C 48

Team Code: C-48
LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION-2015
IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF PAMMU
Writ Petition (s) (Civil) No (s)._______/2015
COMMON CAUSE AND ANR.

Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
UNION OF PAMMU
Respondent(s)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONERS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS -
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS -
II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
III
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
IX
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
XII
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
XIII
PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES
I. THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLES ACT (THIRD AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 2014

IS ARBITRARY IN NATURE AND AFFECTS THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO CONTEST
THE ELECTIONS.
1
A. THE ORDINANCE IS NOT VALID AND IS ULTRA VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION
B. THE ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14. -
C. THE ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19 (1) (A). -
II. THE TELECOM ORDER ONLY TARGETING THE WEBSITES PROMPTING

REVENGE PORN IS NOT VALID. -
A. THE TELECOM ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND VIOLATES ARTICLE 14. -
B. THE TELECOM ORDER IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 (1) (A).
C. THE BAN INFRINGES THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY ENSHRINED IN/UNDER ARTICLE 21. 8
III. THE GAUVANSH SANRAKSHAN AND GAUSAMVARDHAN ACT, 2015 IS NOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID. -
A. THE ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14.
B. THE ACT IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19(1) (G) AND ARTICLE 21. -
11
PRAYER
XIV
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
Paragraph
A.I.R.
All India Reporter
Anr.
Another
Art.
Article
cl.
Clause
Dist.
District
Ed.
Edition
Honble
Honourable
MP
Member of Parliament
Ors.
Others
S.C.
Supreme Court
S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reporter
SBP
Sabka Vikaas Party
UOI
Union of India
v.
Versus
Cooper
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India
R.D. Shetty
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of

India
II
CASES CITED:
S R.
CASE NAME
NO.
PAGE
NO.
1.
A.K. Kaul v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1403
2.
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710
3.
Abdul Hakim Quraishi v. State of Bihar, (1961) 2 S.C.R. 610
12
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Akhil Bhartiya Upabhokta Congress v. State of M.P., A.I.R.
5,10
2011 S.C. 1834

Asha Sharma v. Chandigarh Administration, 2011 10 S.C.C. 86
13
Association of Democratic Reforms v. UOI, A.I.R. 2001 Del.
126
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 S.C.C. 625
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1951 S.C.
118
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, 1951 S.C. 41
10. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 1987 A.I.R 579
11. Dist. Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 S.C.C.

496.
12. Dr. Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2014 P&H 67
13. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555
14.
Express Newspaper P. Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986
6,9
S.C.872
15. Govind v. State of MP, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1378
16. H. Sowbhagya v. N.G.E.F. Ltd., A.I.R. 2004 Kant. 155
17. Hashmatullah v. State of M.P., (1996) 4 S.C.C. 391
12
III
18.
Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Jamat,

A.I.R.2008S.C.1892
19. Humanity & Anr. v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 2308
20.
21.
13
Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, A.I.R.
5,10
2
2003 S.C. 1843

Indra Sawhney Etc. Etc v. Union of India and Ors, Etc., A.I.R.
3,4
1993 S.C. 477
22. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Ors., A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 498
3,4
23. Jagdish Chavla v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr. L.J. 2562 (Raj.)
10
24.
25.
Janhit Manch and Ors. v. Union of India , PIL 155 of 2009, Civil
Appellate Side , High court of Mumbai
Karthekeyan R v. UOI, WRIT PETITION NO.20344 OF 2009,
High Court of Madras
26. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1295

27.
Life Insurance Corporation v. Manu Bhai Shah, A.I.R. 1993 S.C.
9
8
171
Management of Coimbatore District Central Co Operative Bank
28. v. Secretary, Coimbatore District Central Co Operative Bank

Employee Association and Anr., [2007] 5 S.C.R. 430
29. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597
30. Mohd. Faruk v. State of M.P., (1969) 1 S.C.C. 853
12
31.
32.
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Ors. v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1958 11,12,13
S.C. 731
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. v. Jan
Mohammed Usman Bhai and Anr., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 700
33. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 S.C.C. 545

34.
13
Oriental Insurance Co. v. Kishore Chandra Sahu, 1997 A.I.H.C.
13
4
2802 (Ori.)
35. Ozair Hussain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 Del. 103
IV
36. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4

S.C.C. 399
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology,
37.
(2002) 5 S.C.C. 111
38. R.A. Jayaram v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1974 Kant 93
12
39. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 264
40.
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of
4,5,6,10
India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628
41. Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. State of Bihar, 1953 S.C. 215
42. Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 (602)
43.
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C.
1,2
564
44. S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 S.C.C. 574
45. S.K. Sagar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1533
46. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918
47.
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket
Association of Bengal, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1236
48. Sharda v. Dharampal, (2003) 4 S.C.C. 493
49. Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322
50
51.
52.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
State of Assam v. Omega Printers and Publishers (Pvt.) Ltd.,
A.I.R. 1995 Gau 49

State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and
13
Ors. A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 212
53. State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490
54. State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose 1962 A.I.R. 945
55. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 S.C. 75
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh A.I.R. 1999
S.C. 3678
Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1984 S.C.
1064
Transport and Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, 2011
2 S.C.C. 575
U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra and
Anr., A.I.R. 2009 S.C. 296

Union of India and Ors. v. Muralidhara Menon and Anr., 2010
(5) A.L.T. 18 (S.C.)

