Professional Documents
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New Domain in Deepwater Drilling: Applied Engineering and Organizational Impacts on Uncertainties and Risk
Abstract
The Macondo blowout highlights the need for well designs capable of consistently obtaining
commercial and technical well objectives while improving safety for personnel and the environment.
But in order to identify a problem, it must be recognized that there is a problem.
This paper discusses key issues concerning setting and aligning safety objectives to achieve an
acceptable balance among a plethora of risks and maintaining a healthy deep-water drilling industry.
In particular we focus on how this impacts performance and, more importantly, safe well designs.
It is important to fully realize how well-drilling objectives and their associated uncertainties are
linked to the safe drilling margin. At first blush, this issue may be viewed as a purely technical matter
but it is primarily a human one, grounded in the forces that inspire to create false choices in risk and
reward.
This paper illustrates how just one key uncertainty can lead to an unsafe well design, e.g., how
the Rig Schedule plays into routinely ignoring warning signs and how risk-taking behavior can
insidiously infect a risk-adverse goal. The symptoms of this infection of an otherwise healthy safety
management system can lead to operator manipulation of both company design practices and also
regulatory requirements under the assumption that any increase in risk or error in judgment is
manageable by last resort safety systems. Inevitably, in this environment, black swan disasters will
eventually occur. iii
Successful Energy Practices International, LLC 2010
mlov0.3
Table of Contents
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
9.1
9.2
9.3
10.0
11.0
12.0
Forward ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
Rig Schedule and The Macondo Prospect.............................................................................................. 4
The Rig Schedule and Compromised Designs - A Design Example .............................................. 11
What are the solutions to the rig schedule dilemma? ......................................................................... 13
What are the options for the rig schedule dilemma? .......................................................................... 14
More on Casing Seat Depth Fundamentals.......................................................................................... 14
How Did Casing Seats Influence the Completion of the Macondo Well: A Story Not Heard ... 16
Understanding Wellbore Instability - Well Listening And The Rig Team Interactive Factors .... 23
Discussion of Key Hazards Leading to Wellbore Instability............................................................. 24
Ballooning or Wellbore Charging .......................................................................................................... 24
Fluids Losses: Lost Circulation and Stuck Pipe ................................................................................... 27
Stuck Pipe .................................................................................................................................................. 27
Analyzing the Risk of Deepwater Drilling: The Metrics Of Wellbore Instability .......................... 28
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 31
References .................................................................................................................................................. 32
Figures
Figure 2.1 The difference between long casing and liner: the 13 in liner.................................................... 5
Figure 2.2 First mistake, fewer barriers to gas flow............................................................................................ 6
Figure 3.3 Second mistake,, fewer centralizers to evenly distribute the cement. ........................................... 7
Figure 2.4 Third mistake, a bond log was dismissed as being unnecessary. ................................................... 7
Figure 2.5 Fourth mistake, the pressure test results were misinterpreted....................................................... 8
Figure 2.6 Fifth mistake, the mud barrier to well pressure was removed early. ............................................ 9
Figure 2.7 Sixth mistake, the blowout preventer failed to close the well...................................................... 10
Figure 3.1 Acona WellPro Macondo Mini Seminar, August 2010. ................................................................ 11
Figure 3.2 Type Dodson MRI 5 Deepwater Well............................................................................................. 12
Figure 6.1 Typical Deepwater Riserless Casing Seat Rationale. ..................................................................... 15
Figure 6.2 Fundamentals of Casing Seat Optimization. .................................................................................. 15
Figure 7.1 Acona WellPro Macondo Mini Seminar, August 2010. ................................................................ 16
Figure 7.2 Hydrocarbon Zones and Potential Flow Paths.............................................................................. 21
Figure 7.3 BP knew they had a tight margin...................................................................................................... 22
Figure 9.1 Downhole pressure during fluid feedback from formation. ........................................................ 26
Figure 10.1 Graphic of Total Days of Wellbore Instability. ........................................................................... 29
Figure 10.2 NPT for 263 wells drilled in less than 600 ft of water. ............................................................... 29
Figure 10.3 NPT for 99 non-subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water. ................................... 30
Figure 10.4 NPT for 65 wells subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water. .................................. 30
Tables
Table 3.1 Summary table for the Dodson Deepwater Mechanical Risk Index............................................ 12
Table 3.2 A caption from a deepwater well program ....................................................................................... 13
Table 7.1 Deepwater Well Example ................................................................................................................... 17
Table 8.1 Interpretive Well Listening: The Human Factors ........................................................................... 23
Table 9.1 Deepwater Ballooning Case History ................................................................................................. 25
Table 10.1 - Days of Wellbore Instability as a percent of total time (exclusive of weather) ......................... 28
1.0
Forward
The Macondo blowout highlights the need for well designs capable of consistently obtaining
commercial and technical well objectives while improving safety for personnel and the environment.
