritually adept
person must contend with more than Stoic transcendence and learn to cultivate a life that
engages and integrates the whole spectrum of reality. Such a life is at the nexus of
immanent and transcendent forces and factors. It is a life that does not simplify, limit,
demean, or forsake either but learns to optimize the modalities of immanence and
transcendence.44 Because Hadot does not take as seriously as he should this Plotinian
counter rejoinder, his preference for Stoic over Plotinian mysticism fails, accordingly, to
meet the standards of critical reason and experience set by the Enneads.
In conclusion, this paper attempts to show that the portrayal of Plotinian
mysticism provided by Pierre Hadot does not give the Enneads its due measure. Despite
the very knowledgeable contributions he has made to the scholarship and general
appreciation of Plotinus, the rejection of Plotinian mysticism is not warranted in the ways
or on the grounds that he has indicated. A corrective response seems appropriate because
this kind of portrayal is rather common in writings on Plotinus.

ENDNOTES

25

His most recent publication is an elaboration of this perspective. See Pierre Hadot, What

is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

2

Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life (Cambridge, MA.: Blackwell Publishers,

1995) p. 281.
3

Ibid., p. 280.

Ibid., p. 281.

Ibid., p. 280.

Ibid., p. 281.

All quotations from the Enneads are from A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus (Cambridge, MA:

Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1966-1988).

Statements like the following are not difficult to find: "the lives below are darkness

and little and dim and cheap" (VI.7.15.4). From such a perspective, contempt, disdain,
disparagement are the appropriate attitudinal correlates. Because the material world is
lacking the good, it is judged to be evil. As a consequence, one should flee the scene and
escape "to the higher world."
9

At the most ecstatic stage where soul and One join, the appraisals include, but if all

the other things about it perished [including the whole cosmos], it would even be pleased,
that it might be alone with this: so great a degree of happiness has it reached.
(VI.7.34.35)
10

Plotinus clearly recognizes the correctness of a non-anthropocentric cosmological

("environmental") perspective. See Douglas Hadley, "Plotinus's Defense of the Sensible:

The Metaphysics of Image and Dance in Ennead II.9" in American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly, LXXI.3 (1997) 433-452, and Donald N. Blakeley, "Plotinus as

26

Environmentalist?" in Laura Westra and Thomas M. Robinson, eds., The Greeks and the
Environment (New York: Roman & Littlefield, 1997). Humans have a role in the
universal drama, but it is not as supreme telos or hegemon (III.2.17.32). To become
human, souls must adapt and respond to the conditions of the surrounding environment
and find their place in the greater cosmic order of things.
11

Thirteen of these uses are associated with ways of communicating, either justifiably or

not. So, for example, there are those who make arrogant assumptions (II.9.11.22) or
Plotinus dares to express his own view, contradicting the opinion of others (IV.8.8.1).
Several other uses apply to attitudes and behavior, e.g., one should not dare to do bad out
of respect for a good neighbor (I.2.5.27) or the presumption of those who try to work
spells or magic (IV.4.30.29).
12

Strictly speaking, a soul is never (ontologically) severed from Soul, nous, and the One,

even as the connection may remain unobserved, disregarded, denied, etc.

13

It is important to note that terms such as 'beyond,' 'there,' 'other,' 'here' that are used by

Plotinus and that support the distinction between transcendence and immanence carry a
warning not to misconstrue the spatial connotations. It is not as if the One and nous are
located in some distant elsewhere. In the sense-world itself, he says, "those very Forms
themselves [are] existing in a different modethe intelligible world is everywhere"
(V.9.13). On occasion, Plotinus displays the categorical map by locating "everything" in
Soul, and Soul in nous, with the One being nowhere and everywhere. The point is, the
hypostases are not to be categorized spatially, so that ontological difference does not
convert to spatio-temporal distances. In addition, the "psychology" here allows for
"concentration" that is more than uniformly (homogeneously) focused. If one's

27

sensibilities can be operative in several different modalities at once, the conception of

self-identity in relation to this diversity does not require an exclusive identity with any
one particular modality. Even the category of 'sameness' or 'at once' is subject to the
characteristics of each modality. In earlier and later writings, Plotinus is clearly
committed to the presence (immanence) of the One and nous, directly available to human
experience, as well as to its transcendence (e.g., VI.7; VI.9).
14

The exposition of "Know Thyself" given in VI.7 illustrates this perspective.