Union of India v. Motion Pictures Association, A.I.R. 1999 S.C.
2334
62. Vashisht Kumar Jaiswal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 2005 All. 105
STATUTES CITED:
S. No.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
1.
PAMMU PENAL CODE, 1860
2.
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950
3.
THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLES ACT, 1951
ARTICLES REFERRED:
S. No.
1.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
B. Shantanu, On Cow Slaughter etc, (7 October, 2015, 7:02 PM),
available at http://satyameva-jayate.org/2012/02/08/cow-slaughter/
2.
Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying & Fisheries (Ministry of

Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Govt. of India), (13 October, 2015,
10:32 AM), available at http://dahd.nic.in/dahd/reports/report-of-thenational-commission-on-cattle.aspx
VI
3.
Dr. Ashok Dhamija, Constitutional Validity of Cow Slaughter Ban in

Maharashtra-a detailed analysis, (11 October, 2015, 02:54 PM), available
at
http://tilakmarg.com/opinion/constitution-validity-of-cow-slaughter-
ban-in-maharashtra-a-detailed-analysis/
4.
Harish Damodaran, Heres why India is set to lose status of worlds largest
beef
exporter
16
October,
2015,
05:37
pm),
available
at
http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/beefed-up-no-longer/
5.
Krishnadas Rajagopal, Cant stop an adult from watching porn in his room,
says
SC,
(16
October,
2010,
4:46
PM),
available
at
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cant-stop-an-adult-fromwatching-porn-in-his-room-says-sc/article7400690.ece
6.
Shubhojit, Significance of Article 14 of Indian Constitution, (2 October,

2015, 11:45 PM), available at
http://www.elections.in/political-
corner/significance-of-article-14-of-indian-constitution/
BOOKS REFERRED:
1 Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, LexisNexis,

2007, 8th Edition.

2007, 8th Edition.

2008, 8th Edition.

2008, 8th Edition.
P.K. Majumdar & R.P. Kataria, Commentary on the Constitution of India,

Orient Publishing Company, 2009, 10th Edition.
2 Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, LexisNexis 2014,

9th Edition.
3 Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, LexisNexis, 2014,

9th Edition.
VII

9th Edition.

9th Edition.
1 Arvind P Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India, LexisNexis, 2010,

2nd Edition.
2 Arvind P Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India, LexisNexis, 2010,

2nd Edition.
MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Wadhwa Nagpur, 2007, 5th Edition.
1 HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Universal Law Publishing Co.,

2014, 4th Edition.
1 Samaraditya Pal, Indias Constitution Origins and Evolution, LexisNexis,

2014, 1st Edition.
2 Samaraditya Pal, Indias Constitution Origins and Evolution, LexisNexis,

2014, 1st Edition.
Vol. VIII, Constituent Assembly Debates, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 5th Reprint
Brajesh Rajak, Pornography Law, Universal Law Publishing Co., 2011
9 V.R. Manohar and W.W. Chitaley, The AIR Manual (Civil and Criminal), 5th
Edition.
10 V.R. Manohar and W.W. Chitaley, The AIR Manual (Civil and Criminal),
5th Edition.
DATABASES REFERRED:
http://www.manupatra.com
http://www.westlawindia.com
http://www.lexisnexis.com
VIII
The counsels on the behalf of the petitioners have filed the writ petition under
Article-321 of the Constitution of Pammu, challenging the constitutional validity
of the Representation of Peoples Act (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 2014, the
Telecom Order targeting the websites prompting revenge porn and the
Gauvansh Sanrakshan and Gausamvardhan Act of 2015. The Honble Supreme
Court of Pammu has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
PAMMU CONST. art. 32: (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be
appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament
may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any
of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.
IX
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Pammu is a quasi-federal country, rich in its cultural history. The laws of

Pammu are pari materia to the laws of India.
B. Pammu mainly consists of two major national political parties, namely Janhit
Party and Sabka Vikaas Party (hereinafter, referred as SBP). The SBP had
been in power at the centre since past 10 years and during its end of second
tenure, various central ministers were allegedly involved in a number of scams,
making people discontented against the government. The next general elections
were scheduled in May 2014.
C. In a parliamentary session held in December 2013, the SBP government
proposed a bill which sought to bring in an amendment to the Representation of
Peoples Act, 1951to introduce certain educational qualifications for being
eligible to contest elections for Member of Parliament. This amendment was
vehemently opposed by all the opposition parties including the Janhit Party. The
opposition to this amendment was so staunch that the entire parliamentary
session was on the verge of getting washed out if the amendments werent
withdrawn. In spite of facing so much opposition, the government refused to do
so. This finally resulted into the entire parliamentary session getting washed
out.
D. After the session adjourned, the SBP government came out with an ordinance
titled the Representation of Peoples Act (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 2014.
The ordinance provided that, to be eligible for contesting MP elections, a
candidate must have passed class 10 of the Board of Secondary Education or its
equivalent. The ordinance came before the next general elections scheduled in
May 2014.
E. The SBP said, during its election campaign, that this ordinance was an electoral
reform measure that would raise the standard of elected representatives.
F. According to the SBP, another important issue was to regulate the proliferation
of pornographic websites on the internet. SBP promised that it would take down
all such pornographic websites if gets elected. The traditional supporters of SBP
also shared the same views as they were ideologically inclined to such thoughts.
X
STATEMENT OF FACTS
G. In the May 2014 general elections, SBP came out as the single largest party with
the number of seats getting significantly reduced than last time. After the SBP
came into power, it asked the Law Ministry to invite suggestion from the general
public on how to tackle the proliferation of pornographic websites on the
internet.
H. After some months, the Telecom Ministry came out with a Telecom Order
directed to the internet service providers and telecom operators to control free
and open access to around 900 porn websites. The implementation of the
Telecom Order resulted into a huge outcry at national as well as social media
forums and was seen as moral policing be the government.
I. The Telecom Minister of Pammu Mr Sibbal said, There is no total ban. This
was done in the backdrop of some websites promoting revenge porn. The
idea is also to protect Pammus cultural fabric. The government said that this
decision for banning the pornographic websites was done on the basis of
representations that the Law Ministry received from the public, but the
government refused to make them public. It was alleged by the civil society that
the governments intention was to get an internet censorship through backdoor.
J. Pammu witnessed another ban in form of a beef ban after the porn ban. The
passed the Gauvansh Sanrakshan and Gausamvardhan Bill, 2015 which
criminalized slaughtering of cows, bulls & bullocks; selling and consumption
of beef.
K. Aggrieved by this, Mr. Mootkar Ritwick Roshan filed a writ petition in the
Honble Supreme Court of Pammu that his right to contest elections has been
affected by the ordinance. He belongs to a village where the literacy rate is very
low and there is no access to primary and secondary education. NGO Common
Cause also filed two separate petitions in the Honble Supreme Court of Pammu
against the porn ban and the beef ban. NGO Common Cause also intervened
in the writ petition filed by Mr. Roshan. The Honble Supreme Court clubbed
the matters as the plaintiffs and respondents were same in all the three cases.
The Honble Supreme Court of Pammu also decided that the present petition is
maintainable and it has the requisite jurisdiction to hear the matter.
XI
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented before the Honble Supreme Court of Pammu:-
I. WHETHER THE REPRESENTATION

