Atayde, Garri A.

1-B-1
Teves v Commission on Elections, 90 Phil 370 (G.R. No. 180363)
FACTS:
The petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30,
2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the
ground that, as was held in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating
Section 3(h), Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section
89 of the Local Government Code of 1991. As a result of which, he was sentenced to
pay a fine of PHP 10, 000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from
running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running
for the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of
his Certificate of Candidacy. It appears; however, that the herein petitioner lost in the
last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant
Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit.
ISSUE:
In the case at bar, the legal question dwells as to whether or not petitioners
violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude?
RULING:
To begin with, it is imperative, in resolution of this case, to define the term moral
turpitude, which as provided heretofore as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
As per the ruling of the Supreme Court, the following provisions were served as
the guidelines in adjudicating the instant case.
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
From the special law from which the petitioner was convicted, Section 3,
paragraph H, of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by
any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The
accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate
Section 3(H) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from
having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
In the same vein, Section 89 of the Local Government Code provides that it shall
be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly to hold
such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean
that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding
circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral
turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or
power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he
intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management
thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of
the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
Finally, being the summation of the foregoing contentions, the crime committed
by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

APPENDIX (SEPARATE OPINION, J. Brion)

The discussion on the nature of moral turpitude has become a very contentious
issue. The absence of definite concept that would uphold it, specifically through
jurisprudence served as a factor that aggravated the art and process of determining the
existence of such in a case to case basis. Although at some point, jurisprudence has
become vastly instrumental in providing resolution to such blazing legal question. To
supplement the foregoing, as per the Separate Opinion of Justice Brion, he augmented
two legal approaches in line with the determination of moral turpitude. To wit:
The Court best expressed the first approach in Zari v Flores where the Court saw
the involvement of moral turpitude where an act is intrinsically immoral,
regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. The Court emphasized that
moral turpitude goes beyond being merely mala prohibita; the act itself must be
inherently immoral. Thus, this approach requires that the committed act itself be
examined, divorced from its characterization as a crime. Thus, one specific attribute in
determining the nature of a crime or offense as involving moral turpitude is to ascertain
whether or not it falls under the guise of malum in se. It must be evil per se. In addition,
another notion is that, as per prevailing judicial pronouncements, the offense or crime
be punishable for a period of not less than six years.
On the other hand, the second approach delves on ascertaining the elements
composing the crime. It is to look at the act committed through its elements as a
crime. In Paras v Vailoces, the Court recognized that as a "general rule, all crimes of
which fraud is an element is looked on as involving moral turpitude." This is the same
conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court made in Jordan, i.e., that crimes requiring fraud
or intent to defraud always involve moral turpitude.
Henceforth, to decipher the nature of an act is to go within the pragmatic bounds
of such act. This is not necessarily to perpetuate unnecessary discretionary measures
on the part of the court but to aid, in guidance of the intended ends of the law, in giving
clarity to one of the most bombarded judicial questions.