15

See, e.g., IV.3 regarding "harmonious adjustment" between ascent and descent.

16

The ontological isomorphic relation of humans and the hypostases presents the

challenge for humans to realize this isomorphism epistemologically, morally, and

aesthetically.
17

Porphyry, "On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books," 8.20, in Armstrong,

Plotinus. Porphyry also says that Plotinus "never, while awake, relaxed his intense
concentration upon the intellect (nous)" (Life: 9.15).
18

Hadot, Pierre, "Neoplatonist Spirituality" and "The Spiritual Guide" in A.H.

Armstrong, ed., Classical Mediterranean Spirituality (New York: Crossroads, 1986).

19

Hadot, 2002, p. 163.

20

Hadot, Pierre, Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision (Chicago, Il.:University of Chicago

Press, 1993, 3rd ed.[1963, 1st ed.]).

21

Hadot, 1993, p. 95.

22

This shift from Porphyrys description of Plotinus to the mystical Plotinus is also

observed in his most recent writing as well. See Hadot, 2002, pp. 157-168.

28

23

See "Levels of the Self" (Chapter II) and p. 106 f., in Hadot 1993, and Levels of the

Self and the Limits of Philosophical Discourse in Hadot, 2002, p. 163-168.

24

Hadot, 1993, p. 111.

25

Ibid.

26

The limits of metaphysics, philosophical theory and concepts, and, more generally,

human language are observed on a number of occasions by Plotinus. But because of the
formative influence of the eidetic constituents of nous, intelligibility to some degree is a
characteristic of all things and processes. Metaphysics as logos can accurately refer to
this reality, even as the objects of reference may vary in the degree of participation in the
logos/eidos means of reference. This is an interesting and problematic area of his
analytic-therapeutic endeavor. Also, Hadot, in his approach to philosophy, gives primacy
to lived experience and ethical sensibility as the basis of metaphysics or systematic
philosophy. Their primary function is to aid in the cultivation of lived experience.
27

Hadot 1993, p. 108.

28

Ibid., p. 94 f.

29

Ibid., p. 113.

30

Stace, W.T., Mysticism and Philosophy (Philadelphia: Lippincott Co.,1960).

31

Hadot, 1998, p. 180-181.

32

Ibid. p. 266.

33

Ibid. p. 207.

34

Hadot, 1995, p. 211.

35

Hadot, 1993, p. 115.

29

36

Margaret R. Miles, Plotinus on Body and Beauty (Cambridge, MA.: Blackwell

Publishers, 1999).
37

Ibid., p. 25.

38

Ibid., p. 170.

39

Hadot, 1993, p. 115.

40

The major Stoics are themselves very cautious about claiming that anyone is up to the

spiritual challenge of becoming a full-fledged Sage who would possess a mind in accord
with God/nature in its active and passive modes and live accordingly. Since logos is
conjoined with God, and physis as ultimate constituents of reality for the Stoics, precisely
what would qualify as mysterious, inexpressible, trans-rational, or transcendent in this
worldview remains problematical. When Hadot identifies the optimum realization as
cosmic consciousness, it is a mode of consciousness that is in unity or accord with divine
reason. So the parameters of consciousness here range from individualized awareness of
self to awareness of the dynamic and rational cosmos as self.
41

42

Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
It is noteworthy that Nussbaum and most others who have found the Stoics and

Epicureans of special interest, including Foucault's treatment of the care of the self, have
not shown interest in the work of Plotinus. See, Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of
Desire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Richard Sorabji does make
some reference to Plotinus in Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to
Christian Temptation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
43

Don Cupitt has some interesting suggestions regarding the future of mysticism and

religion in Mysticism After Modernity (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). See

30

also F. Samuel Brainard, Reality and Mystical Experience (University Park, PA: Penn
State University Press, 2000).
44

As was indicated previously, the distinction between immanence and transcendence is

to be explicated systematically according to the placement along the ontological

spectrum, i.e., relative to the hypostases. The bi-directional dynamics extend so that in
every instance of immanence there also resides transcendence and the transcendent
extends in formative empowerment to every instance of immanence.