ORDINANCE, 2014
IS
OF
PEOPLES ACT (THIRD AMENDMENT)
ARBITRARY IN NATURE AND AFFECTS THE RIGHT
OF
PETITIONER TO CONTEST THE ELECTIONS OR NOT.

II. WHETHER THE TELECOM ORDER ONLY TARGETING THE WEBSITES PROMPTING
REVENGE PORN IS VALID OR NOT.
III. WHETHER THE GAUVANSH SANRAKSHAN AND GAUSAMVARDHAN ACT OF 2015 IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT.
XII
I.
It is most respectfully submitted that the Representation of Peoples Act (Third

Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 is arbitrary and unconstitutional in nature as it
infringes Article 14 and Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Pammu. It is a
result of colourable use of power by the Government. It violates Article 14
because the law treats unequal equally, which is in contradiction to the basic
essence of Article 14. The law came at a time when a considerable section of
the population was debarred from contesting elections. It also infringes Article
19(1) (a) because it stops a person to express the views and the problems of the
people in the parliament.
II.
It is most humbly submitted before this Honble Supreme Court that the
impugned Telecom Order is vague and arbitrary. The Order in the guise of
banning revenge porn intends to ban pornographic websites as a whole. The
order is an act of Moral Policing by the State and is therefore violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. Further, the Order has been enacted in order to give effect
to the traditional views of the supporters of SBP and not the views of the public
at large. Further, the Order infringes the right to freedom of speech and
expression enshrined under Article 19(1) (a). It imposes an unreasonable
restriction and is therefore, liable to be struck down.
III.
It is most humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that the
Gauvansh Sanrakshan and Gausamvardhan Act, 2015 is unconstitutional as it is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of Pammu. The impugned act has
imposed a total ban on slaughter of cow, bulls and bullocks without considering
the fact that they are less useful to the society after attaining certain ages. Total
ban on the said cattle is extraneous to the object sought to be achieved. Further,
the impugned act is also violative of Article 19 (1) (g) and Article 21 of the
Constitution as it has imposed a total prohibition on the activities of the butchers
which is not a reasonable restriction in public interest. It has infringed the right
to livelihood of butchers and right to privacy of people who used to eat beef.
Hence the impugned Act is arbitrary and unconstitutional.
XIII
I.
THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLES ACT (THIRD AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE,

2014 IS ARBITRARY IN NATURE AND AFFECTS THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO
CONTEST ELECTIONS.
1.
It is most respectfully submitted that the Ordinance which was promulgated by

the President in respect to bringing an educational qualification in contesting
election for MP is arbitrary and unconstitutional in nature. The argument put
forward to support the above contention is three fold: firstly, the Ordinance
doesnt comply with the basic essence of democracy and is ultra vires the
Constitution [A], secondly, it is in violation of Article 14 [B] and thirdly, it
violates Article 19(1) (a) [C].
A.
THE ORDINANCE
IS NOT VALID AND IS ULTRA VIRES TO THE
CONSTITUTION.
2.
The SBP government has not acted in a bona fide manner in advising the
President to issue the ordinance. It can be seen prima facie that there werent
any circumstances which made it necessary to issue an Ordinance in this regard2
as the bill faced furious opposition in the parliament.3 The fundamental aim and
purpose of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 is to strengthen
representative democracy. The Ordinance is violating the basic notion behind
the act by refusing to vehement oppositions and causing consequential financial
losses.4
3.
Article 123 (1)5, Constitution of Pammu empowers President to promulgate an

