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FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.137873.April20,2001]

D.M.CONSUNJI,INC.,petitioner,vs.COURTOFAPPEALSandMARIAJ.JUEGO,
respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN,J.:

Ataround1:30p.m.,November2,1990,JoseJuego,aconstructionworkerofD.M.Consunji,Inc.,fell14floors
fromtheRenaissanceTower,PasigCitytohisdeath.
PO3RogelioVillanuevaoftheEasternPoliceDistrictinvestigatedthetragedyandfiledareportdatedNovember
25,1990,statingthat:
xxx.[The][v]ictimwasrushedto[the]RizalMedicalCenterinPasig,MetroManilawherehewaspronounceddead
onarrival(DOA)bytheattendingphysician,Dr.ErroldeYzo[,]ataround2:15p.m.ofthesamedate.
Investigationdisclosedthatatthegiventime,dateandplace,whilevictimJoseA.JuegotogetherwithJessieJaluagand
DelsoDestajo[were]performingtheirworkascarpenter[s]attheelevatorcoreofthe14thflooroftheTowerD,
RenaissanceTowerBuildingonboarda[p]latformmadeofchannelbeam(steel)measuring4.8metersby2meterswide
withpinulidplywoodflooringandcablewiresattachedtoitsfourcornersandhookedatthe5tonchainblock,when
suddenly,theboltorpinwhichwasmerelyinsertedtoconnectthechainblockwiththe[p]latform,gotloosexxxcausing
thewhole[p]latformassemblyandthevictimtofalldowntothebasementoftheelevatorcore,TowerDofthebuilding
underconstructiontherebycrushingthevictimtodeath,savehistwo(2)companionswholuckilyjumpedoutforsafety.
ItisthusmanifestthatJoseA.Juegowascrushedtodeathwhenthe[p]latformhewasthenonboardandperforming
work,fell.Andthefallingofthe[p]latformwasduetotheremovalorgettinglooseofthepinwhichwasmerelyinserted
totheconnectingpointsofthechainblockand[p]latformbutwithoutasafetylock.[1]
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damagesagainstthedeceasedsemployer,D.M.Consunji,Inc.Theemployerraised,amongotherdefenses,thewidows
prioravailmentofthebenefitsfromtheStateInsuranceFund.
Aftertrial,theRTCrenderedadecisioninfavorofthewidowMariaJuego.The dispositive portion of the RTC
decisionreads:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedorderingdefendanttopayplaintiff,asfollows:
1.P50,000.00forthedeathofJoseA.Juego.
2.P10,000.00asactualandcompensatorydamages.
3.P464,000.00forthelossofJoseA.Juegosearningcapacity.
4.P100,000.00asmoraldamages.
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5.P20,000.00asattorneysfees,plusthecostsofsuit.
SOORDERED.[2]
OnappealbyD.M.Consunji,theCourtofAppeals(CA)affirmedthedecisionoftheRTCintoto.
D.M.ConsunjinowseeksthereversaloftheCAdecisiononthefollowinggrounds:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCEOFTHEALLEGEDNEGLIGENCEOFPETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR
[sic]ISAPPLICABLETOPROVENEGLIGENCEONTHEPARTOFPETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT
UNDERARTICLE2180OFTHECIVILCODE,AND
THEAPPELLATECOURTERREDINHOLDINGTHATRESPONDENTISNOTPRECLUDEDFROM
RECOVERINGDAMAGESUNDERTHECIVILCODE.[3]

Petitionermaintainsthatthepolicereportreproducedaboveishearsayand,therefore,inadmissible.TheCAruled
otherwise.Itheldthatsaidreport,beinganentryinofficialrecords,isanexceptiontothehearsayrule.
TheRulesofCourtprovidethatawitnesscantestifyonlytothosefactswhichheknowsofhispersonalknowledge,
thatis,whicharederivedfromhisperception.[4]Awitness,therefore,maynottestifyaswhathemerelylearnedfrom
others either because he was told or read or heard the same.Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
receivedasproofofthetruthofwhathehaslearned.[5]Thisisknownasthehearsayrule.
Hearsayisnotlimitedtooraltestimonyorstatementsthegeneralrulethatexcludeshearsayasevidenceappliesto
written,aswellasoralstatements.[6]
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of crossexamination.[7] The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by
crossexamination.[8]
TheRulesofCourtallowseveralexceptionstotherule,[9]amongwhichareentriesinofficialrecords.Section44,
Rule130provides:
Entriesinofficialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofhisdutymadeintheperformanceofhisdutybyapublicofficerof
thePhilippines,orbyapersonintheperformanceofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylawareprimafacieevidenceofthe
factsthereinstated.