In order to identify a problem, it must be recognized that there is a problem. Examining deep
water operations in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) indicate that there are unidentified and,
consequently, reoccurring systemic risk management problems unique to complex deepwater well
development that have not as yet been fully understood or effectively treated by some offshore
operators. 1 Fundamentally this stems from a deficient safety culture and a resulting dysfunctional
safety management system.
Professor Andrew Hopkins2 has analyzed high-performing organizations and found that
organizational mindfulness is a key leading indicator of such problems, i.e., a mindset that exists in
some organizations that support a culture of denial, as characterized by following:
A belief that it can't happen here. It usually will, especially when in denial.
A tendency to dismiss warning signs. Many deepwater well operators experience an frequent
subsurface problems that have risk implications that are not fully analyzed or
appreciated.
A tendency to normalize warning signs. At what point are abnormal operations considered
routine and safe? Recognizing a conditioned behavioral response by the crew due to
frequency of occurrence is a function of a successful safety management system.
Rather than proving that an activity is unsafe, there is a tendency to prove that an activity is safe
(important distinction). The safety of the complex operations should not be assumed.
Group think. The tendency to ignore the dissenting voice and move towards the loudest
or more popular choice without fully regard of the issue. How many times does this
happen?
drilling objectives and their associated uncertainties are linked to the safe drilling margin. At first blush,
this issue may be viewed as a purely technical matter. However, that would be a mistake -- it is not
and this paper illustrates how just one key uncertainty can lead to an unsafe well design, e.g., How
the Rig Schedule plays into routinely ignoring warning signs and how risk-taking behavior can
insidiously infect a risk-adverse goal. The symptoms of this infection of an otherwise healthy safety
management system can lead to operator manipulation of both company design practices and also
regulatory requirements and complacency. Schedule driven decisions create a dynamic characterized
by a tendency to overlook or possibly ignore essential design requirements to ensure a safe drilling
margin and properly manage uncertainties and ancillary risks. Like a virulent virus, as the
contagion spreads, it can and has escalated into an unhealthy co-dependent relationship between
operators and regulators, contaminating the intended system of checks and balances in favor of
doing it cheaper and faster.
2.0
The record shows that BP Macondo well rig schedule and budget over-runs influenced the
casing design decision to forego a tied-back string of 13 in casing to the wellhead in favor of a
single long-string 5 as well as other questionable decisions (all of which increased the risk of a
blowout) were more than causal to the failure. If the 13 in casing had been tied back and
successfully cemented, then this catastrophe could have been avoided as pointed out in Figure 2.1
on the next page.6
Furthermore there would be no issues regarding compromising or breaching the integrity of
shallower string casings. Investigators are now seeking answers to many questions, including why
was the decision made to use a long string to complete the well instead of an inherently more secure
tie-back liner? On this issue the record speaks clearly time and money. 7
A review of the events that occurred during the drilling of the Macondo well reveals that
incidents and gas-kicks were encountered and well control was problematic before the catastrophe
occurred. Various deficiencies in casing seats exacerbated well bore instability events and
complicated equivalent circulating density (ECD) control, making it difficult to manage from the
18 in casing downward. This inability to manage ECD may have contributed to the decision to
nitrify the cement a typical procedure used to minimize ECD management in the very narrow
annuli between casings. Nitrified cement is less dense, therefore lighter and has less resistance to
friction forces while circulating. However, it should be noted that using this type of cement is rare
for these kinds of operations as it also has lower yield strength. The risk of using the nitrogen
foamed cement has been highlighted in the investigation into the Macondo blowout as different
mixtures of the nitrogen foamed cement failed several tests before it was ultimately used to cement
the final casing in the well.8
Figure 2.1 The difference between long casing and liner: the 13 in liner. iv
A summary of the several key factors are highlighted in the following six graphics (Figure 2.2,
Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, and Figure 2.7) published in the Times Picayune, New
Orleans, LA. 9 These illustrate the string of six major mistakes that culminated in the well blowout:
Additional details on the Macondo well drilling design plan and additional risk-exacerbating
decisions are described in The Macondo Well by Paul Parsons.10
Acona Wellpro,
http://www.aconawellpro.com/@api/deki/files/251/=MiniSeminar_Macondo_August_2010.pdf, 17.
iv
David Hammer, 6 Fateful Missteps, The Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA, September 5, 2010.