Ordinance when there are circumstances that necessitate the President to issue
an Ordinance.6The ordinance comes only when there is an emergency and the
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710, 11 (Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud).
Moot Proposition, 2.
4
Ibid.
5
PAMMU CONST. art. 123.
6
A.K. Roy v. Union of India A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710, 11 (C.J. Y.V. Chandrachud); RustomCavasjee
Cooper v. Union of IndiaA.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564, 233, 23, 25 (Justice J.C. Shah); S.K. Sagar v. Union
of India A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1533, 15 (Justice R.S. Sarkaria); State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose,
A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 945, 6 (Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar).
3
parliament is not in session, meaning where the Ordinance is of such a nature

that it is not expedient for the President to wait for the session to promulgate.
The Petitioners submit that there existed no circumstances with necessitated the
promulgation of the Ordinance, rather it was promulgated in order to achieve
the political ends of the government. The Justice P.N. Bhagwati, in D.C.
Wadhwa v. State of Bihar7 expressly held that the use of Ordinance should be
done to tackle an extraordinary situation and not any political objective. The
impugned Ordinance, therefore, could have waited a duly enacted law.
4.
The Satisfaction of the President, under Clause (c) of the second proviso to
Article 3118, is open to judicial review on the ground of mala fides and also on
the ground that it was based on extraneous grounds.9 The Honble Supreme
Court, in the Cooper10 case, opined that the satisfaction can be challenged if
there is no genuine satisfaction in the circumstances of the case.
5.
It is submitted that the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 omitted the clause which was
brought in by the 38th Amendment Act, 1975 in Article 123 and 213. The
omission of that Cl. (4), by the 44th Amendment Act follows the view of the
minority in the Cooper11 case that notwithstanding the fact that the satisfaction
of the president under Cl. (1) was subjective, it could be challenged on the
ground of mala fides. The Petitioners submit that where the Bill was vehemently
opposed in Parliament by all opposition parties, it required a reconsideration by
the Government and the Ordinance was issued with a mala fide intent.
6.
Ordinances are sometimes issued a day before the sitting of the assembly or a
day after the prorogation of the assembly. An Ordinance may be issued to
achieve a particular political objective such as creating a new offence to harm a
political opponent, or creating a new disqualification to prevent a political
opponent from contesting elections without any intention of having it passed by
D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579, 2,6 (Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati).
PAMMU CONST. art. 311, cl. 2, sub cl. c.
9
A.K. Kaul v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1403, 9 (Justice S.C. Agarwal); Indian Railway
Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajaykumar, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 1843, 18 (Justice Arijit Pasayat); S.R. Bommai
v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918, 56 (Justice S.R. Pandian).
10
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564, 237 (Justice J.C. Shah).
11
Ibid.
8
the assembly.12 The issued Ordinance in the instant case is more inclined
towards the latter, reiterating the mala fide intent on the part of the President,
and is therefore, ultra vires to the Constitution.
B.
7.
THE ORDINANCE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE-1413.
The ordinance is in clear violation of Article 14.14 Equality of opportunity is

also embedded in Equality before law.15 The basic essence is that the equals
should be treated equally and the unequal should be treated unequally.16 In this
case, there is a differentiation between two classes:1) Those who aspire to become a MP & are educated;
2) Those who aspire to become MP & are uneducated.
8.
There is no intelligible differentia present in aforementioned instance as the

classes that are being created are arbitrary. This is so because the government
has completely overlooked the fact that everyone in the country is not at a par
level in terms of access to education.17 There are still some people, like
Petitioner, in Pammu which have no access to primary education and secondary
education.18 This law would certainly debar a part of the overall population from
contesting elections, thus making the law arbitrary. The classification does not
satisfy the constitutional requirements, therefore, it becomes invalid.19 The
classification done is itself not reasonable on the face of the law, making it
contrary to Article 14.20 The classification done here is completely unreasonable
12
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India, 2008, 8 th Ed., Vol. 4., Pg. 5514
14
Supra note 9.
15
Indra Sawhney Etc. Etc v. Union of India and Ors, Etc., A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477, 27, 94A (Justice B.P.
Jeevan Reddy).
16
Management of Coimbatore District Central Co Operative Bank v. Secretary, Coimbatore District
Central Co Operative Bank Employee Association and Anr., [2007] 5 S.C.R. 430, 22 (Justice C.K.
Thakker); Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Ors., A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 498, 54 (Justice M. Jagannadha
Rao); U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra and Anr., A.I.R. 2009 S.C. 296, 37
(Justice C.K. Thakker); Union of India and Ors. v. Muralidhara Menon and Anr., 2010 (5) A.L.T. 18
(S.C.), 14 (Justice S.B. Sinha).
17
Report by Ministry of Human Resource Department, 14 September, 2011
18
19
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 41, 88 (Justice S.K. Das) ; State of West Bengal v.
Anwar Ali Sarkar, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 75, 80 (Justice N. Chandra Shekhar Aiyer).
20
Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 215, 17 (Justice B.K. Mukherjea).
13
as it is not conducive to the functioning of the society.21 Hence, the principle of