InAfrica,etal.vs.Caltex(Phil.),Inc.,etal.,[10]thisCourt,citingtheworkofChiefJusticeMoran,enumerated
therequisitesforadmissibilityundertheaboverule:
(a)thattheentrywasmadebyapublicofficerorbyanotherpersonspeciallyenjoinedbylawtodoso
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performanceofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylawand
(c)thatthepublicofficerorotherpersonhadsufficientknowledgeofthefactsbyhimstated,whichmusthave
beenacquiredbyhimpersonallyorthroughofficialinformation.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not
present.
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The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court. In
Rodriguezvs.CourtofAppeals,[11]whichinvolvedaFireInvestigationReport,theofficerwhosignedthefirereport
alsotestifiedbeforethetrialcourt.ThisCourtheldthatthereportwasinadmissibleforthepurposeofprovingthetruth
ofthestatementscontainedinthereportbutadmissibleinsofarasitconstitutespartofthetestimonyoftheofficerwho
executedthereport.
xxx.SinceMajorEnriquezhimselftookthewitnessstandandwasavailableforcrossexamination,theportionsofthe
reportwhichwereofhispersonalknowledgeorwhichconsistedofhisperceptionsandconclusionswerenothearsay.
Therestofthereport,suchasthesummaryofthestatementsofthepartiesbasedontheirswornstatements(whichwere
annexedtotheReport)aswellasthelatter,havingbeenincludedinthefirstpurposeoftheoffer[aspartofthe
testimonyofMajorEnriquez],maythenbeconsideredasindependentlyrelevantstatementswhichweregatheredin
thecourseoftheinvestigationandmaythusbeadmittedassuch,butnotnecessarilytoprovethetruththereof.Ithas
beensaidthat:
Whereregardlessofthetruthorfalsityofastatement,thefactthatithasbeenmadeisrelevant,thehearsayruledoesnot
apply,butthestatementmaybeshown.Evidenceastothemakingofsuchstatementisnotsecondarybutprimary,for
thestatementitselfmayconstituteafactinissue,orbecircumstantiallyrelevantastotheexistenceofsuchafact.
WhenMajorEnriqueztookthewitnessstand,testifiedforpetitionersonhisReportandmadehimselfavailablefor
crossexaminationbytheadverseparty,theReport,insofarasitprovedthatcertainutterancesweremade(butnottheir
truth),waseffectivelyremovedfromtheambitoftheaforementionedSection44ofRule130.Properlyunderstood,this
sectiondoesawaywiththetestimonyinopencourtoftheofficerwhomadetheofficialrecord,considersthematteras
anexceptiontothehearsayruleandmakestheentriesinsaidofficialrecordadmissibleinevidenceasprimafacie
evidenceofthefactsthereinstated.Theunderlyingreasonsforthisexceptionaryrulearenecessityandtrustworthiness,
asexplainedinAntillonv.Barcelon.
Thelitigationisunlimitedinwhichtestimonybyofficialsisdailyneededtheoccasionsinwhichtheofficials
wouldbesummonedfromhisordinarydutiestodeclareasawitnessarenumberless.Thepublicofficersare
fewinwhosedailyworksomethingisnotdoneinwhichtestimonyisnotneededfromofficialsources.Were
therenoexceptionforofficialstatements,hostsofofficialswouldbefounddevotingthegreaterpartoftheir
timetoattendingaswitnessesincourtordeliveringdepositionbeforeanofficer.Theworkofadministrationof
governmentandtheinterestofthepublichavingbusinesswithofficialswouldalikesufferinconsequence.For
thesereasons,andformanyothers,acertainverityisaccordedsuchdocuments,whichisnotextendedto
privatedocuments.(3WigmoreonEvidence,Sec.1631).
Thelawreposesaparticularconfidenceinpublicofficersthatitpresumestheywilldischargetheirseveraltrustswith
accuracyandfidelityand,therefore,whateveractstheydoindischargeoftheirdutymaybegiveninevidenceandshall
betakentobetrueundersuchadegreeofcautionastothenatureandcircumstancesofeachcasemayappearto
require.
ItwouldhavebeenanentirelydifferentmatterifMajorEnriquezwasnotpresentedtotestifyonhisreport.Inthatcase
theapplicabilityofSection44ofRule143wouldhavebeenripefordetermination,andthisCourtwouldhaveagreed
withtheCourtofAppealsthatsaidreportwasinadmissiblesincetheaforementionedthirdrequisitewasnotsatisfied.
ThestatementsgivenbythesourcesofinformationofMajorEnriquezfailedtoqualifyasofficialinformation,therebeing
noshowingthat,attheveryleast,theywereunderadutytogivethestatementsforrecord.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
containedthereinbutisadmissibleinsofarasitconstitutespartofthetestimonyofPO3Villanueva.