Figure 3.3 Second mistake,, fewer centralizers to evenly distribute the cement. vi
Figure 2.4 Third mistake, a bond log was dismissed as being unnecessary. vii
vi
vii
Figure 2.5 Fourth mistake, the pressure test results were misinterpreted. viii
viii
Figure 2.6 Fifth mistake, the mud barrier to well pressure was removed early. ix
ix
Figure 2.7 Sixth mistake, the blowout preventer failed to close the well. x
10
3.0
The Rig Schedule and Compromised Designs - A
Design Example
With respect to ECD Management, delineates many of the problems encountered in the drilling
of the Macondo well and illustrates many failures in regard to ECD management, most notably fluid
losses and kicks (well control). The failure to fully honor the pore pressure fracture gradient
relationship in this well resulted in a exceptional amount of casing strings and actually intensified the
drilling risks and mechanical difficulties of dealing with small hole and casing diameters, and narrow
annuli at the extraordinary depths associated with deepwater operations.
Increased risk stemming from liner and cementing decisions results from increasingly high ECD,
which exacerbates the ability to obtain viable cement integrity. The management of ECD is critical
and the failure to do so has resulted in an excessive amount of Non-Productive Time (NPT) and
caused unsafe incidents. In addition 11, there are many wells that simply fail to meet technical
objectives and are abandoned. Such wells never become part of the drilling database that is used to
measure drilling performance, thus the industry metrics are worse than reported.
Failure to maximize leak off tolerance 12 with each casing string against the overburden gradient
renders successive hole sections more difficult to manage, shortens the hole section and reduces well
control capabilities. This problem is compounded with each successive casing string. The net result
is that casing sizes are ineffective and diminishes the ability to manage ECD top to bottom,
negatively impacts wellbore stability, and causes other operational issues such as cementing integrity.
In the GOM deepwater environment, wells are ranked by the James K. Dodson & Company
from data supplied the operators. A summary of the ranking is shown in Table 3.1.
xi
11
Table 3.1 Summary table for the Dodson Deepwater Mechanical Risk Index xii
WD
ft ss
(ocean depth)
3,200
4,300
23,000
72
4,400
28,000
5.5
81
6,000
29,500
85
6,700
30,000
7.5
100
Complexity
Level
Well Depth
ft KB xiii
Number of
Casing Strings
Percent of Population
penetrating salt
19,000
78
The following example in Figure 3.2 portrays estimated pressures and fracture gradient
(overburden) profiles from a typical deepwater well. This well is not the Macondo and in fact is
much more complex than the Macondo but nonetheless highlights design gaps based on rig
incapability. This example well would represent the highest degree of complexity (Dodson MRI 5)
encountered in current deepwater drilling operations. A rig suitability evaluation follows using the
data provided in Table 3.2.
xiii
12
Reach objective casing point of 15,000 to set 16 as deep as possible with respect to hookload
limitations of the drilling rig
Rig Capabilities:
Derrick:
Draw works:
Pumps:
Question 1: How can this rig be rated for 35,000 ft when the actual safe margin load requires
much more hookload capacity? This design rating also does not apply a safety factor, and usually
that is 80 % of load, or 1,200,000 lb.
Answer 1: It cannot. This rating is overstated for this example well, and more than likely many
of the more complex wells (Dodson MRIs 3-5).
The hookload requirements for the safest possible well design which honors the complete
uncertainty of the drilling margin is not possible with this rig: the 16 in casing is not deep enough
and the rig is incapable of hoisting deeper loads of 16 in or the 13 in, that is unless the design is
compromised. (Note the planned depth of 15,000 ft.)
Question 2: Is this rating compromised for the most complex of deepwater of wells?
Answer 2: Most probably, depending on the pore pressure and fracture gradient relationship
which determines the safe drilling margin. At the minimum, this rating denies the capability of
managing risk by failing to enable optimization of all casing string depths to bottom. (Note: this is
not the fault of the contractor, rather the operator must ensure that all design criteria are met and
aligned with the capacity of the rig.)