equality of opportunity laid down in Indra Sawhney22 case is infringed by the
law by the Ordinance.
9.
The Honble Supreme Court has also held that Right to Equality not only means
not to be discriminated, but it also protects from the arbitrary actions of the
state.23 It becomes the responsibility of the state to build up such a society where
the equality of opportunity is available to all its citizens and the poor can also
enjoy the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.24 Moreover,
equal opportunity policies by the state makes sense only if the
underprivileged classes are able to develop their full human potential.25
However, in the instant case, the Ordinance does not provide equal opportunity
to all the citizens. It takes away the right of the unprivileged class to contest the
elections. The government failed to take into consideration the severe
consequences of the law, thus making it arbitrary.
10.
Article 123(2)26 provides that the ordinance shall have the same force and effect
as an act of Parliament. Article 13(3)27 defines law to include an ordinance
and, like a law made by the Parliament, an ordinance would be void to the extent
it contravenes fundamental rights conferred by Part-III. In the R.D. Shetty case,
the government actions must not be arbitrary or capricious, but must be based
on the principle which meets the test of reason and relevance.28 When both the
decision making process and decision taken are based on irrelevant facts &
circumstances, while ignoring relevant considerations, such an action is
21
Transport and Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, 2011 2 S.C.C. 575, 28 (Justice Markandey
Katju).
22
Supra note 15.
23
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 111, 9 (Justice
Ruma Pal); See also, H. Sowbhagya v. N.G.E.F. Ltd., A.I.R. 2004 Kant. 155, 9 (Justice D.V.
Shylender Kumar); Vashisht Kumar Jaiswal v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 2005 All. 105, 9 (Justice
Markandey Katju); Dr. Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2004 P&H 67, 4 (Justice S.S. Nijjar);
State of Assam v. Omega Printers and Publishers (Pvt.) Ltd., A.I.R. 1995 Gau 49, 23 (Chief Justice
V.K. Khanna); Oriental Insurance Co. v. Kishore Chandra Sahu, 1999 A.C.J. 122, 7 (Justice A.
Pasayat).
24
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) Supp. (3) S.C.C. 217, 27 (Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy).
25
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490, 166 (Justice Krishna Iyer).
26
PAMMU CONST. art. 123, cl. 2.
27
PAMMU CONST. art. 13, cl. 3.
28
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628, 20
(Justice P.N. Bhagwati).
arbitrary.29 The facts clearly project the non-requirement of such law as it was
vehemently opposed in the parliament.30 Still the law was made which takes
away the fundamental rights of the citizens.
11.
The Petitioners submit that such an arbitrary action of enacting a law, against
the popular voices, ignoring the basic principle of law and being violative of
Article 14, deems the actions of the government as non-legitimate. The means
of the government to achieve would deprive a section of population in taking
part in the elections. The Petitioners submit that the ends of the government to
achieve an educated leader for all are indeed progressive, however the means to
achieve them are unfair. The Government could have achieved them in phase
wise manners and with adequate consultation, however the instant Ordinance,
which did neither, renders is non-legitimate. Means also justifies the end.31 The
Petitioners in light of aforementioned arguments plead the Ordinance being
violative of Article 14.
C.
12.
THE ORDINANCE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE- 19(1) (A).32
It is humbly submitted that the impugned law is in violation of Article 19 (1)

(a). Right to Contest Elections is in form a statutory right, but in substance, it
is the fundamental right of speech and expression. Freedom of Speech &
Expression is a foundation of a democratic society.33 Democratic form of
government itself demands by its citizens an active and intelligent participation
in the affairs of the community.34 A MP expresses the views, opinions and
problems of the people who have elected him in the parliament during the policy
making of the whole country.
29
2 Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, LexisNexis, 2014, 9 th Edition.
31
Humanity & Anr. V. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 2308, 46 (Justice A.K. Ganguly); See
also, Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628, 21
(Justice P.N. Bhagwati); Akhil Bhartiya Upabhokta Congress v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 1834,
21 (Justice G.S. Singhvi).
32
33
Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 (602), 9 (Justice Patanjal Sastri); Union of
India v. Motion Pictures Association, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2334, 14 (Justice S.V. Manohar).
34
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 S.C.C. 574, 34 (Justice Jagannath Shetty).
30
13.
According to the Ministry of Human Resource Department of Pammu35, there

is only 3% secondary school enrolment from the poorest strata of population.
Secondary school enrolment lies only at 42%. It is submitted that the work of
Government isnt limited to providing schools in every area, but it continues
beyond that. In making laws for the whole country, political acumen and
wisdom comes above education. This law, debarring a section of the society to
express their opinions, is against the fundamental notion of a representative
democracy.
14.
It is most humbly submitted that the ordinance is against the philosophy of

democratic governance in the Republic of Pammu, featuring in the Preamble of
the Constitution, and it is also violative of Article 14 and 19(1) (a).
II.
THE TELECOM ORDER
ONLY TARGETING THE
WEBSITES
PROMOTING
REVENGE PORN IS INVALID.

15.
The counsels on behalf of petitioners contend before the Honble Supreme

Court that the Telecom Order banning the sites prompting revenge porn is
void and is liable to be struck down. The argument put forward to support the
above contention is three fold: firstly, the telecom order is arbitrary and hence
violates Article 14 [A], secondly, the ban is violative of Article 19(1) (a) [B]
and thirdly, the ban infringes the right to privacy as enshrined in Article 21. [C]
A.
16.
THE TELECOM ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND VIOLATES ARTICLE 14.
Article 1436 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and
equality of treatment.37 The principle of reasonableness is an essential element
of equality or non-arbitrariness and pervades Article 14 like a brooding
omnipresence.38
17.
The expression arbitrary means in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done

capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principles, not
35
REPORT BY MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEPARTMENT, 14 SEPTEMBER, 2011