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In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which were of his personal knowledge
sufficetoprovethatJoseJuegoindeeddiedasaresultoftheelevatorcrash.PO3VillanuevahadseenJuegosremainsat
the morgue,[12] making the latters death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the
premisesofthebuildingthedayaftertheincident[13]andsawtheplatformforhimself.[14]Heobservedthattheplatform
wascrushed[15]andthatitwastotallydamaged.[16]PO3VillanuevaalsorequiredGarciaandFabrotobringthechain
block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting machine,
withoutanypinorbolt.[17]
WhatpetitionertakesparticularexceptiontoisPO3Villanuevastestimonythatthecauseofthefalloftheplatform
was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion.
Subjecttocertainexceptions,[18]theopinionofawitnessisgenerallynotadmissible.[19]
Petitionerscontention,however,losesrelevanceinthefaceoftheapplicationofresipsaloquiturbytheCA.The
effectofthedoctrineistowarrantapresumptionorinferencethatthemerefalloftheelevatorwasaresultoftheperson
havingchargeoftheinstrumentalitywasnegligent.Asaruleofevidence,thedoctrineofresipsaloquiturispeculiarto
thelawofnegligencewhichrecognizesthatprimafacienegligencemaybeestablishedwithoutdirectproofandfurnishes
asubstituteforspecificproofofnegligence.[20]
Theconceptofresipsaloquiturhasbeenexplainedinthiswise:
Whilenegligenceisnotordinarilyinferredorpresumed,andwhilethemerehappeningofanaccidentorinjurywillnot
generallygiverisetoaninferenceorpresumptionthatitwasduetonegligenceondefendantspart,underthedoctrineof
resipsaloquitur,whichmeans,literally,thethingortransactionspeaksforitself,orinonejurisdiction,thatthethingor
instrumentalityspeaksforitself,thefactsorcircumstancesaccompanyinganinjurymaybesuchastoraisea
presumption,oratleastpermitaninferenceofnegligenceonthepartofthedefendant,orsomeotherpersonwhois
chargedwithnegligence.
xxxwhereitisshownthatthethingorinstrumentalitywhichcausedtheinjurycomplainedofwasunderthecontrolor
managementofthedefendant,andthattheoccurrenceresultingintheinjurywassuchasintheordinarycourseofthings
wouldnothappenifthosewhohaditscontrolormanagementusedpropercare,thereissufficientevidence,or,as
sometimesstated,reasonableevidence,intheabsenceofexplanationbythedefendant,thattheinjuryarosefromorwas
causedbythedefendantswantofcare.[21]
Oneofthetheoreticalbasesforthedoctrineisitsnecessity,i.e.,thatnecessaryevidenceisabsentornotavailable.
[22]

Theresipsaloquiturdoctrineisbasedinpartuponthetheorythatthedefendantinchargeoftheinstrumentalitywhich
causestheinjuryeitherknowsthecauseoftheaccidentorhasthebestopportunityofascertainingitandthattheplaintiff
hasnosuchknowledge,andthereforeiscompelledtoallegenegligenceingeneraltermsandtorelyupontheproofof
thehappeningoftheaccidentinordertoestablishnegligence.Theinferencewhichthedoctrinepermitsisgroundedupon
thefactthatthechiefevidenceofthetruecause,whetherculpableorinnocent,ispracticallyaccessibletothedefendant
butinaccessibletotheinjuredperson.
Ithasbeensaidthatthedoctrineofresipsaloquiturfurnishesabridgebywhichaplaintiff,withoutknowledgeofthe
cause,reachesovertodefendantwhoknowsorshouldknowthecause,foranyexplanationofcareexercisedbythe
defendantinrespectofthematterofwhichtheplaintiffcomplains.Theresipsaloquiturdoctrine,anothercourthassaid,
isaruleofnecessity,inthatitproceedsonthetheorythatunderthepeculiarcircumstancesinwhichthedoctrineis
applicable,itiswithinthepowerofthedefendanttoshowthattherewasnonegligenceonhispart,anddirectproofof
defendantsnegligenceisbeyondplaintiffspower.Accordingly,somecourtsaddtothethreeprerequisitesforthe
applicationoftheresipsaloquiturdoctrinethefurtherrequirementthatfortheresipsaloquiturdoctrinetoapply,itmust
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appearthattheinjuredpartyhadnoknowledgeormeansofknowledgeastothecauseoftheaccident,orthattheparty
tobechargedwithnegligencehassuperiorknowledgeoropportunityforexplanationoftheaccident.[23]
TheCAheldthatalltherequisitesofresipsaloquiturarepresentinthecaseatbar:
Thereisnodisputethatappelleeshusbandfelldownfromthe14thfloorofabuildingtothebasementwhilehewas
workingwithappellantsconstructionproject,resultingtohisdeath.Theconstructionsiteiswithintheexclusivecontrol
andmanagementofappellant.Ithasasafetyengineer,aprojectsuperintendent,acarpenterleadmanandotherswhoare
incompletecontrolofthesituationtherein.Thecircumstancesofanyaccidentthatwouldoccurthereinarepeculiarly
withintheknowledgeoftheappellantoritsemployees.Ontheotherhand,theappelleeisnotinapositiontoknowwhat
causedtheaccident.Resipsaloquiturisaruleofnecessityanditapplieswhereevidenceisabsentornotreadily
available,providedthefollowingrequisitesarepresent:(1)theaccidentwasofakindwhichdoesnotordinarilyoccur
unlesssomeoneisnegligent(2)theinstrumentalityoragencywhichcausedtheinjurywasundertheexclusivecontrolof
thepersonchargedwithnegligenceand(3)theinjurysufferedmustnothavebeenduetoanyvoluntaryactionor
contributiononthepartofthepersoninjured.xxx.
