the principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all

persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the
varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. It would be
inexpedient and incorrect to think that laws have to be made uniformly applicable to all
people in one go. The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying
persons for legitimate purposes. The legislature is competent to exercise its discretion and
make classification.
Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere
production of inequality is not enough .Differential treatment does not per se constitute
violation of Article 14. It denies equal protection only when there is no reasonable basis for
the differentiation.
If a law deals equally with members of a well-defined class, it is not obnoxious and it
is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application
to other persons. The pensioners form a class distinct to those in service, and so are the
prisoners and non-prisoners and the employees stationed within a project area and the
employees stationed outside. Legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or
purpose need not be all-embracing. It is for the Legislature to determine what categories it
would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which
would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out
would not render the legislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and
violative of Article 14. No service rule can satisfy. Each employee; its reasonableness should
be considered from the standpoint of justice to the majority of employees.
Article 14 does not prevent the Legislature from introducing a reform gradually, that
is to say, at first applying the legislation to some of the institutions or objects having common
features or particular areas only, according to the exigencies of the situation.
No economic measure has yet been devised which is free from discriminatory impact
and that in such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist, the court does well
not to impose too rigorous a standard of criticism, under the equal protection clause,
reviewing fiscal service.