PAMMU CONST. art.14.
37
E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555, 85 (Chief Justice A.N. Roy); Ramana
Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C.1628, 12 (Justice P.N.
Bhagwati) ; Express Newspaper P. Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986 S.C.872.
38
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597, 56 (Chief Justice Hameedulla Beg).
36
founded in nature of things, non-rational, not done according to reason or

judgment depending on will alone.39 The petitioner strongly contends that the
impugned Order is arbitrary, vague and unreasonable as it has been enacted at
the pleasure of the government. The Telecom Minister, Mr. Sibbal, stated that
the government came out with the Order in the backdrop of banning some sites
which are promoting revenge porn.40 However, the Order simply advised the
telecom operators and ISPs to control free and open access to around 900 porn
sites. The order in its current form fails to define the category of revenge porn,
which according to the government, it intends to ban. In Sudhir Chandra v. Tata
Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.41, the Supreme Court has observed: Absolute discretion
uncontrolled by guidelines which may permit denial of equality before law is
the antithesis of rule of law. The Order is, therefore, vague, lacks proper
guidelines and gives wide discretion to the government to take down
pornographic websites in the guise of banning revenge porn.
18.
In Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh42, the Supreme Court

held that Non-arbitrariness, being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law,
it is imperative that all actions of every public functionary in whatever sphere
must be guided by reason & not humour, whim, caprice or personal
predilections of the persons entrusted with the task on behalf of the state &
exercise of all powers must be for public good instead of being an abuse of
power. The ban can be regarded as moral policing by the government so as to
support the ideologies of the traditional supporters of SBP who were inclined to
such thoughts and not the ideologies of the public at large. The ban on websites
is a clear abuse of the power conferred upon the government and therefore, can
be regarded as arbitrary and violative of Article 14.
B.
19.
THE TELECOM ORDER IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1) (A).
Article 19(1) (a)43 ensures to its citizen the freedom of speech and expression.
It includes in its ambit the right to propagate ones views through print media
39
Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322, 28 (Arijit Pasayat) ; Bannari Amman
Sugars Ltd. V. CTO, (2005) 1 S.C.C. 625, 17 (Justice Arijit Pasayat).
40
41
Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1064, 20 (Justice D.A. Desai).
42
Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3678, 12 (Justice R.P. Sethi).
43
PAMMU CONST. art.19, cl. 1, sub cl. (a).
or through any other communication channel including radio and television.44

The State is under an obligation to create conditions in which the right to voice
ones opinion, right to seek information and ideas and the right to receive
information and the right to impart information can be exercised.45
20.
It is argued that the intention of the government was not to ban revenge porn
but pornographic websites as a whole. The fact that SBP promised to take down
pornographic websites immediately if it is elected to power,46 shows the
inclination of the government to take down all the porn websites. The
government asked the Law Ministry to invite suggestions from the general
public on how to tackle the proliferation of the online pornographic websites.47
This clearly depicts that the government, from the time of contesting elections
till the time of coming up with the Order, has focused on taking down the
pornographic websites in its entirety and not websites promoting revenge porn.
21.
In Janhit Manch and Ors. v. Union of India48, a petition was filed by an NGO
to impose a blanket ban on all the pornographic websites. The High Court of
Bombay held that the courts are the protectors of free speech and expression
and refused to impose a blanket ban all the pornographic websites. In Secretary,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal49,
Supreme Court held that the right to entertain and to be entertained are an
integral part of the freedom under Article 19(1) (a). The impugned Order
infringes the right of its citizens to be entertained and take away their freedom
to free speech and expression by putting a ban on 900 websites in the guise of
banning revenge porn. It is a clear step of imposing internet censorship through
backdoor.
22.
The Principle of Proportionality states that the Legislature should maintain a

proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation may have on
44
Life Insurance Corporation v. Manu Bhai Shah, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 171, 8 (Justice A.M.Ahmadi and
Justice M.M. Punchhi).
45
Association of Democratic Reforms v. UOI, A.I.R. 2001 Del. 126, 21 (Justice A.D. Singh); Ozair
Hussain v.Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 Del. 103, 12,15 (Justice Anil Dev Singh).
46
47
48
Janhit Manch and Ors. v. Union of India , PIL 155 of 2009, Civil Appellate Side , High court of
Mumbai. ; Karthekeyan R v. UOI, WRIT PETITION NO.20344 OF 2009, High Court of Madras.
49
Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, A.I.R. 1995
S.C. 1236, 17 (Justice P.B. Sawant).
interests of the persons keeping in mind the purpose they were intended to
serve.50 It must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature. Legislation which
arbitrarily or excessively affects the Fundamental Right cannot be said to
contain the quality of reasonableness.51 The telecom order takes down the entire
website and does not ban only those videos pertaining to revenge porn. The ban
clearly fails the test of proportionality and hence is an unreasonable restriction.
23.
Therefore, the counsel submits that the Telecom Order is in violation of Article
19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Pammu.
C.
THE BAN INFRINGES THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY ENSHRINED IN ARTICLE