Noworkerisgoingtofallfromthe14thfloorofabuildingtothebasementwhileperformingworkinaconstructionsite
unlesssomeoneisnegligent[]thus,thefirstrequisitefortheapplicationoftheruleofresipsaloquiturispresent.As
explainedearlier,theconstructionsitewithallitsparaphernaliaandhumanresourcesthatlikelycausedtheinjuryisunder
theexclusivecontrolandmanagementofappellant[]thus[,]thesecondrequisiteisalsopresent.Nocontributory
negligencewasattributedtotheappelleesdeceasedhusband[]thus[,]thelastrequisiteisalsopresent.Alltherequisites
fortheapplicationoftheruleofresipsaloquiturarepresent,thusareasonablepresumptionorinferenceofappellants
negligencearises.xxx.[24]
Petitionerdoesnotdisputetheexistenceoftherequisitesfortheapplicationofresipsaloquitur,butarguesthatthe
presumptionorinferencethatitwasnegligentdidnotarisesinceitprovedthatitexercisedduecaretoavoidtheaccident
whichbefellrespondentshusband.
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendants
negligenceispresumedorinferred[25]whentheplaintiffestablishestherequisitesfortheapplicationofresipsaloquitur.
Oncetheplaintiffmakesoutaprimafaciecaseofalltheelements,theburdenthenshiftstodefendanttoexplain.[26]The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a
disputablepresumption,suchasthatofduecareorinnocence,mayoutweightheinference.[27]Itisnotforthedefendant
toexplainorproveitsdefensetopreventthepresumptionorinferencefromarising.Evidencebythedefendantofsay,
duecare,comesintoplayonlyafterthecircumstancesfortheapplicationofthedoctrinehasbeenestablished.
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police
investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro's sworn statement, the company enacted rules and
regulationsforthesafetyandsecurityofitsworkers.Moreover,theleadmanandthebodegeroinspectthechainblock
beforeallowingitsuse.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private
respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners employees, also assails the same statement for being
hearsay.
Petitioneriscorrect.Fabro'sswornstatementishearsayandinadmissible.Affidavitsareinadmissibleasevidence
underthehearsayrule,unlesstheaffiantisplacedonthewitnessstandtotestifythereon.[28]Theinadmissibilityofthis
sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to crossexamine the
affiant,butalsoonthe commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not preparedbytheaffianthimselfbutby
anotherwhouseshisownlanguageinwritingtheaffiantsstatementswhichmayeitherbeomittedormisunderstoodby
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theonewritingthem.[29]Petitioner,therefore,cannotusesaidstatementasproofofitsduecareanymorethanprivate
respondentcanuseittoprovethecauseofherhusbandsdeath.Regrettably,petitionerdoesnotciteanyotherevidence
torebuttheinferenceorpresumptionofnegligencearisingfromtheapplicationofresipsaloquitur,ortoestablishany
defenserelatingtotheincident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the
LaborCodeandis,therefore,precludedfromclaimingfromthedeceasedsemployerdamagesundertheCivilCode.
Article173oftheLaborCodestates:
ART.173.Extentofliability.Unlessotherwiseprovided,theliabilityoftheStateInsuranceFundunderthisTitleshallbe
exclusiveandinplaceofallotherliabilitiesoftheemployertotheemployee,hisdependentsoranyoneotherwiseentitled
toreceivedamagesonbehalfoftheemployeeorhisdependents.ThepaymentofcompensationunderthisTitleshallnot
bartherecoveryofbenefitsasprovidedforinSection699oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode,RepublicAct
NumberedElevenhundredsixtyone,asamended,RepublicActNumberedSixhundredten,asamended,RepublicAct
NumberedFortyeighthundredsixtyfourasamended,andotherlawswhosebenefitsareadministeredbytheSystem
orbyotheragenciesofthegovernment.