One of the problems with the current design philosophy is that acceptance of P50 pore pressure
criteria (See Figure 3.2) only has chance of becoming the actual well condition and does not honor
the outer boundary of risk and well control. If in fact the P50 pore pressure midpoint noted in
Figure 3.2 for design calculations is exceeded, which is entirely possible, this design is inadequate
and unsafe regarding kick tolerance, burst, and safe load requirements.
4.0
First, the rig schedule should not drive front end loading or the design, especially if it is deemed
necessary to utilize an under-rated rig just to meet the schedule. This is clearly an organizational
issue and requires objectives alignment from the onset.
xiv
13
Second, the design itself (See Figure 3.2) must recognize the outer boundary of drilling margin
uncertainty, which at its worst case scenario is equivalent to the overburden gradient itself. This can
be either in pore pressure prediction or stress, which acts like pore pressure in that it requires mud
weight to counter. Stress can be no greater than overburden itself. Recognizing the maximum outer
boundary of the drilling margin relationship honors the greatest risk possible and that is where risk
management begins.
Third, casing seats design must not be compromised in: 1) seat designs which honor the
maximum uncertainties and 2) casing string weights or grades, again just to accommodate an
underrated rig.
Fourth, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
could consider modifying lease expiration criteria to accommodate operators sincere efforts to meet
the terms of leases.
5.0
If the rig schedule cannot be met for the safe and necessary design, then the well should be moved off the schedule
without compromise. Failure to do so violates the essence of risk management.
Another solution that might be considered is to batch-set all casing strings down to salt with rigs
of lesser capacity and completing the drilling operation by later moving in a large capacity rig as
available.
In fact, this option could have an industry advantage as over time as it would optimize the
available fleet, especially since development drilling will become more common place. Rigs of lesser
capacity can be used for shallower batch setting and the more capable rigs used for the deeper and
more complex environments.
6.0
The current practice of seawater jetting in the first string of casing, usually 250 to 300 ft below
the mud line, results in a casing seat set too shallow. This does not supply enough leak-off tolerance
for the drilling of the next hole section due to the very soft formations where there is little strength
or competency for fracture resistance. This first string of casing is commonly referred to as the
structural or Conductor string. Its design purpose is to support the weight of subsequent casing
strings and wellhead and supply resistance for bending moment of riser loading. However, in reality,
its ability to support much of an axial load is limited and it really does not supply much axial or
bending moment resistance until it is coupled to the subsequent casing strings. The first structural
string in current well designs does not take advantage of the growth of the fracture gradient and this
negatively impacts the overall well design by wasting casing diameters. The current well design
then sets additional casing strings above every anticipated drilling hazard which further reduces the
casing diameters and hole sizes available for well depths that routinely exceed 30,000 ft measured
14
depth. Figure 6.1 illustrates the current approach for the shallow casing setting depths in the
riser-less sections of current deepwater wells.
Casing seat optimization requires that the first string of casing to not only provide the structural
integrity necessary to support the axial loading the second string of casing, but also takes advantage
of the growth of the fracture gradient below the mud line. This affects leak-off tolerance to continue
drilling for the subsequent drilling and installation of the second string of casing. This rationale
extends to each casing seat to total depth (TD). Figure 6.2 illustrates the rational of setting the casing
seats as a function of the fracture gradient.
15
The design begins with the premise that casing seat placements must all meet not only pore
pressure and fracture gradient leak off requirements, specifically providing an acceptable leak-off for
all subsequent casing string drilling operations, but must also meet structural requirements beginning
with the first casing string.
7.0
How Did Casing Seats Influence the Completion of the
Macondo Well: A Story Not Heard
In order to successfully design such a composite or telescopic string of casings for minimizing
the number of casing strings to obtain the improved well design, the reality is that the first casing
string must provide for, and take advantage of, the natural progressive grow of the fracture gradient.
Therefore, the design of the first string provides both structural integrity as well as leak-off integrity
for the drilling and subsequent placement of next casing, the second casing string. This is a key and
critical design difference of this proposal versus the current practice of simply jetting in the first
casing string and using the first casing string for structural integrity only.
It has already been established by BP that the setting of the 16 in casing was too shallow.
xv
16
It is not possible to determine the exact cause of this shallow setting depth (other than wellbore
instability while drilling), and the data is not available to evaluate the exact cause. The events of
wellbore instability and ballooning (Section 9.1) are not unique in any of these complex wells.
