G.R. No.

88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasans failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them
their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar
Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in
the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the
interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right
to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a
court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section
1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power
although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 1423). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive.
She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power
to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers,
according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not
forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on
the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during
times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in
and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual
basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The
supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She
has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The presidents power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events
and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current
problem can only be answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, its
the executives responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety
from arising.
3. We cant sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in
to Marcos wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state
interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos right to return, live & die in his own country. It is
a right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal,
tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos return would pose a threat to national
security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers but the executives powers were outlined to limit her powers & not
expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos right to return
to the Philippines. .

2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be
buried w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to
restrict it. Its w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public
safety/health demands that such be restricted. It cant be absolute & unlimited all the
time. It cant be arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are
speculative & military admits that its under control. Filipinos would know how to handle
Marcos return.

Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. Presidents determination that Marcos return would threaten national security should be
agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the
petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989,
Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those
who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the
tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be
brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their
country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the
Philippines be granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of
lack of merit.
Ratio:
1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.

2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The
threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to
provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also
called President Aquino illegal claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power.
Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving
the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts
of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from
sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US).
This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos
power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.
4. It is within Aquinos power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She
bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily

Estrada vs. Disierto

353 SCRA 452 Political Law Constitutional Law De Jure vs De Facto President Arroyo a
de jure president
Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October
4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited
reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the
Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of
Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power,
Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given
up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity
could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on
the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

G.R. No. 191002 : April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,Petitioner,v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO,Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
The Court Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R.
No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
To summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the
aforegiven order:
1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has
not yet decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the
power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the
candidates, has not submitted a short list to the President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary
for the President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and
legal basis. The statement undermines the independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional
mandate and its implementing rules and regulations.
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if
the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the
motions for reconsideration were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the
Court resolved. His comment asserts:
1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the
separate opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Courts power of supervision over the JBC
as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Courts
adjudicatory power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review
are not required, which was why Valenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter.
Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a position on when to submit the short list to the
proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of
supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the
Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of
Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to
either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on
nepotism).
It deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised
and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010

ISSUES:
Whether the decision on March 17 2010 is controlling?
Whether the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
HELD: The motion for reconsideration is denied.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: stare decisis
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to
adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle
underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions
of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until
the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The
decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the
decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably
not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those dutybound to enforce obedience to them. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of
the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each
other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule
according to its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent.
Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular
decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The adherence to
precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges
make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a common-law system; hence,
judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an
earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning
and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and
justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of
convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or
reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore,
devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself
recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle
of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.
POLITICAL LAW: constitutional prohibition on appointments
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the
Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article
VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and
justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among
the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however,
Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article

VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"such that the final version of the second paragraph of
Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen
or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
The Motion for reconsideration is denied.

Bautista vs. Salonga

172 SCRA 150 Political Law Appointments Commission on Human Rights Security of
Tenure
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the
Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the
designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA)
requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA.
Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she
explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the
COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautistas appointment with the COA, Cory designated
Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautistas
appointment as ad interim.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COAs actions. She impleaded Mallillin.
Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of
the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA
and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as
chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to COAs confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments
are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The
President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in
Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers
of government whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint. The law which
authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautistas appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political
in nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be
made without the participation of the COA. Thus, Corys act of submitting the appointment of
Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the
latters approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission,
the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant as at that time, Bautista
already took her oath and was the incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautistas appointment as ad interim. Since the
position of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all
appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the
CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is
unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of
the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR
cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is guaranteed that they must have a
term of office. They can only be removed upon cause and with the observance of due process.

Calderon vs. Carale

208 SCRA 254 Political Law Appointment List of Appointees Requiring COA Confirmation
Cannot Be Expanded by Law
In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA
6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the
Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however
not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the appointment
saying that without the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted that RA 6715 is not an
encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the
Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in addition to those mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required
exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the
various Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to the other officers (second to
fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments
must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by
adding the phrase and other officers required by law at the end of the first sentence, or the
phrase, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments at the end of the second
sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the
Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil
Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide
for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the

officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law.

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to
declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under
Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of
the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant
the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it
is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve
the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification
for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of
law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment
of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was

incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian

position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not
destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

David vs Arroyo
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take
Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order
No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG
and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known antiGMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis,
was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it
has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed
in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of
PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation
of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017
is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and
GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines,
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA
was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or
duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their
faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom
of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to

speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered
the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it
stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may
call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such
criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017
however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of
laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as
the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise
needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a
valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

DECISION
(En Banc)

BUENA, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty
by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and
the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as
a treaty by the other contracting State.

II.

THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b)
the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification
by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has
not required it.
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This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the
other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the
other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the
United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to
the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense
they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as
a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under
international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
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The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is
indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.