TheprecursorofArticle173oftheLaborCode,Section5oftheWorkmensCompensationAct,providedthat:
SEC.5.Exclusiverighttocompensation.TherightsandremediesgrantedbythisActtoanemployeebyreasonofa
personalinjuryentitlinghimtocompensationshallexcludeallotherrightsandremediesaccruingtotheemployee,his
personalrepresentatives,dependentsornearestofkinagainsttheemployerundertheCivilCodeandotherlaws
becauseofsaidinjuryxxx.
WhetherSection5oftheWorkmensCompensationActallowedrecoveryundersaidActaswellasundertheCivil
Codeusedtobethesubjectofconflictingdecisions.TheCourtfinallysettledthematterinFlorescavs.PhilexMining
Corporation,[30] which involved a cavein resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation.
Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex
MiningintheCourtofFirstInstance(CFI).UponmotionofPhilexMining,theCFIdismissedthecomplaintforlackof
jurisdiction.TheheirssoughtrelieffromthisCourt.
Addressingtheissueofwhethertheheirshadachoiceofremedies,majorityoftheCourtEnBanc,[31] following
theruleinPacaavs.CebuAutobusCompany,heldintheaffirmative.
WEnowcometothequeryastowhetherornottheinjuredemployeeorhisheirsincaseofdeathhavearightof
selectionorchoiceofactionbetweenavailingthemselvesoftheworkersrightundertheWorkmensCompensationAct
andsuingintheregularcourtsundertheCivilCodeforhigherdamages(actual,moralandexemplary)fromthe
employersbyvirtueofthenegligenceorfaultoftheemployersorwhethertheymayavailthemselvescumulativelyofboth
actions,i.e.,collectthelimitedcompensationundertheWorkmensCompensationActandsueinadditionfordamagesin
theregularcourts.
Indisposingofasimilarissue,thisCourtinPacaavs.CebuAutobusCompany,32SCRA442,ruledthataninjured
workerhasachoiceofeithertorecoverfromtheemployerthefixedamountssetbytheWorkmensCompensationAct
ortoprosecuteanordinarycivilactionagainstthetortfeasorforhigherdamagesbuthecannotpursuebothcoursesof
actionsimultaneously.[Underscoringsupplied.]
Nevertheless,theCourtallowedsomeofthepetitionersinsaidcasetoproceedwiththeirsuitundertheCivilCode
despitehavingavailedofthebenefitsprovidedundertheWorkmensCompensationAct.TheCourtreasoned:
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Withregardtotheotherpetitioners,itwasallegedbyPhilexinitsmotiontodismissdatedMay14,1968beforethe
courtaquo,thattheheirsofthedeceasedemployees,namelyEmeritoObra,LarryVillar,Jr.,AurelioLanuza,Lorenzo
IslaandSaturninosubmittednoticesandclaimsforcompensationtotheRegionalOfficeNo.1ofthethenDepartmentof
LaborandallofthemhavebeenpaidinfullasofAugust25,1967,exceptSaturninoMartinezwhoseheirsdecidedthat
theybepaidininstallmentsxxx.Suchallegationwasadmittedbyhereinpetitionersintheiroppositiontothemotionto
dismissdatedMay27,1968xxxinthelowercourt,buttheysetupthedefensethattheclaimswerefiledunderthe
WorkmensCompensationActbeforetheylearnedoftheofficialreportofthecommitteecreatedtoinvestigatethe
accidentwhichestablishedthecriminalnegligenceandviolationoflawbyPhilex,andwhichreportwasforwardedbythe
DirectorofMinestothenExecutiveSecretaryRafaelSalasinaletterdatedOctober19,1967onlyxxx.
WEholdthatalthoughtheotherpetitionershadreceivedthebenefitsundertheWorkmensCompensationAct,suchmay
notprecludethemfrombringinganactionbeforetheregularcourtbecausetheybecamecognizantofthefactthatPhilex
hasbeenremissinitscontractualobligationswiththedeceasedminersonlyafterreceivingcompensationundertheAct.
HadpetitionersbeenawareofsaidviolationofgovernmentrulesandregulationsbyPhilex,andofitsnegligence,they
wouldnothavesoughtredressundertheWorkmensCompensationCommissionwhichawardedalesseramountfor
compensation.Thechoiceofthefirstremedywasbasedonignoranceoramistakeoffact,whichnullifiesthechoiceasit
wasnotanintelligentchoice.Thecaseshouldthereforeberemandedtothelowercourtforfurtherproceedings.