Table 7.1 below details such an example (from another operator) where instability, and the
misinterpretation of ballooning, not only caused the early setting of casing string but also resulted in
the failure to execute the objectives of the well. This of course resulted in a shallow set of the
13 in and the 11 in. It is not physically possible to be any other way from an engineering
perspective as each section can only be drilled as deep as the prior hole-section kick tolerance will
allow.
Table 7.1 Deepwater Well Example
Drilling Record
Static
MW
ECD
Comments
Drill 8548-9145
11
DKD
13
DKD,
9.6
MW
NR
9.729.78
10.60
NR
10.90
10.83
10.80
11.00
10.80
11.00
17
Static
MW
Comments
Hole section mitigants: Maintain the same mud weight at the shoe for drill out as was the prior casing seat. Conduct
a leak-off test. Due not raise mud weight until hole conditions dictate: background gas alone is not a reason to raise
mud weight and can be unsafe. Keep mud solids low. Circulate more to avoid re-cycling gas, or alternatively improve
surface gas separation. Improve rig cleaning capabilities. Improve the mud inhibition characteristics. Know the
cuttings characteristics: fluffy, sticky shale is indicative of wetting, versus cuttings characterization of underbalanced
shale: splintered, concave and solid. Conduct rig crew training to understand ballooning vs. flow events. The
inordinately high mud weight through this section resulted in failure to get the section deep enough and created
ballooning and fluids loss events. The hole section was compromised: the section was not optimized. Furthermore,
without a leak-off test, this section was essentially drilled blind with no knowledge of the safe tolerance for the seat if
a real well control event had occurred.
16.5 hole section
Run in Hole (RIH) w/ 16 X 19
BHA. Raise MW to 11.4 ppg, tag
and drill cement and shoe track.
Wash & Ream (W&R) to 10,400
ECD 11.78 ppg. Drill to 10410.
ECD 11.72 ppg. C&C, reduce
ECD to 11.63 ppg. Flow check.
OK. Perform FIT 12.13 ppg. W&R
10375 10410. EDC 11.7 11.74
ppg.
Drill 10,506 11407. ECD 11.76
ppg. C&C due to high gas a Kelly
down. Drill 11,407 11416. C&C
at 11,438 due to high gas.
Drill 11,416 11,438. ECD 11.75
ppg. C&C, flow check 1.5 bbl
back. C&C raising mud weight to
11.6 ppg @ 11,438. Flow Check,
gain 3.3 Bbls and then static.
C&C, ECD 11.81 ppg. Flow
Check, gained 9.4 Bbls, then
static. Pump 350 Bbls of 14 ppg
and spot. Flow Check, gained 3.7
Bbls, then static. Had to make
partial trip to 6109 to retrieve a
broken Drill Pipe screen.
Displacement was 5 Bbls over.
POH to re-configure BHA.
11.40
11.50
11.76
11.60
18
Static
MW
ECD
Comments
Hole section mitigants: The mitigants for this hole section are much the same as the above hole section.
Furthermore, well control was initiated for all the wrong reasons resulting in fracturing the wellbore.
14.75 hole section
RIH w/ 14 X 17 BHA. Drill
shoe track. FC static. Cleaned
up rat hole to 11,529. Drill 11,529
11,530. Pump 50 bbl Loss
Circulation Material (LCM) sweep.
C&C. FIT to 12.67 ppg, 401 psi,
pumped 15 Bbls, bled back 5 Bbls.
Pump to 12,85 ppg (no bleed back
shown on report). Drill 11,472
11,539. FIT 12.67 ppg. Torque 28k, ECD 12.21 12.25 ppg. Drill to
11,663. Att. To open reamer with
hole packing off, and working pipe.
Had to work with 100k over pull.
W&R, excess torque and stalling.
Working pipe to 125k over. Weight
up to 12.1 ppg. Open hole to
11,539.
ECD 12.26 ppg. Reduced to 12.4
ppg. D/11,663 11,843, ECD
12.26 12.42 ppg. Drill 11,843
11967, ECD 12.55 ppg. Raise
MW to 12.3 Drill 11,967 12,024,
ECD 12.6 ppg. Hole packing off.