21.52
24.
The right to privacy53 is implicit in right to life and liberty to the citizens under
Article 21.54 It is a right to be let alone.55 In the case of Stanley v. Georgia,56
there was a conflict between right to privacy and right to freedom of speech.
The Court did weigh both rights and concluded that private possession of
obscene material is constitutionally protected. According to the opinion of
Justice Marshall in this case, If the first amendment means anything, it means
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone at his house, what books
he may read or what films he may watch.
25.
The law accepts that obscene content has the tendency to undermine decency
and morality but it does not punish a person who watches the content in a private
room. In the opinion of Rajasthan High Court, mere viewing obscene film at
home on T.V. with VCR does not amount to an offence under section 292.57
When a similar question regarding imposing a ban on pornographic websites
50
Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 872, 77 (Justice A.P. Sen).
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 118, 8 (Justice M.C. Mahajan).
52
53
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1295, 38 (Justice N. Rajagopal Ayyanger).
54
Govind v. State of MP, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1378, 25 (Justice Mathew).
55
R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 264, 28 (Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy); Peoples Union
for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 S.C.C. 399, 131 (Justice M.B. Shah); Sharda v.
Dharmpal, (2003) 4 S.C.C. 493, 76 (Justice S.B. Sinha); Dist. Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank,
(2005) 1 S.C.C. 496, 26, 40 (Chief Justice R.C. Lahoti).
56
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), 6 (Justice Marshall).
57
Jagdish Chavla v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr. L.J. 2562 (Raj.), 9 (Justice G.L. Gupta).
51
came before the Supreme Court of India, it said that such a step would be
violation of the right to personal liberty.58
26.
It is submitted that the Telecom Order affects the right to privacy of a person by
monitoring the content which the individual can watch within the four walls of
his house. It is an unreasonable interference by the State and hence violative of
Article 21.
III.
THE GAUVANSH SANRAKSHAN
AND
GAUSAMVARDHAN ACT, 2015
IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
27.
The counsels on behalf of petitioners most humbly contend before this Honble
Supreme Court that the Gauvansh Sanrakshan and Gausamvardhan Act, 2015
(hereafter referred as The Act) is unconstitutional. The argument put forward
to support the above contention is twofold: firstly, the Act is violative of Article
14[A] secondly, it infringes Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of Pammu [B].
A.
THE
IMPUGNED ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 14
OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
28.
Article 14 of the Constitution of Pammu ensures its citizens equality before law
and equal protection of law within the territory of Pammu.59
29.
The right under Article 14 is not absolute; State can do discrimination on

reasonable grounds, to achieve a bona fide end provided the means must justify
the end.60 The means in the impugned act i.e. total ban on slaughtering of cow,
bulls and bullocks, and selling and consumption of beef, are not justified and
does not have nexus with the object, sought to be achieved which is to protect,
preserve and improve the agriculture and animal husbandry. The impugned act
is, therefore, an arbitrary action by the government since it is extraneous to the
object sought to be achieved.
Krishnadas Rajagopal, Cant stop an adult from watching porn in his room, says SC, (16 October,
2010, 4:46 PM), available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cant-stop-an-adult-fromwatching-porn-in-his-room-says-sc/article7400690.ece.
59
60
Humanity v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 2308, 46 (Justice A.K. Ganguly); Ramana
Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628, 8 (Justice P.N.
Bhagwati); Akhil Bhartiya Upabhokta Congress v. State of MP A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 1834, 28 (Justice
G.S. Singhvi).
58
10
30.
Article 4861 provides for organization of agriculture and animal husbandry on

modern and scientific lines which can be achieved by preserving and
improving the breeds and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and other milch and
draught animals. The government de hors the later from the former. The cow
and other milch and draught animals specified in Article 48 are the ones which
are useful for the purpose of agriculture. The Honble Court in Mohd. Hanif
Quareshi v. State of Bihar62, while dealing with the total prohibition on
slaughter of cattle to implement DPSP under Article 48 held that:
The protection recommended by this part of the directive is, in our opinion,
confined only to cows and calves and to those animals which are presently or
potentially capable of yielding milk or of doing work as draught cattle but does
not, from the very nature of the purpose for which it is obviously recommended,
extend to cattle which at one time were milch or draught cattle but which have
ceased to be such.
31.
The impugned Act took away the prior exemption for slaughter of old and cattle
unfit for agriculture, thereby imposing a total ban of slaughtering. The
restriction imposed is unreasonable and arbitrary since after attaining a certain
age, the cows, bulls and bullocks are not productive enough for the society.
Hence, the Act by putting a total ban on slaughtering clearly violates Article 14
of the Constitution.
B.
THE
IMPUGNED
ACT
IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 19 (1) (G)
AND
ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

(i) The act violates Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution.
32.
Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of Pammu gives its citizens right to practise
any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 63 This right is
subject to Article 19 (6) which allows State to put certain restrictions in the
interests of general public, etc.64
61

Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Ors. v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731, 7 (Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan
Das).
63
PAMMU CONST. art.19, cl. 1, sub cl. (g).
64
PAMMU CONST. art.19, cl. 6.
62
11
33.
The impugned act has imposed total ban on the slaughtering of the cows, bulls
and bullocks, taking away the previous exemption of slaughtering the cattle
unfit for the agriculture.65 It imposes total prohibition on business of butchers
or Kasais who generally engage in the slaughtering of cattle and its subsidiary
undertakings such as supply of hides, tannery, glue making, gut making and
blood de-hydrating. The previous law only regulated the business of these
butchers because they were allowed to slaughter old and unfit cattle for
agriculture purpose, but the restriction imposed by impugned act is total
extinction of their right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. The
restriction imposed should be reasonable and in proportion to the evil sought to
be remedied.66 The restriction is not reasonable because it is a total prohibition67
and is based on irrational grounds and lacks nexus with the object sought to be
achieved, and therefore, is not in the public interest. Honble Court in Mohd.
Hanif Qureshi and Ors.., v. State of Bihar 68, observed that:
A total ban on the slaughter of she-buffaloes, bulls and bullocks (cattle or
buffalo) after they cease to be capable of yielding milk or of breeding or working
as draught animals cannot be supported as reasonable in the interest of the
general public."
34.
Moreover, impugned act by putting restriction on the selling of beef, would lead
to adverse effects on the beef exports by the country. There is a huge demand
for beef across the globe and so the beef ban imposed by the government
would hit the economy of the country and affect its income.69 The blanket ban
on the slaughtering of cows, bulls and bullocks also infringes the right to trade
of exporters.
65
Moot Proposition, 6,
R.A. Jayaram v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1974 Kant 93, 11 (Justice Malimath).
67
Abdul Hakim Quraishi v. State of Bihar, (1961) 2 S.C.R. 610, 24 (Justice S.K. Das); Mohd. Faruk
v. State of M.P., (1969) 1 S.C.C. 853, 11 (Justice J.C. Shah); Hashmatullah v. State of M.P., (1996)
4 S.C.C. 391, 23 (Justice B.N. Kripal).
68
Mohd. Hanif Qureshi and Ors.., v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731, 57 (Justice Sudhi Ranjan
Das).
69
Harish Damodaran, Heres why India is set to lose status of worlds largest beef exporter ( 16 October,
2015, 05:37 PM), available at http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/beefed-up-no-longer/
66
12
(ii) The ban infringed Article 21 of the Constitution.