However,shouldthepetitionersbesuccessfulintheirbidbeforethelowercourt,thepaymentsmadeunderthe
WorkmensCompensationActshouldbedeductedfromthedamagesthatmaybedecreedintheirfavor.[Underscoring
supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime
Corporationvs.Avelino,[32]Vda.deSeverovs.FelicianoGo,[33]andMarcopperMiningCorp.vs.Abeleda.[34]In
thelastcase,theCourtagainrecognizedthataclaimantwhohadbeenpaidundertheActcouldstillsueundertheCivil
Code.TheCourtsaid:
IntheRoblescase,itwasheldthatclaimsfordamagessustainedbyworkersinthecourseoftheiremploymentcouldbe
filedonlyundertheWorkmensCompensationLaw,totheexclusionofallfurtherclaimsunderotherlaws.InFloresca,
thisdoctrinewasabrogatedinfavorofthenewrulethattheclaimantsmayinvokeeithertheWorkmensCompensation
ActortheprovisionsoftheCivilCode,subjecttotheconsequencethatthechoiceofoneremedywillexcludetheother
andthattheacceptanceofcompensationundertheremedychosenwillprecludeaclaimforadditionalbenefitsunderthe
otherremedy.TheexceptioniswhereaclaimantwhohasalreadybeenpaidundertheWorkmensCompensationAct
maystillsuefordamagesundertheCivilCodeonthebasisofsuperveningfactsordevelopmentsoccurringafterhe
optedforthefirstremedy.(Underscoringsupplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private
respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
ProsecutorsMemorandumdismissingthecriminalcomplaintagainstpetitionerspersonnel.Whilestatingthattherewas
nonegligenceattributabletotherespondentsinthecomplaint,theprosecutorneverthelessnotedintheMemorandum
that,ifatall,thecaseiscivilinnature.TheCAthusappliedtheexceptioninFloresca:
xxxWedonotagreethatappelleehasknowledgeoftheallegednegligenceofappellantasearlyasNovember25,
1990,thedateofthepoliceinvestigatorsreport.Theappelleemerelyexecutedherswornstatementbeforethepolice
investigatorconcerningherpersonalcircumstances,herrelationtothevictim,andherknowledgeoftheaccident.She
didnotfilethecomplaintforSimpleNegligenceResultingtoHomicideagainstappellantsemployees.Itwasthe
investigatorwhorecommendedthefilingofsaidcaseandhissupervisorreferredthesametotheprosecutorsoffice.This
isastandardoperatingprocedureforpoliceinvestigatorswhichappelleemaynothaveevenknown.Thismayexplain
whynocomplainantismentionedinthepreliminarystatementofthepublicprosecutorinhermemorandumdated
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February6,1991,towit:RespondentFerdinandFabroxxxarebeingchargedbycomplaintofSimpleNegligence
ResultingtoHomicide.Itisalsopossiblethattheappelleedidnothaveachancetoappearbeforethepublicprosecutor
ascanbeinferredfromthefollowingstatementinsaidmemorandum:RespondentswhowerenotifiedpursuanttoLaw
waivedtheirrightstopresentcontrovertingevidence,thustherewasnoreasonforthepublicprosecutortosummonthe
appellee.Hence,noticeofappellantsnegligencecannotbeimputedonappelleebeforesheappliedfordeathbenefits
underECCorbeforeshereceivedthefirstpaymenttherefrom.Herusingthepoliceinvestigationreporttosupporther
complaintfiledonMay9,1991mayjustbeanafterthoughtafterreceivingacopyoftheFebruary6,1991
MemorandumoftheProsecutorsOfficedismissingthecriminalcomplaintforinsufficiencyofevidence,statingtherein
that:Thedeathofthevictimisnotattributabletoanynegligenceonthepartoftherespondents.Ifatallandasshownby
therecordsthiscaseiscivilinnature.(Underscoringsupplied.)Consideringtheforegoing,Wearemoreinclinedto
believeappelleesallegationthatshelearnedaboutappellantsnegligenceonlyaftersheappliedforandreceivedthe
benefitsunderECC.ThisisamistakeoffactthatwillmakethiscasefallundertheexceptionheldintheFlorescaruling.