Back ream to 11,930. At. To wash
down to 11,930 with total loss of
12.00
19
Static
MW
ECD
Comments
12.30
12.65
12.30
12.68
The failure to execute this well was primarily a result of inordinately high mud weight, from the initiation of the first
casing sections below installation of the riser. These problems compounded with each hole section. Furthermore, for
the last hole section, a case could be built for blind drilling without knowledge of the integrity of the prior casing seat.
This is a dangerous practice. DHM summary: Proper mud weight with improved inhibition and raise the mud weight
only when the totality of hole conditions dictate, have good gas removal and cleaning equipment at the surface as all
shale has entrained gas and higher mud weight will not mitigate this condition. Practice well listening techniques and
proper well control, including a leak-off test at each casing seat. Ballooning was a major issue and induced hazards.
Train rig teams to avoid ballooning, and this begins with recognizing the difference between ballooning and well
control which was initiated with no indicators of a well control event. Failure to optimize the drilling margin for each
hole section resulted in wasted casing and burned casing diameters. The net effect was that drilling margins were
not optimized, rather compromised and the well ran out of casting options early objectives were not met and the
well junked.
Plug and abandon well
20
For the Macondo, the net result was a string of 11 in casing set 2000 ft above the reservoir.
The following should be considered as a conclusion given we do not have pore pressure (PP) or
fracture strength (FG) data, but with at least 14.6 ppg mud weight (MW):
There was a pressure regression into reservoir of 12.8 (not uncommon in this earth model
environment
This is a differential of 1.8 lb/gal (PPG): up to 1800 psi across the cement into a highly
porous and permeable reservoir
Did this compromise yielding of the cement?
Did gas then mitigate from above cement and honey comb? Who knows? Did it at least
exacerbate?
According to BP, this influenced their decision to use nitrified cement.
21
The 14.6 ppg mud weight created unavoidable differential across the cement a minimum of
1800 psi while curing. Consequently, we cannot discount that honey-combed cement exacerbated
creating micro-annulus resulting in a flow path for nitrogen separation.
8.0
Understanding Wellbore Instability - Well Listening
And The Rig Team Interactive Factors
Although not an exhaustive list of drilling hazards, the following discussion does represent a
major portion of nonproductive time (NPT) in drilling operations.
Best practices used while drilling is a fundamental principle of ensuring wellbore stability. Some
drilling hazards can be induced by failure to recognize or misinterpreting the dynamics of the drilling
margin.
Well listening engages the human factor and requires considerable skill and training to
understand what drilling operations related to the well conditions are communicating.
Understanding these basic drilling conditions are critical to safe and successful operations.
Table 7.1 lists several key indicators of well drilling state that the driller must track, interpret,
and respond to in order to maintain well control.
Table 8.1 Interpretive Well Listening: The Human Factors
xvi
xvii
23
Creates unnecessary fluid losses, differential sticking, and risk of fracturing softer
formations.
Increase opportunities for "Ballooning," possibly creating unsafe drilling conditions.
Other Hazard Indicators
D exponents: Changing drillable trends (analogue of mud weight, ROP, and WOB xviii)
Pinched bits, elliptical hole ( principle stress vectors)
Fluffy, wetted shale (chemical instability)
9.0
Discussion of Key Hazards Leading to Wellbore
Instability
Misinterpreting any of the dynamic factors listed in Table 7.1 can result from simple fluid losses
to catastrophic failure. Singular interpretation of conditions from any of these dynamics can be
counterproductive to maintaining a safe and stable wellbore and result in actually inducing hazards.
The following is an abbreviated discussion of key hazards leading to wellbore instability. The
reason why understanding these hazards is so crucial is that any event of wellbore instability has a
high likelihood of becoming a well control event.
The following discussions regarding drilling hazards are not meant to comprise an exhaustive
list. These hazards are the primary precursors of wellbore instability. However, through good drilling
practices such as outlined, these hazards can be recognized, understood, managed, and either
avoided or effectively mitigated.
9.1
Ballooning is a phenomenon and consequence associated with high ECD. Resultant flowback
can often be confused with influx due to a pore pressure greater than mud balance. This
interpretation is often further complicated by gas entrained in shale, common especially in mottled
shale, with the operator weighting up the mud to counter the shale gas. This further complicates
ballooning. Arbitrarily increasing mud weight in the presence of shale gas alone can result in
fracturing the formation below or at the shoe. The consequence can be catastrophic.13
Failure to recognize ballooning versus well control is a common mistake made in drilling
operations. It is one of the leading causes of unnecessarily expending casing strings in narrow
margin drilling operations.