35.
It is submitted that impugned Act is violative of Article 2170 as it deprives

butchers of their right to livelihood,71 which they used to earn by slaughtering
cattle. The act imposes a criminal sanction on the consumption of beef and is
violative of rights of people who eat beef because what one eats is totally a
personal affair and is a part of Right to Privacy.72 Total ban on the slaughter of
cattle brings about a serious dislocation of the business of a considerable section
of the people who are, by occupation butchers (Kasais), hide merchants and so
on and for those who eat beef, such a ban will also deprive them of what may
be an important component of their diet.73
36.
Moreover, the maintenance of useless cattle involves a wasteful drain on the

nation's cattle feed. To maintain them is to deprive the useful cattle of the much
needed nourishment. The presence of so many useless animals tends to
deteriorate the breed. Consequently, the people will be deprived of quality
products of cow and its progeny, essential for the scientifically healthy diet. The
impugned act is against the public health of the country and cannot be termed
as in the interest of public.74
37.
The reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in governmental action is the core of

our constitution75 and the restriction imposed by impugned act being
unreasonable and dearth nexus with the object, cannot be constitutionally valid.
The impugned Act arbitrarily puts criminal sanction on the slaughtering, selling
as well as consumption of beef and is therefore, unreasonable.
38.
Therefore, the counsel humbly submits that the Act is unconstitutional as it

infringes upon Article 14, 19(1) (g) and Article 21 of the Constitution.
70

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. (1985) 3 S.C.C. 545, 37 (Justice Y.V. Chandrachud).
72
Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Jamat, A.I.R.2008S.C.1892, 22 (Justice Markandey
Katju).
73
Mohd. Hanif Qureshi and Ors.., v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731, 54 (Chief Justice Sudhi
Ranjan Das).
74
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. V. Jan Mohammed Usman Bhai and Anr.
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 700, 19 (Justice R.B. Mishra).
75
Asha Sharma v. Chandigarh Administration, 2011 10 S.C.C. 86, 10 (Justice Swatanter Kumar).
71
13
PRAYER
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, the counsels on behalf of the Petitioners most humbly pray before this Honble
court to adjudge and declare that:
1. The Representation of Peoples Act (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 2014

is arbitrary in nature and affects the right of the petitioner to contest
elections and hence is liable to be struck down.
2. The Telecom Order targeting the websites prompting revenge porn is
void and hence is liable to be struck down.
3. Gauvansh
Sanrakshan
and
Gausamvardhan
Act
of
2015
is
unconstitutional and hence is liable to be struck down.
And pass any other order that this Honble Court may deem fit in the interests of
justice, equity and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the counsel would forever pray before this Honble court.
Date:
____________________
Sd/-
Counsel on behalf of Petitioner
XIV

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LEX OMNIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION-2015

IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF PAMMU

Writ Petition (s) (Civil) No (s)._______/2015

COMMON CAUSE AND ANR.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONERS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONERS

PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES

I. THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLES ACT (THIRD AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 2014

B. THE ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14. -

C. THE ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19 (1) (A). -

II. THE TELECOM ORDER ONLY TARGETING THE WEBSITES PROMPTING

A. THE TELECOM ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND VIOLATES ARTICLE 14. -

B. THE TELECOM ORDER IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 (1) (A).

A. THE ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14.

B. THE ACT IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19(1) (G) AND ARTICLE 21. -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONERS

All India Reporter

Supreme Court Reporter

Sabka Vikaas Party

R.C. Cooper v. Union of India

Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONERS

A.K. Kaul v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1403

A.K. Roy v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710

Abdul Hakim Quraishi v. State of Bihar, (1961) 2 S.C.R. 610

Akhil Bhartiya Upabhokta Congress v. State of M.P., A.I.R.

2011 S.C. 1834

Association of Democratic Reforms v. UOI, A.I.R. 2001 Del.

Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1951 S.C.

10. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 1987 A.I.R 579

11. Dist. Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 S.C.C.

Express Newspaper P. Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986

15. Govind v. State of MP, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1378

16. H. Sowbhagya v. N.G.E.F. Ltd., A.I.R. 2004 Kant. 155

17. Hashmatullah v. State of M.P., (1996) 4 S.C.C. 391

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONERS

Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Jamat,

Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, A.I.R.

2003 S.C. 1843

1993 S.C. 477

High Court of Madras

26. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 S.C.1295

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