[35]
TheCAfurtherheldthatnotonlywasprivaterespondentignorantofthefacts,butofherrightsaswell:
xxx.Appellee[MariaJuego]testifiedthatshehasreachedonlyelementaryschoolforhereducationalattainmentthat
shedidnotknowwhatdamagescouldberecoveredfromthedeathofherhusbandandthatshedidnotknowthatshe
mayalsorecovermorefromtheCivilCodethanfromtheECC.xxx.[36]
Petitionerimpugnstheforegoingrulings.Itcontendsthatprivaterespondent"failedtoallegeinhercomplaintthather
application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue
submittedduringthetrial,thetrialcourthadnoauthoritytohearoradjudicatethatissue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as
November28,1990,privaterespondentwasthecomplainantinacriminalcomplaintfor"SimpleNegligenceResulting
to Homicide" against petitioner's employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in the
lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against
petitioner'semployees,thecasewas"civilinnature."Thesepurportedlyshowthatpriortoherreceiptofdeathbenefits
from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of
remediesavailabletoherandyetshechosetoclaimandreceivethebenefitsfromtheECC.
Whenapartyhavingknowledgeofthefactsmakesanelectionbetweeninconsistentremedies,theelectionisfinal
andbarsanyaction,suit,orproceedinginconsistentwiththeelectedremedy,intheabsenceoffraudbytheotherparty.
Thefirstactofelectionactsasabar.[37]Equitableinnature,thedoctrineofelectionofremediesisdesignedtomitigate
possibleunfairnesstobothparties.Itrestsonthemoralpremisethatitisfairtoholdpeopleresponsiblefortheirchoices.
Thepurposeofthedoctrineisnottopreventanyrecoursetoanyremedy,buttopreventadoubleredressforasingle
wrong.[38]
Thechoiceofapartybetweeninconsistentremediesresultsinawaiverbyelection.Hence,theruleinFloresca
thataclaimantcannotsimultaneouslypursuerecoveryundertheLaborCodeandprosecuteanordinarycourseofaction
undertheCivilCode.Theclaimant,byhischoiceofoneremedy,isdeemedtohavewaivedtheother.
Waiveristheintentionalrelinquishmentofaknownright.[39]
[It]isanactofunderstandingthatpresupposesthatapartyhasknowledgeofitsrights,butchoosesnottoassertthem.
Itmustbegenerallyshownbythepartyclaimingawaiverthatthepersonagainstwhomthewaiverisassertedhadatthe
timeknowledge,actualorconstructive,oftheexistenceoftheparty'srightsorofallmaterialfactsuponwhichthey
depended.Whereonelacksknowledgeofaright,thereisnobasisuponwhichwaiverofitcanrest.Ignoranceofa

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materialfactnegateswaiver,andwaivercannotbeestablishedbyaconsentgivenunderamistakeormisapprehension
offact.
Apersonmakesaknowingandintelligentwaiverwhenthatpersonknowsthatarightexistsandhasadequate
knowledgeuponwhichtomakeanintelligentdecision.Waiverrequiresaknowledgeofthefactsbasictotheexerciseof
therightwaived,withanawarenessofitsconsequences.Thatawaiverismadeknowinglyandintelligentlymustbe
illustratedontherecordorbytheevidence.[40]
ThatlackofknowledgeofafactthatnullifiestheelectionofaremedyisthebasisfortheexceptioninFloresca.
Itisinlightoftheforegoingprinciplesthatweaddresspetitionerscontentions.
Waiverisadefense,anditwasnotincumbentuponprivaterespondent,asplaintiff,toallegeinhercomplaintthat
shehadavailedofbenefitsfromtheECC.Itis,thus,erroneousforpetitionertoburdenprivaterespondentwithraising
waiverasanissue.Onthecontrary,itisthedefendantwhooughttopleadwaiver,aspetitionerdidinpages23ofits
Answer[41]otherwise,thedefenseiswaived.Itis,therefore,perplexingforpetitionertonowcontendthatthetrialcourt
hadnojurisdictionovertheissuewhenpetitioneritselfpleadedwaiverintheproceedingsbeforethetrialcourt.
Doestheevidenceshowthatprivaterespondentknewofthefactsthatledtoherhusbandsdeathandtherights
pertainingtoachoiceofremedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact.In this case, the fact that
served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners employees, of which private respondent
purportedlylearnedonlyaftertheprosecutorissuedaresolutionstatingthattheremaybecivilliability.InFloresca, it
wasthenegligenceoftheminingcorporationanditsviolationofgovernmentrulesandregulations.Negligence,or
violationofgovernmentrulesandregulations,forthatmatter,however,isnotafact,butaconclusionoflaw,overwhich
onlythecourtshavethefinalsay.Suchaconclusionbindsnooneuntilthecourtshavedecreedso.Itappears,therefore,
thattheprinciplethatignoranceormistakeoffactnullifiesawaiverhasbeenmisappliedinFlorescaandinthecaseat
bar.