Table 8.1 represents an actual deepwater example where high ECD resulted in ballooning and
raising the mud weight resulted in fracturing the formation. The higher ECD further complicating
correct wellbore stability conditions by increasing the cyclic bleed offs. Ultimately, the mud weight
xviii
24
was increased to where fracturing occurred and massive and unsafe losses were sustained before
regaining control of the well. The misinterpretation of ballooning required setting casings before
their time.
Table 9.1 Deepwater Ballooning Case History
16.5 hole section
Run in Hole (RIH) w/ 16 x 19 BHA.
Raise MW to 11.4 ppg, tag and drill cement
and shoe track. Wash & Ream (W&R) to
10,400 ECD 11.78 ppg. Drill to 10410. ECD
11.72 ppg. C&C, reduce ECD to 11/63 ppg.
Flow check. OK. Perform FIT 12.13 ppg.
W&R 10375 -103=410. Drill 10410
10740.ECD 11.7 0 11.74 ppg.
Drill 10,506 -113407. ECD 11.76 ppg. C&C
due to high gas at Kelly down. Drill 11,407 11416. C&C at 11,438 due to high gas.
Drill 11,416 11,438. ECD 11.75 ppg. C&C,
flow check 1.5 bbl back. C&C raising mud
weight to 11.6 ppg @ 11,438. Flow Check,
gain 3.3 Bbls and then static. C&C, ECD 11.81
ppg. Flow Check, gained 9.4 Bbls, then static.
Pump 350 Bbls of 14 ppg and spot. Flow
Check, gained 3.7 Bbls, then static. Had to
make partial trip to 6109 to retrieve a broken
Drill Pipe screen. Displacement was 5 Bbls
over. POH to re-configure BHA.
Static
MW
ECD
11.40
11.7811.63
11.50
11.76
11.60
11.60
11.70
11.80
11.7511.81
11.9 11.93
11.8811.83
25
This is non-productive
time. It is also wasted
time, or for future
operations, Removable
Lost Time.
Static
MW
ECD
11.80
When ballooning is recognized, care must be taken to avoid unnecessarily weighting up.
Bleeding back trapped pressure as a result of ballooning is critical.
Best Practice
The best practice revolves around "well listening" and integrating all drilling dynamic factors to
make the correct hazard management and avoidance decisions. Interpreting ballooning is crucial to
narrow margin drilling operations and ensuring safe and efficient drilling operations.
26
9.2
Fluid losses can range from slight to catastrophic and result in wellbore failure or well-control
events. The primary cause of fluid loss is exceeding the outer boundary of the drilling margin
depicted in Figure 8.1. This can be the result of ballooning, or in porous formations, merely the
result of applying an unnecessarily high mud weight and resultant ECDs. Maintaining an ECD low
enough to ensure fluid volume integrity and uncompromised drilling barrier, while high enough to
exceed the lower boundary necessary for wellbore integrity, is critical. Applying well listening
techniques is a rig team interactive predecessor to making correct decisions driven by drilling
conditions.
Best Practice
The best practice and first line of defense is to avoid overweighting the hole and avoiding
ballooning events. Typical fluid-loss, decision-tree processes can and should be created.
9.3
Stuck Pipe
Stuck pipe is a drilling hazard that can be associated with ballooning and fluid losses. Generally,
stuck pipe is avoidable if drilling margins are honored.
Primary Causes:
Secondary Causes:
Coal sections
Tar
Under gauge hole and pseudo stresses.
Permeable sections, high fluid loss
Cuttings buildup
Salt creep
Collapsed casing
Junk
Green cement
Recognition and avoidance of stuck pipe requires some of the same well listening techniques:
Hole caving
Splintered cuttings
Concave-shaped cuttings
Sloughing shale, chemical shale wetting, and instability
Tectonic or pseudo-induced stresses
Best Practice
The best practices to avoid stuck pipe are much the same as ballooning and fluids loss, that is,
recognizing the conditions within the drilling margins and events and reacting correctly. In addition,
other factors such as Bottom Hole Assembly (BHA) xix and drill string configuration and the
inhibitive characteristics of the formations being drilled should be considered.
xix
28
2.20%
0.70%
2.30%
1.20%
6.40%
2.24
2.90%
2.90%
2.40%
1.90%
10.10%
9.797
0.70%
0.90%
2%
0.80%
4.40%
2.376
4
56.00%
35
0.42
29
33.78%
97
1.843
9
26.40%
54
0.432
Over four times as much time is spent on the more complex wells combating wellbore instability
events. Even more revealing is that over four times as much time is also spent on the blowout
preventer (BOP) combating kicks.