Inanyevent,thereisnoproofthatprivaterespondentknewthatherhusbanddiedintheelevatorcrashwhenon
November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is
datedNovember25,1990,10daysaftertheaccomplishmentoftheform.Petitionerfiledtheapplicationinherbehalfon
November27,1990.
Thereisalsonoshowingthatprivaterespondentknewoftheremediesavailabletoherwhentheclaimbeforethe
ECCwasfiled.Onthecontrary,privaterespondenttestifiedthatshewasnotawareofherrights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the
Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Courts ruling in
Florescaallowingachoiceofremedies.
Theargumenthasnomerit.TheapplicationofArticle3islimitedtomandatoryandprohibitorylaws.[42]Thismay
bededucedfromthelanguageoftheprovision,which,notwithstandingaperson'signorance,doesnotexcusehisorher
compliancewiththelaws.TheruleinFlorescaallowingprivaterespondentachoiceofremediesisneithermandatory
norprohibitory.Accordingly,herignorancethereofcannotbeheldagainsther.
Finally,theCourtmodifiestheaffirmanceoftheawardofdamages.Therecordsdonotindicatethetotalamount
privaterespondentoughttoreceivefromtheECC,althoughitappearsfromExhibitK[43]thatshereceivedP3,581.85
asinitialpaymentrepresentingtheaccruedpensionfromNovember1990toMarch1991.Herinitialmonthlypension,
according to the same Exhibit K, was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total
amountshewilleventuallyreceivefromtheECCislessthanthesumofP644,000.00intotaldamagesawardedbythe
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trialcourtissubjecttospeculation,andthecaseisremandedtothetrialcourtforsuchdetermination.Shouldthetrial
court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the
Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial courts award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this
adjudicationaimstopreventdoublecompensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the
awarddecreedinitsdecisionismorethanthatoftheECC.Shouldtheawarddecreedbythetrialcourtbegreaterthan
thatawardedbytheECC,paymentsalreadymadetoprivaterespondentpursuanttotheLaborCodeshallbededucted
therefrom.Inallotherrespects,theDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsisAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.(Chairman),Puno,andYnaresSantiago,JJ.,concur.
Pardo,J.,onsickleave.
[1]ExhibitA,Records,pp.6061.
[2]Rollo,pp.7980.
[3]Id.,at19.
[4]Sec.36,Rule130.
[5]Peoplevs.Ramos,122SCRA312(1983).
[6]31AC.J.S.Evidence194.SeealsoPhilippineHomeAssuranceCorp.vs.CourtofAppeals,257SCRA479(1996).
[7]5J.H.WIGMORE,ATREATISEONTHEANGLOAMERICANSYSTEMOFEVIDENCEINTRIALSATCOMMONLAW3(3RD
ED.).
[8]SanSebastianCollegevs.CourtofAppeals,197SCRA138(1991).
[9]SeeRULESOFCOURT,RULE130,SECTIONS3747.
[10]16SCRA448(1966).SeealsoPeoplevs.SanGabriel,253SCRA84(1996).
[11]273SCRA607(1997).
[12]TSN,December20,1991,p.9.
[13]Id.,at28TSN,January6,1992,p.29.
[14]Id.,at29Ibid.
[15]Id.,at33.
[16]Id.,at34.
[17]Id.,at24and28.
[18]RULESOFCOURT,RULE130,SECTIONS4950.
[19]Id.,Sec.48.
[20]Layuganvs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 (1988).See also Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 (1996)
RadioCommunicationsofthePhilippines,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals,143SCRA657(1986).
[21]57BAmJur2d,Negligence1819.

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[22]Id.,at1824.
[23]Id.,at1914.
[24]Rollo,pp.8788.
[25]Whetherthedoctrineraisesapresumptionormerelyaninferenceissubjecttodebate.See57BAmJur2d,Negligence19251928.
[26]Id.,at1920.
[27]Id.,at1947.
[28]Peoplevs.Villeza,127SCRA349(1984)Peoplevs.Quidato,297SCRA1(1998).
[29]Peoplevs.Ramos,supra.
[30]136SCRA141(1985).
[31]JusticesAquino,MelencioHerrera,andGutierrezdissented.
[32]151SCRA333(1987).
[33]157SCRA446(1988).
[34]164SCRA317(1988).
[35]Rollo,pp.9091.UnderscoringbytheCourtofAppeals.
[36]Id.,at90.UnderscoringbytheCourtofAppeals.
[37]Id.,at5.
[38]Id.,at2.
[39]Castrovs.DelRosario,etal.,19SCRA196(1967).
[40]28AmJur2d,EstoppelandWaiver202.
[41]Records,pp.1718.
[42]ITolentino,A.M.CommentariesandJurisprudenceontheCivilCodeofthePhilippines19(1995).
[43]Records,p.100.

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