Figure 10.2 NPT for 263 wells drilled in less than 600 ft of water.xx
xx
29
Figure 10.3 NPT for 99 non-subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water. xxi
Figure 10.4 NPT for 65 wells subsalt wells drilled in greater than 3000 ft of water.xxii
Any event of wellbore instability has the potential of becoming a well control event.
xxi
xxii
30
11.0
Conclusion
The BP tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) has clearly revealed two major categories of the
consequences of risk the incident itself and the resultant environmental disaster. These risk
consequences are quite obvious. Risk in any endeavor cannot be eliminated entirely, but it can be
successfully managed if it is recognized and the consequences are fully understood.
In order to have a meaningful outcome for future deepwater drilling, the mindsets identified by
Andrew Hopkins must be addressed, and one must first understand that there is a problem, and
then focus on solving the problem.
This paper offers design improvement suggestions through applied engineering, considering risk
as the first step towards developing a safer and more reliable deepwater drilling environment. This
begins with recognizing the metrics of drilling operations and looking at the common denominator
of failures: the design itself in regard to how casing seats are determined and the consequential
hazards of failing to adequately determine casing seats.
This design weakness begins with the very first Conductor string and is compounded with
depth. If kick tolerance is not maximized at each casing seat, by definition it cannot be maximized in
the next hole section and subsequent casing seat. This in and of itself leads to many direct well
control events and execution failures, including deeper ECD management and subsequent
operations such as cementing liners or casing..
Industry efforts to tweak execution systems include enlarging the well hole, fluids
improvements, and efforts to improve critical issues like ECD management in these difficult narrow
margin drilling environments. Although some industry professionals will disagree with how risk
should be managed, the failure to recognize the design as critical to the facts of the metrics denies
what a high-performance, high-reliability organization should represent.
Avoiding a repeat of the current situation and changing the climate of denial can be achieved
with a dose of common sense. Solutions must consider and actively apply the following:
The current design model must be challenged. Sound and unbiased engineering design is the
fundamental precursor to safety, sustained success and full life cycle reliability. If we solve the
problem wells, then by definition of risk management, the rest of the well population is mitigated.
31
12.0
References
1. David Pritchard and Kenneth Kotow, Deepwater Well Complexity: The New Domain,
DHSG White Paper, Successful Energy Practices International, LLC, September 2010.
2. Andrew Hopkins, biography, http://www.professorandrewhopkins.com/biography.
3. J.C. Cunha, Drilling Management, Society of Petroleum Engineers, JPT, September 2010,
72.,
4. David M. Pritchard, et al., Drilling Hazard Management: Excellent performance begins with
planning, World Oil, August 2010.
5. David Hammer, 5 key human errors, colossal mechanical failure led to fatal Gulf oil rig
blowout, The Times Picayune, September 5, 2010.
6. Totte Lager and Terje Magnussen, The Deepwater Horizon accident on well Macondo
#1, Acona Wellpro, Mini Seminar, August, 2010,
http://www.aconawellpro.com/@api/deki/files/251/=MiniSeminar_Macondo_August_2010.pdf.
7. cite to testimonial record
8. Ben Casselman and Siobhan Hughes, Contractor Accused of Flawed Job on Rig, Wall
Street Journal, October 29, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303362404575580420328930294.html?mod=ITP
_pageone_0#project%3DOILRIGS1004%26articleTabs%3Darticle.
9. David Hammer, 6 Fateful Missteps, The Times Picayune, New Orleans, LA, September 5,
2010.
10. Paul Parsons, The Macondo Well, Energy Training Resources, LLC, July 15, 2010,
https://www.energytrainingresources.com/data/default/content/Macondo.pdf.
11. Pritchard, Kotow, op. cit.
12. Kenneth Kotow and David Pritchard, Casing Optimization and Riserless Drilling, OTC,
May 2009.
13. B. W. Swanson, et al., Measurement of Hydrostatic and Hydraulic Pressure Changes During
HPHT Drilling on Erskine Field, Society of Petroleum Engineers, Offshore Europe, September 912, 1997.
32